module 4 network and computer security

MODULE 4 MCA-501 Computer Security ADMN 2012-‘15

Dept. of Computer Science And Applications, SJCET, Palai Page 83

4.1 NETWORK SECURITY

Network security consists of the provisions and policies adopted by a network administrator to prevent

and monitor unauthorized access, misuse, modification, or denial of a computer network and network-

accessible resources.

4.1.1 Kerberos

trusted key server system from MIT

Symmetric encryption

using no public keys

provides centralised private-key third-party authentication in a distributed network

allows users access to services distributed through network

without needing to trust all workstations

rather all trust a central authentication server

two versions in use: 4 & 5

Kerberos Requirements

Secure: should be strong enough that a potential opponent does not find it to be the weak link.

Reliable: should be highly reliable and should employ a distributed server architecture with one

system able to back up another.

Transparent: the user should not be aware that authentication is taking place beyond the

requirement to enter a password.

Scalable: should be capable of supporting large numbers of clients and servers.

Kerberos v4 Overview

a basic third-party authentication scheme

have an Authentication Server (AS)

That knows the passwords of all users and stores these in a centralized database.

Shares a unique secret key with each server.

Creates a ticket that contains the user’s ID and network address and the server’s ID.

have a Ticket Granting server (TGS)

issues tickets to users who have been authenticated to AS

Kerberos v4 Dialogue

1. The client requests a ticket-granting ticket by sending its user’s ID to the AS, together with the TGS

ID, indicating a request to use the TGS service.

2. The AS responds with a ticket that is encrypted with a key that is derived from the user’s password

(Kc), which is already stored at the AS. When this response arrives at the client, the client users his



password, generates the key, and attempts to decrypt the incoming message. If the password is

correct, the ticket is successfully recovered.

3. The client requests a service-granting ticket by transmitting a message to the TGS containing the

user’s ID, the ID of the desired service, and the ticket-granting ticket.

4. The TGS decrypts the incoming ticket using a key shared only by the AS and the TGS (Ktgs) and it

checks to make sure that the lifetime has not expired. Then it compares the user ID and network

address with the incoming information to authenticate the user. If the user is permitted access to the

server V, the TGS issues a ticket to grant access to the requested service.

5. The client requests access to a service by transmitting a message to the server containing the user’s

ID and the service-granting ticket. The server authenticates by using the contents of the ticket.

Fig 4.1 Kerberos V4 Overview

Kerberos Version 4

Simplified approach

Client asks authentication server for ticket

AS grants ticket

Client sends ticket to server

Weaknesses

Big load on AS (Provide secondary ticket-granting servers)

Repeated password entry (Password to AS seldom, tickets from TGS when needed,

based on AS authentication)



Kerberos Realms

a Kerberos environment consists of:

a Kerberos server

a number of clients, all registered with server

application servers, sharing keys with server

this is termed a realm

typically a single administrative domain

if have multiple realms, their Kerberos servers must share keys and trust

Fig 4.2 Kerberos Realms

Difference between Version 4 and 5

Encryption system dependence (V.4 DES)

Internet protocol dependence

Message byte ordering

Ticket lifetime

Authentication forwarding

Interrealm authentication

4.1.2 X.509 Authentication Service

Distributed set of servers that maintains a database about users.



Provides a certificate that contains the public key of a user and is signed with the private key of a

CA

defines framework for authentication services

directory may store public-key certificates

with public key of user signed by certification authority

also defines authentication protocols

uses public-key crypto & digital signatures

Available versions are 1,2,and 3

Fig 4.3 X.509 certificate

version (1, 2, or 3)

certificate serial number (unique within CA)

signature algorithm identifier

issuer name (CA)

period of validity (from - to dates)

subject name (name of owner)

subject public-key info (algorithm, parameters, key)

issuer unique identifier

subject unique identifier



extension fields

signature (of hash of all fields in certificate)

Obtaining a Certificate

any user with access to CA can get any certificate from it

only the CA can modify a certificate

The standard uses the following notation to define a certificate

CA<<A>> = CA {V, SN, AI, CA, UCA, A, UA, Ap, TA}

Notation CA<<A>> denotes certificate for A signed by CA

V=version of the certificate

SN=serial number of the certificate

AI =identifier of the algorithm used to sign the certificate

CA =name of certificate authority

UCA =optional unique identifier of the CA

A=name of user A

UA=optional unique identifier of the user A

Ap=public key of user A

TA=period of validity of the certificate

CA Hierarchy

if both users share a common CA then they are assumed to know its public key

each CA has certificates for clients (forward) and parent (backward)

each client trusts parents certificates

enable verification of any certificate from one CA by users of all other CAs in hierarchy

