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Mobilizing for Distant Rebels: Weak Diasporas and the
Mass Mobilization of Solidarity Activists
by
David Zarnett
Thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science University of Toronto
© Copyright by David Zarnett 2017
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Mobilizing for Distant Rebels: Weak Diasporas and the Mass
Mobilization of Solidarity Activists
David Zarnett
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science University of Toronto
2017
Abstract
This dissertation examines the causes of grassroots organizing in support of distant rebel
groups. In most discussions of this kind of transnational activism, scholars often focus on
the mobilization of ethnic kin, or diasporas. By contrast, I focus on the mass
mobilization of grassroots activists who have no ethnic tie to the distant rebels they
support. I refer to these mobilizations as “mass solidarity mobilizations.” The emergence
of these mobilizations is puzzling given not only that those who make them up often have
weak historical, cultural and material ties to the distant rebels they support, but also that
only some rebels but not others receive this kind of external assistance.
Why do mass solidarity mobilizations form in support of some distant rebels but not
others? This question matters since these mobilizations can shape distant intra-state
conflicts by influencing third-party state policies and distant rebel resistance strategies.
Contrary to most recent scholarship which focuses on how distant rebels frame their
cause internationally and on international gatekeeper NGO advocacy, I focus on rebel
recruitment strategies abroad. Drawing on more than 150 interviews with solidarity
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activists, a statistical analysis of an original dataset, and a comparative case of the
grassroots solidarity organizing in North America and Europe for Palestinians and its
absence for the Kurdish struggle in Turkey, I show that mass solidarity mobilizations are
more likely to form for distant rebels that cannot rely on their ethnic kin abroad for
meaningful support. In the absence of a strong external ethnic constituency, rebel
activists are more likely to look beyond their ethnic kin and recruit non-diasporans
instead. When they actively recruit non-diasporans, mass solidarity mobilizing on their
behalf becomes more likely.
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Acknowledgments
In completing this dissertation, I have many people to thank. I offer a sincere thanks to
my supervisor Professor Wendy Wong, whose advice and guidance over the last 5 years
has been invaluable. I could not have completed this degree without Wendy’s
attentiveness and consistent encouragement when I struggled, as well as her ability to see
the bigger picture when my thinking narrowed. In working with Wendy, I have a learned
a lot about what it means to be a mentor and mentee.
I also owe a great deal of thanks to my committee members, Professors Matthew
Hoffmann and Oded Haklai whose insights and guidance greatly improved the quality of
this dissertation. I benefited significantly from Matt’s close reading of my theoretical
arguments, his ability to breakdown causal processes into constituent parts, and his ability
to clarify my central narrative. I also benefited immensely from Oded’s expertise on
social movements as well as, most importantly, Israel-Palestine. His insights greatly
improved my case study chapters. Beyond my committee, I also owe much thanks to my
internal and external reviewers, Professors Lilach Gilady and Steve Saideman, both of
whom have offered invaluable thoughts on what I need to do to turn my dissertation into
a book manuscript.
I am also indebted to a number of faculty members who were willing to sit down with me
on a number of occasions to help me think through my project and clarify my thoughts. I
am especially grateful to Professors Peter Loewen and Chris Cochrane for their assistance
on my quantitative chapters, Ron Levi for his insights on Qualitative Comparative
Analysis and Jeff Kopstein who read early versions of my dissertation proposal and
theory chapters. I am also grateful to Fahd Husain who helped me learn the basics of
statistical reasoning and analysis. Although they did not have a direct hand in the
dissertation, I have also learned a great deal from Professors Rod Haddow and Rob
Vipond about the job market, book publishing, and the behind the scene workings of a
university department. And last but not least, I owe a considerable amount of thanks to
the departmental staff who made sure that all my administrative matters were in order –
Mary-Alice Bailey, Carolynn Branton, Julie Guzzo, Elizabeth Jagdeo, Jennifer O’Reilly,
Sari Sherman, and Louis Tentsos.
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I am also deeply grateful to my many colleagues in Toronto and beyond, whose support
and guidance was in abundance. I am fortunate to have seemingly unfettered access to an
especially smart and ambitious group of friends, including Kiran Banerjee, Megan
Dersnah, Souha Ezzedeen, Aarie Glas, Will Greaves, Jamie Levin, Joe McKay, Craig
Smith. Their wisdom on all matters, academic or not, is indispensable. Beyond Toronto,
I am especially indebted to Miriam Bradley who, whether in Oxford or Barcelona, was
always there (via G-chat or email) to offer her thoughts on various aspects of my project,
to read drafts, and to generally just listen without judgment as I struggled to make sense
of what I was trying to do. And I also owe much thanks to my American Foxhound,
Do(u)g, whose ability to discern patterns would put any social scientist to shame. He has
taught me invaluable life lessons about bond, self-discipline, and being in the moment.
I have also benefited from having a strong family support network, who consistently
reminded me that there is life beyond the dissertation. To my parents Ben and Susie, and
my sister Dara, I could not have completed this without your support and ability to
cultivate the traits in me I needed to see this through to the end. Thank you!
David Zarnett
Toronto, Canada
April 2017
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................. iv
Chapter 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Key Terms: Rebels, Mass Solidarity Mobilizations, and Diaspora Strength .............................. 7 1.2 Central Argument ........................................................................................................................................... 9 1.3 Scope Conditions ........................................................................................................................................ 11 1.4 Alternative Explanations .......................................................................................................................... 13 1.5 Scholarly Contributions ............................................................................................................................ 16 1.6 Plan of the Dissertation ............................................................................................................................. 21
Chapter 2 Explaining Mass Solidarity Mobilizations – Rebels, Recruitment and Diaspora Strength 23
2.1 The Three-Step Process of Mass Solidarity Mobilizations ............................................................ 23 2.2 Grassroots Issue Adoption and the Importance of Recruitment ................................................... 32 2.3 Diaspora Strength and Entrepreneur Recruitment Strategies ........................................................ 36 2.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................... 40
Chapter 3 A Quantitative Test .......................................................................................... 42 3.1 Universe of Cases: Amnesty International Campaigns ................................................................... 42 3.2 Dependent Variable: Mass Solidarity Mobilization ......................................................................... 44 3.3 Independent Variable: Diaspora Strength ........................................................................................... 45 3.4 Control Variables ........................................................................................................................................ 52 3.5 Results ............................................................................................................................................................ 55 3.6 Robustness Checks ..................................................................................................................................... 58 3.7 Model Predictions ....................................................................................................................................... 62 3.8 Unpredictability and Agency in Mass Solidarity Mobilizing ....................................................... 64 3.9 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................... 66
Chapter 4 Why Compares Palestinians and Kurds? ......................................................... 68 4.1 Palestinian and Kurdish Grievances: Ethnic Discrimination and Occupation ......................... 70 4.2 Conflict Severity ......................................................................................................................................... 73 4.3 Western Complicity .................................................................................................................................... 76 4.4 Extent of Violence Perpetrated by Palestinian and Kurdish Militants ....................................... 77 4.5 International Visibility .............................................................................................................................. 78 4.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................... 82
Chapter 5 Explaining Varying Levels of Western Grassroots Solidarity for Palestinians and Kurds 84
5.1 Mass Solidarity Mobilizing for Palestine ............................................................................................ 84 5.1.1 The PLO’s International Diplomacy and the Origins of Mass Solidarity Mobilizing for
Palestine ........................................................................................................................................................... 87 5.1.2 Palestinian Diaspora Activism & the Recruitment of Non-Palestinians in the 1980s .. 93
5.2 The Absence of Mass Solidarity Moblizing for the Kurds ......................................................... 109 5.2.1 The Emergence and International Diplomacy of the PKK ................................................ 110 5.2.2 The PKK’s Diaspora Mobilization Strategy ........................................................................... 113 5.2.2 Why Was the PKK Successful in Mobilizing the Diaspora? ............................................ 120
5.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 122
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Chapter 6 Hypotheses for Non-Mobilization Under Conditions of Rebel Diasporic Weakness 123
6.1 Mass Solidarity Mobilization Not Needed ....................................................................................... 128 6.1.1 Human Rights Progress ................................................................................................................. 128 6.1.2 Western Sanctions ........................................................................................................................... 131
6.2 Mass Solidarity Mobilization Not Asked For ................................................................................. 133 6.2.1 No Rebel Campaign ....................................................................................................................... 133 6.2.2 Rebel Campaign But No International Diplomacy ............................................................... 138 6.2.3 Campaigning Rebels Who Do Not Seek External Support ................................................ 139 6.2.4 Rebel Campaign and Diplomacy But No Targeting of Western Grassroots ................ 141
6.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 144
Chapter 7 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 146 7.1 Implications for Policy ........................................................................................................................... 147 7.2 Theoretical Implication: Why Do Islamic State’s Foreign Fighters Have Weak Ties to Islam? .................................................................................................................................................................. 148 7.3 Future Research ........................................................................................................................................ 150
7.3.1 Improving the Dataset.................................................................................................................... 150 7.3.2 Grassroots Non-Mobilizations .................................................................................................... 151 7.3.3 Rebel Diplomatic Strategies ........................................................................................................ 152
7.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 152 Appendix A: Correlation Matrix ................................................................................................................ 153 Appendix B: Coding of Dependent Variable ......................................................................................... 154 Appendix C: Measuring Diaspora Civil Society Mobilization ......................................................... 202 Appendix D: Description of Amnesty Campaigns ............................................................................ 224
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Chapter 1 Introduction
In 2004, the plight of the Darfuris became an international cause célèbre. In
North America and Western Europe, thousands of grassroots activists with no ethnic tie
to Darfur mobilized to call for an international intervention to save Darfuris from what
they claimed to be the genocidal policies of the Sudanese government.1 They mobilized
as if Darfur was more important than the many domestic issues affecting those much
closer to home. And they mobilized as if their own elected governments were not guilty
of severe rights violations abroad, namely in the two countries they had just invaded -
Iraq and Afghanistan.2 As Samantha Power put it, these Darfur activists were “people
who were gathering to demand action about something that had nothing to do with
them…”3
From 2004 to 2007, hundreds of Darfur-focused NGOs formed, including the
Save Darfur Coalition, which brought together approximately 180 member organizations,
and Students Taking Action Now: Darfur, which included hundreds of local chapters
across North American campuses.4 In their campaigning, these NGOs adopted Darfuri
political positions on the nature of the violence being committed.5 They called for
sanctions against the Sudanese government and they ran divestment campaigns that
targeted multi-national corporations doing business in Sudan.6 These efforts influenced
the conflict in Darfur, although not only in positive ways.7 Their advocacy added to the
international moral and economic pressure on the Sudanese government to change its
1 Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005). 2 Mahmood Mamdani, Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror (Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2009). . 3 Samantha Power, ‘The Citizen Activism Phenomenon’, PBS Frontline available at: [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darfur/themes/citizen.html] accessed 27 May 2016. 4 Rebecca Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 5 Mamdani, Saviours and Survivors 6 Luke Patey, “Against the Asian Tide: The Sudan Divestment Campaign,” Modern African Studies, 47:4 (2009), pp. 551-573. 7 Alan Kuperman, “Darfur: Strategic Victimhood Strikes Again,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 4:3 (2009), pp. 281-303.
2
domestic behaviour, contributing to its willingness to negotiate an end to the violence.8
However, their advocacy also inadvertently encouraged Darfuri rebels to eschew
compromise and remain committed to armed struggle.9 “Because of the Save Darfur
movement,” Alan Kuperman has argued, “the rebels believe that the longer they provoke
genocidal retaliation, the more the West will pressure Sudan to hand them control of the
region.”10
In this dissertation, I investigate the phenomenon of Western grassroots
mobilizations for distant rebels. In particular, I investigate what I call “mass solidarity
mobilizations” - the creation of a grassroots support infrastructure to promote a distant
rebel cause. In most discussions of grassroots organizing for distant rebels, scholars
often think of organizing on the grounds of ethnicity,11 such as Tamils in Toronto
mobilizing for their ethnic kin in Sri Lanka12 or Albanians in New York mobilizing for
their kin in Kosovo.13 Instead, my focus is on the widespread activation of grassroots
activists who take up distant rebel causes to which they have no ethnic tie. I refer to these
activists as solidarity activists14 who mobilize for “the lives of others”15 and engage in
“activity for the sake of strangers who belong to other cultures” in distant countries.16
8 Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert & David Lanz, “Globalised Rebellion: The Darfur Insurgents and the World,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 51:2 (2009). 9 Medina Haeri, “Saving Darfur: Does Advocacy Help or Hinder Conflict Resolution?” PRAXIS: The
Fletcher Journal of Human Security Vol. XXIII (2008), pp. 33-46. 10 Alan Kuperman, “Strategic Victimhood in Darfur,” New York Times (May 31, 2006) “http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/31/opinion/31kuperman.html 11 Nicole Watts, “Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention in International Affairs,” in Joel Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the
Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 127-128. 12 Amarnath Amarasingam, Pain, Pride & Politics: Social Movement Activism and the Sri Lankan Tamil
Diaspora in Canada (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2015). For a useful overview of the violence in Sri Lanka and international NGO engagement, see Jo Becker, Campaigning for Justice: Human
Rights Advocacy in Practice (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013). 13 Maria Koinova, “Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism For Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK,” Foreign Policy Analysis. Vol. 9, No. 4 (2013), pp. 433-453. 14 Eric Hirsch, “Sacrifice for the Cause: Group Processes, Recruitment and Commitment in a Student Social Movement,” American Sociological Review Vol. 55, No. 2 (April 1990), p. 243. William Gamson, “Commitment and Agency in Social Movements,” Sociological Forum Vol. 6, No. 1 (1991), p. 45. 15 Margaret Power & Julie Charlip, “On Solidarity,” Latin American Perspective Vol. 36 No. 6 (November 2009), p. 4. 16 Dieter Rucht, “Distant Issue Movements in Germany: Empirical Description and Theoretical Reflections,” in Guidry, A., Kennedy M. & Zald, M (eds.), Globalization and Social Movements: Culture,
Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere. (Ann Arbor: Michigan: University of Michigan Press), p. 96. Eric Hirsch, “Sacrifice for the Cause: Group Processes, Recruitment and Commitment in a Student Social
3
These activists are not “slacktivists” who mobilize primarily online and through social
media, with minimal effort or risk to themselves. On the contrary, they dedicate
considerable personal resources to supporting distant rebels by creating organizations,
and energetically running and contributing to campaigns. While solidarity activists often
work closely with rebel activists and their diaspora supporters, and in many cases
populate the same organizations,17 mass solidarity mobilizations are distinct from
diaspora mobilizations.
The mass solidarity mobilizing that occurred for the Darfuris is just one case in a
larger universe of cases. Since the end of the Second World War, a number of distant
rebels demanding significant political change, ranging from equal rights and regime
change to an independent state of their own, have been the recipients of widespread
grassroots solidarity abroad. These include black South Africans resisting apartheid,18
Chileans seeking the overthrow of Augusto Pinochet,19 Guatemalan, Nicaraguan, and
Salvadorans battling US-backed governments and right-wing armed groups,20 and
Palestinians,21 Tibetans,22 and East Timorese seeking self-determination,23 among others.
And yet, for all the distant rebels that garner significant external grassroots
solidarity, numerous others with equally meritorious struggles have not. While solidarity
activists mobilized for Darfuris, they did not for Congolese civilians despite the fact that
Movement,” American Sociological Review Vol. 55, No. 2 (April 1990), p. 243. William Gamson, “Commitment and Agency in Social Movements,” Sociological Forum Vol. 6, No. 1 (1991), p. 45. 17 Alexandra Cosma Budabin, “Diasporas as Development Partners for Peace? The Alliance Between the Darfuri Diaspora and the Save Darfur Coalition,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 35 No. 1 (2014), pp. 163-180. 18 Rob Skinner, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Liberal Humanitarians and Transnational Activists in
Britain and the United States 1919-1964 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009). 19 Margaret Power, “The US Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” Latin American
Perspectives Vo. 36, No. 6 (2009), pp. 46-66. 20 Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The US Central America Peace Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Sharon Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture and Agency in the
Central America Solidarity Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 21 Paul Kelemen, The British Left and Zionism: History of a Divorce (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012). Colin Shindler, Israel and the European Left (New York: Continuum, 2012). 22 John Roberts & Elizabeth Roberts, Freeing Tibet: 50 Years of Struggle, Resilience and Hope (New York: AMACOM, 2009). Stephen Noakes, “Transnational Advocacy Networks and Moral Commitment: The Free Tibet Campaign Meets the Chinese State,” International Journal (Spring 2012), pp. 507-525. 23 Brad Simpson, “Solidarity in an Age of Globalization: The Transnational Movement for East Timor and US Foreign Policy,” Peace & Change Vol. 29, No 3 & 4 (July 2004), pp. 453-479. Clinton Fernandes, The
Independence of East Timor: Multi-Dimensional Perspectives – Occupation, Resistance, and International
Political Activism (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2011).
4
they faced violence that was more severe and, arguably, no more complex.24 These same
Darfur activists, purportedly animated by a desire to prevent mass atrocities, also did not
mobilize for the Tamils when violence in Sri Lanka in 2009 spiked resulting in
approximately 40,000 dead.25 Similarly, while East Timorese rebels associated with the
Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of East Timor and the National Council of
Timorese Resistance received widespread grassroots solidarity in the West, the Acehnese
independence struggle in northern Indonesia, led by the Free Aceh Movement, garnered
very little despite the many similarities between the two struggles.26 Other well-known
rebel movements have also failed to secure widespread grassroots solidarity abroad,
including the Kurdish movement in Turkey and the Kashmiri and Sikh movements in
India.
This variation in external support is not particularly puzzling if we were to
compare highly visible political conflicts, such as Israel-Palestine, with more obscure
conflicts about which information is hard to come by. However, this variation does
become more puzzling when we focus only on the conflicts that have been made salient
within the global human rights informational network. This begs the question that is at
the heart of this dissertation: among the widely reported political conflicts around the
world, why do mass solidarity mobilizations form in support of some distant rebels but
not others?
This question matters because mass solidarity mobilization can impact how
distant intra-state conflicts play out.27 Much like human rights NGOs and transnational
24 Alison Brysk, Speaking Rights to Power: Constructing Political Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 25 Interview GI-NET, July 27, 2012. 26 Antje Missbach, Separatist Conflict in Indonesia: The Long-Distance Politics of the Acehnese Diaspora
(New York: Routledge, 2012). William Nessen, “Why Not Independence?” Inside Indonesia 81 (January-March 2005). http://www.insideindonesia.org/why-not-independence-2. Lesley McCulloch, “Building Solidarity,” Inside Indonesia 81 (January-March 2005). http://www.insideindonesia.org/building-solidarity-2 27 There is a large literature on the effects of international interventions in domestic conflicts. On NGOs and transnational civil society, see Darren Hawkins, International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in
Chile (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002). Susan Burgerman, Moral Victories: How Activists
Provoke Multilateral Action (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). Emilie Hafner-Burton, “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem,” International Organization 62 (Fall 2008), pp. 689-716. Matthew Krain, “J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or Politicides?” International Studies Quarterly 56 (2012), pp. 574-589. Amanda Murdie & David Davis, “Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs,” International Studies Quarterly 56 (2012), pp. 1-16. Cullen Hendrix & Wendy Wong, “When is
5
advocacy networks, these mobilization can exert significant agenda-setting and
behavioural effects through their public awareness campaigns and lobbying.28 By
applying political pressure to their own governments, these mobilizations can help put a
distant struggle on the domestic political agenda and influence third-party state foreign
policy towards them,29 which can in turn affect the distant rebel’s chances of success.30
For example, the mass solidarity mobilizations for black South Africans and the African
National Congress resisting apartheid influenced the Reagan administration’s decision to
impose sanctions on South Africa in 1986, contributing to the end of apartheid in 1994.31
The same is true in the case of East Timor in which significant grassroots pressure
contributed to Western states, namely the US, downgrading its relationship with
Indonesia and declaring their support for the East Timorese claim to independence. As
Brad Simpson put it, East Timor solidarity activists were central in “severing the
international sources of Indonesia’s diplomatic, economic and military support,”
contributing significantly to the creation of an East Timorese state in 2002.32 In the
absence of this domestic pressure, Western government would have been far less likely to
take an interest in the East Timorese struggle, preferring the status quo instead.33 While
mass solidarity in the West appears to have benefited black South Africans and the East
Timorese, these mobilizations do not always have such positive effects, and in some
cases can make conflicts longer, more severe, and harder to resolve peacefully.34 But
the Pen Truly Might? Regime Type and the Efficacy of Naming and Shaming in Curbing Human Rights Abuses,” British Journal of Political Science Vol. 43, No. 3 (2013), pp. 651-672. 28 For instance, see Jutta Joachim, Agenda Setting, the UN and NGOs (Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2007). 29 Stephen Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 30 On foreign state interventions see William Zartman, “Internationalization of Communal Strife: Temptations and Opportunities of Triangulation,” in Manus Midlarsky (ed.), The Internationalization of
Communal Strife (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 27-44. Deepa Khosla, “Third World States as Intervenors in Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for Regional and International Security,” Third World
Quarterly (December 1999), pp. 1143-1156. Patrick Regan, “Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 46, No. 1 (2002), pp. 55-73. 31 Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). Neta Crawford & Audie Klotz, How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). 32Simpson, “Solidarity in an Age of Globalization,” p. 454. 33 On the importance of inertia in foreign policy see David Welch, Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign
Policy Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 34 Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & David Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups,” International Organization 65 (Fall 2011), p. 710. Alan Kuperman, “The Moral
6
when they target states that are concerned with their international reputations,35 or that
have strong economic ties to the West,36 they can increase the likelihood of progressive
changes to domestic human rights practices.
Beyond their policy influence, mass solidarity mobilizations can also shape an
intra-state conflict by influencing the behaviour of the insurgent groups they support.
Specifically, they can assist domestic groups materially and emotionally, bolstering their
efforts to pressure their governments ‘from below.’37 Palestinian activists, for instance,
credit their Western supporters with providing them with the motivation to carry on
against a more powerful foe.38 Over time, this type of moral support can have positive
outcomes for the distant rebel, especially if their steadfastness imposes increasing costs
on state authorities that ultimately force them to negotiate in good faith.39 In fact, in the
absence of domestic pressure, repressive states, even those under the most intense
international pressure to reform, are less likely to enact meaningful policy reforms.40
Importantly, however, mass external solidarity can also encourage behaviour that makes
conflict resolution less likely, especially when it incentivizes rebels to stick to their core
demands and eschew compromise, as was the case for Save Darfur movement’s effects
on Darfuri rebels.41 Given their potential effects, under what conditions are mass
solidarity mobilizations more likely to form?
I argue that among the distant rebel causes that are widely reported
internationally, those that cannot rely on their ethnic kin abroad for meaningful support
are the more likely recipients of widespread grassroots solidarity. That is, mass solidarity
mobilizations are more likely to form for distant rebels that have weak diasporas – by
which I mean, diasporas that are either small or politically inactive. The causal
Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 52 (2008), pp. 49-80. 35 Joshua Busby, Moral Movements and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 36 James Franklin, “Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression in Latin America,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 52, (2008), pp. 187-211. 37 Amanda Murdie & Tavishi Bhasin, “Aiding and Abetting: Human Rights INGOs and Domestic Protest,” Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 55 No. 2 (2011), pp. 163-191. 38 For example, see here: https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/59935 39 Marwan Darweish & Andrew Rigby, Popular Protest in Palestine: The Uncertain Future of Unarmed
Resistance (London: Pluto Press, 2015), p. 7. 40 Murdie & Davis, “Shaming and Blaming.” Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The
Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 41 Jumbert & David Lanz, “Globalised Rebellion: The Darfur Insurgents and the World.”
7
mechanism has to do with recruitment. In the absence of sufficient support from their
ethnic kin, rebel entrepreneurs and their supporters are more likely to look beyond the
diaspora and recruit non-diasporan supporters. When they recruit in this way, these
entrepreneurs contribute to the diffusion of participation opportunities through the social
and organizational networks on which they focus. This creates the conditions for the
activation of new supporters and expanding mobilizations over time. As such, when non-
diasporans are actively recruited, mass solidarity mobilizing becomes increasingly likely.
Contrary to the existing scholarship on solidarity activism, which focuses on the
psychological and ideological characteristics of the solidarity activist,42 this dissertation
puts rebel recruitment strategies at the center of the analysis.
The rest of this introductory chapters proceeds in five main sections. First, I
define what I mean by “rebels,” “mass solidarity mobilizations,” and “diaspora strength.”
Second, I outline my central argument in more detail and specify the scope conditions of
my argument. Third, I distinguish my argument from other prevailing explanations found
in the existing literature. Fourth, I specify the contributions this dissertation makes to the
existing literatures on transnational activism, social movements, the transnational
dimensions of intra-state conflict, and diaspora politics. I then conclude with an outline
for the rest of the dissertation.
1.1 Key Terms: Rebels, Mass Solidarity Mobilizations, and Diaspora Strength
Rebels are actors in conflict with their state. Similar terms include “insurgents” or
“local challengers”, but I use rebels in order to situate this dissertation within the growing
literature on rebel diplomacy.43 Following on Clifford Bob, I define rebels as
“domestically based social currents and organizations that oppose governments, elites,
and other powerful institutions chiefly using protest and pressure outside conventional
political channels.”44 Rebels can vary in goals. Some, like the Liberation Tigers of the
Tamil Eelam, are secessionists,45 while others, like the African National Congress, may
42 Smith, Resisting Reagan. Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul. 43 See for instance Bridget Coggins, “Rebel Diplomacy: Theorizing Violent Non-State Actors’ Strategic Use,” in Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir & Zachariah Mampilly (eds.), Rebel Governance in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 98-118. 44 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion, p. 8. 45 Neil Devotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey Vol. 49 No. 6 (November/December 2009), pp. 1021-1051.
8
seek regime change and the overthrow of an authoritarian government but not a state of
their own.46 They can also vary in strategy, with some employing violence and others
preferring non-violent methods.47 Further, some may focus their efforts primarily on the
domestic front, while others may also seek to internationalize their struggle and secure
external support for their domestic objectives.48
Mass solidarity mobilizations form to support distant rebel movements, and are
the outcomes this dissertation seeks to explain. By “mass” I mean widespread, involving
a significant number of activists and organizations. By “solidarity” I mean the
involvement of activists who mobilize for distant others with whom they share no ethnic
tie. Despite lacking an ethnic tie to the struggle, solidarity activists are often partisans,
taking sides with rebels against their enemies and employing nationalistic or
ideologically inspired advocacy frames.49 In this respect, solidarity activism is distinct
from the advocacy style of the leading human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch, that seek to present themselves as politically
impartial and neutral observers of all forms of human rights abuse, regardless of the
identity of the perpetrators and victims.50 By “mobilization,” I refer to individuals and
groups taking action, which can include organizing and attending public protests and
demonstrations, fundraising, lobbying elected officials, among others. I use this term,
rather than ‘network’ or ‘movement,’ which assume ties between nodes, in order to
capture a wider set of cases that may vary in terms of tie strength and in terms of
organizational or network structure.51 It is often the case that solidarity NGOs supporting
the same rebel group are connected to each other in some way, but I do not require that
such ties exist for a mass solidarity mobilization to occur and I do not theorize about the
46 Scott Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the African National Congress. (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996). 47 Erica Chenoweth & Maria Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent
Action (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 48 Reyko Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War,” International Security Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 2016), pp. 89-126. Awet Tewelde Weldemichael, Third World Colonialism and Strategies of Liberation: Eritrea &
East Timor Compared (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 49 Patrick William Kelly, “The 1973 Chilean Coup and the Origins of Transnational Human Rights Activism,” Journal of Global History (2014) 8, pp. 167-168. 50 Ann Marie Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 51 Emilie Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, & Alexander Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations,” International Organization Vol. 63 (Summer 2009), pp. 559-592.
9
networked-ness of the actors that make up these mobilizations. I leave it to future
research to probe the variations between cases of mass solidarity mobilizing, across
dimensions such as size, structure, and effectiveness.
Diaspora strength is the main independent variable in this study. It refers to the
extent to which a rebel movement’s ethnic kin abroad is able to provide it with
meaningful support. Drawing on Martin Sokefeld, I define a diaspora as an imagined
ethno-national community that exists outside of the borders of the conflict zone (or
‘homeland’) but retains some degree of connection to it.52 Diaspora formation is not the
inevitable result of migration. Rather diasporas must be socially constructed and
maintained over time by entrepreneurial agents.53 Accordingly, diasporas not only vary
in size and material wealth, but also in ability and willingness to engage in political
activism for the purposes of influencing the homeland conflict.54 The diaspora strength
variable aims to captures these variations that, I argue, impact the likelihood of mass
solidarity mobilizing in support of distant rebels.
1.2 Central Argument
Mass solidarity mobilizations form through a three-step process in which rebel
recruitment of non-diasporan supporters abroad is central. In the first step, rebel
entrepreneurs, whether operating from the conflict zone or in exile, establish single-issue
NGOs abroad in order to organize their transnational advocacy efforts. An example of
such rebel-linked NGOs include the International Campaign for Tibet, around which
much grassroots organizing for Tibetan self-determination in the US has taken place. In
52 Also see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism (London: Verso Books, 1983). 53 Martin Sokefeld, “Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora,” Global Networks Vol. 6 No. 3 (2006), pp. 265-284. It is true that the meaning of the term ‘diasproa’ is hotly contested. See Roger Brubaker, “The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora,” Ethnic & Racial Studies Vol. 28 No. 1 (2005), pp. 1-19. For a useful overview see Bahar Baser, Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts: A Comparative Perspective (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2015), chapter 2. 54 Maria Koinova, “Can Conflict-Generated Diasporas be Moderate Actors During Episodes of Contested Sovereignty? Lebanese and Albanian Diasporas Compared,” Review of International Studies Vol. 37 (2011), pp. 437-462. Maria Koinova, “Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism for Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK,” Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 9 No. 3 (2013), pp. 433-453. Stephen Saideman, Erin Jenne & Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham have begun to build a dataset to explain variations in diaspora mobilizing, however their data collection efforts appear to have stopped. See Saideman, Jenne & Gallagher, “Diagnosing Diasporas: Understanding the Conditions Fostering or Blocking Mobilization, Preliminary Analyses,” Paper for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (2014).
10
the second step rebel entrepreneurs, and a primary group of supporters, begin to reach out
for wider public support. To do so, they recruit non-diasporan supporters from their
social and organizational networks to participate in concrete activists tasks. As they
recruit successfully, entrepreneurs contribute to the emergence of new supporters and
organizations. This contributes to the diffusion of participation opportunities through the
networks on which they focus, creating the conditions for expanding mobilizations over
time. It is this step that is crucial – if entrepreneurs do not recruit at all, or fail to recruit
effectively, mass solidarity mobilizations will not occur. In the third step, these
recruitment and mobilization processes continue to unfold until a threshold is reached
that signals the existence of a grassroots organizational infrastructure of some
significance in support of a distant rebel movement.
My focus on rebel recruitment strategies, and in particular the decision to recruit
non-diasporans, stems from the fact that the personal narratives solidarity activist often
provide justifying their activism fail to adequately explain why they mobilized for one
distant group but not another. Activists may take up causes for a variety of personal
reasons.55 For some, participation may be driven by material incentives, such as
improved career prospects,56 while for others it may be more emotional in nature given
the benefits one can accrue from building close bonds with like-minded people and
putting into practice deeply-held beliefs and values.57 A focus on individual motivations,
however, leaves unanswered the question of why an individual would select one distant
cause to support over others since participation in any number of causes and movements
would provide very similar benefits.
Further, activists may also justify their mobilization by reference to the specific
attributes of the issue itself, which may involve non-violent resistance to an authoritarian
state (as in Tibet), foreign occupation and Western complicity (as in East Timor and
Israel-Palestine), racial and ethnic discrimination (as in apartheid South Africa), or mass
atrocities (as in Darfur), among others. Yet, like personal motivations, these issue-
55 Eric Hirsch, “The Creation of Political Solidarity in Social Movement Organizations,” Socioligical
Quarterly Vol. 27 No. 3 (Autumn 1986), p. 374. 56 Mancur Olson, the Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). John McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” American Journal of Sociology (1977) 82:6, p. 1216. 57 Eric Hirsch, “Sacrifice for the Cause,” p. 244.
11
specific justifications also do not adequately explain why an individual mobilized around
one distant rebel cause but not another. This is because these kind of justifications often
fail to adequately distinguish one rebel cause from numerous others that the activist could
have also mobilized to support.
Rather than focusing on motivations or issue characteristics, I argue that the
causes an individual takes up and those they ignore reflect what they distant causes they
are recruited to support.58 Put simply, individuals are more likely to mobilize for the
causes for which they are recruited and more likely to ignore those for which they are
not.59 Therefore, to explain mass solidarity mobilizations we need to identify the
conditions under which non-diasporans are more likely to be recruited en masse to
support a distant rebel’s cause.
This dissertation identifies one such factor that increases the likelihood of rebel
recruitment of non-diasporan supporters – the political weakness of the rebel’s diaspora.
When rebels cannot rely on their ethnic kin, because of their small size or unwillingness
to organize for political action, then they are more likely to recruit non-diasporans. This
makes mass solidarity mobilizing on their behalf more likely. By contrast, when rebels
are able to draw on a strong diaspora, they are less likely to actively recruit non-
diasporans, in turn making mass solidarity mobilizing on their behalf a more remote
possibility.
1.3 Scope Conditions
Before proceeding to specify how the perspective I offer differs from prevailing
explanations found in the existing literature, it is important to note the scope conditions
of my central argument. Most importantly, my analysis is almost entirely focused on the
structural conditions (diaspora strength) that influence rebel advocacy behaviour (the
decision to recruit non-diasporans or not). While my emphasis on rebel recruitment
draws on insights collected from more than 100 interviews with solidarity activists, this
dissertation does not probe the decision-making process of these activists in any detail.
Rather, the primary focus is on rebel recruitment strategies. This approach is consistent
58 McAdam & Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism.” 59 McAdam & Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism.” Schussman & Sarah Soule, ‘Process and Protest, p. 1086.
12
with Clifford Bob’s approach in The Marketing of Rebellion which “highlight(s) the
action, innovation, and skills of [distant] movements themselves.”60
Beyond my focus on rebel recruitment strategy, there are three additional scope
conditions that are worth mentioning. First, as I noted above, my argument extends to all
types of rebel movements and intra-state conflicts. It is not confined only to secessionist
movements, such as the Palestinians or Kurds, but also movements seeking significant
policy reforms including regime change, such as black South Africans under apartheid
rule, Chileans resisting Augusto Pinochet or Egyptians protesting Hosni Mubarak. It also
extends to all groups regardless of whether or not they employ violence, and thus
includes conflicts that are civil wars but many that are not. My weak diaspora argument,
therefore, is applicable to a wide set of domestic resistance using a variety of violent and
non-violent strategies to achieve a wide set of goals.
Second, my weak diaspora argument pertains primarily to those instances of
domestic resistance and conflict that have already been placed on the international human
rights agenda by the advocacy efforts of a gatekeeper NGO, in this case Amnesty
International. In the quantitative tests I conduct in chapter 3, I define my universe of
cases only to those that have been the subject of an Amnesty International campaign.
While scholars have examined why gatekeeper organizations champion some causes but
not others, my argument operates in large part after or alongside gatekeeper advocacy. It
is not about explaining the gatekeeper advocacy decisions themselves but rather why
among the issues gatekeepers do take up, some diffuse and receive wider grassroots
support but not others. Therefore, in my comparative case study chapter in which I
explain why a mass solidarity mobilization has occurred for the Palestinians but not the
Kurds of Turkey, I justify my case selection on the grounds that both causes are widely
publicized to transnational human rights networks, making them both the likely recipients
of mass external solidarity.
Third, my argument primarily holds in democratic settings. I test my arguments
on evidence and data I collected from conditions and developments in Western
democracies, but theoretically similar processes and dynamics may also play in non-
Western democracies as well. I do confine my argument to democracies because in more
60 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion, p. 4.
13
authoritarian settings, different mechanisms underpinning civil society mobilizing may be
at play, such as the active role that such governments may play in directly setting the
advocacy agenda and by setting the borders of what is considered to be legitimate issues
to protest. They may do this in part to divert public attention away from more pressing
domestic social problems.
1.4 Alternative Explanations
My central argument, emphasizing rebel recruitment strategy and diaspora
strength, differs from prevailing hypotheses about the conditions under which mass
solidarity mobilizations will occur. Although scholars have not addressed mass solidarity
mobilization through a comparative lens, the literature on transnational activism and
transnational advocacy networks (TANs) does contain at least three implicit hypotheses
that may account for why they form for some distant rebels and not others.
The first hypothesis emphasizes the characteristics of the issue itself, or issue
attributes, as affecting the probability that Western activists will take it up. In their
seminal work on TANs, Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink identify two types of issues
that they suggest are more likely to gain the support of transnational activists: “issues
involving body harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when there is a short and clear
causal chain (or story) assigning responsibility” and “issues involving legal equality of
opportunity.”61 In this dissertation, and specifically in chapter 3, I argue that this
perspective is unpersuasive in explaining mass solidarity mobilization. In fact, evidence
suggests that the opposite of Keck & Sikkink’s expectation is true. I find that distant
rebels in intra-state conflicts in which violence is ‘two-sided’ – that is, perpetrated by
both state and non-state actors in a significant way and thus more complex – are more
likely to gain widespread grassroots solidarity. Further, I also find that numerous
struggles that involve the denial of legal equality of opportunity also fail to attract mass
solidarity mobilizations support and thus cannot account for enough of the variance.
A second hypothesis emphasizes issue framing. In this view, it is not just issue
attributes that matter but rather the way in which the issue is presented or marketed to a
particular audience whose support is requested. Successful frames help convince an
61 Keck & Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 27.
14
audience to see an issue as a problem worthy of concern, who is to blame for it, and what
can be done to solve it.62 Effective advocacy frames motivate an audience to take action
and convince them that their actions have a good likelihood of success.63 Scholars have
argued that when new issues are framed in ways that speak to, or can be grafted onto,
existing norms, they are more likely to be adopted.64 In the case of East Timor, for
instance, scholars and activists have suggested that the popularity of the East Timorese
cause in the West was due to the ability of the East Timorese leadership to frame their
struggle in Western-friendly terms, emphasizing self-determination, democracy and
human rights.65
I also challenge this perspective. I do not dispute the importance of advocacy
frames that resonate with Western activists, but rather suggest that such frames alone are
not enough to lead to mass solidarity mobilization. Good frames may engender sympathy
but in the absence of recruitment, and the availability of participation opportunities,
grassroots activists are not likely to mobilize.66 For instance, in the late 1990s and the
early 2000s, both the Acehnese67 and Kurdish68 leaderships began to more explicitly
frame their struggle in the language of human rights. Yet, to date, they have both have
failed to garner mass solidarity support. The reason for this, I argue, is that in these cases,
as in others I identify in chapter 6, mobilizing grassroots non-diasporans was not an
explicit goal. Acehnese and Kurdish transnational advocacy strategies did not involve
62 Robert Benford & David Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology (2000), pp. 611-639. William Gamson, Talking Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 63 Bert Klandermans, The Social Psychology of Protest (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1997). 64 Richard Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Landmines,” International Organization 52 (Summer 1998). Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion, p. 4. 65 Geoffrey Robinson, “Human Rights History from the Ground Up: The Case of East Timor,” in Steve Stern & Scott Straus (eds.), The Human Rights Paradox: Universality and Its Discontents (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin, 2014). David Webster, "Non-State Diplomacy: East Timor 1975-99." Portuguese Studies Review Vol. 11, No. 1 (2003): 1-28, Interview, ETAN, March 26, 2015. 66 Doug McAdam & Ronnelle Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism,” American Journal of Sociology Vol. 99, No. 3 (November 1993). 67 Missbach, Separatist Conflict in Indonesia. 68 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, “Political Movements and Leverage Points: Kurdish Activism in the European Diaspora,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs Vol. 22, No. 1 (2002). Nicole Watts, “Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention in International Affairs,” in Joel Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local
Practices Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p,130; Leila Berkowitz & Liza Mugge, “Transnational Diaspora Lobbying: Europeanization and the Kurdish Question,” Journal of Intercultural
Studies Vol. 35, No. 1 (2014), p. 84.
15
recruiting non-diasporan supporters, something that is crucial for the mass solidarity
mobilization process to move forward successfully. This is not to suggest that all
attempts to generate a mass solidarity mobilization succeed, but only that such mobilizing
is made possible when active recruitment attempts are made.
A third hypothesis emphasizes issue adoption by gatekeeper NGOs. A number of
scholars have argued that the patterns of Western activism for distant causes is in large
part determined by the advocacy choices made by these gatekeepers who control what
issues “make it” and which do not.69 According to this view, when gatekeepers champion
a rebel movement, it becomes more visible to the transnational human rights community
and thus more likely to attract donor attention and the resources of smaller NGOs looking
for new issues to add to their agendas.70 The influence of these gatekeepers is said to
come from their perceived credibility within the human rights community,71 their
organizational structure, namely their ability to centralize agenda setting and decentralize
campaign implementation,72 and their central location with wider advocacy and policy
networks.73 As Bob puts it, “central to [transnational] network formation are gatekeepers,
whose decisions to back a movement activate other organizations and individuals across
the world.”74
My findings generally support this claim. I find that many of the mass solidarity
mobilizations I identify focus on distant rebels whose cause has been championed by
Amnesty International. However, I also qualify this argument and demonstrate that many
of the distant rebels whose plight is championed by Amnesty fail to gain mass solidarity
mobilizations support.75 Gatekeeper advocacy may improve the chances of mass
solidarity mobilization, but additional factors, namely the recruitment of non-diasporan
supporters, must also be present.
69 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion. 70 Charli Carpenter, “Governing the Global Agenda: “Gatekeepers” and “Issue Adoption” in Transnational Advocacy Networks,” in Deborah Avant, Martha Finnemore & Susan Sell (eds.), Who Governs the Globe?
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 210. 71 Bob, Marketing of Rebellion, p. 18. 72 Wendy Wong, Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs Transforms Human Rights. )Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2012). 73 Charli Carpenter, Lost Causes: Agenda Vetting in Global Issue Networks and the Shaping of Human
Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014). 74 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion, p. 18. 75 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion, p. 18.
16
1.5 Scholarly Contributions
In addition to advancing a new perspective on the causes of mass solidarity
mobilization, this dissertation also contributes to the literatures on transnational activism,
social movements, the transnational dimensions of intra-state conflict, and diaspora
politics. First, I extend the growing literature on ‘issue selection’ in transnational civil
society. Issue selection refers to why transnational activist organizations and advocacy
networks mobilize around some issue areas but not others. The main thrust of this
research has been on explaining the advocacy choices of multi-issue NGOs, or
‘gatekeepers’, working on human rights,76 arms control,77 health,78 the environment,79
and children in armed conflict.80 In the area of human rights advocacy, which is most
relevant for this dissertation, scholars have focused primarily on explaining why Amnesty
International devotes more advocacy attention to the abuses committed by some states
but not others, despite its assumed impartiality and commitment to universalist
principles.81 Conflict severity is not the only determinant of Amnesty’s advocacy
choices.82 Research has shown that Amnesty focuses more attention on the states that
have closer economic and military ties with the West,83 that are featured more
prominently in the Western press,84 and that have more local NGOs able to document
instances of abuse.85
76 James Ron, Howard Ramos & Kathleen Rodgers, “Transnational Information Politics: NGO Human Rights Reporting, 1986-2000,” International Studies Quarterly 49 (2005), pp. 557-587. James Meernik, Rosa Aloisi, Marsha Sowell & Angela Nichols, “The Impact of Human Rights Organizations on Naming and Shaming Campaigns,” Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 56, No. 2 (2012), pp. 233-256. Cullen Hendrix and Wendy Wong, “Knowing Your Audience: How the Structure of International Relations and Organizational Choices Affect Amnesty International’s Advocacy,” Review of International Organizations (March 2014), pp. 29-58. 77 Charli Carpenter, “Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and the Paradox of Weapons Norms,” International Organization 65 (Winter 2011), pp. 69-102. 78 Jeremy Shiffman, “A Social Explanation for the Rise and Fall of Global Health Issues,” Bulleting of the
World Health Organization Vol. 87, No. 8 (August 2009), pp. 608-613. 79 Amanda Murdie & Johannes Urpelainen, “Why Pick on US? Environmental INGOs and State Shaming as a Strategic Substitute,” Political Studies Vol, 63, No. 2 (2015), pp. 353-372. 80 Charli Carpenter, “Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing the Emergence and Nonemergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 51 (2007), pp. 99-120. 81 Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience. 82 Ron, Howard Ramos & Kathleen Rodgers, “Transnational Information Politics.” 83 Cullen Hendrix & Wendy Wong, “Knowing Your Audience.” 84 Ron, Howard Ramos & Kathleen Rodgers, “Transnational Information Politics.” 85 Meernik, Rosa Aloisi, Marsha Sowell & Angela Nichols, “The Impact of Human Rights Organizations on Naming and Shaming Campaigns.”
17
To date, however, this literature has not systematically engaged with solidarity
activism at a more grassroots level and has not offered an explanation for why mass
solidarity mobilizations mobilize for some distant rebels but not others. While some have
studied specific mass solidarity mobilizations, including the Central America solidarity
movement,86 the anti-apartheid movement,87 the transnational Zapatista mass solidarity
mobilizations,88 among others,89 this work is largely descriptive and single-case. It is
useful for identifying potential hypotheses but it does not provide a systematic and
comparative treatment of mass solidarity mobilization across a wider universe of cases.
This dissertation provides such a study.
