mood-congruent perceptions of success depend on self...

Mood-congruent perceptions of success depend on

self-other framing

Brian Detweiler-Bedell and Jerusha B. Detweiler-Bedell

Lewis and Clark College, Portland, OR, USA

Peter Salovey

Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA

Research on self-other framing suggests that self-judgements typically neglectinformation about others and instead use an ambiguous intrapersonal standard,making these judgements susceptible to the influence of mood as predicted by theaffect infusion model (Forgas, 1995). Two experiments tested the hypothesis thatmood-congruent judgements of personal success occur when these judgements areframed to maintain self-focus but are eliminated when participants first focus onother individuals. In Experiment 1, self-other framing moderated the influence ofmood on perceived success for an ambiguous object identification task. Happyparticipants reported greater perceived success, compared to sad participants, afterjudging their own success relative to others (self-focused frame) but not after directlyjudging the success of others (other-focused frame). Experiment 2 replicated theseresults with students' perceptions of their academic success. These findings suggestthat the open, constructive processing accompanyingmost self-judgements is criticalin producing mood-congruent perceptions of personal success.

Mood-congruent judgement is a pervasive, robust phenomenon. More often than

not, self-perceptions and social thinking reflect the valence of a person's mood

(for reviews, see Bower & Forgas, 2000; Forgas & Vargas, 2000; Sedikides,

1992). Positive moods tend to bring about more optimistic thinking and per-

ceptions, whereas negative moods occasion pessimism. Research suggests that

the emotions of everyday life continuously shape our thinking and behaviour,

Correspondence should be addressed to Brian Detweiler-Bedell, Lewis and Clark College,

Department of Psychology, Campus Box 16, 0615 SW Palatine Hill Road, Portland, Oregon 97219,

USA; e-mail: [email protected]

This research was part of the first author's doctoral dissertation and was supported by a Yale

University dissertation fellowship. We would like to thank David Pizarro, Diana Cordova, David

Armor, Geoffrey Cohen, Paul Bloom, Michael Barnes, and the members of Peter Salovey's Health,

Emotion, and Behavior Laboratory for their contribution to this research and comments on earlier

drafts.

# 2006 Psychology Press Ltd

http://www.psypress.com/cogemotion DOI:10.1080/02699930500294996

COGNITION AND EMOTION

2006, 20 (2), 196±216

often in ways that are subtle and go unnoticed. Sunshine bolsters ratings of life

satisfaction (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) and is associated with higher daily stock

returns (Hirshleifer & Shumway, 2003); finding a dime in a payphone leads

individuals to be more helpful to a stranger (Isen & Levin, 1972); and simply

holding a pen with one's teeth, which activates the musculature of a smile, is

enough to make a cartoon seem more amusing (Strack, Martin, & Stepper,

1988).

Contemporary theories of emotion offer many compelling accounts of mood-

congruent judgement. According to the ``affect-as-information'' view, emotion

serves as direct experiential feedback (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988). For

instance, a positive mood is experienced as success, which produces more

optimistic judgements even when the source of the mood is unrelated to the

judgement. Alternatively, the cognitive priming view suggests that emotion first

brings similarly valenced memories and concepts to mind; the increased salience

of this one-sided emotional information then shapes the outcome of a judgement

(Bower, 1981; Bower & Forgas, 2000). For instance, a positive mood might

prime memories of one's past accomplishments, leading to more favourable

self-perceptions. Forgas (1995, 2002a) has reconciled the affect-as-information

and priming views with his ``affect infusion model'' (AIM). The AIM proposes

that mood-congruent judgement depends on open, constructive information

processing and occurs through two distinct pathways: through the use of affect

as experiential feedback when information processing is heuristic, and through

cognitive priming when information processing is more substantive. That is,

mood serves alternatively as a simple decision-rule for relatively snap judge-

ments or as a powerful prime of related cognitions for judgements requiring

more effortful processing.

Forgas' synthesis of the affect-as-information and cognitive priming views

illustrates the field's current, more nuanced understanding of mood-congruent

judgement. Still, Forgas (2002b) acknowledges that the field is quite young and,

as a result, most theories of emotion tend to be ``rather nonspecific about the

precise psychological mechanisms responsible for affect congruence'' (p. 92).

To inform our understanding of these mechanisms, it is important to know when

mood-congruent judgement occurs and to have a clear sense of its boundary

conditions. Mayer and colleagues have demonstrated that mood-congruent

judgement generalises across a large variety of natural mood states, judgement

tasks, and participant characteristics (Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans,

1992). They conclude that mood-congruence has few, if any, boundary condi-

tions and appears to result from a pervading, low level cognitive process.

However, Forgas' AIM specifies one clear requirement of mood-congruent

judgement: It should occur only when judgements are open (i.e., ambiguous) and

information processing is therefore constructive (Forgas, 1995, 2002a). What

boundary conditions does this requirement impose on mood-congruent

judgement? This question guided our current research.

