module cooperation and partnership

ITC-ILO Curriculum on

“Building modern and effective labour inspection systems”

MODULE

5 Cooperation and partnership

5. Cooperation and partnership

What this Module is about

Labour Inspectorates need to work in wider cooperation and partnerships if they are to be effective and maximise their impact.

This module examines cooperation and partnerships on labour inspection issues at several levels: between different Government ministries and between inspection services, with social partners and other stakeholders and international partnerships. It considers the role of other bodies and institutions in supporting labour inspection in its different functions and provides an overview of voluntary initiatives in order to promote compliance with national and international principles and rights at work.

Objectives

At the end of this module, participants will be able to:

Appreciate the importance of cooperation and partnership to ensure impact and efficiency of a labour inspection system.

Recognize the importance of collaboration with other government bodies and inspection services at both national and international levels.

Describe different modalities for promoting tripartism and collaboration with social partners at different levels, and promote them.

Identify other important partners in a labour inspection system.

Be familiar with the international debate on voluntary compliance in relation to labour inspection.

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ITC-ILO Curriculum on “Building modern and effective labour inspection systems”

Acknowledgements

This module is based on ILO reports and documents - mainly from ACTRAV, ITUC, ACTEMP, IOE, Multi, Better Work and Dialogue – and IALI publications.

Particular thanks go to the ITC/ILO Technical Programme on The social dimension of trade and investment for the bibliography, the relevant documents and the technical advice provided in the areas of corporate social responsibility and voluntary compliance.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction 5

2. Cooperation with the social partners 62.1. The strategic framework of Tripartism 62.2. Principles of tripartite cooperation in Labour Inspection 72.3. Cooperation with social partners at macro-policy level 8

Cooperation agreements 102.4. Cooperation with social partners at supra-national level 11

2.5. Cooperation with social partners at sectoral and local level 122.6. Cooperation with social partners at enterprise level 132.7. Cooperation with employers 132.8. Cooperation with workers 16

The worker inspectors 18 Exercise 1: Advantages of cooperation among Labour Inspection

and Social Partners 19

3. Cooperation between inspectorates 203.1 National cooperation and partnerships 203.2 International cooperation and partnerships 21 International Association of Labour Inspection 21 Regional inspectorate associations 22

4. Cooperation with other stakeholders 234.1. Social security and social insurance institutions 23

4.2. The police 24

4.3. Judicial bodies 25

4.4. Tax authorities and the ministries responsible for the sectors covered by inspection 25

4.5. National human rights mechanisms 26

4.6. Immigration authorities 26

4.7. Social research institutions and universities 27

4.8. Professional institutions and NGOs 28

4.9. The Media 28 Exercise 2: Cooperation: missing links 31 Exercise 3: Cooperation with... 33

5. Voluntary compliance and beyond 355.1. Corporate social responsibility 36

Definitions 36Historical background 36Public-private partnership approach 38Voluntary compliance 39

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Multinational Enterprises 405.2. Social Audit, monitoring and certification 41

Pros and cons, an open debate 42Forward looking… 44

Exercise 4: I agree, I don’t agree 45

Summary 47

Bibliography and additional readings 49

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1. INTRODUCTION

There is still a persistent inadequacy, at least in practice, of cooperation mechanisms helpful to the labour inspectorate in its activities. The most obvious reason for this is the tendency for the different authorities involved to operate separately from one another. It is thus necessary to have greater integration of objectives, means, and circulation and processing of information.

For too long, the labour inspectorate in most countries has operated in a reactive manner and in isolation, and the results achieved reflect the means generally allocated to it. This is still the case in many developing countries. In industrialized countries, greater awareness of the economic losses that result from poor or illegal working conditions has prompted greater efforts to improve working conditions generally. Institutional cooperation and the active involvement of the social partners continue to prove their worth in this regard.

Establishing inter-institutional cooperation and multilateral collaboration is an inherent part of the very concept of a labour administration system.

Since the purpose of a systemic approach is to ensure that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, the effectiveness of labour inspection will depend in no small measure on its capacity to function through interaction with its social and economic environment. It requires action to develop mechanisms and areas of cooperation with all the public and private players concerned, in particular with the social partners and their representative organizations.

The designation of a central labour inspection authority ensures that the activities of the authorities placed under its control are coordinated with a view to achieving a clearly defined objective.

It also ensures a degree of cohesion between mechanisms for cooperation and collaboration with other public and private bodies and institutions and with the employers and workers and their organizations, which are referred to in Article 5 of Convention No. 81 and Articles 12 and 13 of Convention No. 129. Lastly, by passing on to the consultative bodies that deal with labour and social issues, to all ministries concerned, and to the social partners, some of the information it receives from its subordinate departments, the central authority can contribute to strengthening the labour administration system as a whole.

A global and systemic approach to labour inspection is needed, and such an approach has become predominant in industrialized countries in recent decades, where it is widely accepted that a high level of protection at work contributes to social cohesion. Different cooperation mechanisms and institutions are also being developed rapidly in many transition countries with a view to strengthening the labour inspection system.


2. COOPERATION WITH THE SOCIAL PARTNERS

2.1. The strategic framework of Tripartism

Tripartism constitutes the framework in which labour inspection must operate if it wants to be successful. ln the ILO context, this means the interaction between government (the labour administration system), and employers and workers, their organizations and their representatives. It is an instrument to address common concerns, involving various means of interaction within a framework of social dialogue: sharing of information, consultations, negotiations and decision making. ln the context of labour inspection, it can take place at international, national, provincial, sector or enterprise level.

Tripartite interaction has several objectives: it enables the parties to be actively involved in issues of mutual concern, thereby promoting improved understanding of their common and conflicting interests. With tripartite interaction, a balance can be found between economic, political and social concerns, as weIl as between the individual interests of each of the three parties and overall sectoral or national interests. Tripartite cooperation means that the specific knowledge and interests of each of the three parties can be taken into account in addressing economic and social questions. ln so doing, policies, laws and specific solutions can be formulated which are acceptable to each party and which address its specific needs. Tripartite cooperation can result in a broader consensus in decision making, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the process and the acceptability of its outcome, and ultimately easing the task of enforcement by inspectors in the field.

Effective tripartism requires that each of the social partners be represented. For workers' and employers' organizations, this implies that they speak on behalf of the majority of workers and employers in the country, or at least a sufficient number to give credibility and recognition to these organizations; that they have effective contact with the members they represent to ensure that those members' interests and ideas are considered; and that they are able to nominate whom they choose as their representatives in the tripartite consultative forum.

Just as employers' and workers' organizations must be representative, so must governments. ln this context, "representative" means that the government in question is perceived as pursuing the legitimate interests of its working people.

Effective tripartism requires also that workers' and employers' organizations be independent: each social partner should be operating according to its own objectives and procedures without undue influence from government authorities. Effective tripartism and social dialogue can lead to reduced conflict, greater industrial peace, better motivation, higher productivity, improved quality, better labour protection and, in consequence, a reduced need for labour inspection intervention.

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2.2. Principles of tripartite cooperation in Labour Inspection

A well-organized labour inspection service with appropriate resources and adequate legal instruments is an important component of economic and social development. It is recognized that cooperation yields better results than confrontation, at least in terms of social peace, and the more the labour inspectorate can do to foster cooperation between employers, workers and the government, the greater its contribution to the economic and social well-being of the country is likely to be.

The need for close cooperation between labour inspection and employers and workers is one of the key principles of Labour Inspection. Under Article 5, the ILO Convention No. 81 on Labour Inspection states that "the competent authority shall make appropriate arrangements to promote collaboration between officiaIs of the labour inspectorate and employers and workers of their organizations". ln addition, Para. 6 of Labour Inspection Recommendation, 1947 (No. 81), advocates that collaboration between officiaIs of the labour inspectorate and organizations of employers and workers should be facilitated by the organization of conferences or joint committees, or similar bodies, enabling a dialogue to be established among the various parties.

On a more general framework, Convention No. 150 on Labour Administration, referring to the overall system of Labour Administration, in its Article 5, requires that:

1. Each Member which ratifies this Convention shall make arrangements appropriate to national conditions to secure, within the system of labour administration, consultation, cooperation and negotiation between the public authorities and the most representative organizations of employers and workers, or - where appropriate - employers' and workers' representatives.

2. To the extent compatible with national laws and regulations, and national practice, such arrangements shall be made at the national, regional and local levels as well as at the level of the different sectors of economic activity.

This cooperation is essential. It begins with the collaboration between labour inspection, government, employers and employees' organizations in the formulation of labour protection legislation until its application in the workplace, including the study of problems and proposals to improve living and working conditions, and the provision of information to employers concerning their statutory obligations.

ln encouraging employers, employers' organizations, and trade unions to become more involved in labour protection, inspectorates also become more concerned with providing advice on what can be done and how, giving information, and training employers and workers to enable them to participate effectively in self-reliant approaches. If this work is undertaken systematically and successfully, their law- enforcement role becomes easier and sometime complementary.

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2.3. Cooperation with social partners at macro-policy level

The object of national policy on labour protection is to create a general framework for the improvement of working conditions and the working environment. Policy formulation has two major aspects: the design process and content. Policy design is best anchored in a framework of tripartite consultations. Many countries have established tripartite bodies specifically mandated for social dialogue in this context. ln other countries, tripartite bodies set, guide, monitor and control the policy formulation and implementation process.