Second, this dissertation contributes to the literature on social movement
formation. Specifically, it speaks to debates surrounding the role of structure and agency
in explaining episodes of collective action. Important perspectives in the study of social
movements have focused on the structural conditions that make collective action more
likely. In one perspective, significant increases in grievances and social dislocation
contribute to social movement formation.90 In another, it is not grievances that matter,
which are a constant,91 but rather macro-level political developments that incentivize
mobilization. These developments include war, elite divisions or the emergence of new
elite allies, economic downturns and fiscal crises, among others. Under these conditions,
individuals are more likely to mobilize because they believe their efforts have a greater
chance of success.92 Proponents suggest that this perspective is said to better explain the
86 Smith, Resisting Reagan. Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul. 87 Skinner, The Foundation of Anti-Apartheid. Roger Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid: A History of the
Movement in Britain: A Study in Pressure Group Politics (London: Merlin, 2005). Hakan Thorn, Anti-
Apartheid and the Emergence of Global Civil Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2006). 88 Thomas Olesen, International Zapatismo: The Construction of Solidarity in the Age of Globalization (London: Zed Books, 2005). 89On Darfur see Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur. On East Timor see Clinton Fernandes, The Independence
of East Timor. On Chile see Power, “The US Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” 90 For instance, see William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1959). 91 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Massuchusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co, 1978). 92 Sidney Tarrow, Power in the Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative
Analysis of France, Russia and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Doug McAdam, John McCarthy & Mayer Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political
Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Mark Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
18
timing of social movement formation. Whether the focus is on grievances or political
opportunities, both perspectives favour structure over agency in explaining social
movement formation.93
In this dissertation, I push back against these structural accounts of collective
action. Instead, I emphasize the role played by agents, namely recruiting entrepreneurs,
who play an active role in mobilizing individuals, networks and organizations to support
a distant rebel cause. In the absence of these entpreneurs, even with permissive structural
conditions, mass solidarity mobilization becomes far less likely.94 In advancing this
view, this dissertation builds on more agentic recruitment-based accounts of collection
action found in resource mobilization theory95 and micro-structural accounts of
activism.96 It also adds a transnational dimension to these perspectives.97
Third, this dissertation also contributes to our understanding of the transnational
dynamics of intra-state conflict. Scholars working in this area have demonstrated the
extent to which internal conflicts need to be understood as transnational in nature,
93 Jeff Goodwin & James Jasper, “Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory,” Sociological Forum Vol. 14, No. 1 (1999), pp. 27-54. Doug McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements,” in Mario Diani & Doug McAdam (eds.), Social Movement and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul. 94 In her account of the US-Central American Peace & Solidarity Movement, Sharon Nepstad also stresses the role played by individual activists, although her emphasis is on more on framing than recruitment. Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul. 95 Charles Perrow & J. Craig Jenkins, “Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946-1972), American Sociological Review Vol. 42, No. 2 (April 1977), pp. 249-269; Jeffrey Berry, Lobbying
for the People: The Political Behaviour of Public Interest Groups (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); J. Craig Jenkins, “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements,” Annual
Review of Sociology Vol. 9 (1983), pp. 527-553. For an overview see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow & Charles Tilley, “Comparative Perspectives on Contentious Politics,” in Mark Lichbach & Alan Zuckerman (eds.), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 96 Bert Klandermans & Dirk Oegema, “Potentials, Networks, Motivations, and Barriers: Steps Towards Participation in Social Movements,” American Sociological Review Vol. 52, No. 4 (August 1987), pp. 519-531. Doug McAdam & Ronnelle Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism,” American Journal of Sociology Vol. 99, No. 3 (November 1993). Florence Passy, “Social Networks Matter, But How?” in Mario Diani & Doug McAdam (eds.), Social Movements and Networks:
Relational Approaches to Collective Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Alan Schussman & Sarah A. Soule, "Process and protest: Accounting for individual protest participation." Social Forces 84, no. 2 (2005): 1083-1108. 97 This perspective is also central to Hector Perla’s account of the US-Central American Peace & Solidarity Movement. See Hector Perla, “Si Nicaragua Vencio, El Salvador Vencera: Central American Agency in the Creation of the US-Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement,” Latin American Research
Review Vol. 43, No. 2 (2008), pp. 136-158.
19
including the involvement of foreign states, 98 international organizations, 99 diasporas,100
and refugees.101 These actors have been identified as playing a role in conflict onset,
duration, intensity, renewal and diffusion.102 This dissertation contributes to our
understanding of rebel diplomacy, or how non-state belligerents seek to attract external
support for their domestic objectives. To date, scholars have described the content of
rebel diplomatic efforts103 and have sought to explain why some rebel groups engage in
diplomacy but not others.104 However, scholars have only begun to examine variation in
rebel diplomatic strategies.105 This study contributes to this literature by drawing
attention to the role that diaspora politics can play in influencing what strategies rebel
groups adopt to secure external assistance. This dissertation also contributes to the
literature the looks at the causes of external support for insurgent groups. This literature
has focused primarily on explaining why third-party states support some ethnic groups in
conflict but not others. Stephen Saideman emphasizes the role that domestic politics,
namely the presence of a domestic ethnic constituency, plays in shaping how
governments intervene in foreign conflicts.106 Salehyan, Gleditsch & Cunningham argue
that variations in external state support has much to do with the organizational capacities
of rebel groups themselves, pointing out that those that are moderately strong are more
98 Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 44 No. 3 (2007), pp. 293-309. 99 Carrie Booth Walling, All Necessary Measures: The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). Also see Michael Doyle & Nicolas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 100 Yossi Shain, “The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution,” SAIS Review 22:2 (2002), pp. 115-144; Hazel Smith & Paul Stares (eds.), Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007). 101 Idean Salehyan & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,” International
Organization Vol. 6 (2006), pp. 335-366. 102 Idean Salehyan, Rebels without borders, Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2009. 103103 For instance see Scott Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the African
National Congress Since 1960 (New York: IB Tauris Publishers, 1996). 104 Reyko Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War,” International Security Vol. 4 No. 4 (Spring 2016), pp. 89-126. 105 Awet Weldemichael, Third World Colonialism and the Strategies of Liberation: Eritrea and East Timor
Compared (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 106 Stephen Saideman, “Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 39, No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 27-50.
20
likely to secure external state support than those that are weak or very strong.107 Like
issue selection in transnational civil society, scholars studying external support for
insurgent groups have not examined mass solidarity mobilizations. This is an important
gap because, as I suggested above, mass solidarity mobilizations can impact Western
foreign policy and can shape insurgent behaviour, thereby influencing how intra-state
conflicts play out. By studying mass solidarity mobilizations, this dissertation extends
this line of research to consider foreign non-state support for distant rebels.
Fourth, this dissertation also contributes to the growing literature on ethno-
national diasporas. Scholars have primarily treated these diasporas as troublemakers who
play an active role in causing, sustaining and renewing civil wars.108 They do this
through the moral and ideological support they provide to their ethnic kin, 109 through the
money and recruits they send abroad,110 and through their influence on their host state’s
foreign policy.111 A smaller body of work has shown that some diasporas can also have
more pacific effects and contribute to conflict resolution.112 This dissertation contributes
to the study of diasporas in two ways.
First, it adds to our understanding of the effect that diasporas can have on the
politics of their host states. Scholars have primarily examined the domestic effects of
diasporas by focusing on ethnic lobbying.113 I consider the effects that diasporas can have
107 Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & David Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups,” International Organization 65 (Fall 2011), pp. 709-744. 108 Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004), pp. 563-595. Idean Salehyan, Rebels without borders, Transnational Insurgencies in World
Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009. Mary Kaldor, New and old wars: Organised violence in a
global era (John Wiley & Sons, 2013). Sarah Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora,” Review of International Studies 30 (2004), pp. 405-426. 109 Feargal Cochrane, "Civil society beyond the state: The impact of diaspora communities on peace building." Global Media Journal: Mediterranean Edition 2, no. 2 (2007), p. 21. Shain, Yossi. "The role of diasporas in conflict perpetuation or resolution." SAIS Review 22, no. 2 (2002): 115-144. Benedict Anderson, "Long-distance nationalism." The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the
world (1998): 58-74. William Safran, "The Jewish diaspora in a comparative and theoretical perspective." Israel Studies 10, no. 1 (2005): 36-60. 110 Paul Hockenos, Homeland calling: exile patriotism & the Balkan Wars. Cornell University Press, 2003. 111 Stephen Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). Tony Smith. Rubenzer. 112 Hazel Smith & Paul B. Stares. Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-makers or Peace-wreckers?, (United Nations Publications, 2007). Antje Missbach, "The Acehnese diaspora: hawks and doves?: Conflict-support, peace-finding and political opportunity structures." Journal of Human Security 5, no. 3 (2009): 22. 113 Trevor Rubenzer, "Ethnic minority interest group attributes and US foreign policy influence: A qualitative comparative analysis." Foreign Policy Analysis 4, no. 2 (2008): 169-185. David Paul & Rachel Anderson Paul. Ethnic lobbies and US foreign policy. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009).
21
on the mobilization of Western activists for distant struggles that are not, at least in ethnic
terms, their own. Some have suggested that such a relationship does exist, but they do
not probe their claims in any detail.114 Second, this dissertation also adds to the study of
variations in diaspora mobilization in terms of scale and substance. 115 Although I do not
offer an explanation for why some diasporas are more politically active than others, I do
provide the first dataset that might be used for this purpose. Specifically, I offer a way to
measure diaspora mobilization quantitatively and provide data on more than one hundred
diaspora communities in North America and Western Europe.
1.6 Plan of the Dissertation
This dissertation proceeds in four main chapters. In chapter 2, I outline the logic
of why distant rebels with weak diasporas in the West are more likely to receive mass
solidarity in North America and Europe. In this chapter, I first explain how mass
solidarity mobilizations occur, emphasizing the importance of rebel recruitment of non-
diasporans in this process. I then outline how the strength of a distant rebel’s diaspora
impacts the likelihood that it will engage in non-diaspora recruitment, thereby affecting
the likelihood of mass solidarity mobilizing. Specifically, I explain how weak diasporas
incentivize rebel entrepreneurs to recruit non-diasporans while strong diasporas do not.
In chapters 3 and 5, I conduct empirical tests of this argument. In chapter 3 I
conduct a quantitative test of my main argument. I use an original dataset that consists of
128 Amnesty International campaigns from 1975 to 2004, 22 of which correlate with
mass solidarity mobilization. Using a series of controls and robustness checks, I find
fairly robust support for my hypothesis that rebel diasporic weakness increases the
chance of mass solidarity mobilizing on their behalf. This chapter also identifies the
limitations of my argument. While distant rebels with weak diasporas have a greater
likelihood of gaining mass solidarity, many such groups do not receive such support. In
chapter 6, I analyze these non-mobilization cases and offer tentative hypotheses that may
account for the absence of mass solidarity mobilizing.
114 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion, p. 44. Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the
Age of Genocide, (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), p. 376. Gail Lapidus, "Contested sovereignty: The tragedy of Chechnya, " International Security 23, no. 1 (1998), p. 28. 115 Koinova, “Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism for Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK.”
22
In chapter 4 I introduce the Palestinian and Kurdish cases and justify my case
selection. In chapter 5 I show how the weakness of the Palestinian diaspora in the West
encouraged Palestinian activists to engage in non-diaspora recruitment and thus enabled
mass solidarity mobilizing on their behalf. I also show how the strength of the Kurdish
diaspora resulted in Kurdish activists focusing their efforts on their ethnic kin, thereby
reducing the chances of mass solidarity mobilizing on their behalf. In chapter 6, I turn to
the unexplained negative cases – cases in which the distant rebel had a weak diaspora in
the West but did not receive mass solidarity. I conduct a qualitative analysis of these
cases to find some general patterns that can account for the variance. In particular, I find
that mass solidarity mobilizations are less likely to form in response to conflicts that
experience meaningful human rights progress or when Western governments impose
sanctions on the rights-abusing state, obviating the need for grassroots mobilizing. I also
find that mass solidarity mobilizations are less likely to form in support of distant rebels
that lack the domestic capacity and opportunity to ask for such support, who have access
to domestic channels for reform, who decide against seeking external support, and who
seek external support but not from Western civil society. In the concluding chapter, I
summarize the main findings of my dissertation and suggest how these findings may be
useful to human rights activists. I then discuss how my main findings may be extended
to help explain the foreign fighter phenomenon and why Islamist recruiters have focused
their efforts on mobilizing vulnerable populations. I then conclude with suggestions for
future research on mass solidarity mobilizations.
23
Chapter 2 Explaining Mass Solidarity Mobilizations – Rebels, Recruitment
and Diaspora Strength
In this chapter I outline the logic for why rebels who cannot rely on their ethnic
kin in the West for meaningful support are the more likely recipients of mass grassroots
solidarity. I first describe the three-step process in which mass solidarity mobilizations
form. I then illustrate why this process is more likely to occur under conditions of rebel
diasporic weakness. To do so, I show how individuals are more likely to take up the
distant causes for which they are recruited and that rebels with weak diasporas in the
West are more likely to recruit non-diasporans en masse to compensate for the absence,
or limitations, of a more ‘natural’ constituency for their struggle.
2.1 The Three-Step Process of Mass Solidarity Mobilizations
I depict the mass solidarity mobilization process in three relatively discrete steps.
First, entrepreneurs mobilize and establish solidarity NGOs in order to organize their
advocacy efforts. Second, entrepreneurs begin to reach out for non-diasporic support not
only by raising awareness but by actively recruiting from their social and organizational
networks. This step is the lynch pin in the mobilization process. If recruitment efforts
fail, the process breaks down. If they succeed, the process moves forward as new
supporters and organizations form. In the third step, as these recruitment and mobilization
processes unfold, a threshold point is hit signaling the existence of a mass solidarity
mobilization. I visualize these three steps in Figure I below.
Figure 1: Three-Step Mass Mobilization Process116
116 The structure of this figure is adapted from Finnemore & Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 896.
Entrepreneurs
emerge
Step 1
Entrepreneurs
recruit
Step 2
Mass
Mobilization
Step 3 Threshold
point
24
Step 1: Entrepreneurs Emerge
In the first step of the mass mobilization process, entrepreneurs mobilize and
establish their own single-issue solidarity NGOs to help organize their advocacy efforts.
While the presence of entrepreneurs does not make a mass mobilization inevitable, it
does make it possible. As with social movements, in the absence of entrepreneurs mass
solidarity mobilizing will not occur.117
Two types of entrepreneurs play a central role in the early phases of mass
solidarity mobilizing. The first are those from the rebel group itself who engage in
international diplomacy and reach out for Western non-diasporan grassroots support for
their struggle.118 Examples include the Zapatista Army of National Liberation119 and the
Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of East Timor,120 both whom were the recipients
of widespread solidarity in North America and Western Europe. These rebels tend to be
motivated by feelings of group solidarity and a desire to restore their rights and
sovereignty, but in some cases can be driven by greed and material self-interest.121 Some
of these rebels operate from within the conflict zone. In these cases, rebels need to work
through third-party channels to secure access to non-diasporans. To do so, they may
activate their ethnic kin abroad to mobilize on their behalf,122 and they may connect with
other rebel groups in order to gain access to their contacts and support networks.123 They
may also seek to establish ties with international NGOs, such as the Unrepresented
Nations and Peoples Organizations, that can connect them to a wider audience.124
117 Sharon Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture and Agency in the Central America
Solidarity Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 118 Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). Bridget Coggins, “Rebel Diplomacy: Theorizing Violent Non-State Actors’ Strategic Use,” in Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir & Zachariah Mampilly (eds.), Rebel
Governance in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 98-118. Reyko Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War,” International Security Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 2016), pp. 89-126. 119 Thomas Olesen, International Zapatismo: The Construction of Solidarity in the Age of Globalization (London: Zed Books, 2005). 120 David Webster, "Non-State Diplomacy: East Timor 1975-99." Portuguese Studies Review 11, no. 1 (2003): 1-28. 121 Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004), pp. 563-595. Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 122 Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert & David Lanz, “Globalised Rebellion: The Darfur Insurgents and the World,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 51:2 (2009). 123 Antje Missbach, Separatist Conflict in Indonesia: The Long-Distance Politics of the Acehnese Diaspora
(New York: Routledge, 2012). 124 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion, p. 76.
25
Other rebels may operate in exile,125 whether in neighbouring states that offer
them safe haven126 or in the West itself.127 Compared to the rebels in the homeland,
rebels with an international base of operations may have an advantage in securing
external support given their ability to more directly connect with international
audiences.128 For instance, in the late 1980s from their base in Dharamasala, India, the
Tibetan leadership initiated an international campaign to put pressure on the Chinese
government to grant Tibetans self-determination rights.129 In 1987, benefiting from the
freedom afforded to him by the Indian government, the Dalai Lama travelled to the US
where he proposed a five-point peace proposal to the Congressional Human Rights
Caucus.130 In the following year, the Tibetan leadership, with the help of Tibetans in the
US, established the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), a Washington-based NGO
founded to build American support for Tibetan autonomy.131 Part of the ICT’s work
focused on elite lobbying, but it also engaged in grassroots recruitment to buttress its
lobbying efforts inside Congress. Accordingly, the formation of the ICT was a crucial
first step in the mass solidarity mobilization process for Tibet.
It is important to note that not all rebels seek to internationalize their struggle.
Although scholars have documented the transnational dimensions of intra-state
conflict,132 including a long history of rebel diplomacy133 as well as transnational
125 Yossi Shain, The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation State. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1989). 126 Idean Salehyan, Rebels without borders, Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2009. 127 Jose V. Fuentecilla, Fighting From A Distance: How Filipino Exiles Toppled A Dictator. (University of Illinois Press 2013). 128 Awet Tewelde Weldemichael, Third World Colonialism and Strategies of Liberation: Eritrea & East
Timor Compared (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 129 Robert Barnett, “Violated Specialness: Western Political Representations of Tibet,” in Thierry Dodin & Heinz Rather, Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projects & Fantasies (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001). 130 For a full text of this address see: Dalai Lama, “Five Point Peace Plan,” September 21, 1987. Available at: http://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/five-point-peace-plan [Accessed November 28, 2016]. 131 John Kenneth Knaus, Beyond Shangri-La: America and Tibet’s Move into the Twentiy-First Century (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2012). 132 Jeffrey Checkel (ed.), The Transnational Dynamics of Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press). Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 44, No. 3 2007), pp. 293-309. 133 Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War.” Bridget Coggins, “Rebel Diplomacy: Theorizing Violent Non-State Actors’ Strategic Use of Talk,” in Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir & Zachariah Mampilly (eds.), Rebel Governance in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 98-118.
26
connections between rebel groups,134 it is not a given that a rebel group will engage in
international diplomacy. In fact, the majority of rebel movements (~60%) will not seek
external support,135 for a variety of strategic and resource-based reasons.136 As I argue in
chapter 6, these domestic-oriented rebels are not likely to be the recipients of widespread
grassroots solidarity in the West since they do not seek to initiate the mass mobilization
process.
In addition to rebels, Western activist entrepreneurs who share no ethnic tie to
the rebel group they support can also spur the mass solidarity mobilization process on. In
the case of Darfur, for instance, some of the key activist organizers were not of Darfuri
descent.137 The motivations of these activists are idiosyncratic and highly varied, but
generally include a combination of anger, shame, altruism, and ideological
commitment,138 although some may also be motivated by more careerist incentives.139 In
many cases, these entrepreneurs mobilize around instances of distant suffering that in
some ways resonate with their personal background and political identity.140 For
instance, many leading Darfur entrepreneurs were of Jewish descent with family that had
been affected by the Holocaust and, thus, were motivated by the anti-genocide mantra of
‘Never Again.’141
While these entrepreneurs tend to mobilize independently of rebel requests for
support, their sustained engagement with the issue is influenced by the actions of the
rebels themselves. For instance, in the case of Tibet some of the leading non-Tibetan
entrepreneurs were those who in the late 1980s had spent time in the region as tourists
134 Idean Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders, Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2009. 135 Reyko Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War,” International Security Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 2016), p 39. 136 Victor Asal, Justin Conrad & Peter White. "Going abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations," International Organization 68, no. 4 (2014). 137 Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur. 138 Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul. 139 Interview, STAND, August 24, 2012. Interview, International Solidarity Movement, January 16, 2013. Mancur Olson, the Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). 140 Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The US Central America Peace Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 141 Shaul Magid,. "The Holocaust and Jewish identity in America: Memory, the Unique, and the Universal," Jewish Social Studies 18, no. 2 (2012): 100-135. Interview, Sudan Divestment Taskforce, September 6, 2012.
27
where they witnessed Chinese government crackdowns against Tibetan protesters.142 As
one American entrepreneur explained, “I went to Tibet a tourist and came home a human
rights activist.”143 Upon their return home, many of these activists linked up with rebel-
inspired organizational initiatives, such as the ICT in the US144 and the Tibet Support
Group in the UK.145 Without these rebel-linked organizations ready and wiling to
channel and sustain the energies of these new activists, their commitment to the cause
may have dissipated. Similarly, in the case of Darfur, while many of the activists had no
direct ties to the rebels, some of the key organizers did, including John Prendergast, who
played a role in forming the Save Darfur Coalition and the Enough Project, as well as
Eric Reeves, whose speaking tours across US college campuses played an important role
in convincing many students to mobilize, contributing to the formation of the Genocide
Information Network and Students Taking Action Now for Darfur.146
In sum, the first step of the mass solidarity mobilization process involves the
emergence of rebel entrepreneurs, and in some cases diasporan and non-diasporan
supporters, who create solidarity NGOs to organize their advocacy efforts.
Step 2: Entrepreneurs Recruit
In the second step, after establishing a solidarity NGO, entrepreneurs begin to
build wider support for their struggle. Part of this outreach includes raising awareness of
their cause. Social movement scholars describe this as “consensus mobilization”, or
efforts by entrepreneurs “to obtain support for its viewpoints.”147 To do so, entrepreneurs
lobby journalists, write op-eds, issue press releases, and organize public seminars and
conferences. Consensus mobilization alone, however, is not enough to secure active
supporters, as awareness and sympathy do not inevitably lead to action.148 To translate
142 Ronald Schwartz, “Travellers Under Fire: Tourists in the Tibetan Uprising,” Annals of Tourism
Research Vol. 18, No. 4 (1991), pp. 588-604. 143 John Ackerly, “Reflections on 25 Years as a Human Rights Activist,” Paper presented to Casa Tibet, Barcelona. November 27, 2012. Obtained through email correspondence with author. 144 Interview, International Campaign for Tibet, December 11, 2012. 145 Interview, Tibet Information Network, December 2, 2012. Interview, Tibet Support Group, December 17, 2012. 146 Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert & David Lanz, “Globalised Rebellion: The Darfur Insurgents and the World,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 51:2 (2009). Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur, p. 45. 147 Bert Klandermans, “Mobilization and Participation: Social Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory,” American Sociological Review Vol. 49 (October 1984), p. 586 . 148 Klandermans & Oegema. "Potentials, networks, motivations, and barriers: Steps towards participation in social movements."
28
sympathy with a distant struggle into active participation in support of it, entrepreneurs
must also recruit. They must solicit non-diasporans to participate in standard social
movement activities, such as organizing and attending protests, helping with campaign
strategizing and implementation, fundraising, and establishing ties with government
officials, among others. When entrepreneurs recruit and provide individuals with
participation opportunities, actual participation becomes increasingly likely.149 Without
exposure to participation opportunities, individuals are most likely to remain inactive.150
Accordingly, the recruitment of grassroots non-diasporans for active participation is thus
central to the mass solidarity mobilization process.
When they recruit, entrepreneurs tap into their own social and organizational
networks.151 Unlike the media or other impersonal mediums of communication, network
ties provide entrepreneurs with the opportunities to engage in more direct forms of
recruitment, including face-to-face requests, which are often more successful.152 As a
result, as is the case in other forms of collective action,153 many solidarity activists came
to their cause after being recruited, or pulled in, by a friend or partner. As one British
activist recalled, “[Tibet] was what I ended up being roped into because my friends were
there and I knew people that were doing it.”154 Beyond social networks, entrepreneurs
also use their organizational ties to recruit supporters. In the 1980s, Central American
entrepreneurs recruited participants from American churches and left-wing organizations,
such as the United Farm Workers, a US-based labour organization.155 In the 1990s,
149 Alan Schussman & Sarah A. Soule, "Process and protest: Accounting for individual protest participation." Social forces 84, no. 2 (2005): 1083-1108. 150 Doug McAdam & Ronnelle Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism,” American Journal of Sociology Vol. 99, No. 3 (November 1993). 151 Florence Passy, “Social Networks Matter, But How?” in Mario Diani & Doug McAdam (eds.), Social
Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 152 Alan Gerber & Donald Green, “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment,” American Political Science Review Vol. 94, No. 3 (September 2000), pp. 653-663. Donald Green, Alan Gerber & David Nickerson, “Getting Out the Vote in Local Elections: Results from Six Door-to-Door Canvassing Experiments,” Journal of Politics Vol. 65 No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 1083-1096. 153 Lee Ann Fuji, Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (Cornell University Press, 2011). Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). Donatella Della Porta, "Recruitment processes in clandestine political organizations: Italian left-wing terrorism." International Social Movement Research 1 (1988): 155-169. 154 Interview, Students for a Free Tibet UK & Edinburgh Tibet Society, December 14, 2012. 155 Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan. Interview, North Shore Colombia Solidarity Committee, October 29, 2013.
29
British Tibet entrepreneurs used to their ties to Buddhist organizations to recruit.156 And
in the early 2000s, Darfur entrepreneurs in Canada drew on their ties to student club
organizations to access potential supporters.157
It is at this point, when entrepreneurs begin to reach out for wider support, where
the mass solidarity mobilization process hits a critical juncture.158 In fact, the mass
solidarity mobilization process hinges on the ability of the entrepreneurs to recruit
effectively. If they fail, the process breaks down. If they succeed, however, the
prospects of mass mobilizing increase significantly. There are a number of factors that
influence recruitment campaign outcomes. These include the advocacy frames deployed
and to extent to which they resonate with the target audience,159 the type of empirical
details used in the frames160 and their credibility,161 the degree of consistency between the
frames and rebel group behaviour,162 the ‘costliness’ of the recruitment asks,163 and the
amount of resources entrepreneurs have available to them to sustain recruitment
campaigns over time in the face of setbacks and rejection.164
When they recruit successfully, entrepreneurs not only expand the material base
of their own solidarity NGOs. They also contribute to the diffusion of participation
opportunities through their wider networks, creating the conditions for others to mobilize.
Among these newly mobilized supporters, some will join existing organizations and
contribute to their actions. Others will embrace an entrepreneurial spirit and create new
organizations. They do so either because there is no local solidarity NGO in their area
156 Interview, Tibet Support Group, December 17, 2012. 157 Interview, The Sentinel Project, October 27, 2012. 158 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political
Science Review Vol. 94, No. 2 (June 2000), pp. 251-267. 159 Robert Benford & David Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 26 (2000), pp. 611-639. Bob, Marketing of Rebellion. Also see Thomas Olesen, International Zapatismo: The Construction of Solidarity in the Age of
Globalization (London: Zed Books, 2005). 160 Mcentire, Leiby & Krain, “Human Rights Organizations as Agents of Change: An Experimental Examination of Framing and Micromobilization.” Paul Slovic, “”If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act:” Psychic Numbing And Genocide,” Judgement and Decision Making Vol. 2 No. 2 (April 2007), pp. 79-95. 161 James Jasper & Jane Poulsen, “Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protests,” Social Problems Vol. 42 No. 4 (November 1995), pp. 493-512. 162 Zuo Jiping & Robert Benford, “Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Student Movement,” Sociological Quarterly Vol. 36 No. 1 (1995), pp. 131-156. 163 Pamela Oliver, ““If You Don’t Do it, Nobody Else Will”: Active and Token Contributors to Local Collective Action,” American Sociological Review Vol. 49 (1984). 164 John McCarthy & Mayed Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” American Journal of Sociology Vol. 82, No. 2 (May 1977)
30
around which they can organize their efforts or because they have a campaign idea that is
currently not being implemented by the existing organizations. For instance, the NGO
Dream for Darfur, which in the run up to the Beijing Olympics in 2008 campaigned to
name and shame China for its support of the Sudanese government, was formed by a
small group of Darfur activists in part because Save Darfur had rejected their requests to
run a China-focused campaign.165 The emergence of new activists and organizations
contributes to the further diffusion of opportunities to take action. In the early 1990s, for
instance, Canadian activists in the East Timor Alert Network used their ties to the War
Resisters League to solicit their American counterparts to form their own pro-East Timor
NGOs. This contributed to the creation of the East Timor Action Network, which
became a hub of grassroots organizing in North America and Europe for East Timorese
independence.166
Step 3: Threshold Point and Mass Mobilization
In the third phase, as these recruitment and mobilization processes continue to
unfold, a threshold is hit in which numerous single-issue NGOs have formed in support
of a distant rebel cause. It is at this point that a mass solidarity mobilization can be said
to exist. Following on Stephen Saideman, Erin Jenne & Kathleen Cunningham,167 I use
organizations, rather than protest events data that are susceptible to media bias,168 as an
indicator of a mass solidarity mobilization. The presence of these organizations suggests
that an infrastructure of support of some significance has been established.
I suggest that a reasonable threshold is met when we can find evidence of at least
ten solidarity NGOs dedicated to a distant rebel cause. While some of the more
prominent mass solidarity mobilizations, such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement169 and
165 Ilan Greenberg, “Changing the Rules of the Games,” New York Times Magazine (March 30, 2008). Available here: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/30/magazine/30olympics-t.html [Accessed November 28, 2016] 166 Interview, ETAN Canada, July 13, 2015. Interview, ETAN US, March 26 2015. 167 Saideman, Jenne & Gallagher, “Diagnosing Diasporas: Understanding the Conditions Fostering or Blocking Mobilization, Preliminary Analyses,” Paper for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (2014). 168 John McCarthy, Clark McPhail & Jackie Smith, “Images of Protest: Dimensions of Selection Bias in Media Coverage of Washington Demonstrations, 1982 and 1991,” American Sociological Review Vol. 61, No. 3 (June 1996), pp. 478-499; Jennifer Earl, Andrew Martin, John McCarthy & Sarah Soule, “The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action,” Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 30 (2004), pp. 65-80. 169 For a list of the anti-apartheid NGOs see here: https://www.nelsonmandela.org/images/uploads/aama-azlist.pdf
31
the US Central America Peace & Solidarity Movement,170 have included hundreds of
solidarity NGOs and thousands of activists, a threshold of ten errs on the side of
inclusiveness in order to capture a wider set of cases. At the same time, this threshold
also distinguishes mass mobilizations from cases of smaller mobilizations that include
one or two organizations but little more. In the statistical analysis I conduct in chapter 3,
I also test my arguments on a relaxed threshold of five or more solidarity NGOs.
While many of the mass grassroots mobilizations follow the same three-step
process as outlined above, once they emerge they can diverge in important ways in terms
of size, as just noted, and in terms of structure. In some cases, the actors involved in a
mass solidarity mobilization may be bound together primarily by informal personal ties,
as seen in Palestine solidarity mobilizing in the US in the late 1980s.171 In other cases,
institutionalized forms of interaction and cooperation may form. In 1974 Chile solidarity
activists in the US established the National Coordinating Committee in Solidarity with
Chile in order to improve coordination between the dozens of Chile solidarity NGOs that
had formed to support the anti-Pinochet resistance.172 In other cases still, mass
mobilizations may develop transnational coordinating structures as well. In 2000, Tibet
activists created the International Tibet Network to strengthen ties between the dozens of
Tibet solidarity NGOs that had formed around the world since the late 1980s.173 Thus,
like advocacy networks and social movements,174 the shape mass solidarity mobilizations
can take once they have formed can also vary significantly. I leave the causes of these
variations in organizational or network structure to future research.
170 Hector Perla, “Si Nicaragua Vencio, El Salvador Vencera: Central American Agency in the Creation of the US-Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement,” Latin American Research Review Vol. 43, No. 2 (2008), pp. 136-158. 171 Interview, SUSTAIN and the US Campaign to End Israeli Occupation, August 24, 2015. 172 Margaret Power, “US Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” Latin American Perspectives Vol. 36 No. 6 (November 2009), pp. 54-55. 173 Interview, International Tibet Network, November 9 2012. See http://tibetnetwork.org/about-us/network-membership/ 174 Noha Shawki, “Organizational Structure and Strength and Transnational Campaign Outcomes: A Comparison of Two Transnational Advocacy Networks,” Global Networks Vol. 11 No. 1 (2011), pp. 97-117. Wendy Pearlman, Violence, Nonviolence and the Palestinian National Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
32
2.2 Grassroots Issue Adoption and the Importance of Recruitment
Why does this mass solidarity mobilization process occur around some distant
struggles but not others? To begin to answer this question it is important to first
understand why a grassroots activist would mobilize for one distant rebel cause but not
others. In what follows, I argue that grassroots issue adoption is a function of
recruitment, or exposure to participation opportunities through network ties. In other
words, an individual activist is more likely to mobilize in support for distant rebel causes
for which they are recruited and will not mobilize for those distant rebel causes for which
they are not recruited.
When asked, individuals often provide two types of justifications for their
activism, neither of which adequately explain grassroots issue adoption. The first has to
do with the emotional payoffs of solidarity activism. In this view, mobilizing for a distant
cause alongside other like-minded folks can provide an individual with a sense of
belonging, which can be especially beneficial to those who feel marginalized by their
own personal and familial networks or by society at large.175 It can also offer individuals
the chance to put into practice identities and values they care deeply about, which can
also contribute to an overall sense of wellbeing.176 While the psychological benefits of
solidarity activism are important, a focus on them alone cannot account for why an
individual would select one cause over numerous that could also provide them with
similar benefits.
In addition to psychological benefits, some activists describe their mobilization as
a result of the nature of the distant struggle itself, depicting it as a just cause that demands
their attention and support. I refer to these as ‘issue-specific’ justifications. For example,
Tibet solidarity activists stress how the Tibetan use of non-violent modes of resistance
makes their struggle particularly worthy of support. Non-violence, one activist
explained, “makes the Tibetan struggle something which non-Tibetans can easily identify
with as it is clear which side is in the right.”177 While non-violence may make Tibetan
175 For a brief review of the alienation literature see Doug McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis: A More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements,” in Mario Diani & Doug McAdam (eds.), Social Movement Analysis: A Network Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 176 Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The US Central America Peace Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. xv. 177 Interview, Students for a Free Tibet UK, November 28, 2012.
33
rebels attractive to some Westerners, it does not make them unique. Throughout the
second-half of the twentieth-century, non-violent resistance campaigns have been fairly
common and, in some decades, more common than violent campaigns. According to
Erica Chenoweth and her colleagues, from 1945 to 2006 40% of the domestic resistance
campaigns they identified were non-violent in nature.178 If non-violence is particularly
attractive to Western activists, why have those who mobilized for Tibet on these grounds
not done so for other such groups?
For their part, Palestine solidarity activists often justify their focus on Israel by
emphasizing its practice of foreign occupation, yet the Palestinians are not unique in
suffering under foreign rule. A number of observers have drawn direct parallels between
Israel’s occupation of the Palestinians and Morocco’s occupation of the Sahrawis.179 If
these similarities have merit, why mobilize for Palestine but not Western Sahara, or, for
that matter, the dozens of other groups around the world that claim to suffer from foreign
occupation?180 Further, Palestine solidarity activists also justify their focus on Israel
because of the support it receives from Western governments, namely the US, which is
said to create a degree of Western complicity in Palestinian suffering.181 Yet, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is just one of many political conflicts around the world where feelings
of Western complicity may be legitimately felt. A number of states with poor human
rights records, such as Egypt and Turkey, among others, receive some of the most US
military aid in the world.182 If close ties to the West have motivated some solidarity
178 Erica Chenoweth & Orion Lewis, “Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 50, No. 3 (2013), pp. 419-420. 179 Rana Khoury, “Western Sahara and Palestine: A Comparative Study of Colonialisms, Occupations, and Nationalism,” New Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 1 (2011), pp. 1-20. Available here: http://www.brismes.ac.uk/nmes/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/NMES2011Khoury.pdf Stephen Zunes, “Western Sahara: The Other Occupation,” Tikkun (January/February 2006). Available at: http://www.tikkun.org/article.php/Zunes-westernsahara-the-other-occupation. 180 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2006). Also see Oded Haklai & Neophytos Loizides (eds.), Settlers in Contested Lands: Territorial
Disputes and Ethnic Conflicts (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2015). 181 Interview, Students for Justice in Palestine Edinburgh, November 28, 2012. Jack McGinn, “Israel and Palestine: A Conflict for the Left?” Available at: https://socialjusticefirst.com/2012/02/27/israel-and-palestine-a-conflict-for-the-left/ 182 Marc Lynch, “Arab Americanisms in the Arab World.” In Peter Katzenstein & Robert Keohane (eds.), Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 208. Human Rights Watch, Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey (1995), p. 2. Accessible here: https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/Turkey.htm [Accessed February 9, 2016]
34
activists to focus their ire on Israel, what explains their non-mobilization for the Egyptian
pro-democracy movement or the Kurdish national movement in Turkey?
Network-based Accounts for Grassroots Issue Adoption
Rather than looking to the emotional or issue-specific justifications individuals
provide, I emphasize the importance of recruitment and the exposure to participation
opportunities through the interpersonal networks in which an individual is embedded.
Networks feature prominently in the literature on collective action.183 They have helped
to facilitate Italian and Islamist militancy,184 ethnic violence in Rwanda,185 peace
activism in the Netherlands,186 and local neighbourhood and high-risk civil rights
activism in the US.187 Networks contribute to collective action by creating and fostering
group identities that enable individuals to overcome collective action dilemmas.188
In addition to facilitating collective action, networks also shape what causes an
individual is likely to take up and which they will ignore. They do this by exposing
individuals to participation opportunities around some causes but not others. The
availability of these participation opportunities is a function of the recruitment efforts of
activist entrepreneurs. When requests for active participation are made, individuals are
more likely to mobilize. In fact, being asked to participate has been found to be a reliable
predictor of participation.189 As Alan Schussman & Sarah Soule put it, “individuals
rarely participate in social movement activities (such as protest) unless they are asked to
do so…”190
183 See Mario Diani & Doug McAdam (eds.), Social Movement Analysis: A Network Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 184 Donatella Della Porta, "Recruitment processes in clandestine political organizations: Italian left-wing terrorism." International Social Movement Research 1 (1988): 155-169Marc Sageman, Understanding
Terror Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 185 Lee Ann Fuji, Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (Cornell University Press, 2011). 186 Bert Klandermans and Dirk Oegema. "Potentials, networks, motivations, and barriers: Steps towards participation in social movements." American sociological review (1987): 519-531. 187 Oliver, “If you don’t do it, Nobody else will,” p. 608. Doug McAdam. Freedom summer. (Oxford University Press, USA, 1990). McAdam & Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship,” p. 654-655. 188 Klandermans, “How Group Identification Helps to Overcome the Dilemma of Collective Action.” 189 Alan Schussman & Sarah A. Soule, "Process and protest: Accounting for individual protest participation." Social forces 84, no. 2 (2005): 1083-1108. 190 Schussman & Soule (2005), p. 1086.
35
Consistent with the findings of participation in other forms of collective action,191
many solidarity activists were recruited through their organizational and social ties.
Friendship networks appear to be especially important. American student activism on
Darfur, for instance, was initially organized in large part through friendship and extended
social networks.192 In fact, numerous others activists who have taken up other causes,
such as Bosnia,193 East Timor,194 and Tibet195 report the significant role that friends
played in pulling them into action.
Given the effects of network ties, when asked to reflect on their activism some
acknowledge its seeming randomness. Some activists referred to their mobilization
around one cause but not another as the result of happenstance or “a huge amount of
random chance”196 by virtue of who the individual knew and the participation
opportunities that came out of that interpersonal tie. As one activist put it:
I didn't really feel like it was a choice…It was kind of right in front of my nose, but I wasn't choosing between one [cause] and another. I think it was just that Darfur was right there.197
Another put it similarly:
I didn’t sit down with a list. I didn’t sit down at any point and think, ‘Oh maybe that is more important than this.’ [Tibet] was just what was there and what was accessible I think.198 The importance of network ties in shaping what causes an individual will take up
and which they will ignore has an important implication, namely that it is possible that
these activists could have mobilized around a different distant rebel cause altogether had
they been recruited for it. “It could have been another conflict,” one activist reflected. “It
could have been Rwanda, it could have been Congo, it could have been Israel.”199
191 Della Porta, "Recruitment processes in clandestine political organizations: Italian left-wing terrorism."p. 158. 192 Interview, Save Darfur Coalition, October 14, 2012. 193 Quoted in Sherri Fink, “The Anti-Genocide Movement on American College Campuses: A Growing Response to the Balkan War,” in Thomas Cushman (ed.),This Time We Knew: Western Responses to
Genocide (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 318. 194 Interview, ETAN Canada, July 13 2015. 195 Interview, Tibet Society, October 25, 2012. 196 Interview, ETAN Canada, July 13, 2015. 197 Interview, US Holocaust Museum Committee on Conscience, February 4, 2013. 198 Interview, Students for a Free Tibet UK & Edinburgh Tibet Society, December 14, 2012. 199 Interview, Students for a Free Tibet UK, January 24, 2013.
36
If an individual’s location within interpersonal networks influences what distant
causes they will take up and which ones they will not, then to explain mass solidarity
mobilizations we need to identify the conditions under which non-diasporans are more
likely to be recruited en masse to support distant rebels. In the next section I argue that
distant rebels and their primary supporters in the West will recruit in this way when they
cannot count on strong diasporic support.
2.3 Diaspora Strength and Entrepreneur Recruitment Strategies
In their efforts to build a support base in the West, rebel entrepreneurs often first
seek out the support of their ethnic kin.200 Pre-existing ethnic, cultural and historical ties
to a struggle, as well as community feelings of guilt for living safely abroad, can make
diasporans receptive audiences to their rebel kin’s recruitment efforts.201 Further,
diasporas may also be attractive to rebel entrepreneurs because of the existence of prior
social and organizational ties that help to facilitate the recruitment process. These ties
are often the result of the transnational friendship, familial or political ties that form
through the migration process. These ties, cultivated by transnational brokers moving in
and between homeland and diasporic environments, help rebels to connect diaspora
communities with resistance organizations and networks in the homeland.202 For these
reasons, diasporas are often the first port of call for rebel entpreneurs seeking external
support for their struggle.
Not all diasporas, however, are able to provide their rebel ethnic kin with the type
of support they require. Some may be too small or politically disinterested to provide
meaningful assistance to a homeland struggle. In this way, the strength of the diaspora
influences whether or not group entrepreneurs decide to focus their attention and
resources primarily on their ethnic kin or if they decide to look beyond the community to
secure a wider base of support. Two specific characteristics of a diaspora influence this
200 Yossi Shain, The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation State. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1989). 201 Klandermans, “How Group Identification Helps to Overcome the Dilemma of Collective Action.” Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau & David Brannan, Trends in Outside
Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2001). 202 Fiona Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” in Jeffrey Checkel (ed.), Transnational Dynamics of Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 75.
37
decision: size and level of political mobilization, at the level elite and grassroots levels.
Specifically, entrepreneurs with large and politically active diasporas are more likely to
focus their efforts on their ethnic kin while those with small or politically inactive
diasporas are more likely to look beyond their ethnic kin in search of non-diasporic
support. When this outreach occurs in a sustained way, mass solidarity mobilization
becomes more likely.
Size Matters
One component of diaspora strength is the size of the community. Large
diasporas tend to become the focal points of rebel recruitment efforts since they can
provide rebel entrepreneurs with material and human resources that can be useful in
waging their homeland struggle.203 Further, large diasporas may also be able to exert
political influence in their host states and impact foreign policy towards the homeland
government. 204 From the perspective of these rebels, large diasporas can obviate the
need for non-diasporan support, making mass solidarity mobilizing far less likely in these
cases. When a rebel group has a large diaspora in the West, it is likely to focus its
international diplomacy efforts on the states in which their ethnic kin resides, and much
less attention elsewhere.
In the 1970s and 1980s South Korean pro-democracy activists targeted the large
Korean community in the US, which numbered approximately one million members, a
quarter of which were American citizens.205 Through their efforts, South Korean
dissidents “established a network within the US Korean community to influence
American politicians and media organizations to exert pressure for reform on the South
Korean government.”206 Similarly, in the 1980s, Tamil insurgents led by the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka (LTTE) tapped into large diasporic communities in
Canada and Europe. The Tigers established a number of offices around the world but
dedicated the vast majority of their resources to securing and maintaining the support
203 Collier & Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,”, p. 575. 204 Saideman, The Ties That Divide 205 Chung-in Moon, “Complex Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying: South Korea in the United States. International Studies Quarterly Vol. 32, No. 1 (1988), p. 79. 206 Yossi Shain, The frontier of loyalty: political exiles in the age of the nation-state. University of Michigan Press, 2010, p. 53.
38
from large Tamil communities in the West.207 The support they received, which included
approximately $80 million annually, enabled the LTTE continue their secessionist
struggle for more than two decades.208 Other rebel groups, such as the Democratic
League of Kosovo and the Kosovo Liberation Army, have also focused much of their
transnational advocacy energies on securing support from their sizeable diasporas in
Europe and North America.209 In these cases, these rebel entrepreneurs focused less of
their efforts on recruiting non-diasporan supporters. There simply was less of a need for
them. As a result, in the absence of sustained recruitment campaigns targeting non-
diasporans, the chances of mass solidarity mobilization reduced considerably.