MOOD EFFECTS DEPEND ON SELF-OTHER FRAMING 197

A recent review by Sedikides and Green (2001) pursued a similar question

concerning mood-congruent judgement and qualifications of the effect implied

by the AIM. Previously, Sedikides (1992) conducted a review emphasising,

along with Mayer et al. (1992), the robust, general nature of mood-congruent

judgement. However, research after 1992 suggests that mood-congruent jud-

gement is qualified in a number of important ways. For example, mood-

congruent self-perceptions appear to be limited to peripheral traits, which are

held with less certainty than central traits (Sedikides, 1995), and they are

observed most reliably among individuals with low self-esteem, who are less

certain of themselves and have less stable self-perceptions (Brown & Man-

kowski, 1993; Smith & Petty, 1995). In other words, the extent to which self-

perceptions are subject to affect infusion depends on the ambiguity of the par-

ticular self-conceptions as well as the ambiguity of the person's overall self-

concept. These qualifications are consistent with the AIM's contention that

mood-congruence will be observed only when examining open, constructive

judgements (Forgas, 1995, 2002a).

Our research further examines the influence of mood on judgements of one's

own efforts and prospects. Following Sedikides (1992), we emphasise the effect

of mood on self-perceptions because these effects can have a significant impact

on the individual's functioning and well-being. For example, negative moods

decrease expectancies for future success, apparently because negative moods

raise personal performance standards, making the prospect of a satisfying out-

come less likely (Cervone, Kopp, Schaumann, & Scott, 1994; Wright & Mis-

chel, 1982). Such a finding is of critical importance because perceptions and

expectancies of success have emerged as key factors in determining future

achievement; in fact, they may be more predictive of future success than

objective measures of past achievement insofar as expectancies mediate the

relationship between past and future efforts (Bandura, 1982; McAuley, Wraith,

& Duncan, 1991; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000).

To understand better the conditions under which mood is likely to influence

evaluations of the self, we found it helpful to consider more general findings

concerning biases in self-judgements. These findings suggest that self-

judgements may be more constructive, and therefore more susceptible to affect

infusion, when they are framed in a manner that maintains a focus on the self.

Biases in self-judgements

Individuals tend to be overly optimistic about their own prospects compared to

the prospects of others (Weinstein, 1980), and they generally believe that their

abilities and traits are above average (e.g., Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak,

& Vredenburg, 1995). These positivity biases are explained, in part, by a

motivation for self-enhancementÐpeople have a vested interest in protecting

and boosting their self-esteem (Brown & Taylor, 1986; Kunda, 1990). Still,

198 DETWEILER-BEDELL, DETWEILER-BEDELL, SALOVEY

motivated reasoning is only one source of bias in self-judgements. Cognitive

factors also play a role. In particular, information processing is limited and

inherently egocentric (see Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). In making judge-

ments about one's own abilities compared to the abilities of others, individuals

rely disproportionately (at times, almost exclusively) on self-relevant informa-

tion and thoughts about the self (e.g., Eiser, Pahl, & Prins, 2001; Kruger, 1999).

This is not surprising. The self corresponds to a much more elaborate and salient

knowledge structure than ``other people,'' and self-relevant information is

processed extremely efficiently (Markus & Sentis, 1982; Ross & Sicoly, 1979).

Still, the increased salience of the self can have intriguing consequences. For

example, egocentrism appears to be self-favouring only in less challenging

domains (Kruger, 1999). When a task is relatively easy, individuals apparently

focus on their own abilities and fail to consider that other individuals are likely

to share the same strengths. This leads to a perception of the self as above

average. In contrast, egocentrism works against self-enhancement in domains

considered to be universally difficult, such as playing chess, computer pro-

gramming, or juggling. When self-relevant information within a domain centres

on personal difficulties, individuals appear to focus on their failings without

recognising that others share these same weaknesses. In these cases, Kruger

(1999) has demonstrated a reliable ``below-average effect''.

How do individuals make comparative judgements between the self and

others if they rely almost exclusively on self-relevant information? What do they

use as a standard of comparison for these judgements? The answer to this puzzle

suggests a means through which mood may be able to shape self-perceptions.

When asked to compare the self to others, individuals appear to sidestep a true

comparison with others by adopting an intrapersonal standard for the judgement

(Eiser et al., 2001; Kruger, 1999). Lacking a normative standard (i.e., a clear

reference point provided by an explicit representation of a ``typical other''), the

comparative judgement becomes more open and ambiguous. The individual

must construct a subjective neutral point and then generate evidence relative to

this personal standard. This opens the judgement to sources of potential bias. For

example, the individual's subjective neutral point can be distorted by counter-

factual thinking (e.g., ``I could have done much worse''; Eiser et al., 2001).

Moreover, when individuals reflect on the distribution of their own positive and

negative experiences within a domain, they typically generate more evidence of

success, especially in domains that are less challenging or that are sufficiently

broad that they can be redefined to suit the individual's strengths (e.g., Alicke,

Vredenburg, Hiatt, & Govorun, 2001; Klein & Kunda, 1993; Kruger, 1999;

Parducci, 1984).

Using an ambiguous intrapersonal standard to make a comparative judgement

between the self and others enables positivity biases to colour the outcome of the

judgement. However, as Kruger's work (1999) has shown, self-favouring is not

guaranteedÐthe direction in which a comparative judgement is distorted


depends on characteristics of the judgement (e.g., the difficulty of the domain in

question). This implies that comparative judgements are open and, therefore,

constructive judgements that can be biased either in favour or against the self.