Fig 4.4 CA hierarchy



Certificate Revocation

certificates have a period of validity

may need to revoke before expiry,

CA’s maintain list of revoked certificates

the Certificate Revocation List (CRL)

users should check certificates with CA’s CRL

Fig 4.5 Certificate revocation list

Authentication Procedures

X.509 includes three alternative authentication procedures:

i. One-Way Authentication

ii. Two-Way Authentication

iii. Three-Way Authentication

all use public-key signatures

One-Way Authentication

1 message ( A->B) used to establish

the identity of A and that message is from A

message was intended for B

integrity & originality of message

message must include timestamp, nonce, B's identity and is signed by A

may include additional info for B

eg session key



Fig 4.6 one way authentication

Two-Way Authentication

2 messages (A->B, B->A) which also establishes in addition:

the identity of B and that reply is from B

that reply is intended for A

integrity & originality of reply

reply includes original nonce from A, also timestamp and nonce from B

may include additional info for A

Fig 4.7 two way authentication

Three-Way Authentication

3 messages (A->B, B->A, A->B)

has reply from A back to B containing signed copy of nonce from B

means that timestamps need not be checked or relied upon

Fig 4.8 three way authentication

X.509 Version 3

has been recognised that additional information is needed in a certificate

email/URL, policy details, usage constraints



rather than explicitly naming new fields defined a general extension method

extensions consist of:

extension identifier

criticality indicator

extension value

Certificate Extensions

key and policy information

convey info about subject & issuer keys, plus indicators of certificate policy

certificate subject and issuer attributes

support alternative names, in alternative formats for certificate subject and/or issuer

certificate path constraints

allow constraints on use of certificates by other CA’s

4.1.3 Public Key Infrastructure

As the set of hardware, software, people, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, store,

distribute, and revoke digital certificates based on asymmetric cryptography.

Enable secure, convenient, and efficient acquisition of public keys.

Fig 4.9 public key infrastructure

End entity: used to denote end users, devices (e.g., servers, routers), or any other entity that can be

identified in the subject field of a public key certificate. End entities typically consume and/or

support PKI-related services.

Certificate authority (CA): The issuer of certificates and (usually) certificate revocation lists

(CRLs).

Registration authority (RA): An optional component that can assume a number of administrative

functions from the CA. Then RA is often associated with the End Entity registration process.

CRL issuer: An optional component that a CA can delegate to publish CRLs.


Dept. of Computer Science And Applications, SJCET, Palai 1

Repository: A generic term used to denote any method for storing certificates and CRLs so that

they can be retrieved by End Entities.

4.2 EMAIL SECURITY

email is one of the most widely used and regarded network services

Email Security Enhancements

1. confidentiality

protection from disclosure

2. authentication

of sender of message

3. message integrity

protection from modification

4. non-repudiation of origin

protection from denial by sender

4.2.1 Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

provides a confidentiality and authentication service that can be used for e-mail and file storage

applications.

developed by Phil Zimmermann

Based on known algorithms such as RSA

integrated into a single program

It is availiable free on a variety of platforms.(Unix, PC, Macintosh and other systems )

originally free, now also have commercial versions available

For personal email security

Operational Description

Consist of four services:

Authentication

Confidentiality

Compression

E-mail compatibility

Authentication

1. sender creates message

2. use SHA-1 to generate 160-bit hash of message

3. signed hash with RSA using sender's private key is attached to message

4. receiver uses RSA with sender's public key to decrypt and recover hash code



5. receiver verifies received message using hash of it and compares with decrypted hash code

Confidentiality

1. sender generates message and 128-bit random number as session key for it

2. encrypt message using 3DES or other methods in CBC mode with session key

3. session key encrypted using RSA with recipient's public key, & attached to message

4. receiver uses RSA with private key to decrypt and recover session key

5. session key is used to decrypt message

Compression

by default PGP compresses message after signing but before encrypting

so can store uncompressed message & signature for later verification

Message encryption is after compression

To strengthen cryptographic security

uses ZIP compression algorithm

Email Compatibility

when using PGP will have binary data to send (encrypted message etc)

however email was designed only for text

hence PGP must encode raw binary data into printable ASCII characters

uses radix-64 algorithm

maps 3 bytes to 4 printable characters

also appends a CRC

PGP also segments messages if too big

Fig 4.10 PGP operation



Cryptographic Keys

PGP uses four types of keys

Session keys

Public keys

Private Keys

Passphrase keys

Session Keys

need a session key for each message

of varying sizes: 56-bit DES, 168-bit Triple-DES

uses random inputs taken from previous uses and from keystroke timing of user

Public & Private Keys

PGP use:

Public keys for encrypting session keys / verifying signatures.

