morality in locke

Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in LockeAuthor(s): Steven FordeSource: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 396-409Published by: Midwest Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2669348 .

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Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke Steven Forde University of North Texas

Liberal theorists have always been confronted with the criticism that liberalism lacks a moral foundation adequate to the needs of society. I undertake a reading of Locke that agrees with those scholars who have found greater moral resources in his philosophy than has sometimes been allowed. Drawing primarily on the Essay Concerning Human Under- standing, the Two Treatises of Gov- ernment, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, and The Reasonableness of Christianity, I find a Lockean basis for morality that transcends narrow or mundane self-interest. This morality however depends on a controversial and unfinished natural theology. This, I argue, led Locke to elaborate a practical teaching that was as independent as possible of theology. The result is a bifurcated legacy: Locke bequeathes us a philosophy with moral depth, but a political teaching vulnerable to the criticism of moral deficiency.

iberalism has always had to contend with the criticism that it lacks a sufficient moral foundation. Its notion of a social contract motivated by self-preservation and comfort seems to deny the need for

any moral concern for others, which its individualist psychology poorly supports in any case. Yet critics question whether society can dispense with such moral concern altogether. Even before Rousseau launched his famous assault, Locke and the other pioneers of liberalism were fending off attacks from often religiously motivated critics of their new politics and morality. Locke himself denies that his philosophy relies only on narrow, mundane self-interest, and indeed claims other-wordly support for it. In accordance with this, some interpreters today find a Locke who is morally more substantial than his critics have alleged, a "perfectionist" Locke whose theory provides moral resources overlooked by those critics.1 In view of modern society's reliance on the liberal philosophy, and the moral failings sometimes traced to this reliance, we would do well to explore Locke's understanding of these matters, especially his claim to have included other-regarding virtues in his liberalism. It matters to us what the moral foundations of our liberalism are, whether they are the cause or the possible cure of society's ills.

In a peculiar sense, they might be both. The following reading of Locke will suggest that philosophically, he provided for a social morality more robust than his critics have perceived, more robust than Hobbes's for example, but that his practical teaching leaves that morality to some degree unsup- ported. Locke's moral philosophy, while not abandoning the distinctively liberal grounding in self-interest, acknowledges that even liberal morality will occasionally encroach on the individual's self-interest in this life. This required Locke to have recourse to a theology of otherworldly rewards and punishments. He never provided a full account of this theology however, and doubted the effectiveness of any novel theological teaching in any case. This problem, I suggest, led Locke in his more practical works to provide a teaching that rooted itself as much as possible in mundane self-interest,

Steven Forde is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, Denton, TX 76203-5340 ([email protected]).

I would like to thank Professors Thomas Pangle and Thomas West for comments on an earlier version. Work on this essay was supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities.

'A good recent review of these controversies may be found in Myers 1998, chapter 1. Liberalism may be considered "perfectionist" if it rests upon distinctive virtues, viewed as human perfections. Myers finds a "perfectionist" Locke and places such authors as William Galston, Joseph Raz, and Stephen Salkever in the attendant camp of liberalism. In the "neutralist" camp he places John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Bruce Ackerman, and others. See also Nathan Tarcov's account of the "non-Lockean Locke" (Tarcov, 1983).

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 2, April 2001, Pp. 396-409

?2001 by the Midwest Political Science Association

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NATURAL LAW, THEOLOGY, AND MORALITY IN LOCKE 397

delving into theology only so far as necessary to correct the most harmful errors of his contemporaries. In a sense therefore, Locke bequeathed to us two linked but distinct moral teachings. The full teaching is found most clearly in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, while the more practical one is most associated with the Second Treatise of Government. Since the practical works, and the Second Treatise in particular, account for most of Locke's influence today, it is a truncated Locke to some extent who stands behind our liberalism.

In order to get a more complete view of Locke, and to see how he might supplement the relatively thin morality he is usually associated with, it is necessary to consult a wider array of his writings than is often done. We must begin with a review of the theoretical underpinnings of Locke's morality, including his reliance on theology, as found primarily in the Essay. We will then look at some of his principal practical works, the Second Treatise, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, and The Reason- ableness of Christianity. We will compare the moral teachings of these works to Locke's full or philosophical moral teaching and evaluate the discrepancies in the light of his practical or rhetorical purpose in these works.

Difficulties of the Natural Law

We first need to confront some basic questions concerning the foundation of Locke's moral philosophy, questions raised by apparent gaps in Locke's presentation of that philosophy. Morality, Locke says repeatedly, is grounded in "natural law." This law is the law of reason, or is reason itself (First Treatise, ?101; Second Treatise, ??6, 11, 181). It is not innate, either in the form of "right reason" or a set of moral principles somehow stamped on our nature.2 Instead, it is a deduction from certain first principles. Locke insists that a "demonstrative morality" is possible on the model of mathematics (Essay 111.11.16, IV.3.18, IV.4.7). Unfortunately, he never produced this demonstration. He never even produced a sys- tematic list of the provisions of natural law, as Hobbes for example had done, though many individual principles are said by him to belong to the natural law (Strauss 1953, 202; Yolton 1958, 487-488; 1970, 172, 176-177). Despite the prodding of friends and critics alike, Locke

never filled these gaps in his writing (Ashcraft 1969, 219; Grant, 1987, 26n; Dunn 1984, 65; Horwitz 1990, 22-28; Locke 1976,4:767-768, 786-787).

Moreover, Locke's writings are ambivalent on the question whether demonstrative morality is easy and widely accessible or plagued with difficulties. He main- tains in places that the natural law is easily discerned, as doubtless it must be if all are to be held to it. Near the beginning of the Second Treatise he states that even in the state of nature, reason "teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it" the fundamental precepts of the natural law (??5, 6; cf. ?12). Tantalizingly, he suggests these precepts derive from the simple principle of equality, without however saying exactly how. Later, we learn that the "greater part" of mankind fails to observe natural law in the state of nature, due partly to lack of adequate "study" (?? 123, 124). Nor is human imbecility in this regard limited to the pre-civil state. In other contexts, Locke emphasizes the near-universal failure of human beings to discover the correct moral code, even in the bosom of society. Many are the nations who have lived in complete ignorance of the true natural law (Questions, 111; cf. 147, 217; Essay 1.3.9). Even the ancient philosophers who de- voted their lives to the task failed according to Locke to discover this rule in its entirety (RC, 143, 149). He once goes so far as to describe the natural law as "hidden and unperceived" (Questions, 111; cf. 147, 217; Essay 1.3.17; 11.28.11).

Much of the difficulty can be traced to the relation- ship between the law of nature and theology. Locke always insisted that any law required a legislating and enforcing will to be a law, to be binding (Questions, 101, 103, 159, 193; Essay 1.3.12, 11.28.5-6; cf. Second Treatise ??7-8, 136). In the case of natural law, this can only be God: Locke's natural law is a species of divine law (cf. Es- say 11.28.7-8). When Locke says that nations and philosophers failed to discover the "true foundations" of morality, he means their failure to find the correct theological underpinnings (Essay, 1.3.6; cf. RC, 139-140,144). It might be that some parts of the true moral demonstration are easy, but the elaboration of these underpinnings is difficult. In any event, for natural law to be natural rather than revealed, unassisted reason would have to be able to establish these underpinnings, the existence of the providential God it postulates. Despite numerous apparent claims that such a proof is possible and even easy,3

2Questions Concerning the Law of Nature, Questions I, IV; Essay Concerning Human Understanding 1.3. 11.4.22; cf. IV.20.6. Hence- forth these works will be cited as Questions and Essay, respectively. The Reasonableness of Christianity will be cited as RC, Some Thoughts Concerning Education as Thoughts, and Conduct of the Understanding as Conduct.