As a consequence, these judgements also should be subject to affect infusion

according to Forgas' AIM. That is, perceptions of one's own efforts and pro-

spects should be more positive when a person is happy and more negative when

a person is sad. However, this prediction of mood-congruence comes with a

natural boundary condition. It should hold true only if the judgement permits the

individual to use an intrapersonal standard rather than a more concrete, inter-

personal standard. Can a judgement be framed in a manner that shifts focus

away from the self, forcing the individual to assess the self in the context of an

interpersonal standard (i.e., an explicit representation of a typical other)?

Research on self-other framing has illustrated a method of doing this, and this

method should provide another boundary condition for mood-congruent

judgements of the self.

Self-other framing

Eiser and colleagues (2001) have demonstrated that positivity biases occur

when making self-judgements in the context of a self-focused frame (e.g., by

asking ``How did you do relative to others?''). However, such biases are

reduced or eliminated when individuals first consider the performance of oth-

ers (e.g., ``How did others do relative to you?'' ± an other-focused frame)

before returning to a self-judgement. The simple task of having to judge and,

therefore, form an explicit representation of a ``typical other'' appears to

eliminate the ambiguity typically associated with comparative judgements,

causing individuals to ground self-judgements relative to a more concrete nor-

mative standard. Additional research has found that people see themselves as

more distinct from others when judgements are prompted with a self-focused

frame compared to an other-focused frame, and that participants provide more

spontaneous positive statements about themselves under self-focused framing

compared to other-focused framing (Pahl & Eiser, in press). Taken as a

whole, this research illustrates the powerful impact of framing comparative

judgements relative to either the self or other individuals (Karylowski, 1990;

Rogers, 1981).

In the context of this research, we wondered what would happen to mood

effects if individuals were led to ground self-judgements relative to a more

concrete, normative standard. The work on self-other framing, joined with the

logic of the AIM, suggests that the ambiguity associated with using an intra-

personal standard to make self-judgements is necessary for mood-congruent

self-perceptions to occur. In the absence of this ambiguity, mood should no

longer play a central role in informing judgement. Specifically, we argue that

mood-congruent self-perceptions should depend on ``self-other framing'', that


is, whether a judgement is framed in a manner that maintains self-focus or in a

manner that shifts focus away from the self and toward other individuals. Mood-

congruent self-perceptions should be observed when a self-judgement is framed

to maintain self-focus. In contrast, having an explicit reference point in making a

self-judgement (e.g., through an other-focused frame) should reduce or eliminate

any ambiguity, leading to a judgement that is less constructive and therefore less

susceptible to affect infusion.

In the current paper, we investigate the joint influence of mood and decision

frame (i.e., focus on the self or on other individuals) on perceived success.

Specifically, we hypothesise that the effects of mood on perceived success

depend on whether the individual's attention is focused on the self or on other

individuals, with mood-congruent judgements resulting only when the decision

frame is self-focusing. That is, we hypothesise that self-focused frames (i.e.,

initially asking individuals to think of their own success compared to the success

of others) will trigger mood-congruent perceptions of personal success at an

achievement task. However, other-focused frames (i.e., initially asking indivi-

duals to think of the success of other individuals independent of their own

success) should eliminate the effect of mood on perceived success. Two

experiments were conducted to test this hypothesis.

EXPERIMENT 1

The purpose of our first study was to provide an initial test, in a controlled

laboratory setting, of whether self-other framing moderates the influence of

mood on judgements of personal success. Participants arrived at the lab and

were told they would be completing two unrelated studies. They first completed

a task in which they were asked to identify, as quickly and as accurately as

possible, four-sided objects embedded in a large selection of variously shaped

objects. Then, while the identification task was ostensibly scored, participants

completed an autobiographical mood-induction procedure. Finally, participants

completed a questionnaire regarding the timed identification task. The first two

items of this questionnaire asked participants to consider either their own

expected performance relative to other individuals on the achievement task

(self-focused framing) or the likely performance of others on the achievement

task (other-focused framing). Following this experimental manipulation, a series

of questions assessed participants' perceived success at the task. This resulted in

a 2 (happy mood, sad mood) 6 2 (self-focused frame, other-focused frame)

between-subjects design. It was hypothesised that mood-congruent perceptions

of success would be observed under conditions of self-focus but that these

perceptions would be reduced or eliminated when the decision frame led par-

ticipants to focus on the performance of others, supporting our argument that the

open, constructive processing that accompanies self-focus plays an important

role in producing mood-congruent perceptions of success.


Method

Participants

A total of 60 undergraduate students were recruited using advertisements

placed around the Yale University campus. The students (65% male, 35%

female; mean age of 19.4 years old) received $5 in exchange for their partici-

pation in this 20 minute study.

Procedure

Participants were told that they would be completing two brief studies. In the

first study they would be taking a timed test of cognitive and visuospatial

abilities. Then, while the experimenter scored this test, they would be asked to

complete a second study concerning social memories. Finally, they would be

asked to complete a questionnaire about the ability test prior to receiving their

scores. Although these instructions suggested that the social memories task was

a separate study, it served as the experimental manipulation of mood prior to the

follow-up questionnaire.