These committees may be set up spontaneously, or in accordance with some procedure laid down by law, or they may be advisory bodies set up at different levels, for example, advisory labour councils, collective agreements supervisory boards, and national safety and health advisory councils.1

Where the government provides the secretariat for these bodies, the aim should be to organize regular meetings with meaningful agendas, and to ensure that decisions made are brought into effect.

The basic duties, characteristics, responsibilities and rights of members and services of tripartite and bipartite collaboration bodies and their organization should be laid down in a national labour protection policy.

The more progressive arrangements come into place when governments can create an environment whereby tripartite committees are made accountable for recommending new and amending existing legislation, developing policy, having responsibility for direction and supervision of labour inspection services and activities, and producing codes of practice and guidance.

Members of the labour inspectorate frequently share in the work of advisory bodies (in addition to providing the secretariat). They may be appointed, by name, as representatives of the minister to whom the particular body is responsible, in which case their appointment is based on the public character of their duties, their rank in the national civil service, or their personal ability to represent the department. On other occasions, the labour inspection service may be requested, together with other technical units, to send representatives to meetings to provide information that the service has obtained in the course of its day-to-day work. This information may be essential in guiding discussions or in deciding on a course of action.

Sometimes it is necessary to make use of the labour inspectorate's knowledge of labour relations in a given area or a particular industry, or to examine the difficulties which might arise in the practical application of a legal text in the

1 Guidance for setting up this kind of mechanisms can be found inter alia in the Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No. 155), and its accompanying Recommendation (No. 164), and also in the EU Framework Directive on Occupational Safety and Health (891391IEEC).


course of preparation. ln these cases, the representative of the labour inspectorate merely attends as an observer or expert, takes no real part in making decisions, and is limited to the provision of advice. The position is quite different when the inspectors' attendance is part of their routine duties, and when it is the labour inspection service itself that is represented because of its technical responsibility (as is the case, for instance, in France and other countries following the French system). This usually involves participation in a collective decision. Occasionally, the inspectorate is asked to give its approval before a final decision on a particular issue is made.

The role of an inspection service in a sectoral planning committee is directed towards drawing attention to the labour problems that should be considered before a particular measure is decided on, and to problems that could result from the introduction of such a measure.

Very often these tripartite bodies have several functions: in addition to policy setting, they could: supervise the inspectorate properly; monitor policy implementation; evaluate the results; attribute resources and assume overall responsibility for the proper running of the inspection service. They may be politically accountable to a government minister or directly to parliament.

The UK tripartite body on occupational safety and health

In the UK, social partners work together at national level in the field of occupational safety and health.

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is responsible for consulting all stakeholders in Great Britain on matters of occupational safety and health, advising government on long, medium and short-term policy and plans for safety and health at work. There is thus consultation between the HSE and social partners, educational and training establishments, standard-setting organizations, insurance organizations and others to develop best practice and a preventative safety and health culture in Great Britain.

The HSE Board comprises representatives from employers and workers organizations as well as other key stakeholders. It also has a structure of tripartite industry advisory committees covering specific sectors or topics, and it encourages them and other industry representatives to produce detailed guidance on relevant matters.

The HSE also comprises the inspectorates who are responsible for providing advice and information at the enterprise level and promoting compliance with relevant safety and health legislation.

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Cooperation agreements

In addition to formal tripartite, bipartite or tripartite-plus national bodies, the inter-institutional cooperation with the social partners may take other forms, such as collaboration agreements.

For example, collaboration focusing on occupational safety and health is ensured through tripartite agreements in Bulgaria and Cyprus; in the Netherlands, the aim of collaboration between employers and workers is to reduce the number of people drawing sickness and disability benefits by improving conditions of work.

Tripartite Agreement in Portugal

The Government of Portugal has announced that the labour inspectorate and the social partners have concluded an agreement on working conditions, health and safety at work, and combating occupational risks. The aim is to develop a national prevention plan and a plan of action targeting the most risk-prone sectors. The Government hopes that the implementation of this agreement will be an opportunity to reactivate the National Occupational Health and Safety Council, to establish an observatory for prevention, and to improve collaboration between the occupational risks centre and other interested bodies. This should also facilitate the adoption or modification of legal provisions applicable to the sectors most affected by occupational accidents, as well as efforts to restructure the statistical system for recording and following up occupational accidents and cases of occupational disease.

How can one improve the active participation of social partners in the Labour Inspection System? There are no “standard” recommendations, valid for every country; each country should find its own way to promote partnerships and alliances.

The ILO, as follow up to audits done in several countries in the world, formulated recommendations aiming at filling the gaps of the system identified. For example, the recommendations from an ILO Audit in Luxemburg are reported as example in the box below.

Recommendations from ILO Audit in Luxembourg

Create a tripartite commission for all questions relating to working conditions. This body would be responsible for identifying problems, suggesting solutions, giving its opinion on the labour inspectorate's policy and its priorities, piloting training programmes aimed at employers or workers, organizing awareness campaigns and participating in the evaluation of the Labour Inspection actions.

ln particular, it could define the objectives and lay down the foundations for a national awareness and training programme for employers and workers.

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The composition of the tripartite commission should include representatives from the Accident lnsurance Association, the occupational health division, customs, the civil service's safety service and, if necessary, the Commission for Maritime Affairs.

The non-representative unions should also be represented in a proportion which needs to be defined.

Eventually create tripartite sub-commissions by sector. Organise a revolving presidency between the employers, workers and the Labour Inspection.

This commission should deal with working conditions (except for other subjects such as employment, unemployment, etc.).

Abandon the idea of the tripartite management of the labour inspection.

Improve the awareness of labour inspectors in an important area of their task which is to promote social dialogue between the employer and the workers' representatives within companies.

2.4. Cooperation with social partners at supra-national level

Cooperation with social partners can also happen at supranational level, in particular in the framework of the regional and subregional economic, trade and social integrations. The most advanced experience, in this perspective, is the European Union, in particular in the area of Occupational Health and Safety.

European Union Tripartite approach to OHS

The European Commission , in matters dealing with OHS, is always bound to consult and to consider the discussion and the written advices of the Advisory Tripartite Committee on Health and Safety for formulating new law proposals. The members of this Committee are chosen by the Member States and by the European workers’ and employers organizations.

Also the classification, labelling and technical standardisation of chemicals in accordance with the European directives - which give the essential safety and health requirements for CE designing and marking products, machinery and protective equipment - are a tripartite exercise.2

2 Ref: 98/37/EC (machinery) and 89/686/EEC (Personal Protective Equipment).


2.5. Cooperation with social partners at sectoral and local level

Many governments, in addition to national tripartite bodies, have established statutory tripartite bodies responsible for labour protection at regional and sectoral levels. These bodies deal with a wide variety of topics, which may include labour protection legislation, wages policy, safety and health, occupational hazards, industrial relations issues and even vocational training. ln most cases, qualification for membership is set out by regulation, and is usually confined to workers' or employers' representatives or members of professional organizations, with a vested interest in the matters under discussion. The labour administration concerned department usually provides administrative support, and its effectiveness is directly related to the quality of this support.

The National Standing Committee on Agriculture, Brazil

In Brazil, the principal objectives of the National Standing Committee on Agriculture, set up in 2001, are a greater formalization of employment and the introduction of social protection coverage. The Committee’s activities focus on efforts to find appropriate solutions in order to improve conditions of work in agriculture, coordinate planning, implement and evaluate accident prevention campaigns in agriculture, and develop occupational safety and health regulations.

Mining sector, Belgium

Workers' delegates have been involved into the mining inspectorate. They are appointed for a period of four years renewable on the proposal of the trade union organizations.

Their experience in mining work gives these workers' delegates the ability to make an effective contribution to the activities of the mining engineers under whom they work. One of the main characteristics of this institution lies in the authority of the workers' delegates, in the event of imminent danger and after discussion with the management or its representatives, to order measures with immediate effect including the evacuation of the danger area. The engineer of the mining service, who must be warned as early as possible, has 24 hours in which to give his opinion on the decision taken.

Sectoral bodies can be particularly effective in interpreting legislation for the processes or activities of the industry or sector in question, by agreeing and publishing detailed guidance. This reassures employers that the same requirements are being imposed on competitors, as well as assisting inspectors in their enforcement of agreed standards.

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2.6. Cooperation with social partners at enterprise level

A growing number of countries have introduced legislation that requires joint committees to be established in industrial, commercial and even non-commercial enterprises above a certain size, although this has not occurred to the same extent in agricultural enterprises. These committees complement some of the functions of the labour inspectorate, exercise in-plant supervision over conditions of work and, in particular, occupational safety and health, and generally help prevent occupational and ever-increasing social and economic risks. A parallel development has been the introduction of safety delegates elected by the workers in enterprises, usually when there are more than ten workers in the enterprise (but sometimes more than five) or, occasionally, when they are appointed by trade unions. ln recognition of the value of both joint safety and health committees and safety delegates, the tendency on the part of governments is to give them increasingly extensive powers, for example to allow them time off (by law) to accompany labour inspectors on their visits - an important point, since they can indicate hazards which might otherwise escape the inspector's notice and generally add considerable value to the inspector's presence in the workplace.

The collaboration of the inspection services with workers' representatives is not confined to questions of occupational safety and health. ln a number of countries, legislation states that trade union delegates and other staff representatives within the enterprise should have special responsibilities for conditions of employment and work. These delegates and representatives are specifically responsible for submitting complaints and observations relating to the application of the legal provisions and regulations to the labour inspectorate.