3See, e.g., Essay 1.4.17, IV.3.21, IV.10, 11.17.17; Questions, questions II, V. It is ambiguous in most if not all of these passages whether the easy and natural proof Locke speaks of establishes the existence of the providential and enforcing God required by morality (cf. Dunn 1984, 84). This of course would be more difficult than prov- ing the mere existence of a deity.



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Locke never produced one, and may in fact not have thought it fully possible.4 Yet this would seem to lead to the conclusion that "there is no law of nature according to Locke" (Rabieh 1991, 951; cf. Strauss 1953, 204, 220).

This state of affairs is doubly puzzling since Locke could have avoided it in several ways. Most simply, he could have subscribed to any of several possible "proofs" of a legislating, enforcing God. Locke alludes to such proofs in his published and unpublished writings, but endorses none of them.5 We must assume he found them defective. He might then have stipulated that natural law does not require a legislating will, or a divine enforcer, to be law. This was the view taken by Hugo Grotius, a wholly respectable authority on natural law in Locke's day. The fact that Locke follows Pufendorf rather than Grotius in this matter, despite the difficulties it caused his theory, is a compelling sign that this was his sincere persuasion.6 Finally, Locke could have abandoned natural law altogether in favor of some other foundation for morality. Perceptive and forceful arguments have been made that Locke did precisely this, professing allegiance to natural law while covertly replacing it with natural right, in the manner of Hobbes (Strauss 1953, 212-214, 227- 229; 1959, 201-206; Zuckert 1994, 237-240, 274; Rabieh 1991). It is undeniable that Locke proceeds by this kind of misdirection in other matters, especially matters

touching on religion.7 But he seems to foreclose the possibility of grounding morality in this type of right rather than natural law when he insists, as he does repeatedly, that not only "natural law," but "duty," "virtue," indeed "morality" tout court depend upon divine legislation and enforcement.8 As we shall see, Locke is compelled to take this position by the premises of his moral philosophy.

Theology and the Foundations of Morality

The Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which contains Locke's most thorough treatment of moral theory, also contains some of his most emphatic statements that morality per se depends upon divine legislation and enforcement: "what duty is, cannot be understood without a law; nor a law be known, or supposed, without a lawmaker, or without reward and punishment" (1.3.12; cf. Questions, 101, 103). Distinguishing himself specifically from Hobbes and from the classical philosophers, he says that "the true ground of morality" can only be "the will and law of a God, who sees men in the dark, has in his hand rewards and punishments, and power enough to call to account the proudest offender" (1.3.6; cf. RC, 139-140, 144). These rewards and punishments moreover must consist of "some good and evil that is not the natural product and consequence of the action itself" (11.28.6). The enforcer must be an active and providential agent.

These are not idle statements. Reward and punishment are made indispensable to morality by Locke's view of human or rational nature and his awareness of the in- evitable conflict between morality and individual interest. The sole motive not only of a human being, but of any rational creature, he asserts, is its own happiness (11.21.43, 52, 62; 11.27.17-18, 26; cf. RC 149). This happiness is reducible to pleasure, which men pursue in different ways (11.21.41, 54-56, 62). Good and evil are but names for what brings pleasure and pain, which has led men to shape morality, variably, in accordance with their views of happiness (11.20.2; 1.3.6). True moral good and evil on the other hand require both divine legislation and

4Strauss 1953, 207; 1959, 202-203, 206; Dunn 1984, 30, 84-85; Grant 1987, 25-26; Pangle 1988, 201; Horwitz 1990, 26. See also RC, 139.

5Locke outlines a providential natural theology based on God's role as father in his journal for 15 July 1678 (passage transcribed in von Leyden 1956, 35). See also RC 133, 149 (but, cf. 139); Essay IV.3.18, IV.13.3. Locke would have been aware of Cicero's lengthy discourse on natural theology in De Natura Deorum, as well as Montaigne's commentary on the natural theology of Raimond de Sebonde (Apologie de Raimond Sebond, Essais 11.12). It is worth mentioning as well that Locke could have professed to adopt one of these proofs, while indicating that the true basis of his moral theory lay elsewhere.

For Locke's admission that he never provided an adequate proof himself, see his letter to William Molyneux of January 19, 1694 (Locke 1976-, vol. 4, 784-787; cf. 767-768). He tended to be evasive when asked why he did not complete this part of his natural theology. Others who find the arguments Locke offers for God's existence or providence less than satisfactory include Lenz 1956, 118; Ashcraft 1969, 203-206, 214; Dunn 1969, 194; Pangle 1988, 198-201. See also the passages cited in notes 3 and 4. Dunn (1984, 84) argues that Locke originally thought the development of an adequate natural theology to be easier than it proved. This may be true, though it is in his early Questions Concerning the Law of Na- ture that Locke describes the law of nature as "hidden and unperceived" (111). See also Horwitz (1990,26-27).

6Grotius [1625] 1925 Prolegomena 13; Pufendorf [1673] 1991 1.2.2, 6, 7; 1.3.10. Cf. Olivecrona 1974, 211. Locke's statement in A Letter Concerning Toleration that "The taking away of God, tho but even in thought, dissolves all," seems to be a direct rebuttal of Grotius' statement to the contrary (Locke, [1689a] 1983, 51).

7Locke makes himself appear to be more orthodox than he is on matters like the Fall and the basis for salvation (Dunn 1969, 23, 193; Myers 1998, 187-188). He also conceals his kinship with Hobbes on matters like the state of nature. Some of these cases will be discussed below. 8 See Questions, 95 (including the formulation of the first question itself), 101; Essay 1.3.6, 12, 18; 11.28.5-6; IV.10.7; Thoughts, ? 61. This is not to deny that Locke turns natural law on its head by rooting it in a form of right. For partially contrasting views, see Strauss 1953, 228, and Zuckert 1994, 272-275.




enforcement, to align happiness with a proper law (11.28.5-6, 8). Since hedonism is inseparable from rationality, the moral law will have to take account of it, indeed build on it: "it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will" (11.28.6). Morality, like obedience to any other law or rule, cannot reasonably be expected of men, unless they each gain individually by it.

It is sometimes alleged that by tying morality so closely to enforcement, Locke confuses obligation and motivation, but this is simply a consequence of his hedonistic moral psychology.9 Not every act that man is motivated to is moral, obviously, but morality cannot justly be demanded of him unless an appropriate motive is supplied. This is why divine providence is necessary: the gains from violating morality can easily outweigh the ad- vantages of obeying it, in this world. Only a providential enforcement whose rewards and punishments specifically outweigh the gains of immorality can bring the individual's pleasure and pain fully into line with moral action (1.3.13; 11.21.70; 11.28.8; cf. Tarcov 1984, 101; Pangle 1988, 191). Curiously, it appears that the more rational a man is, the more providence becomes necessary to support his morality. Most human beings, Locke re- minds us, follow custom and habit more than reason in their thoughts and actions (1.3.24-25; 11.28.12; IV.16.4; cf. Questions, 127, 135; Conduct, 381). If they are moral, it is likely for this reason. But those who think for themselves, who understand the true principles of rational action, need instead a reason for behaving morally. Provi- dence is the only reason offered to such individuals by Locke's philosophy.