Achievement task. Participants were seated and asked to read the

instructions for a timed ``object identification task'' (adapted from Freitas &

Higgins, 2002), which the study's consent form had described as a test of

cognitive and visuospatial abilities. This task required participants to scan

through several pages of geometric objects and cross out those with four sides.

Before beginning the task, participants were asked to report their age and sex,

and they rated how well they expected to do on the identification task on a 7-

point scale ranging from not well at all to extremely well. Subsequently, they

were given 2 minutes to identify as many of the four-sided objects as possible

while leaving other objects unmarked. This task was designed to be a plausible

but ambiguous performance task. Accordingly, most participants (82%) believed

their performance at least ``somewhat'' reflected their abilities. However,

participants' perceptions of their performance were unrelated to the actual

number of objects they had identified, all rs (60) < .15, ns.

Mood induction. Following the object identification task, and while the test

ostensibly was scored, the experimenter led participants to another room and

asked them to complete a second ``social memories'' study (adapted from

Forgas, 1995, 1999) that was designed to induce a happy or sad mood. Under the

cover story that the experimenter was compiling an inventory of memorable life

events, half of the participants were randomly assigned to recall an episode of

their lives that had made them feel happy and continued to make them happy

even today, whereas half of the participants were asked to recall a sad episode.

In both conditions, participants were instructed to ``. . .imagine this episode as


vividly as you can. Recall the events happening to you. Recall your surroundings

as clearly as possible. Picture the people or objects involved. Try to think the

same thoughts. Try to feel the same feelings''. Below these instructions,

participants were provided with 36 blank lines on which to list words describing

the autobiographical event. This request reinforced the cover story that the

experimenter was compiling an inventory of social memories. Moreover, it was

expected that these words would be emotionally valenced and strengthen the

mood induction in a manner consistent with the use of valenced self-referential

statements in Velten mood-induction procedures (e.g., Brown & Mankowski,

1993; Velten, 1968). Autobiographical recollections and self-generated imagery

have been used extensively in previous research to induce transient moods (e.g.,

Forgas, 1995; Gendolla, Abele, & Kruesken, 2001; Goodwin & Williams, 1982;

Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993; Salovey & Rodin, 1985; Wright

& Mischel, 1982), and these procedures have proved effective particularly when

a plausible cover story, such as compiling an inventory of social memories,

justifies the task (Salovey, 1992; Thompson, Cowan, & Rosenhan, 1980).

After 5 minutes, participants were instructed to complete a second page of the

social memories survey, consisting of a mood manipulation check. Four items

asked participants to indicate their current feelings along 7-point bipolar scales

(i.e., unpleasant-pleasant, happy-sad, tired-alert, and tense-relaxed).

Self-other framing. After completing the mood-induction procedure,

participants received a follow-up questionnaire about the object identification

task. The questionnaire's instructions informed participants that performance on

the ability test was a function of the speed and accuracy with which they had

identified the geometric objects, and they were asked to complete the

questionnaire, keeping these factors in mind, prior to receiving their scores.

The first two items of the follow-up questionnaire served as the study's

experimental manipulation of decision frame. Half of the participants were

randomly assigned to the self-focused framing condition, in which they were

asked judge their own performance on the identification task relative to the

performance of other individuals they knew and of students similar to them-

selves. Specifically, they were asked: ``Think for a moment about yourself. How

do you suppose you did on the object identification task compared to people you

know (including your peers, friends, and family)?'' and ``Again, think for a

moment about yourself. How do you suppose you did on this task compared to

other students like you?'' In contrast, half of the participants were assigned to

the other-focused framing condition, in which they were asked to judge the

performance of other individuals directly without making a self-other compar-

ison. Specifically, they were asked: ``Think for a moment about people you

know (including your peers, friends, and family). How do you suppose they

would do on the object identification task?'' and ``Think for a moment about

other students like you. How do you suppose they would do on this task?''


Measures

Except for the first two items of the follow-up questionnaire, all participants

completed a common set of outcome measures.

Attributions of performance. Four items asked participants to rate the extent

to which various factors (ability, task difficulty, effort, luck) influenced their

performance on the identification task. Ratings for these items were made using

7-point scales ranging from not at all to extremely.

Perceived success. Participants then were asked to rate their performance

on the identification task without knowing their scores. Three items were

included in an index of participants' perceived success at the task. Participants

were asked how they felt they had performed on the task (assessed on a 7-point

scale ranging from not well at all to extremely well) and how well they thought

they had performed compared to other people who had taken the test (assessed

on an 11-point percentile scale ranging from 0% or worse than all others to

100% or better than all others). Also included in the index was a measure of

how challenging participants found the identification task, assessed using a 4-

point scale ranging from not at all to extremely. Task challenge warranted

inclusion in the index of perceived success because task challenge was strongly,

negatively associated with the other performance judgements [corrected item-

total r(60) = 7.49, p < .001].1 After transforming these items into z-scores, they

were combined into a standardised index of participants' perceived success (a =

.80.)

Additional measures. One additional measure asked participants to decide

with whom they would be most interested in comparing their score on the

identification task (assessed on a 7-point scale ranging from someone who got

the lowest score to someone who got the highest score). This social comparison

measure was included because of the potential relationship between social

comparison processes and the study's manipulation of self-other framing.