2.7. Cooperation with employers

The effectiveness of labour inspection services is considerably enhanced if it is supported by the concerted action not only of workers but, first and foremost, of employers and their representatives. There is a global tendency to associate both workers and employers more closely with the work of the inspectorate. Many countries' safety and health inspection systems, notably in the European Union, but also in Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand, focus on the employer as the person unequivocally responsible for labour protection within the enterprise. New policies in these countries aim to stimulate (the Netherlands) or influence, indeed persuade (United Kingdom) employers to do whatever is reasonably practicable to improve and safeguard working conditions and the working environment and, in doing so, to go beyond the legal minimum standards of protection. If these policies are to succeed and have a sustainable effect at the workplace, labour inspection must also be seen to be providing services to employers. ln the main, these will concern advice and information, but in more and more countries, inspectors also provide training for employers' representatives or staff, for example, safety engineers or occupational nurses. Increasingly, in the small enterprise

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sector, employees are offered training programmes that combine elements of business management and basic labour protection issues as a service by the inspectorate.

Very often, the establishment of bodies, such as joint committees, is provided for by legislation, and supplemented by collective agreements supervised by the inspectorate.

The organizational structure and scope of employers is an important determinant of how and to what extent the labour inspectorate can engage in social dialogue and provide effective services. Central federations facilitate cooperation. ln many industrializing countries, employers that are members of a national federation, though often in the minority, tend to provide substantially better conditions than non-organized employers do. They are more available to share information and experience, and are generally more open to the service orientation of labour inspection.

Individual employers, both large and small, can do much to encourage greater consultation and discussion with workers on working conditions and the working environment. Inspectorates can advise and encourage employers to form joint consultative bodies, and informal work groups to assume responsibility for some of the matters related to labour inspection, such as working conditions, safety and health, enforcement of labour law at the workplace.

Employers' organizations can be encouraged to advise individual employers on good work practice, and assist them in undertaking more self-inspection, as good work practice is good business.

The Good Neighbour Scheme in Ireland

An interesting initiative in Ireland has been the “Good Neighbour Scheme”. Under this scheme, large companies work together with smaller companies to promote greater awareness of workplace health and safety issues. The scheme aims to “marry” the two together, with the larger companies offering a helping hand to the smaller companies. The type and level of support is left entirely up to the companies concerned. A similar scheme is operating in Japan, with a more active involvement of the Labour Inspectorate. There, if small enterprises refuse the help of experienced professionals from the larger companies, they may in consequence be targeted for in-depth inspection by the officers of the Labour Standards Bureau. Certain provinces in Canada are also experimenting with “godfather”-type schemes or linkages between large and small companies, though entirely on a voluntary basis.3

Just as an example, the box below reports the recommendations issued from an ILO Audit in a developing country (references to the country have

3 ILO, Document N56, New Prevention Strategies for Labour Inspection, Labour Administration Branch.


been cancelled on purpose, in order to focus on the issues and not to the specific context).

Measures to ensure active involvement of employers' organizations

ln order to further enhance the role and effectiveness of the employers organization (XY) in the improvement of understanding between employers and workers on the one hand, and inspection officers on the other in areas of labour and factory inspection, a number of specific recommendations are prepared as follows.

Concerted tripartite revision of existing labour legislation and enforcement practices by Government in order to cover all employers, workers and workplaces on labour and industrial relations matters such as freedom of association, collective bargaining, workers' protection and compensation, labour/factory inspection, and settlement of disputes.

Continuous membership drive by XY and, especially, by its constituent industrial groups to recruit and involve the greatest number of employers and employees' organizations, especially among indigenous enterprises and commercialised parastatals.

Concerted effort by XY and its constituent industrial groups to convince employers to regard occupational safety and health as integral parts of the daily and normal factors of production on equal footing with wages, employee benefits, finance, technology and sales, and to place prevention of occupational accidents and diseases on the highest possible priority.

Continuous assistance of employers by XY and its constituent industrial groups through practical programmes of information, education, training, and research in occupational safety and health as weIl as working conditions.

For XY and its constituent industrial groups to encourage and assist employers in establishing company-specific, practical, and action-oriented policies and programmes on occupational safety and health and working conditions at the shop- floor level, including the creation of safety committees, worker/management consultative committees, job safety analysis, plant safety inspections and accident investigation procedures.

For employers to include matters of occupational safety and health and the improvement of working conditions as important issues of collective bargaining negotiations and agreements.

More intensive and vigorous compliance with occupational safety and health standards by employers, including disciplining of workers who neglect to wear protective equipment and clothing.

Moreover, on a voluntary basis, employers can undertake initiatives to go beyond the floor established by the national law and adopt measures for applying international labour principles and rights at work even in the

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absence of national ratification, as further illustrated in chapter 5 of this module.

So-called voluntary compliance programmes can be considered as a new type of service provided by the inspectorate to employers, such as those practised in the United States.

2.8. Cooperation with workers

Labour inspection was established for the protection of workers. Clearly, they are the primary beneficiaries of its services. It is therefore both inevitable and indispensable that labour inspectors and workers should have close relationships. These can be established in a variety of forms; outside enterprises, through trade union organizations and within enterprises, through workers' representatives in works councils and labour protection committees, through shop stewards or safety representatives.

Trade unions at the industry and enterprise levels can do much to bring breaches of the labour law and regulations to the attention of individual employers and employers' organizations, thereby improving workers' protection.

They can also actively encourage and participate in collective bargaining on working conditions and include workplace safety and health.

ILO Conventions and Recommendations on OSH matters (in particular C155 and R164) provide that workers representatives and other participatory structures should receive enough information; have the possibility to discuss about it with their organizations; ask for agreed external technical expertise; have the opportunity to analyse risk factors and to propose preventive measures; be consulted before taking important OSH measures have to be taken and before adopting changes in operations or work organization having repercussions on OSH, in particular on air pollution and noise.

Despite their widespread ratification, these regulations are often only superficially formalistically applied in many countries worldwide. However, in some countries, social supervisory organs of the trade unions have, among other things, the right to supervise the manner in which the undertakings fulfil their obligations regarding occupational safety and health, and to make regular inspections of the workplaces and installations. Moreover, in some cases, these bodies have powers to verify whether undertakings make investigations of occupational accidents and to participate in investigating the causes of such accidents and of occupational diseases, by making investigations themselves in appropriate cases. In order to perform their task effectively these organs may invite undertakings, by means of instructions of a binding nature, to make good shortcomings existing in the operation of machinery and equipment and, in the event of imminent danger, to order a stoppage of work.

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Labour inspectors in many countries have an important role in overseeing the observance of trade union rights, the protection of legitimate workers' representatives, and the effective operation of statutory bodies designed to engage in social dialogue. This is also an important domain for inspectors' advisory services, to workers and employers alike.

The continuing decline in trade union membership in many industrialized countries has had the effect of eroding trade unions' status as representatives of their constituency. ln this context, services provided by labour inspection acquire increasing importance. The task of ensuring compliance with regulations designed to guarantee that workers' representatives can exercise their functions, and that representative bodies can function constructively in such conditions, takes on a new dimension.

ln many countries, labour inspectors are also charged with the task of providing training for workers' representatives on aIl issues related to labour protection.

If the inspectorate does not organize this training itself, inspectors will regularly participate in training activities organized by other parties. Of course, inspectors also provide direct services to individual workers, in so far as they react to complaints or give advice. Although the decision on what action to take rests with the inspectors, it is in this context that an inspectorate will be judged as to whether or not it provides a service, and whether this service is performed to the satisfaction of its primary clients, the workers. ln some countries, trade unions or individual workers, if they are dissatisfied with the way a complaint has been handled, will refer it to their parliamentary representative, which may result in its being made public, or referred to an ombudsperson, showing the inspectorate in a bad light.

The box below reports the recommendations issued by an ILO Audit in the same developing country of the previous box.

Measures to ensure active involvement of workers' organizations

These recommendations are addressed to the Workers confederations and their affiliated industrial Trade Unions and staff associations.

The Confederations and each of their affiliates should draw up a comprehensive, action-oriented policy to improve labour protection in the country.

Labour protection issues should be made an integral part of aIl collective bargaining negotiations.

Labour leaders should develop considerably more sensitivity and acquire the necessary awareness and knowledge through extensive workers' education training and information. ILO should give more assistance in this field.

The Confederations and their affiliates should give special attention and training to the newly set-up Safety and Health Committees and safety representatives.

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Labour leaders should make it a matter of priority to represent the workers' interests on matters of occupational safety, health and welfare in tripartite bodies at both Federal' and State levels. This should include the presentation of position papers, etc.

Specific provisions on child labour with stiff fines for non-compliance should be adopted.

There is a need to provide guidelines for employers to correctly calculate the compensation benefits for injured workers and dependants of dead workmen.

The Worker Inspectors

In some Central and Eastern European countries, the so called "worker inspectors" play a special role. In truth, the institution's origins lie much further back in time. It emerged in the industrialized countries of western Europe at the end of the 19th century and had long been a central demand of the trade unions in France and Germany.

The trade unions had secured recognition for union reps to act as inspectors under a variety of names in industries like mining. In some cases, these worker inspectors held auxiliary posts within the general labour inspection authority. The evidence is that this institution made a major contribution to prevention provided there was a clear demarcation of roles between the collective representation of workers and enforcement of legislation.