To be sure, the morality Locke proposes, liberal morality, is less demanding than its predecessors, and, as we shall see, this fact is pivotal to his practical teaching. Lockean morality derives from the fundamental principle of the preservation and happiness of mankind, understood in the hedonistic way Locke has outlined (1.3.6; cf. 11.21.47-52; First Treatise ??56, 59, 86; Second Treatise ??6, 7, 135, 182; Thoughts ?116; RC, 147). A morality directed to this end will impinge on the interests of individuals much less than other, more austere moral codes. But Locke does not imagine that its demands can always be reconciled with personal happiness or self-interest in this life (cf. RC pp. 148-149; Tarcov 1984, 149; Pangle 1988, 191, 211). That reconciliation can only take place in another.

Thus does Locke anticipate the argument that even a liberal order cannot be viable without a religiously grounded morality. But it is necessary to mark closely the type of religion this order requires and the method Locke uses to discover it. To begin with, God must understand that moral behavior cannot be reasonably expected of human beings (or any rational beings) unless he makes it worth their while in terms of pleasure or happiness (1.3.13, 11.21.62). Locke's general procedure in theology is to reason in this way from his own considered views of morality to conclusions concerning divine will. Nor is this an abusive form of moral reasoning. Locke's syllogis- tic or demonstrative morality would take precisely this approach, beginning from ideas grounded in perception (v. Grant 1987, 38; Myers 1998, 49). Thus, since punish- ing others for Adam's sin is incompatible with justice, Locke knows that God does not do so (First Treatise ??46-47; RC, pp. 6-8; cf. Dunn 1969, 22, 192). Similarly, the curse put upon Eve is something she and her daugh- ters are perfectly free to evade, if they can, in the name of happiness (First Treatise ?47). Locke sides with reason against scripture concerning man's natural right to use the animals for food, a right derived logically from preservation (Second Treatise ?25; contrast First Treatise ?86 with ?39 and with Genesis 1:29 and 9:3). As he writes in the Essay, "Reason is natural revelation," and must be used to "regulate" our assent to alleged supernatural revelations (IV.19.4, 14). Speaking specifically of reli- gious matters, he says "Reason must be our last judge and guide in every thing" (IV. 17.24; cf. First Treatise ?86). In fine, "natural religion" is to be preferred to revelation (111.9.23).

Locke uses his fundamental principle of natural law, that the preservation and happiness of mankind are to be served as much as possible, to sift revelation, accepting some of its precepts and rejecting others. He interprets the Biblical injunction "be fruitful and multiply" as a simple statement of this principle. Whether or not it was actually uttered by God, Locke asserts that it is conveyed to men via the natural impulse of self-preservation (First Treatise ?86). Thus did God speak to man-"that is, directed him by his senses and reason"-commanding him to provide for himself (id.). This command proves to mandate not only Locke's doctrine of property, but "the improvement too of the Arts and Sciences, and the conveniences of Life," together with such things as a ban on absolute monarchy (First Treatise ?33; cf. Second Treatise ?4 1). God could not be so capricious or cruel as to give us irresistible impulses to preservation, comfort, propagation, and the like, and then punish us for following them. Rather, such impulses, together with our natural desire for happiness and the characteristics of the world in which we have been placed,

9In the Essay, Locke writes "the inclination and tendency of [men's] nature is an obligation and motive to them" (11.21.52, emphasis added). See Dunn 1969, 190; Yolton 1958, 491; Zuckert 1994, 286; Myers 1998, 137.



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are our surest indications of the divine plan (First Treatise ?86). Locke silently dismisses the possibility that these impulses might be the corrupt appurtenances of a fallen nature, or that our natural condition might be partly the consequence of Adam's sin.10

Without even having established the existence of a providential God, we already know a great deal about what his will or intention must be. What God wills is human prosperity and happiness; the moral law that he gives us is directed to that and that alone. God wills private property and the respect of that property by others. He wills rational and industrious accumulation and has granted the earth (solely) to those who practice it (Se- cond Treatise ?34). This, rather than any quietism or purely spiritual perfection, is God's plan for mankind (cf. Dunn 1969,chapter 18; Ashcraft 1969). The perfection of our nature is the pursuit of happiness in the most reflec- tive or rational manner possible (Essay 11.21.47, 51). The law we are given, Locke says, is but "the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest, and prescribes no farther than is for the general Good of those under that Law" (Second Treatise ?57).

But this brings us back to our problem: natural law is directed to the "general Good" of mankind, which will often but not always coincide with the "proper Interest" of the individual. The rational individual is concerned with his own interest above all (Essay 11.27.17, 18), but for Locke, the moral perspective is the perspective of the generality. It is not possible to bring these two fully into harmony without providence, which is why Locke is unwilling to relinquish the theological aspects of his moral theory. The question that has vexed interpreters from Locke's day to this is, Why did he not provide an adequate proof of the providential God his theory requires? His writings sketch a fairly robust natural theology; all it lacks, pointedly, is this cornerstone. We know that Locke was aware of this problem, if only because of the pleas of his friends, but we may never be able to say for certain why he left it unremedied."1 Perhaps a partial remedy is to be found in his argument that some things can be known only probably, which are nonetheless adequate for guiding our conduct (I. 1.4-5; IV. 14; cf. IV.3.6). Locke is careful to stipulate at a number of points, in Pascalian fashion, that the prospect of divine rewards

and punishments is enough to determine our actions even if considered in the mere probability (11.21.44, 70; IV.14.2). Indeed, upon examination, many of his statements about our knowledge of God, and hence the status of "demonstrative morality," turn out to be couched in probabilistic terms (e.g., IV.3.6, 17-18; IV.14.2; IV.17.23). Whether this is fully compatible with his stronger statements about the solidity of natural theology and demonstrative morality is an open question.

In any case, it is clear that Locke never modified his explicit teaching on morality on account of this difficulty and that that teaching is dependent upon natural theology. What is striking as we move from the Essay Concern- ing Human Understanding to Locke's more practical works, where moral conduct is discussed in concrete terms, is how this whole controversy recedes into the background. These works make some use of natural theology, but typically very little. They rely much more on other motivations to produce moral action. In light of the difficulties of natural theology, this should not be surprising. Locke seeks in his practical works to provide a foundation for moral action as independent as possible of the uncertainties that will necessarily surround his theology. At the same time, Locke is aware that any natural theology, however solid, could not immediately become the basis for the sweeping reform of politics and moral culture that he seeks. To tie his practical project too closely to a novel theology, even a fully perfected one, would only be to jeopardize its success.

Natural Law and Politics

Despite occasionally prominent mention of the Deity, the Second Treatise of Government develops an argument that is almost wholly independent of theology and the controversies surrounding natural law. It relies not on divine legislation and enforcement, but on mundane interests and material incentives. It shows eloquently and at length how the social good is most effectively advanced by self-interested action, in the acquisition of property, the defense of individual rights, and the like. In making this argument, the Second Treatise takes the perspective of society rather than the individual citizen almost exclusively. This is natural enough, given its focus, but we should not fail to notice that this perspective also allows it to elide almost completely the difference between society's "general Good" and the individual's "proper interest," disguising the need for other-regarding morality in citizens. To show that selfish action on the whole advances the social good, as in economics, is not to show

10This is not to say that following any and every appetite amounts to morality (Essay 1.3.13). On the contrary, the essence of morality is rational discipline of the appetites (Essay 11.21.57, 62; Thoughts ?33). But morality does consist in finding and pursuing true pleasure in this world first. This we can do rationally, without divine grace being necessary to correct a "fallen nature" (cf. Essay 11.21.47).