Although no specific hypotheses related to this measure were specified in

advance, participants generally said they would prefer to compare their scores to

someone with an above average score on the identification task, M = 5.59, SD =

1.60, t(58) = 7.66, p < .001. This is consistent with past research showing that

1 Participants also were asked how much they enjoyed the identification task, but enjoyment was

not associated with the two primary indicators of perceived success: corrected item-total r(60) = .14,

ns. Another item asked participants how confident they were about their performance on the task, but

this item was discarded because some participants instead used it to indicate confidence in their

preceding performance ratings (e.g., some participants who felt they had performed poorly indicated

a relatively high level of confidence in having done so).


individuals generally choose to compare their performance with others who

perform well for many reasons (e.g., Bandura, 1986, Festinger, 1954; Suls,

1986; Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Wheeler, 1991). Beyond this, however, the social

comparison measure did not produce any significant findings, so it will not be

discussed further.

After participants completed the follow-up questionnaire, they were informed

that the identification test was not a valid test of ability. Instead, it had been

designed as an ambiguous task to investigate participants' perceptions of their

own performance. The task was not scored until after the study, and subjects

never received any feedback about their actual performance. Participants then

were debriefed about the study's mood induction and the hypotheses of the

study. After debriefing, participants were thanked and paid, asked if they had

any questions, and then dismissed.

Results and discussion

A common analytic strategy was adopted for the two studies presented in this

article. First, the mood manipulation check was examined to confirm that the

mood-induction procedure had the intended effect. Second, relationships among

each study's background questions and outcome measures were examined to

identify potential covariates that might be used in evaluating the influence of

mood and self-other framing on perceived success. This included examination of

both pre-experimental measures (e.g., age, sex) and post-experimental measures,

including participants' post-experimental attributions of their performance to

ability, task difficulty, effort, and luck. After identifying these potential cov-

ariates, a preliminary ANCOVA modelling perceived success was conducted.

All of the covariates were examined in the context of a full model to determine

whether any should be removed for failing to explain unique variance in per-

ceived success (using a cautious criterion for pooling error terms, p > .25).

Redundant covariates were removed one at a time until a final model was

attained, and a multivariate procedure was used to check and confirm the

assumption of homogeneous regression slopes across groups. It is this final

ANCOVA model that is reported and interpreted for each study.

Mood manipulation check. Participants in the happy mood condition

reported feeling more pleasant (M = 5.60, SD = 1.07) than participants in the sad

mood condition (M = 3.70, SD = 1.37), t(58) = 5.99, p < .001, as well as less sad

(M = 2.83, SD = 1.32 vs. M = 4.53, SD = 1.33), t(58) = 74.97, p < .001. When

ratings for the two arousal items were combined (i.e., tired-alert, tense-relaxed),

it appeared that participants in the happy mood condition may have felt

somewhat more aroused than participants in the sad mood condition (M = 3.95,

SD = 1.07 vs.M = 3.50, SD = 0.82, respectively), t(58) = 1.82, p < .08. However,

this effect was only marginally significant and appears to have been an artifact


of the overlap between the valence and arousal items (i.e., happy participants

reported being significantly more alert but somewhat less tense).

Statistical covariates. Participants' initial ratings of how well they expected

to do on the identification task were significantly related to their perceived

success at the task, r(60) = .36, p < .01. (In contrast, there was no relationship

between perceived success and the actual number of objects identified by

participants, r = .13, p = .34. For this reason, actual performance was not used as

a covariate in evaluating perceived success.) Additionally, men reported greater

success at the task than did women (M = 0.26, SD = 0.99 vs. M = 70.49, SD =

0.84), t(58) = 2.97, p < .01, and older students were more likely to report greater

success, r(60) = .25, p < .06. Analysis of participants' performance attributions

also revealed a significant negative relationship between perceived success and

participants' attributions of their performance to luck, r(60) = 7.33, p < .02, but

the mood by self-other framing interaction failed to influence these attributions,

F(1, 55) < 1.0, ns. Thus, this strategy identified four potential covariates, all of

which were retained based on preliminary modelling of perceived success.

Perceived success. A two-way ANCOVA, controlling for the covariates

identified above, was conducted to assess the influence of mood and self-other

framing on perceived success at the object identification task. Although there

was no main effect of self-other framing, F(1, 52) < 1.0, ns, there was a

significant main effect of mood; happy participants indicated greater perceived

success (M = 0.25) compared to sad participants (M = 70.25), F(1, 52) = 5.43, p

< .05, r = .31. However, this effect was qualified by the predicted interaction of

mood and self-other framing, F(1, 52) = 3.65, p = .06, r = .26, as displayed in

Figure 1. Inspection of this interaction revealed a strong, simple effect of mood

among self-focused participants, with happy participants indicating greater

perceived success at the identification task (M = 0.50, SD = 0.21) compared to

sad participants (M = 70.42, SD = 0.21), F(1, 52) = 9.42, p < .01, r = .39. In

contrast, mood did not influence the personal performance judgements of

participants in the other-focused framing condition (happy M = 0.01, SD = 0.22

vs. sad M = 70.08, SD = 0.21), F(1, 52) = 0.07, ns. A planned contrast testing

our hypothesis that mood-congruent perceptions of success would be observed

only under conditions of self-focus was reliable, F(1, 54) = 9.71, p < .01, r = .39,

and accounted for 98% of the variance in perceived success explained by our

experimental manipulations of mood and self-other framing.

