MORE HASTE, LESS SPEED?

Evaluation of Fast Track Feb 2003 – Jan 2005

Universities of

Glasgow

Stirling

Strathclyde

A. New approach forchildren’s hearings to tackle

youth crime

B. What works?

Evidence-based policy and practice

TWO STRANDS

Innovation and evaluation

New policy or servicePilot

Evaluate

Evidence of success Evidence of lack of success

CARRY ON ROLL OUT

MODIFY(AND CARRY ON)

STOP !

Children’s hearings and crime

• Children’s hearings not courts deal with nearly all offences by young people age < 16 years, where compulsory measures may be required

• The processes for dealing with offences are the same as for other ‘grounds of referral’ to the hearings (e.g. care and protection concerns)

• Reporters handle referrals; lay panel members make decisions

• Decisions should be made giving paramount consideration to the welfare of the child or young person

Children’s hearings and persistent offending

• Young people who persistently offend account for a large % crime (and hence trouble to society)

• Persistent offending is a risk factor for adult/life-course offending

• Hearings have been regarded as ‘ineffective’ in dealing with persistent offending (though so have other systems too)

• Delays in response encourage repeat offending

• Improve (risk) assessment

• Target interventions on young people who persistently offend

• Speed up processes

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

FAST TRACK

The Fast Track Pilot

Aims [Targets]

reduce time taken for decisions

[maximum duration for each stage in all cases]

ensure access to appropriate programmes

[each young person - specific plan; a programme when needed]

reduce re-offending

promote comprehensive assessments

[all cases with risk assessment – YLS or ASSET]

The Fast Track Pilot

Criterion

5 or more offence referrals in 6 months

OR

reporter discretion

The Fast Track Pilot

3 SITES – 6 AUTHORITIES

Dundee

East, North and South Ayrshire

East Lothian and Scottish Borders

Began February 2003

The Fast Track Pilot

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Mainly went to reporters, local authority social work and voluntary agencies

Small amounts for police and for panel member training

Most spending was on:

• front line reporters and social work personnel• IT• admin support• specialist services e.g. youth offending schemes, mentors

The Fast Track Pilot

Like all areas in Scotland, the pilots had received additional Youth Justice funding in the previous few years

Expenditure on individual cases continued to bemainly from other sources, with the single largest component

being residential and secure accommodation

The policy innovation had multiple componentsaffecting several sets of agencies and decision-makers

superimposed on a complex web of decision-making and services

THE EVALUATION

Purpose to assess effectiveness, including cost effectiveness

Comparison in similar authoritiesof policies, service inputs and persistent offending cases

Multi-stranded – data types and sources

The Comparison: I

PILOT COMPARISON

POPULATION 714,300 665,000

UNEMPLOYMENT

FREE SCHOOL MEALS

SCHOOL EXCLUSION

HEARINGS REFERRALS

SIMILARRANGES

Comparison sites’ approaches to youth crimewere varied

The Comparison: II

PILOT COMPARISON

OFFENCE

REFERRALS

01/02 02/03

2,060 2,925

01/02 02/03

1,719 1,866

42% increase 8% increase

Research ElementsKey contact interviews

Key contact information

SCRA RAD data

Case questionnaire survey

Cost –effectiveness data

Service provider study

Intensive case study

MAINSAMPLE

42 x 2/3

10 x 3/4

58

167 + 56 = 223

111, 142, 151

84

FAST TRACK CASES307 In first 18 months

Two thirds aged 14-15

PERSISTENT OFFENDING CASES IN COMPARISON SITES

114 In first 18 monthsSimilar age pattern

Source: SCRA Update

FAST TRACK CASESSupervision

Source: Main Sample

Just over half (55%) on supervision at the start

Just under one in five ceased being on supervision

Just over one in five began supervision after flagging

One fifth – no supervision during Fast track

TIME-SCALES

Evidence showed that police, reporters and social workersprovided reports and took decisions more quickly

in Fast Track areas

a. compared with previouslyb. compared with other authorities/forces

Targets met in 90%+ cases

Fast Track did speed up processing of cases

Issue of electronic transfer of reports from police and social work

Technological, operational and ethical considerations

RISK ASSESSMENT

Use of YLS or ASSET

Pilot site cases - nearly all (95%)

Comparison sites – only one third

Source: Case questionnaires

ASESSMENTS AND ACTION PLANS

Some social workers thought that the time-pressuresthreatened the quality and thoroughness of work done