In most former Soviet bloc countries, the labour inspection system had forged close ties with the trade unions and was partly based on the activity of these "worker inspectors". This relationship was not clear-cut inasmuch as the trade unions tended to operate as an extension of the Party and State authorities. The worker inspectors often sought to play down company management's liability for accidents and blame them on mistakes by individual workers.

The revival of independent trade unions ought to have given a new impetus to this institution. The worker inspection system was heavily run down during the transition towards a free market economy and has completely disappeared in some countries. In Poland, the system has struggled to stay alive in firms with trade union representation, but remains highly active in the mining industry in the Czech Republic.

In Luxembourg, in 2002 an ILO audit of the labour inspection service criticized the appointment of labour inspectors on proposals from representative trade unions. ILO missions in Central and Eastern European countries have recommended that trade union inspection systems be dismantled.

However, far from being a quirk of former Soviet bloc countries, the worker inspection system could in many ways strengthen preventive strategies in the countries of Western Europe. Although lacking such wide-ranging powers, the district workers' safety reps in Sweden carry out some labour inspection-like tasks by running legislation enforcement campaigns in some areas.

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Exercise 1

TITLE Advantages of cooperation among Labour Inspection and Social Partners

TASK In small groups, discuss what are the main advantages to associate workers’ and employers’ representatives to Labour Inspection Functions. Try to make some concrete examples of the advantages mentioned, drawn from group members’ experience.

List the main advantages in a flip chart and designate a rapporteur to present the findings in plenary.

At the end of the groups’ presentation, the facilitator will summarise the key findings and consolidate them in a list.

TIME From 30’ to 45’ for group work. 5’ for each group presentation. From 20’ to 30’ for final consolidation.


3. COOPERATION BETWEEN INSPECTORATES

3.1. National cooperation and partnerships

Labour inspection responsibilities are frequently divided between different government ministries or departments according to specified criteria, such as geographical location, economic sector or subject matter. In all cases, it is important for there to be good cooperation between these different inspectorates at national and local levels, to improve both efficiency and effectiveness. Rationalizing and pooling material and logistical resources could also alleviate the chronic inadequacy of resources available to inspectorates in many countries. For this reason, some countries have now adopted so-called Integrated Labour Inspection Systems, moving towards the principle of “One enterprise: one inspector”.

The importance of collaboration between the inspectorates and other government authorities and institutions is widely recognized, even though the methods and extent of such collaboration vary from country to country. First and foremost, cooperation must be established among the various services of the system that deal with different kinds of inspection or different sectors of employment. Experience shows, however, that such cooperation is frequently absent; this may sometimes be due to the absence of any central coordinating authority. Thus, in countries where departmental inspection responsibilities correspond to economic sectors, labour inspectors responsible for industry and commerce may have hardly any contact with their colleagues responsible for, say, agriculture, who may be attached to the Ministry of Agriculture. The isolation of special branches of the inspection system is unjustified when they are all part of the same labour administration system; in such circumstances, there seems to be no obvious reason for a lack of central coordination. Even if the isolation does not lead to rivalry about fields of influence or competence, it is bound to be harmful to the standing of labour inspection as a whole, in particular vis-à-vis its clients. It also prevents cross-fertilization of ideas and practices since experience in one sector can often provoke innovation in another.

Cooperation between separate inspection services should be organized at the highest level, particularly for the joint consideration of problems which, at the national level, are bound to concern each of those services, no matter what their responsibilities may be. At lower levels, contacts may be organized on an informal basis, although it is preferable that collaboration between inspection services be institutionalized. In some countries where specialised mines inspectorates have been set up to deal with safety and health in mines, their inspectors are obliged by law to inform the labour inspectorates of the results of their visits. The latter may also ask to participate in the mines inspectorates’ visits. In one country, the legislation requires that the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Ministry of Health and the national insurance body must collaborate in carrying out their activities.

In some countries, agreements between inspectorates take the form of official Memoranda of Understanding. For example, these sometimes exist between Marine Safety Departments and labour inspectorates regarding the safety of

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dockworkers loading and unloading ships: if there is defective equipment on board ships, labour inspectors must inform their colleagues in Marine Safety Departments.

3.2 International cooperation and partnerships

Several international organizations now exist to support national labour inspection services and to promote greater professionalism amongst inspectors themselves. Such organizations greatly facilitate cooperation between national inspectorates on common topics, encouraging both effectiveness and efficiency. Innovations, information and ideas are thus exchanged through networking as well as through formal meetings, conferences etc. The use of the internet has also made it much easier to work effectively at an international level, although some labour inspectorates are still inadequately resourced here.

The International Association of Labour Inspection (IALI)

IALI was set up in 1972 as a group of labour inspectorates across Europe, to promote information exchange. It now has over 110 members from all over the world, and holds regular international meetings and other events to ensure a good flow of relevant and up-to-date information.

Its stated aims are:

To promote the professionalism of its members on all aspects of labour inspection, so as to enhance their impact and effectiveness;

To hold international and regional conferences and similar events at which members can exchange ideas and experience about how best to promote compliance with labour law and good practice;

To provide information to its members about professional issues through the Association’s website, newsletters, reports and other publications;

To promote closer collaboration between its members, through regional networking and activities.

IALI has always worked in close partnership with the International Labour Office and other host country organizations, and is increasingly working at regional levels.4

4 More information about IALI is available on its website: www.iali-aiit.org

http://www.iali-aiit.org/


Regional inspectorate associations and Networks

Several regional associations of labour inspectorates also exist for similar purposes.

For example, the EU Senior Labour Inspectors Committee (SLIC) provides a forum for discussion of common issues for labour inspectors across the EU and to foster good networking on an informal basis.

The Regional Alliance of the Labour Inspectorates (RALI) regroups countries of Southeast Europe as well as Azerbaijan and Ukraine. It allows for a regular regional cooperation in the area of labour inspection through an exchange of best practices.

In South America, the Confederación Iberoamericana de Inspectores de Trabajo (CIIT) was set up in 1992 for similar purposes and it supports its member inspectorates in their efforts to promote compliance with labour laws.

In April 2009, during the international workshop held in Santiago de Chile to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the ILO and the 80th anniversary of the Dirección general de Trabajo of Chile, a network of labour inspectorates of some selected Latin-American countries including Spain and Portugal was also formed. The main target of this network – Red Iberoamericana de la Inspeccion de Trabajo - is related to the promotion and mutual support of national inspections, the exchange of information and knowledge sharing. It is open to the adhesion of new countries, as has been the case of Central America in November 2009.

Networks on capacity building for labour inspection

The international network for training centres in the field of labour (RIIFT, Réseau International d´Institutions de Formation dans le domaine du Travail), is a platform for exchanging information and experiences in training and education in the field of labour. It contributes to the reflection of national training strategies amongst its members. At present this network operates only in French.

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4. COOPERATION WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

Broad cooperation is also needed between the various labour inspectorates and other stakeholders, that is, organizations which also have an interest in promoting decent working conditions and upholding social justice in the workplace.

Stakeholders like research and training organizations often have much data and other information useful for inspectorates, and regular cooperation between such organizations brings mutual benefit. Communication methods vary from one country to another, but the development of good IT systems and databases and annual reports has brought significant improvements in data exchange in recent years in many countries. This is less true for developing countries where infrastructures are such that it is much harder to compile relevant and coherent information. However, there have been some significant advances in some areas in recent years, notably on occupational safety and health, which bodes well for the future.

The different services responsible for employment, equality in the workplace, vocational training, job placement, migration, youth, basic or compulsory education, for the disabled and for the gathering of statistical information, can all play a significant part in helping the labour inspectorate to define its priorities. For example, statistical data disaggregated by sex, exact data on school truancy, migrants, or job placements for disabled workers in certain activities, are all useful for planning inspections in establishments generally, including establishments where there are workers in vulnerable categories.

Example from Australia

In Australia the Commonwealth Arbitration Inspectorate cooperates closely with the public employment services to ensure that the level of wages and conditions of service offered to job seekers conform with the legal requirements and arbitration awards. Another example of a constructive relationship is information services on basic, prevention-oriented occupational safety and health issues, basic minimum employment standards or wages provided to managers of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the context of job creation programmes that are often organized by the public employment services of the labour administration system.

4.1. Social security and social insurance institutions

The respective objectives of social security and labour inspection services are complementary; the benefits of bringing them together under the authority of a single government authority are becoming increasingly evident in several countries.

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Although it is often a legal obligation for the employer, worker or responsible medical practitioner to report accidents at work or cases of occupational disease to the labour inspectorate, it is often in practice the social security services that are the first, and sometimes the only, recipients of such notifications. It is therefore desirable that provisions be in place to ensure that any relevant information on cases and conditions defined by legislation be communicated as systematically as possible to the labour inspectorate. This would give the labour inspectorate the data it requires to identify high-risk establishments and activities and determine means of prevention with a view to eliminating risk factors. By the same token, inspection services should be required to inform the social security and social insurance services of situations that pose a threat to workers. safety and health which they encounter during inspection visits. Raising insurance premiums for employers who are particularly negligent or persistent in disregarding inspectors. injunctions could reinforce the safety and health role of the labour inspectorate. The economic advantages of such cooperation, for both the enterprise and the insurance institutions, has been more than amply demonstrated amply demonstrated in all the countries where relevant measures have been implemented.