By contrast, rebels with small diasporas in the West are more likely to seek out
non-diasporan assistance in order to augment their support base. As I noted above, in the
1980s the Tibetan leadership launched an international campaign to increase the pressure
on the Chinese government to grant self-determination rights for Tibet. Part of this
campaign included the recruitment of non-Tibetans in the West. The Dalai Lama sent
directives to Tibetan lamas in the West to start mobilizing their non-Tibetan students for
political action. He also toured Buddhist centers across North America and Western
Europe to directly solicit political support.210 This strategy, in part, reflected the small
size of the Tibetan diaspora in the West which numbered no more than a few thousand
members.211 As one Tibetan activist put it, strategies were adopted to “overcome our size
and become a real force in the international community.”212
Similarly, East Timorese rebels adopted a similar strategy to compensate for the
small size of the Timorese diaspora in the West..213 Accordingly, one Canadian activist
put it, “they built much of their strategy around Western [grassroots] solidarity.”214 Other
rebel entrepreneurs have also engaged in similar non-diaspora outreach practices to
compensate for the small size of their diasporas in the West, such as the Chileans in the
207 Byman et al, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, p. 44. 208 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities.” 209 Paul Hockenos, Homeland calling: exile patriotism & the Balkan Wars. Cornell University Press, 2003. 210 Interview, Tibet Support Group, December 17, 2012. 211 Carole Samdup, “A Canadian group fights to ensure success of Tibetan Freedom Struggle,” Tibetan
Bulletin (1996), p. 21. 212 Samdup, “A Canadian group fights to ensure success of Tibetan Freedom Struggle,” p. 21. 213 Juan Federer. The UN in East Timor: building Timor Leste, a Fragile State. (Charles Darwin University Press: 2005). 214 Interview, ETAN Canada, July 13, 2015.
39
early 1970s,215 the Saharawis in the 1980s,216 and the Burmese in the mid-1990s.217 In all
of these cases, the efforts by rebel entrepreneurs to recruit non-diaspora grassroots
supporters made mass mobilizing possible and increasingly likely.
Ability & Willingness for Diaspora Political Action
In addition to size, the ability and willingness of diaspora members to engage in
activism on homeland politics also impacts rebel diplomatic strategy. Diasporas able to
organize themselves politically are more likely to be the targets of rebel recruitment
efforts as it is these groups that are more likely to respond positively to requests for help.
As I describe in more detail in chapter 4, when Kurdish activists associated with the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) began moving to Europe in the late 1970s and 1980s
they were able to draw on a diaspora that had begun to organize themselves for homeland
politics. The presence of diaspora mobilizing structures within the community made the
work of these PKK entpreneurs much easier.218 In this case, as in others, Kurdish
entrepreneurs had less of a reason to look beyond their ethnic kin for support, making
mass solidarity mobilizing less likely. As such, politically organized diasporas,
especially those that are large, become the focal point of rebel diplomacy.
If a community is unable organize politically, due to concerns about deportation,
past traumas from direct exposure to state violence, political illiteracy, poverty, political
and religious divisions, linguistic barriers, geographic dispersion, among other factors,
rebel entrepreneurs are more likely to look elsewhere for support. When rebels are
unable to overcome these obstacles to mobilization, non-diasporan outreach becomes an
increasingly attractive recruitment strategy.
In the early 1970s Filipino exiles launched a campaign to build international
support against the Marcos regime. They first sought support from the large Filipino-
American community, which at the time numbered in the hundreds of thousands. As Jose
215 Thomas Wright & Rudy Onate Zuniga. “Chilean Political Exile.” Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2007), p. 70. 216 See http://www.smalgangen.org/files/dated/2014-08-28/history_of_the_western_sahara_campaign_uk.pdf [Accessed February 9, 2016] 217 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, "Recycling Home Politics: The Burmese Diaspora in North America." In Unpublished paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting,
Washington, DC, September. 2005 218 Olivier Grojean, “Bringing the Organization Back-In: Pro-Kurdish Protest in Europe,” in Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden (eds.), Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish
Issue (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 182-196.
40
Fuenticilla explains, the exiles “had assumed that their compatriots in the United States
would empathize with their experience and respond readily to appeals for money,
membership, and participation.” Community support, however, was not forthcoming.219
Many of the newer immigrants had more immediate and pressing concerns, and were
unable to devote any of their meager resources to homeland politics. The Marcos regime
also took measures to dissuade Filipinos in the US from supporting anti-government
campaigns in exile by threatening the lives of family members who remained in the
Philippines. Embassy and consular offices closely monitored the community and reported
on the diaspora’s actions.220 This strategy was effective as the exiles were largely
unsuccessful in securing mass support from the community.221
With diasporic channels resistant, the anti-Marco exiles turned their focus towards
non-diasporic networks. In 1973, a group of exiles and American activists set up the
solidarity NGO Friends of the Filipino People, which over time would come to include
approximately seventeen chapters across the US. Suggestive of the status of the Filipino
diaspora at the time as a political actor, its work was underpinned by the view that “U.S.
voters should take the main responsibility for changing Washington’s policy towards the
Philippines.”222 Due to a general level of political apathy, the Filipino community,
despite its size, was no longer seen as the main agent of change. Non-Filipinos were
recruited to fill the void.
2.4 Conclusion
In sum, this chapter has outlined the logic for why rebel groups with weak
diasporas in the West are the more likely subjects of mass solidarity mobilizing. The
main reason is because it is these rebels who are more likely to look beyond their ethnic
kin for support and recruit non-diasporan supporters en masse. When they recruit in this
way, they make mass solidarity mobilizations increasingly likely.
In the next two chapters I empirically test this argument. In chapter 3 I conduct a
quantitative test of this claim. In chapter 5, I test this claim qualitatively using a paired
219 Jose V. Fuentecilla, Fighting From A Distance: How Filipino Exiles Toppled A Dictator. (University of Illinois Press 2013). 220 Fuentecilla, Fighting from a Distance. 221 See here: http://www.press.uillinois.edu/wordpress/?p=11857 222 See here: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/95z8f0v4 [Accessed February 9, 2016]
41
comparison of Western activists responses to the Palestinian and Kurdish struggles, only
the former of which has attracted widespread grassroots solidarity. I show how the
weakness of the Palestinian diaspora in the West encouraged non-diaspora recruitment,
while the strength of the Kurdish diaspora did not.
42
Chapter 3 A Quantitative Test
In chapter 2 I argued that mass solidarity mobilizations in North America and
Western Europe are more likely to form in support of distant rebels with weak diasporas
in the West than those with strong diasporas. Weak diasporas create permissive
conditions for this kind of mobilizing because they encourage rebels to recruit non-
diasporans to their cause. When they recruit in this way successfully, rebels contribute to
the diffusion of participation opportunities around their cause, resulting in expanding
mobilizations until a threshold point is hit. Therefore, I argue, under these conditions of
diasporic weakness, mass solidarity mobilization becomes more likely.
In Chapter 2 I laid out the logic of this argument, referring to select cases to
demonstrate the processes and mechanisms at play. In this chapter, I test the correlation
between diaspora strength and the probability of mass solidarity mobilization occurring
on a broader universe of cases, using an original dataset built for this dissertation. In the
concluding chapter I discuss ways in which this dataset can be improved.
3.1 Universe of Cases: Amnesty International Campaigns
The world is replete with oppressed groups, yet not all can be considered likely
recipients of support from Western solidarity activists. I define the universe of relevant
distant rebels to include those whose plight has been publicized by an Amnesty
International campaign. Scholars have identified Amnesty as a gatekeeper human rights
NGO whose advocacy decisions influence the agenda of the Western human rights
community.223 While Amnesty is not the only gatekeeper, it is particularly influential.224
I use Cullen Hendrix and Wendy Wong’s dataset on Amnesty International’s
reporting from 1975 to 2004 to identify Amnesty campaigns.225 This dataset includes
223 Clifford Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and Transnational Activism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 18. 224 Wendy Wong, Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs Transforms Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2012). 225 Cullen Hendrix and Wendy Wong, “Knowing Your Audience: How the Structure of International Relations and Organizational Choices Affect Amnesty International’s Advocacy,” Review of International
Organizations (March 2014), pp. 29-58.
43
counts of the urgent actions, press releases, and reports published by Amnesty and
categorized by country target. I identify four types of Amnesty campaigns across two
dimensions – time period and group type. In terms of time period, a campaign can be
either multi- or single-year. A multi-year campaign begins when Amnesty publishes at
least twelve advocacy items on a particular country in a single year and ends when there
are two successive years in which fewer than twelve advocacy items are published. For
single-year campaigns, Amnesty publishes at least twenty advocacy items on a country in
a single year.226 Single-year campaigns can occur within multi-year campaigns, but when
this happens I include it only as a single campaign.
After identifying all multi-year and single-year Amnesty campaigns, I then
disaggregate them into national-level and minority-level campaigns. For national-level
campaigns, I expect to see mass solidarity mobilizations in support of pro-democracy
movements seeking broad national goals such as the overthrow of an authoritarian leader
or regime change. This type of campaign corresponds to the mass solidarity
mobilizations that formed to support the Chilean struggle against Augusto Pinochet.
Identifying national-level campaigns is straightforward and requires investigating the
content of Amnesty’s advocacy on a particular country. For minority-level campaigns, I
expect to see mass solidarity mobilizations in support of a minority group seeking
particularist goals, such as self-determination. These types of campaigns correspond to
the mass solidarity mobilizations that occurred in support of the Tibetans and East
Timorese, among others. To classify minority-level campaigns, I use the Minorities at
Risk (MAR) dataset to identify the politically relevant minority groups in each state
targeted by an Amnesty campaign. According to MAR, politically relevant minority
groups are those that are politically mobilized and who suffer from systematic
discrimination.227 I then searched the Amnesty website to determine the frequency with
which the organization’s coverage of a country referred to these groups. A minority-level
campaign occurs when Amnesty refers to a minority group in at least 10% of its
publications during its national-level campaign on a country. This threshold follows on
226 For a multi-year campaign I select 12 advocacy items as a threshold as it would amount to one advocacy item per month. For single-year campaigns I select 20 advocacy items as a threshold in order to identify significant short bursts of attention given to a country. 227 See http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/definition.asp [Accessed February 9, 2016]
44
Clifford Bob’s analysis of the Zapatista movement, which received approximately 10%
of Amnesty’s total coverage of rights abuses in Mexico from 1994 to 2003.228
Table I below summarizes the four types of Amnesty campaigns. In total, I
identify 128 campaigns from 1975 to 2004. I use this list of Amnesty campaigns to guide
my search for instances of mass solidarity mobilization. In the majority of cases I find,
mass solidarity mobilizations form during or within a few years of an Amnesty campaign.
In a few cases, I find mass solidarity mobilizations that formed before 1975.
Table 1: Amnesty International Campaign Types
Campaign length Group type
Single-year campaign (20+ items in single year)
Majority group (eg. Chinese, Sudanese)
Minority group (eg. Tibetans, Darfuris)
Multi-year campaign (Begins with 12+ items in two successive years. Ends with two successive years of
less than 12 items each)
Majority group
Minority group
3.2 Dependent Variable: Mass Solidarity Mobilization
The dependent variable in this study is binary and refers to either the presence or
absence of a mass solidarity mobilization. These mobilizations consists of a significant
number of grassroots activists in North America and/or Western Europe who organize to
support a distant rebel’s struggle to which they have no ethnic tie. Accordingly, these
mobilizations are distinct from diaspora or ethno-national mobilizations. Examples of
such mobilizations include the Save Darfur and Free Tibet movements, which consisted
of a significant number of non-Darfuri and non-Tibetan Western activists.
To operationalize mass solidarity mobilizations, I follow on Saideman et al and
use organizations, or in this case single-issue solidarity NGOs, as the key indicator of
non-diaspora mobilization in support of a distant rebel.229 Solidarity NGOs are often
228 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion. 229 Stephen Saideman, Erin Jenne & Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham have begun to build a dataset to explain variations in diaspora mobilizing, however their data collection efforts appear to have stopped. See Saideman, Jenne & Gallagher, “Diagnosing Diasporas: Understanding the Conditions Fostering or
45
comprised of both diaspora and non-diasporan activists, and in some cases only the latter.
The central argument is that these types of organizations will form to compensate for
diasporic weakness. I suggest that a mass solidarity mobilization has occurred when I
find evidence of at least ten solidarity NGOs focused on a distant rebel. To avoid
spurious findings, in my robustness checks below I include a sensitivity analysis that
relaxes the threshold to five or more NGOs. I construct this variable as binary (1 = mass
solidarity mobilization; 0 = no mobilization) due to the absence of sufficiently precise
data on the presence of solidarity NGOs.
To identify cases of these mobilizations I examine each Amnesty International
campaign entry, which make up the rows of my dataset, using four data sources. First, I
consulted the Yearbook of International Organizations (YIO) archive, which includes
records and details of 66,000 international organizations and international NGOs since
1907. Second, I conducted Google searches using four specific search terms for each
group to identify the websites of solidarity NGOs that had mobilized in support of a
single group.230 Third, I consulted two directories of NGOs in North America and
Western Europe in the early 1980s, which include listings of geographically focused
NGOs.231 And fourth, I consulted scholarly sources for each of the political conflicts
covered by an Amnesty campaign. I also use these data to estimate an approximate start
date of the mass solidarity mobilizations, which I use in my measurement of the
independent and control variables described below. In total I identify 24 cases of mass
solidarity mobilization. Appendix A includes details on how each of the 128 Amnesty
campaigns was coded.
3.3 Independent Variable: Diaspora Strength
The main independent variable in this study is the strength of a distant rebel’s
diaspora in the West. I draw on Martin Sokefeld’s understanding of diaspora as a
Blocking Mobilization, Preliminary Analyses,” Paper for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (2014). 230 The four search terms used are: “[Distant rebel] Support Group”, “[Distant rebel] AND Solidarity”, “Save [Distant rebel]”, “Friends of [Distant rebel]”. 231 Lauri Wiseberg & Harry M. Scoble, North American Human Rights Directory 1980: Human Rights
Internet (Maryland: Human Rights Internet, 1980). Laurie S. & Hazel Sirett. North American Human
Rights Directory. (Maryland: Human Rights Internet, 1984).
46
socially constructed transnational ethno-national community of individuals who share a
similar ancestry and connection with a distant homeland.232 Emphasizing the socially
constructed nature of a diaspora enables us to think about variations between diasporas,
in terms of the willingness of its members to engage in homeland politics. If diasporas
are socially constructed, then migrant communities do not always mobilize into
diasporas, and diasporas do not all mobilize to the same degree or in the same way for
homeland politics.233
Scholars have examined variations in the levels of diaspora mobilizing but to date
no quantitative data has been collected that can facilitate systematic cross-case
comparisons.234 I construct a new index variable that combines three indicators that
capture different aspects of a diaspora’s political strength. These include the diaspora’s
size across Western states, its level of civil society or grassroots political organizing in
the West, and whether or not it has a foreign policy lobby in the US. I describe the
rationale for these indicators in more detail below. In the statistical analysis I combine
these three indicators to create an index. I score each group’s diaspora on a scale of 0 to
1. I give each indicator an equal weighting (0.33) in the absence of good theoretical
reasons to weigh one more than another. I use an additive index, rather than
multiplicative interaction terms, due to a lack of variability in the data, in particular the
prominence of zeros.
The reason I combine these indicators is to develop a more complete picture of
the status of a distant rebel’s diaspora in the West. None of the indicators on their own
capture diaspora strength sufficiently. For instance, a diaspora can be large but if it is
unable to mobilize politically, then, I argue, rebel entrepreneurs are likely to look to
232 Martin Sokefeld, “Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora,” Global Networks Vol. 6 No. 3 (2006), pp. 265-284. 233 Bahar Baser & Ashok Swain, “Stateless Diaspora Groups and their Repertoires of Nationalist Activism in Host Countries,” Journal of International Relations Vol. 8, No. 1 (2010), p. 40. 234 Much of the diaspora comparative work is qualitative. See for example Maria Koinova, “Can Conflict-Generated Diasporas be Moderate Actors During Episodes of Contested Sovereignty? Lebanese and Albanian Diasporas Compared,” Review of International Studies Vol. 37 (2011), pp. 437-462. Maria Koinova, “Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism for Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK,” Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 9 No. 3 (2013), pp. 433-453. Stephen Saideman, Erin Jenne & Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham have begun to build a dataset to explain variations in diaspora mobilizing, however their data collection efforts appear to have stopped. See Saideman, Jenne & Gallagher, “Diagnosing Diasporas: Understanding the Conditions Fostering or Blocking Mobilization, Preliminary Analyses,” Paper for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (2014).
47
mobilize non-diasporan grassroots supporters. As noted in chapter 2, this was the case
with the anti-Marcos rebels and the Filipino-American community in the 1970s.
Similarly, a diaspora can be mobilized, whether at the grassroots or elite lobbying levels,
but if it is too small to provide meaningful political or material support, then I also expect
entrepreneurs to seek out non-diaspora grassroots assistance. This is the case with the
Tibetan diaspora in the West that had organizational structures in the West prior to the
emergence of mass solidarity mobilizing in support of Tibetan self-determination, but it
did not have the size to provide the Tibetan leadership with adequate resources to wage
its campaign against the Chinese state.235
My unit of analysis for measuring diaspora strength is the ‘West’ rather than
specific countries. I do this because of how I assume rebel entrepreneurs think about
their international diplomacy. If distant rebels have a strong diaspora (large and
politically organized) in a single Western state, then I expect that state to become their
advocacy target. In turn, I expect them to pay less attention to other states, decreasing the
chances of mass solidarity mobilizations there. The same would be true if distant rebels
have a diaspora that is strong but dispersed across a number of states. For example, the
PKK’s transnational advocacy focused on Europe because of the large and politically
organized Kurdish communities there, and less so on the US where the Kurdish diaspora
was far weaker. As a result, these Kurdish rebels did not initiate the mass solidarity
mobilization process in the US given the extent of the support they were receiving from
their own kin in Europe.
Measuring Diaspora Size
The first component of diaspora strength is the size of the diaspora in the West.236
All things being equal, distant rebels with smaller diasporas in the West are more likely
to target their ethnic kin in their recruitment campaigns and less likely to target non-
diasporan grassroots activists.
235 Margaret McLagan, Mobilizing for Tibet: Transnational Politics and Diaspora Culture in the Post-Cold
War Era. PhD Dissertation. Department of Anthropology, New York University (1996). 236 In the measurement of diaspora size, the countries I use include are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Greece, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United States and the United Kingdom.
48
Measuring diaspora size is not straightforward. No official census data exists on
the size of many of the communities studied here.237 To estimate a diaspora’s size in the
West, I draw on a number of sources. The first is the World Bank’s bilateral migration
data.238 These data do not disaggregate by ethnicity as it only provides data on the total
number of people leaving a particular country. As such, these data are more useful for
estimating the size of ‘state-linked’ diasporas, such as the Chinese or Indian diasporas,
but not for estimating ‘state-less’ diasporas, such as the Tibetan or Kashmiri diasporas.
To estimate the size of state-less diaspora groups, preferred estimates came from
scholarly sources. When scholarly estimates could not be found, which was the case for
twenty-three groups, I used Minorities at Risk (MAR) data on population proportion.
Using MAR data, I estimated the size of a diaspora by first calculating the total number
of migrants out of that country that went to Western states. I then divided that total
number by the percent of the total population in the home country that are members of
the distant rebel. For example, to calculate the size of the Mon (a minority group in
Burma) diaspora across Western states, I first calculated the total number of migrants out
of Burma to Western states (111,677). I then divided this number by the proportion of
Burma’s population that MAR data suggests is Mon (2%), which suggests that the size of
the Mon diaspora in the West is approximately 2,233. One problem with this estimation
technique is that it relies on the assumption that the patterns of migration from a given
country fit that country’s demographic breakdown. That is, in the case of Burma it
assumes that Mons are no more likely to migrate than others. While this may be true in
some cases, it may be erroneous in others, especially where only some groups are the
victims of state oppression and thus more likely to emigrate. In the absence of more
reliable data, however, adopting this assumption is necessary. In future research to
improve this dataset, more accurate measures of diaspora size may be gleaned from
interviews with community activists and leaders.
For all the data sources used to estimate size, the time period used is from 1960,
when World Bank migration data begins, to either the year when the mass solidarity
237 Gabriel Sheffer. Diaspora politics: At Home Abroad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 100. 238 See here: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-bilateral-migration-database [Accessed February 9, 2016]
49
mobilization occurs for positive cases or to the end date of the Amnesty campaign for
negative cases. After each estimate was calculated, the diaspora was then given a score
from 0 to 1 as outlined in Table 2 below. This transformation does involve some loss of
information, although using 0.1 increments minimizes the loss. This loss is necessary to
build an additive index.
Table 2: Coding of Diaspora Size
Score assigned
Estimated diaspora size
Score assigned
Estimated diaspora size
0 0 – 99,999 0.6 600,000 – 699,999
0.1 100,00 – 199,999 0.7 700,000 – 799,999
0.2 200,000 – 299,999 0.8 800,000 – 899,999
0.3 300,000 – 399,999 0.9 900,000 – 999,999
0.4 400,000 – 499,999 1 1,000,000+
0.5 500,000 – 599,999
Measuring Diaspora Grassroots Political Organizing
The second indicator of diaspora strength is the extent to which the diaspora is
politically mobilized at the grassroots level. This type of mobilization can entail public
protests and demonstrations, as well as NGO and church lobbying. I use the existing
scholarly literature on each of the distant rebel’s diasporas to approximate their level of
political mobilization in the West. Where scholarly sources suggested a highly active and
demonstrative diaspora, a score of 1 was given. Where these sources suggested some
degree of mobilization, but that the community was either nascent or highly fractured, the
diaspora was given a score of 0.5. If no scholarly sources on a diaspora were found, or if
scholarly sources mentioned that the diaspora was more of a migrant community rather
than a political community, then the case was given a score of 0. The scores assigned to
distant rebels who have been recipients of mass solidarity mobilizations support are based
on the time prior to mass solidarity mobilization. Table 3 outlines the coding method
used for this indicator. Appendix B indicates the sources used to assign these measures
to each group.
50
Table 3: Coding of Diaspora Civil Society Activism Indicator
Score Condition
1 If scholarly sources indicate mobilized and active diaspora.
0.5 If scholarly sources indicate nascent diaspora mobilization or highly fractured community.
0 If no scholarly sources on diaspora found, or if scholarship suggests no diaspora exists.
Measuring Diaspora Elite Lobbying
The third indicator of strength is whether or not the diaspora has a lobby in the
US. Diasporas who have created a lobby indicate that the community has a political
leadership and sufficient resources to engage with the political establishment on matters
important to them, including the fate of their ethnic kin back ‘home’. I select the US for
theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretically, given the openness of its political
system to ethnic lobbying, as well as its superpower status during the second half of the
20th century, I expect a politically engaged diaspora, regardless of size, to set up a lobby
in the US.239 Empirically, I focus on the US because an authoritative list of ethnic lobby
organizations is readily available. I do not include ethnic lobbies in Europe because up
until the early 2000s, there has been relatively little ethnic lobbying at the EU.240
A diaspora is given a score of 1 if it was found to have a lobby in the US. For
mass solidarity mobilizations cases, a score of 1 was only assigned if the diaspora
established the lobby prior to mass solidarity mobilization. This periodization ensures
that the causal arrow is pointed in the right direction. Data for this indicator was taken
from the list of US ethnic lobbies found in David Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul’s
Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy.241 Table 4 below outlines the coding of this
variable.
239 Trevor Rubenzer, “Ethnic Minority Interest Group Attributes and US Foreign Policy Influence: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 4 (2008), pp. 169-185. 240 Adrian Favell & Andrew Geddes, “Immigration and European Integration: New Opportunities for Transnational Mobilization? in Ruud Koopmans & Paul Stathan (eds.), Challenging Immigration and
Ethnic Relations Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 407-428. 241 David Paul & Rachel Anderson Paul. Ethnic lobbies and US foreign policy. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), pp. 124-125.
51
Table 4: Coding of diaspora lobby indicator
Score given Condition
1 For negative cases, if diaspora has lobby in US at any time. For positive cases, if diaspora has lobby in US prior to mass solidarity mobilization.
0 For negative cases, no lobby in the US. For positive cases, no lobby in US or if lobby created after mass solidarity mobilization.
I combine these three indicators – size, grassroots organizing and elite lobbying in
the US - to create an index variable of diaspora strength and score each group’s diaspora
on a scale of 0 to 1. A bivariate look at the data provides preliminary support for the
proposition that mass solidarity mobilizations are more likely to form in support of
distant rebels with weak diasporas. As seen in Table 5 below, of the 128 Amnesty
campaigns that make up the dataset, 35 focused on groups with strong diasporas while 93
focused on groups with weak diasporas. In only 6% of the cases with strong diasporas
does a mass solidarity mobilizations form, while in 22% of the cases with weak diasporas
do we see a mass solidarity mobilizations form. This is a significantly higher proportion
that suggests a relationship between low levels of diaspora strength and mass solidarity
mobilization, although the possibility of confounding must also be considered before
more confident conclusions can be made. The data also show that the relationship
between diaspora strength and mass solidarity mobilization is not deterministic.
Numerous rebels with weak diasporas in the West have not received widespread
grassroots solidarity. These cases are the focus of chapter 6.
52
Table 5: Diaspora Strength and Mass Solidarity Mobilization
Mass Solidarity Mobilization
Diaspora Strength
No Yes Total
Weak (<0.5)
71 (76%) 22 (24%) 93
Strong (>=0.5)
33 (94%) 2 (6%) 35
Total 104 24 128
3.4 Control Variables
The analysis below also includes a number of controls. I first control for
Christianity. Distant rebels that are Christian may be more likely to attract the support of
Western activists because their plight may resonate more deeply with Christian
westerners who may be more likely to support their co-religionists abroad than, say,
Muslim or Hindu distant rebels with whom they presumably have less in common.
Further, Christian distant rebels, regardless of denomination, can leverage transnational
networks of churches through which they can send information and requests for
support.242 The religion of a distant rebel was identified using the CIA World Factbook
and the MAR dataset.
Second, I control for how far the distant rebel is from the West. Geographic
proximity can impact the extent to which a distant rebel is known to Westerners and the
extent to which the group is able to situate themselves within transnational networks of
Western activists and NGOs.243 More proximate countries may be easier for Westerners
to access, thus making it more likely that they will come into direct contact with those
suffering abuses.. I determine geographic proximity by measuring the distance (in
kilometers) between the distant rebel’s location and either Washington D.C. or London,
242 Geoffrey Robinson “If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die”: How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 243 Steven Levitsky & Lucan Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 16, No. 3 (2005), pp. 20-24.
53
England, whichever is closer. I use Washington and London as reference points since the
US and UK have been geographic centers for a number of mass solidarity mobilizations.
Third, I control for whether or not the distant rebel in question is involved in a
conflict that can be characterized as a civil war. I expect groups in civil war conflicts to
be less likely to attract mass solidarity mobilizations support. Civil war may proxy two
different aspects of a distant conflict. First, it can say something about the complexity of
the conflict. Conflicts where there is more than one armed actor may be less appealing to
Western activists because it in these situations where foreign observers find it harder to
distinguish between the “good guys” deserving solidarity and the “bad guys” deserving
censure.244 Second, civil war may also proxy the severity of the conflict. Conflicts
characterized by multiple armed actors may involve higher levels of abuses than domestic
conflicts that are primarily characterized by governmental repression alone. I use
Nicolas Sambanis & Michael Doyle’s data that defines civil war as an internal conflict in
which both state and non-state actors are engaged in considerable levels of violence.245
According to this definition, an internal conflict is not a civil war if the targeted group
does not mount a meaningful armed resistance.246
Fourth, I control for conflict severity more directly by using political terror scores.
If human rights activists are principled actors, then we might expect them to mobilize in
response to cases of the most severe repression.247 In this view, distant rebels facing
genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other extreme forms of violent abuse, will attract more
attention than those who are the victims of ‘lesser’ abuses, such as the denial of religious
freedoms and basic democratic rights. Data for this variable is taken from the Political
Terror Scale (PTS) dataset. These data assess the extent to which a country’s population
is subjected to personal integrity rights violations including torture, arbitrary detention,
and extrajudicial killing.248
244 Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 27. 245 Michael Doyle & Nicolas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace
Operations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 246 Sambanis, Nicholas. “What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 6 (2004) p. 830. 247 Clifford Bob (ed.), The International Struggle for New Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 248 See here: http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/About/FAQ/ [Accessed February 9, 2016]
54
Fifth, I control for media attention. In publicizing distant conflicts and in
fostering solidarity, the mainstream media can play a vital role.249 For this analysis a new
measure of media coverage was constructed. Existing studies have sought to explain why
Western media outlets devote more attention to some countries and not others,250
however their focus is on country-to-country variations not group-to-group variations.
The latter is more useful here. To capture the salience of a distant rebel in Western media
coverage, I count the number of articles published in the Globe & Mail, New York Times,
and London Times that refer to the distant rebel in question. I use these three newspapers
as proxies of Western coverage not only because of their national and international
prominence but also because they cover the left-right political spectrum, given that the
London Times tends to skew to the right while the Globe and New York Times are left-
leaning.251
Two time lags are used - one from 1950 to either the year of mass solidarity
mobilization or the year in which the Amnesty campaign ends, and another that captures
the 10-year period prior to the relevant end date. The total number of articles found in
each newspaper is summed and then divided by the total number of years searched.
Lastly, I control for Western arms transfers to the target state. While individuals
may not closely follow to whom their government sells military equipment, close military
ties between states allows activist entrepreneurs to use advocacy frames and recruitment
strategies that emphasize their own government’s complicity in the suffering of a distant
rebel. This can have powerful motivational effects on an audience. To measure arms
transfers, I used the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) arms transfers database
on the military exchanges between the US and UK and the states targeted by an Amnesty
249 Howard Ramos, James Ron & Oskar Thoms, “Shaping the Northern Media’s Human Rights Coverage, 1986-2000,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 44, No. 4 (2007), pp. 385-386. Gary Bass Freedom’s Battle:
The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008). Pp. 25-26 250 Ramos, Ron & Thoms. “Shaping the Northern Media’s Human Rights Coverage, 1986-2000.” 251 I do not use The Guardian in my measure of media coverage, despite its prominence on the Western Left, primarily for data availability reasons. Unlike the archives available for the Globe & Mail, New York
Times and London Times, The Guardian’s online archive is not free. Further, the archive’s search function does not permit one to conduct searches within a previously specified set of articles requested. For instance, among all the articles referring to Afghanistan, I cannot search within these articles to determine how many refer to the Hazaras. Given that I include Amnesty International minority level campaigns that refer to groups that may live in a number of different states, this limitation of the archive is a problem and would mean removing twenty-one cases in the statistical analysis due to missing data. In a dataset with an already small universe (n = 128), removing 16% of the cases is not advisable.
55
campaign.252 As with media attention, two time lags are employed - one from 1950 to the
year of mass solidarity mobilization or when the AI campaign ends, and the other that
captures the 10 year period prior to the relevant end date.
Table 6 below summarizes the variables employed in the analysis below and their
expected effect on mass solidarity mobilization
Table 6: Summary of Independent and Control Variables
Variable Operationalization Source(s) Expected effect on
mass solidarity
mobilization
Diaspora strength (index)
0-1 scale; 0 is weakest, 1 is strongest.
World Bank bilateral migration data; Minorities at Risk data; see supplementary material for additional sources used; Paul & Paul 2009.
-
Christianity 1 for ‘yes’; 0 for no. CIA World Factbook; Minorities at Risk dataset +
Geographic proximity to West
Distance from distant rebel’s location to Washington, DC or London, UK, whichever is closest
http://www.distancecalculator.net/
-
Civil war 1 for yes; 0 for no Doyle & Sambanis 2006 -
Political terror 1-5 scale; 1 least oppressive, 5 most oppressive.
Political Terror Scale http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ +
Media attention (logged)
Average count of articles per year referring to distant rebel in Globe &
Mail, New York Times and London Times
Globe & Mail, New York Times, London
Times
+
Western arms (logged)
Arms transfers from US & UK to state targeted by Amnesty campaign
SIPRI Arms Transfers dataset http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
+
3.5 Results
I fit a standard logit model to test the weak diaspora proposition on four baseline
models that include the diaspora strength index variable plus all controls described above.
252 See http://www.sipri.org/databases/yy_armstransfers/background [Accessed February 9, 2016]
56
The civil war and political terror scores are highly correlated (p = 0.58) and cannot be
included in the same model. Table 7 below provides the results. A correlation matrix is
provided in Appendix A. I also ran these baseline models in which I separate the
diaspora mobilization (civil society activism plus ethnic lobby) and diaspora size
variables as opposed to treating them as part of the diaspora strength index. In this
analysis, the coefficients for both variables are in the right direction (negative), thus
providing some support for the weak diaspora hypothesis. However, both are largely
insignificant (p > 0.1). Only in model 1a is the diaspora mobilization variable weakly
significant (p = 0.089).
Table 7: Results for baseline models
DV = mass solidarity mobilization (1/0)
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Diaspora strength
-3.394 (1.275)*** -3.071 (1.212)** -3.364 (1.324)** -2.998 (1.247)**
Christian
1.875 (0.586)*** 1.890 (0.589)*** 1.796 (0.578)*** 1.801 (0.583)***
Geographic proximity
0.000 (0.0001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Civil War
2.121 (0.647)*** 2.244 (0.664)*** _________ _________
Political Terror
_________ _________ 1.743 (0.511)*** 1.863 (0.523)***
Media attention 1950 lag (logged)
0.337 (0.177)* _________ 0.264 (0.176) _________
Media attention 10yr-lag (logged)
_________ 0.318 (0.180)* _________ 0.232 (0.189)
Western arms 1950 lag (logged)
0.324 (0.164)** _________ 0.36 (0.174)** _________
Western arms 10-yr lag (logged)
_________ 0.329 (0.133)** _________ 0.361 (0.144)**
N 128 128 128 128
Prob < chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.2550 0.2532 0.2715 0.2767
% predicted correctly
50% 50% 37.5% 41.6%
Log-odds are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1 ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01.
57
In all four models, diaspora strength is negatively associated with mass solidarity
mobilization and statistically significant. The direction and significance of diaspora
strength holds whether controlling for civil war or levels of political terror and when
controlling for media attention and Western arms transfers using the two different time
lags. This suggests fairly robust evidence in favor of the proposition that distant rebels
with weak diasporas in the West are the more likely recipients of mass solidarity.
The controls in each baseline model largely act as expected. Christian groups are
more likely to attract mass solidarity than non-Christians. The civil war and political
terror variables are also positively associated with mass solidarity mobilization and
highly significant. The positive relationship between civil war and mass solidarity
mobilization is worth noting as it suggests that distant rebels in conflicts where violence
is “multi-sided,” and presumably where a conflict will be seen by outside observers as
more complex, are more likely to attract mass solidarity mobilizations support than
“simpler” internal conflicts characterized primarily by state repression alone. This may be
the result of the fact that distant rebels who mobilize domestically, including for violence,
are more likely to attract the attention of external actors. Another possible explanation is
that civil wars are more severe and involve higher levels of human rights abuse than non-
civil war internal conflicts. This view is supported by the results in models 2a and 2b,
which indicate that increasing levels of political terror make mass solidarity mobilization
more likely. Western arms transfers also matter as mass solidarity mobilizations are most
likely to mobilize against states that receive higher levels of US and UK arms. Perhaps
what is most surprising about these results is the finding that geographic proximity and
media attention appear to play no significant role in mass solidarity mobilization. Media
attention using both time lags is only weakly significant when the model includes civil
war but insignificant when the model includes political terror scores.
I now turn to examine the specific effects that diaspora strength has on mass
solidarity mobilization. I use Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg and Gary King’s
CLARIFY software to compute predicted probabilities for each of the four baseline
models to measure the effect that increases in diaspora strength have on the likelihood of
58
mass solidarity mobilization.253 In these computations, I set the continuous variables to
their means and the dichotomous variables (Christianity and civil war) to 0.
Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Mass Solidarity Mobilization at Each Value of Diaspora Strength
Figure 2 shows that in each of the four models, as the strength of a group’s
diaspora increases, the probability of mass solidarity mobilization decreases from a low
probability to an even lower one. In models 2a and 2b, the drop is the most steep, from
an approximately 15% chance of mass solidarity mobilization at a diaspora strength score
of 0 to a 1% chance at a diaspora strength score of 1. In models 1a and 1b, the drop is
less severe from a ~6% of mass solidarity mobilization at a diaspora strength of 0 to just
0.4% at a diaspora strength of 1.
3.6 Robustness Checks
As a robustness check of the finding that decreases in diaspora strength increase
the chances of mass solidarity mobilization, I include a series of regional and temporal
controls to the four baseline models described above. It may be the case that the patterns
we have observed so far in the data are being driven by a specific set of cases, unique to
certain regions of the world or to a specific time period. To consider these possible
253 See http://gking.harvard.edu/clarify
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
0.0
0
0.0
3
0.0
7
0.1
0
0.1
3
0.1
7
0.2
0
0.2
3
0.2
7
0.3
0
0.3
3
0.3
7
0.4
0
0.4
3
0.4
7
0.5
0
0.5
3
0.5
7
0.6
7
0.8
0
0.8
3
0.9
0
1.0
0
% P
rob
ab
ilit
y o
f W
SN
Fo
rma
tio
n
Diaspora Strength Scores
Model 1a
Model 1b
model 2a
model 2b
59
effects, each baseline model was re-run with a regional dummy for Eastern Europe, Latin
America, Asia-Middle East and Africa, and with a dummy for the Cold War (pre-1990).
As Table 8 shows, including these regional and temporal controls provides further
support for the weak diaspora hypothesis. Across all models, the diaspora strength
variable retains its direction and significance.
60
Table 8: Results for baseline models with regional and temporal controls
DV = mass solidarity mobilization (1/0)
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Diaspora strength
-3.496 (1.522)** -3.038 (1.427)** -2.959 (1.387)** -2.673 (1.324)**
Christian
1.292 (0.927) 1.203 (0.919) 1.399 (0.926) 1.319 (0.906)
Geographic Proximity
0.0000 (0.000) 0.0000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Civil War
3.384 (0.978)*** 3.300 (0.947)*** _________ _________
Political Terror
_________ _________ 1.607 (0.539)*** 1.641 (0.541)***
Media attention 1950 lag (logged)
0.271 (0.192) _________ 0.169 (0.186) _________
Media attention 10yr-lag (logged)
_________ 0.277 (0.195) _________ 0.187 (0.196)
Western arms 1950 lag (logged)
0.275 (0.193) _________ 0.290 (0.188) _________
Western arms 10-yr lag (logged)
_________ 0.210 (0.158) _________ 0.244 (0.162)
East Europe 1.695 (1.464) 1.258 (1.443) 0.490 (1.419) 0.266 (1.373)
Latin America
3.200 (1.133)*** 3.121 (1.110)*** 1.488 (0.925) 1.414 (0.930)
Asia-Middle East
1.552 (0.987) 1.410 (0.987) 0.923 (0.966) 0.709 (0.994)
Cold War
1.105 (0.781) 1.030 (0.758) 0.563 (0.724) 0.434 (0.709)
N 128 128 128 128
Prob < chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.3779 0.3680 0.3106 0.3068
Log-odds are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1 ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01.
As a further robustness check, I conduct a sensitivity analysis of the 10+ NGO
threshold for mass solidarity mobilization. I recode borderline cases – those that have
evidence of 5+ solidarity NGOs – as mass solidarity mobilizations. Table 9 shows the
results for the baseline models while Table 10 shows the results for the baseline models
including regional and temporal controls. The inclusion of these cases does not
undermine the weak diaspora hypothesis as the diaspora strength index retains its
direction and remains statistically significant, albeit with some weakening (p < 0.1).
61
Table 9: Results for baseline models (5+ NGO threshold for mass solidarity mobilizations)
DV = mass solidarity mobilization (1/0)
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Diaspora strength
-2.995 (1.184)** -2.624 (0.129)** -3.094 1.262)** -2.772 (1.190)**
Christian
1.781 (0.543)*** 1.786 (0.544)*** 1.878 (0.565)*** 1.908 (0.573)***
Geographic Proximity
0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.0000 (0.000)
Civil War
1.700 (0.581)*** 1.767 (0.591)*** _________ _________
Political Terror
_________ _________ 1.790 (0.505) 1.932 (0.523)***
Media attention 1950 lag (logged)
0.327 (0.169)* _________ 0.292 (0.173)* _________
Media attention 10yr-lag (logged)
_________ 0.282 (0.171) _________ 0.244 (0.186)
Western arms 1950 lag (logged)
0.250 (0.152) _________ 0.299 (0.167)* _________
Western arms 10-yr lag (logged)
_________ 0.272 (0.126)** _________ 0.341 (0.141)**
N 128 128 128 128
Prob < chi2 0.000 0.0001 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.2260 0.2217 0.279 0.2865
Log-odds are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1 ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01.
62
Table 10: Results for baselines models with regional and temporal controls (5+ NGO threshold for
mass solidarity mobilizations)
DV = mass solidarity mobilization (1/0)
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Diaspora strength
-2.857 (1.490)* -2.441 (1.408)* -2.473 (1.394)* -2.232 (1.330)*
Christian
0.677 (0.923) 0.610 (0.916) 0.753 (0.885) 0.708 (0.872)
Geographic Proximity
0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Civil War
3.242 (0.961)*** 3.152 (0.944)*** _________ _________
Political Terror
_________ _________ 1.768 (0.575)*** 1.792 (0.578)***
Media attention 1950 lag (logged)
0.243 (0.188) _________ 0.1455 (0.182) _________
Media attention 10yr-lag (logged)
_________ 0.236 (0.193) _________ 0.152 (0.193)
Western arms 1950 lag (logged)
0.191 (0.192) _________ 0.221 (0.196) _________
Western arms 10-yr lag (logged)
_________ 0.132 (0.159) _________ 0.188 (0.169)
Europe 1.792 (1.495) 1.406 (0.1488) 1.090 (1.427) 0.867 (1.387)
Latin America
4.062 (1.178)*** 3.990 (1.155)*** 2.475 (0.984)** 2.398 (0.988)**
Asia-Middle East
1.243 (0.981) 1.151 (0.987) 0.553 (0.973) 0.388 (1.009)
Cold War
1.412 (0.765)* 1.382 (0.757)* 0.972 (0.733) 0.866 (0.723)
N 128 128 128 128
Prob < chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.4040 0.3959 0.3624 0.3604
Log-odds are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1 ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01.
3.7 Model Predictions
As a final look at the data, I now consider the predictive performance of the four
baseline models considered above to assess how useful they are in telling us under what
conditions we might expect a mass solidarity mobilizations to form. To do so, I use
classification tables to see the number of cases that each model predicts accurately. For
each case in the data, the models compute a probability of mass solidarity mobilization.
The model makes an accurate prediction when it computes a probability of mass
63
solidarity mobilization that is greater than 50% in a case where such a mobilization is
observed. Similarly, the model also performs well when the model computes a
probability that is less than 50% for a case where a mass solidarity mobilizations is not
observed. In terms of predictive power, the models accurately predict around only half of
the cases of mass solidarity mobilization. Models 1a and 1b accurately predict 50% of the
positive cases, while models 2a and 2b predict ~40% of the positive cases.
Table 11: Classification Table for Model 1a
Predicted
Observed
Yes mass solidarity mobilizations
No mass solidarity
mobilizations
Yes mass solidarity mobilizations
12 5
No mass solidarity mobilizations
12 99
Table 12: Classification Table for Model 1b
Predicted
Observed
Yes mass solidarity mobilizations
No mass solidarity
mobilizations
Yes mass solidarity mobilizations
12 4
~No mass solidarity mobilizations
12 100
Table 13: Classification Table for Models 2a
Predicted
Observed
Yes mass solidarity mobilizations
No mass solidarity
mobilizations
Yes mass solidarity mobilizations
9 5
No mass solidarity mobilizations
15 99
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Table 14: Classification Table for Models 2b
Predicted
Observed
Yes mass solidarity mobilizations
No mass solidarity
mobilizations
Yes mass solidarity mobilizations
10 3
No mass solidarity mobilizations
14 101
The predictive limits of the four baselines models is a finding that is worthy of
some consideration. As I argue in the next section, the poor predictive performance of
the models suggests the limits of a structural account of mass solidarity mobilization.
While the analysis so far has shed some light on the conditions under which mass
solidarity mobilization is more likely, what is missing from this approach is the central
role that agents play in generating collective action. Political opportunities for mass
solidarity mobilization may exist but without individuals willing to take action and
mobilize, collective action will not occur. As Sharon Nepstad put it, “even the best of
conditions cannot produce a movement unless people choose to act.”254
3.8 Unpredictability and Agency in Mass Solidarity Mobilizing
According to the weak diaspora theory outlined in chapter 2, and supported here,
weak diasporas create incentives for rebels to recruit non-diasporic supporters to their
cause. For the theory to work as expected, however, a number of conditions need to be in
place. These conditions reflect the contingent and agentic nature of mass solidarity
mobilization that make it a hard-to-predict phenomenon.
First, rebel entrepreneurs must be present. Conducive structural conditions for
mass solidarity mobilization does not make this a given. For any number of reasons,
entrepreneurs may not emerge. One may lack the time or resources to take on a
leadership position, preferring others to do the job instead.255 They may not be embedded
254 Sharon Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture and Agency in the Central America
Solidarity Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 255 Pamela Oliver, ““If You Don’t Do it, Nobody Else Will”: Active and Token Contributors to Local Collective Action,” American Sociological Review Vol. 49 (1984).
65
in social or familial networks that are supportive of activism,256 and they may feel like
they do not have the skills or connections to do the job successfully. For diasporans, fear
of deportation and discrimination, as well as a lack of language and political skills,
amongst others, may also act as obstacles to activist entrepreneurship.257 While for some
physical and emotional trauma experienced in the homeland conflict can spur activism,
for others it can act as an obstacle. The same is true for distant rebels who must have the
wherewithal to organize themselves and engage in transnational activism, which can be
costly.258 Levels of poverty and domestic repression impact the ability of a distant rebel
to go abroad. Government authorities may block members of distant rebels from
travelling, and may interrupt communications between them and potential external
supporters. As Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink have suggested, “very oppressive
governments sometimes do not become the subject of international campaigns by the
advocacy networks, because information gathering requires at least some minimal links
between domestic opposition and the transnational networks if the latter is to gain access
to the norm-violating state.”259
Second, assuming rebel entrepreneurs exist, it is then not a given that they will
engage in the types of advocacy strategies as expected by the weak diaspora proposition.