Private keys for decrypting session keys / creating signatures.

Passphrase Keys

A passphrase is a longer version of a password, and in theory, a more secure one. Typically

composed of multiple words,

PGP Message Format

Fig 4.11 PGP message format

PGP Key Rings

each PGP user has a pair of key rings:



public-key ring contains all the public-keys of other PGP users known to this user, indexed

by key ID

private-key ring contains the public/private key pair(s) for this user, indexed by key ID &

encrypted keyed from a hashed passphrase

PGP Message Generation

EP=public-key encryption

DP=public-key decryption

EC=symmetric encryption

DC = symmetric decryption

H=hash function

||=concatenation

Z=compression using ZIP algorithm

Fig 4.12 PGP message generation

The sending PGP entity performs the following steps:

Signs the message:

PGP gets sender’s private key from key ring using its user id as an index.

PGP prompts user for passphrase to decrypt private key.

PGP constructs the signature component of the message.

Encrypts the message:

PGP generates a session key and encrypts the message.

PGP retrieves the receiver public key from the key ring using its user id as an index.

PGP constructs session component of message

PGP Message Reception

The receiving PGP entity performs the following steps:



Decrypting the message:

PGP get private key from private-key ring using Key ID field in session key

component of message as an index.

PGP prompts user for passphrase to decrypt private key.

PGP recovers the session key and decrypts the message.

Authenticating the message:

PGP retrieves the sender’s public key from the public-key ring using the Key ID

field in the signature key component as index.

PGP recovers the transmitted message digest.

PGP computes the message for the received message and compares it to the

transmitted version for authentication.

Fig 4.13 PGP message reception

PGP Key Management

in PGP every user is own CA

can sign keys for users they know directly

PGP adopts a trust model called the web of trust.

No centralised authority means Individuals sign one another’s public keys, these “certificates” are

stored along with keys in key rings.

PGP computes a trust level for each public key in key ring.

Trust levels for public keys dependent on:

Number of signatures on the key;

Trust level assigned to each of those signatures.



Trust levels recomputed from time to time.

4.2.2 S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions)

security enhancement to MIME email emerged as the industry standard

original Internet RFC822 email was text only

MIME provided support for varying content types and multi-part messages

with encoding of binary data to textual form

S/MIME added security enhancements

have S/MIME support in many mail agents

eg MS Outlook, Mozilla, Mac Mail etc

S/MIME Functions

Enveloped Data: Encrypted content and encrypted session keys for recipients.

Signed Data: Message Digest encrypted with private key of “signer.”

Clear-Signed Data: Signed but not encrypted.

Signed and Enveloped Data: Various orderings for encrypting and signing

Header fields in MIME

MIME-Version: identifies the version

Content-Type: Describes the data contained in the body (application/word)

Content-Transfer-Encoding: How message has been encoded (radix-64)

Content-ID: Unique identifying character string.

Content Description: Needed when content is not readable text (e.g.mpeg)

S/MIME Cryptographic Algorithms

digital signatures: DSS & RSA

hash functions: SHA-1 & MD5

session key encryption: RSA

message encryption: AES, Triple-DES and others

MAC: HMAC with SHA-1

S/MIME Certificate Processing

S/MIME uses X.509 v3 certificates

uses a hybrid of X.509 CA hierarchy & PGP’s web of trust for key management

each client has a list of trusted CA’s certificates and own public/private key pairs & certificates

certificates must be signed by trusted CA’s

S/MIME – User Agent Role

Key generation



Generating key with RSA

Registration

Register a user’s public key with a certification authority

Certificate storage and retrieval

Access to a local list of certificates in order to verify incoming signatures and encrypt

outgoing

Enhanced Security Services

Signed receipts: the recipient signs the entire original message plus original (sender's) signature

and appends the new signature to form a new S/MIME message.

Security labels: used for access control, by indicating which users are permitted access to an

object.