The branch of social security responsible for occupational accident and disease insurance, or workers' compensation, has been an important new partner in labour inspection in several countries. Indeed, in some countries, such as France, the cooperation between the French labour inspectorate and the Regional Health Insurance Funds is time-honoured and effective. Similar conditions exist in countries such as Austria and Luxembourg. ln others, such as Germany, there is a problematic dual inspection system, mainly as a result of overlap and lack of coordination. Both in certain states of Australia (New South Wales and Victoria) and in New Zealand the occupational safety and health inspectorate and the workers' compensation authority (social insurance body) were merged into a single organization.

4.2. The police

Effective support from the police can be useful and is sometimes essential in carrying out certain inspection missions, especially when it comes to some types of enforcement. For example, where inspectors are likely to face serious obstruction, it may be advisable for inspectors to be accompanied by police officers before they visit workplaces in question. In some countries, accidents and dangerous occurrences must be reported firstly to the police, who should then inform the labour inspectorate.

Allowing labour inspectors to call on the support of the police when they are obstructed in the performance of their duty can have a deterrent effect, all the more so if effective measures are in place to ensure rapid implementation. Likewise, where inspectors believe they are likely to face threats to their physical safety (e.g. from a violent employer), the presence of a police officer can enable a planned inspections to take place more smoothly.

Inspectors may have legal powers to bring along police officers where circumstances require, but in many developing countries this is not practicable because of the separation of the institutions and the absence of appropriate mechanisms at different hierarchical levels. Good collaboration between

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labour inspectorates and the police are therefore vital, at national and local levels.

4.3. Judicial bodies

The impact that labour inspectors is to a large extent dependant on the real threat of sanctions they can impose, through the courts or otherwise.

Unfortunately, the Judiciary in many countries do not give high priority to labour law cases and the fines or other sanctions that they impose may be far too low for the purposes of deterrence or penalty. Inspectorates should therefore collaborate with Judiciaries to build understanding and mutual trust, and judges should be encouraged to treat alleged labour law offences seriously and to impose realistic fines or other penalties when cases are proven. A growing number of countries are making positive efforts in this regard.

One reason why judges and other members of the legal profession do not hold labour law cases in high regard is the poor quality of inspectors’ reports brought before the courts. Inspectors must therefore be well trained in bringing cases to court, in how to collect high quality evidence and how to write high quality well-argued legal reports.

Judges and other members of the legal profession should also be well informed and trained about labour rights and labour law. Closer cooperation between the judiciary and labour inspectorate could also raise awareness of the social and economic value of labour inspection and encourage the legal profession as a whole to pay more attention to the goals and efforts of the inspectorate.

4.4. Tax authorities and the ministries responsible for the sectors covered by inspection

Machinery should be put in place to ensure that any information needed to identify establishments and undertakings legally liable to inspection and held for other purposes by other public authorities (for example, finance and tax authorities, or departments responsible for issuing operating licenses) is made available to the labour inspectorate.

In Croatia, the central labour inspection authority has strongly suggested that the cooperation of the tax authorities be sought in any proceedings to recover unpaid wages.

The case of Portugal

A protocol agreement was signed in Portugal on 1 October 1997 between the Labour Inspectorate-General, the Directorate General for Taxation and the Regional Social Security Centres. The protocol aims at coordinating action to

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fight the ever-growing level of clandestine or unregulated labour and curb tax and parafiscal fraud and evasion. Up until now, the inspection activities of the labour administration authorities, the tax administration and the social security services had been carried out separately, that is, without coordinated joint efforts on the part of all three. a coordinating group was set up with the task to programme and evaluate joint actions of a nationwide. It also involve a periodic exchange of information amongst the three systems and training programmes for employees belonging to the three services. The main objectives will be to promote greater mutual understanding of aims and methodology and to increase areas of action wherever a common interest exists.

4.5. National human rights mechanisms

Following the recommendation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), many countries have created a national human rights mechanism which individuals may use to file complaints regarding violations of human rights, including labour rights. In these countries, effective cooperation between the labour inspection system and the national human rights mechanism is useful and to be encouraged.

4.6. Immigration authorities

In view of the growing numbers of foreign and migrant workers in many countries, the labour inspectorate is often asked to cooperate with immigration authorities with a view to finding illegal migrant workers. The prevention role of inspectors needs to be stressed here, and they should not be required to act in effect as an agency for the migration authorities. If they are required to detect illegal migrants on behalf of the migration authorities, for example, this will undermine their impartiality and independence. Trust will be eroded and migrant workers will be unlikely to cooperate with inspectors or, for that matter, to make any complaints about their working conditions. Inspectorates may need to sensitize other authorities on such matters.

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4.7. Social research institutions and universities

Article 9 of Convention No. 81 and Article 11 of Convention No. 129 prescribe the interaction between the inspection services and “duly qualified technical experts and specialists”. This mutually beneficial relationship is indispensable for the proper functioning of labour inspection, and extends to collaboration with public and private institutions, universities, research centres, consultants and others.

Cooperation with such organizations can keep inspectorates better informed on important labour-related matters in different fields, in particular new emerging areas. Institutions may also undertake research on occupational safety and health, leading to the development of innovative methods of prevention, and they may also be able to help inspectors with the investigation of accidents or diseases.

Universities are also playing a greater role in the professional training of labour inspectors, giving them a formal qualification in relevant topics. In Ethiopia, for example, a new degree course has been set up to train inspectors on occupational safety and health.

The Centre for the Improvement of Working Conditions and Environment, Pakistan

The Centre for the Improvement of Working Conditions and Environment in Lahore, Pakistan, is a centre of expertise on occupational safety and health and working conditions and provides training and expertise to employers, workers and government agencies including labour inspectors. It has pioneered several low cost innovations for improving working conditions where young, female and other vulnerable workers are employed.

Collaborative research recently led to the development of a low-cost carpet weaving loom that was better designed ergonomically, reducing the need to workers to stand all day and increasing productivity. Inspectors were informed about the developments and were able to advise employers. The innovation won a Tech Award of Innovation from the USA.5

Technological developments render the task of labour inspection increasingly complex and represent one of the major challenges facing today’s labour inspectors. Even when they belong to a high-performing service, they cannot keep abreast of all developments and collaboration with research institutions is of growing importance.

5 http://www.wiserearth.org/organization/view/aa09b8de12439b5f1ba5f47b85edb5e9

http://www.wiserearth.org/organization/view/aa09b8de12439b5f1ba5f47b85edb5e9


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4.8. Professional institutions and NGOs

Professional institutions exist for many disciplines and regular cooperation with inspectorates can be of benefit to all parties. For example, institutions for safety and health officers in industry exist to promote greater networking amongst members and to encourage best practice. Inspectors’ support for such organizations can be very encouraging for NGO members, while regular cooperation also provide opportunities for inspectors to disseminate important information to wider audiences.

Cooperation with the NGO community is particularly important where issues like child labour or HIV/AIDS are concerned.6 NGOs may, for example, be involved in tackling hazardous child labour or raising greater awareness of HIV/AIDS, and as such they could be very useful partners for inspectorates in local communities. Good cooperation between inspectorates and such NGOs should aim to combine the traditional role of inspection with a supportive framework for preventing risks of exploitation and creating opportunities for self-development.

4.9. The media

The media has a vital role to play in upholding wider public respect for fundamental principles and rights at work and the task of inspectors in promoting such principles and rights. Good cooperation between inspectorates and the media can thus help create a positive image of labour inspection as an important tool for social development and help inspectorates meet their broader aims as well.

In fact, inspectors have made good use of information channels and the mass media for many years, through radio, TV, newspaper columns, poster campaigns etc. These have all been used to good effect, to achieve greater impact amongst employers, workers and their organizations in general as well as to publicise inspectors’ work. In particular, this sort of cooperation with media has enabled inspectorates to get important messages across to workplaces not normally subject to inspection, such as those in the informal economy. Use of the media thus becomes an indispensable part of an inspectorate’s broader operational strategy.

However, inspectors need to be cautious in their dealings with the media in order not to give misleading information or to pre-judge investigations. For example, after a major accident, the press may want an immediate story and to interview the investigating inspector about the likely causation and consequences of the accident. In attempts to be helpful, an inspector may provide premature comments about the likely outcome of the investigation, to the embarrassment of the inspectorate and the enterprise concerned.

Thus, some inspectorates have appointed staff to maintain regular contact with the media, while others have trained individual inspectors in how to work with them. Inspectors should make contact with such groups or

6 See Combating child labour: A handbook for labour inspectors, ILO, 2002; A handbook on HIV/AIDS for labour and factory inspectors, ILO, 2005.


specialists from within their organization as needed, e.g. after an accident of public interest, to ensure that their dealings with the media are always professionally managed.

Media spokespersons, National Labor Inspectorate, Poland

The Polish National Labour Inspectorate has designated a special team of spokespersons who are responsible for contacts with the media. Based in each of the 16 district inspectorates, such persons represent the National Labour Inspectorate in contacts with the press, radio and TV and maintain good working relations with them. In particular, they are responsible for disseminating appropriate information and creating the Inspectorate’s positive public image, and keeping the media well informed about its current activities.

Spokespersons need to have some knowledge of the work of field inspectors and many of them were formerly labour inspectors. They also need good communication skills and to be able to work well under stress especially when it comes to public appearances. They attend regular (annual) training, which aims at expanding their knowledge and perfecting skills in media relations. Training topics include press law, professional preparation of press releases, workshops in improving conversation skills in contacts with journalists (interviews, press conferences, etc.) as well as speaking in front of the camera (practical exercises).