1'See the citations and discussion at note 5.




that self-interest has no harmful consequences. Locke does say at the outset of the Second Treatise that the pursuit of individual self-interest must be bounded by the law of nature, which commands that each strive, "as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind" (?6). But he interprets this duty purely negatively, as a prohibition of harm: "no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions" (?6). And it is remarkable how far the Second Treatise advances the common interest without relying on even this minimal duty.12

Property is the paradigmatic case. In the original state of nature, natural law imposed a limit on accumulation, that of waste: it was a violation of the law to allow anything to spoil in one's possession (??31, 38, 46, 48). This restriction was rooted in the general good of mankind, inasmuch as waste robs others of their share (??3 1, 37, 46). But Locke emphasizes that it was the interest of individuals, not their charitableness, that made this rule effective: no one has an incentive to gather goods that will rot in their possession (??46, 48, 51). With the inven- tion of money, even this limit is lifted, and accumulation without regard to others' shares becomes legitimate (??36, 50; cf. Fagiani 1983, 169). Locke's well-known argument is that this limitless accumulation serves the common good by unleashing the productive power of la- bor and increasing wealth exponentially (??37, 40-41, 43). The concern with others' shares is obviated by greater social prosperity, as acquisitiveness serves the natural law's mandate to "preserve mankind" better than charity itself. Though Locke had spoken of charity in the First Treatise,13 it is notoriously absent from his treatment of property in the Second Treatise (Pangle 1988, chapter 14; Strauss 1953, 248). Traditional charity could paradoxically interfere with the preservation or comfort of mankind, since too great an emphasis on charity is likely to turn into a condemnation of the acquisitive impulse that truly serves the good of mankind. Traditional charity also fails to distinguish adequately between the "Industrious and Rational" to whom God gave the earth and the "Quarrelsom and Contentious," to whom he apparently did not (?34; cf. Fagiani 1983, 168). On both

counts, it would run counter to the divine plan, or to natural law.

In politics as well, the Second Treatise replaces altru- ism or beneficence as much as possible with self-interest. Limited government may be the only government that properly serves the preservation of mankind and there- with the natural law (??42, 229; First Treatise, ??33, 41), but Locke presumes neither a "godlike prince" who will be wise or generous enough to maintain such a system (Se- cond Treatise ?42), nor a citizenry who will demand it in the name of the good of mankind. Free government is se- cured rather by individuals acting in their own interest (??208, 230; 17, 23, 111). Individuals will not even rise to the defense of oppressed fellow-citizens, unless they believe that oppression augurs ill for themselves (??208, 230). Finally and most notoriously, individuals in the state of nature will not by and large enforce the law of nature on others' behalf, although they have that power (??7, 126). This power is rooted explicitly in the "right" each individual has to preserve mankind; but the only "duty" said to arise from it is a duty not to harm (??1 1, 13, 16).

Even a negative duty is a duty though, and the moral minimalism of the Second Treatise should not blind us to the fact that its natural law does impose limits on individuals. This is most visible in the well-known differences between Locke and Hobbes. Hobbes had derived morality entirely from mundane self-interest. His natural law bid men to be socially accommodating, to be "compleasant" to one another, solely for their own good in this life, which is served by peace.14 Locke requires greater moral restraint from individuals, partly because they have greater moral privileges. Lockean individuals enjoy exclusive property rights even in the state of nature and hence do not have rights to one another's life or limb, except perhaps in extremis. There can be "force without right" in the state of nature, a possibility that scarcely exists in Hobbes."5 Locke's rights, unlike those of Hobbes, entail duties on the part of others (Tarcov 1984,

12For much more detailed accounts of this, see Pangle 1988, chapters 16, 17, 20, and Zuckert 1994, chapters 8, 9.

13?42, where charity is apparently limited to cases of starvation on the one side and the existence of a "surplusage" on the other. We should also note the context: Locke is arguing that one man can never use the neediness of another to force him into subjection- that Adam, even if he had had exclusive dominion of the world, could not have used it to gain dominion over others, but would have been bound to give them of his surplus (??41-43). See also the argument for charity as a duty in extremis in the short essay labeled "Venditio," dated 1695 (reprinted in Dunn 1968, pp. 84- 87).

'4Hobbes, Leviathan, chapters 14, 15. Hobbes does assert, like Locke, that the law of nature is law only due to divine legislation (Leviathan, chapters 15, 21, 26, 31). This however does not appear to alter the purely mundane nature of the self-interest this law serves. In the Leviathan, Hobbes introduces natural law, defines its basis (preservation of a man's "life," that is, existence in this world), and lists and analyzes the nineteen laws of nature, before mentioning divine legislation almost as an afterthought (chapters 14-15). He also says, in opposition to Locke, that these laws are enforced by the purely natural consequences their violation brings (chapter 31; contrast Locke, Essay 11.28.6).

'5Second Treatise ??19, 232. "Force without right" might exist in Hobbes's state of nature if one individual attacked another without being motivated by concern for his preservation. Hobbes takes little cognizance of this possibility, except perhaps through his at- tack on vainglory (Leviathan,chapters 13-15).



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132; Grant 1987, 91; Zuckert 1994, 275). Though these are purely negative, duties to do no harm, they do entail restrictions on the pursuit of self-interest (Tarcov 1984, 149; Pangle 1988, 211). The fact that many flaunt these restraints with impunity does not render them nugatory as moral rules or prevent Locke from establishing a fundamental moral divide between the "Industrious and Ra- tional" and the "Quarrelsom and Contentious," in the state of nature itself.16 Those who violate property rights might well advance their personal interest thereby; the rule they violate is that which seeks the general good of mankind. For Locke unlike Hobbes, there is such a thing as injustice in the state of nature, and its source is the ex- cessive pursuit of self-interest.

This is why neither the theoretical difficulties of natural law nor its practical ineffectiveness in the state of nature and in most societies induce Locke to replace it with natural right, at least as he understands that term.17 To be sure, the rights of individuals, based on their deep- est needs and interests, are the basis of his moral system-this is what makes his a liberal morality. But it is Locke's view that rights cannot form a natural basis for morality without a pre-civil duty on the part of others to respect them. This is natural law. Its moral focus is the general good, or the preservation of mankind, the same perspective Locke takes in advancing his philosophy. Yet this leaves unsettled the question of individual motivation, and hence obligation,18 in those cases where the general and individual good do not coincide. Again: While it is true that the security of my property depends on an environment in which rights are respected, I may still benefit from taking advantage of others' forbearance in such an environment. It may be a logical contradiction for an individual to claim property rights without conceding the like to others (as Locke's derivation of natural law from bare equality in the Second Treatise suggests: ?6; cf. Strauss 1953, 229; Zuckert 1994, 277-278), but this will not affect individual motivation or obligation in any way recognized by Locke's philosophy.