Perception and interpretation shape how entrepreneurs respond to the conditions around
them.260 Rebels have to perceive their diasporic communities in the West as weak in
order to recruit in ways expected by the theory. A diaspora or distant rebel entrepreneur
who believes his or her diasporic community has the capacity to provide significant help
to the homeland and play a significant political role in shaping Western policy, is less
likely to seek out non-diasporic support. For this reason, the predictive capability of the
256 Doug McAdam & Ronnelle Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism,” American Journal of Sociology Vol. 99, No. 3 (November 1993). 257 Martin Sokefeld, “Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora,” Global Networks Vol. 6 No. 3 (2006), pp. 265-284. Bert Klandermans and Dirk Oegema. "Potentials, networks, motivations, and barriers: Steps towards participation in social movements." American sociological review (1987): 519-531. 258 Victor Asal, Justin Conrad & Peter White. "Going abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations," International Organization 68, no. 4 (2014). 259 Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: An Introduction,” in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The
Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 22. 260 Jeff Goodwin & James Jasper, “Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory,” Sociological Forum Vol. 14, No. 1 (1999), p. 33.
66
statistical models is dependent on not only the presence of rebel entrepreneurs but also
their ability to see their circumstances in a way that is consistent with what the model is
suggesting.
Third, even when rebel entrepreneurs interpret their surroundings in a way that is
consistent with the theory, it is not predetermined that their recruitment efforts will be
successful and that mass solidarity mobilization will follow. Successful recruitment is
contingent on the use of advocacy frames that resonate and motivate an audience.
Effective advocacy often involves presenting an issue in a way that makes the cause
legible to an audience, helps them to identify with it in some way, and motivates them to
take action.261 When an issue is framed in a way that matches the values and interests of
an audience, it is more likely to be taken up.262 If rebel entrepreneurs fail to frame their
cause in a way that makes sense to their audience, then it is less likely that a mass
solidarity mobilizations will form. They may also fail to identify the right non-diasporic
networks to recruit from, as some networks may be more likely to oppose their cause, or
feel neutral about it, than others. Furthermore, issues beyond the control of the rebel
entrepreneurs themselves impact the likelihood of successfully gaining non-diasporic
support. To become an activist, an individual must not only be motivated but they must
also be able to overcome any barriers that may exist to their participation in a social
movement.263 In some instances, regardless of how compelling a cause is and how savvy
the rebels are, non-diasporans may simply lack the ability to add a new issue to their
plate, despite their normative buy-in to the struggle. A rebel entrepreneur can do all the
right things and still fail to attract much support.
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter provided a quantitative test of the claim that mass solidarity
mobilizations are more likely to form in support of distant rebels with weak diasporas in
the West than those with strong ones. I found fairly robust evidence in favour of the
proposition using a series of controls and robustness checks. Statistical tests, however,
261 Robert Benford & David Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology (2000), pp. 611-639. 262 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion. 263 Klandermans & Oegema. "Potentials, networks, motivations, and barriers: Steps towards participation in social movements.”
67
only provide a partial examination of the hypothesized relationship between diaspora
strength and mass solidarity mobilization. In the next two chapters I build on this analysis
by conducting a qualitative test of the weak diaspora proposition in order to shed light on
the causal mechanism that ties together lower levels of diaspora strength with an
increased probability of mass solidarity mobilizing.
68
Chapter 4 Why Compares Palestinians and Kurds?
The quantitative results I presented in chapter 3 suggest a fairly strong statistical
relationship between the strength of a distant rebel’s diaspora in the West and the
probability that mass solidarity mobilizations will occur on their behalf. Specifically,
distant rebels with weaker diasporas were found to be more likely to receive this kind of
external support than those with stronger diasporas. Quantitative methods, however, only
allow for a partial test of the existence of a causal relationship between diaspora strength
and mass solidarity mobilizing. To avoid spurious correlation, we still require evidence of
the causal processes or mechanisms, outlined in chapter 2, that tie rebel strategy, diaspora
strength and mass solidarity mobilization together.
In the next two chapters I provide qualitative evidence of this causal process,
illustrating how a weak diaspora can enable mass solidarity mobilizing, while a strong
diaspora does not. Using a “most-similar systems” design,264 I compare the cases of
Western activist responses to the Palestinian and Kurdish struggles. I select these cases
not only because they vary significantly in the level of support they have received from
Western solidarity activists but also because of the number of theoretically relevant
similarities between them. These similarities include not only statelessness but also the
nature of the grievances involved, the severity of the two conflicts, the framing strategies
and militancy of the Palestinians and Kurds, international visibility, and Western
governmental support for Israel and Turkey. Given these shared characteristics, this case
selection adheres to James Mahoney & Gary Goertz’s “possibility principle” in which the
negative case selected (the Kurds) represents a case where the outcome being studied
(mass solidarity mobilization) is possible.265 In other words, it is reasonable to suggest
that we should have seen mass solidarity mobilizations in support of both distant rebel
movements, even if conditions favoured even wider mobilizing for the Palestinians.
264 Sidney Tarrow, “The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice,” Comparative
Political Studies Vol. 43, No. 2 (2010), p. 234. 265 James Mahoney & Gary Goertz, “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research,” American Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 4 (2004), pp. 653-669.
69
I argue that what explains why a mass solidarity mobilization has occurred for the
Palestinians but not the Kurds has to do with the differences between the Palestinian and
Kurdish diasporas in North America and Western Europe which impacted the recruitment
strategies of both rebel movements. Specifically, the weakness of the Palestinian
diaspora, characterized by its small size, inaction and internecine conflict, has encouraged
Palestinian activist organizers to recruit non-Palestinians to actively support their cause.
By contrast, the strength of the Kurdish diaspora, characterized by large numbers and
high levels of political organization, has encouraged Kurdish activist organizers to focus
their recruitment efforts on the Kurdish communities in Europe, and less attention on
recruiting non-Kurdish supporters. These distinct recruitment strategies, as a function of
the diasporas, helps to explain the varying responses of Western grassroots activists to
these two similar struggles.
In this chapter I justify my selection of these two cases. Importantly, both groups
differ markedly in terms of the extent of grassroots solidarity in the West they have
received. I outline these mobilizations in more detail in chapter 5, but suffice it to say
here that while hundreds of Palestine-focused solidarity NGOs have formed since the
early 1980s, and especially in the 2000s, very few have formed for the Kurds. In fact,
today Palestine is arguably a cause celebre in Western civil society, especially in light of
the growing popularity of the Boycott, Divestment & Sanctions campaign that formally
began in 2005. The extent of these mobilizations for Palestine is significant, with some
suggesting that Israel is now the target of a widespread international campaign seeking to
delegitimize its very existence.266 Others note that within European civil society, if not
Western civil society more broadly, Israel is widely considered to be a “state beyond the
pale.”267 By contrast, the Kurds in Turkey have not been the recipients of such
widespread grassroots solidarity in the West and, relatedly, the Turkish state has not been
266 Gerald Steinberg, “Soft Powers Play Hardball: NGOs Wage War Against Israel,” Israel Affairs Vol. 42 No. 4 (October 2006), pp. 748-768. Efraim Karsh, “The War Against the Jews,” Israel Affairs Vol. 18 No. 3 (July 2012), pp. 319-343. Don Habibi, “Human Rights and Politicized Human Rights: A Utilitarian Critique,” Journal of Human Rights Vol. 6 No. 3 (2007). Efraim Sicher, “The Image of Israel and Postcolonial Discourse in the Early 21st Century: A View From Britain,” Israel Studies Vol, 16 No. 1 (Spring 2011), pp. 1-25. 267 Robin Shepherd, A State Beyond the Pale: Europe’s Problem with Israel (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2009).
70
the targets of sustained grassroots campaigning against it in North America and Western
Europe. As one British activist put it:
The Palestinian cause is well known and many, all around the world, stand in solidarity with the Palestinian people. A people without a state who have been struggling for one for nearly 70 years. This support is generally underpinned by the principle of self-determination. Compare this, though, to the campaign forKurdish independence and statehood and thesupport vanishes. It is important to note that theKurds are the largest ethnic group in the worldwithout a state of their own, not a well-knownfact. Their struggle, furthermore, has beenongoing for a century since the fall of theOttoman empire. Yet, despite this, the Kurdish cause is curiously neglected by those who campaign for Palestine.268
Given the number of important similarities between the Palestinian and Kurdish
struggle, this is a puzzling outcome. In the rest of this chapter I outline these similarities.
In the next chapter I illustrate how variations between Palestinian and Kurdish diaspora
strength in the West has contributed to these varied mobilization outcomes.
4.1 Palestinian and Kurdish Grievances: Ethnic Discrimination and
Occupation
Scholars have argued that the nature of a group’s grievances can impact their
likelihood of attracting transnational activist support. Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink,
among others, argue that the violation of bodily integrity rights and the ability to trace
these violations to a clear perpetrator make a group more likely to attract the support of
transnational activists. 269 They also suggest that the denial of equal legal opportunity, as
seen in case of apartheid South Africa, can also make a cause more attractive.270 In this
regard, the Palestinian and Kurds face similar conditions. Both have long suffered from
repeated and severe bodily integrity rights violations that can be easily associated with
the actions of a government and its armed forces, and also face political exclusion and
268 Zwan Mahmod, “Solidarity and Double Standards: Why Palestine but not Kurdistan,” Kurdistan
Tribune (October 26, 2014). Available at: http://kurdistantribune.com/2014/solidarity-double-standards-why-palestine-but-not-kurdistan/ 269 Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). Diane Stone, “Think Tanks, Global Lesson Drawing and Networking Social Policy Ideas,” Global Social Policy Vol. 1, No. 3 pp. 338-360. 270 Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders.
71
ethnic discrimination. Further, they both suffer from colonial rule and foreign
occupation.
Since 1948, the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel has held a precarious position.
They face political marginalization and economic inequality, despite their formal status
as citizens and the provision of basic civil rights as stipulated in Israel’s founding
documents and Basic Laws.271 Israeli political institutions, including the judiciary, often
practice a strong bias in favor of the rights of Jewish citizens of the state at the expense of
the Arab minority across a wide variety of public policy areas, including access to health
care, education, transportation, housing and education.272 In light of these practices,
some claim that Israel is best understood as an ethnic democracy that privileges Jews
over Arabs,273 while others refer to it as an ‘ethnocracy’ engaged in attempts to “Judaize”
Palestine274 and remove any remaining vestiges of Palestinian identity and political
claims to the land.275 For the Palestinians who live under military and civilian occupation
in the West Bank and Gaza, the situation is arguably much worse. In large part due to the
creation and expansion of Jewish-only settlements, and the security infrastructure that
surrounds them, many have likened Israeli policy in the occupied territories to apartheid
rule in South Africa.276
In light of their situation, Palestinians have not only called for policy reforms but
also the restructuring of the Israeli state. Palestinian NGOs in Israel argue that Israel
ought to abandon its identity as a ‘Jewish State’ and recognize the Arab minority as an
indigenous population with collective rights.277 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza
271 Alan Dowty, The Jewish State: A Century Later (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 186. Oded Haklai, Palestinian Ethnonationalism in Israel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 272 David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2002). Oded Haklai, “Religious-Nationalist Mobilization and State Penetration: Lessons From Jewish Settlers’ Activism in Israel and the West Bank,” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 40 No. 6 (June 2007), pp. 713-739. 273 Sammy Smooha, “The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State,” Nations
and Nationalism Vol. 8 No. 4 (2002), pp. 475-503. 274 Oren Yiftachel, Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 275 Baruch Kimmerling, Politicide: Ariel Sharon’s War Against the Palestinians (London: Verso Books, 2003). 276 Ben White, Israeli Apartheid: A Beginner’s Guide (London: Pluto Press, 2009). Uri Davis, Israel, an
Apartheid State (London: Zed Books, 1987). 277 Dov Waxman, “Israel’s Other Palestinian Problem: The Future Vision Documents and the Demands of the Palestinian minority in Israel,” Israel Affairs Vol. 19 No. 1 (2013), pp. 214-229.
72
have called for the establishment of their own state alongside Israel, a position that is still
supported by a majority of people on both sides. In recent years, however, some have
more actively advocated for a one-state solution and the establishment of a bi-national
state for both Jews and Arabs.278
It is often argued that one reason for mass solidarity mobilization for the
Palestinians has to do with the nature of the Israeli state not only as ethno-nationalist but
also as colonial in nature, and thus illegitimate. 279 Many Palestine solidarity activists
situate the founding of Israel within a history not of historical anti-Semitism culminating
in the Nazi Holocaust,280 but rather in the history of Western colonialism and European
maltreatment of indigenous populations.281 This has led many to call for the end of the
Jewish State on the grounds that its founding and current policies are out of step with
twentieth-century post-colonial values.282
These characteristics, however, are also present in the Kurdish case, especially for
those living in Turkey. Kurds have also faced decades of exclusion and systematic
discrimination throughout the Middle East. Since the formation of the Turkish Republic
in 1923, official state policy has denied the political legitimacy of Kurdish identity and
has been one of coercive assimilation.283 In official Turkish discourse, Kurds were not
referred to as ‘Kurds’ but rather as “Mountain Turks”, “prospective Turks,” or “Turks to-
be.”284 Government institutions expressed a strong anti-Kurdish bias. The judiciary
rejected Kurdish rights claims285 and the state criminalized the use of the Kurdish
language.286 The state has also banned numerous Kurdish parties. In fact, Turkish law
278 For example see Omar Barghouti, “Organizing for Self-Determination, Ethical De-Zionization and Resisting Apartheid,” Contemporary Arab Affairs Vol. 2 No. 4 (October-December 2009), pp. 576-586. 279 Emanuel Adler, “Israel’s Unsettled Relations with the World,” in Emanuel Adler (ed.), Israel in the
World: Legitimacy and Exceptionalism (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 7. 280 Avi Bareli, “Forgetting Europe: Perspectives on the Debate about Zionism and Colonialism,” Journal of
Israeli History (2001), pp. 99-120. 281 Edward Said, The Question of Palestine (New York: Times Books, 1979). 282 Tony Judt, “Israel: The Alternative,” New York Review of Books (October 23, 2003). http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2003/10/23/israel-the-alternative/ 283 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2011), p. 3. 284 Bahar Baser, Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts: A Comparative Perspective, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015) p. 54-55. 285 Derya Bayir, “Representation of the Kurds by the Turkish Judiciary,” Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 35 (2013), pp. 116-142. 286 Welat Zeydanlioglu, “Turkey’s Kurdish Language Policy,” International Journal of the Sociology of
Language (September 2012), pp. 99-125.
73
provides minority protections only to non-Muslim groups, including Armenians, Greeks
and Jews, but not to Kurds.287 Given what many see as its poor record in protecting
Kurdish minority rights, Turkey, like Israel, has also been described as an ethnic
democracy that privileges the rights of Turks over Kurds.288 Others have taken it a step
further, suggesting that Turkey’s Kurdish policy is not only discriminatory but
genocidal.289
The Kurds have also claimed that their struggle is one against Turkish colonialism
and occupation.290 They too depict their struggle as resisting foreign rule.291 For
example, the Kurdish Parliament in Exile (now the Kurdish National Congress) has
called for the end to the “foreign occupation”of Kurdistan.292 Ismail Besikci, a Turkish
sociologist, has argued that Kurdistan constitutes an “international colony.”293 As such,
like the Palestinians, the Kurds are not only seeking equal rights to Turks but have also
asserted their right to self-determination, whether in an autonomous province in
southeastern Turkey or in an independent state.294
4.2 Conflict Severity
Beyond grievances, the severity of the conflicts, namely the extent of state
violence and repression, may also account for differing responses by Western activists.
As I showed in the statistical tests in chapter 3, the more severe a conflict is the more
likely a mass solidarity mobilizations is to mobilize in response to support the aggrieved.
In the case of the Palestinians and Kurds, however, both conflicts are comparable in
terms of severity. According to the Political Terror Scores data (presented in Figure 3
287 Leila Berkowitz & Liza Mugge, “Transnational Diaspora Lobbying: Europeanization and the Kurdish Question,” Journal of Intercultural Studies Vol. 35, No. 1 (2014), p. 78. 288 Mustafa Saatci, “Nation States and Ethnic Boundaries: Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish-Kurdish Conflict,” Nations and Nationalism Vol. 8 No. 4 (2002), p. 552. 289 Desmond Fernandes, “Modernity and the Linguistic Genocide of Kurds in Turkey,” De Gruyter Mouton (2012), pp. 75-98. 290 Ismail Besikci, Kurdistan & Turkish Colonialism: Selected Writings (London: Kurdistan Information Centre, 1991). Ismail Besikci, International Colony Kurdistan (London: Taderon Press, 2004). 291 Cengiz Gunes, The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey: From Protest to Resistance (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 74. Baser, Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts 292 Henri Barkey & Graham Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p. 36. Robert Pape, Dying to Wing: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2006). 293Ismail Besikci, International Colony Kurdistan. 294 Gunes Murat Tezcur, “When Democratization Radicalizes: The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 46 No. 7 (2010), p. 775.
74
below), from 1975 to 2006 both conflicts received an average score of 3.5 out of 5 (1
being the best, 5 being the worst).
Figure 3: Levels of Political Terror in Israel-Palestine and Turkey 1975 - 2006
From 1948, the Israeli government’s impact on Palestinian life has been
significant. The creation of the Jewish state resulted in somewhere between 600,000 and
750,000 refugees,295 as well as hundreds of Arab villages destroyed,296 although it is
important to note that historians disagree on the causes of these developments.297 Many
of these refugees have not been allowed to return to their homes.298 The 1967 war
resulted in approximately 300,000 Palestinian refugees, many of whom were displaced
for a second time.299 From 1967 to the Gaza war (Operation Cast Lead) in 2009, it is
estimated that Israeli forces have killed more than 8000 Palestinians in the occupied
territories, including Gaza.300 Displacement and death tolls, however, only capture a part
295 Efraim Karsh, “How Many Palestinian Arab Refugees Were There?” Israel Affairs Vol. 17, No. 2 (2011), pp. 224-246. 296 Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oxford: OneWorld, 2007). 297 Efraim Karsh, Fabricating Israeli History: The “New Historians” (London: Frank Cass, 1997). Efraim Karsh, Palestine Betrayed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). Benny Morris, The Birth of the
Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Benny Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). Pappe, The
Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Eugene Rogan & Avi Shlaim (eds.), The War for Palestine: Rewriting the
History of 1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 298 Simon Waldman, Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1948-1951 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015). 299 Nur Masalha, “The 1967 Palestinian Exodus,” in Ghada Karmi & Eugene Cotran (eds.) The Palestinian
Exodus, 1948-1998 (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999), p. 63. 300 This number combines B’Tselem data from 1987 to 2009 available here: http://www.btselem.org/statistics/first_intifada_tables and Neve Gordon’s estimate of 650 Palestinian
0.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.04.55.0
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75
of the picture. In the West Bank, a system of checkpoints and roadblocks has made
Palestinian movement as well as social and political cohesion increasingly difficult.301
Furthermore, thousands of Palestinian homes in the West Bank have been demolished
and many more are under demolition orders. According to the Israeli Committee against
House Demolitions, since 1967 the Israeli army has destroyed more than 46,000
Palestinian civilian structures in the occupied territories.302
Turkish repression of the Kurdish minority has also been significant, dating back
the founding of the modern Turkish republic in the early 1920s. In 1925, during a
government crackdown of a Kurdish uprising, British ambassador to Turkey Sir Ronald
Lindsay stated that it is “difficult to imagine how the net of [state] repression could have
been thrown out more widely…”303 Through the 1970s, and especially after the 1980
military coup, the repression of the Kurds increased significantly. In 1982 Turkish
lawmakers included bans on the use of the Kurdish language and the establishment of
Kurdish political parties in the constitution.304 In 1988, a Turkish parliamentary fact-
finding mission reported that Turkish security forces had turned the Kurdish regions of
the country into “a sort of concentration camp where every citizen is being treated as a
suspect and where oppression, torture and insult by the military are the rule rather than
the exception.”305 Part of the government’s strategy to crush Kurdish resistance included
the destruction of villages, especially those suspected of supporting Kurdish militants. By
1994, it is estimated that more than 2000 villages had been destroyed.306 Torture,
extrajudicial killings, and the burning of forests also characterized government policy, so
deaths from 1967-1987. Neve Gordon, Israel’s Occupation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), p. xvii. 301 Gordon, Israel’s Occupation. Marwan Darweish & Andrew Rigby, Popular Protest in Palestine: The
Uncertain Future of Unarmed Resistance (London: Pluto Press, 2015). 302 See http://icahd.org/ 303 David Romano, The Kurdish National Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 36. 304 Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p. 74. Eva Ostegaard-Nielsen, Trans-state Loyalties and Policies: Turks and Kurds in Germany (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 60. 305 Quoted in Romano, The Kurdish National Movement, p. 80. 306 Romano, The Kurdish National Movement, p. 81.
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much so that observers have referred to this period as a “dirty war.”307 Since 1984, it is
estimated that 40,000 have been killed and three million have been displaced.308
4.3 Western Complicity In addition to grievances and conflict severity, the extent of Western
governmental complicity in the rights abuses of both Palestinians and Kurds is also
similar. As I noted in chapters 2 and 3, Palestine solidarity activists often claim that their
work is motivated by the ‘special relationship’ that exists between Israel and the West,
namely the US government. As one activist put it in a letter to the New York Times: “we
target Israel for boycott not because we believe Israel is the worst human rights violator
(we don’t), but because Israel is the single largest recipient of American foreign aid, more
than $3 billion a year.”309
Palestine solidarity activists are correct in describing a close relationship between
the US and Israel. According to the Congressional Research Service, “Israel is the
largest cumulative recipient of US foreign assistance since World War II, ” the vast
majority of which comes as military aid.310 Yet, Turkey, as a member of NATO, also
tops the list of recipients of US military aid, receiving the third-most assistance of all
states.311 As in the Israel-Palestine case, this US aid has been widely described as
enabling Turkey’s military repression of the Kurds.312 In 1995, for instance, a Human
Rights Watch report found that “U.S weapons, as well as those supplied by other NATO
members, are regularly used by Turkey to commit severe human rights abuses and
violations of the laws of war in the [Kurdish] southeast.”313 Other prominent voices have
also picked up on this claim. In 1999, for example, Edward Said, whose writings on
Israel-Palestine have contributed greatly to pro-Palestine sentiment in the West, wrote in
307 Baser, Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts, p. 60.. 308 Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p. 72. 309 “Is a Boycott of Israel Just?” New York Times (February 18, 2014). http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/19/opinion/the-case-for-the-israel-boycott.html?_r=0 310 Jeremy Sharp, “US Foreign Aid to Israel,” Congressional Research Service (June 10, 2015). Available here: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf 311 Romano, The Kurdish National Movement, p. 53. 312 Tamar Gabelnick, “Turkey: Arms and Human Rights,” Foreign Policy in Focus Vol. 4 (1999). 313 James Ron, Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey, Human Rights Watch (1995), p. 2.
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the New Left Review decrying Turkish policy towards the Kurds. He referred to Turkey
as “a US ally whose policies [towards the Kurds] are in fact abetted by the US.”314
4.4 Extent of Violence Perpetrated by Palestinian and Kurdish Militants
Beyond grievances, conflict severity, and Western complicity, the strategies the
aggrieved adopt to advance their interests are also said to matter in shaping their
attractiveness to Western activists.315 Some activists suggest that non-violent groups are
more likely to secure the support of Western activists than those who adopt violent
methods.316 Yet, both the Palestinian and Kurds have made armed struggle a central pillar
of their strategies for change. Leading Palestinian organizations including the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, among others, have long
engaged in armed resistance to Israel, which has included attacks on both military and
civilian targets. Since 1984 the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has been the main armed
insurgent group resisting the Turkish state.317 Both the US State Department and
European Union have labeled these groups as terrorist organizations.318 These groups
have also perpetrated a similar level of violence, albeit with vastly different distributions
(see Figure 4 below).319
314 Edward Said, “Protecting the Kosovars,” New Left Review (1999), p. 74. 315 Keck & Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders. Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion. Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & David Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups,” International Organization 65 (Fall 2011), pp. 709-744. 316 Interview, NGO Forum on Sri Lanka/US Counsel on Sri Lanka, October 1, 2012. 317 Gunes Murat Tezcur, “When Democratization Radicalizes: The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 47, No. 6 (2010), pp. 775-789. 318 See http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm 319 All data is available here: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
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Figure 4: Palestinian and Kurdish Attacks 1970 - 2005
4.5 International Visibility
The similarities so far described between the Palestinian and Kurdish struggles
may be of little relevance in explaining mass solidarity mobilizations mobilization if
information about them is not readily available. While the Palestinian struggle has been
widely documented and garnered significant international attention, leading some to
suggest that “Israel is among the most common targets of the global spotlight,”320 the
Kurdish struggle has also received considerable international attention making mass
solidarity mobilizing in this case also possible, even if less widespread.
From 1986 to 2000, Israel and Turkey were among the top-ten most frequent
targets of Amnesty International’s reports and press releases.321 In fact, from 1975 to
2000, Amnesty devoted more attention to Turkey than it did to any other state.322
Through the 1990s, both countries were among the top-ten recipients of attention from
Human Rights Watch.323 Both conflicts also hold a prominent place in the agendas of
320 Emilie Hafner-Burton, “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem,” International Organization 62 (Fall 2008), pp. 691. 321 James Ron, Howard Ramos & Kathleen Rodgers, “Transnational Information Politics: NGO Human Rights Reporting, 1986-2000,” International Studies Quarterly 49 (2005), p. 568. 322 Cullen Hendrix & Wendy Wong (2012), ‘When is the Pen Truly Mighty? Regime type and the efficacy of naming and shaming in curbing human rights abuses’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 1-22. 323 Ron, Ramos & Rodgers, “Transnational Information Politics. p. 574
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leading international organizations. It has been well documented that the UN General
Assembly and Human Rights Commission/Council have paid more attention to Israel and
the Palestinians than they have to most other states, including those with comparable or
worse records of human rights abuse.324 While Turkish abuses are not particularly salient
within UN human rights discourse, they are prominent in European regional institutions,
including the European Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).325
In 1995, for instance, the European Parliament awarded Leyla Zana, a prominent Kurdish
politician in Turkey who had been arrested on the grounds of promoting separatism, the
Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Speech.326 From 1959 to 2011, Turkey topped the list of
countries subject to a judgment issued by the ECHR. In fact, Turkey received
approximately 500 more judgments than the court’s second most-frequent target,
Russia.327 For good reason, Bahar Baser refers to the Kurdish struggle as “highly visible
in world politics”328 while Nicole Watts describes it as an “international cause
celebre.”329
The Palestinians and Kurds have also received considerable attention from the
Western press. As Figure 5 below shows, from 1950 to 2002, the New York Times has
paid more attention to the Palestinians than the Kurds but also that the Kurds have been
far from absent from its pages.330
324 Thomas Franck, Nation against Nation: What Happened to the UN Dream and what the US Can Do
About It (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), ch. 11-12. Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights at the United Nations 1955-1985: The Question of Bias, ” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988), p. 290. Steven Seligman, “Politics and Principle at the UN Human Rights Commission and Council,” Israel Affairs Vol. 17, No. 4 (2011), pp. 526-527. 325 Marlies Casier, “The Politics of Solidarity: The Kurdish Question in the European Parliament” in Marlies Casier & Joost Jongerden (ed.), Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism,
and the Kurdish Issue (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 199-200. 326 Casier, “The Politics of Solidarity,” p. 201 327 See http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/03/14/turkey-echr/ 328 Bahar Baser, Inherited Conflicts: Spaces of Contention Between Second-Generation Turkish and
Kurdish Diasporas in Sweden and Germany, PhD Dissertation Department of Political Science, European University Institute (2012), p. 40. 329 Watts, “Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention in International Affairs.” 330 The specific search terms used were: “Palestinian,” “Palestinians,” ”Kurd,” “Kurds,” “Kurdish”
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Figure 5: New York Times Reference to Palestinians and Kurds 1950-2002
In the Palestinian case, a number of spikes in media coverage correlate with
episodes of Western activist mobilization. These include Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in
1982, the start of the first intifada in the late 1980s, and the start of the second intifada in
the early 2000s. As can be seen in Figure 2, the Kurds have also been subject of media
spikes that could have resulted in Western activist mobilizations. In 1963, and then again
in the mid-1970s, the New York Times reported consistently on the negotiations and
fighting that occurred between the Iraqi government and Kurdish leaders on the matter of
regional autonomy. In 1979, greater attention was paid to the Kurds in Iran in the
context of the Islamic revolution. That year, William Safire penned a largely sympathetic
portrait of the Kurds, observing that “no voice is raised in that entire establishment (the
United Nations) for the legitimate rights of an ancient people now being denied by Iraq,
Iran, Turkey and Syria.”331 1988 also saw an increase in attention to the Kurds after the
Iraqi government’s use of poison gas against them and their flight en masse to the
Turkish border. That year Safire wrote that “a classic example of genocide is under way,
and the world does not give a damn.”332 Others at the time also described the conditions
facing the Kurds as genocidal.333 The first Gulf War in 1990-1991 also saw increased
attention to the Kurds, including reports of Iraqi and Turkish strikes against Kurdish
331 William Safire, “The Kurdish Question,” New York Times, September 19, 1979, p. 23. 332 William Safire, “Stop the Iraqi Murder of the Kurds,” NYT, Sept 5, 1988, p. 21. 333 “Poison Gas: Iraq’s Crime,” New York Times, March 26, 1988, p. 30. “Hardly a Peep on Poison Gas,” New York Times, September 10, 1988, p. 26. “Murder within Sovereign Borders,” NYT, September 5, 1988, p. 20.
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positions. The coverage throughout the rest of the 1990s continued to cover the Kurds in
northern Iraq as well as the situation of the Kurds in Turkey.334
Both struggles have also been salient within Western left-wing networks. The
Western-left has long engaged with the question of Zionism and Palestine, well before
the creation of the State of Israel.335 While some segments of the left were supportive of
the Zionist project, many were hostile. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, many
Western Marxists, including those of Jewish descent, argued that Zionism was not the
answer to pervasive anti-Semitism.336 In their view, Jews ought to assimilate, join
socialist organizations, and work towards a revolution that would create a classless
society built on socialist principles. The Zionist attempt to sway European Jews towards
nationalism was seen as a threat to those Marxists seeking to convince those very same
Jews that their interests would be better served in a European-wide socialist movement.
The experiences of the Nazi Holocaust did generate some left-wing sympathy for Jewish
nationalism,337 but this was relatively short-lived. By the 1960s and 1970s, the
emergence of the ‘New Left’ signaled a new phase in the Western left’s opposition to
Zionism and Israel.338 Zionism in this phase became identified as a form of Western
colonialism and Israel was labeled a settler-colonial state.339 This sentiment has helped
facilitate mass solidarity mobilizations in support of the Palestinians.
The struggle of the Kurds has also featured within Western left-wing
discussions.340 This is especially true of the journal MERIP: Middle East Research &
Information Project. Founded in 1971 by anti-war activists in the US,341 MERIP has
been described as “the foremost US magazine of critical analysis on the Middle East” and
as one of the most widely read publications on the region, including by those working in
334 “Political Intolerance in Turkey,” NYT, Aug 3, 1996, p. 18. 335 Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, Lenin’s Jewish Question (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). 336 Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 94. 337 Philip Mendes, “The Australian Left’s Support for the Creation of the State of Israel,” Labour History
No. 97 (November 2009), p. 137. 338 Paul Kelemen, The British Left and Zionism: History of a Divorce (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012). Colin Shindler, Israel and the European Left (New York: Continuum, 2012). 339 Maxine Rodinson, Israel: A Settler-Colonial State (New York: Monad Press, 1973) 340 See http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/201210975353819725.html http://rudaw.net/english/yourrudaw-26062013000624 341 See http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Swearer_Center/Literacy_Resources/peace.html
82
human rights organizations.342 Through the 1970s until the early 1980s, MERIP
highlighted the situation facing the Kurds in Iraq, and to a lesser extent in Iran.343 In the
1980s, MERIP turned their attention to the Kurds in Turkey. In 1984, they dedicated an
entire issue to what the editors called “state terror in Turkey.”344 The 1990s also saw a
number of articles on the Kurds as well as an issue in 1994 focusing on the ‘Kurdish
experience Readers of MERIP would have undoubtedly picked up on the significance of
the Kurdish cause.
Beyond MERIP, some leading figures on the Western left have also been out-
spoken on the oppression of the Kurds. For instance, Noam Chomsky, whose writings on
a variety of issues have been widely influential among certain segments of the Western
left, has on numerous occasions written about the plight of the Kurds and the need for a
solution to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.345 In 2002 Harold Pinter described Chomsky as
someone who has “never ceased to call attention to the persecution of the Kurdish people
in Turkey…346
4.6 Conclusion
In light of these similarities, why is it that only the Palestinians have attracted
widespread solidarity in the West while the Kurds have not? One possible reason may
have to do with the religious breakdown of the two groups, yet this view is not
persuasive. While both groups are overwhelmingly Muslim,347 the Palestinian
community does have a Christian minority. Some Palestinian Christian leaders, such as
those associated with the Sabeel Ecumenical Palestinian Liberation Theology Center,
have been active in mobilizing their counterparts in the West for solidarity work and have
played an important role in recent years in the passing of sympathetic resolutions by
Western church organizations, such as the World Council of Churches, Presbyterian
342 See http://www.jstor.org/journal/middleeastreport 343 See John Galvani, “The Baathi Revolution in Iraq,” MERIP Reports 12 (1972). “Iraq and Kurdish Autonomy,” MERIP Reports (1974); “The Kurds Trust a Bad Ally,” MERIP Reports (1975); “Iraq and War in the Gulf,” MERIP Reports (1981). 344 Martin von Bruinessen, ““The Kurds in Turkey”, MERIP Reports (1984). 345 Noam Chomsky, “Foreword,” in Yildiz & Muller, The European Union and Turkish Accession: Human
Rights and the Kurds (London: Pluto Press, 2008). 346 See http://www.haroldpinter.org/politics/introtochomskyspeech.html 347 According to Minorities at Risk data, 90% of Palestinians are Muslim.
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Church USA, the United Methodist Church, and the Church of England.348 The ties
between Palestinian and Western Christians may partially explain the Christian
contingent of the mass solidarity mobilizations on Palestine but it does not provide an
explanation of the mass solidarity mobilizations as a whole, which includes numerous
secular activists as well as those unaffiliated with Christian networks or organizations. In
the next chapter, I argue that this variation is explained by the fact that the Palestinians
have actively recruited non-Palestinians to compensate for the weakness of their diaspora
while the Kurds have not because their diaspora was strong.
348 Naim Ateek, Cedar Duaybis & Maurine Tobin (eds.), Challenging Christian Zionism: Theology,
Politics, and the Israel-Palestine Conflict (London: Melisende, 2005). Stephen Sizer, Christian Zionism:
Road Map to Armageddon? (Leicester, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 2004). Paul Merkley, Christian
Attitudes Towards the State of Israel (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001).
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Chapter 5
Explaining Varying Levels of Western Grassroots Solidarity for Palestinians and Kurds
In the preceding chapters I have argued that rebel groups and movements with
weak diasporas in the West are the more likely recipients of mass solidarity than rebels
with strong diasporas. In this chapter I provide more fine-grained empirical evidence in
support of this claim. To do so, I focus on the variations in Western solidarity for the
Palestinians and Kurds in Turkey. I first show how the weakness of the Palestinian
diaspora in the West incentivized Palestinian rebels to recruit non-Palestinians,
contributing to their mass mobilization. I then show how the strength of the Kurdish
diaspora incentivized Kurdish rebels to focus their recruitment efforts on mobilizing their
ethnic kin rather than non-Kurds. Due to the absence of sustained recruitment attempts
by Kurdish rebels to mobilize non-Kurds, a mass solidarity mobilization in support of the
Kurds has, to date, not occurred. This chapter proceeds in two main sections. In the first
section I focus on the Palestine case, while in the second I turn to the Kurds.
5.1 Mass Solidarity Mobilizing for Palestine
Well before the creation of Israel in 1948, Western observers had long expressed
concern about what a Jewish state in Palestine might mean for the local Arab
population.349 In the late 1970s and early 1980s in North America and Western Europe,
this concern translated into active grassroots support for the Palestinian struggle for self-
determination. As one British activist explained, “until the 1980s there was no real
[solidarity] movement. There were groups of people and Palestinian students in
universities, but there was no Palestine solidarity movement as such.”350 Some of the
activists who mobilized at this time were of Palestinian descent and thus had a direct
connection to the struggle. Many, however, were not. These non-Palestinians came from
349 Colin Shindler, Israel and the European Left (New York: Continuum, 2012). 350 Interview, Palestine Solidarity Campaign & J-BIG, February 6, 2013.
85
broader left-wing networks, including the labour movement in the UK351 and the peace
movement in the US.352
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to root out PLO strongholds, and the
violence and Palestinian casualties that ensued, served as a ‘moral shock’ that led many
activists to take action. In Canada, the US and the UK, the first step many activists took
was to create solidarity NGOs to help organize their advocacy and to facilitate more
widespread mobilizations. These entrepreneurs then began to reach out into various
advocacy and social networks in search of supporters. By the outbreak of the First
Intifada in the late 1980s, they had established an institutional base on which wider
mobilizing could take place. This base facilitated the formation of hundreds of groups
and committees across North America and Europe dedicated to supporting the Palestinian
struggle from afar.353
The structures of Palestine solidarity that had formed through the 1980s began to
demobilize in 1993 when Israeli leader Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yasser
Arafat signed the Oslo Peace Accords. At the time, some activists believed the conflict
was effectively over, and thus turned their attention to seemingly more pressing matters,
such as the independence struggle in East Timor.354 Others, including those who were
skeptical of what the Oslo peace process might mean for the attainment of Palestinian
rights, demobilized on the grounds that it was unclear whether the Palestinians still
required their support and, if they did, what this support might entail.355 Through much
of the 1990s, as a result, Western grassroots mobilizing for Palestine largely ground to a
halt.356
When the peace process collapsed in 2000 and the Second Intifada began, many
activists who had previously been active a decade earlier started to re-engage with the
351 Colin Shindler, Israel and the European Left (New York: Continuum, 2012). 352 Hilton Obenzinger, “Palestine Solidarity, Political Discourse, and the Peace Movement, 1982-1988,” CR: The New Centennial Review Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall 2008), p. 234. 353 Interview, SUSTAIN, August 24, 2015 354 Simpson, “Solidarity in an Age of Globalization,” Peace & Change Vol. 29, No. 3 & 4 (July 2004), p. 459. 355 Interview, SUSTAIN, August 24, 2015. 356 Joseph Massad, “Palestinians and the Dilemmas of Solidarity,” The Electronic Intifad (May 14, 2015). Available here: https://electronicintifada.net/content/palestinians-and-dilemmas-solidarity/14518. Rafeef Ziadah & Adam Hanieh, “Collective Approaches to Activist Knowledge: Experiences of the New Anti-Apartheid Movement in Toronto,” in Aziz Choudry & Dip Kapoor, Learning From the Ground Up: Global
Perspectives on Social Movements and Knowledge Production (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010),
86
issue. The structures of solidarity that had been established in the 1980s were re-
activated. In the 2000s, through the dedicated work of Palestinian and non-Palestinian
activist organizers, grassroots mobilizing for Palestine grew considerably and became
more increasingly cohesive.357 Within a few years, a loosely connected mass solidarity
mobilizations came to consist of hundreds of supporting organizations across North
America and Europe able to organize large-scale protests involving thousands of
demonstrators.358 Since 2004 and 2005, many of these solidarity activists and their
organizations have united around a call from Palestinian civil society for an international
boycott campaign against Israel, modeled on the international anti-apartheid movement.
This call initiated the Boycott, Divestment & Sanctions (BDS) campaign, whose goals
are to end Israel’s occupation of land occupied in 1967, to grant Palestinian-Arab citizens
of Israel equal rights, and to allow Palestinian refugees to exercise their right to return to
their homes in accordance with UN resolutions.359 These mobilizations have increasingly
drawn the ire of the Israeli government and its main supporters abroad, who have been
drawn into what Richard Falk has described as a “legitimacy war.”360
What explains this mass solidarity mobilization for Palestine? Why have so many
activists mobilized for the Palestinians despite having no ethnic tie to the struggle? I
show how the political weakness of the Palestinian diaspora in North America and
Western Europe, due to its relatively small size and inability to organize politically,
encouraged Palestinian organizers to recruit non-Palestinians, creating the conditions for
their mass mobilization. I make this case by drawing on original interviews with
activists, as well as relevant secondary and online materials.
357 Ziadah & Hanieh, “Collective Approaches to Activist Knowledge: Experiences of the New Anti-Apartheid Movement in Toronto,” p. 90 358 Abigail Bakan & Yasmeen Abu Laban, “Palestinian Resistance and International Solidarity: The BDS Campaign,” Race & Class Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 29-54. 359 Omar Barghouti, BDS: Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011), p. 6. 360 Richard Falk, “The Palestinian ‘Legitimacy’ War,” Al-Jazeera (December 24, 2010). Available here: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2010/10/20101021113420124418.html
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5.1.1 The PLO’s International Diplomacy and the Origins of Mass Solidarity
Mobilizing for Palestine
The founding of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its decision to look for
external support constitute an important first step in the mass solidarity mobilizing in the
West that took place for Palestine. Palestinian resistance to Zionism can be dated back to
the 1880s with the arrival of the first wave of Jewish migrants from Europe to the area.361
Through the 1920s and 1930s, the Palestinian national leadership was weak and divided
between rival clans.362 In some accounts, this weakness contributed to the collapse of
Palestinian society in 1947-48 during its war with the Zionist movement.363 After the
founding of Israel in 1948, stronger Palestinian-led organizations began to emerge. In the
1950s, Fatah was formed and advocated for the notion that Palestine could be liberated
by Palestinians themselves rather than by the Arab states. In 1964, the PLO was created
by the Arab League in an effort to rival Fatah. Among Palestinians in the 1960s, the PLO
was the predominant organization given a widely held faith in the abilities of the Arab
states to liberate Palestine.364
This faith in the Arab world among Palestinians changed in 1967 when the
combined efforts of the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies not only failed to defeat
Israel but also lost significant territory. Israel nearly tripled in size. It also became the
occupier of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, many of
whom had been displaced once before during the 1947-48 war.365 It was in this context
that Fatah emerged as a potential leader of Palestinian nationalist movement, drawing not
only on growing skepticism about the commitment of the Arab world to liberating
Palestine but the ability of its guerillas to successfully attack Israeli military targets. By
the late 1960s, Fatah had become the more popular organization. In 1969, in internal
361 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 362 Marwan Darweish & Andrew Rigby, Popular Protest in Palestine: The Uncertain Future of Unarmed
Resistance (London: Pluto Press, 2015). 363 Wendy Pearlman, Violence, Nonviolence and the Palestinian National Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 364 Kemal Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics: A Study of the Mobilization of Support for the Palestinian
Cause (London: Frances Pinter, 1986), p. 36. 365 Michael Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Also see Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the
Settlements, 1967-1977 (New York: Times Books, 2006).
88
elections that took place in Cairo, the PLO came under the control of Fatah and Yasser
Arafat was appointed chairman.366
In its efforts to liberate Palestine, the PLO not only worked to mobilize
Palestinians, namely those in the refugee camps in the region. It also devoted
considerable resources to the international community. From its birth, Fatah and other
Palestinian groups linked to the PLO had long recognized the importance of securing
international support. Part of this reflected their worldview as well as the broader
international context of the 1950s and 1960s, a time that featured a number of prominent
national liberation struggles in Asia and Africa. These struggles provided Palestinian
rebels with inspiration and models of resistance to emulate.367 The PLO’s interest in
international diplomacy also reflected the fact that being part of the Arab world provided
it with transnational organizing opportunities, beyond the reach of the Israeli state. In
particular, from their local bases in neighboring Arab states, including Jordan in the
1970s and Lebanon in the 1980s, the PLO leadership was able to travel around the world,
facilitating their efforts to build connections with external leaders and other potential
supporters.368 Furthermore, the PLO’s interest in diplomacy also reflected material
realities on the ground, given the imbalance between Israeli and Palestinian capabilities.
From a position of relative weakness, and in an effort to balance the playing field, the
PLO engaged in vigorous international campaigning to secure external support for their
domestic objectives.369
In their international advocacy efforts, the PLO employed two main strategies.
The first involved the use of violence against Israel as well as abroad, included a spate of
airplane hijackings and the killing of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972.370
These attacks led some to label the group as international terrorists and thus unworthy of
support. But for others, especially those who understood that armed struggle and national
366 Kemal Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics: A Study of the Mobilization of Support for the Palestinian
Cause (London: Frances Pinter, 1986). 367 Chamberlin, The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Making of the Post-Cold War Order, p. 26. 368 Idean Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders, Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). 369 Augustus Richard Norton, “Introduction,” in Augustus Richard Norton & Jerrold Green (eds.), The
International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), p. 2. 370 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 75.