Secure mailing lists

4.3 IP SECURITY

Internet Protocol security (IPsec) is a suite of cryptography based protection services and security

protocols.

provides

authentication

confidentiality

key management

applicable to use over LANs, WANs, & Internet

Fig 4.14 IPsec architecture



Applications of IPSec

Secure branch office connectivity over the Internet

Secure remote access over the Internet

Establishing extranet and intranet connectivity with partners

Enhancing electronic commerce security

Benefits of IPSec

in a firewall/router provides strong security to all traffic

in a firewall/router is resistant to bypass

transparent to applications and end users

provide security for individual users

IP Security Architecture

Architecture

RFC4301 Security Architecture for Internet Protocol

have two security header extensions:

Authentication Header (AH)

Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

Contains

1. Documents that define IPSec.

2. IPSec services

3. Concept of security association.

IPSec Documents

The IPSec specification consists of numerous documents and is divided into seven groups,

1. Architecture: Covers the general concepts, security requirements, definitions, and mechanisms

defining IPSec technology.

2. Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP): Covers the packet format and general issues related to the

use of the ESP for packet encryption and authentication.

3. Authentication Header (AH): Covers the packet format and general issues related to the use of AH

for packet authentication.

4. Encryption Algorithm: A set of documents that describe how various encryption algorithms are

used for ESP.

5. Authentication Algorithm: A set of documents that describe how various authentication algorithms

are used

6. Key Management: Documents that describe key management schemes.



7. Domain of Interpretation (DOI): include identifiers for approved encryption and authentication

algorithms, as well as operational parameters such as key lifetime

IPsec Services

Access control

Data origin authentication

Rejection of replayed packets

Confidentiality (encryption)

Limited traffic flow confidentiality

Security Associations

a one-way relationship between sender & receiver that affords security for traffic flow

defined by 3 parameters:

i. Security Parameters Index (SPI): A bit string assigned to SA to enable the receiving system to

select the SA under which a received packet will be processed.

ii. IP Destination Address:unicast addresses are allowed

iii. Security Protocol Identifier: indicates whether the association is an AH or ESP security

association.

has a number of other parameters

seq no,lifetime etc

Authentication Header (AH)

provides support for data integrity & authentication of IP packets

Authentication based on use of a MAC(HMAC)

Fig 4.15 Authentication Header

Next Header (8 bits): Identifies the type of header immediately following this header

Payload Length (8 bits): Length of Authentication Header

Reserved (16 bits): For future use

Security Parameters Index (32 bits): Identifies a security association

Sequence Number (32 bits): A monotonically increasing counter value for preventing attacks

Authentication Data (variable): A variable-length field



Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

provides message content confidentiality & limited traffic flow confidentiality

can use a variety of encryption & authentication algorithms

Fig 4.16 ESP

Security Parameters Index (32 bits): Identifies a security association

Sequence Number (32 bits): A monotonically increasing counter value; this provides an anti-replay

function

Payload Data (variable): This is a transport-level segment (transport mode) or IP packet (tunnel

mode) that is protected by encryption

Padding (0–255 bytes): for various reasons

Pad Length (8 bits): Indicates the number of pad bytes

Next Header (8 bits): Identifies the type of data contained in the payload data field by identifying

the first header in that payload

Authentication Data (variable): A variable-length field that contains the Integrity Check Value

Transport and Tunnel Modes

Transport Mode(end-to-end)

• Provides protection primarily for upper-layer protocol payloads

• Used for end-to-end communication between two hosts.

Tunnel Mode(end-to-intermediate)

• provides protection to the entire IP packet

• add new header for next hop

• no routers on way can examine inner IP header

• is used when one or both ends of an SA are a security gateway, such as a firewall or router

that implements IPSec



Fig 4.17 transport and Tunnel modes

Combining Security Associations

SA’s can implement either AH or ESP

to implement both need to combine SA’s

form a security association bundle

combined by

transport adjacency: more than one security protocol on same IP packet, without

invoking tunneling

iterated tunneling: application of multiple layers of security protocols effected

through IP tunneling

Mainly four cases of SA association

Fig 4.18 SA association cases

The cases are:

i. Case 1 security is provided between end systems that implement IPSec.



ii. Case 2 security is provided only between gateways (routers, firewalls, etc.) and no hosts implement

IPSec.

iii. Case 3 builds on Case 2 by adding end-to-end security.

iv. Case 4 provides support for a remote host that uses the Internet to reach an organization’s firewall

and then to gain access to some server or workstation behind the firewall. Only tunnel mode is

required between the remote host and the firewall.