Greater collaboration with the media should be seen as a sound long-term investment. Through such collaboration, the general public should become more aware of the importance of the Inspectorate’s work and the need to promote decent working conditions. This in turn should lead to increased worker protection and better standards of compliance.

In fact many labour inspectorates are now actively working with the media much more often, for example publicising local campaigns so as to achieve greater awareness and impact. Elsewhere, inspectorates’ engagement with the media has been part of national programmes, such as on occupational safety and health or combating child labour. Such an investment has proved invaluable in reaching out to a wider section of the working population, such as small firms and those in the informal economy, which rarely if ever receive an inspection visit.

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Exercise 2

TITLE Cooperation missing links

TASK In country-based groups or individually, draft in a flip chart a map with boxes illustrating the key bodies involved in labour inspection functions in your country.

With a red felt pen, indicate the existing strong links and cooperation existing among the bodies. Discuss in the group the missing links and the reason why.

Nominate a rapporteur to present the chart and the main findings of the discussion in plenary.

At the end of the groups’ presentation, a general discussion will take place in plenary.

The facilitator will summarise the key findings of the discussion.

TIME 60’ for group work. 10’ for each group presentation. 20’ to 30’ for final discussion.


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Exercise 3

TITLE Cooperation with...

TASK In country-based groups or individually fill in the attached questionnaire.

The facilitator will collect them, process them and report later the results in plenary for feed-back.

TIME 20’ for individual/group work.

(separate time for the facilitator to process the results and synthesize them on a flip chart or power point).

20’ for presentation by the facilitator in plenary and feed back .


Exercise 3

COOPERATION WITH ...

Mark with a “X” the cell to indicate, for each body mentioned, if your Labour Inspectorate cooperate very strongly (S) with that body, if the collaboration is week or ad hoc (W) or if does not cooperate at all (-).

S W -

Workers at national level

Workers at sectoral level

Workers at enterprise level

Employers at national level

Employers at sectoral level

Employers at enterprise level

Other sectoral Labour Inspectorates

OSH Inspectorate

Social Security Body

Employment services

Conciliation-Mediation Body

Judicial Body

Police

Tax authority

National Human Rights Body

Immigration Authority

Universities

Research Institutes

NGOs

Private auditors

The Media

OTHER (specify)

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5. VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AND BEYOND

At the heart of the relationship with society is the obligation on companies to comply with the law.

Most countries have legislation that reflects internationally-recognized values and principles, which provide an adequate framework of reference for what a company’s responsibilities are. Moreover, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998) makes clear that ILO member States have an obligation, by the sole virtue of their membership of the Organization, “to respect, to promote and to realize” workers’ fundamental rights, defined as freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. This whether or not they have ratified the relevant Conventions.

It is the responsibility of governments to ensure the rule of law and the enforcement of those laws across the society; and labour inspection is a key instrument for law enforcement at the workplace.

However some problems limit the capacity of government in law enforcement. In the last decades, in many countries, Labour Administrations (including labour inspectorates) have been reduced (in size, resources, and mandate) by the structural adjustment measures.

At the same time, in a globalized world, with production systems transcending national boundaries, the country-based forms of regulation (national labour law and national systems of industrial relations) alone are not sufficient to ensure full respect of labour rights.

It is in this context that the ILO World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (WCSDG) examined the new challenges globalization poses to the State, including the extra efforts required to protect workers in the face of mobile and powerful capital. 7 “Global markets have grown rapidly without the parallel development of economic and social institutions necessary for their smooth and equitable functioning,” the report noted. 8 It called for concerted effort to protect workers’ rights and build a labour movement that could provide “the countervailing power necessary to promote improved wages for workers, combat and reverse any deterioration of labour standards and support a virtuous cycle of rising living standards and equitable growth.”9

The flourishing growth of Corporate Social Responsibility developed in this framework.

7 ILO (2004), Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All Available at: www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/docs/report.pdf 8 Ibid, p. xi. 9 Ibid p. 66.


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5.1. Corporate social responsibility

Definitions

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is the name now most commonly applied to the multitude of innovative social and environmental initiatives undertaken by business in both the marketplace and the wider community.

There are several definitions of CSR.

According to the European Commission, CSR is:

“a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis. Being socially responsible means not only fulfilling legal expectations, but also going beyond compliance and investing ‘more’ into human capital, the environment and the relations with stakeholders.”10

The International Labour Organization (ILO) has also recently defined CSR as:

"…a way in which enterprises give consideration to the impact of their operations on society and affirm their principles and values both in their own internal methods and processes and in their interaction with other actors. CSR is a voluntary, enterprise-driven initiative and refers to activities that are considered to exceed compliance with the law".11

In summary, CSR consists in the companies themselves defining, unilaterally and voluntarily, social and environmental policies by means of alternative instruments that are neither collective agreements nor legislation, and offering, in pursuit of these aims, partnerships to multiple actors.

Historical background

The concept of the social responsibility of business is an old concept, which can be found in several cultures, traditions, even religions.

During the 1950s the CSR debate became the subject of an important number of studies in the United States and in Europe.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the increased importance of multinational enterprises raised the CSR issue in the discussions of some international organizations such as the ILO and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which adopted two important instruments in this area: the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE Declaration) and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines).

10 See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0366:FIN:EN:PDF 11 InFocus Initiative on Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic Orientations (GB.295/MNE/2/1). See: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb295/pdf/mne-2-1.pdf .

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0366:FIN:EN:PDF

http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb295/pdf/mne-2-1.pdf


The present concept of CSR appeared during the second half of the 1990s, after the Rio Conference on Environment and Sustainable Development of 1992, where the United Nations (UN) invited multinational enterprises to assume a commitment towards society and the environment by including in their commercial agreements provisions to protect basic human rights, workers’ rights and the environment.

In 1999, in his address to the World Economic Forum, the United Nations’ Secretary-General Kofi Annan, challenged business leaders to join an international initiative that would bring companies together with UN agencies, labour and civil society to support universal social and environmental principles, and launched the idea of a Global Compact.

The international reaction to that speech was extremely positive, and the Office of the Secretary General decided to convene the three UN Agencies responsible for the principles and values promoted by the initiative – the International Labour Organization, the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights and the United Nations Environment Programme – to discuss on how to create a system to involve companies in the promotion of universal principles and values. The Global Compact’s operational phase was launched at UN Headquarters in New York on 26 July 2000.

The UN Global Compact is an initiative based on voluntary choice of companies to commit themselves to a responsible mode of conducting business. It is based on 10 universal principles; thanks to their universality, these principles in all of the 191 UN member States, including countries where the legislation concerning human rights, labour, environment protection and fight against corruption is not advanced.

The 10 UN GLOBAL COMPACT PRINCIPLES

The Global Compact asks Companies to:

Human rights

1. Support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights.

2. Make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuse.

Labour

1. Uphold freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining.

2. Uphold the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour.

3. Uphold the effective abolition of child labour.

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4. Uphold the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.

Environment

1. Support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges.

2. Undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility.

3. Encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.

Anti-corruption

1. Work against all forms of corruption, including extortion and bribery.

The Global Compact act as a network for sharing good practices, involving companies, governments (at national and local level), employers’ and workers’ organizations, NGOs and academic institutions.

Governments ensure the legitimacy and universality of Global Compact principles and develop the legal framework in which they are put into practice. By exercising their legislative competency, governments can provide an enabling legal environment where voluntary initiatives, such as the Global Compact, can play a complementary role.

Public-private partnership approach

The increased liberalization of international trade, expansion of foreign direct investment and the emergence of massive cross-border financial flows of the last two decades have led to significant changes in the way the world economy is organized and governed. In this context of globalization, the private sector has started to play an increasingly important role in areas of work that were previously considered the preserve of public sector actors and civil society such as social policy and the environment, thus contributing to the spread of self-regulation practices and public-private partnerships.

Public-private partnership could be very useful for promoting workers’ rights, if the framework for this collaboration is well defined and transparent. Enterprises are not an alternative to government. CSR is not an alternative to appropriate public legislation and public engagement and enterprises need to be careful to ensure that, in acting, they are not circumventing national policy debates or priorities.

This point is crucial as sometimes the use of voluntary self-regulation in the labour field is viewed as part of a larger picture in which self-regulation by business is encouraged as an alternative to regulation by the State. The arguments for this approach is that fixed rules created centrally by

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governments, backed by inflexible sanctions, are infective, expensive and counter productive, while corporate self-regulation is seen as one answer to the problems of governance in the 21st century.

On the contrary, a stronger role of Labour administration, combined with socially responsible enterprises and sound industrial relations could be a winning strategy for creating an inductive environment for sustainable development.

A public-private partnership project involving labour inspectors

The multi-national enterprise Volkswagen AG, the German Development organization (GTZ) and the ILO participated in a public-private partnership project from 2002-2008 to promote safety and health within the Volkswagen supply chain. The project took place in 3 countries – Mexico, South Africa and Brazil – and engaged the Departments of Labour in those countries and their labour inspectors. Volkswagen experts and local labour inspectors conducted joint audits of the suppliers, all of them small and medium-sized enterprises, and gave advice on prevention and other safety and health matters. Inspectors also participated in training courses for representatives from these companies.

Evaluation of the project showed that it was successful in meeting most of its objectives, except in Brazil where agreement was not reached regarding inspectors’ enforcement role during the audit process. Nevertheless, the project brought significant benefits in Mexico and South Africa, both for labour inspectors and for the enterprises involved, whose trust and confidence in the work of the inspectorate was much increased.