89
liberation often go hand in hand, PLO actions contributed to their activism. This was
largely because of the effect these attacks had on Israeli policy. This can be seen most
clearly in 1982 when consistent PLO attacks across Israel’s northern border provoked
increasingly harsh Israeli reprisals and, subsequently, the full invasion of the country.371
Israel’s invasion received widespread international attention and condemnation, including
from Israeli civil society.372 This also served as an important contributing factor to the
grassroots solidarity organizing for the Palestinians that took place at the time in North
America and Western Europe.373
The PLO’s second strategy involved international diplomacy. Part of this
diplomacy entailed building ties with other rebel groups around the world, such as the
National Liberation Front in Algeria and the South Vietnamese National Liberation
Front.374 It also entailed securing third-party state and United Nations support. The focus
on the UN made strategic sense. As seen in Figure 6 below, from 1945 to 1980 the
proportion of the UN’s member states that were Asian and African, as well as those that
were associated with the Non-Aligned Movement, increased significantly. In 1950 the
Asian-African bloc comprised only 28% of all UN members. In 1960 this proportion rose
to 46%. By 1980, 58% of all UN member states were either from Asia or Africa. In part
because of their recent history with colonialism and decolonization, as well as their
reliance on Arab oil, many of these states were more predisposed to pro-Palestinian
sentiment than Western bloc states, which included those that had friendly relations with
Israel and that tended to see the Palestinian issue as a refugee problem requiring a
technical fix rather than as a matter of injustice.375
371 Avner Yanic & Robert Lieber, “Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative? Israel’s Invasion of Lebanon,” International Security Vol. 8 No. 2 (Fall 1983), pp. 67-83. 372 “100,000 Demonstrate in Tel Aviv Against War in Lebanon,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency (July 6, 1982). Available here: http://www.jta.org/1982/07/06/archive/100000-demonstrate-in-tel-aviv-against-war-in-lebanon 373 Obenzinger, “Palestine Solidarity, Political Discourse, and the Peace Movement, 1982-1988,” p. 233. Colin Shindler, Israel and the European Left (New York: Continuum, 2012). 374 Chamberlin, The Global Offensive. 375 Avi Beker, The United Nations and Israel: From Recognition to Reprehension (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1988).
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Figure 6 The Changing Distribution of UN Member States 1945-1980
The changing nature of the UN’s membership provided the PLO with an
opportunity to secure significant external support for their cause. To do so, it framed its
struggle in terms that many of these states could understand, using the language of anti-
imperialism, anti-colonialism, and anti-racism. This approach paid dividends. In 1973
the Non-Aligned Movement declared the PLO to be the “sole representative of the
Palestinian people.”376 In 1974, the UN granted the PLO permanent observer status
allowing it access to the General Assembly and all of its related organs. In 1975, the
PLO was invited to participate in all UN efforts related to addressing problems in the
Middle East. That same year the UN General Assembly declared the Palestine problem a
threat to international peace and established the Committee on the Exercise of the
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.377
Since this time, key UN human rights bodies, including the General Assembly
and the Human Rights Commission/Council have devoted more attention to the question
of Palestine than most other issues, the overwhelming majority of it critical of Israel and
Zionism.378 For instance, UN resolutions decried “the unholy alliance between South
African racism and Zionism” and declared “Zionism is a form of racism and racial
discrimination.”379 This echoed the language found in PLO pamphlets published in the
1960s, one of which stated that “racism is not an acquired trait of the Zionist settler-
376 Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics, p. 153. 377 Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics, p. 143. 378 Seligman, “Politics and Principle at the United Nations Human Rights Council.” 379 See UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 here: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/000/92/IMG/NR000092.pdf?OpenElement
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
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1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Latin America
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Eastern Europe
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state…it is inherent in the very ideology of Zionism and in the basic motivation for
Zionist colonization and statehood.”380 These UN resolutions also created the broad
conditions for grassroots mobilizing for Palestine in the West by legitimizing the
Palestinian struggle and situating it within widely accepted international norms.381 In the
mid-1970s the PLO also engaged in direct diplomacy with Western states. Its ability to
connect with Western officials, namely those in Europe, was in part facilitated by their
ties to the Arab states who allowed a PLO delegation to take part in the Euro-Arab
Dialogue, which began in 1973. Through this initiative, the PLO was able to secure
direct access to Western officials. In light of this access, the PLO leadership largely
adopted an elite-oriented diplomatic style targeting state policy-making channels
directly.382
While much of its diplomatic efforts was elite in orientation, the PLO did work to
some extent with the Palestinian diaspora in the West. However, unlike the PKK, its
efforts to turn their diaspora community into a political actor of some significance were
minimal. It is true that the PLO was a diaspora organization. It was led by Palestinians
living outside of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, and drew significantly on
the Palestinian population living in the refugee camps throughout the Middle East.383 Its
organizational structure enabled, to some degree, the Palestinian global community to
access its decision-making channels. Palestinians living in the West were linked to the
PLO through a variety of associations, such as the General Union of Palestine Students,
the General Union of Palestinian Women, and the General Union of Palestinian Workers,
amongst others. Diaspora Palestinians could also sit on the Palestine National Council,
380 Fayez Sayegh, Zionist Colonialism in Palestine (Beirut: Research Center, Palestine Liberation Organization, 1965), p. 21. 381 David Cesarani, “Anti-Zionism in Britain, 1922-2002: Continuities and Discontinuities,” Journal of
Israeli History Vol. 25 No. 1 (March 2006), p. 146. Suzanne Morrison, “The Emergence of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement,” in Fawaz Gerges (ed.), Contentious Politics in the Middle East:
Popular Resistance and Marginalized Activism Beyond the Arab Uprisings (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015). 382 Morgan Kaplan, “Strategies of Insurgent Diplomacy: Evidence from the Iraqi Kurdish Liberation Movement,” unpublished manuscript (August 3, 2016), p. 2. For further insights into the content of PLO elite diplomacy towards Western states see: Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics, chapter 7. Rory Miler, “The PLO Factor in Euro-Israeli Relations, 1964-1992,” Israel Affairs Vol. 10 Nos.1-2 (2004), pp. 123-155. Mohamed Rabie, US-PLO Dialogue: Secret Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995). 383 Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics.
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which served as the PLO’s legislature.384 The quality of this access was low and
arguably had little effect on PLO policy.385
In addition to providing diasporans with institutional affiliation, the PLO also sent
activists abroad “whose job was to organize, recruit, solicit funds, marshal support, stage
demonstrations, and the like.”386 These PLO operatives, however, often demonstrated
little commitment to mobilizing the community for political action. They were not
experienced political organizers, knew little of Palestinian history and generally
expressed a lack of interest in community politics.387 This was indicative of the low
priority that the PLO gave to mobilizing its Western diaspora, which reflected the
diaspora’s political weakness. In the late 1970s and 1980s, during the PLO’s heyday, the
Palestinian diaspora in the West was not only small, numbering approximately 25,000
people, and unlikely to have much electoral significance.388 It was also divided on
political grounds between the various factions within the PLO that had different visions
for how to liberate Palestine as well as for what a liberated Palestine might look like. At
this time, and until today, internal factional Palestinian politics made organizational
efforts difficult and short-lived.389
The PLO also adopted a relatively detached and disinterested approach to non-
diaspora activist networks as well. It did publish materials geared towards an English-
audience,390 but it also rejected the efforts of prominent Palestinian academics in North
America, including Edward Said and Iqbal Ahmad, who had asked it to devote more
resources to establishing a grassroots solidarity movement similar to the international
384 Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad. 385 As’ad Ghanem, Palestinian Politics after Arafat: A Failed National Movement (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2010). 386 Turki, Exile’s Return, p. 195. 387 Turki, Exile’s Return, p. 197. 388 In 1977, the Palestinian community in the US was approximately 25,000 people. Kirsci, The PLO and
World Politics, p. 35. 389 Turki, “The Passions of Exile: The Palestine Congress of North America.” 390 Paul Chamberlin, “The Struggle Against Oppression Everywhere: The Global Politics of Palestinian Liberation,” Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 47 No. 5 (January 2011), p. 29. Also see Paul Chamberlin, The
Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Making of the Post-
Cold War Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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anti-apartheid movement that was cultivated by the African National Congress (ANC).391
One American activist explained this in some detail:
[Edward] Said and Iqbal Ahmad actually met with Arafat on two different occasions and tried to convince him that he needed an international solidarity movement and to try to explain to him how central this had been in the case of South Africa. But the Fatah leadership of the PLO, and all of the leadership of the PLO, were initially sold on armed struggle and were focused on the Arab states in supporting that. In Oslo, they were convinced that negotiations and diplomacy were going to work. This has always been incredibly frustrating. When we were doing South African divestment work, the ANC would send representatives from South Africa to every little college to meet with you, to be encouraging, to tell you how important your work was, to talk about the ANC, what its goals were, what the strategies were, treating you as part of the movement. There was never anything like that with the PLO. The PLO never prioritized protests and international solidarity, and all of these things.392
5.1.2 Palestinian Diaspora Activism & the Recruitment of Non-Palestinians in the
1980s
Given the PLO’s reluctance to engage in sustained grassroots organizing, many
Palestinian diaspora activists moved in to fill the void. Had it not been for these activists
and their sustained attempts to mobilize non-Palestinians, mass solidarity mobilizing
would have most likely not occurred. The recruitment campaigns of these activists
were central to the grassroots mobilizations in the 1980s and through the 2000s. While
many of them did look to first mobilize their own community, they eventually moved
beyond their kin and started to seek out non-Palestinian supporters. They did this
because of the political weakness of the Palestinian communities, in terms of both size
and political organizing.
In Canada in the 1970s and 1980s, Rezeq Faraj, who has been described as a
“leading Canadian activist for Palestinian human rights,”393 played a central role in
recruiting non-Palestinian supporters. Faraj was born in Palestine, was displaced in the
1948 war, and grew up in the Daheisha refugee camp, located just south of Bethlehem.
391 Interview, General Union of Palestinian Students, September 28, 2016. On the ANC’s international diplomacy see Scott Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the African National
Congress. (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996). 392 Interview, SUSTAIN, August 24, 2015. 393 See http://rabble.ca/news/2010/06/rezeq-faraj-legacy-man-without-childhood
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As part of a UN program, Faraj was able to leave Palestine to study electrical mechanics.
After making stops in the Gulf Arab states and then in Germany, he arrived in Canada in
1966.394 In 1973, Faraj and a group of his supporters founded the Quebec-Palestine
Association (QPA), whose objective was to establish stronger links with Canadian civil
society. It sought to build support for Palestine within trade union circles and to develop
ties with Jews and non-Jews, including anti-Zionists and those otherwise critical of Israeli
policy. According to one Palestinian-Canadian activist who supported Faraj’s work at
the time:
What is very clear from this period is that there was the beginning of Palestinian activism and that this Palestinian activism was really non-sectarian in the sense that it wasn’t just Palestinians. They were trying to link up with the Jewish community, with anti-Zionist individuals, and with the trade unions in Quebec….395 This strategy of non-sectarianism and cultural outreach reflected the values of the
Palestinian-Canadian activists. “We just didn’t think in sectarian terms,” one activist put
it.396 Yet, this strategy also reflected the status of the Palestinian community in Canada.
Through the 1970s and 1980, there was no real Palestinian community to speak of in a
political sense, which arguably decreased these activists’ sectarian-ness. The Palestinian
community at the time was very small including, according to Canadian census data from
1991, only 6000 members.397 Further, it was largely inactive, unable to establish a
community infrastructure to facilitate sustained community activism. “There was no
hope of getting the Palestinian community active,” one activist put it” because there was
no such thing as the Palestinian community.”398 The first intifada in the late 1980s did
generate some mobilization among Palestinian-Canadians, including the formation of
organizations like Solidarity for Palestinian Human Rights. These efforts, however, were
short-lived and involved only a small set of Palestinian students.399 According to one
Palestinian-Canadian:
394 Dave Himmelstein, “Rezeq Faraj: the legacy of a man without a childhood,” Rabble.ca (June 3, 2010). http://rabble.ca/news/2010/06/rezeq-faraj-legacy-man-without-childhood 395 Interview, Palestinian-Canadian, Aug 18, 2015. 396 Interview, Palestinian-Canadian, August 18, 2015. 397 Canadian Census 1991. 398 Interview, Palestinian-Canadian, August 18, 2015. 399 Karma Nabulsi, Palestinians Register: Laying Foundations and Setting Directions: Report of the Civitas
Project. (Nuffield College 2006). p. 74. Interview, Canadian academic, August 11, 2015.
95
[During the First Intifada], Palestinians [in Canada] had a sense that something needed to be done, but nothing was really done. They lobbied here and there and had a few events here and there, and tried to collect money to send. The community reacts to the act, but once that is done, you don’t hear anything. There are no organizations anywhere, like a lobby organization or a Palestinian organized movement, no such thing.400 Faraj and his supporters could have decided to focus the bulk of their energies on
mobilizing the Palestinians that did live in Canada by adopting a more ethno-national
advocacy approach conducive to building a politically active diaspora. However, easier
targets at the time included those non-Palestinian Canadians already hostile to, or at least
deeply critical of, Zionism and Israeli policy, as well as those in the trade unions who
travelled within a leftist milieu that had long expressed doubts about Jewish nationalism
and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Thus, Faraj’s strategy reflected what
channels of possible support were available to him.
Faraj’s recruitment efforts in Canada did much to increase the accessibility of the
Palestinian cause to non-diasporans. The QPA’s work with trade unions appears to have
been particularly effective as it was in the 1970s that Canadian union leaders began to
express their solidarity with the Palestinians.401 The QPA was not the only group to forge
such links with Canadian civil society. Other groups included Medical Aid for
Palestinians that also worked closely with the trade unions in Quebec as they sought to
compensate for the political weakness of the Palestinian community. These early efforts
contributed to more significant mobilizations in the late 1980s, which included a strong
contingent of francophone activists in Quebec. 402
In the early 1980s, Palestinian-American activists were also employing a strategy
of non-diaspora recruitment. The first Palestinians to arrive in the US after 1948 did not
profess a broad Palestinian identity. They mobilized culturally and socially around
family and village affiliations, rather than along broader national lines.403 According to
one community member reflecting on Palestinian identity in the US at the time, “we
knew we were from Ramallah; we didn’t really know whether it was Jordan or Palestine
400 Interview, Palestinian-Canadian, Feb 26, 2015. 401 Interview, Palestinian-Canadian, August 18, 2015. 402 Interview, Canadian academic, August 11, 2015. 403 Yossi Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the US and their Homelands (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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or what.”404 After 1967, Palestinians in the US began to think about becoming a more
active political force. In the 1970s, for instance, the Ramallah Federation, founded in
1958, added ‘Palestine’ to its name.405 In 1978, a group of Palestinians came together to
form the Palestine Congress of North America (hereafter, the Congress) “to represent the
Palestinian community in America, to disseminate information about the cause, and to
help Palestinians become acquainted with their constitutional rights.”406 The Congress,
however, did not last very long and did not have a meaningful impact on Palestinian-
American mobilization and community advocacy.407 This was largely due to internal
community divisions that made organizing difficult. 408 “It never got off the ground
because of infighting,” one Palestinian activist explained.409
While there were isolated instances of community mobilizing and the occasional
protest, the extent of community participation was low. By the late 1980s, activist
organizers found that although members of the Palestinian-American community strongly
identified with the struggle and plight of their ethnic kin abroad, they nevertheless
remained politically inactive.410 Part of this was a result of political divisions within the
community, but it was also the result of hostile public perceptions of the Palestinian
cause among the American public, which had far more sympathy for Zionism and Israel.
As one American activist observed:
There was general apprehension [among Palestinian-Americans] about what it means to speak out. It was very hard for Palestinians to be involved in any political or electoral work. There was no place to go. Talking about Palestine was forbidden.411 In light of these conditions, Palestinian-American activists began to reach out
more broadly beyond their community to mobilize a wider audience.412 In 1981, for
instance, Palestinian-American activists associated with the General Union of Palestinian
404 Christison, “The American Experience: Palestinians in the US,” p. 30. 405 Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad. 406 Fawaz Turki, Exile’s Return: The Making of a Palestinian American (Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1993), 196. 407 Turki, Exile’s Return. 408 Nabulsi, Palestinians Register, p. 172-3. 409 Interview, Palestinian-American activist, September 28, 2015. 410 Christison, “The American Experience: Palestinians in the US,” p. 29. 411 Interview, November 29th Coalition for Palestine, July 9 2015. 412 James Zogby & Joe Stork, “’They Control the Hill, but We’ve Got a Lot of Positions around the Hill,” MERIP: Middle East Report, No. 146 (1987), P. 24.
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Students (GUPS), an organization linked to the PLO, helped form the November 29th
Coalition for Palestine, later renamed the Palestine Solidarity Committee (PSC).413
According to one PSC founder, this outreach “was one of the first efforts [by Palestinian-
Americans] to reach beyond the [Palestinian] community…This was reaching out more
broadly.”414 The reason for this outreach stemmed from their frustration with what they
saw as their community’s inaction and inability to effectively organize to assist their kin
back home. According to one activist:
[we] got so frustrated with the formalities of the Palestinian community which were not moving [our cause] forward, so we activated ourselves locally… When the PLO, whether through GUPS or the Congress, wasn’t able move forward, we found what was local and we linked in to it.”415 Part of the PSC’s outreach included linking to local peace councils in an attempt
to put Palestine on the agenda and to recruit individuals to support the cause. It also
involved working within broader advocacy networks to build organizational relationships
and alliances, and to gain access to new recruits. In 1982, for instance, the PSC
participated in demonstrations in Washington, DC against the Ku Klux Klan.416 In
focusing on non-Palestinian recruitment, these activists did not disengage from the
Palestinian community. Rather, they simply re-oriented their advocacy towards a wider
American audience.
We still had an affiliation with what was going on [in Palestine] and we had a desire to remain connected someway but [the Palestinian community] wasn’t serving the appetite that we had. We saw in front of us an open country….And we saw that nobody was addressing it. So we found these local entities to help us move through that and address the potential we saw in front of us.417 Through their recruitment efforts, the PSC was able to grow significantly. By the
late 1980s it included several chapters across the country.418 Beyond organizational
growth, the PSC also played an important role in organizing the larger mobilizations that
would occur in response to the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987-88. In the US this
413 Obenzinger, “Palestine Solidarity, Political Discourse, and the Peace Movement, 1982-1988,” p. 238.. 414 Interview, November 29th Coalition for Palestine, July 9, 2015. 415 Interview, Palestinian-American activist, September 28, 2016. 416 Courtland Milloy & La Barbara Bowman, “Turner urges public to avoid Klan’s rally,” Washington Post (November 27, 1982), p. A1. 417 Interview, Palestinian-American activist, September 28, 2016. 418 “Critics Question a Plan to Send Students to Gaza,” New York Times (July 29, 1990), p. 37.
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period saw the creation of dozens of small organizations and committees that formed in
solidarity with the Palestinians.419 Under the auspices of the PSC, local peace networks
in Ohio and Pittsburgh helped to organize a campaign targeting the US-based Federal
Laboratories, which was producing and selling tear gas canisters to the Israeli military.
Drawing on their peace movement contacts, these activists recruited a few hundred
supporters to engage in letter-writing campaigns, public protests and acts of civil
disobedience. This campaign received institutional support from the Centre for
Constitutional Rights, who in 1992 sued Federal Laboratories in a court in
Pennsylvania.420 After two years of campaigning, Federal Laboratories agreed to stop
sending teargas shipments to Israel, however it is unclear if this decision was the result of
advocacy pressure or the winding down of the First Intifada. When the Second Intifada
began, the shipments of the canisters resumed, but this time without the “Made in the
US” label.421
Like their counterparts in Canada and the US, Palestinian activists in the UK
adopted a similar strategy of non-diaspora recruitment to compensate for the weakness of
their own community. Ghada Karmi was central to these efforts. Karmi was born in
Jerusalem in 1948 and fled with her family to England a year later. In the 1970s, as a
university student, she decided to become politically active, seeing around her
widespread pro-Israel sentiment and a general ignorance of Palestinian suffering and
grievances. As she put it:
The accumulated frustrations, humiliations, and sense of being misunderstood as a Palestinian in Britain had reached a climax. I was determined to reverse this dismal fate by action that would counter such ignorance and contempt.422 Upon deciding to take action, Karmi initially reached out to her fellow
Palestinians. “I began to look for what I thought were like-minded Palestinians,” she
wrote, “but with little result.”423 Among the Palestinians in the UK at the time, Karmi
was unique. Most were first generation migrants who “lived on their memories and
419 Interview, November 29th Coalition for Palestine, July 9, 2015. 420 “US Teargas Manufacturers,” Adalah-NY: The New York Campaign to Boycott Israel. Available here: https://adalahny.org/campaign-main-document/564/us-teargas-manufacturers 421 Interview, SUSTAIN, August 24, 2015 422 Karmi, In Search of Fatima, p. 393. 423 Karmi, In Search of Fatima, p. 393.
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consigned Palestine to an irrevocable past which it would be futile to reincarnate.”424 The
community was also comprised of Palestinian students whose presence in the UK was
conditional on the good will of the British government and thus were largely unwilling to
engage in controversial political work that may get them deported. Palestinian student
unions in the UK did exist, Karmi observed, but there were “no cultural or lobbying
groups, and no organized communal activities.”425
In the absence of willing and able ethnic kin, Karmi turned to non-Palestinian
channels. She recruited a small group of British activists, some whom were linked to the
Young Liberals and the Labour Party. In 1972, they established Palestine Action, a
solidarity NGO modeled on the Anti-Apartheid Movement and which called for the “total
liberation of Palestine by political or armed means.”426 Karmi and her supporters focused
their recruitment efforts on the networks surrounding the British Labour Party, which
were becoming increasingly critical of Israel and hostile to Zionism. Andrew Faulds, a
Labour MP, who had taken an “unflinchingly brave and principled stand on the Palestine
question,” became the group’s president.427 In addition to recruiting through the labour
movement, Palestine Action also ran advertisements in the British press soliciting new
members and donations.428 Through the 1970s, the organization grew considerably and
came to consist of primarily of British activists,429 including an “odd collection of left-
wingers, communists and genuinely confused Jewish people, unhappy about Israel’s
oppression of the Palestinians.”430
Palestine Action’s work and recruitment within the British labour movement was
significant. In 1982, in response to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, it contributed to the
formation of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC-UK), which became the central hub
for Palestine solidarity organizing in the UK.431 Through the 1980s, PSC-UK activists
continued to work within labour networks to recruit and mobilize. These efforts were
424 Karmi, In Search of Fatima, p. 393. 425 Karmi, In Search of Fatima, 394. 426 “New Pals,” London Times (June 5, 1972), p. 14. Also see Paul Kelemen, The British Left and Zionism:
History of a Divorce, p. 160-161. 427 Karmi, In Search of Fatima, p. 395. 428 “The Campaign Organiser,” London Times (May 11, 1973), p. 7. 429 Marion Woolfson, AE Carpenter, & Vanda Dawdry, “Origins of Israel,” London Times (May 19, 1973), p. 15. 430 Karmi, In Search of Fatima, p. 395. 431 Interview, LabourStart, February 27, 2015.
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made easier given pre-existing shifts in thinking towards Israel and earlier mobilization
efforts in support of the Palestinians,432 such as the formation of Trade Union Friends of
Palestine in 1980 and the first British Trade Union congress resolution condemning
Israeli policy in 1982.433 While a beneficiary of these changes, the PSC-UK also
contributed to them. In particular, they brought a distinct organizational dimension that
enabled pro-Palestine sentiment to be translated into concrete action. Through the 1980s,
PSC-UK actively networked through the labour movement in order to establish a number
of branches throughout the country.434
The Palestine solidarity organizing that took place in the 1980s died down in the
1990s during the Oslo Peace Process. While some groups remained engaged with the
issue and active, most demobilized. The PSC-UK, for instance, engaged in occasional
advocacy efforts through media channels, most commonly in the form of letters to the
editor, some of which included criticisms of the newly formed Palestinian Authority and
what one Executive Committee member described as its “increasing authoritarianism.”435
In 1996, for instance, it called for a boycott of Israeli produce, predating a central feature
of its campaigning in the 2000s.436 However, the PSC-UK’s actions in the 1990s were
largely an exception. As Rafeef Ziadah & Adam Hanieh describe it,
the effect [the Oslo peace process] had on the “older” Palestine solidarity movement during the 1990s was devastating. Networks that had developed over decades in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s simply fell apart as confusion over the future of Palestine and the Palestinians caused disillusionment among a broad layer of activists. Oslo had acted to demoralize and weaken the earlier structures of Palestinian solidarity.437
Palestine Solidarity Mobilizing in the 2000s
With the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process and the outbreak of the Second
Intifada in the early 2000s, networks and organizations that had engaged in Palestine
solidarity work in the 1980s sprung back into action. Part of this can be accounted for by
the material conditions on the ground in Israel-Palestine, including not only a spate of
432 Daphna Baram, Disenchantment: The Guardian and Israel (London: Guardian Books, 2004). 433 Shindler, Israel and the European Left. See Chapter 15. 434 Interview, Palestine Solidarity Campaign, February 6, 2013. 435 R. J. Deed, “Letter: Police State in Palestine,” The Independent (June 18, 1996), p. 11. 436 “Calls for British Boycotts,” The Independent (November 18, 1996), p. 11. 437 Ziadah & Hanieh, “Collective Approaches to Activist Knowledge,” p. 88.
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suicide bombings but also the increased Israeli military presence through the West Bank,
which had been considerably scaled back in the 1990s. The outbreak of the Second
Intifada alone does not fully explain the grassroots mobilizations that occurred during this
period. As it was during the 1980s, central to the solidarity mobilization was the active
recruitment of non-Palestinian supporters, who formed new solidarity groups and who
came out to protest Israeli policy and declare their support for the Palestinian struggle.
The extent of these mobilizations was in part a result of the fact that there already existed
local and national networks of Palestine solidarity activists. When the Second Intifada
broke out, key activists and organizations re-mobilized.
In late 2000, two American activists, who had been linked to the PSC and the
campaign against Federal Laboratories in the 1980s, formed the organization Stop US
Tax-Funded Aid to Israel (SUSTAIN). Their re-mobilization was due in part because of
the efforts of Palestinian activists in the West Bank who had begun to reach out again to
American global justice networks in an effort to organize solidarity campaigns.438
SUSTAIN’s objective was to build support for the idea of ending American military and
economic aid to Israel. This aid was seen to be enabling the on-going occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza and denial of Palestinian rights. For those in SUSTAIN, among
others, US foreign policy was considered to be an obstacle to a just solution to the
conflict.
At the time of its founding, SUSTAIN’s focus on boycotts and sanctions was
controversial. According to one of its founders, the organization “took shit” from other
mainstream organizations working on Palestine who believed that such an approach was
too divisive, unlikely to work, and would undermine any political capital they had
established in policy circles in Washington. The Arab-American Anti-Discrimination
Committee (ADC), for instance, denounced the group and refused to attend its meetings.
The American Friends Service Committee was also hesitant about the idea of a
divestment campaign. And the US Campaign to End Israeli Occupation (hereafter, US
Campaign), which today is a leading advocate for US sanctions on Israel, decided to
initially exclude SUSTAIN from their coalition.439 Although some of the founders of the
438 Interview, Palestinian-American, September 28, 2016 439 Interview, SUSTAIN, August 24, 2015.
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US Campaign were sympathetic to the idea of boycotts and sanctions, they saw the tactic
as unduly divisive given their attempts to patch together a nation-wide coalition of highly
diverse Palestine solidarity groups coming from distinct political and cultural
backgrounds.440 Other activists were concerned that a boycott call was too
confrontational and would turn people away from a conflict that was already seen as
hotly contested and complex.441 What was needed, they argued, was ongoing public
education and awareness-raising work.442
SUSTAIN’s leaders were dissatisfied with these responses and began looking
elsewhere to build support for their campaign. One option was the Palestinian-American
community. The problem, however, was that the community lacked clear-cut entry
points. As it was in the 1970s and 1980s, in the early 2000s there was no national
representative Palestinian-American organization one could approach to galvanize
community support. In 2006, Palestinian-American activists did attempt to build a
national organization, named the US Palestinian Community Network (USPCN), in order
to organize and coordinate the community and to amplify its voice to the Palestinian
leadership in Ramallah.443 Like the Congress, however, the USCPN has also been
described as somewhat of a disappointment. This was largely the result of factional
infighting and community divisions. As one of the main organizers explained:
Because there is no authority, because there is no central body, you have this internal friction even amongst initiatives like the USPCN, that try to be fair to everybody, that suffered from internecine politics, the same that afflicts Palestinian society and politics abroad [in Palestine]. There were those who hated the fact that USPCN was too inclusive and included Fatah. They responded and said “if you include Fatah in this you are a collaborator and we don’t want to be a part of it.” And when the group didn’t condemn Hamas’ takeover in Gaza, the Fatah folks were really angry and said “you have shown your true colours.” 444
Accordingly, for SUSTAIN’s leaders, the Palestinian-American community did
not present an easily accessible source of support. Instead, they drew on their pre-existing
440 Interview, SUSTAIN, August 24, 2015. 441 Rafeef Ziadah & Adam Hanieh, “Collective Approaches to Activist Knowledge: Experiences of the New Anti-Apartheid Movement in Toronto,” p. 90 442 Interview, Coalition Against Israeli Apartheid, Sept 7, 2012. 443 Noura Erakat, “Beyond Sterile Negotiations: Looking for Leadership with a Strategy,” Al-Shabaka: The
Palestinian Policy Network (February 1, 2012). Available here: https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/beyond-sterile-negotiations-looking-leadership-strategy/ 444 Interview, Palestinian-American, July 25, 2013.
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ties with the global justice network in the US that had been energized in 1999 during the
anti-WTO protests in Seattle. They sought to draw on the momentum created from these
protests. They drew on their contacts to attract people to join their fledgling organization.
Some of these individuals were Palestinian-Americans, but many others were not. Their
tactics included teach-ins and seminars across the country at various high schools,
colleges, and activist organizations. From late 2000 to 2003, they organized
approximately 300 events which contributed greatly to a groundswell of support for a
boycott and divestment campaign of Israel, especially among more radically inclined
college students.445 In 2003, in large part due to this growth in support for more
confrontational tactics, SUSTAIN joined the US Campaign.
SUSTAIN’s early advocacy efforts, notably among student activist networks,
created the conditions for more widespread mobilizing on campus. In 2002, Students for
Justice in Palestine (SJP) at the University of Berkley circulated a divestment petition and
hosted an annual conference. Their objective, according to Abraham Greenhouse, was
“to build a national coordination mechanism for campus-based Palestine solidarity
activists in the United States.” In April of that year, they organized large-scale
demonstrations in which 1200 students demonstrated to protest the University of
California’s investments in Israel and the Israeli military.446 This lead to the formation of
a coalition NGO, the Palestine Solidarity Movement, which held annual conferences at
Ohio State University in 2003, Duke University in 2004 and Georgetown University in
2006. It campaigned around the idea of divestment and overtime came to be comprised of
few hundred organizations, including some non-student groups and groups in Canada.447
While SUSTAIN and its student supporters were actively recruiting at the
campus-level, the US Campaign began recruiting from its own extended activist
networks, which mainly included more established organizations. US Campaign leaders,
for good reason, did not specifically target the Palestinian-American community for
recruitment and mobilization. On the contrary, they sought to position Palestine within
445 Erakat, “BDS in the USA, 2001-2010.” 446 “Appear from Students for Justice in Palestine UC Berkely.” Available here: http://web.archive.org/web/20020525235530/http://justiceinpalestine.org/ 447 Abraham Greenhouse, “Palestine activism on campus and beyond: Overcoming Israel’s efforts to erase history,” The Electronic Intifada (November 8, 2012). Available here: https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/abraham-greenhouse/palestine-activism-campus-and-beyond-overcoming-israels-efforts-erase
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broader advocacy networks. For instance, the US Campaign established close ties with
the anti-war movement, namely the United for Peace & Justice (UFPJ) coalition that
opposed the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The two organizations established a
quid pro quo. In 2003, the US Campaign helped UFPJ “organize and mobilize for some
of our country’s largest-ever protests.” In return, in 2003 the UFPJ network, which
included 1000 member groups, began to actively oppose US policy towards Israel,
providing the US Campaign with significant access to organizational resources and
recruits.448 During this time, in large part because of these outreach efforts, the US
Campaign has grown significantly, from six members in 2001 to 378 in 2011 as shown in
Figure 7 below. 449
Figure 7: Growth of the US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation 2003 - 2011
As it was in the US, with the collapse of Oslo, Palestine solidarity NGOs and
networks in the UK that had been active in the late 1980s re-mobilized and new
organizations formed. In 2001, for instance, Scottish activists who had been active
during the First Intifada organized a campaign to twin Edinburgh with Ramallah, tapping
into what one described as Edinburgh’s “tradition of standing alongside cities which have
faced oppression, such as those in South Africa during the apartheid regime.”450 A few
months later, in a meeting at Trinity College in Dublin, the Ireland-Palestine Solidarity
448 “Looking Back, Moving Forward: Lessons from 10 Years of Work,” The US Campaign to End Israeli
Occupation. Available here: http://www.endtheoccupation.org/downloads/2011conference_lessonslearned.pdf 449 Data on the growth of the US Campaign is available here: http://www.endtheoccupation.org/downloads/2011conference_lessonslearned.pdf 450 Jill Stark, “Opposites Attract: Edinburgh may twin with West Bank City,” Daily Record (March 23, 2001).
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Campaign was formed.451 In 2002, British activists, some of whom had a long history of
involvement in Palestine solidarity work dating back to the 1980s, issued a petition
calling for an end to European research and academic collaboration with Israeli
universities and institutions. Within a few days, the petition received the support of
approximately 120 academics in the UK and across Europe.452 This petition helped to
spark wider mobilizing around a campaign to boycott Israel, ushering in what Omar
Barghouti has referred to as a “new form of solidarity with Palestinian rights.”453 New
organizations were set up to support this campaign, such as the British Committee for
Universities of Palestine, which has played an active role in British academic unions.454
Boycott initiatives have also targeted British companies that sell Israeli goods and
produce, such as Marks & Spencer, Selfridges, Safeway and Sainsbury’s.455
Through the 2000s, the PSC-UK also grew considerably, expanding its
institutional base across the country and developing ties to other advocacy networks in
order to facilitate large-scale protests. Like SUSTAIN in the US, it largely focused on
recruiting from non-Palestinian advocacy channels rather than from Palestinian diaspora
networks. To be sure, the PSC-UK did work with the British-Palestinian community,
including the Association of the Palestinian Community in Britain as well as the Palestine
Return Centre, and drew on their support in demonstrations they organized.456 Yet,
mobilizing local Palestinians was not their main focal point. As it was the case elsewhere
in North America and Western Europe,457 the Palestinian community in Britain in the
early 2000s was not only small in number but also not well organized, suffering from
internal divisions and low levels of political participation.458 Some British-Palestinians
451 “Appeal for (pounds) 100m Palestinian Aid,” The Irish Times (November 29, 2011). 452 The content of the letter can be seen here: http://commlist.org/archive/all/2002-04/msg00005.html. Also see Hilary Rose & Steven Rose, “The Choice is do noting or try to bring about change: why we launched the boycott of Israeli institutions,” Guardian (July 15, 2002). Available here: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jul/15/comment.stevenrose 453 Barghouti, BDS, p. 19. 454 Barghouti. BDS, p. 19. 455 David Graves, “Two British West Bank protesters linked to Scargill,” The Daily Telegraph (April 4, 2002), p. 4. “Welsh campaigners build boycott of Israeli produce,” Morning Star (April 6 2002), p. 6. 456 “Campaigners announce Palestine march plans,” Morning Star (April 1, 2002), p. 6. 457 Nabulsi, Palestinians Register, pp. 73, 84, 122, 129, 130-131, 132-3, 140. 458 Lina Mahmoud, “British Palestinians: The Transformation of an Exiled Community,” in Shiblak (ed.), The Palestinian Diaspora in Europe, p. 100. Loddo, “Palestinian Transnational Actors and the Construction of the Homeland.” Nabulsi, Palestinians Register, p. 137. Maria Koinova, “Why Do
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have remarked that the community lacks the political will to become a more effective
political force. “We are too slow to do anything,” one community member put it. “It
takes months for us to hold a conference and days to say anything. We must find the
motivation within ourselves and become more effective.”459 In the early 2000s, as we
saw with Karmi’s outreach efforts in the 1970s and 1980s, these characteristics made the
Palestinian community an unattractive site of recruitment and mobilization. As a result,
Stephanie Loddo observed in 2006, “Palestinian groups are under-represented in pro-
Palestinian activism in the UK…”460
By drawing on national union networks, the PSC-UK encouraged the formation of
local branches across the country. The purpose of these local branches was not only to
demonstrate and raise public awareness. Rather, their main objective was to lobby their
local trade union chapters to support their campaign for Palestine.461 This focus reflected
the fact that the British labour movement been supportive of the Palestinian struggle
since the 1980s due in part because of the work of Palestine Action,462 and the fact that
the leadership of the PSC-UK was closely connected to many of the organizations that
were active in internal union advocacy, including Communist Party of Britain, Militant
Tendency, the Socialist Party UK, and the Socialist Workers Party.463
Beyond the unions, the PSC-UK also recruited actively from within the British
peace movement, capitalizing on the mobilizations that were occurring to oppose
American and British military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the wake of the
September 11th attacks. This strategy dates back to at least the early 1990s when the
PSC-UK linked up with a number of anti-war organizations, such as the Committee to
Stop War in the Gulf, protesting the war in Iraq.464 In the early 2000s, the PSC-UK
fostered close ties with the leaders of Campaign against Nuclear Disarmament in England
Conflict-Generated Diasporas Pursue Sovereignty-Based Claims Through Stated-Based or Transnational Channels?” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 20, No. 3 (2014). 459 Quoted in Nabulsi, Palestinians Register, p. 122. 460 Loddo, “Palestinian Transnational Actors and the Construction of the Homeland. 461 “Campaign praises Star’s unrivalled coverage of rally.” Morning Star. May 21, 2002. 462 Shindler, Israel and the European Left. Ronnie Fraser, “The Academic Boycott of Israel: A Review of the Five-Year UK Campaign to Defeat It,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (March 2, 2008). Available here: http://jcpa.org/article/the-academic-boycott-of-israel-a-review-of-the-five-year-uk-campaign-to-defeat-it/ 463 Interview, LabourStart, February 27, 2015. 464 Alex Renton, “Strange bedfellows in the fight for peace,” The Independent (January 23, 1991), p. 19.
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& Wales (CND), as well as with other anti-war groups including Stop the War Coalition
and Labour Against the War.465 In late September 2001, it offered to share London’s
Trafalgar Square with the CND to allow it to hold a rally protesting the proposed military
intervention into Afghanistan.466 By doing so, it helped to integrate Palestine into the
peace movement and gained access to rank-and-file activists, many of whom would
largely be receptive to their recruitment efforts. Similar outreach was conducted towards
other advocacy networks as well, including solidarity networks. In 2002, for instance,
the PSC-UK supported the efforts of the Colombia Solidarity Campaign to protest to a
visit to the UK by Henry Kissinger.467
This strategy of non-diaspora outreach and inter-movement alliance building was
largely effective. In 2002, PSC-UK organizers were able to run large-scale protests
across the country, attended by thousands chanting “Justice for the Palestinians” and
“End to Israeli Occupation.”468 The PSC-UK’s recruitment has also contributed to
widespread campus mobilizing as well, seen notably in 2006 with the formation of
Action Palestine, a national organization that linked together activist organizers across
fifteen British campuses.469
The Palestine solidarity mobilizations in Canada, the UK and the US that
occurred in the early 2000s were given a significant boost in 2004 and 2005 when
Palestinian activists and intellectuals in the West Bank formed the Palestinian Campaign
for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI). PACBI called for an
international boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) campaign of Israel modeled on
strategies of the African National Congress and the international anti-apartheid
movement. Omar Barghouti, a founder of PACBI and leading Palestinian activist,
465 Daniel Coysh & Andrian Roberts, “Stop the War! Benn urges resistance to new attacks on Iraq,” Morning Star (March 4, 2002), p. 1. 466 Mike Ambrose, “CND plans protest on military action; Demonstrators will march on Trafalgar Square,” Morning Star (September 25, 2001) 467 “Solidarity groups go all out to get Kissinger on British visit,” Morning Star (April 13, 2002), p. 5. 468Adrian Roberts, “Stop the killings: thousands swell protests against Israeli terror,” Morning Star (May 6, 2002), p. 1. 469 Abraham Greenhouse, “Palestine activism on campus and beyond: overcoming Israel’s efforts to erase history,” The Electronic Intifada (November 8, 2012). Available here: https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/abraham-greenhouse/palestine-activism-campus-and-beyond-overcoming-israels-efforts-erase
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describes BDS as the “South Africa strategy for Palestine.”470 PACBI’s formation was
based on a critique of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA) for its failure to end
the Israeli occupation and create the conditions for a Palestinian state. As noted above,
the PLO had largely sought state-based solutions to the problem of Palestine. PACBI, by
contrast, emphasized grassroots mobilizing abroad. Drawing explicitly on the precedent
set by up the African National Congress during the anti-apartheid struggle, they have
sought to harness the power of Western civil society in order to effect change in
Palestine. According to PACBI activists, the call for BDS is “inspired by the struggle of
South Africans against apartheid and in the spirit of international solidarity, moral
consistency, and resistance to injustice and oppression.”471
PACBI’s transnational advocacy strategy has been geared primarily towards non-
Palestinians rather than the Palestinian diaspora in the West. In part, this reflected the
weakness of the Palestinian diaspora. As one Palestinian activist explained:
The [non-Palestinian activists] of this world are far more active than our own community. I hate to say it, but it’s the reality. It’s one of the things that keeps me up at night because I’m trying to make a case to Americans and the first question I get is “how about your own community, what are they doing?” I have to say we have a weakness…I don’t dismiss my people or drop them but I understand it’s a very long-term process and I can’t wait. The urgency is something that the Palestinian-American community doesn’t get. The [solidarity] activism community gets it. They understand there’s been and there continues to be urgency here.472
Accordingly, PACBI has largely sought to connect directly with existing solidarity
organizations and encourage them to organize themselves around the BDS campaign, in
terms of tactics and goals. This strategy reflected the developments that were occurring
in Western civil society, described above, which included long-standing calls for the
boycott of Israel but which lacked Palestinian leadership.473 Under the leadership of the
BDS National Committee in Ramallah, the mass solidarity mobilizing in Palestine in
470 Barghouti, BDS: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights, see chapter 3. 471 “BDS Movement Call, July 9, 2005,” in Audrea Lim (ed.), The Case for Sanctions Against Israel (London: Verso, 2012), p. 24. 472 Interview, Palestinian activist, September 28, 2016. 473 Barghouti, “Putting Palestine Back on the Map,” p. 53.
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North America and Europe has grown considerably in size and improved in transnational
cohesion.474
5.2 The Absence of Mass Solidarity Moblizing for the Kurds
While the Palestinians have received widespread non-diaspora support in North
America and Western Europe, the Kurds of Turkey have not. From the 1980s until the
early 2000s, there have been only limited and small-scale instances of grassroots non-
Kurdish mobilization for the Kurds. In 1983, for instance, French activists helped local
Kurds establish the Institute Kurde de Paris, which today has become a leading
organizaiton that promotes Kurdish culture, language and history.475 In 1993, Irish
activists established the Kurdish Information Network, which was later renamed
Kurdistan Solidarity Ireland.476 In 1994, a UK-based activist established the Peace in
Kurdistan Campaign, which received declaratory support from prominent British
politicians and left-wing figures, such as Noam Chomsky and Harold Pinter, among
others.477 And in 1995, German activists travelled to southeastern Turkey and held
protests in support of Kurdish villagers.478
The extent of these non-Kurdish mobilizations, however, pale in comparison to
that seen in the case of Palestine. They do not reach either of the thresholds for mass
soldiarity mobilizing that I use in chapter 3, whether five- or ten-plus solidarity NGOs.
To date, no solidarity NGOs or coalitions similar to the Palestine Solidarity Campaign,
with its 60 branches across the UK, or the US Campaign to End Israeli Occupation, with
its 300-plus member groups, have formed for the Kurds.
What explains this case of non-mobilization? Why have so few taken up the
Kurdish cause despite the many similarities it has with the Palestinian struggle, described
in chapter 4? In this section I argue that this instance of non-mobilization is due to the
474 Abigail Bakan & Yasmeen Abu Laban, “Palestinian Resistance and International Solidarity: The BDS Campaign,” Race & Class Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 29-54. 475 Nicole Watts, “Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention in International Affairs,” in Joel Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies
in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 136. 476 See http://homepage.eircom.net/~ksi/ 477 See http://peaceinkurdistancampaign.com/ 478 Fiona Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” in Jeffrey Checkel (ed.), Transnational Dynamics of Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 85.
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fact that Kurdish rebels have not prioritized non-Kurdish recruitment abroad. On the
contrary, the large size of, and high levels of political organization among, the Kurdish
communities in Europe encouraged Kurdish rebels to adopt a diaspora mobilization
strategy rather than one that focused on the mobilization of non-Kurds.
5.2.1 The Emergence and International Diplomacy of the PKK
From the 1920s to the 1950s, Kurdish resistance to Turkey was largely subsumed
within the broader Turkish socialist movement. In the 1960s, however, Kurdish activists
began to assert their own ethno-national identity. They started to separate themselves
from the Turkish Left and began to organize distinctly Kurdish organizations. This was
the result of a number of domestic and international factors, including the relative
openness of Turkish politics in the 1960s that allowed Kurds to organize cultural
activities, the Kurdish engagement with the Left that introduced ideas of colonial
oppression, and the emergence of a Kurdish national movement in Iraq.479 It was also a
response to what many Kurds saw as the failure of the Turkish Left to recognize the
Kurdish problem as anything more than an issue of economic underdevelopment that
would be solved through a socialist revolution. The PKK emerged within this larger
context of Kurdish ethno-national mobilizing in Turkey.
The organizational history of the PKK began in 1975 when Abdullah Ocalan and
a number of Kurdish students left Ankara and moved to the Kurdish regions of southeast
Turkey. Their objective was to create an organization that would represent all Kurds.