Discussion. Results of this experiment confirm that self-other framing can

moderate the influence of mood on perceptions of personal success. When

participants were initially prompted to evaluate their own performance relative

to others, positive mood increased perceptions of success whereas negative

mood decreased perceptions of success. In contrast, mood failed to influence the


personal performance judgements of participants who were initially prompted to

think about the performance of other individuals. These findings suggests that

self-focus may play a critical role in producing mood-congruent perceptions of

personal success. Focusing on other individuals appears to eliminate this effect.

EXPERIMENT 2

The achievement task used in the first study was ideal because it relied on a

highly ambiguous performance task, thus providing a particularly good context

for observing the subjective consequences of mood and self-other framing.

However, its use raises possible criticisms concerning the contrived nature of the

object identification task and, in turn, the generalisability of the findings of the

experiment. Experiment 2 sought to replicate these findings using a more

familiar and compelling domain, students' expected academic performance for

the current semester. Because it was assumed that students would have a rela-

tively clear sense of their current academic standing and performance, particular

attention was paid to controlling for pre-existing differences in academic ability

and expectations so that the subjective consequences of mood and self-other

framing might be observed. Otherwise, the components of the study's survey

paralleled those of Experiment 1. The experiment again took the form of a 2

(happy mood, sad mood) 6 2 (self-focused frame, other-focused frame)

between-subjects design in which it was expected that mood-congruent per-

Figure 1. Perceived success at the identification task as a function of mood and self-other framing,

Experiment 1. (Means are adjusted for initial expectations, sex, age, and performance attributions to

luck.)


ceptions of success would be observed under conditions of self-focus but that

these perceptions would be reduced or eliminated when the decision frame led

participants to focus on other individuals.

Method

Participants

A total of 72 undergraduate students were recruited in the dining halls of Yale

University, 10 weeks into the university's 16 week spring semester. The students

(44% male, 56% female; mean age of 19.4 years) received a candy bar in

exchange for their participation in a brief survey concerning judgements of

academic performance.

Procedure

Participants received a three-page survey containing a few background

questions, the social memories mood-induction procedure, and a final ques-

tionnaire about their expected academic performance for the current semester.

Background questions. The first page of the survey included general

instructions and asked participants to report their age and sex. In addition,

participants answered four questions pertaining to their academic ability and

expectations. These items solicited the student's overall score on the Scholastic

Achievement Test (SAT; assessed on a 6-point scale ranging from less than

1000 to 1500 or greater), cumulative grade point average prior to the current

semester (assessed on a 5-point scale ranging from less than 2.0 to 3.5 or

greater), expected academic performance for the current semester compared to

the student's previous performance at the university (assessed on a 5-point scale

ranging from far below my average performance to far above my average

performance), and perceived academic standing compared to other students at

the university (assessed on an 11-point percentile scale ranging from 0% or

worse than all others to 100% or better than all others).

Mood induction. On the second page of the survey, participants completed

the ``social memories'' mood-induction procedure described in Experiment 1.

This was followed by an abbreviated two-item mood manipulation check

assessing the valence of participants' current feelings (i.e., unpleasant-pleasant

and happy-sad).

Self-other framing. On the final page of the survey, participants completed

a questionnaire about their expected academic performance for the current

semester. Again, the first two items of this questionnaire served as the study's

experimental manipulation of self-other framing. Half of the participants were


randomly assigned to the self-focused framing condition, in which they were

asked to think momentarily about their academic performance for the current

semester relative to the performance of other students they knew and of students

similar to themselves. Specifically, they were asked: ``Think for a moment about

yourself. How do you suppose you will perform academically this semester

compared to other students you know at Yale?'' and ``Again, think for a

moment about yourself. How do you suppose you will perform academically this

semester compared to other students like you?'' In contrast, half of the

participants were assigned to the other-focused framing condition, in which their

attention was directed momentarily to the academic performance of other

students without calling for a comparison between their own performance and

the performance of other students. The other-focused manipulation included the

following two items: ``Think for a moment about other students you know at

Yale. How do you suppose they will perform academically this semester?'' and

``Think for a moment about other students like you. How do you suppose they

will perform academically this semester?''

Measures

Except for the first two items of the final questionnaire, participants com-

pleted a common set of outcome measures.

Expected grades for the current semester. Participants were asked to predict

their letter grades for the current semester. For each of their courses, they were

asked to give their best estimate of the grade they expected to receive along with

the lowest and highest grades they might possibly receive. Responses were

coded using a 13-point scale ranging from 0 (i.e., a letter of F) to 12 (i.e., a letter

grade of A+) and then averaged to produce three measures: average expected

grade, average lowest possible grade, and average highest possible grade.

Although the results of Experiment 1 suggested that mood and self-other

framing might influence only subjective perceptions of academic success, not

these more objective measures of academic performance, these measures were

included after the experimental manipulations to rule out the possibility of such

an effect.