Key Management

handles key generation & distribution of secret keys

typically need 2 pairs of keys

2 per direction(Transmit and Receive) for AH & ESP

Two types of key management

i. manual key management

System admin manually configures every system

ii. automated key management

automated system for on demand creation of keys for large systems

4.4 WEB SECURITY

Web application security is a branch of Information Security that deals specifically with security of

websites, web applications and web services. At a high level, Web application security draws on the

principles of application security but applies them specifically to Internet and Web systems.

4.4.1 SSL (Secure Socket Layer)

is a method for providing security for web based applications

transport layer security service

subsequently became Internet standard known as TLS (Transport Layer Security)

uses TCP to provide a reliable end-to-end service

SSL has two layers of protocols

SSL Architecture

SSL Record Protocol: provides basic security services to various higher-layer protocols.

Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP):which provides the transfer service for Web client/server

interaction,

Hand Shake, Change Cipher Spec and Alert: SSL-specific protocols are used in the management

of SSL exchanges.



Fig 4.19 SSL architecture

Two important SSL concepts

1. SSL connection

peer-to-peer, communications link

associated with one SSL session

2. SSL session

an association between client & server

created by the Handshake Protocol

may be shared by multiple SSL connections

SSL Record Protocol Services

This protocol provides two services for SSL connections:

1. Confidentiality - using conventional encryption.

2. Message Integrity - using a Message Authentication Code (MAC).

Fig 4.20 SSL record protocol operation

It takes an application message to be transmitted and fragments it into manageable blocks.

These blocks are then optionally compressed which must be lossless and may not increase the

content length by more than 1024 bytes.

A message authentication code is then computed over the compressed data using a shared secret

key. This is then appended to the compressed (or plaintext) block.

The compressed message plus MAC are then encrypted using symmetric encryption.

The final step is to prepend a header



SSL Change Cipher Spec Protocol

This consists of a single message which consists of a single byte with the value 1.

This is used to cause the pending state to be copied into the current state which updates the cipher

suite to be used on this connection.

SSL Alert Protocol

conveys SSL-related alerts to peer entity

Consists of two bytes

fatal or warning

If the level is fatal SSL immediately terminates the connection.

The second byte contains a code that indicates the specific alert

SSL Handshake Protocol

This protocol is used before any application data is sent.

Fig 4.21 SSL hand shake protocol

allows server & client to:

authenticate each other

to negotiate encryption & MAC algorithms

to negotiate cryptographic keys to be used

Uses a series of messages exchanged by the client and server during 4 phases,

Establish Security Capabilities

Server Authentication and Key Exchange

Client Authentication and Key Exchange

Finish



4.5 SYSTEM SECURITY

4.5.1 Intruder

Can identify classes of intruders

Masquerader: An individual who is not authorized to use the computer and who penetrates a

system's access controls to exploit a legitimate user's account

Misfeasor: A legitimate user who accesses data, programs, or resources for which such access is not

authorized, or who is authorized for such access but misuses his or her privileges

Clandestine user: An individual who seizes supervisory control of the system and uses this control

to evade auditing and access controls or to suppress audit collection.

Intruder attacks range from the benign (simply exploring net to see what is there); to the serious (who

attempt to read privileged data, perform unauthorized modifications, or disrupt system)

Intrusion Techniques

aim to gain access and/or increase privileges on a system

basic attack methodology

target acquisition and information gathering

initial access

privilege escalation

covering tracks

key goal often is to acquire passwords so then exercise access rights of owner

Password Guessing

one of the most common attacks

attacker knows a login (from email/web page etc)

then attempts to guess password for it

defaults, short passwords, common word searches

user info (variations on names, birthday, phone, common words/interests)

exhaustively searching all possible passwords

Password Capture

another attack involves password capture



watching over shoulder as password is entered

using a trojan horse program to collect

monitoring an insecure network login

eg. telnet, FTP, web, email

extracting recorded info after successful login (web history/cache, last number dialled etc)

Intrusion Detection

intrusion detection is the one method of system defense

which aims to detect intrusions so can:

i. block access & minimize damage if detected quickly;

ii. act as deterrent given chance of being caught;

iii. Can collect info on intruders to improve future security.