Drawing on Marxist-Leninist principles, they sought to mobilize the Kurdish masses for a
revolution.480 In terms of mobilization, they were remarkably effective. Through the
1980s, as a result of severe state repression and concerted PKK mobilization efforts that
spoke more directly to Kurds feelings of oppression and their desire for cultural dignity,
the PKK became the predominant Kurdish rebel group in Turkey. It sidelined numerous
challengers that offered competing options for the Kurds, which included those who
479 Cengiz Gunes, The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey: From Protest to Resistance (New York: Routledge, 2012). Cengiz Gunes, “Explaining the PKK’s Mobilization of the Kurds in Turkey: Hegemony, Myth and Violence,” Ethnopolitics Vol. 12, No. 3 (2013), pp. 247-267. 480Barkey & Graham Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question. p. 22.
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promoted non-violence, assimilation, further integration with the Turkish Left, and
Islamism.481
The PKK’s efforts in southeastern Turkey involved securing support from the
Kurdish peasants, attacking state institutions, and diminishing state capacity in the
region.482 Their mobilizations provoked harsh Turkish state responses, notably after
1980 in the aftermath of the military coup. In 1981 the state took concerted action to
undermine PKK structures, imprisoning and killings thousands of its members. This
occurred in a larger context of government crackdowns on all forms of dissent, whether
Turkish or Kurdish. Yet, arguably, the Kurdish regions of the country were hit the
hardest. In 1983, the Kurdish language was official outlawed, “continuing policies of
changing Kurdish place-names to Turkish ones and forbidding parents to give their
children Kurdish names.”483 In 1986, a Turkish parliamentary fact-finding mission
referred to the creation of a concentration camp into the eastern parts of the country. And
from 1987 to 1997 Kurdish provinces were placed under emergency rule.484 During this
period, David McDowall writes, “every Kurdish village learnt what the state meant by
law and order.”485
The PKK’s domestic mobilizations, as well as the state violence that ensued as a
result, sparked international attention. While the Western press did not spend much
attention on the Turkey’s Kurds through the 1980s,486 prominent international human
rights NGOs did. As I show below in Figure 8, as violence intensified, Amnesty
International paid an increasing amount of attention to rights abuses occurring inside
Turkey.487 Just as Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in1982 contributed to solidarity
mobilizations in the US and UK, events in Turkey around the same time could have had a
481Cengiz Gunes, The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey: From Protest to Resistance (New York: Routledge, 2012). 482 Romano, The Kurdish National Movement, p. 77. 483 Romano, The Kurdish National Movement, p. 80. 484 Romano, The Kurdish National Movement, p. 77-80. 485 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: IB Tauris, 1996), p. 425. 486 From 1980 to 1990 the New York Times and the London Times published approximately 35 articles per year referring to the Kurds in Turkey. 487 Data is from Cullen Hendrix & Wendy Wong, “When is the Pen Truly Might? Regime Type and the Efficacy of Naming and Shaming in Curbing Human Rights Abuses,” British Journal of Political Science
Vol. 43, No. 3 (2013), pp. 651-672.
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similar effect. The difference in the Kurdish case, however, was the absence of sustained
recruitment efforts of non-diasporans by Kurdish activists.
Figure 8: Amnesty International Coverage of Turkey 1976 - 1999
In addition to organizing within Turkey, the PKK was also active in securing
external support for their struggle. Like the PLO, the PKK’s leadership operated from
abroad. In 1980, predicting severe government crackdowns amidst an impending military
coup, Ocalan and the PKK’s central command relocated to Syria and Lebanon where they
were granted a safe haven. 488 In the Bekaa Valley, an area in Lebanon that was then
controlled by Syria, the PKK was able to train with other rebel groups, including with the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.489 In 1985 the PKK’s relations with the
Syrian government further improved, despite Turkish pressure on the Syrian government
to expel the rebels,490 Beyond Syria, the PKK also received support from the Kurds in
northern Iraq and Iran, as well as from groups in Armenia, Russia, Greece and Cyprus.491
In part because of this external support, the PKK was able to conduct hundreds of attacks
through the 1980s until 1999, and then again after 2004.492
488 Romano, The Kurdish National Movement, p. 79, 85. 489 Barkey & Graham Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question. p. 22. 490 Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York: New York University Press, 2007), p. 99. 491 Martin van Bruinessen, “Turkey, Europe and the Kurds after the Capture of Abdullah Ocalan,” in Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), Kurdish Ethnonationalism versus Nation-Building States (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 2000). 492 Tezcur, “When Democratization Radicalizes: The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey.”
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Beyond regional diplomacy, however, the PKK also actively looked to Europe for
support. Unlike the PLO, they did not, however, adopt an elite-oriented approach to do
so. This reflected the fact that while the PKK had state sponsors who supported its
struggle against Turkey, none of them were interested in publicly backing the cause of
Kurdish nationalism in international forums. Syria, for instance, had a restive Kurdish
minority of its own and was thus unwilling to promote a cause that could potentially
undermine its territorial integrity. Thus, Syria publicly denied supporting the PKK. In
1992, after a visit by a Turkish delegation, the Syrian government declared the PKK to be
an “outlawed organization.”493 Without strong state backers, the PKK was not able to
gain access to the international institutions, such as the UN which provided rebels with
direct access to Western officials, that the were available to the PLO through its ties to
Arab states. In light of these conditions, the PKK had to go through grassroots channels
to secure the external support it required to wage its campaign against the Turkish state
more effectively.
In pursuing a grassroots oriented strategy in the West, the PKK leadership had
two options open to them. One option was to focus on the broader Western left,
including Marxist and socialist organizations, trade unions, and peace groups. This
strategy would have fit with PKK’s ideological identity as well as its understanding of the
their struggle as anti-colonial in nature. Like the PLO, it also could have drawn upon
Third Worldist themes of national liberation that were effective in mobilizing segments
of the Western Left for the Palestinians.494 Further, the PKK could have also focused on
the peace movement in the West, given Turkey’s membership in NATO and the
significant amount of military support it received from the US. Had it adopted such an
approach, the PKK would have made mass solidarity mobilizing on its behalf far more
likely.
5.2.2 The PKK’s Diaspora Mobilization Strategy
The PKK leadership, however, did not adopt such a strategy geared towards the
mobilization of non-Kurds. On the contrary, they largely focused their grassroots efforts
their ethnic kin. This strategy began in 1981 when the PKK’s Central Committee first
493 Bruinessen, “Turkey, Europe and the Kurds after the Capture of Abdullah Ocalan,” 494 Colin Shindler, Israel and the European Left (New York: Continuum, 2012).
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deployed activists to Europe in response to the military crackdown that accompanied the
1980 coup in Turkey.495 Their job was to organize the Kurdish community along PKK
lines. In particular, they sought to turn community members into active protest
participants and contributors to PKK operations inside Turkey. “By the mid-1980s,”
Vera Eccarius-Kelly explains, “PKK representatives endorsed a protest campaign to
empower Kurds to assert their ethnic background not only in Germany but throughout
Western Europe or wherever Kurdish families had settled.”496
To be sure, an important objective of this protest campaign was to raise awareness
in the West of the Kurdish cause. It was designed not only to send messages of support
back to the Kurdish communities inside Turkey, but also to pressure Western officials to
care about the issue as well as the Western public. However, as I argued above, this
strategy of consensus mobilization was insufficient to generating active non-Kurdish
support for the West. Little was done in the way out of sustained recruitment towards
non-Kurdish leftwing channels. Occasionally Kurdish activists would attend Marxist
conferences in the UK and Europe each year to hand out leaflets to the participants, a
strategy that generally has a low probability of success in recruiting and retaining active
supporters. Unlike the Palestinian outreach efforts, these Kurdish efforts were brief and
generally short-lived, and were not part of more sustained recruitment campaigns. This
generally reflected the Kurdish leadership’s general disinterest in non-diasporan
mobilization. As one Kurdish activist put it:
a lot of these [diaspora] campaigns are centrally defined….It may work in Turkey but is it going to work in Britain or in France? Nobody asks that question. And those people who tend to make these decisions do not have a good understanding of Western society.497 I argue that the PKK selected a diaspora mobilization strategy because of the
already existing political strength, as well as the political potential, of the Kurdish
communities in Europe prior to the arrival of the PKK in the early 1980s. It is true that
the PKK did much to contribute to the extent and direction of Kurdish political
organizing in Europe. However, I suggest that some scholars go too far in emphasizing
495 Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p 75. 496 Eccarius-Kelly, The Militant Kurds, p 8. 497 Interview, Kurdish activist, December 5, 2012.
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PKK actions alone as the main driver of Kurdish diaspora mobilization.498 In fact, the
PKK’s focus on the diaspora reflects two key characteristics of the community: its size
and pre-existing levels of political organization due in part to the organizing efforts of
other Kurdish groups active in Europe through the 1960s and 1970s.499 As resource
mobilization scholars indicate, social movements, including diaspora-based movements,
often form out of pre-existing networks and organizations that help to bring people
together and expose them to mobilization campaigns by entrepreneurs.500
In the 1950s, Kurds began migrating to Europe in large numbers. Initially,
Kurdish migrants were mainly students and intellectuals. In the 1960s and 1970s they
were labourers, and in the 1980s and 1990s they were asylum seekers. Kurdish migration
to Europe increased significantly after the coup in Turkey in 1980 that ushered in a
period of severe repression and violence. During this time, many Kurdish activists
relocated to Europe to evade repression and to pressure the Turkish state from abroad.501
By the late 1970s, the Kurdish communities in Europe were estimated to include
hundreds of thousands of members.502 Through the 1980s and 1990s, as violence inside
Turkey spiked, the community grew considerably. There is no authoritative data on the
size of the Kurdish diaspora, since ethnic background is not captured in European census
data. However, estimates range from 850,000 to 1.5 million people, most of whom live
in Germany, France, Sweden, and the UK, among other Western states.503 Some Kurdish
498 Martin Van Bruinessen, “Shifting National and Ethnic Identities: The Kurds in Turkey and the European Diaspora,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs Vol. 18 No. 1 (1998), p. 45. Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p. 77. 499 Grojean, “Bringing the Organization Back-In.” Bahar Baser, “KOMKAR: The Unheard Voice in the Kurdish Diaspora. In Christou, A., & Mavroudi, E. (Eds.). Dismantling Diasporas: Rethinking the
Geographies of Diasporic Identity, Connection and Development. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015). 500 J. Craig Jenkins, “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements,” Annual Review
of Sociology Vol. 9 (1983), pp. 527-553. For an overview see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow & Charles Tilley, “Comparative Perspectives on Contentious Politics,” in Mark Lichbach & Alan Zuckerman (eds.), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 501 Baser, Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts, p. 56-57. 502 Andreas Blatte, “The Kurdish Movement: Ethnic Mobilization and Europeanization,” Paper Presented
at the EUSA 8th International Biennial Conference (March 2003), p. 6. 503 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, “Nationalism, Ethnic Rap, and the Kurdish Diaspora,” Peace Review: A Journal of
Social Justice Vol. 22 (2010), pp. 424-5. Also see population estimates here: http://www.kongrakurdistan.net/en/kurdistan/
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leaders suggest that the population is closer to two million in Europe.504 The size of the
Kurdish communities made it an attractive target for the PKK.
Size, however, is only one characteristic of the strength of the Kurdish diaspora.
As I suggested above, large diasporas can be politically weak when they lack the capacity
or willingness to mobilize for homeland politics. This was not the case for the Kurds in
Europe. In fact, what made the Kurdish communities a focal point of PKK attention was
the fact that well before the PKK had formed, Kurds in Europe had already begun to
organize themselves. They created networks and associations to facilitate an active
engagement in homeland politics. The PKK was aware of these developments and
tailored their international diplomacy accordingly.505
In the 1950s and 1960s Kurdish activists began mobilizing Kurdish students in
Europe who formed a significant part of the first wave of the Kurdish migrations. In
1956, the Kurdish Student’s Society in Europe was founded, followed by the National
Union of Kurdish Students in Europe in 1965. While the two organizations were not
explicitly political, their activities did have political undertones. They followed events in
Turkey and the Middle East closely, and tended to espouse progressive political views.
Further, by identifying as “Kurdish,” members of the two groups were engaging in an
explicitly political act, given that such an identity at the time had no legal standing in
Turkey. Kurdish mobilizations continued through the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in the
formation of new organizations, such as Hevra and Bahoz, both of which worked to
politicize Kurdish students arriving from Turkey (Grojean 2011: 184).
Alongside the mobilization of students was the politicization of Kurdish workers
who formed a significant part of the second wave of migrations from Turkey to Europe in
the 1960s and 1970s. Initially, the Kurdish migrants joined Turkish worker associations,
such as the Federation of Turkish Socialists in Europe. These organizations had
connections to the left-wing parties inside Turkey who were growing increasingly critical
of the state. The ties between the Kurdish workers and the Turkish left in Europe
mapped on to the close connections between two groups inside Turkey. In the 1970s,
504 “Interview with Kemal Burkay,” Centre for Policy & Research on Turkey (April 7, 2013). Available here: 505 Alynna Lyon & Emek Ucarer, “Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict: Kurdish Separatism in Germany and the PKK,” Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 24, No. 6 (November 2001), p. 933.
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however, as Kurds began to separate from the Turkish left in Turkey, similar processes
occurred in Europe. Most notably, after the military coup in 1971, numerous Turkish and
Kurdish political parties established bases in Europe, drawing on support from their
respective communities there. By the end of the decade, all Kurdish parties in Turkey
had an organizational presence in Europe, with the Kurdistan Socialist Party (PSK) being
the most significant.506 Bahar Baser estimates that there were approximately thirty
Kurdish organizations across Europe around this time.507 In 1978, many of these
organizations came together to create an umbrella organization known as the Federation
of Kurdish Workers Associations (KOMKAR) that focused on supporting the Kurdish
struggle in Turkey as well as promoting the rights of Kurdish workers in Europe.508
KOMKAR and its affiliated group organized cultural events, including the celebration of
Newroz, the Kurdish new year. They also organized political actions as well. In 1981,
for instance, they organized a hunger strike to protest the military coup in Turkey and
sent representatives to the Council of Europe to draw the attention of European officials
to the Kurdish issue.509
In light of these organizational developments, when the PKK began to look to the
West for support, they were able to draw on not only a sizeable community of Kurds
there but also one that was to some extent politically organized for homeland politics.
This is not to suggest that all Kurds were politically active by the late 1970s. What it does
suggest, however, is that the organizational efforts of various Kurdish groups in Europe
in the 1960s and 1970s created a community infrastructure that the PKK could draw on to
mobilize Kurds on their behalf. The presence of these organizations incentivized a
diaspora mobilization strategy and lessened the chances of the PKK focusing on
mobilizing non-diasporan networks.
The PKK’s efforts to mobilize the diaspora on their behalf were highly successful.
It was able to extract a significant amount of material assistance from the community.
Through the 1990s, for instance, the Kurds in Germany are estimated to have given the
506 Grojean, “Bringing the Organization Back-In,” pp. 184-185. 507 Baser,, “KOMKAR: The Unheard Voice in the Kurdish Diaspora,” p. 117. 508 Ostegaard-Nielsen, Trans-state Loyalties and Policies, p. 62. 509 Baser, “KOMKAR: The Unheard Voice in the Kurdish Diaspora,” p. 118.
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PKK 30-50 million Deutsch Marks annually.510 As Barkey & Fuller observe, the Kurdish
diaspora has “contributed generously to the PKK”, although not all of their contributions
have been entirely voluntary.511 It was also able to recruit personnel from the European
Kurdish communities. Some became fighters in the mountains of Kurdistan but many
others became political operatives that were crucial to the strengthening of the PKK’s
transnational network of information centres, associations, journals and advocacy
groups.512
Beyond financial support and personnel, it also was successful in turning the
diaspora into a highly active European-based social movement.513 Through the 1980s
and 1990s, Kurds in Europe conducted more than one hundred and fifty protests each
year, amounting to almost one protest every other day.514 It is estimated that many of
these protests attracted more than 50,000 participants.515 Often, these protests were part
of larger mobilizations taking place among Kurdish communities across Europe and
beyond.516 In 1999, for instance, in response to the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, Kurdish
communities erupted in protest across Europe, which one New York Times report
described as indicative of the diaspora’s “extraordinary coordination.”517 In light of the
extent of the community’s activism, Olivier Grojean describes the Kurdish diaspora as
“probably the most demonstrative group in Europe…”518
Furthermore, Kurdish diaspora activism has helped to open up Western policy
channels to Kurdish lobbying. Through the 1990s, and especially after Ocalan’s arrest in
1990, this lobbying has sought to situate the Kurdish struggle within international human
rights norms in an attempt to appeal to Western policy-making audiences. In 1992 the
510 Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p. 82. 511 Barkey & Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, p. 30. Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” pp, 81-84. Eccarius-Kelly, The Militant Kurds, p. 4. 512 Martin van Bruinessen, “Turkey, Europe and the Kurds after the Capture of Abdullah Ocalan,” in Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), Kurdish Ethnonationalism versus Nation-Building States (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 2000). 513 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, “Political Movements and Leverage Points: Kurdish Activism in the European Diaspora,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs Vol. 22, No. 1 (2002). 514 Grojean, “Bringing the Organization Back In,” p. 193n2. 515 Ostegaard-Nielsen, Trans-state Loyalties and Policies, p. 75. 516 Ostegaard-Nielsen, Trans-state Loyalties and Policies, p. 82. 517 Alessandra Stanley, “Top Kurd’s Arrest Unleashes Rioting Across Europe,” (February 17, 1999). New
York Times. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/17/world/top-kurd-s-arrest-unleashes-rioting-all-across-europe.html 518 Grojean, “Bringing the Organization Back-In,” p. 182.
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UK-based Kurdish Human Rights Project, which included non-Kurdish lawyers and was
widely suspected to have PKK ties, was one such organization that brought cases of
Turkish repression of Kurds to the European Court of Human Rights. They sought to take
advantage of the fact that Turkey had signed on to the European Convention of Human
Rights and thus fell under the mandate of the court.519 In the mid-1990s, the German
government engaged in talks with the PKK leadership in an effort to quell Kurdish
political actions inside Germany.520 Kurdish groups in Europe have also engaged in elite-
level diplomacy within various European institutions. In 1995, the Kurdish Parliament in
Exile was formed to serve as the Kurds formal diplomatic body in Europe, similar to the
Algerian National Liberation Front and the African National Congress. The Parliament
closely identified with the PKK and appointed Ocalan as its honorary chairman.521 In
May 1999, the Parliament became the Kurdish National Congress.
Through the 2000s, Kurdish political organizations have increasingly lobbied the
European Parliament in an effort to insert themselves into the negotiations surrounding
Turkey’s bid to become a member of the European Union. Groups like the Kurdish
National Congress and the Association of Kurdish Organizations in Europe have used the
accession process to increase their pressure on Turkey to grant Kurds the right to speak
and be educated in their own language.522 In these efforts, Kurdish groups have
established ties with various European political parities, including the Party of European
Socialists, the European United Left/Nordic Green Left and the Greens/European Free
Alliance.523 During this period, the PKK leadership largely shifted away from its
secessionist claims and demands for an independent state, and instead focused on what
has been called “democratic confederalism,” which would entail Kurdish autonomy
within a unified Turkey.
519 Nicole Watts, “Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention in International Affairs,” in Joel Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies
in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 130-133. 520 Van Bruinessen, “Turkey, Europe and the Kurds after the Capture of Abdullah Ocalan,” 521 Nicole Watts, “Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention in International Affairs,” p. 143. 522 Leila Berkowitz & Liza Mugge, “Transnational Diaspora Lobbying: Europeanization and the Kurdish Question,” Journal of Intercultural Studies Vol. 35, No. 1 (2014). 523 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, “Political Movements and Leverage Points: Kurdish Activism in the European Diaspora,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs Vol. 22, No. 1 (2002), pp. 91-92. Berkowitz & Mugge, “Transnational Diaspora Lobbying: Europeanization and the Kurdish Question,” p. 83.
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5.2.2 Why Was the PKK Successful in Mobilizing the Diaspora?
The PKK’s ability to mobilize the diaspora so effectively was due to two main
factors. First, it was able to establish itself as the leader of the Kurdish movement inside
Turkey. The PKK’s ability to attack government targets and to withstand military assaults
earned them the respect and admiration of Kurds abroad. Other Kurdish groups that had
established a presence in Europe in the 1970s, including the PSK, tended to wilt in the
face of increasing government repression. This undermined not only their organizational
capacities, but it also raised questions among diaspora Kurds about whether or not the
group represented a viable path towards Kurdish liberation.524 The successes of the PKK
inside Turkey were thus integral to its success in securing diaspora support.525
Second, the PKK also devoted significant resources to “agitate the [diaspora]
population ideologically.”526 They established journals and magazines to advance their
perspectives on the Kurdish question. In these publications, the PKK employed a
strategy of ethnic outbidding against its Kurdish rivals. Ethnic outbidding refers to an
iterative process in which political actors depict themselves in increasingly radicalized
terms, unwilling to compromise on aspects deemed central to their political identity.527
For the PKK, this outbidding took two forms. It involved the use of violence and
coercion against its competitors, undermining their capacity and willingness to mobilize.
It also involved advocacy frames that depicted rival Kurdish groups as insufficiently
Kurdish. These frames sought to question the commitment of non-PKK elements in the
community to the Kurdish cause and to suggest that they might be willing to sell-out or
compromise on the rights of their ethnic kin. These advocacy frames were made that
much more powerful in light of the first factor noted above – the PKK’s ability to assert
itself, often violently, against the Turkish state.528
In addition to outbidding, PKK advocacy frames also emphasized the “double
marginalization” of the Kurds by the Turkish state and by Europe, namely Germany, both
524 Baser, B. (2015). KOMKAR: The Unheard Voice in the Kurdish Diaspora. In Christou, A., & Mavroudi, E. (Eds.). Dismantling Diasporas: Rethinking the Geographies of Diasporic Identity,
Connection and Development. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate), p. 119. 525 Romano, The Kurdish National Movement. 526 Grojean, “Bringing the Organization Back In,” p. 188. 527 Neil Devotta, “From Ethnic Outbidding to Ethnic Conflict: The Institutional Bases for Sri Lanka’s Separatist War,” Nations and Nationalism Vol. 11 No. 1 (2005), pp. 141-142. 528 Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p. 80.
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of which had failed to properly attend to their rights. In Germany, second- and third-
generation Kurds were depicted as foreigners, denied citizenship and, thus, socially and
economically marginalized.529 These conditions made the PKK’s version of Kurdish
identity, as a form of resistance to both Turkish and European state power, that much
more compelling.530 It mapped on to the felt experiences of the Kurdish communities in
Europe. In employing these tactics, the PKK was able to mobilize consensus around their
particular vision of Kurdishness and resistance. When Western governments began to
move against the PKK, including Germany’s 1993 ban of the organization and then the
EU’s designation of the group as a terrorist organization in 2002, many in the community
saw this as further evidence in support of the PKK’s message of Europe’s attempt to
marginalize the Kurds, presumably at the bidding of the Turkish state. Far from
weakening the political capacity of the Kurdish community, these bans and designations
had an emboldening effect, leading to more protests in the following years.531
Importantly, mobilizing sympathy and consensus around a cause or organization
is not the same as mobilizing active support. Thus, in addition to consensus mobilization
in the community, the PKK also set up organizational structures to facilitate action
mobilization.532 In 1985 it established a political wing in Europe – the National
Liberation Front for Kurdistan (ERNK) – that worked to unite all pro-PKK associations
abroad and to bring them together under a single European federation.533 European
countries with Kurdish populations were divided up into regions that were to be
controlled by the ERNK’s Central Committee in Europe, which was headquartered in
Germany (Cologne) and Belgium (Brussels), and which had national offices in England,
France, Holland, Scandinavia, and Switzerland.534 Cultural associations for artists,
intellectuals, youth and women were founded to further strengthen community ties. The
various national organizations and associations created were then tied in to an overall
transnational network of umbrella organizations, including KON-KURD (Belgium),
YEKKOM (Germany), FEYKA (France), FEDKOM (Holland), and FEYKURD
529 Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p. 78. 530 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, “Radical Consequences of Benign Neglect: The Rise of the PKK in Germany,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Vol. 24 No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 161-174. 531 Lyon & Ucarer, “Kurdish Separatism in Germany and the PKK,” p. 935. 532 Barkey & Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, p. 22. 533 Grojean, “Bringing the Organization Back-In,” p. 188. 534 Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p. 75.
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(Denmark). This structure enabled the community, under the leadership of the PKK, to
coordinate its actions across borders and to make their claims known to European
authorities.535 In light of the willingness of the European Kurds to mobilize along PKK
lines and to offer significant levels of assistance, Kurdish leaders have not focused their
finite resources on securing grassroots non-diasporan support. This has made the
likelihood of mass solidarity mobilizing for the Kurds far less likely.
5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that a reason why a mass solidarity mobilization has
formed for the Palestinian but not the Kurds reflects distinct Palestinian and Kurdish
rebel recruitment strategies. As a result of the political weakness of the Palestinian
diaspora in North America and Europe, Palestinian activists have actively sought to
recruit non-Palestinians, contributing directly to their mass mobilization. By contrast, the
strength of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe encouraged Kurdish rebel activists to focus on
mobilizing their ethnic kin rather than non-Kurds. Accordingly, non-diasporans have not
mobilized to the same extent for the Kurds as they have for the Palestinians.
This chapter offers one explanation (strong diaspora leading to diaspora-centric
recruitment strategies) for why we do not see mass solidarity mobilizing for some distant
rebels. But what about cases in which distant rebels have weak diasporas but still do not
receive mass solidarity from non-diaspora activists? It is to this set of cases that I now
turn.
535 Baser, “Kurdish Diaspora Political activism in Europe With a Particular Focus on Great Britain,” p. 17.
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Chapter 6
Hypotheses for Non-Mobilization Under Conditions of Rebel Diasporic Weakness
In the previous chapters, I argued that rebel groups with weak diasporas in the
West are the more likely recipients of widespread grassroots solidarity. These rebels are
more likely to recruit grassroots non-diasporan supporters in North America and Europe,
and thus more likely to receive their support. That said, the relationship between a weak
diaspora and receiving this kind of external support is far rom deterministic. As I first
reported in chapter 3, and again in Table 15 below, in my dataset the majority groups
with weak diasporas in the West have not received widespread grassroots solidarity.
What explains these instances of non-mobilization? Why, despite permissive conditions,
have Western grassroots activists not taken up these rebel causes in a significant way?
Table 15: Diaspora Strength and Mass Solidarity Mobilizations
Mass Solidarity Mobilization
Formation
Diaspora
strength
No Yes Total
Weak
(<0.5)
71 (76%) 22 (24%) 93
Strong
(>=0.5)
33 (94%) 2 (6%) 35
Total 104 24 128
In this chapter I provide some tentative answers to this question. I identify two
broad reasons for the absence of mass solidarity mobilizing. First, I argue that mass
solidarity mobilizations will not form when non-diaspora activists do not see a real need
for it. I suggest that this perceived lack of need can be the result of two conditions -
when the human rights issue in question improves considerably or when Western
governments take a meaningful response by imposing economic sanctions on the rights-
abusing state. When at least one of these two conditions hold, I suggest that Western
activist entrepreneurs are likely to focus their attention on what they deem to be more
pressing matters. I use the Non-Violent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes
(NAVCO) and the Cingranelli-Richard Human Rights (CIRI) datasets to identify human
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rights progress and conflict resolution. I use the Threat and Imposition of Economic
Sanctions (TIES) dataset to identify instances in which Western states have imposed
economic sanctions that include a human rights stipulation.
Second, mass solidarity mobilization will not form when the rebels themselves do
not ask for this type of support. A mass solidarity mobilization is not asked for when the
aggrieved are unable to run a domestic campaign that Western solidarity activists can
mobilize behind. I identify two reasons for the absence of such domestic campaigns –
severe state repression or institutional openness, both of which shape the behaviour of
dissidents but in different ways. A mass solidarity mobilization is also not asked for
when groups are able to campaign domestically but either do not seek out external
support for their struggle or if they do seek it out they do not ask for it from Western
grassroots activists. I use the NAVCO dataset to identify which groups have campaigned
and which groups have not. I use the CIRI and POLITY datasets to identify levels of
repression and institutional openness, and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset to
identify which minority groups have sought external support for their struggle. I
complement these data with research from secondary scholarly sources, NGO reports, as
well as interviews I have conducted with solidarity activists. Table 16 below displays the
distribution of cases across these categories. Appendix C includes a brief description of
each case and how they were coded.
Some of these categories are not mutually exclusive and some groups may appear
in more than box. For instance, cases may fall within the human rights progress and
economic sanctions sub-categories, given that sanctions may compel a state to reform its
domestic practices.536 Further, cases may also fall within the ‘Mass Solidarity
Mobilization Not Needed’ categories and one of either the ‘No Domestic Campaign’ or
‘Yes Domestic Campaign’ sub-categories. Just like mass solidarity mobilization
536 The sanctions literature suggests that economic coercion tends to worsen the target’s state respect for human rights and can have unintended negative effects on the civilian population, but few studies examine the specific effects of human rights-inspired sanctions. Some studies outline how economic sanctions have lead to human rights disasters, as in Haiti and Iraq. See Dursun Peksen, “For Better or Worse? The Effect on Economic Sanctions on Human Rights,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 46, No. 1 (2009), pp. 59-77. However, human rights criticism by foreign governments of states with strong international economic ties has lead to reductions in government repression, which may suggest that in some cases rights-inspired sanctions can have positive effects. See James Franklin, “Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression in Latin America,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 52, (2008), pp. 187-211.
125
formation, its absence in a particular case can be the result of a number of interacting
conditions.
This chapter proceeds in two main sections. In the first section I discuss the cases
that fall into the ‘Mass Mobilization Not Needed’ category, focusing first on those in the
human rights progress sub-category followed by those in the economic sanctions sub-
category. In the second section I discuss those cases that fall into the ‘Mass Solidarity
Mobilization Not Asked For’ category, first by examining the ‘No Domestic Campaign’
sub-category followed by the ‘Yes Domestic Campaign’ category. In each section I
provide a broad overview of the cases. For the most part I seek breadth not depth,
however I do probe some cases more closely. Due to the availability of data, I explore
the pro-democracy movement in Egypt and the Acehnese struggle for independence from
Indonesia more closely in order to elaborate on the explanatory utility of the category in
question.
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Table 16 Distribution of Amnesty Campaigns (years in brackets are Amnesty International campaign years).
*= state collapse **=tentative determination
Mass Solidarity Mobilization Not Needed (25) Mass Solidarity Mobilization Not Asked For (68)
Human Rights Progress (13)
Western Sanctions (12)
No Domestic Campaign (49) Yes Domestic Campaign (20)
State Repression (42) Institutional Openness
(6) Not Seeking External
Support (11)
Seeking External Support But Not Mass Solidarity
Mobilization Support (9)
Acehnese (1985-2003) Bangladeshis (1985-1988) Bolivians (1980-1982) Hondurans (1981-1988) Indonesians (1997-1998) Kenyans (1991-1991) Malawis (1992-1993) Nepalese (1991-1991) Nigerians (1994-2000) Ogonis (1994-2000) Paraguay (1985-1988) Romania (1989-1990) Russians (1990-1991) Sierra Leoneans (1998-2000) Sudanese (1983-1985) Tutsis-Rwanda (1994-2000)
Acehnese (1985-2003) Bangladeshis (1985-1988) Bolivians (1980-1982) Cambodians (1997-1998) Indonesians (1985-2003) Nigerians (1994-2000) Ogonis (1994-2000) Soviets (1976 – 1990) Southern Sudanese (1989-1997) Sudanese (1989-1997) Sudanese (2002-2003) Togolese (1999) Uruguay (1975-1984) Zimbabwe (2000)
Ahmadiyya - Pakistan (1991-2000) Bahrainis (1996-1996) Belarusians (1997-2000) Burundi (1994-2000)* Cambodia (1997-98) Congolese (1996-2000)* Darfuris (1989-1997) Hazaras (1996-1999) Hutus – DRC (1996-2000)* Indonesia (1985-1996) Kenya (1995-1998) Malaysians (1987-1991; 1996-2000) Mauritanian (1989-90) Mons (1988-2000) Nigerians (1988-91) Nuba (1989-97; 2002-3)
Brazilians (1988-2000) Cypriots (1991-1995) Hondurans (1981-1988) Indigenous – Mexico (1994-2003) Roma (1993-1998) Sri Lankans (1985-2003)
Bangladeshis (1985-1988)** Bolivians (1980-1982)** Egyptians (1989-2002) Indonesians (1997-1998)** Karens (1988-2000) Malawis (1992-1993)** Nigerians (1994-2000)** Pakistanis (1979-1988)** Romanians Russians (1990-1991)** Tajiks (1996-1999)** Ugandans (1984-1985)**
Acehnese (1985-2003) Chechens (1991-2000) Hutus – Burundi (1994-2000) Nepalese (1999-2003) Ogonis (1994-2000) Romanians (1987-1989)** Shia – Iraq (1988-1993) Southern Sudanese (1989-1997) Tutsis – Rwanda (1990-1991)
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Paraguay (1985-88) Romanians (1978-1980) Russians (1976-1989; 1992-2000) Rwandans (1990-91; 1994-2000) Saudis (1989; 1998-2000) Shans (1988-2000) Shia – Saudi (1998-2000) Sierra Leoneans (1998-2000)* Somalis (1988-2000)* Sudanese (1983-1985; 1989-97; 2002-03) Syrians (1985-2000) Thais (1986-1987) Togolese (1999) Tunisians (1986-87) Turkmenistan (1997-1998) Tutsis – Burundi (1994-2000)* Tutsis – DRC (1996-2000)* Uighurs (1986-2002) Uruguayans (1975-1984) Uzbeks (1993-1995; 1996-2000) Zimbabwe (2000)
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6.1 Mass Solidarity Mobilization Not Needed
6.1.1 Human Rights Progress
In many cases the rapid deterioration of rights and spikes in violence have
correlated with the mobilization of Western solidarity activists. Indonesia’s invasion of
East Timor in 1975 sparked activist mobilizations in Australia, Europe and North
America,537 as did Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which lead to the creation of the
Palestine Solidarity Campaign in the UK.538 Similarly, the violence in Darfur in the early
2000s created considerable concern among a number of Western activists, which
contributed to the creation of the Save Darfur Coalition.539 As the quantitative results in
chapter 3 show, mass solidarity mobilization are more likely to mobilize in support of
distant rebels in particularly severe conflicts.
If increasing levels of severity increase the likelihood of mass solidarity
mobilization, the opposite also appears to be true. As one Bosnia activist put it, “when
there’s no crisis, no one seems to care.”540 As the severity of an issue lessens, Western
activists may turn their attention elsewhere. The Central America Solidarity movement,
Sharon Nepstad has observed, “began to subside in the late 1980s as the countries in the
region signed peace accords and military regimes lost power.”541 Many of these activists
began to shift their focus elsewhere, including to Colombia where rights violations were
becoming increasingly severe and to East Timor in response to the Santa Cruz Massacre
in 1991.542 One solidarity activist described the shift away from Central America to
Colombia in the following way:
After the 1990s, the Sandinistas were voted out of office, peace treaties were signed, and the revolutionary option seemed to subside in El Salvador and Guatemala…Colombia really came to the fore after the 1990s as being the focus of US policy and as the greatest recipient of US aid. Also, in terms of human rights violations Central American governments were receding and Colombia was surging forward in militarization and human rights violations. I think a lot of people who had been interested in Central America were turning their attention to Colombia because of that, because of its place in the hemisphere and in US foreign policy.543
537 Geoffrey Robinson, “Human Rights History from the Ground Up: The Case of East Timor,” in Steve Stern & Scott Straus (eds.), The Human Rights Paradox: Universality and Its Discontents (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin, 2014). 538 Interview, Palestine Solidarity Campaign & J-BIG, February 6, 2013. Colin Shindler, Israel and the
European Left (New York: Continuum, 2012). 539 Rebecca Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011). 540 Quoted in Sherri Fink, “The Anti-Genocide Movement on American College Campuses: A Growing Response to the Balkan War,” in Thomas Cushman (ed.),This Time We Knew: Western Responses to
Genocide (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 327. 541 Sharon Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture and Agency in the Central America
Solidarity Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 137. 542 Brad Simpson, “Solidarity in an Age of Globalization: The Transnational Movement for East Timor and US Foreign Policy,” Peace & Change Vol. 29, No 3 & 4 (July 2004), p. 459. 543 Interview, North Shore Colombia Solidarity Committee, October 29, 2013.
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In the 1980s, relative calm in Indonesia’s Aceh province is one reason for the
limited international mobilization in support of the Acehnese struggle.544 Similarly,
during the Oslo Peace Process in the 1990s Palestine solidarity work in the West was put
on hold as the conflict moved to formal negotiations of which many began to express
some optimism.545 Many solidarity activists who had worked on Palestine through the
1980s began to focus on other issues.546 And as violence waned in Darfur, the Darfur
solidarity NGOs began to shrink. At this time, rather than fold up, some Darfur NGOs,
such as STAND, began to expand their mandate to include rights violations in the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar.547
Government attentiveness to domestic human rights problems, whether genuine
attempts at reconciliation or strategic acts to weaken domestic and international
pressures,548 can reduce the urgency of solidarity work. This sentiment was expressed by
some activists when asked to reflect on the lack of mass solidarity mobilization support
for the aboriginal struggle in Australia, a situation that many have likened to apartheid549
and cultural genocide.550 Although Australia’s aborigines are not part of the 71 Amnesty
campaigns examined here, the reasons some activists provide for the absence of a mass
solidarity mobilization in this case is illustrative. Australia is widely seen to have made
significant progress towards improving the human rights and socio-economic conditions
of its aboriginal population.551 For some, this progress has lessened the need for sustained
solidarity work to pressure the Australian government to continue with its reforms. As
one activist explained:
The aborigines in Australia have received an apology. And there have been changes in terms of some of the laws [including]...terra nullius. I think we would have problems convincing people that Australia is in violation of the International Convention of Apartheid because…they’ve said that they’re trying to overcome it. 552
In some of the other 71 Amnesty campaigns, the absence of a mass solidarity
mobilization may be attributable to human rights progress, real or perceived, on the
ground. For example, during the anti-junta campaign in Bolivia from 1977 to 1982, to
which Amnesty devoted considerable attention from 1980 to 1981,553 each year the
situation appears to have improved. In 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980 the military
544 Interview, Amnesty International – East Timor desk, May 1, 2015. 545 To be sure, not all Palestine solidarity activists were optimistic about Oslo’s prospects. Interview, November 29th Coalition for Palestine, July 9, 2015. Interview, SUSTAIN, August 24, 2015. 546 Interview, SUSTAIN, August 25, 2015. 547 Interview, STAND/GI-NET, August 24, 2012. 548 Emilie Hafner-Burton, “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem,” International Organization 62 (Fall 2008), p. 710. 549 See http://johnpilger.com/articles/mandela-is-gone-but-apartheid-is-alive-and-well-in-australia 550 Damien Short, “Australia – A Continuing Genocide?” Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 12 (March-June 2010), pp. 45-68. 551 See http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/un-human-rights-envoy-james-anaya-nt-intervention-is-racist/story-e6frg6n6-1225767082240 552 Interview, Coalition Against Israeli Apartheid, September 7, 2012. 553 In 1980 AI produced 20 advocacy items on Bolivia. In 1981, the number doubled to 42.
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government offered significant concessions to the opposition. Although in 1981 some
observers referred to Bolivia as a possible new member of the “trio of regimes in
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, that base their rule primarily on official and tolerated
terror,”554 the country did experience substantial improvements in the protections of
human rights and civil liberties, most notably from 1981 to 1982 and especially in 1983.
In 1982 the military government was overthrown, after which the country began the
difficult process of democratization.555 Western activists could have mobilized in support
of the anti-junta campaign but, arguably, in light of the progress on the ground they may
have reasoned their attention was best spent elsewhere, especially towards the violence
occurring in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, which began to spiral just as Bolivia
appeared to be on the mend.
Other cases in this group include pro-democracy campaigns that were successful
within one or two years in overthrowing authoritarian leaders, as seen in Russia in 1990-
1991, the anti-Banda campaign in Malawi in 1992-1993, and the anti-Suharto campaign
Indonesia in 1997-1998. At the time these regime transitions were seen as part of a
global shift towards democracy and thus viewed optimistically. After the fall of Suharto
in 1998, Indonesian student activists in Berlin demobilized, assuming that Indonesia was
on the path towards democracy.556 Western NGOs working on democratization held
similar views.557 Underpinning their optimism was what Thomas Carothers has referred
to as the “transition paradigm.” This paradigm rests on a number of assumptions, such as
the view that all political transitions away from authoritarianism are transitions towards
democracy, that elections and related processes lead to and strengthen democracy, and
that democracy requires no pre-conditions.558 Taken together, these assumptions
generated considerable enthusiasm. According to Carothers, “the new “no preconditions”
outlook was a gratifyingly optimistic, even liberating view that translated across borders
as the encouraging message that, when it comes to democracy, “anyone can do it.””559
For those activists in states to which Amnesty devoted so much attention, the appearance
of progress towards the institutionalization of human rights protections lessened the
urgency among Western solidarity activists to mobilize. Those searching for a cause
looked elsewhere to more severe crises.
554 Christopher Mitchell, “The New Authoritarianism in Bolivia,” Current History, Vol. 80 No. 463 (1981), p. 75. 555 See http://carnegieendowment.org/files/democracy_bolivia.pdf 556 Syafiq Hyasim, “Challenging a Home Country: A preliminary account of Indonesian Student Activism in Berlin, Germany,” Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies Vol. 7 No. 2 (2014). 557 Mary Kaldor, “Deepening Democracy,” in David Held & David Mepham (eds.), Progressive Foreign
Policy: New Directions for the UK (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), p. 40. 558 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1
(2002), pp. 7-8. 559 Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” p.8
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6.1.2 Western Sanctions
Not only can the appearance or reality of human rights progress and
democratization reduce the likelihood of mass solidarity mobilization, so too can the
responses of Western governments to rights violations by other states. Scholars have
shown that civil society activists not only mobilize to protest what governments do but
also to protest what they do not do. Ronnie Lipschutz suggests that “state incompetence”
is one driver of civil society mobilization.560 When states show an unwillingness to
respond to pressing problems, civil society is more likely to fill the void.561 This has
occurred in a variety of issues areas including refugee assistance, humanitarian aid, and
global environmental governance. At a grassroots level, local civil society organizations
and networks have mobilized to provide their communities with basic services, including
security, when state authorities have shown themselves unable or unwilling to do so.562
There is some evidence to suggest that Western solidarity activists tend to act in
the same way. When states take action in response to rights violations, often by imposing
embargos and terminating foreign aid, Western solidarity activists may see little reason to
mobilize. For instance, some Palestine solidarity activists state that Israel is the focus of
their work because of Western inaction to stop Israeli violations of Palestinian rights.563
As one activist put it, “the problem with Israel is not about how many people they kill,
how many people they put in jail, et cetera. It’s the fact that our governments in the West
are actively supporting what Israel does.”564 Many of these same activists also note that
since many other rights abusing states in the Middle East, and elsewhere, are under
Western state pressure to reform, their efforts are better spent on other causes.565 Haggai
Matar, an Israeli activist involved in Palestine solidarity work, captures this sentiment
well when he writes:
One of the most common claims one hears against the BDS movement is that it is hypocritical. “Why don’t they boycott Iran/Syria/Hamas/ISIS?” is a question that comes up quite often. The answer? We actually do boycott other countries and groups. Iran and Syria are facing a harsh sanctions regime….Nearly every country in the West, the Mediterranean and the Arab world are fighting against the Islamic State. There are sanctions and boycotts on North Korea and Sudan, Cuba was
560 Ronnie Lipschutz, “Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society,” Millenium
– Journal of International Studies Vol. 21, No. 3 (1992), pp. 407-413. 561 Aseem Prakash & Mary-Kay Gugerty, “Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action: An Introduction,” in Aseem Prakash & Mary-Kay Gugerty (eds.) Advocacy Organizations and Collective
Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 8). Ann Florini, The Third Force: The Rise of
Transnational Civil Society (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 2000). For a top-down approach of civil society mobilization, see Kim Reimann, “A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 50, No. 1 (2006), pp. 45-67. 562 David Lake & Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management Ethnic Conflict,” International Security Vol. 21, No. 2 (1996), pp. 41-75. Neil Devotta, “From Ethnic Outbidding to Ethnic Conflict: The Institutional Base for Sri Lanka’s Separatist War,” Nations and Nationalism Vol. 11, No. 1 (2005), pp. 141-159. 563 Interview, Students against Israeli Apartheid, October 11, 2012. 564 Interview, Russell Tribunal, October 24, 2012. 565 See http://www.bricup.org.uk/documents/WhyBoycottIsraeliUniversities.pdf, p. 25.
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under a U.S. embargo for decades, Russia is now being placed under sanctions, the list goes on.566 Government inaction also played an important role in leading to the formation of
the Save Darfur network. In September 2004, in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearing, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the Sudanese government and
its Janjaweed proxy militia were guilty of genocide in Darfur.567 This declaration is
widely cited as the catalyst that led to the Save Darfur network,568 but what mattered just
as equally, if not more so, was Powell’s statement that despite the conflict being a case of
genocide, US policy would not change. As Powell put it:
No new action is dictated by this [genocide] determination. We have been doing everything we can to get the Sudanese Government to act responsibly. So let us not be too preoccupied with this designation.569
For Darfur activists, this gap between government rhetoric and policy created a need for
civil society mobilizing in order to shame the Bush administration to act. One leading
Darfur activist described his mentality in 2004 and 2005 in the following way: “There is
no interest in acting on genocide. No one has an interest in it…We have to create the
interest.”570 In his view, a mass movement was required.571
By contrast, when Western states punish rights violators, or take actions that
Western activists deem sufficient, mass solidarity mobilization formation in support of
the repressed appears to become less likely. In a number of cases in this category, the US
and various European states have imposed sanctions to protest the human rights practices
of various governments, especially crackdowns on pro-democracy activists. Western
sanctions have been imposed on Uruguay from 1977-1981, Bolivia from 1979-1982,
Togo from 1992-2007, Nigeria from 1993-1999, Cambodia from 1998-2007, and
Zimbabwe in 2000. Often these sanctions involve the termination of foreign aid, but in
other instances they can be more severe, including total economic embargos, export
restrictions, travel bans and the freezing of assets. Concerted Western governmental
action in these cases has reduced the need for Western civil society mobilizations and
appears to have diverted activist attention elsewhere.