In the end, the Second Treatise of Government does not fully explain how individuals can rationally be ex-

pected to obey the natural law. Virtue is left to some degree "unendowed" (RC, 150). The problem is minimized by laying out the broad common ground between public and private interest, which Locke's liberalism makes broader by defining the common good as an aggregation of private interests, and confining natural moral duty to abstention from harm. This is adequate so long as we are painting in broad strokes, concentrating on the way in which a regime of natural law serves the generality. But limitations of the approach are visible in the argument of the Second Treatise itself. Locke does not mar his presentation for example by bringing up the nettlesome subject of military service, an area where public and private interest clash most urgently. This was an issue about which Hobbes was most forthright (Leviathan, chapter 21). Similarly, liberty appears in the Second Treatise primarily as a safeguard of material interests, a "Fence" to preservation (??17-18, 23). This is a surprisingly crabbed defense of freedom for one of the founding documents of modern free government. In other works, Locke places freedom in a decidedly nobler light, designating it "a perfection of our nature" (Essay 2.21.47; cf. 2.21.67; Thoughts ??33, 38, 45, 122; Grant 1987, 90-93, 198; Myers 1998, 163, 168). It is a perfection because true freedom is rational freedom, the rational direction of our nature to its true happiness. Rational freedom presupposes a reflec- tive awareness of the distinction between true and apparent happiness and a weighing of the respective alter- natives. In the Second Treatise, this understanding of freedom is barely visible in Locke's argument for natural law as self-restraint: freedom is freedom only within the limits of reason. Those who defy these limits forfeit their rights and sink to the level of beasts (??8, 10, 11, 163, 172). The language is striking, but equally striking is the fact that Locke scarcely uses it in the Second Treatise to argue the nobility of free action or of free government. He does not explain, as he does in other works, why rationality is that which makes men human. In the Second Treatise, rational self-restraint is only abstention from harm, to avoid receiving harm in return (?6). Rationality is simply a faculty that makes men productive, and safe to one another. This corresponds to the limited focus of the work as a whole.

It has been said that the Second Treatise is more a civil than a philosophical work (Strauss 1953, 220; cf. Dunn 1969, 88, 120); in that capacity, it has been a stun- ning success. It has transformed customary ways of thinking, even where it does not provide a complete account of the basis of its own philosophical underpinnings (Dunn 1969, 88; Myers 1998, 38). It has been suc- cessful partly because, while explicitly basing itself on natural law, it minimizes the duties demanded by that

16?34. It is possible to argue that in practice Locke's state of nature resolves so thoroughly into a state of war that his law of nature becomes essentially a dead letter in that state, as with Hobbes (v. Zuckert 1994, 235-240). It seems to me though that this would entail the demise of Locke's exclusive, prepolitical property right as well as his distinction between the rational and the contentious, which would have the direst consequences for his political philosophy as a whole. His argument for limited government, for example, at least as a moral argument, would be in extreme jeopardy.

17Questions, 101. Again, see Locke's statements on law as the only possible basis of morality, Essay 1.3.6, 12.

'8See note 9, and text, above.




law and focuses much more memorably on natural rights. Freedom-loving human beings respond much more enthusiastically to this approach (cf. Tarcov 1984, 114). As to theology, the natural law is said in the Second Treatise to be authorized by God, but no strong or the- matic statements are made on the subject, and the argument proceeds almost wholly without relying on divinity. In almost every instance where God is mentioned, a par- allel argument relying simply on reason or "nature" is offered as well. The prohibition of suicide may be the only exception (though cf. Glenn 1984, 86-87; Zuckert 1994, 245-246). In the work, there appears to be only one explicit mention of God as legislator (?135) and none as enforcer-even in the section on the enforcement of the natural law (??7-13)! This parsimony allows Locke to develop his argument with minimum controversy and maximum appeal, but it leaves the argument with some important gaps.

Virtue in Education

Locke might be dismayed were he to learn that the Se- cond Treatise of Government has become so definitive of his thought for so many readers in our age. Its moral teaching is limited to the rules of social convenience and does not give a complete view of why even that morality is choice worthy for individuals. A more complete view of these matters is found in Some Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke's curriculum for a moral upbringing and another key example of his practical teaching. This work contains Locke's most complete account of the virtues and provides a more rounded view than the Second Treatise alone of the cultural transformation that Lockean liberalism has in view. It makes no reference to natural law, but does take the preservation of mankind to be the defining principle of morality. This principle is presented unequivocally as the basis of morality, and the origin of natural duties, as well as rights: "truly, if the preservation of all mankind, as much as in him lies, were everyone's persuasion, as indeed it is everyone's duty, and the true principle to regulate our religion, politics, and morality by, the world would be much quieter and better natured than it is" (?116).

We note that this formulation of the principle high- lights the concern for others in it, the difference between the preservation of mankind and the narrow self-interest of the individual. This is the theme that the Second Trea- tise largely finessed. Still, it is not immediately clear what duties this principle prescribes, or exactly how or why we are to be concerned for others. The statement quoted ap-

pears in Locke's discussion of cruelty and how it can be prevented in children. As the antithesis of concern for the preservation of mankind, cruelty could be considered the archetypical crime or vice for Locke, as for many modern thinkers. But how does Locke understand this vice and its countervailing virtue? To begin with, Locke refuses to believe that there is any natural impulse to cruelty, hypothe- sizing instead that it must come from custom, and from history, which typically confers glory on the perpetrators of cruelty.19 To prevent cruelty from developing in their children, there are two things Locke tells parents to do. They should not allow their children to torment animals, a practice that paves the way to cruel treatment of human beings (?116). And they must teach them civil and com- passionate behavior toward their social inferiors (?117). The second of these, and perhaps the first as well, essentially constitute lessons in the principle of equality. Equal- ity is the principle from which natural law or the duty to preserve mankind was derived in the Second Treatise (?6); Locke's procedure here suggests that that principle, if sin- cerely embraced by the child, of itself fosters humanitarian fellow-feeling. "Children should not be suffered to lose the consideration of human nature in the shufflings of outward conditions" (?117). Social rank is an obstacle to the development of humane sentiment; it is all too likely to give rise to a haughty pride that nurtures cruelty and oppression (id.). Locke wishes to forestall pride-based cruelty in children and foster in its stead a humanitarian concern for others rooted in equality.

Locke's education to justice reflects a similar orienta- tion toward others. It is especially useful to compare this part of his curriculum with the teaching of the Second Treatise. As with the other virtues, Locke begins his in- struction in justice by playing on the child's desire for the esteem and approval of his parents-by appealing to a positive kind of pride. "The first tendency to any injustice that appears," writes Locke, "must be suppressed with a show of wonder and abhorrence in the parents and gover- nors" (?110; cf. ?84). Gradually, parents may teach children certain "rules and cases of justice," the beginnings of a rational view of the subject. Children who remain intractable, Locke says, should have some possession of theirs taken away, to make them understand the sting of injustice, and to "make them sensible what little advantage they are like to make by possessing themselves unjustly of what is another's, whilst there are in the world stronger and more men than they" (?110). Here is a rational argument for justice-and a remarkably Hobbesian one. It is

19?1 16 (but cf. ? 102). Hobbes also denied that cruelty is natural to men (Leviathan, chapter 6, 126), and Montaigne regarded it as a cardinal vice ("De la cruaute'," Essais, 11. 1 1).