Voluntary compliance

The promotion of voluntary compliance is an important emerging area for a modern labour inspection system. In most systems inspectors try to ensure that workers and employers cooperate to follow labour laws. The balance between exercising the power to enforce laws through legal sanction and establishing commitment to voluntary compliance is a continuing challenge which realistically, can only be met by experienced and well trained inspectors on a case-by-case basis. Close cooperation with employers' organizations and unions can greatly assist inspectors in meeting these challenges.

Including provisions of the national law in company codes or other means of corporate social responsibility – as well as in collective bargaining agreements - can be a successful strategy for law enforcement. At the same time, it’s a solid floor for going over and above legal requirements.

The concept of voluntary compliance could be expanded to compliance not only to national legislation but to International Labour Standards.

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ILO Conventions relates to enterprise not only throughout national law (through and ratification); the principles of the ILO Conventions can also be used as an inspiration by enterprises even if ratification is not in place, and used as reference to guide enterprise behaviour.

Enterprises that guide themselves by the principles derived from ILO Conventions can play a tremendous role to contribute enhancing law enforcement in countries where legislation is either non-existent or non-enforced.

Multinational Enterprises

Two main instruments can guide the social behaviour of Multinational Enterprises: the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy and the OECD Guidelines of Multinational Enterprises.

Many CSR initiatives refer to the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. However, the point of reference for the ILO’s work on CSR is the MNE Declaration (1977).

The objective of the MNE Declaration is to encourage the positive contribution that multinationals can make to economic and social progress and to minimize and resolve the difficulties to which their various operations may rise. It provide guidelines on how enterprises should apply

Enterprise

Principles Non-binding

Member State ratification

Binding

International Labour Conventions and enterprises

National legislation

International Labour Conventions


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principles deriving from international labour standards concerning employment, training, conditions of work and life, and industrial relations.

The OECD Guidelines, adopted in 1976 and revised in 2000, are recommendations addressed by governments to multinational enterprises. They set out voluntary principles and standards for responsible business conduct consistent with applicable laws. The OECD Guidelines are aimed at:

Ensuring that the operations of multinational enterprises are in harmony with government policies.

Strengthening the basis of mutual confidence between enterprises and the societies in which they operate.

Helping improve the foreign investment climate.

Enhancing the contribution to sustainable development made by multinational enterprises.

The OECD Guidelines are part of a broader instrument – the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises – which promotes a comprehensive, interlinked and balanced approach for governments’ treatment of foreign direct investment and for enterprises’ activities in adhering countries.

5.2. Social Audit, monitoring and certification

Over the last decade, auditing, monitoring and certification systems for labour standards have developed alongside existing national inspection programmes.12 These audit and certification initiatives come under a range of names: including social auditing, external verification and independent monitoring. However, at their core is the issue of inspection and assessment of social standards in enterprises.

These audit systems include company-based monitoring programmes, global corporate auditing services, industry based initiatives, NGO programmes, and accreditation and certification systems. These assessments may be conducted by the buyer itself (e.g. Gap Vendor Compliance Officers) or they may be subcontracted to different types of organizations, some commercial (e.g. PWHC, Cal Safety Compliance Corporation (CSCC)), some not-for profit (e.g. Verite), academia and trade unions. They are mainly active in industries such as garments and footwear, textiles, and agriculture, but similar initiatives also exist in forestry and are developing in the tourism and fishery industries.

The most well known of these initiatives include Social Accountability International, BSCI, the Fair Labour Association and the Worldwide

12 It is difficult to get information on the size of the market, however there are signs that it is significant. For example, in 2005 Walmart conducted 13,600 social audits in 7,200 factories and CSCC claims to conduct 11,000 social audits per year.


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Responsible Accredited Production, but these organizations are only the tip of the iceberg. Companies like C&A, Reebok, Timberland, Nike, H&M and Adidas- Solomon have actively developed social compliance programmes in recent years, while NGOs like the Clean Clothes Campaign have engaged in workplace monitoring around the world.

Although used interchangeably, in many contexts there is (at least) a difference between social auditing and monitoring as such. Monitoring usually implies an “ongoing and regular surveillance of a facility by one or more people. The most important characteristic of monitoring is the requirement of continuous engagement and presence at the facility. Unlike auditing, monitoring systems are more capable of offering an in-depth and long term view of the workplace. Monitoring requires the continuous presence and engagement of monitors”13.

Certification processes usually take place at the final stage of a social auditing or monitoring process when companies report on how they have performed in respect of the aspirations of their code of conduct or the code of conduct of their buyer. In the case of a buyer, this may also involve a process of establishing external assurance or verification by an organization like the FLA. In the case of a supplier, this lasts stage may involve their certification or accreditation for conformity against a code, for example SA8000.14

Pros and cons, an open debate

Companies, industry associations, NGOs and multi-stakeholder initiatives have developed these “social auditing and certification” systems for a variety of reasons, including:

Pressure by activist and consumers concerned with working conditions and compliance with labour standards in global supply chains and demanding so called 'fair trade' products made under the right conditions.

Reduction of brand liability, as part of corporate risk management strategies.

Demand by supplier factories wishing to gain a competitive advantage over their peers.

Weakness in existing governmental inspection systems.

Auditing and certification systems have developed, at least in part, as a response to weaknesses in national regulation systems. The development of these audit/monitoring/certification programmes raises a number of important questions with regard to how workplaces are monitored and who

13 See Hunter and Urminsky “Social Auditing, freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining”, MULTI, ILO. 14 See Susan Hayter presentation on InFocus Forum on “Private systems of social auditing, monitoring and certification: a review of the issues”, November 2006.


is responsible for monitoring them. These questions naturally address governments, employers' and workers' organizations, as all three are involved in labour inspection initiatives to varying degrees.

Pros

These systems have potential to contribute to decent work in that they can engage multiple actors in the supply chain, provide incentives and market access and facilitate the transfer of technology and know-how which can ultimately contribute to social and economic upgrading. Where workers are involved in the day-to-day monitoring of working conditions, these can lead to sustainable improvements in labour standards.

In this framework, there are some important examples of cooperation and initiatives that involve concrete cooperation with public authorities such as the ILO Better Work project. Multi-stakeholder organizations such as the FLA and SAI are also encouraging cooperation by including labour inspectors in their training programmes.

The key issue, from an ILO perspective, it that voluntary forms of self-regulation can be an important complement to public regulation and inspection, but not an alternative.

The principles embodied in the ILO MNE Declaration also provide a guide for good practice encompassing consultation with national governments, social dialogue, and the development of industrial relations specific to the national context which provide mechanisms for monitoring and for complaints.

Cons

Private systems of labour assessment are criticized for failing to provide independent assurance. There are no rules governing service providers and there is not professional competency framework. Since both the names of suppliers and audit reports tend to be confidential, there is also no way for the public to independently verify claims in CSR reports.

Another issue is the relationship between national regulation and public inspection. Most of the model codes call for companies to comply with national law. The auditing protocols and guidance that support these codes tend to assess conformity with national regulatory requirements. Divergences are sometimes found between what is required by the model code and national law especially concerning overtime and wages.

In what concerns the relationship between private systems of labour assessment and public inspection, article 5 (a) of Convention 81 on Labour Inspection calls on the competent authority to promote effective cooperation between the labour inspectorate and private institutions engaged in similar activities”. However, in the majority of cases these private initiatives either function independently or they are seen to be filling a regulatory gap and at the worst they are seen to be privatizing public labour inspection.

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In addition, these private systems of compliance have been challenged also for having a limited scope for reaching sub-contractors and the more vulnerable casual and home-based workers. Also the high cost of the private services to monitor compliance are been referred to as an issue, as well as the fact that these systems seem to be vulnerable to the same weaknesses as public services.

On a broader policy view, there is a risk that the sphere of private law is extending to the detriment of public law not only in the choice of instruments, but also in the one of their control, this undermining the regulating power of the public authorities. The concrete implications could be: weaken the law-making and contractual rights by replacing them with nonbinding instruments without any legal value; weaken the regulating and arbitral role of the national and international public authorities by replacing it with voluntary one-sided regulations by the companies; affect the national and international public authorities in their role as supervisors of the application of the standard-setting systems by replacing them with private bodies; extend the sphere of private law to the detriment of public law: private instruments (codes of conduct, labels, charters) controlled by private bodies according to their own regulations instead of public administration and labour inspectorates.

Forward looking…

These risks could be avoided if a clear, modern, strong and effective Labour Inspection System is adopted, including effective cooperation between systems for private labour assessment and public inspection services for improved governance. As already mentioned, Convention No. 81 provide the framework for this complementarity: "the competent authority shall make appropriate arrangements to promote effective cooperation between the inspection services and other government services and public or private institutions engaged in similar activities".

The challenge is to ensure that standards for “social auditors” and private workplace inspection are developed that are compatible with the best practices of the labour inspectorate, promote a culture of compliance with law and are consistent with the role of industrial relations.

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Exercise 4

TITLE I agree, I don’t agree

TASK Individually, read carefully the sentences in the attached sheet, make a reflexion, and decide for each sentence if you agree or not, and why. Mark with a “X” your answer.

The facilitator will ask your opinion in a plenary session, and compare with other participants’ views.

A general discussion will follow.