Perceived success. Participants were then asked to rate their expected

academic success for the current semester. Three items were included in an

index of participants' perceived academic success. Participants were asked how

well they thought they would perform academically this semester (assessed on a

7-point scale ranging from not well at all to extremely well), how well they

thought they would perform compared to other Yale students (assessed on an 11-

point percentile scale ranging from 0% or worse than all others to 100% or

better than all others), and how much they enjoyed the semester academically


(assessed using a 4-point scale ranging from not at all to extremely). After

transforming these items into z-scores, they were combined into a standardised

index of participants' perceived success (a = .61).

After completing the follow-up questionnaire, participants were instructed to

return the survey and were debriefed about the study's mood induction and the

hypotheses of the study. They were then thanked, compensated, and dismissed.

Results and discussion

Mood manipulation check. Once again, the social memories procedure

successfully influenced participants' feelings. Participants in the happy mood

condition reported feeling more pleasant (M = 5.61, SD = 1.27) than participants

in the sad mood condition (M = 4.08, SD = 1.20), t(70) = 5.24, p < .001, and they

also reported feeling less sad (M = 2.75, SD = 1.32 vs. M = 4.14, SD = 1.31),

t(70) = 74.48, p < .001.

Statistical covariates. Prior grade point average was significantly related to

perceived success for the current semester, r(72) = .32, p < .01. Additionally,

pre-experimental expectations for the current semester and perceived academic

standing were significantly related to post-experimental perceived success for

the current semester, r(72) = .24, p < .05 and r(72) = .65, p < .001, respectively.

Analysis of the post-experimental measures of expected grades revealed that

average lowest possible grade and average highest possible grade were

significantly related to perceived success, r(72) = .38, p < .01 and r(72) =

.51, p < .001, respectively. Interestingly, average expected grade was not related

to these measures or to the index of perceived success, all rs (72) < .10, ns.

Importantly, none of the post-experimental measures of expected grades was

influenced by the interaction of mood and self-other framing, all Fs (1, 66) <

2.03, ns, which justified the use of average lowest grade and average highest

grade as covariates in evaluating the effects of mood and self-other framing on

perceived success.

These initial analyses identified five potential covariates: prior grade point

average, expectations for the current semester, perceived academic standing, and

the postexperimental measures of average lowest and highest possible grades for

the current semester. However, preliminary modelling revealed that prior grade

point average failed to explain any unique variance in perceived academic

success for the current semester (p = .80) so this variable was eliminated from

the analyses presented below.

Perceived success. A two-way ANCOVA, controlling for the covariates

identified above, was conducted to assess the influence of mood and self-other

framing on perceived academic success for the current semester. Neither mood

nor self-other framing significantly influenced perceived success, Fs (1, 64) =


2.33 and 0.58, respectively, ns. However, the predicted interaction of mood and

self-other framing was observed, F(1, 64) = 4.58, p < .04, r = .26, as displayed in

Figure 2. The pattern of this interaction again revealed a reliable simple effect of

mood among self-focused participants. Self-focused participants who were in a

happy mood anticipated greater academic success for the current semester (M =

0.35, SD = 0.16) than did those in a sad mood (M = 70.23, SD = 0.16), F(1, 64)

= 6.51, p < .02, r = .30. In contrast, mood did not influence the perceived success

of other-focused participants in happy (M = 70.11, SD = 0.15) vs. sad (M =

70.01, SD = 0.15) moods, F(1, 64) = 0.19, ns. Likewise, a planned contrast

testing our hypothesis that mood-congruent perceptions of success would be

observed only under conditions of self-focus again was reliable, F(1, 66) = 6.53,

p < .02, r = .30, and accounted for 86% of the variance in perceived success

explained by our experimental manipulations of mood and self-other framing.

Discussion

The results of this experiment provide evidence that, in moderating the influence

of mood, the influence of self-other framing extends to everyday perceptions of

personal success. In this experiment, the effect was observed for students'

perceptions of their academic success, and the same effect was observed in

Experiment 1 for perceived success at a relatively inconsequential object

Figure 2. Perceived academic success for the current semester as a function of mood and self-other

framing, Experiment 2. (Means are adjusted for initial expectations, perceived academic standing,

and the postexperimental measures of average lowest and average highest possible grades.)


identification task. In each case, self-focused framing appeared to be necessary

to produce mood-congruent perceptions of personal success; a frame leading

participants to focus on the performance of other individuals eliminated the

influence of mood.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Our research evaluated the role of self-other framing in moderating the influence

of mood on self-perceptions of success. Forgas' AIM (1995, 2002a) holds that

affect infusion occurs only when judgements are ambiguous and information

processing is constructive. This requirement should impose a number of

boundary conditions on mood-congruent self-perceptions (Sedikides & Green,

2001). Egocentric accounts of self-favouring biases suggest that self-judgements

are prone to distortion because they typically lack an explicit, normative stan-

dard (Eiser et al., 2001; Kruger, 1999), which led us to hypothesise that mood-

congruent perceptions of success would be eliminated in the context of an other-

focused framing manipulation. Specifically, we predicted that asking partici-

pants to form an explicit representation of the performance of a ``typical other''

would give self-judgements a concrete point of comparison, making them less

ambiguous and, therefore, less susceptible to affect infusion according to the

AIM. This would imply that the open, constructive processing that typically

accompanies self-judgements is critical in producing mood-congruent percep-

tions of personal success.