Approaches to Intrusion Detection

1. Statistical anomaly detection

2. Rule based detection

1. Statistical anomaly detection: collect data relating to the behavior of legitimate users, then use

statistical tests to determine whether new behavior is legitimate user behavior or not.

a. Threshold detection:

b. Profile based

threshold detection

Define thresholds, independent of user, for the frequency of occurrence of events.

count occurrences of specific event over time

if exceed reasonable value assume intrusion

profile based

develop profile of activity of each user and use to detect changes in the behavior



characterize past behavior of users

detect significant deviations from this profile usually multi-parameter

2. Rule-based detection: attempt to define a set of rules used to decide if given behavior is an intruder

a. Anomaly detection:

analyze historical audit records to identify usage patterns & auto-generate rules for them

then observe current behavior & match against rules to see if conforms

like statistical anomaly detection does not require prior knowledge of security flaws

b. Penetration identification: expert system approach that searches for suspicious behavior

uses expert systems technology

with rules identifying known penetration, weakness patterns, or suspicious behavior

compare audit records or states against rules

rules usually machine & O/S specific

rules are generated by experts who interview & codify knowledge of security admins

quality depends on how well this is done

Audit Records

fundamental tool for intrusion detection

Basically, two plans are used:

• Native audit records: Virtually all main O/S’s include accounting software that collects information on

user activity,

• Detection-specific audit records: implement collection facility to generates custom audit records with

desired info, advantage is it can be vendor independent and portable, disadvantage is extra overhead

involved

Distributed Intrusion Detection

may need to deal with different audit record formats

One or more nodes in the network will serve as collection and analysis points for the data, which

must be securely transmitted to them



Either a centralized (single point, easier but bottleneck) or decentralized (multiple centers must

coordinate) architecture can be used.

Fig 4.22 Distributed Intrusion Detection

Host agent module: audit collection module operating as a background process on a monitored

system

LAN monitor agent module: like a host agent module except it analyzes LAN traffic

Central manager module: Receives reports from LAN monitor and host agents and processes and

correlates these reports to detect intrusion.

Agent Implementation

The agent captures each native O/S audit record, & applies a filter that retains only records of

security interest.

These records are then reformatted into a standardized format (HAR).

Fig 4.23 Agent implementation

Then a template-driven logic module analyzes the records for suspicious activity.



When suspicious activity is detected, an alert is sent to the central manager.

The central manager includes an expert system that can draw inferences from received data. The

manager may also query individual systems for copies of HARs to correlate with those from other

agents.

Password Management

front-line defense against intruders

users supply both:

login – determines privileges of that user

password – to identify them

passwords often stored encrypted

Unix uses multiple DES (variant with salt)

more recent systems use crypto hash function

should protect password file on system

Managing Passwords - Education

can use policies and good user education

educate on importance of good passwords

give guidelines for good passwords

minimum length (>6)

require a mix of upper & lower case letters, numbers, punctuation

not dictionary words

Computer Generated

let computer create passwords

if random likely not memorisable, so will be written down

have history of poor user acceptance

FIPS PUB 181 one of best generators

has both description & sample code

generates words from concatenating random pronounceable syllables



Reactive Checking

reactively run password guessing tools

cracked passwords are disabled

but is resource intensive

bad passwords are vulnerable till found

Proactive Checking

most promising approach to improving password security

allow users to select own password

but have system verify it is acceptable

simple rule enforcement

compare against dictionary of bad passwords

use algorithmic (markov model or bloom filter) to detect poor choices

4.5.2 Malicious software

Malicious software (malware) is any software that gives partial to full control of your computer to do

whatever the malware creator wants. Malware can be a virus, worm, trojan, adware, spyware, root kit, etc.

Fig 4.24 Classification of malicious software

Backdoor or Trapdoor

Uses secret entry point into a program

allows those who know access bypassing usual security procedures

have been commonly used by developers

a threat when left in production programs allowing exploited by attackers

very hard to block in O/S



requires good s/w development & update

Logic Bomb

one of oldest types of malicious software

code embedded in legitimate program

activated when specified conditions met

eg presence/absence of some file

particular date/time

particular user

when triggered typically damage system

modify/delete files/disks, halt machine, etc

Trojan horse

A Trojan horse is a useful, or apparently useful, program or command procedure (eg game, utility,

s/w upgrade etc)

Containing hidden code that performs some unwanted or harmful function that an unauthorized user

could not accomplish directly.

Commonly used to make files readable, propagate a virus or worm, or simply to destroy data.

Zombie

program which secretly takes over another networked computer then uses it to indirectly launch

attacks

used in denial-of-service attacks,

Typically zombies exploit known flaws in networked computer

Viruses

a piece of self-replicating code attached to some other code

both propagates itself & carries a payload (code to make copies of itself)

Once a virus is executing, it can perform any function, such as erasing files and programs.