TIME 15’ - 20’ for individual work From 20’ to 30’ for plenary feed-back, discussion and consolidation


Exercise 4 I agree, I don’t agree

1. “Enterprises are an integral part of society, producing the goods, services and employment that people need, thus stimulating economic prosperity and enhanced quality of life. Corporate social responsibility is a means by which enterprises affirm their principles and values for themselves and for external organizations.”

I agree I don’t agree

2. “Voluntary compliance and self-regulation by business should be encouraged as an alternative to regulation by the State. Fixed rules created centrally by governments, backed by inflexible sanctions, are infective, expensive and counter productive for economic development and enterprise growth.”


3. “Labour Inspection Services should collaborate with private social audit services and jointly promote a culture of compliance with law.”


4. “In the Third World countries, the labour inspectorate has been decimated by the structural adjustment measures and in the industrial countries deregulation and the advancement of employment flexibility have reduced the capacity of the labour administration. “


5. “The result of private initiatives such as CSR is to weaken or even abolish the law-making and contractual rights by replacing them with nonbinding instruments without any legal value (zero-level deregulation). “


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SUMMARY

The systems approach of the Labour Administration Convention, 1978 (No.150) calls for cooperation among Labour Administration Bodies and a wide range of other stakeholders at national and local level in all its main functions, starting with the labour inspectorate. Clearly this includes the social partners, namely workers’ and employers’ organizations, but other stakeholders need to be engaged if labour inspectorates are to have an impact in workplaces more widely. Where inspection responsibilities are divided between different inspection services, it is vital that they cooperate and work together. Cooperation with other enforcement authorities, such as the police, is also important in many contexts.

Such cooperation should happen at several different levels. It should happen at the national level, to define the legal and policy framework for labour inspection; at sectoral level, to give orientation for labour inspection in particular industries; at local level, to promote compliance with legislation in enterprises; and lastly at international level, to promote the exchange of information and good practice in an increasingly global economy.

In the last decade, several functions traditionally belonging to labour inspection, have been covered by several forms of private initiatives such as voluntary self-regulation, and audit systems which provide monitoring and certification for labour standards.

Public-private partnership could be a useful means for promoting workers’ rights, if the framework for this collaboration is well defined and transparent. CSR should be complementary and not alternative to other institutional labour legislation enforcement mechanisms, in primis labour inspection.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ADDITIONAL READINGS

"Is Corporate Citizenship making a difference?" in The Journal of Corporate Citizenship, No. 28, 2007.

Amnesty International and PWBLF. 2002. Human Rights: is it any of your business.

Blanpain, R. (ed.). 2000. Multinational Enterprises and the social challenges of the 21sr Century (Kluwer, Dordrecht).

Bronchain, P. 2003. Towards a sustainable corporate social responsibility.

CSR Consulting. 2005. R vs. R, the Rhetoric versus the Reality of Corporate Social Responsibility, Challenges for the corporate sector, investors, and the Government, based on a case study in the Foodservice sector.

DLA Piper. 2007. CSR as Business strategy.

Edwards, T.; Marginson, P.; Edwards, P.; Ferner, A.; Tregaskis, O. 2007. Corporate social responsibility in multinational companies: Management initiatives or negotiated agreements?, discussion paper IILS.

Fussler, C., Cramer, A., Van der Vegt, S. 2004. Raising the Bar:Creating Value with the United Nations Global Compact (Greenleaf).

Global Reporting Initiative. 2008. Small, Smart and Sustainable: Experiences of SME Reporting in Global Supply Chains.

Hayter, S.; Hunter, P. 2008. Codes of Conduct and private systems of assessment: a review of issues, 2008.

Hopkins, M. 2004. Corporate Social Responsibility: an issues paper, ILO Policy Integration department, Working Paper No. 27.

Hunter, P., Urminsky M. 2003. Social auditing, freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining.

International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU). 2004. 'Social Responsibilities of Business', in ICFTU Trade Union Guide to Globalisation, Chapter 6.

—. 2007. Resolution on the social responsibilities of business in a gloabl economy, adopted by ICFTU Congress in Dec 2007.

International Council on Human Rights Policy. 2002. Beyond voluntarism: Human Rights and the developing international legal obligations of companies.

International Labour Organization (ILO). 2005a. Promoting fair globalization in textiles and clothing in a post-MFA environment (ILO Sectoral Activities Programme, Geneva).


—. 2005b. The role of trade unions in the global economy and the fight against poverty, International Workers' Symposium.

—. 2006. General Survey of the reports concerning the Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (Geneva).

—. 2007. The Promotion of Sustainable Enterprises: Conclusions concerning the promotion of sustainable enterprises.

International Labour Conference. 2008. ILO Declaration on social justice for a fair globalization.

International Organisation of Employers (IOE). 2004. The Global Compact: the Employers' Guide.

—. 2005. The Role of Business within Society, position paper.

Jenkins, R.; Person, R.; Seyfang, G. 2003. Corporate Responsibility & Labour Rights, Codes of Conduct in the Global Economy, Earthscan Publications.

Jones, R.; Hubbard, P. Workers’ voice in corporate governance – A trade union perspective, Global Unions discussion paper, published under the auspices of the Trade Union advisory committee to the OECD and the Committee on Worker’s capital.

Kolstad, I. 2007. Human Rights and Assigned Duties: Implications for Corporations.

Leipziger, D. 2003. Corporate Responsibility Code Book (Greenleaf, Sheffield).

Locke, R.; Kochan, T.; Piore, M. (Eds.). 1995. Employment Relations in a changing Economy (MIT press, Cambridge).

Locke, R.M.; Qin, F.; Brause, A. 2006. Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards?: Lessons from Nike, Working paper No. 24 (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA).

Møller, K.; Erdal T. 2003. Corporate responsibility towards society: A local perspective.

Monshipouri, M.; Welch Jr, C.E.; Kennedy, E.T. 2003. "Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of Global responsibility: problems and possibilities" in Human Rights Quarterly (Academic Research Library).

Murray, J. 2004. Corporate social responsibility: an overview of principles and practice, ILO Policy Integration Department, Working Paper No. 34.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2001. Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Corporate Responsibility: Private Initiatives and Public Goals.

—. 2005. Globalisation, Jobs and Wages, Policy Brief.

—. 2007. “OECD Workers in the Global Economy: Increasingly Vulnerable?“ in OECD Employment Outlook (Chapter 3).

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—. 2007. Globalisation and Structural Adjustment.

O’Rourke, D. 2006. “Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring” in Policies Studies Journal, Vol. 31.

Perrini, F.; Pogutz, S.; Tencati, A. 2006. Developing Corporate Social Responsibility: A European Perspective, Edward Elgar.

Rasche, A. 2007. ‘A necessary supplement’ – what the United Nations Global Compact is and is not.

Richter, J. 2001. Holding corporations Accountable: Corporate Conduct, International Codes and Citizen Action (Zed Books, London).

Rogovsky, N. 2000. Corporate Community Involvement Programmes: Partnerships for Jobs and Development (International Institute of Labour Studies, ILO, Geneva).

Rogovsky, N.; Sims, E. 2002. Corporate success through people - making international labour standards work for you (ILO, Geneva).

Roitstein, F. 2005. Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility Training Initiatives in Multinational Enterprises: The challenge of localizing CSR (The World Bank, Washington, D.C.)

Sornajah, M. 2004. The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed).

The European Foundation for the improvement of life and working conditions. 2003. Towards a sustainable Corporate Social Responsibility.

UN Global Compact, UNHCHR, Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, A Guide for integrating human rights into business management.

UNDP/IBLF; Nelson, J.; Prescott, D. 2003. Business and the Millennium Development goals – a framework for action New York, UNDP/IBLF.

UNIDO. 2007. Corporate Social Responsibility and Public Policy: The role of Governments in facilitating the uptake of CSR among SMEs in developing countries.

UNRISD. 2003. Promoting Socially Responsible Business in Developing Countries (Geneva).

Urminsky, M. (ed.). 2001. Self-regulation in the workplace: Codes of conduct, social labelling and socially responsible investment, Working paper No. 1, Series on management systems and corporate citizenship (ILO, 2001) in Codes of Conduct and multinational enterprises.

Urminsky, M. 2005. Public policy, reporting and disclosure of employment and labour information by multinational enterprises (MNEs).

Van der Vegt, S. 2005. Social Auditing in Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey; Results from survey and case study research (ILO).

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Visser, W.; Matten, D.; Pohl, M.; Tolhurst, N. 2007. The A to Z of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Complete Reference Guide to Concepts, Codes and Organizations (John Wiley and Sons, Chichester).

Vogel, L. 2008. Inspection still a weak link in most national preventive strategies, ETUI-REHS. Available at: http://hesa.etui-rehs.org/uk/newsletter/files/Pages%2023-29%20from%20FINAL_News33UK_v5-6.pdf

WCSDG. 2004. A fair globalization: Creating opportunities for all (ILO, Geneva).

Wells, D. 2006. “Best practice” in the regulation of international labour standards: lessons of the US- Cambodia textile agreement” in Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 27, No. 357, p. 360.

Zerk, J.A. 2006. Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in International Law (Cambridge University Press).

http://hesa.etui-rehs.org/uk/newsletter/files/Pages%2023-29%20from%20FINAL_News33UK_v5-6.pdf

http://hesa.etui-rehs.org/uk/newsletter/files/Pages%2023-29%20from%20FINAL_News33UK_v5-6.pdf

module cooperation and partnership

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