The first main category, and its two sub-categories, capture some of the
motivations that drive Western solidarity activists and thus which may help explain
instances in which they do not mobilize. But equally as important for mass solidarity
mobilizing are the actions of the aggrieved themselves. In these cases, discussed in the
566 See http://972mag.com/why-not-boycott-iran/107822/ 567 See: http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36042.htm 568 Rebecca Hamilton & Chad Hazlett, “Not On Our Watch: The Emergence of the American Movement for Darfur,” in Alex De Waal (ed.), War in Darfur and the Search for Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Global Initiative, 2007) p. 343. 569 See http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36042.htm 570 Interview, STAND/GI-NET, July 27, 2012. 571 Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide, (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003).
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next section, the absence of mass solidarity mobilizing is due to the fact that this kind of
external support is not being asked for.
6.2 Mass Solidarity Mobilization Not Asked For
6.2.1 No Rebel Campaign
Domestic campaigns occurring abroad have at times led to outpourings of support
from Western activists. The beginnings of the anti-apartheid movement in the UK and the
US, for instance, came in response to the early campaign work of the Africa National
Congress (ANC) in the 1950s as well as government attempts to quash their efforts. In
1952, during the ANC’s First Defiance campaign, Christian activists in the UK created a
fund to assist those black South Africans arrested for their involvement. American
activists also mobilized to support the campaign by forming the American Committee on
Africa, which established close ties to the ANC leadership.572 In 1960 the government’s
response to protests in Sharpeville, which led to the killing of sixty-nine protesters, also
led to significant outpourings of support from Western activists and the expansion of the
anti-apartheid movement.573 A similar pattern appears in other cases of mass solidarity
mobilization. In the case of the Tibet, demonstrations in Lhasa in 1987 by Tibetan
monks encouraged many Westerners, including Western Buddhists who until then tended
to eschew political action,574 to take up the Tibetan cause for self-determination and
religious freedom.
In the case of East Timor, a campaign of sustained non-violent protests in the
early 1990s also attracted considerable Western activist support. In November 1991 the
Indonesian army fired upon a large non-violent demonstration of 1500 East Timorese
marching to the Santa Cruz cemetery to commemorate the death of a young activist.
Approximately 250 East Timorese were killed. Western activists responded quickly,
organizing protests outside Indonesia’s permanent mission to the UN in New York.575
By December the East Timor Action Network (ETAN) had been formed,576 which came
to be a leading NGO in the mass solidarity mobilization for East Timorese
572 Rob Skinner, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Liberal Humanitarians and Transnational Activists in
Britain and the United States 1919-1964 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), p 11. Rob Skinner, “The Moral Foundations of British Anti-Apartheid Activism, 1949-1960,” Journal of Southern African Studies
Vol. 35, No. 2 (2009), p. 405. 573 David Black, “The long and winding road: International norms and domestic political change in South Africa,” in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights:
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 83. 574 See Christopher S. Queen, “Introduction: A New Buddhism,” in Queen (ed), Engaged Buddhism in the
West (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000), pp. 1-31. 575 Clinton Fernandes, The Independence of East Timor: Multi-Dimensional Perspectives – Occupation,
Resistance, and International Political Activism (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2011). p. 91-92. 576 Simpson, “Solidarity in an Age of Globalization,” p. 459.
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independence.577 One of the founders of ETAN recalled that the “the Santa Cruz
massacre catalyzed the re-emergence of a worldwide solidarity movement.”578
While the campaigning of the ANC, Tibetans and East Timorese are all primarily
instances of non-violent protest, violent action can also create the conditions for mass
solidarity mobilization.579 For instance, when Darfuri rebels, led by the Sudan Liberation
Army and the Justice & Equality Movement, mobilized an insurgency campaign in the
early 2000s, the world also began to take notice and Western activists began to
mobilize.580 Not only did the rebels launch attacks against the Sudanese military, but they
also began to seek out external support for their struggle from neighbouring Chad and
Darfuri diaspora groups in Canada, the US and Norway.581 The ability and willingness
of Darfuri rebels to mobilize to take action, provoking a harsh government response,
alerted the world to their existence and helped to create the conditions for the formation
of the Save Darfur network in 2004 and 2005.
If the domestic campaigns of distant rebels can increase their chances of attracting
mass solidarity mobilization support, then their absence can help to partially explain why
Western activists do not mobilize. Following Chenoweth & Lewis, a campaign is a
continuous contentious episode that can last days, months or, in some cases, years. They
involve actions that involve at least 1000 observed participants, that occur within a year
of each other, and that show some degree of coordination. Campaigns can be violent or
non-violent and can pursue a variety of aims including regime change, institutional
reform, policy change, secession, autonomy, or the end of foreign occupation.582
As seen in Table 16 above, numerous groups in the dataset that do not receive
mass solidarity mobilization support fall within this category. That is, these groups have
not run significant and sustained domestic campaigns. To make sense of some of these
cases I identify two tentative reasons for the absence of a domestic campaign. The first
points to the role that state repression can have on reducing the likelihood of domestic
mobilizing. The second points to the role that institutional openness can play in directing
grievances and political contention towards legal institutional channels and off of the
streets. As I describe in more detail below, these reasons are not full explanations for the
absence of a domestic campaign as campaigns have occurred in both highly repressive
577 Interview, ETAN, March 26, 2015. Carmel Budiardjo, “The International Solidarity Movement for East Timor,” in East Timor: A Testimony (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2004), p. 67. 578 Charles Scheiner, “Grassroots in the Field: Observing the East Timor Consultation.” See: http://www.etan.org/ifet/grassfield.html 579 Clifford Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and Transnational Activism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 26. 580 David Lanz, “Why Darfur? The Responsibility to Protect as a Rallying Cry for Transnational Advocacy Groups,” Global Responsibility to Protect Vol. 3, No. 2 (2011), p. 227. 581 Victor Tanner & Jerome Tubiana, “Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups,” Small Victor Tanner, Jérôme Tubiana & Michael Griffin. “Divided They Fall: the fragmentation of Darfur's rebel groups”. (Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2007), p. 20. Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The
Ambiguous Genocide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p. 126. 582 Erica Chenoweth & Orion Lewis, “Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 50, No. 3 (2013), pp. 419-420.
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states as well in open and accessible states. Rather, they are used to provide some
additional clarity on why some groups may not engage in the type of behaviour
conducive to them attracting widespread solidarity in the West.
State repression generates some of the grievances that undergird protest
movements,583 but it can also act as an obstacle to the recruiting and mobilizing that
opposition groups must engage in to organize mass public protest.584 Scholars have
identified the willingness of states to use violence against dissidents as one reason for the
absence of social movements.585 When dissidents are jailed and prevented from doing
organizing work, domestic campaigns become much less likely. Scholars have also
observed that when the coercive capacity of the state, as well as its willingness to use
violence, diminishes, the chances of social movement formation increases, as seen in the
French Revolution in the 1790s586 and the nationalist campaigns in the Soviet Union in
the 1980s.587 Under these conditions, activists are more likely to act publicly,
emboldening others to follow suit.588
In a number of cases in this category, state repression, including that facing the
Mons in Myanmar, the Hazaras in Afghanistan, or opposition activists in Uzbekistan or
Zimbabwe, have made it difficult for dissidents to organize and run sustained anti-regime
campaigns of the sort that would capture world attention and sympathy. Severe
repression has also undermined the capacity and mobilizing efforts of anti-regime and
democracy activists in Saudi Arabia and Syria, 589 and Uyghur insurgents in China.
The case of Belarus provides a clear example of how state repression can
undermine dissident mobilizations and in turn make mass solidarity mobilization
formation less likely. Amnesty International began campaigning on Belarus in the late
1990s, reporting widespread government abuses of violations of freedom of speech and
association, including the detention of opposition leaders and activists. During this period
no sustained pro-democracy campaign formed.590 Its absence was not due the popularity
of the regime or the lack of democratic sentiment in the country. In fact, according to
international survey data, Belarusians appear to be more committed to democracy than
583 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). 584 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). 585 Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, & Meyer Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Framing Processes,” in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, & Meyer Zald (eds.), Comparative
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-20. 586 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russi, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 587 Mark Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 588 Timor Kuran, “Now out of Never – The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution in 1989,” World Politics, Vol. 44 No. 1 (1991), pp. 7-48:. 589 Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 36 No. 2 (January 2004), pp. 139-157. 590 Mark Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomenon,” Perspectives on Politics
Vol. 5 No. 2 (2007), pp. 259-276.
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many of their neighbours.591 Rather, the absence of anti-regime campaigns is a result of
what Vitali Silitski refers to as a state policy of preemption. Under Alyaksandr
Lukashenka, no civil society space was given to anti-regime activists. The government
preempted any form of resistance by targeting new political parties when they were still
weak, removing potential challengers even before they gained public backing, and
cracking down on even the smallest of civil society organizations. This policy had
significant material and psychological effects on the opposition. According to Silitski,
“such systematized repression instills in them a sense of hopelessness and imposes the
perception that political change is far beyond reach.”592
State repression makes domestic campaigning less likely but it does not make it
impossible.593 While the Uyghurs in Xinjiang through the 1980s and 1990s were unable
to organize mass campaigns, the Tibetans have been able to, specifically in the late
1980s. While Darfuri rebels in Sudan were quiescent in the 1990s, their southern
Sudanese counterparts were not, contributing to widespread Western activist
mobilizations in their support.594 In Belarus in 2006 in response to the announcement of
the re-election of Lukashenka, thousands took the streets of Minsk to protest what they
believed was a rigged election. These protests were comparable in size to those that
occurred in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan where incumbents were successfully removed from
power.595 Such a mobilization of oppositional activity in Belarus could have sparked the
solidarity of Western activists concerned with more than a decade of authoritarian rule. It
did not. I discuss the reasons for this in the next section by looking at the decisions
groups make about whether to seek external support for their struggle and, if they decide
to do so, from whom.
A second reason for the absence of a domestic campaign may be due not to
government repression but rather the opposite - government openness to dissent. These
conditions can lead to social movement formation and increased public protest, however
in cases where institutions are open to the public and decision-making channels made
relatively accessible, contention may occur primarily in the form of elite lobbying. This
view underpinned an early perspective of social movement formation in the US in the
1950s and 1960s. At the time, pluralists argued that the American political system was
highly accessible to the public. This made social movement formation and participation a
591 Vitali Silitski, “Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 16 No. 4 (October 2005), p. 85. 592 Silitski, “Preempting Democracy,” p. 84. 593 Karl Dieter Opp & Wolfgang Roehl, “Repression, Micromobilization and Political Protest,” Social
Forces Vol. 69, No. 2 (1990), pp. 521-547. Rabab El Mahdi, “Enough! Egypt’s Question for Democracy,” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 42 No. 8 (August 2009), p. 1028. 594 Allen Hertzke, Freeing God's children: The Unlikely Alliance for Global Human Rights (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004). Don Cheadle & John Prendergast, Not on Our Watch: The Mission to End genocide in
Darfur and Beyond (Hachette Books, 2007). 595 Lucan Way, “The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 19 No. 3 (July 2008), p. 59.
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fundamentally irrational way for groups to seek redress for their grievances.
Accordingly, social movements were depicted as means through which individuals dealt
with feelings of social dislocation, alienation and frustration. The anti-war protests in the
1960s challenged the pluralist view of the American political system and ushered in new
perspectives on the rationality of social movement participation.596
Recent scholarship on protest supports the basic intuition that when decision-
making channels are open extra-institutional advocacy becomes less likely. Keck &
Sikkink suggest that local groups engage in transnational advocacy when domestic
channels for reform are blocked,597 a view supported by Asal, Conrad & White.598 Maria
Koinova finds a similar pattern among some UK-based diaspora groups suggesting that
those who can gain access to the state are more likely to focus on lobbying work than
civil society mobilization.599 And Stephen Saideman and his colleagues find that groups
in democracies with proportional representation are significantly less likely to protest and
engage in violence. Where minority group members can have their concerns heard within
existing political institutions “neither large-scale demonstrations nor violence is required
for groups who have some say over their destinies.”600 Institutional openness may thus
partially explain the absence of domestic campaigns by disaffected groups in the more
democratic states targeted by Amnesty and thus help to account for the absence of a mass
solidarity mobilization to help them secure their rights.
In the 1990s, and mainly from 1993 to 1998, Amnesty paid close attention to the
plight of the Roma in Romania. In Romania, and throughout Europe, the Roma have
faced severe social and political exclusion, including unequal access to housing,
education and employment. Their conditions arguably got worse after the fall of
Communism.601 According to the World Bank, a Roma child in Romania is three times
as likely to be born into poverty than other Romanians, is likely to live in a slum, unlikely
to finish high school, and have a life expectancy six years less than the average citizen.602
Their living conditions are said to be comparable to those found in parts of Sub-Saharan
596 Doug McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis: A More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements,” in Mario Diani & Doug McAdam (eds.), Social Movement Analysis: A Network Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 597 Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 598 Victor Asal, Justin Conrad & Peter White. "Going abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations," International Organization Vol. 68, no. 4 (2014). 599 Maria Koinova, “Why Do Conflict-Generated Diasporas Pursue Sovereignty-Based Claims Through Stated-Based or Transnational Channels?” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 20, No. 3 (2014). 600 Stephen Saideman, David Lanoue, Michael Campenni & Samuel Stanton, “Democratization, Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985-1998,” Comparative Political
Studies Vol. 36 No. 1 (2002), p. 118. 601 Melanie Ram, “Interests, Norms and Advocacy: Explaining the Emergence of the Roma onto the EU’s Agenda,” Ethnopolitics Vol. 9, No. 2 (201), p. 198. 602 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/04/07/breaking-the-cycle-of-exclusion-for-roma-in-romania
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Africa.603 Despite significant and persistent grievances, however, there was no Roma
domestic campaigning in Romania through the 1990s. In fact, through this decade the
Roma remained largely politically inactive in both domestic and international
advocacy.604
Part of the reason for this has to do with the institutional openness of the
Romanian state to dissent, notably as a result of EU pressure to democratize and improve
minority rights protections. In 1996 pro-Western reformers came to power in
Romania.605 Since then, Roma rights advocacy has been able to be conducted through
existing institutional channels since according to Romanian law the Roma can hold at
least one seat in the Romanian parliament and thus are able to voice their concerns at the
governmental level.606 The limited Roma domestic advocacy that did occur during this
period focused mainly on government institutions and less on mass mobilizing.
According to one activist, “we tried not to be too vocal in criticizing the government
while working directly with them to administer projects.”607 In the absence of domestic
campaigning, mass solidarity mobilization for the Roma’s plight is less likely to occur.
6.2.2 Rebel Campaign But No International Diplomacy
While those who do not campaign domestically are less likely to gain the support
of a mass solidarity mobilization, the same is true for those who campaign but do not
actively seek out mass solidarity mobilization support. Solidarity activists have often
referred to the importance of requests for support that come directly from the aggrieved.
Palestine solidarity activists stress how their work is in response to a Palestinian call. At
a debate at the London School of Economics in 2011 on the merits of a boycott of Israeli
academic institutions, one leading British activist explained:
You asked why Israel and not China. [This is] because there has been a call from the Palestinians as there was from the South Africans for boycott. If there were a call from within China I would support that, but there has not been such a call.608
In the context of Israel-Palestine, however, the validity of this kind of statement is
questionable, given that Palestine solidarity boycott campaigns long predate the
Palestinian call for BDS, as I show in chapter 5. Yet, according to this view, in the
absence of rebel requests for support, mass solidarity mobilizations become less likely.
603 Ram, “Interests Norms and Advocacy,” p. 198. 604 Ram, “Interests, Norms and Advocacy,” pp. 200-201. See Zoltan Barany, The East European Gypsies:
Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), chapter 4. 605 Anna Milada Vachudova, Europe Divided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 606 See http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=36003 607 Ram, “Interests, Norms and Advocacy,” p. 201. 608 Audio of the debate can be found here: http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=848. Statement at 48m47s.
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As one Canadian activist observed: “It’s not a question of the scale of the injustices. It’s a
question of the movements, the call [for support], that kind of stuff.”609 The absence of a
call for support has been cited as one reason for the lack of mass solidarity mobilization
support for Tamil self-determination in Sri Lanka. “The relative silence [among Western
activists] is a real problem,” one activist put it, “[but] there has not been a widespread call
by Tamil communities in Canada or in Sri Lanka itself for a boycott [campaign].”610 In
discussing Australian abuses against aborigines and the lack of Western solidarity they
receive, another activist noted that “if aborigines were asking for an international
exposure of continued Australian legacies of racism, and they wanted to call it Apartheid,
I would consider it.”611 As noted above, in 2006 the Belarusian opposition organized
mass protests in an effort to remove Lukashenka from power. This type of domestic
campaigning is what can galvanize Western activists, however no mass solidarity
mobilization formed to support the Belarusian struggle for democracy. One reason for
this is because Belarusian activists did not ask for grassroots solidarity from Western
activists. On the contrary, they looked to activists in Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine who
had not only mobilized under similar repressive conditions but who were also successful
in overthrowing authoritarian leaders.612 In the eyes of the Belarusian opposition, it was
these activists, rather than Western Europeans or North Americans, that could provide the
support and guidance they needed to remove Lukashenka.
I divide the groups who run domestic campaigns but who do not seek out external
support into two sub-categories. The first includes those who campaign but do not seek
out any external support. The second includes those groups that campaign and seek out
external support but not from Western grassroots activists. I describe each in turn.
6.2.3 Campaigning Rebels Who Do Not Seek External Support
Not all groups seeking rights seek external support. Organizing for contentious
action is difficult and costly, with transnational advocacy being especially so.613 Among
terrorist groups, for instance, the overwhelming majority operate domestically, not
transnationally.614 The reasons for not seeking external support can include a lack of
capacity, due to repression or poverty, or a lack of will due to either the availability of
domestic channels for reform or strategic considerations. High levels of repression and
poverty in Myanmar have undermined the ability of the Karen minority to reach out for
external assistance, while concerns about being labeled pro-American, or in the pocket of
609 Interview, Faculty for Palestine, August 22, 2012. 610 Interview, Faculty for Palestine, August 22, 2012. 611 Interview, Coalition against Israeli Apartheid, September 7, 2012. 612 Way, “The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions,” p. 59. 613 Asal, Conrad & White, “Going abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations." 614 Walter Enders, Todd Sandler & Khusrav Gaibulloev, “Domestic versus Transnational Terrorism: Data, Decomposition, and Dynamics,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 48 No. 3 (2011), pp. 319-337.
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the CIA, has dissuaded some Pakistani and Egyptian democracy activists from seeking
Western support.
In the early 2000s Egyptian activists organized a series of protests that initially
focused on Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories and the US invasion of Iraq but
were then redirected towards the Egyptian state led by Hosni Mubarak. These activists,
who mobilized under the name ‘Kifaya’, Arabic for ‘enough’, called for the end of one-
party rule.615 Kifaya was a broad based movement consisting of leftists, liberals,
nationalists, and Islamists. Unlike the official Egyptian opposition parties that lacked a
social base and were heavily constrained by establishment restrictions, Kifaya was far
more radical as they called for regime change.616
Kifaya’s emergence was unexpected, at least from a political opportunities point
of view. Since the 1982 assassination of Anwar Sadat, Egypt had been placed under
emergency law. While opposition parties sat in parliament, civil society opposition was
suppressed. A set of highly restrictive laws were in place designed to quell Islamist
militancy, namely from the Muslim Brotherhood, but these were also applied broadly to
any form of anti-regime activity.617 Although Kifaya was not successful in removing
Mubarak from power, and they failed to meet their goal of mobilizing a 100,000-
participant demonstration, their ability to mobilize at all was important. Their protests
captured Western media attention, including coverage in the New York Times.618 They
also laid the groundwork for future mobilizations in Egypt, including the April 6th Youth
Movement in 2008 and the Tahrir Square protests in 2011.
Despite operating in a relatively closed political system, which tends to push
dissidents to go abroad,619 the Kifaya movement did not engage in any sustained outreach
to Western activists.620 There are at least three reasons why Kifaya opted not to
internationalize their struggle. First, Kifaya activists were concerned about being seen as
Western imperialist agents, supported by the US government and CIA.621 In a 2004
Zogby survey, when Kifaya was mobilizing, 98% of the Egyptian public was found to
hold unfavourable views of the US.622 Receiving support from Western activists would
have made it easier for the Egyptian government to delegitimize the movement in the
eyes of the public by painting them as the stooges of the West. Second, Kifaya was an
615 El-Mahdi, “Egypt’s Quest for Democracy,” p. 1023. 616 Samer Shehata, “Opposition Politics in Egypt: A Fleeting Moment of Opportunity? Arab Reform
Bulletin (2004). http://carnegieendowment.org/2004/10/14/arab-reform-bulletin-october-2004/f12#opposition 617 El-Mahdi, “Egypt’s Quest for Democracy,” p. 1013. 618 See http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/09/world/africa/egypts-metamorphosis-one-step-down-the-open-road.html; http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/27/magazine/kifaya.html 619 Keck & Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders. Asal, Conrad & White, "Going abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations.” 620 Email correspondence. 621 I thank Jean Lachapelle for pointing this out to me. 622 Marc Lynch, “Arab Americanisms in the Arab World,” in Katzenstein & Keohane (ed.) Anti-
Americanisms in World Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 208.
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ideologically diverse coalition.623 This made it difficult for them to agree on how to
engage in transnational advocacy work, especially in regards to who should be sent
abroad as Kifaya’s representative, and whose external support that representative should
seek. Further, support from Western activists would have altered the balance of power
within the coalition towards the leftists and liberals at the expense of the nationalists and
Islamists, thereby increasing the chance of movement collapse. The third reason has to
do with government repression of Egyptian civil society. While domestic repression can
encourage dissidents to go abroad, it can also keep them in.624 According to CIRI data,
during Kifaya’s main mobilizing years in the early-mid 2000s the freedom of foreign
movement of Egyptian citizens was severely restricted. Without the ability to freely
travel to Western capitals and organize speaking tours, securing the support of Western
civil society activists becomes difficult.
What is interesting about the Kifaya case is that the movement could have secured
Western activist support if they had asked for it. As a non-violent movement that
campaigned for democracy, Western activist support may have been forthcoming. While
violent groups with less democratic credentials have secured Western activist support,
Kifaya’s commitment to these values would have made their recruitment efforts much
easier. In addition, Kifaya advocacy could have also pointed to the close ties that exited
between successive US administrations and the Egyptian regime since the of Camp David
Accords in the late 1970s.625 Egypt is among one of the largest recipients of US foreign
aid, which includes approximately $1.2 billion in military support each year since
1975.626 This fact could have been used as a framing device to convince Western
activists, namely Americans, that they were indirectly complicit in the abuses committed
by the Mubarak regime. This type of strategy has proved effective in other cases, namely
in Palestine and East Timor where activists have stressed Western complicity in grave
rights violations. Kifaya’s cause had many of the characteristics that would have made it
a likely subject of mass solidarity mobilizing if only they had asked for it.
6.2.4 Rebel Campaign and Diplomacy But No Targeting of Western Grassroots
Distant rebels who run domestic campaign and seek external aid but not from
grassroots Western activists are also less likely to gain widespread solidarity. The
importance of actively recruiting Western activists can be seen in a number of cases of
mass solidarity mobilization formation. In the case of the anti-apartheid movement, the
623 Brian Doherty & Timothy Doyle, Environmentalism, Resistance and Solidarity: Politics of Friends of
the Earth International (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), chapters 4-5. Jennifer Hadden, Networks in Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 624 Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: An Introduction,” in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The
Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 22. 625 See https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf 626 Lynch, “Arab Americanisms in the Arab World,” p. 208.
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ANC explicitly recruited grassroots activists in Europe and North America for solidarity
work. In 1959, when the ANC sent out a call for an international boycott of South
Africa, they also sent a number of their activists abroad to mobilize grassroots support
and to coordinate boycott initiatives.627 ANC engagement with Western civil society was
central to their outreach efforts.
Like the ANC, the Tibetan leadership has also dedicated resources to mobilizing
grassroots Western activists. From 1985 to 1987 Tibetan elites in Dharamsala and the
diaspora began discussing ways to build an international campaign to put pressure on
Beijing to renew negotiations with the Dalai Lama.628 Part of this internationalization
strategy involved the Dalai Lama sending directives to Tibetan Lamas in Europe and
North America asking them to mobilize their students for solidarity work for Tibetan
independence.629 These requests, combined with speaking tours by the Dalai Lama, led to
the creation of a number of solidarity NGOs in the West, including the Tibet Support
Group in London, which became a leader in the Free Tibet Network. 630
Unlike the ANC and the Central Tibetan Administration, not all dissident and
insurgent leaders actively seek out Western grassroots support for their struggle. Shia
groups in Iraq, as well as in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, have primarily geared their
international advocacy efforts towards securing state support from Iran, whose foreign
policy has sought to destabilize neighbouring Sunni states in order to create the
conditions for a Shia-inspired Islamic revolution.631 Similarly, Chechen insurgents have
also not made a concerted effort to reach out to Western grassroots activists for support.
On the contrary, the Chechen leadership has primarily sought the support from the
Chechen diaspora in Moscow,632 the US government, and the UN.633 The extent of their
outreach to Western civil society involved establishing ties with the Geneva-based
Unrepresented People’s Organization as part of an effort to gain greater access to the UN
circles.634 In other cases in this category, some distant rebels have focused their
international advocacy efforts primarily on securing the support of large international
NGOs and less so on Western grassroots mobilizing. The Ogonis in Nigeria, led by Ken
Saro-Wiwa’s Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) primarily
targeted leading INGOs rather than solidarity activists. MOSOP was able to secure the
627 Rob Skinner, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid, p. 162. 628 Robert Barnett, “Violated Specialness: Western Political Representations of Tibet,” in Thierry Dodin & Heinz Rather, Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projects & Fantasies (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001). 629 Tibet Support Group UK Fact Sheet, “Appeal for Support by His Holiness the Dalai Lama,” Dated February 1989. Email correspondence. 630 Interview, Tibet Information Network, December 2012. 631 Hafizullah Emadi, “Exporting Iran’s Revolution: The Radicalization of the Shiite Movement in Afghanistan,” Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 31 No. 1 (January 1995), pp. 1-12. 632 Maria Koinova, “Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts: The Mobilization of the Armenian, Albanian and Chechen Diasporas,” Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 34, No. 2 (February 2011), p. 345. 633 Gail Lapidus, "Contested sovereignty: The tragedy of Chechnya, " International Security 23, no. 1 (1998), p. 27. 634 Gail Lapidus, “Contested Sovereignty,” p. 30.
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support from NGOs like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth International, among
others.635
The importance of actively targeting grassroots Western activists for support can
be seen perhaps most clearly in the case of the Acehnese separatist movement in
Indonesia that actively sought to internationalize their struggle. Unlike their East
Timorese counterparts, the Acehnese did not recruit and mobilize Western grassroots
supporters. On the contrast, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) adopted a more elitist
international advocacy style that focused on securing the support of states. Through the
1980s it sought external state support to replenish its military stocks, which it was able to
secure from Libya.636 This support enabled GAM to re-emerge inside Aceh as a
significant military actor.637
In the 1990s GAM shifted its focus towards the West. Through its ties with
Moluccan separatists, the GAM leadership became active in the Unrepresented Peoples
Organization (UNPO) where they described themselves as an indigenous people resisting
settler colonialism and foreign military occupation by the Indonesian state.638 GAM also
lobbied at the UN, which was in part facilitated by their connections to the East Timorese
leadership. Through the 1990s GAM coordinated their UN advocacy work with the other
Indonesian separatist movements,639 often issuing joint statements decrying Indonesian
military atrocities.640 During this period the GAM attended informal talks, sought press
coverage, and worked to get mentions in UN documents.641 They also lobbied Western
governments, namely the British. They received support from Lord Avebury, a member
of the British House of Lords who became an active supporter for Acehnese rights. GAM
believed that Avebury’s support would help them secure British official recognition of
the right of the Acehnese to a state of their own.642
Unlike the East Timorese, the Acehnese did not couple their government lobbying
work with grassroots mobilizing.643 The GAM leadership did not put much stock in the
power of transnational civil society.644 They did not attempt to build a transnational
network of supporters. According to one observer, “Acehnese communities overseas
635 Bob, Marketing Rebellion, p. 119. 636 Louise Richardson, “Terrorists as Transnational Actors,” Terrorism & Political Violence Vol. 11 No. 4 (1999), p. 214. http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-got-off-list/p10855#p1 637 Kristen Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement: Anatomy of a Seperatist Organization (Washington: East-West Center, 2004). 638 See UNPO Conference on Population Transfer (1992): http://unpo.org/downloads/Population-Transfer-1992.pdf 639 Antje Missbach, Separatist Conflict in Indonesia: The Long-Distance Politics of the Acehnese Diaspora
(New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 96. 640 Antje Missbach, “The Acehnese Diaspora: Hawks or Doves? Conflict-Support, Peace-Finding and Political Opportunity Structures,” Journal of Human Security Vol. 5, No. 3 (2009), p. 31. 641 Missbach, Separatist Conflict in Indonesia, p. 97. 642 Missbach, Separatist Conflict in Indonesia, p. 97. 643 Missbach, Separatist Conflict in Indonesia, p. 117. 644 Interview, Indonesia Human Rights Project, Nov 12, 2015.
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don’t invest time and energy fostering relationships with local activists.”645 Even in their
efforts to secure British state support, no attempts were made to build a solidarity
network that could be used to raise public awareness of Aceh and pressure British MPs
from below. According to one activist, “the Acehnese have made very little attempt to
build Western support. They haven’t tried to build a Western solidarity movement.”646
As a result, the GAM presence within Western activist networks was thin,647 making
them an unlikely recipient of widespread grassroots solidarity.
6.3 Conclusion
In this chapter I have suggested possible reasons why Western grassroots activists
do not mobilize in support of a distant struggle. I argued that in some cases Western
grassroots mobilizing may not occur because the need for it is not readily apparent.
Western grassroots mobilizing may not be needed when a distant struggle in question is
seen to be improving, obviating the need for further action. In this case, Western activist
entrepreneurs may be more likely to focus their attention on other more severe instances
of rights abuse . Further, there may be little need for mass solidarity mobilizing when
Western states adequately respond to a case of human rights abuse abroad, often by
imposing economic sanctions on the rights-violating state. This too may divert the
attention of grassroots activists to other causes on which their government is seen to be
doing little or complicit in rights abuses. I also argued that mass solidarity mobilizations
are less likely to occur when the distant rebels in question are not asking for this kind of
support, either because they do not organize domestic protest campaigns that Western
activists can get behind or because they do run such campaigns but do not include
securing Western grassroots support as part of their overall strategy for change.
The evidence to support these hypotheses for the absence of a mass solidarity
mobilization is only suggestive. As I describe in more detail in the concluding chapter,
future research on grassroots mobilizing and non-mobilizing ought to probe more closely
the decisions making of these types of activists. What effect do perceptions of human
rights progress and government action have on their propensity to mobilize? Under what
conditions are these activists more likely to see a real need for grassroots work?
Experimental surveys and focus groups with solidarity activists may help to identify how
this sub-set of civil society thinks about the conditions under which their work is most
needed. Further research is also required on the conditions under which distant rebels
seek out Western grassroots support for their struggle. As I described above, a main
reason for the absence of a mass solidarity mobilization may due to the fact that the
aggrieved group in question is not asking for it. Why is it that some groups but not others
645 Lesley McCulloch, “Building Solidarity,” Inside Indonesia 81 (January-March 2005). http://www.insideindonesia.org/building-solidarity-2 646 Interview, ETAN Canada, July 13, 2015 647 Interview, ETAN Canada, April 9, 2015.
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engage in the transnational solicitation of Western grassroots activist support? Some
scholars have begun to study variations in transnational advocacy strategies, mainly
between violent and non-violent strategies, but this work has not paid close attention to
the mobilization of non-ethnic grassroots supporters in the West. Weak diasporas may
incentivize this the recruitment of Western grassroots activists, but clearly they do not
make it inevitable. What other factors beyond diaspora strength encourage this type of
recruitment?
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Around the world myriad rebels struggle for rights. Only a select few, however,
are recipients of significant levels of external support from solidarity activists. This
dissertation offers an explanation for part of the variation in support that we see. In it, I
focus on rebel recruitment strategies, and in particular the strategy of mobilizing non-
diasporan activists to support the rebel cause. Drawing on insights from interviews with
activists, as well as the micro-structural account of social movement participation found
in sociology, I argue that when this kind of recruitment occurs mass solidarity
mobilization in support of distant rebels becomes more likely. Further, I argued that
rebels who could not rely on their ethnic kin abroad for meaningful support, whether due
to their small size or inability to organize for ‘homeland’ politics, were more likely
recruit supporters from outside of their diasporic networks. As such, the central
argument this dissertation makes is that for reasons pertaining to rebel recruitment
strategies, rebels with weak diasporas are the more likely subjects of mass solidarity
mobilizing than rebels with strong diasporas.
In chapters 3 and 5, I tested the empirical validity of this argument in two ways.
In chapter 3 I tested it quantitatively on an original dataset, and found fairly robust
evidence in favour of the proposition that mass solidarity mobilizations in North America
and Europe are more likely to occur for distant rebels with weak diasporas in the West.
In chapter 5, I tested it qualitatively by investigating why a mass solidarity mobilization
had formed for the Palestinians but not the Kurds. In this chapter, I found evidence in
favour of my proposed causal mechanism, which suggests that when rebel activists
cannot rely on their diasporas for support, they are more likely to recruit non-diasporans.
Specifically, the political weakness of the Palestinian diaspora in the West encouraged
Palestinian activists to mobilize non-Palestinian supporters, thereby contributing directly
to the mass solidarity mobilization on their behalf. By contrast, the strength of the
Kurdish diaspora in Europe incentivized Kurdish activists to focus their efforts on their
ethnic kin rather than on mobilizing non-Kurds. As a result, no mass solidarity
mobilization for the Kurds has formed.
In this concluding chapter I extend this analysis in three ways. First, I discuss the
policy implications of my argument for activists looking to build wider support for their
cause. Second, I apply my insights on rebel recruitment strategies to the phenomenon of
foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq to support the Islamic State’s (IS) insurgency.
I show how the underlying strategic logic that encourages rebels to look beyond their
presumed “natural” constituencies abroad can be used to explain why so many foreign
fighters that have joined IS had previously only had weak or non-existent ties to Islam.
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And finally, I outline three areas of new research that ought to be pursued to further our
understanding of mass solidarity mobilizing for distant rebels.
7.1 Implications for Policy
In the literature on transnational activism, scholars tend to focus on the
importance of getting information out and framing a cause in ways that an international
audience can understand.648 The main suggestion is that individuals and groups seeking
Western civil society support must tailor their message to resonate with the values and
interests of a Western audience.649 While it is true that messaging and advocacy frames
matter, my analysis suggests that information dissemination alone, however savvy, is
insufficient to mobilize support. What is also important is recruitment and related actions
that make opportunities available for individuals to participate in concrete activist tasks.
As social movement scholars have shown, being asked to participate is often a reliable
predictor of actual participation.650 This finding is not only applicable to political
activism and movement participation, but also for encouraging charitable donations and
in bringing out the vote. For instance, in their study of the determinants of voter turnout,
Alan Gerber & Donald Green show that individuals are more likely to vote if they are
exposed to personal canvassing than by direct mail or telephone calls.651 Similarly, my
dissertation shows that rebels who adopt a strategy that focuses on recruiting non-
diasporan supporters, often in person, are the one who are more likely to receive it.
In practical terms, activists who want mass support must go out and ask for it.
Issuing press releases, working on social media, lobbying journalists, and organizing
public actions are often useful in raising awareness but are often not enough to mobilize
action. Entrepreneurs ought to also ensure that they pursue and implement recruitment
strategies as well. They should make formal and specific requests for support. They must
make their presence known on university campuses, at trade union meetings, at global
justice events, and at the appropriate religious events. They must leverage their personal
connections with others in order to more increase the chances of mobilization on their
behalf. As such, rebel activists, as well as other kinds of activists, seeking mass external
support would be better off if they also devoted considerable resources to active
recruitment campaigns, rather than just public awareness efforts.
648 Alison Brysk, Speaking Rights to Power: Constructing Political Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 649 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion. 650 Alan Schussman & Sarah Soule, “Process and Protest: Accounting for Individual Protest Participation,” Social Forces Vol. 84, No. 2 (December 2005), pp. 1083-1108. 651 Alan Gerber & Donald Green, “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment,” American Political Science Review Vol. 94, No. 3 (September 2000), pp. 653-663. Donald Green, Alan Gerber & David Nickerson, “Getting Out the Vote in Local Elections: Results from Six Door-to-Door Canvassing Experiments,” Journal of Politics Vol. 65 No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 1083-1096.
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7.2 Theoretical Implication: Why Do Islamic State’s Foreign Fighters Have
Weak Ties to Islam?
In addition to providing practical advice, my findings may also help us to explain
additional phenomena as well. In this section I focus on one in particular – foreign
fighter participation in the IS insurgency in Iraq and Syria. I suggest that the underlying
strategic logic of rebel recruitment that I offer in this dissertation may shed some light on
IS recruitment strategies in North America and Europe. That strategic logic suggests that
when a rebel’s external and presumed “natural” constituency is not particularly
forthcoming with support, rebel activists are likely to look beyond it in an effort to turn
this weakness into a strength. This is what rebels with weak diasporas are doing when
they recruit non-diasporans - compensating for the limitations, or absence, of their ethnic
kin abroad. It is also what IS recruiters may be doing when they seek to recruit
Westerners with weak ties to Islam - compensating for the unwillingness of mainstream
Muslim organizations and mosques to actively contribute to their radical agenda.
Foreign fighters are defined as individuals “voluntarily joining the rebels in an
armed struggle outside of their own home country….”652 This practice has a long history,
dating back to at least the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s.653 It has become especially
prominent in the last few decades, notably in the 1970s during the Afghan war against
Soviet occupation, in the 1990s and early 2000s with the wars in Chechnya,654 and today
with the IS insurgency. Many of these foreign fighters are Western. According to one
estimate, since 2011 approximately four to five thousand foreign fighters have travelled
from Europe, Canada, and the United States to fight alongside the Islamic State in its
effort to extend its territory and establish a global caliphate.655 This is significant. As a
number of studies have shown, the insertion of foreign fighters matters as they can
increase the lethality of an insurgency and contribute to the collapse of governing
structures leading to state failure, 656 they can dramatically reshape the ideological
orientation of an insurgency to make it more intractable, 657 and they can return home
prepared and willing to engage in terrorist violence.
Who are these foreign fighters? According to one study that examined open
source records on approximately 1200 IS foreign fighters, there is no single profile of the
652 Kristin Bakke, “Help Wanted? The Mixed Record of Foreign Fighters in Domestic Insurgencies,” International Security Vol. 38 No. 4 (Spring 2014), pp. 150-187. 653 R. Dan Richardson, “Foreign Fighters in Spanish Militias: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939,” Military
Affairs Vol. 40 No. 1 (February 1976), pp. 7-11. 654 Kristin Bakke, “Copying and Learning from Outsiders? Assessing Diffusion and Transnational Insurgents in the Chechen Wars,” in Jeffrey Checkel (ed.), Transnational Dynamics of Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 31-62. 655 Michael Weiss & Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York: Regan Arts, 2015). 656 David Malet, “Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Perspectives and Solutions,” Orbis (Winter 2010), p. 97. 657 Jonathan Fox, “The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary
Wars, 1945-2001,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 41 No. 6 (2004), pp. 715-731.
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foreign fighter. On the contrary, they vary considerable in terms of background.
However, the study also found that the vast majority of foreign fighters had weak ties to
Islam. The overwhelming majority had no formal religious education and “individuals
who made the decision to become a foreign fighter tended not to be lifelong strict
adherents to Islam, but also rarely recent converts.”658 This is a puzzling finding given
that IS insurgency is imbued with radical Islamist themes and that it has the goal of re-
establishing an 8th century Muslim caliphate, first in the Middle East and then globally.
This begs the question: what explains why so many foreign fighters with weak ties to
Islam have joined the IS insurgency?
The strategic logic that I ascribe to rebel group recruitment strategies and their
diasporas may help us to answer this question. In more general terms, this logic suggests
that rebel activists will look beyond their presumed “natural” external constituency for
supporters when that constituency shows itself unable or unwilling to offer the rebels the
kind of support they need. For IS rebels, their ‘natural’ constituency is the wider Muslim
diaspora, which offers them a vast network of possible external supporters. The
challenge IS recruiters face, however, is that many Muslim communities around the
world, especially in North America and Europe, actively oppose IS’ radical agenda and
interpretation of Islam, and thus work to block IS recruitment efforts. As one American
news report put it, “ever since ISIS stormed onto the world stage last year, prompting a
US-led bombing campaign against the group in Iraq and Syria, Muslim scholars and
community leaders have been on the front lines in the war against the group’s ideas,
which are far from mainstream.”659 In the UK, British Muslims have also organized to
oppose the IS message. After the beheading of two American journalists – James Foley
and Steven Sotloff - a number of leading Islamic organizations in the UK, including the
Muslim Council of Britain, issued a press release referring to the Islamic State as
“deceitful” and engaged in “actions [that] are far from the teachings of Islam.” The press
release continued:
we urge our youth not to contemplate going to Iraq or Syria or join IS or any
similar groups that spread violence and hatred, nor give them any kind of support
whatsoever. We call on all mosques and Islamic centres in the US to address this
issue with their congregations during their Friday sermons.660
658 Arie Perliger & Daniel Milton, From Cradle to Grave: The Lifecycle of Foreign Fighters in Iraq &
Syria (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, November 2016). Available here: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Cradle-to-Grave.pdf 659 Emily Feldman, “How Muslim Groups, Scholars Have Been Fighting ISIS,” NBC News Los Angeles
(December 9, 2015). Available here: http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/national-international/Muslim-Scholars-Groups-Against-ISIS-Speal-Out-361309791.html?amp=y 660 “Leading Islamic Centres Condemn So-Called ‘Islamic State,’ Muslim Council of Britain press release. Available here: http://www.mcb.org.uk/leading-islamic-centres-condemn-so-called-islamic-state/
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In response, IS recruiters operating in North America and Europe have looked
beyond the Muslim communities to recruit supporters. One strategy has been to target
prison networks, given that they are “locations in which individuals are likely to be
vulnerable and may thus be receptive to the appeal of violent extremists.”661 In addition,
they have also sought to mobilize those who feel frustrated and alienated from
mainstream society. As one father of IS foreign fighter explained, describing IS
recruiters: “Those people are professionals. They know exactly who their prey is. They
pick on the easiest prey they can find that they can easily brainwash.”662 By focusing on
marginalized, frustrated and vulnerable individuals,663 IS recruits have adopted a
recruitment strategy that reflects the fact that their ability to mobilize from within
mainstream Muslim networks is severely limited. In this regard, IS recruitment strategy
may in part be shaped by a similar strategic logic that influences ethno-national rebel
groups – when they lack a strong diaspora on which to rely, they are more likely to seek
supporters from non-diasporic external networks.
7.3 Future Research
Beyond offering a new line of research into the determinants of IS recruitment
strategies, this dissertations opens up three additional lines of inquiry that can be used to
improve our understanding of mass solidarity mobilizations and, perhaps, other related
transnational activist phenomena as well.. The first seeks to contribute to the quantitative
study of mass solidarity mobilization and calls for a further refinement of the dataset
employed in chapter 3. The second focuses on the causes of issue non-adoption by
grassroots activists and the absence of a mass solidarity mobilization. The third focuses
more directly on rebel diplomacy and seeks to explain why some rebels opt to actively
recruit Western grassroots activist support while others select different diplomatic
strategies.
7.3.1 Improving the Dataset
In chapter 3 I employed an original dataset to test the relationship between
diaspora strength and the probability of mass solidarity mobilization formation. For
some of the variables, including mass solidarity mobilization formation and diaspora
strength, new data had to be collected. As is often the case with even the most well-
established datasets, the dataset can be improved. I suggest a number of improvements.
First, the universe of cases can be broadened to include not only Amnesty International
661 “Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe,” p. 18. 662 Quoted from video in Lizzie Dearden, “ISIS: Islam is ‘not strongest factor’ behind foreign fighters joining extremist groups in Syria and Iraq – report,” The Independent (November 16, 2016). Available here: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/isis-foreign-fighters-british-european-western-dying-radicalised-islam-not-strongest-factor-cultural-a7421711.html 663 Daan Weggemans, Edwin Bakker, and Peter Grol, “Who are They and Why do They Go? The
Radicalisation and Preparatory Processes of Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters,” Perspectives on Terrorism
Vol.8 No. 4 (2014), pp. 100–110.
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campaigns but also those of Human Rights Watch. Second, a new variable that considers
the tone or advocacy frames used in the NGO campaign could also be included, as it may
have a causal effect on the willingness of grassroots activists to mobilize. As it exists
now, the dataset treats all Amnesty International campaigns as equal observations. Third,
measures of mass solidarity mobilization formation and diaspora strength can also be
improved. For both variables, teams of undergraduate research assistants could be
employed to check the validity of the measures used as well as to ensure some degree of
inter-coder reliability. This is especially the case with the diaspora strength variable,
which relied on my own assessments of the scholarly literature. In addition, the diaspora
strength measures could be improved by soliciting the input of diaspora scholars to
further assess the robustness of the measures of diaspora political mobilization. And
additional data on ethnic lobbying in Canada and the European Union could be added to
the lobby indicator, which as of now only includes US-based ethnic lobbying
organizations.