Virus Operation

virus phases:

Dormant – virus is idle, waiting for trigger event. Not all viruses have this stage

propagation – virus places a copy of itself into other programs / system areas

triggering – virus is activated by some trigger event to perform intended function

execution – desired function (which may be harmless or destructive) is performed

Virus Structure

components:



infection mechanism - enables replication

trigger - event that makes payload activate

payload - what it does, malicious or benign

Virus can be prepended / postpended / embedded

when infected program invoked, executes virus code then original program code

Can block initial infection (difficult) or propagation (with access controls).

Sample Virus code

The virus code (V) is prepended to infected programs (assuming the entry point is the first line of

the program).

The first line of code jumps to the main virus program. The second line is a special marker for

infected programs.

The main virus program first seeks out uninfected executable files and infects them. Then it may

perform some action,

Finally, the virus transfers control to the original program. If the infection phase of the program is

reasonably rapid, a user is unlikely to notice any difference between the execution of an infected

and uninfected program. This type of virus can be detected because the length of the program

changes. More sophisticated variants attempt to hide their presence better, by for example,

compressing the original program.

Fig 4. 25 sample virus code

Types of Viruses

can classify on basis of how they attack



i. parasitic virus : traditional and still most common form of virus, it attaches itself to executable

files and replicates when the infected program is executed

ii. memory-resident virus: Lodges in main memory as part of a resident system program, and infects

every program that executes

iii. boot sector virus:Infects a master boot record and spreads when a system is booted from the disk

containing the virus

iv. Stealth: a virus explicitly designed to hide itself from detection by antivirus software

v. Polymorphic virus: mutates with every infection, making detection by the “signature "of the virus

impossible.

vi. Metamorphic virus: mutates with every infection, rewriting itself completely at each iteration

changing behavior and/or appearance, increasing the difficulty of detection.

Macro Virus

macro code attached to some data file

platform independent

infect documents

easily spread

exploit macro capability of office apps

executable program embedded in office doc

is a major source of new viral infection

Email Virus

spread using email with attachment containing a macro virus

e.g. Melissa

exploits MS Word macro in attached doc

if attachment opened, macro activates

sends email to all on users address list

and does local damage

usually targeted at Microsoft Outlook mail agent & Word/Excel documents

Worms

replicating but not infecting program

typically spreads over a network by using users distributed privileges or by exploiting system

vulnerabilities

widely used by hackers to create zombie PC's, subsequently used for further attacks, esp DoS

major issue is lack of security

Worm Operation



worm phases like those of viruses:

dormant

propagation

search for other systems to infect

establish connection to target remote system

replicate self onto remote system

triggering

execution

Virus Countermeasures

prevention - ideal solution but difficult

realistically need:

detection

identification

removal

if detect but can’t identify or remove, must discard and replace infected program

Anti-Virus Software

first-generation

scanner uses virus signature to identify virus

or change in length of programs

second-generation

uses heuristic rules to spot viral infection

or uses crypto hash of program to spot changes

third-generation

memory-resident programs identify virus by actions

fourth-generation

packages with a variety of antivirus techniques

eg scanning & activity traps, access-controls

Advanced Anti-Virus Techniques

generic decryption

use CPU simulator to check program signature & behavior before actually running it

Ex: behavior blocking software

digital immune system (IBM)

general purpose emulation & virus detection

any virus entering is captured, analyzed, detection/shielding created for it, removed



Behavior-Blocking Software

integrated with host O/S

monitors program behavior in real-time

eg file access, disk format, executable mods, system settings changes, network access

Fig 4.26 Behavior blocking software

for possibly malicious actions

if detected can block, terminate, or seek ok

has advantage over scanners

but malicious code runs before detection

Digital Immune System

1. A monitoring program on each PC uses a variety of heuristics based on system behavior, suspicious

changes to programs, or family signature to infer that a virus may be present, & forwards infected

programs to an administrative machine

2. The administrative machine encrypts the sample and sends it to a central virus analysis machine

3. This machine creates an environment in which the infected program can be safely run for analysis

to produces a prescription for identifying and removing the virus.

4. The resulting prescription is sent back to the administrative machine

5. The administrative machine forwards the prescription to the infected client

6. The prescription is also forwarded to other clients in the organization

7. Subscribers around the world receive regular antivirus updates that protect them from the new

virus.