Two experiments were conducted to determine whether self-focused framing

would result in mood-congruent perceptions of personal success, whereas other-

focused framing would eliminate this effect. Results from these experiments

were consistent in their support of our hypothesis; the influence of mood on

perceived success depended on whether participants were exposed to self-

focused or other-focused decision frames. Mood-congruent judgements of suc-

cess were observed only when participants were self-focused, with happy par-

ticipants anticipating greater success compared to sad participants. In contrast,

this effect was eliminated after participants made an explicit judgement about

the performance of other individuals. This interaction between mood and self-

other framing was observed in the context of a simple object identification task,

and it generalised to students' perceptions of their academic success. The con-

sistency of these findings provides compelling evidence that self-other framing

moderates the influence of mood on perceived success. Other-focused decision

frames appear to decrease subjectivity and diminish the influence of mood on

self-judgements as information processing becomes less open and constructive

(Forgas, 1995, 2002a).

The current research used two types of achievement tasks, but the meth-

odologies of the two experiments otherwise were quite similar. Given the

methodological similarities, there are some possible limitations of the research.


First, both of the experiments used a common autobiographical mood-induction

procedure. This is not a serious concern insofar as self-referential experiences

are a primary source of naturally occurring moods. However, past research has

found that different mood-induction procedures can lead to different outcomes

(e.g., Rosenhan, Salovey, & Hargis, 1981; Wood, Saltzberg, & Goldsamt, 1990).

Moreover, autobiographical recollections would seem to be particularly self-

focusing, which raises some concern over their use in conjunction with a

manipulation of self-other framing. Future studies using other manipulations of

mood (e.g., music or video clips) would add to the strength and generality of the

current findings. Still, self-focus is likely to accompany moods originating from

other sources (Salovey, 1992). More importantly, our finding that an other-

focused decision frame appears to remove the egocentrism typically associated

with self-judgements, even after experiencing a particularly self-focusing

autobiographical mood induction, argues that the effect of such frames is quite

powerful and that other-focused frames easily disrupt the influence of mood on

self-perceptions. This is compelling evidence of another boundary condition of

mood-congruent self-perceptions.

A second limitation of our investigation is that it did not include a neutral

mood condition, so the effect of the happy and sad mood conditions only can be

judged relative to one another. The observed influence of mood might reflect a

comparable, symmetrical effect of happiness vs. sadness, as we argue based on

the AIM and its assumption that positive and negative moods will distort

judgements in opposite directions. Alternatively, our findings could be attributed

to the influence of either happiness or sadness alone. Although our studies

cannot rule out the possibility of an asymmetry between the happy and sad mood

conditions (for a discussion of this concern, see Rusting, 1998), careful con-

sideration of our data suggests that they reflect a symmetrical effect of positive

vs. negative moods. In both studies, the other-focused manipulation clearly

eliminated the effect of mood on perceptions of success. As a result, these

conditions provide a reasonable proxy of a neutral mood control, compared to

which we observed a symmetrical effect of mood in the self-focused framing

conditions. Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that mood-congruent

judgement consistently produces symmetrical effects, whereas mood-congruent

memory produces asymmetrical effects (Blaney, 1986; Mayer et al., 1992;

Rusting, 1998). The reason for this difference between mood-congruent

judgement and mood-congruent memory remains unclear (Rusting, 1998) and is

outside the scope of our current research. However, it is important to char-

acterise our research as pertaining only to mood-congruent judgement (for a

review of mood-congruent memory, see Blaney, 1986).

Finally, there is a possibility that a match, or lack thereof, between the self-

other framing manipulation and the subsequent judgement task contributed to

our findings. Specifically, participants in the self-focused framing conditions of

both studies were asked to focus on themselves (for the manipulation) and to rate


their own performance (for the outcome measure). Those in the other-focused

framing conditions were asked to focus on other people (manipulation) and to

rate their own performance (outcome). We have argued and demonstrated that

mood-congruent self-perceptions occur when a judgement focuses on the self

rather than on others. We based this prediction on the AIM, implying that other-

focused framing leads to less constructive information processing, in general.

However, given the design of our study, it is possible that mood-congruent

judgement occurs when the target of the judgement task (self vs. other) matches

the focus of the decision frame (self-focus vs. other-focus, respectively). We did

not include sufficient outcome measures asking participants to rate the perfor-

mance of others, so we cannot speak directly to this possibility. However,

research showing that mood-congruent biases are sometimes found when

making judgements concerning others (e.g., Forgas & Bower, 1987), suggests

that this matching-hypothesis should be tested in future studies.

Despite these possible concerns, the current research provides initial evidence

that self-other framing can play a significant role in moderating the influence of

mood on perceptions of personal success. More broadly, these findings suggest

that the open, constructive processing accompanying most self-judgements is

critical in producing mood-congruent perceptions of personal success, high-

lighting another boundary condition of mood-congruent judgement. In future

work, we will apply similar methods to judgements that go beyond achievement.

By doing so, we hope to gain further insight into how emotion and cognition

function interdependently and how people subjectively interpret themselves,

others, and the situations they experience.

Manuscript received 2 December 2004

Revised manuscript received 28 July 2005

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