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based on the child's vulnerability and appeals only to his self-interest. But Locke is careful to inform us that this is not how he wishes children-or adults-to think about justice. Rather, they should be imbued with "an ingenuous detestation of this shameful vice," which is explicitly presented as a different, and a better, fence against injustice than "any considerations drawn from interest" (?110). The "Hobbesian" logic is marshalled only as a last resort. Its argument is a true one, and most effective for children whose selfishness has proven intractable, but for Locke it represents neither the complete argument nor the true motive for justice.

Locke's preferred education to justice grounds it instead in liberality. The first thing children should learn regarding material possessions, Locke contends, is how to part with them, "easily and freely" (?110). Parents foster this by compensating children for any losses, ensuring that their children always profit by being liberal. Of course, a profitable liberality hardly deserves the name, but Locke's purpose is to develop habits that will later make children truly liberal, deriving independent pleasure from generosity to others. Even in the early stages of this education, Locke says that the child's gain from liberality will be twofold: greater plenty (guaranteed by the parents) and "a return of kindness" from those they benefit and any who observe their liberality (?110). By the time children learn that liberality is often a material sacrifice, they will find it rewarding on its own terms, owing to the goodwill of their beneficiaries and the esteem of society at large. The result is to be an "ingenuous detestation" of injustice and a positive inclination to liberality.

Locke's procedure may be surprising to readers of the Second Treatise. The apostle of natural, exclusive property rights teaches children liberality before property, and as an educational matter at least, lays the "foundations" of justice in this other-regarding virtue (? 110). The virulence with which Locke condemns illiberality might even take us by surprise: "Covetousness, and the desire of having in our possession and under our dominion more than we have need of, being the root of all evil, should be early and carefully weeded out" (? 110). This quasi-Biblical rhetoric is hardly what we would have expected from the Locke of the Second Treatise. Where that work portrayed "the desire of having in our possession and under our dominion more than we have need of" as productive of the greatest social good, it is here productive of the greatest social evil, due to its association with "covetousness."

The two assessments of property are not contradic- tory, nor do they stem from differing views of the subject. What they reflect is the divergent purposes of the two works. The Second Treatise outlines a political morality

based on individual rights, with minimal natural-law duties to others. It shows how self-interested action based on those rights is the most effective guarantor of the social good, without fully accounting for individual motivation and action. Some Thoughts Concerning Education, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with these. Locke's goal here is the formation of an individual who is to find personal happiness as a useful member of society. This leads Locke beyond the moral minimalism of the Second Treatise, even as individual pleasure remains the motivation. In order to counteract the natural tendency of the love of property to become predatory or "covetous," Locke weaves liberality into the very foundation of the child's concern with property. This procedure suggests that at least psychologically, justice and beneficence are closely bound, that respect for the rights of others necessarily in- volves a certain element of liberality, rather than simple selfish calculation. Hobbesian calculation may be a restraint on the injustice of especially refractory children, but it is not justice as Locke wishes to cultivate it.

The same must be said of the moral ideal of Some Thoughts Concerning Education as a whole. The work is suffused with the belief that beneficence is vital to the individual's happiness in society. The good will it earns from others, and just as importantly, the satisfaction one can learn to take in beneficence itself, are lasting rewards that the properly raised child learns especially to relish. These rewards are not to be dismissed lightly. They constitute the real link between virtue and individual happiness in the work, the bridge that liberal theory typically has most difficulty constructing. Like all liberals, Locke must find a way to make fundamentally separate and indivi- dualistic human beings sociable enough to sustain social order. In Some Thoughts Concerning Education, he finds a solution in civility and "good breeding," traits that become the ultimate goal of his education. These specifically social virtues enhance the warmth and pleasure of the life of virtue in society (??94, 134). Civility and good breeding, more than the other virtues, turn Lockean individuals into social creatures, though of a distinctive sort.

Civility is an extension of the humanity or fellow feeling that Locke wants children to develop from a sense of the equality of men. Both qualities are cultivated by preventing haughty behavior toward social inferiors (? 1 17). Locke first invoked the sense of humanity to prevent cruelty in children; now, under his husbandry, it blossoms into a "respect and good will to all people" (?67). Locke emphasizes that good will is not to be mere outward show, but a sincere warmth toward others (??67, 143). Affectation, feigning this warmth where it is lacking, is particularly condemned by Locke (?66; Tarcov 1984, 109). It is essential that children develop a real, not




a counterfeit, concern for others, for only a sincere civility will fulfill the functions Locke designs for it.

We cannot but be pleased with a humane, friendly, civil temper wherever we meet with it. A mind free and master of itself and all its actions, not low and narrow, not haughty and insolent, not blemished with any great defect, is what everyone is taken with.. .This seems to me to be that beauty which shines through some men's actions... .when by a con- stant practice, they have fashioned their carriage, and made all those little expressions of civility and respect which nature or custom has established in conversa- tion, so easy to themselves that they seem not artifi- cial or studied, but naturally to follow from a sweetness of mind and a well-turned disposition. (?66)

This solicitude for others is not entirely natural-it must be practiced-but it can and should become entirely sincere (Tarcov 1984, 138). This sincerity is "sweetness of mind" (?66), "good nature and kindness" (?67), or simply "good nature" (?110), and it is the culmination of Lockean social virtue. Complete civility-the "internal civility of the mind," together with the external forms to convey it- is what Locke calls good breeding, the "first and most taking of the social virtues" (?143; cf. ?67). Well-bred individuals gain pleasure from pleasing others, basking in the esteem of society and of themselves. For this purpose, Locke confides, good breeding is more important than any other virtue or virtues. "The happiness that all men so steadily pursue consisting in pleasure, it is easy to see why the civil are more acceptable than the useful.... Power and riches, nay virtue itself, are valued only as conducing to our happiness" (?143). Since the essence of virtue according to Locke is restraint and self-denial (??33, 38, 45; cf. Essay 1.3.13), civility and good breeding provide the reward for this sacrifice in our relations with others. Good breeding comes to take pleasure in the very discipline of social virtue, in liberality and social beneficence. It accom- plishes what Locke's social philosophy must, combining individual hedonism with the concern for the well being of mankind that is the defining principle of his morality. These two qualities make the life of virtue not only a most respectable, but a most pleasant life.

This pleasure, obviously, is wholly of this world, which accords well with Locke's desire to avoid reliance on theology where possible. But religion is not absent from Locke's education; he says indeed that obedience to God is the true standard of morality (?61), and that a "true notion of God" is the foundation of virtue in the child (?? 136, 139; cf. Essay I.3.18). Still, the child's creed is limited to a few simple ideas. He is to know God as

"Supreme Being, Author and Maker of all things, from Whom we receive all our good, Who loves us, and gives us all things" (?136). In due course, God is revealed as one who sees and hears all, governs all, and "does all manner of good to those that love and obey Him" (id.). While hardly a full theology, this creed is evidently adequate to the support of virtue, and not only children's virtue (id.). We note that it presents God as a lawgiver only implicitly (God as governor, as one who should be obeyed); his role as enforcer is even more latent (omni- scient giver of good to those who obey). Locke says noth- ing of the afterlife or of punishments for those who dis- obey. Divine retributions are not invoked even in the case of the most refractory children (the Hobbesian bogey is enlisted instead). The God discovered by Locke's pupils is both more benign, and more remote, than the God of many of their compatriots. As for the Bible, Locke indicates that it has much that is wrongheaded along with the good (??158-159). He recommends some reading from the Bible for young children, but only selectively, and centered on moral tales (??158-159). In older pupils, the Bible is taken up again-in fact, it is the only reading offered in morals-but Locke notes that at this point in the pupil's education, reading is less important than the training in morals that he has already experienced (?185).20 In accordance with what we have noticed in other contexts, Locke's use of the Bible displays more concern that children not receive false notions from it, than that the book should be neglected. The purely social compensations of civility and good breeding carry much more weight in Locke's education to virtue.