Source: Key contacts and case questionnaires

Reporters and panel members mostly saw these asimproved, more comprehensive and specific

SERVICE/TIME INPUTS

Comparison site cases had higher proportions of both low and high service time inputs (under 5hrs per week or over 11 hrs). Use of voluntary agencies occurred in fewer cases

Twice as many young people in Pilot sites (40%) attended a standard programme as in Comparison sites (20%)

Source: Cost sub-sample and case questionnaire information

SERVICE COSTS: COMPARISON

Mean expenditure per case for young peopleliving in the community

Fast track cases £8,200Comparison cases £9,200

Source: Key informant information

Mean expenditure for young people accommodated residentially

Fast track cases £87,300 Comparison cases £95,500

VIEWS OF FAST TRACKKey contacts welcomed:

concerted attention to offending

additional resourcesemphasis on faster action

Source: Key contacts

“All children’s hearings should be like this”

Improved time-scales, assessments, action plans

Good inter-agency collaboration

VIEWS OF FAST TRACK

In most cases, panel members believed Fast Track hada. promoted a focus on offending

b. BUT not adversely affectedattention to young people’s needs

A minority of social work respondents believed that attention to Fast Track had diverted

resources away from other work

Source: Case questionnaires

Perceived impacts

Source: casequestionnaires

Intervention seen by reporters as very effective in 32% of FT cases 26% of Comparison cases

Intervention in FT cases seen by panel members to have: Positive impact on young person - halfMixed impact – quarterMade little difference – nearly a quarter

Risk offending changes

Source: Key informants

YLS + ASSET SCORES2+ occasions

N = 146

Increased 10%Stable 56%Decreased 34%

Reasons for exit

Improved/responded 70%Adult system 16%Not improved/responded 9%

N = 88

Source: Key informant information

Changes in offending

Source: RAD data on Main sample

The samples in Fast Track and comparison areas were not matched, but there were only slight differences as regards age, gender, living situation and prior offending

Changes in offending

Source: RAD data on Main sample

The study data showed that there had been a significantdecrease in offending for young people in Fast Track

BUT: the reduction was even greater in comparison sites XX

?

DATA ON OFFENDING:COMPARISON

Source: RAD and Main sample

Decrease (FT) 69%Decrease (C) 81%

% of young people whose offending reduced or not

Increase (FT) 24%Increase (C) 14%

DATA ON OFFENDING:COMPARISON

Source: RAD and Main sample

10.7

5

9.17.9

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Prior Post

ComparisonFast track

Mean number of offences

Changes in offending

Therefore SCRA were asked to carry out an analysis forall cases of persistent offending

(where enough time had elapsed for follow up)

DATA ON OFFENDING:COMPARISON

Source: SCRA

Changes in numbers of offencesafter ‘implementation’ compared with before

Fast Track Comparison All Scotland

Down 32% Down 55% Down 42%

Changes in numbers of offence referralsafter ‘implementation’ compared with before

Fast Track Comparison All Scotland

Down 32% Down 54% Down 41%

The Executive decided to discontinue Fast Trackand concentrate instead on Standards

CONCLUSIONSCONCLUSIONSFast track worked well in speeding up procedures

Assessment, action plans and inter-agency co-operation were widely reported to have improved

Transfer of information was problematic in some respects

There was wide support for seriousness as well as persistence in offending to underpin targeting

Official evidence of offending indicated that reductionsin Fast Track cases were less than elsewhere

Some improvements diffused beyond persistent offending

Possible explanationsPossible explanations

Perhaps variations in police practice accounted for the difference

Comparison site lower numbers: a tribute to early intervention?

Comparison sites – able to focus resources on fewer cases

It may have been too soon to judge Setting up period; short follow-up

The time and effort spent on assessment and report writing was at the cost of direct intervention

Did some Fast track cases receive too many interventions?

Too small % of funds spent on community based interventions

Too little attention given to neighbourhood work,education and health services, residential provision etc.

QUESTIONS ARISINGQUESTIONS ARISINGon Evidence-based Policyon Evidence-based Policy

How can evaluations of complex policies best be carried out?

How wise is it to base policy decisions on official offending data?

“Official data…depend strongly on police efforts and the willingness of victims to report crime.

They are also affected by political and police priorities”Van der Laan and Smit 2006

How should policy-makers balance varied evidence about processes and outcomes?

Does evidence of ‘success’ receive as close a scrutiny asevidence of ‘failure’?

For a reasonable price?