Fig 4.27 Digital Immune System

Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS)

DDoS Countermeasures

Three broad lines of defense:

1. attack prevention & preemption (before)

2. attack detection & filtering (during)

3. attack source traceback & ident (after)

Fig 4.28 DDoS Attack

4.5.3 FIREWALL

A firewall is a network security system, either hardware or software based, that controls incoming and

outgoing network traffic based on a set of rules. Acting as a barrier between a trusted network and other

untrusted networks -- such as the Internet -- or less-trusted networks -- such as a retail merchant's network

outside of a cardholder data environment -- a firewall controls access to the resources of a network through

a positive control model.

Hardware and Software Firewalls

Firewalls can be either hardware or software but the ideal firewall configuration will consist of both.

Hardware firewalls can be purchased as a stand-alone product but are also typically found in broadband



routers, and should be considered an important part of your system and network set-up. Most hardware

firewalls will have a minimum of four network ports to connect other computers, but for larger networks,

business networking firewall solutions are available.

Software firewalls are installed on your computer (like any software) and you can customize it;

allowing you some control over its function and protection features. A software firewall will protect your

computer from outside attempts to control or gain access your computer.

Fig 4.29 Firewall

Firewall Limitations

cannot protect from attacks bypassing it

cannot protect against internal threats

cannot protect against transfer of all virus infected programs or files

Types of Firewalls

Three common types

1. packet filters

2. application-level gateways

3. circuit-level gateways

Fig 4.30 Types Firewall



Firewalls – Packet Filters

A packet-filtering router applies a set of rules to each incoming and outgoing IP packet to forward

or discard the packet.

Filtering rules are based on information contained in a network packet such as source & destination

IP addresses, ports, transport protocol & interface.

Some advantages are simplicity, transparency & speed.

If there is no match to any rule, then one of two default policies are applied:

i. discard packet, conservative policy

ii. Forward packet, permissive policy

Fig 4.31 packet filtering firewall

Firewalls - Application Level Gateway (or Proxy)

have application specific gateway / proxy

has full access to protocol

user requests service from proxy

proxy validates request as legal

then actions request and returns result to user

can log / audit traffic at application level

Fig 4.32 Application Level Gateway



need separate proxies for each service

some services naturally support proxying

others are more problematic

Firewalls - Circuit Level Gateway

relays two TCP connections,

i. between itself and an inside TCP user

ii. between itself and a TCP user on an outside host

Once the two connections are established, it relays TCP data from one connection to the other

without examining its contents.

The security function consists of determining which connections will be allowed.

Fig 4.33 Firewalls - Circuit Level Gateway

Bastion Host

highly secure host system

runs circuit / application level gateways

provides externally accessible services

may support 2 or more net connections

Firewall Configurations

i. screened host firewall, single-homed bastion

ii. screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion

iii. screened subnet firewall

Screened host firewall, single-homed bastion



the firewall consists of two systems:

• a packet-filtering router - allows Internet packets to/from bastion only

• a bastion host - performs authentication and proxy functions

This configuration has greater security, as it implements both packet-level & application-level

filtering

Fig 4.34 Screened host firewall, single-homed bastion

Screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion

Physically separates the external and internal networks, ensuring two systems must be

compromised to breach security.

The advantages of dual layers of security are also present here. Again, an information server or

other hosts can be allowed direct communication with the router if this is in accord with the security

policy, but are now separated from the internal network.

Fig 4.35 Screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion

Screened subnet firewall

The most secure shown.



It has two packet-filtering routers,

i. Between the bastion host and the Internet

ii. Between the bastion host and the internal network, creating an isolated subnetwork.

May include one or more information servers and modems for dial-in capability.

Systems on the inside network cannot construct direct routes to the Internet

Fig 4.36 Screened subnet firewall

Access Control

given system has identified a user

determine what resources they can access

general model is that of access matrix with

subject - active entity (user, process)

object - passive entity (file or resource)

access right – way object can be accessed

can decompose by

columns as access control lists

rows as capability tickets

Fig 4.37 access matrix



Bell LaPadula (BLP) Model

one of the most famous security models

implemented as mandatory policies on system

has two key policies:

no read up (simple security property)

a subject can only read/write an object if the current security level of the subject dominates

(>=) the classification of the object

no write down (*-property)

a subject can only append/write to an object if the current security level of the subject is

dominated by (<=) the classification of the object

module 4 network and computer security

Education

incoming ticket

secondary ticket

grants ticket client

client users

users id

computer network

users access

tgs id