The Reasonableness of Christianity and Theological Reform

In Some Thoughts Concerning Education, as in the Second Treatise of Government, Locke wishes to construct a morality with minimal reliance on theology. He does this in part because of the unfinished state of his own theology, in part to avoid unnecessary confrontations with Chris- tianity. But even in his practical works, he cannot avoid theology altogether. The Two Treatises of Government and Some Thoughts Concerning Education inevitably uncover flaws in Christianity, at least as interpreted in his day- unjust in its belief in the Fall, wrongheaded in its insis- tence on charity, false in its denigration of happiness in

20Though the Bible is the only reading in "morals," Cicero is as- signed as reading in "ethics," and Pufendorf and perhaps Grotius in politics, natural right, and law (??185-186).



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this life. Locke's procedure in these instances is to substi- tute proper principles surreptitiously, quoting the Bible where possible, remaining silent where not, above all never admitting a disagreement with Christianity. But Christian orthodoxy still looms as an unconquered fortress-a practical obstacle now, more than a theoretical one. An assault on the fortress, in the name of natural theology, would clearly be counterproductive. What strategy would then be effective? Sound principles of natural theology may eventually replace Christian error, but Locke's moral and political teachings will have to make their way, initially at least, in a world dominated by orthodoxy.

The Reasonableness of Christianity represents Locke's response to this immediate problem. In some respects, it represents the furthest reach of his strategy with the practical works. It shows how far Locke believed orthodoxy could be pushed in the direction of his teachings, in his immediate historical context, and how far it would have to be accommodated. This appears to be the reason for the most puzzling aspect of the The Reasonableness of Chris- tianity, its apparent acceptance of the veracity of scrip- tural revelation, and the remarkable accommodations it makes to portions of the Biblical teaching at odds with liberal morality. These have been interpreted as philosophical capitulation (Ashcraft 1969, 218; Dunn 1969, 187), but we should see them instead as parts of a tempo- rizing strategy. The Essay Concerning Human Understand- ing was composed roughly simultaneously with The Rea- sonableness of Christianity (Dunn 1969, 198; cf .Yolton 1970, 179), and that work leaves no doubt about the difficulty if not impossibility of confirming revelation and the danger of relying on it implicitly (IV. 16, 18, 19). The Essay strictly subjects revelation to the scrutiny of reason, under the dictum, "Reason must be our last judge and guide in every thing" (IV.19.14; cf. IV.16, 18, 19; Conduct, p. 342). The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures, by contrast, signals by its very title a strategy of accepting scripture at face value, interpreting it without investigating its provenance. Given their contempora- neity, the differences between the two works must be traceable to differences of strategy alone.

Indeed, the Essay itself suggests the need for a work like Reasonableness. Although it is the duty of each of us to follow reason even in matters of religion, the Essay tells us, the unfortunate fact is that "a great part of mankind are, by the natural and unalterable state of things in this world," doomed to an "invincible ignorance" of the basis of their own opinions (IV.20.2-3; cf. 1.4.22; 11.21.47-53, 67). The Reasonableness of Christianity con- curs: "the greatest part [of mankind] cannot know, and therefore they must believe" (146). Paradoxically, one of the things Locke finds most "reasonable" about Christianity is its substitution of authoritative revelation

for reason (142-144, 147, 157). Up to the time of Jesus, philosophy had failed to establish a true morality, upon the foundation of a proper natural theology (pp. 139- 140,144). Even if it had, Locke notes, the true philosophy would have had to compete with the false and could never have been as effective a prop to morality as an authoritative dogma (141-143). Moreover, the times were corrupt, burdened with pernicious "manners and principles" (144). All this made it reasonable for Jesus to teach by fiat rather than logic (143).

The times in which Locke writes are corrupt enough in their own way, and revelation remains a much more powerful tool than philosophy, if its worst abuses can be corrected.21 Though Locke indicates clearly enough the unverifiability of Jesus' claim to revelation,22 he makes no issue of it. To repeat, his undertaking in The Reasonable- ness of Christianity is to interpret the Bible as it stands, and the Bible's teaching is emphatically not natural theology (5). What the Bible teaches instead is the Fall (4), salvation by faith (17-20, 50-51), and a highly stringent moral code (1 15). Locke begins by accepting these premises, gradually turning them to account, so far as they may be turned to account.

Thus The Reasonableness of Christianity endorses the principle of salvation by faith, indeed elevates it into the sole tenet of Christianity. The result is to make it an en- gine of toleration. Any who believe that Jesus is the Mes- siah are Christians and are eligible for salvation on the basis of divine forgiveness (17-20, 50-51). The myriad other points of Christian theology, which have set Chris- tians at each others' throats for so long, are relegated to secondary if not insignificant status. If this interpretation of the Bible were to prevail, virtually all bases for sectari- anism would be removed, and toleration would be universal among Christians. But Locke goes further. Faith, he says, is not the only avenue to salvation in the Bible. Non-Christians may merit eternal life if they obey "every tittle" of the law and so do not stand in need of forgiveness (12; cf. 10). This appears to be very difficult, and Locke is ambivalent on its possibility for human beings (11, 110, 112, 114). But if this path to salvation is closed,

21Cf. Dunn 1984, 66. For good accounts of how Locke softens or modifies Christian doctrine in Reasonableness, see Zuckert 1986; Pangle 1988, 151-158; Rabieh 1991. See also Kraynak 1980, 60, 62, 66. 22 Locke says Jesus' commission was proven by his miracles, which were so certain that no one has ever dared deny them, not even Julian (138). Yet the existence of non-Christians, atheists, and yes, Julian the Apostate, show the reverse so patently that Locke's statement can only be understood ironically (Strauss 1959, 210; Rabieh 1991, 149-150). He notes that the Jews might even have admitted the miracles, without conceding Jesus' commission (80). Locke's Discourse of Miracles subjects miracles subtly but unmistakably to rational judgment (Locke 1997a, 261-262, 264).




or extremely difficult, the age-old question arises, How can those justly be condemned who never heard of Jesus? To this, the "obvious and natural" answer, says Locke, is that all those will be forgiven by God "who rely on him, for whatever, either by the light of nature, or particular promises, he has revealed to them of his tender mercies, and taught them to expect from his bounty" (130). The "light of nature" might reveal to many a merciful and forgiving God; belief in this deity puts them on a level with Christians. Faith in Jesus, the defining tenet of Christianity, can be replaced by a purely rational belief in the tender and forgiving nature of God (cf. 133).

Thus Locke endorses the Biblical principle of salvation by faith, uses it to sow toleration among Christians, then opens it to non-Christians, on the basis of what we can only call natural theology. Still, the need for salvation by faith is not questioned, nor is the principle that creates that need, the Fall.23 These are intrinsic to the Bible. Locke's accommodation to scripture is even more striking in his treatment of morality or natural law. Drawing exclusively on Jesus' statements in the Bible, Locke concludes that this law forbids "not only murder, but causeless anger, and so much as words of contempt"; "irregular desires," "ostentation of charity," "covetousness" and "wordly care," as well as "lasciviousness" and "evil thoughts"-all, "upon pain of hell-fire" (115-116). Locke goes out of his way to identify these principles with "the eternal law of right," or natural law, repeating assertions to this effect to the point of monotony (10, 11-13, 112, 115, 122, 142-143, 144, 157).

It is not possible to square this teaching with the liberal morality Locke himself champions elsewhere under the rubric of natural law. It suffices to think of the iden- tification of happiness with pleasure in the Essay, or the "industrious and rational" virtues of acquisition on which God smiles in the Two Treatises. The Reasonable- ness of Christianity accepts the Biblical teaching instead, even though its moral stringency contributes to the need for continual forgiveness, salvation by faith, and other theological peculiarities. What sense can be made of this? Aside from his self-imposed rule in this work to take scripture at its word, Locke's strategy seems to be to identify Jesus' teaching with rational morality or natural law-by hook or by crook-then gently to suggest another understanding of such a morality (142-143). In a crucial set of passages, Locke first vindicates Jesus' mis- sion by pointing to the failure of pre-Christian philosophy to establish true natural law. But in the course of that discussion, he reveals that at least some true knowledge of right was abroad in antiquity. In politics, true

rules of right were discovered by statesmen who simply sought social convenience and general prosperity. For "The law of nature is the law of convenience too" (142; cf. 139, 144, Essay 1.3.6). Similarly, part of natural law was known to the "heathen philosophers," though they failed to teach it effectively (p. 138-139, 142). The opposition of priests, the competition with false philosophy, and the failure of the philosophers themselves to find the true foundation of natural law, all doomed them to impotence (135, 139, 140-144). Their failure justified Jesus' recourse to revelation.

Locke's own situation is not unlike that of the ancient philosophers, and his reliance on revelation in The Reasonableness of Christianity is one result. But that reliance severely limits what he can say in the work about natural law. Locke does not say that the law of convenience is all of the law of nature (cf. 140, 142; Essay 1.3.10), but we know that his reform of moral philosophy is designed to bring it much closer to the sum of those rules than the Bible will strictly allow. The Reasonableness of Christianity notes that one of the problems with virtue before Jesus was its "unendowed" character (150). It was unendowed because it required unnecessary sacrifices and lacked otherworldly enforcement. Christianity rem- edies the second defect, but only aggravates the first. "Virtue and prosperity do not often accompany one another," says Locke at one point, taking the Biblical perspective (148). But this is not his own perspective. Liberal virtue, the virtue of the "industrious and rational," coin- cides with prosperity the great majority of the time. This virtue and its reward are scarcely visible in The Reason- ableness of Christianity, although Locke is careful to give them some recognition. The Bible may be nudged in the direction of liberal, acquisitive virtue, and in the direction of Locke's natural theology, but it cannot without falsification be brought into the liberal fold.

This is why The Reasonableness of Christianity should be seen as a provisional work, one that Locke hoped perhaps would outlive its usefulness. A case could be made that Locke's ultimate goal as a reformer is the replacement of Christianity with a natural theology of the type he outlines in other works. Perhaps he hoped for something like the situation that prevailed one hundred years after his writing, when Deism seemed on the verge of supplanting Christianity-in no small part due to Locke's influence. This was the era of Jefferson's bold prediction, "I trust that there is not a young man now living in the United States who will not die an Unitarian."24 But not long thereafter,

"See pages 6, 105. This is not to say that Locke's interpretation of the Fall is orthodox.

24This statement was penned in 1822 (Jefferson 1984, 1459; cf. 1464). On the influence of Locke's theology, including its influence in colonial America, see Pangle 1988, 151-158; Pangle and Pangle 1993,28,76-78.



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natural theology was on the wane, and Christianity resur- gent. Liberalism in the West has had to confront more or less permanently a Biblical understanding with which it can never be entirely in accord. This is the situation for which The Reasonableness of Christianity was designed.

Conclusion: Locke's Complex Bequest

The Reasonableness of Christianity reveals most starkly the complex nature of Locke's bequest to his posterity, the sometimes extreme accommodations he was willing to make to different audiences and occasions. The Se- cond Treatise of Government and Some Thoughts Con- cerning Education show different sorts of accommodation, but accommodations they remain. Philosophically, Locke developed a liberal politics and morality that draws on the moral resources of (natural) theology, but in these practical works he presents his liberalism in forms mostly shorn of its theological supports. My argument has been that Locke did this intentionally, owing to the problems posed by the theological elements of his full theory. Those problems are both theoretical-the lack of a complete or fully satisfactory natural theology-and practical-the resistance his political and moral philosophy would meet if tied too closely to a novel theology.

The result of this strategy is that Locke's bequest is divided into two main strands. In its fully articulated form, his liberalism enlists divine support in order to bring rational and hedonistic individuals to the service of the "preservation of Mankind." Locke could not dispense with this element of his thought because the need for incentives to virtue is built into the very foundations of his philosophy. Without these, no other-regarding actions can be expected of Lockean individuals, and indeed no such obligations can be laid on them. Locke agrees with those who have argued, from Hobbes's day to this, that even liberal morality needs more than narrow or mundane self-interest to be viable. But this message has been muddled by his strategy of fashioning a practical teaching largely independent of that theology.

Locke's practical works show both how desirous he was of disentangling his bequest from theological controversy and how far Lockean liberalism can get without theology. The Second Treatise appeals to very little beyond immediate self-interest, yet constructs a vision of government and individual rights that human beings have found compelling. It is able to do this in part because its focus on the general social good allows it to fi- nesse some of the conflicts between that and the indi-

vidual good. This leaves it open to the objections of those who find liberalism morally inadequate. Some Thoughts Concerning Education by contrast shows how Locke be- lieves an individual might be motivated to perform his duty to tend to the general good, who indeed will be glad to practice liberality and other forms of social beneficence. Esteem and reputation are this individual's reward, but Locke emphasizes the virtues of civility and "good breeding" as the pivotal gratifications of social virtue. These, when properly cultivated, find pleasure in the very act of serving others.

To the extent that Locke discusses theology in these works, it is more to counteract false and baleful notions held by his contemporaries than to advance a full-blown theology of his own. Those few notions aside, he largely leaves the field to Christianity, at least for the immediate future. This renders all the more salient the need to make Christianity itself more reasonable, at least as reasonable as it can become, given its dependence on the text of the Bible. This limited, provisional, but nonetheless important task is undertaken in The Reasonableness of Christianity.

The complexity of Locke's strategy, which is devised to maximize the social and cultural influence of his philosophy, resulted in an oeuvre whose individual works do not always seem to agree. One of the most significant consequences of this is a practical teaching severed to a significant degree from the theological underpinnings that it had in Locke's own mind. It is no doubt true that the immense influence of Lockean liberalism is due in part to this separation, but it also lays him open to charges of an impoverished, morally inadequate philosophy. This no doubt is not the outcome Locke would have desired, but I have suggested that it is almost invited by the way he presents his teaching. The result is that Locke could paradoxically be said to be responsible for some of the moral shortcomings with which liberalism is charged today, while at the same time offering guidance on how those very shortcomings might be made good.

Manuscript submitted March 4, 2000. Final manuscript received September 5, 2000.

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