7.3.2 Grassroots Non-Mobilizations
A second line of research could focus more closely on the absence of a mass
solidarity mobilization even under permissive or conducive conditions. As I described in
more detail in chapter 5, the weak diaspora theory advanced here only captures a part of
the story of mass solidarity mobilization formation. A number of distant rebels with
weak diasporas in the West have not attracted mass solidarity mobilization support.
Chapter 5 suggested possible explanations for the absence of a mass solidarity
mobilization in these cases, however these reasons were not rigorously tested. A closer
study of these instances of non-adoption is needed as they can tell us more about the
conditions under which we might expect mass solidarity mobilizations to occur.664
To conduct this research, I suggest a similar approach to the one adopted by
Charli Carpenter and her colleagues but adapted to the study of grassroots activists rather
than NGOs.665 In this study, focus groups with solidarity activists can be run to help to
shed light on the conditions that they think mass solidarity mobilization will form and not
form. Each focus group can include two distinct sessions. The first would including a
more general discussion of mass mobilizing, while the second will offer a more guided
discussion around specific cases of non-mobilization treated as thought experiments.
These specific cases will be taken from the existing set of weak diaspora/No mass
solidarity mobilization cases, analyzed in chapter 5. The data collected through these
focus groups can then be used to assess the validity of the aforementioned hypotheses on
664 Charli Carpenter, “Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing the Emergence and Nonemergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 51 (2007), pp. 99-120. 665 Charli Carpenter, Sirin Duygulu, Alexander Montgomery & Anna Rapp, “Explaining the Advocacy Agenda: Insights from the Human Security Network,” International Organization 68 (Spring 2014), pp. 449-470.
152
non-mobilization, described in chapter 5, and to identify additional explanations that may
also account for the absence of a mass solidarity mobilization.
7.3.3 Rebel Diplomatic Strategies
A third line of research could probe in more detail the transnational advocacy
strategies of distant rebel organizations and how they relate to mass solidarity
mobilization formation. I suggested that distant rebels who actively seek out Western
grassroots support are more likely to receive it. To date, however, scholars have not paid
much attention to explaining variations in rebel diplomatic strategies.666 In this
dissertation I suggested that rebel with weak diasporas in the West were more likely to
engage in Western grassroots mobilizing than those rebels with strong diasporas. As we
saw in chapters 4 and 5, however, diaspora strength is but one determinant of such a
strategy. For example, the PLO eschewed grassroots mobilizing in the West while
PACBI embraced it, despite the weakness of the Palestinian diaspora. The East Timorese
made Western grassroots mobilizing central to their transnational advocacy work667 but
other groups with weak diasporas in the West, such as the Acehnese, have not, preferring
to lobby Western government officials and large NGOs instead.668 What accounts for
these variations in strategy? If a focus on mobilizing Western grassroots activists for
solidarity work makes mass solidarity mobilization more likely, it is important to identify
the causes of such a strategy.
7.4 Conclusion
In sum, this dissertation has sought to explain why some distant rebels but not
others secure mass external grassroots solidarity. It argued that rebels with weak
diasporas are the more likely recipients of mass solidarity mobilization support because it
is these group that are more likely to actively recruit non-diasporan supporters. The
perspective I offer opens up a number of new areas of inquiry, including on phenomena
that extend beyond the subject of solidarity activism. In particular, my analytical focus
on rebel recruitment strategies, and the factors that shape those strategies, may provide
important insights into how Islamist movements recruit to build up their stock of foreign
fighters. This topic, among others, promises to keep scholars busy in the years to come.
666 One recent exception is Victor Asal, Justin Conrad & Peter White. "Going abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations," International Organization 68, no. 4 (2014). 667 David Webster, "Non-State Diplomacy: East Timor 1975-99." Portuguese Studies Review 11, no. 1 (2003): 1-28. 668 Antje Missbach, Separatist Conflict in Indonesia: The Long-Distance Politics of the Acehnese Diaspora
(New York: Routledge, 2012). Antje Missbach, “The Acehnese Diaspora: Hawks or Doves? Conflict-Support, Peace-Finding and Political Opportunity Structures,” Journal of Human Security Vol. 5, No. 3 (2009).
153
Appendix A: Correlation Matrix
Diaspora strength
Christian Geographic Proximity
Civil War
Political Terror
Media attention 1950 year lag
Media attention 10 year lag
Western Arms Transfer 1950 lag
Western Arms Transfer 10 year lag
Diaspora strength 1 ________
________ ____ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______
Christian -0.0359 1 ________ ____ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______
Geographic Proximity -0.2770 -0.0765 1 ____ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______
Civil War
-0.0817 -0.1351 0.1189 1 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______
Political Terror 0.0047 -0.1396 0.1728 0.5800 1 _______ _______ _______ _______
Media attention 1950 lag 0.4363 0.0092 -0.0194 -0.2488 -0.0551 1 _______ _______ _______
Media attention 10 year lag
0.4272 0.0297 -0.0700 -0.2137 -0.0424 0.9478 1 _______ _______
Arm transfer 1950 lag 0.1616 -0.2074 0.2582 0.0020 0.0947 0.3177 0.2417 1 _______
Western arm transfer 10 year lag
0.1283 -0.1412 0.1540 -0.1259 -0.0956 0.2894 0.2460 0.8514 1
154
Appendix B: Coding of Dependent Variable Mass Solidarity Mobilization = 10+ solidarity NGOs
Distant rebel (AI campaign years)
Yearbook of International
Organizations669
Google Searches670
Human Rights Directory North America671 &
Western Europe672 (year founded)
Other sources Citations Estimated # of NGOs
mass solidarity
mobilization? (10+)
mass solidari
ty mobiliz
ation start
date or AI
campaign end
Acehnese/ 1985-2003
None None
None
Lesley McCulloch, “Building Solidarity,” Inside Indonesia (2005). http://www.insideindonesia.org/building-solidarity-2 Antje Missbach. 2012. Separatist
Conflict in Indonesia: The Long-
distance politics of the Acehnese
diaspora. New York: Routledge.
0 No 2003
Afghanis/ 1996-1999
Afghanistan World Foundation (2002 - USA)
Women for Afghan Women (USA) Afghan Women’s Mission
Franco-Afghan Friendship (1980 – France)
Terry Glavin. 2011. Come From
the Shadows: The Long & Lonely
Struggle for Peace in
Afghanistan. Vancouver: Douglas
30 Yes 2001
669 Online database here: http://ybio.brillonline.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/ybio/ [Accessed through Robarts Library - http://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?9714790] 670 Search terms to use: “[Distant rebel] Support Group”, “[Distant rebel] AND Solidarity”, “Save [Distant rebel]”, “Friends of [Distant rebel]”. 671 Laurie S. Wiseberg & Harry M. Scoble, North American Human Rights Directory 1980: Human Rights Internet (Garret Park: Maryland, 1980). 672 Laurie S. Wiseberg & Hazel Sirett (eds.), Human Rights Directory: Western Europe (1982).
155
(2000) Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan (1996) – 13 chapters Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee (2006) – 13 chapters Afghan Friends Network (2002)
Afghan Voice (n/a - UK) - diaspora
& McIntyre. Rosemarie Skaine. 2002. The
Women of Afghanistan Under the
Taliban. Jefferson: McFarland.
Sunita Mehta (ed.). 2002. Women
for Afghan Women: Shattering
Myths and Claiming the Future. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Ahmadis/ 1991-2000
None None None
0 No 2000
Albanians/ 1991-1996
None Irish Friends of Albania (2002 – Ireland – medical service NGO
None
0 No 1996
Algerians/ 1992-1999
International Committee of Solidarity with the Algerian Youth (1961) - ? International Committee of Support to Algerian Intellectuals (~1990s – France)
Algeria Solidarity Campaign (2011 – London) – diaspora Comite des Droits de l’Homme et Libertes en Algerie (n/a – France)
None
Catherine Lloyd. 1999. “Organising Across Borders: Algerian Women’s Associations in a Period of Conflict,” Review
of African Political Economy, No. 82, pp. 479-490. Catherine Lloyd. 1999. “Transnational Mobilizations in Context of Violent Conflict: The Case of Solidarity with Women in Algeria,” Contemporary Politics, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 365-377.
1 No 1999
Argentinians/1975-1983
None Support Group for the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (1978 – Holland, France, Germany)
Argentine Commission for Human Rights (1976) – diaspora/exile Argentine Information Service
Marguerite Guzman Bouvard. 1994. Revolutionizing
Motherhood: The Mothers of the
Plaza de Mayo. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc.
16 Yes 1977
156
Center (n/a) Chicago Committee for Human Rights in Argentina Washington Committee for Human Rights in Argentina (1979) No Candu for Argentina Committee (n/a – Canada) Commission in Solidarity with the Relatives of Political Prisoners, the Disappeared and Killed in Argentina (1977 – Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, UK, et al) Belgian Committee against Repression in Argentina (n/a – Belgium) French-Argentine Solidarity Association (n/a – France) Argentine Solidarity
Kathryn Sikkink. 1993. “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America.” International
Organization. Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 411-441.
157
Committee (n/a – Netherlands) Committee in Solidarity with the Argentine People (n/a – Spain) Committee for Human Rights in Argentina (n/a – UK)
Armenians/ 1992-1995
None None None
0 No 1995
Azerbaijanis/1992-1995
None None None
0 No 1995
Bahrainis/ 1995-1996
None Bahrain Solidarity Campaign (~2013 – UK) Bahrain Center for Human rights (2002 – Bahrain w/ presence in Denmark since 2011) Save Bahrain (2012) - ???
None
0 No 1996
Bangladeshis/1985-1988
Bangladesh International Action Group (~mid-1980s) – ??? International Movement to Save Bangladesh (N/A) - ???
Australia Bangladesh Solidarity Network (2014 – Australia) Friends of Bangladesh (n/a – Australia)
None
0 No 1988
Belarusians /1997-2000
Belarus Republic League for Human Rights (1992) – unclear nature
Belarus Solidarity Campaign (2010 – USA) – diaspora
Conference of Free Byeolorussians (1977) – diaspora
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. 2010. Competitive
Authoritarianism: Hybrid
Regimes after the Cold War. New
0 No 2000
158
Belarus Free Theatre (2005 – Belarus with some international support)
York: Cambridge University Press.
Black South Africans/
1977-1995
Anti-Apartheid Movement (1959 – UK) Artists and Athletes against Apartheid (1983) Europeans Against Apartheid (n/a)
See list of anti-apartheid organizations here: https://www.nelsonmandela.org/images/uploads/aama-azlist.pdf
American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sport & Access (1976) – a coalition of organizations. Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (1977) Boston Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa (n/a) - Campaign to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa (1977) – a coalition of organizations. New York Committee to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa (n/a) Rochester Ad Hoc Committee Against Bank Loans to South Africa (n/a) Seattle Committee to
Roger Fieldhouse. 2005. Anti-
Apartheid: A History of the
Movement in Britain: A Study in
Pressure Group Politics. London: Merlin. Rob Skinner. 2010. The
Foundations of Anti-Apartheid:
Liberal Humanitarians the
Transnational Activists in Britain
and the United States, c. 1919-
1964. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Hakan Thorn. 2006. Anti-
Apartheid and the Emergence of a
Global Civil Society. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
David Black. 1999. “The Long and Winding Road: International Norms and Domestic Political Change in South Africa.” In Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). The
Power of Human Rights:
International Norms and
Domestic Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 78-108.
100s Yes 1960
159
Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa (n/a) Stop Banking on Apartheid (n/a) New England Committee on Southern Africa (n/a) - network Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa (1956) International Defense & Aid Fund for Southern Africa North American Committee (1972) People for South Africa Freedom (n/a) United Peoples Campaign Against Apartheid and Racism (n/a) South Africa Action Coalition (n/a) Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (n/a) Action Committee on Southern Africa
160
(1972 – Belgium) Boycott Outspan Action (1975 – Belgium) Anti-Apartheid Denmark (n/a) Anti-Apartheid Movement (1975 – France) Anti-Apartheid Movement (1974 – West Germany) Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement (1964 – Ireland) Anti-Apartheid Movement (n/a – Netherlands) Norwegian Council for Southern African (1967 – Netherlands) World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear collaboration with South Africa (1979 – Norway) Isolate South Africa Committee (n/a –
161
Sweden) Anti-Apartheid Movement for German-Speaking Switzerland (1975 – Switzerland) International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (1956 – UK) End Loans to South Africa (n/a – UK) Anti-Apartheid Movement (1959 – UK)
Bolivians/ 1980-1982
None Bolivia Solidarity Campaign (n/a – UK) Toronto Bolivia Solidarity (2008 – Canada) Canada Bolivia Action Solidarity Network (n/a – Canada) Bolivia Information Forum (2006 – UK) Friends of Bolivia (1983 – UK) – humanitarian service NGO
Support Group for the Bolivian People’s Struggle (~1980 – Sweden)
Caitlin Esch abnd Wes Enzinna, “Groups Call for Solidarity with Bolivia,” NACLA. https://nacla.org/news/groups-call-solidarity-bolivia
~4 No – 1980s and late 2000s mobilization too small.
1982
Bosnians/ 1993-1997
None None From Fink: Students Against
Sheri Fink. 1996. “The Anti-Genocide Movement on American College Campuses: A
18 Yes 1993
162
Genocide Coalition American Committee to Save Bosnia Bosnia Support Committee at Cornell Ad Hoc Committee on Bosnia at Carleton University Bosnia Coordinating Committee American Task Force for Bosnia Americans for Bosnian Orphans Bosnia Task Force San Diego Bosnia Support Committee of DC Ann Arbor Committee for Bosnia
Growing Response to the Balkan War,” in Thomas Cushman and Stjepan Mestrovic (eds.) This
Time We Knew: Western
Responses to Genocide in Bosnia. New York: New York University Press, pp. 313-349.
163
Free Bosnia Action Group California Coalition against Ethnic Cleansing Friends of Bosnia Greenwich Coalition for Peace in Bosnia New York Committee to Save Bosnia New England Bosnia Relief Committee Bosnia Advocates of Metrowest New Hampshire Committee for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Brazilians /1975-1978
None None None American Friends of Brazil American Committee for Information on Brazil Committee
James Green. 2003. “Clerics, Exiles and Academics: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States, 1969-1974.” Latin
American Politics and Society, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 87-117. James Green. 2010. We Cannot
3+ Yes – Green refers to parallel campaign in Europe
1969
164
against Repression in Brazil
Remain Silent: Opposition to the
Brazilian Military Dictatorship in
the United States. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.
Brazilians /1988-2000
None None None 0 No 2000
Burmese/ 1988-2000
Free Burma Coalition (1995 – USA) International Action Committee for Democracy in Burma (n/a) - ?? International Burma Campaign (n/a) - ??
US Campaign for Burma (2003 – USA) ~78,000 grassroots members, 100 chapters Burma Campaign UK (1991 – UK) Burma Support Group ( - Australia) Burma Action Group (Australia) Canberra Network for Democracy in Burma (Australia) Burma Solidarity Group (Australia) Burma Campaign Sydney (Australia) Australia Burma Network (Australia) Burma Action Ireland (Ireland) Swedish Burma Committee (Sweden)
None See list of orgs here: http://burmacampaign.org.uk/useful-resources/links/
John Dale. 2011. Free Burma:
Transnational Legal Action and
Corporate Accountability. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Shanthi Kalathil. 2002. “Community and Communalism in the Information Age,” The
Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 347-354.
100+ Yes 1994
165
Burma Action Committee (USA) Burma Forum Los Angeles (USA) New England Burma Roundtable (1994 – USA) Canadian Friends of Burma (1991 – Canada) Friends of Burma (1985 – USA) Association Suisse-Birman (1992 – Belgium) Oxford Burma Alliance (UK)
Burundian /1994-2000
None Friends of Burundi (2005 – UK) – Christian solidarity Burundi Friends International (2007) – anti-poverty org
None Steven Mufson. 2004. “How a Tragedy Became a Cause,” Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64132-2004Aug13.html
0 No 2000
Cambodians /1997-1998
None Cambodia Support Group (1983 – Canada) – diaspora/charity Save Cambodia (n/a – USA) - ?? Cambodia Action (1973 – UK) – Christian org, charity.
Cambodian Coordination Committee (n/a) – diaspora Cambodian Religio-Cultural Association of America (1975) - diaspora
Caroline Hughes. 2007. “Transnational Networks, International Organizations and Political Participation in Cambodia: Human rights, Labour Rights and Common Rights,” Democratization. Vol, 14, No. 5, pp. 834-852.
0 No 1998
166
Chechens /1976-2000
None Save Chechnya Campaign (??) American Committee for Peace in Chechnya (1999 – USA) -
None
John Laughland. 2004. “The Chechens’ American Friends,” Guardian (2004). http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/08/usa.russia Gail Lapidus. 1998. “Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya.” International
Security. Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 5-49.
1 No 2000
Chileans/1975-1992
International Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes of the Military Junta in Chile (1974) - ?? International Friends of the Chilean Human Rights Commission (n/a) - ??
Chile Committee for Human Rights (1976) Chile Democratico (1973) – diaspora Chile Legislative Center (n/a) National Chile Center (n/a) – coalition of 22 local and national orgs Non-Intervention in Chile (n/a) – 9 chapter throughout US Office for Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Chile (n/a) Austin Committee for Human Rights in Chile (n/a)
Margaret Power. 2009. “The US Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s.” Latin
American Perspectives, Vol. 36, No. 6 (2009), pp. 46-66. Michael Wilkinson. 1992. “The Chile Solidarity Campaign and British Government Policy Towards Chile, 1973-1990.” European Review of Latin
American and Caribbean Studies, No. 52, pp. 52-74. Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink. 1999. “International Norms and Domestic Politics in Chile & Guatemala.” In Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). The Power of
Human Rights: International
Norms and Domestic Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 172-204.
32 Yes 1973
167
Bay Area Ecumenical Council for Chile (n/a) Bay Area Trade Union Committee of Concern for Chile (n/a) Buffalo Committee for Chilean Democracy (n/a) Chicago Committee to Save Lives in Chile (n/a) Chilean Boycott Task Force (n/a) Cleveland Chile Committee (n/a) Committee for Chilean Inquirty (n/a) Denver Chile Group (n/a) Detroir Chile Group (n/a) Eugene Free Chile Center (n/a) Free Chile Center (n/a)
168
Kansas City Chile Solidarity Committee (n/a) New England Chile Solidarity Committee (n/a) New York Chile Solidarity Committee (n/a) Pittsburgh Chile Solidarity Committee (n/a) Portland Chile Coalition (n/a) Franco-Chilean Friendship (1974 – France) Action for the Release of Political Prisoners in Chile (1975 – West Germany) Chile America (1974 - Italy) – diaspora? Chile Solidarity Campaign (1973 – UK)
169
Chile Committee for Human Rights (1974 – UK)
Chileans /1998-2000
None None None
0 No 2000
Chinese/ 1986-2002
Foundation for Human Rights & Democracy in China (1989 – France) - ??
Initiatives for China (n/a – USA) China Support Network (1989 – USA) – Free China Movement (??_
Chinese Americans for Freedom and Human Rights (1977) – diaspora Chinese Human Rights Society (1975) – diaspora Committee to Defend
0 No 2002
170
Democratic Rights in China (1980 – UK)
Colombians/ 1981-2003
None Colombia Support Network (~1994, USA) – 6 chapters Colombia Solidarity Campaign (2001 – UK) – 8 chapters Sussex Colombia Solidarity (UK) Justice for Colombia (2002 – UK) North Shore Colombia Solidarity Committee (USA) Colombia Action Solidarity Alliance (Canada)
US Committee against the Violation of Human Rights and Democratic Liberties in Colombia (n/a) Colombian Committee for Human Rights (n/a – UK) – diaspora?
Winifred Tate. 2009. “US Human Rights Activism and Plan Colombia.” Colombia
Internacional, No. 69, pp. 50-69.
18 Yes 1994
Congolese/ 1996-2000
European NGO Network on Congo (1989) –coalition but not of single issue orgs
Friends of the Congo (2004 – USA) Congo Global Action (2006) Congo Coalition (1998 – USA) - diaspora
None
Alison Brysk. 2013. Speaking
Rights to Power: Constructing
Political Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
1 No 2000
Cubans/ 1991-2000
None Cuba Solidarity Campaign (UK) Canadian Network on Cuba (2002 – Canada)
Of Human Rights (1977) – diaspora? Portuguese-Cuban Friendship Association (n/a –
Darren Hawkins. 2002. International Human Rights and
Authoritarian Rule in Chile. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
14 Yes 1992
171
Canadian-Cuban Friendship Association (Canada) – BC, Alberta, Ontario Cuba Edmonton Solidarity Committee (Canada) Cuba Education Tours (Canada) Friends of Cuba against the US Blockade (Canada) Vancouver Communities in Solidarity with Cuba (Canada) Manitoba-Cuba Solidarity Committee (Canada) The Nova-Scotia Cuba Association (Canada) Hamilton Friendship Association with Cuba (Canada) Ottawa-Cuba Connections (Canada) Rock Around the Blockade (1995 – UK)
Portugal)
Darren Hawkins and Joshua Lloyd. 2003. “Questioning Comprehensive Sanctions: The Birth of a Norm.” Journal of
Human Rights, Vol. 2, Issue 3, pp. 441-454.
Cypriots/1991-1995
International Committee of Solidarity with Cyprus (1974) - ??
European Solidarity Front for Cyprus Friends of Cyprus (1974)
Minnesota Friends of Cyprus (1974) Solidarity with
4 No 1995
172
Cyprus (n/a – UK)
Darfuris/1989-1997
None None
0 No 1997
Darfuris/ 2002-2003
Save Darfur Coalition (2004/5 – USA)
Students Taking Action Now Darfur (2003 - USA) – 40 chapters, Canada Dream for Darfur Chicago Coalition to Save Darfur Cincinnatians United to Save Darfur Connecticut Coalition to Save Darfur Darfur Alert Help Darfur Now Mason-Dixon Darfur Alliance Masschusetts Coalition to Save Darfur Pittsburgh Darfur Emergency Coalition Western Massachusetts Darfur Coalition 24 Hours for Darfur
None
Rebecca Hamilton. 2011. Fighting for Darfur: Public
Action and the Struggle to Stop
Genocide. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Rebecca Hamilton & Chad Hazlett. 2007. “The Emergence of the American Movement for Darfur,” in Alex de Waal (ed.), War in Darfur and the Search for
Peace. Cambridge: Global Equity Initiative, pp. 337-366.
50+ Yes 2005
East Timorese /1985-2003
International Federation for East
East Timor Alert Network (1987 – Canada) – 12
Emergency Committee for
Brad Simpson. 2004. “Solidarity in an Age of Globalization: The
37 Yes 1991
173
Timor (1991 – USA) East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (1991 – USA) – 12 chapters Solidarity with East Timor (1976 – France)
chapters East Timor International Support Center (Australia) Easet Timor Relief Association (Australia) Brisbane East Timor Office (Australia) Campaign for an Independent East Timor (Australia) Australia-East Timor Association (Australia) Australians for a Free East Timor (Australia) Friends of East Timor (Australia) Hobart East Timor Committee (Australia) Canadian Action for Indonesia and East Timor East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign British Coalition for East Timor East Timor Scotland
Human Rights in Indonesia and Self-Determination in East Timor (1978) Association in Solidarity with East Timor (n/a – France) Commission for the Rights of the Maubere People (n/a – Portugal) British Campaign for an Independent East Timor (1975 – UK)
Transnational Movement for East Timor and US Foreign Policy,” Peace & Change. Vol. 29, No. 3-4, pp. 453-482. Clinton Fernandes. 2011. The
Independence of East Timor:
Multi-Dimensional Perspectives –
Occupation, Resistance, and
International Political Activism. Portland: Sussex Academic Press. David Webster. 2003. “Non-State Diplomacy: East Timor 1975-99,” Portuguese Studies Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 1-28. Shane Gunderson. 2015. Momentum and the East Timor
Independent Movement: The
Origins of America’s Debate on
East Timor. Lanham: Lexington Books.
174
Support Group
Egyptians/ 1989-2002
None EgyPt Solidarity (2014 – UK)
None
Yasmin Alibhai-Brown. 2011. “Stop blaming Israel for every grievance in the Middle East,” Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/yasmin-alibhai-brown/yasmin-alibhai-brown-stop-blaming-israel-for-every-grievance-in-the-middle-east-2277726.html
0 No 2002
Filipinos/ 1981-1993
None Anti-Martial Law Coalition (1974) – diaspora Friends of the Filipino People (1973) – 17 chapters Friends of the Filipino People – splinter group (1979) Church Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines (1978) – coalition of religious organizations. Movement for a Free Philippines (1973) Belgian Philippine Support Committee (1979)
Jose Fuenticilla. 2013. Fighting
from a Distance: How Filipino
Exiles Helped Topple a Dictator. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Daniel Schirmer. 1994. “Standard Questions – Friends of the Filipino People.” http://escholarship.org/uc/item/95z8f0v4
20 Yes 1973
Greeks/ 1991-1996
None Greece Solidarity Campaign (2012 – UK)
None
3 No – orgs are
1996
175
Australia-Greece Solidarity Campaign (2014 – Australia) Greece Solidarity Movement New York (2012 – USA)
Greece-focused, not on Greeks in Albania
Guatemalans /1979-2003
None Guatemala Solidarity Network (UK) Guatemala Solidarity Project (USA) Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala (1981 – USA)
Association in Solidarity with Guatemala (1979) Guatemala-El Salvador Committee (n/a – Sweden) Guatemala Working Group (n/a – UK)
Sharon Nepstad. 2004. Convictions of the Soul: Religion,
Culture and Agency in the
Central America Solidarity
Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. Christian Smith. 1996. Resisting
Reagan: the US Central America
Peace Movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
100s+ Yes 1980
Haitians/ 1985-1994
Solidarity Europe-Haiti (n/a) - ??
Haiti Action Committee (1991 - USA) Canada Haiti Action Network (2004 – Canada) Haiti Support Group (UK - 1992) Toronto Haiti Action Committee (2004 – Canada) Friends of Haiti (USA) Let Haiti Live (USA)
Friends of Haiti (1971)
Committee in Solidarity with Haiti (US) Committee to Support the Popular Movement in Haiti (US)
Tom Reeves. 2004. “Notes on the US-Haiti Solidarity Movement,” in Melinda Miles and Eugenia Charles (eds.), Let Haiti Live:
Unjust US Policies Towards the
Oldest Neighbor. Florida: Educa Vision Inc.
10+ Yes 1992
176
Haiti Solidarity Ireland (Ireland)
Hazaras/1996-1999
None None None 0 No 1999
Hondurans/ 1981-1988
None Honduras Solidarity Network (2009 – US & Canada) Friends of Honduras (USA) Comite de Solidaridad Seattle – Honduras (USA) Colective Honduras USA Resistencia (USA) Friends of Honduran Children (~1980 – Canada) Friends of Honduras USA (2009 – USA)
None Sharon Nepstad. 2004. Convictions of the Soul: Religion,
Culture and Agency in the
Central America Solidarity
Movement. New York: Oxford University Press.
4 No – not part of Central America Solidarity Movement
1988
Hutus/1994-2000
None None None 0 No 2000
Hutus/1996-2000
None None None 0 No 2000
Indians/1988-2000
None Friends of India – Central Arkansas (USA) – diaspora? Friends of India (Switzerland)
None No 2000
Indigenous Peoples/1994-
2003
None None None No 2003
Indonesians/ 1985-2003
East Timor & Indonesia Action
Indonesia Human Rights Network (1998 – USA)
Emergency Committee for
Pip Hinman, “Organising Australia – Indonesia Solidarity,”
8 No 2003
177
Network (1991 – USA)
Indonesia Solidarity Action/Action in Solidarity with Indonesia & East Timor (1990 – Australia)
Human Rights in Indonesia and Self-Determination in East Timor (1978) TAPOL: US Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners (1975) Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners in Indonesia (1978 – TAPOL France) Indonesia Committee (1968 – Netherlands) – diaspora? Indonesian Documentation and Information Centre (1979 – Netherlands) TAPOL UK (1973 – UK)
Inside Indonesia (2003). http://www.insideindonesia.org/organising-australia-indonesia-solidarity
Iranians/ 1981-2003
Iranian Human Rights Working Group (n/a) - ???
Iran Solidarity (2009 – UK) International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran (2008 – US) Solidarity with Iran (2010 – Iran based, pro-gov’t)
None No 2003
178
Iraqis/1988-1993
European Association for Peace & Solidarity with the Iraqi People (n/a – Belgium) International Committee for a Free Iraq (1991 – UK) International Organization for the Defense of Human Rights in Iraq (n/a) - ???
Iraq Solidarity Campaign (2003 – diaspora?) Act Together: Women Against Sanctions on Iraq (UK) Britain against Sanctions on Iraq (UK) Campaign against Sanctions in Iraqi (UK) Iraq Action Coalition Committee for the Lifting of the Economic Sanctions on the Iraqi People (UK) Iraqi People First (UK) Sheffield Committee against War in the Gulf (UK) Sussez Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq (UK) Voices for Justice in Iraq (UK) Canadian Network to End Sanctions on Iraq (Canada) The Committee for Lifting the Economic Sanctions on Iraq (Canada)
None See: Darren Hawkins and Joshua Lloyd. 2003. “Questioning Comprehensive Sanctions: The Birth of a Norm.” Journal of
Human Rights, Vol. 2, Issue 3, pp. 441-454. Campaign Against Sanctions on
Iraq: http://www.casi.org.uk/about.html
20+ Yes 1997
179
Nova Scotia Campaign to End Sanctions (Canada) University of Western Ontario Movement to End the War Against Iraq (Canada) Committee to End the Iraqi Sanctions (Ireland) Committee to Save the Children in Iraq (Germany) National Network to End the War Against Iraq (2001 – USA) Iraq Action Coalition (USA)
Karens/1988-2000
None None None 0 No 2000
Kashmiris/ 1988-2000
World Kashmir Freedom Movement (1990) – diaspora International Kashmir Alliance (2003 – UK) - diaspora
Kashmir Solidarity Network (2010) – location?? British Friends of Kashmir (2005 – UK)
None Tavseef Mairaj, “Kashmir – The Forgotten Solidarity,” World
Bulletin (2014). http://www.worldbulletin.net/news-analysis/142459/kashmir-the-forgotten-solidarity
0 No 2000
Kenyans/ 1986-1991
None American Friends of Kenya (2004)
None Hans Peter Schmitz. 1999. “Transnational Activism and Political Change in Kenya and Uganda,” In Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn
0 No 1991
180
Sikkink (eds.). The Power of
Human Rights: International
Norms and Domestic Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39-77.
Kenyans/ 1995-1998
None American Friends of Kenya (2004)
None Hans Peter Schmitz. 1999. “Transnational Activism and Political Change in Kenya and Uganda,” In Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). The Power of
Human Rights: International
Norms and Domestic Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39-77.
0 No 1998
Kurds/1980-2002 (Turkey)
International Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan (1991 – Germany) – diaspora/inactive Kurdish Human Rights Project (1992 – UK) – inactive 2011 European Organization for Human Rights in Kurdistan (1992 - ??) – diaspora/inactive
Peace in Kurdistan Campaign (1994 - UK) Labour Solidarity with Kurds (2014) – British Labour Party members – ISIS focus only Nottingham Kurdish Solidarity (2014 – UK) – Scottish Solidarity with Kurdistan (2014 – Scotland) Kurdistan Solidarity Ireland (1993 – Ireland)
Kurdistan Committee (1980– Netherlands) – diaspora British-Kurdish Friendship Society (1980 – UK) - ??
Nicole Watts. 2004. “Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention in International Affairs,” in Joel Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and
Belonging: States and Societies in
the Struggle to Shape Identities
and Local Practice. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 121-148.
3 - 4 No – fits and starts but never meets threshold.
2002
Kurds/1985-2000 (Syria)
International Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan (1991 –
Peace in Kurdistan Campaign (1994 - UK) Labour Solidarity with
International Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan (1991 –
International Support Kurds in Syria Association (2009 – UK)
Nicole Watts. 2004. “Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention
No – fits and starts but never meets
2000
181
Germany) – diaspora/inactive Kurdish Human Rights Project (1992 – UK) – inactive 2011 European Organization for Human Rights in Kurdistan (1992 - ??) – diaspora/inactive
Kurds (2014) – British Labour Party members – ISIS focus only Nottingham Kurdish Solidarity (2014 – UK) – Scottish Solidarity with Kurdistan (2014 – Scotland) Kurdistan Solidarity Ireland (1993 – Ireland)
Germany) – diaspora/inactive Kurdish Human Rights Project (1992 – UK) – inactive 2011 European Organization for Human Rights in Kurdistan (1992 - ??) – diaspora/inactive
in International Affairs,” in Joel Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and
Belonging: States and Societies in
the Struggle to Shape Identities
and Local Practice. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 121-148.
threshold.
Kurds/1988-1993 (Iraq)
International Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan (1991 – Germany) – diaspora/inactive Kurdish Human Rights Project (1992 – UK) – inactive 2011 European Organization for Human Rights in Kurdistan (1992 - ??) – diaspora/inactive
Peace in Kurdistan Campaign (1994 - UK) Labour Solidarity with Kurds (2014) – British Labour Party members – ISIS focus only Nottingham Kurdish Solidarity (2014 – UK) – Scottish Solidarity with Kurdistan (2014 – Scotland) Kurdistan Solidarity Ireland (1993 – Ireland)
Kurdistan Committee (~1980s– Netherlands) – diaspora British-Kurdish Friendship Society (n/a – UK)
Nicole Watts. 2004. “Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention in International Affairs,” in Joel Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and
Belonging: States and Societies in
the Struggle to Shape Identities
and Local Practice. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 121-148.
No 1993
Lebanese/ 1997-2000
None Friends of Lebanon (2006 – UK)
None 0 No 2000
Malawis/ None Malawi Support Group - None 0 No 1993
182
1992-1993 ?? Christian focused Friends of Malawi (USA) -
Malaysians/ 1987-1991
None Friends of Malaysia (USA) None 0 No 1991
Malaysians/ 1996-2000
None Friends of Malaysia (USA)
None 0 No 2000
Mauritanians/1989-1990
Coalition against Slavery in Mauritania & Sudan (1995 – USA)
None None 1 No 1990
Mexicans/ 1982-1984
Religious Task Force on Central America & Mexico (1980)
Mexico Solidarity Network (1998 – US) London Mexico Solidarity (UK) Cambridge-Mexico Solidarity (2014 - UK)
None Kathryn Sikkink. 1993. “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America.” International
Organization. Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 411-441.
3 No 1984
Mexicans/ 1994-2003
Force on Central America & Mexico (1980)
Mexico Solidarity Network (1998 – US) London Mexico Solidarity (UK) Cambridge-Mexico Solidarity (2014 - UK)
None Kathryn Sikkink. 1993. “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America.” International
Organization. Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 411-441.
3 No 2003
Mons/ 1988-2000
None Mon National League For Solidarity (USA) - diaspora
None 0 No 2000
183
Moroccans/ 1990-1994
Association for the Support of Committees against Repression in Morocco (1972 – France)
Friends of Morocco (USA) Committee for Defense of Human Rights in Morocco (1979) – diaspora? Coordinating Committee against Repression in Morocco (1972 – France)
Sieglinde Granzer. 1999. “Changing Discourse: Transnational Advocacy Networks in Tunisia and Morocco,” In Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). The Power of
Human Rights: International
Norms and Domestic Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 109-133.
3 No 1994
Nepalese/ 1986-1987
None Canada Nepal Solidarity for Peace (??) Friends of Nepal (USA, Australia)
None 0 No 1987
Nepalese/ 1999-2003
None Friends of Nepal (USA, Australia) Canada Nepal Solidarity for Peace (??)
None 1 No 2003
Nicaraguans/1978-1979
Association Solidarity Luxembourg Nicaragua (n/a – Luxembourg)
National Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People (1979) – coalition of 60+ groups in US Canadian Action for Nicaragua (1979) – coalition of 25 orgs. Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign (1978 – UK)
Sharon Nepstad. 2004. Convictions of the Soul: Religion,
Culture and Agency in the
Central America Solidarity
Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. Christian Smith. 1996. Resisting
Reagan: the US Central America
Peace Movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
100s+ Yes 1979
Nigerians/ 1988-1991
None We Stand in Solidarity with Nigeria (2015)
None 0 No 1991
184
Friends of Nigeria (1996 – USA)
Nigerians/ 1994-2000
None We Stand in Solidarity with Nigeria (2015) Friends of Nigeria (1996 – USA)
None 0 No 2000
Nuba/ 1989-1997
None End Nuba Genocide Coalition (??) Nuba Survival Foundation (UK)
None Samuel Totten and Amanda Gryzb (eds.). 2015. Conflict in the
Nuba Mountains: From Genocide
by Attrition to the Contemporary
Crisis in Sudan. New York: Routledge. Mark Bradbury. 1998. “Sudan: International Responses to War in the Nuba Mountains.” Review of
African Political Economy. No. 77, pp. 463-474.
0 No 1997
Nuba/ 2002-2003
None End Nuba Genocide Coalition (??) Nuba Survival Foundation (UK)
None Samuel Totten and Amanda Gryzb (eds.). 2015. Conflict in the
Nuba Mountains: From Genocide
by Attrition to the Contemporary
Crisis in Sudan. New York: Routledge. Mark Bradbury. 1998. “Sudan: International Responses to War in the Nuba Mountains.” Review of
African Political Economy. No. 77, pp. 463-474.
0 No 2003
Ogonis/ 1994-2000
None Ogoni Solidarity Network (Canada) Ogoni Solidarity Ireland (Ireland)
None Clifford Bob. 2005. The
Marketing of Rebellion:
Insurgents, Media and
International Activism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
2 No 2000
185
Pakistanis/ 1979-1988
None Movement for Solidarity and Peace in Pakistan (2011 – Pakistan)
Pakistan Committee for Democracy & Justice (1979) – diaspora coalition.
0 No 1988
Pakistanis/ 1991-2000
None Pakistan Committee for Democracy & Justice (1979) – diaspora coalition.
0 No 2000
Palestinians/ 1986-2000
European Association for NGOs Working on Palestine (1992 – Belgium) Al Awda – Palestine Right of Return Coalition (n/a – USA) Palestine Human Rights Campaign (1977 – USA) International Committee of Solidarity with the Palestinian People (n/a)
Palestine Solidarity Campaign (1982 – UK) – 62 Branches http://www.palestinecampaign.org/get-involved/branches/ Coalition against Israeli Apartheid (Canada) Students against Israeli Apartheid (Canada) US Campaign to End Israeli Occupation - ~400 member groups: http://www.endtheoccupation.org/groups.php?sortby=&modin=&state=&bydate=2012-09-01&search=Search Australian Friends of Palestine Australians for Palestine
Palestine Human Rights Campaign (n/a) Palestine Solidarity Committee (1975) – 12 affiliate groups Search for Justice & Equality in Palestine (1976) International Committee on Palestinian Human Rights (1975 – France) – 6 chapters in Europe & Australia. British Anti-Zionist Organization, Palestine Solidarity (1975 – UK)
Ben White. 2009. Israeli
Apartheid: A Beginner’s Guide. London: Pluto Press. Abigail Bakan and Yasmeen Abu-Laban. 2009. “Palestinian Resistance and International Solidarity: the BDS Campaign,” Race & Class, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 29-54. Omar Barghouti. 2011. BDS:
Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions:
The Global Struggle for
Palestinian Rights. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
100s+ Yes 2001
186
British Committee for the Universities for Palestine Ireland Palestine Solidarity Campaign Scottish Palestine Solidarity Campaign Students for Justice in Palestine Canadians for Justice & Peace in the Middle East
Papuans/ 1985-2003
Committee for the Aid to West Papuan Refugees (1977)
Free West Papua Campaign (Australia) Freedom Flotilla for West Papua Australian West Papua Association Free West Papua Collective West Papua Solidarity Group (Australia) Australians for a Free West Papua Surfers for West Papua (Australia) Free West Papua Action Group (Australia)
Committee for Self-Determination West Papua/West New Guinea (1961 – Netherlands)
Peter King. 2004. West Papua &
Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or
Chaos (2004). Sydney: UNSW Press. Martin Pelcher. 2012. “Fear, Grief and Hope in Occupied West Papua,” IC Magazine. https://intercontinentalcry.org/fear-grief-and-hope-in-occupied-west-papua/ Jason MacLeod. 2013. “What Kind of Solidarity for West Papua,” IC Magazine (2013). https://intercontinentalcry.org/what-kind-of-solidarity-for-west-papua/
15 Yes 2004
187
West Papua Action Network (USA) East Timor & Indonesia Solidarity Network (USA) Free West Papua Campaign Netherlands (Netherlands) West Papua Action Network (Canada) Free West Papua Campaign France Free West Papua Campaign Germany West Papua Action Ireland (1996)
Paraguayans/1985-1988
None Friends of Paraguay (1987 – USA)
Paraguay Watch (n/a) – informal coalition Solidarity Committee in Support of the People of Paraguay (1982 – France) Paraguay Working Group (1976 – West Germany) Committee in Solidarity with the Paraguayan People (n/a – Sweden)
6 No 1988
188
Paraguay Information and Solidarity Center (n/a – Switzerland) Paraguay Committee for Human Rights (1978 – UK)
Peruvians /1983-2000
None Peru Support Group (1983 – UK) Solidarity Peru (2003 – USA) – humanitarian Canadian Friends of Peru – humanitarian/development
Peru Solidarity Committee (1979)
See list of orgs here: http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1992/eirv19n39-19921002/eirv19n39-19921002_044-shining_paths_operatives_abroad.pdf Committee in Defense of Human Rights in Peru (Belgium) Committee in Support of the Peruvian People (Belgium) French-Peruvian Committee against Repression (France)
James Brooke. 1991. “Shining Path Supporters Abroad Anger Peru,” New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/18/world/shining-path-supporters-abroad-anger-peru.html
12+ Yes 1983
189
Sol-Peru Committee (France, UK) Movement for the Liberation of Peru (France) International Solidarity Committee with the Struggle of the Peruvian People (France) Support Group for the Liberation Struggle of the Peruvian People (Denmark) Peru Popular Movement (Denmark) Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru (USA) Solidarity with Peru Group (USA) Peru Popular Movement in
190
Switzerland (Switzerland)
Poles/ 1982-1986
Polish Peace Committee (n/a) - ??
Polish Solidarity Campaign of Great Britain (1980 – UK)
None Giles Hart. 1993. For Our
Freedom and Yours: A History of
the Polish Solidarity Campaign of
Great Britain 1980 – 1994.
London: Polish Solidarity Campaign.
1 No 1986
Roma/ 1993-1998
European Roma Rights Centre (1996 – Hungary)
Roma Support Group (1998 – UK) – Roma migrants in UK; diaspora.
None Melanie Ram. 2010. “Interests, Norms and Advocacy: Explaining the Emergence of the Roma onto the EU’s Agenda,” Ethnopolitics, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 197-217.
1 No 1998
Romanians/ 1978-1980
None Committee for Human Rights in Rumania (1976) - formed by Hungarian Americans League for the Defense of Human Rights in Romania (1980 – France) - diaspora?
0 No 1980
Romanians/ 1989-1990
None None 0 No 1990
Romanians/ 1993-1998
None None 0 No 1998
Soviets/ 1976-1990
None Committee for Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners (1972) – exile org?
Matthew Evangelista. 1999. Unarmed Forces: The
Transnational Movement to End
the Cold War. Ithaca, New York:
1 No 1990
191
Scientists for Orlov & Shcharansky (1978) – national org of scientists
Cornell University Press.
Russians/ 1991-2000
None None 0 No 2000
Rwandans/ 1990-1991
None None 0 No 1991
Rwandans /1994-2000
None None Samantha Power. 2002. A
Problem from Hell: America and
the Age of Genocide. New York: Basic Books.
0 No 2000
Saharawis /1990-1994
None Western Sahara Campaign (UK – 1984) Western Sahara Resource Watch Free Western Sahara Network Western Sahara Solidarity Group (Belgium) Norwegian Support Committee for Western Sahara (1993 – Norway) Western Sahara Action Ireland (
Saharan Peoples Support Committee (1977) Portuguese Committee to Support the Polisario Front (n/a – Portugal) Sarahan People’s Support Committee of Switzerland (1977 – Switzerland)
Maria Stephan and Jacob Mundy. 2006. “A Battlefield Transformed: From Guerrilla Resistance to Mass Nonviolent Struggle in the Western Sahara,” Journal of Military and Strategic
Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3. http://jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/132/148 Stephen Zunes. 2006. “Western Sahara: The Other Occupation,” Tikkun. http://www.tikkun.org/article.php/Zunes-westernsahara-the-other-occupation
9 Yes 1984
Salvadorans/1977-1996
None Broad Movement of Solidarity with the Salvadorean People (1977)
Sharon Nepstad. 2004. Convictions of the Soul: Religion,
Culture and Agency in the
Central America Solidarity
Movement. New York: Oxford
100s+ Yes 1980
192
Committee for Progressive Salvadoreans (1975) – diaspora Religious Task Force for El Salvador (1980) Salvadorean-American Human Rights Committee (1980) – diaspora Guatemala-El Salvador Committee (n/a – Sweden) El Salvador Solidarity Campaign (n/a – UK) El Salvador Committee for Human Rights (1981/2 – UK)
University Press. Christian Smith. 1996. Resisting
Reagan: the US Central America
Peace Movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Saudis/ 1989-1989
None None 0 No 1989
Saudis/ 1998-2000
None None 0 No 2000
Serbs/ 1995-1998
None None 0 No 1998
Shans/1988-2000
None None 0 No 2000
Shi'is (Iraq) /1988-1993
None None 0 No 1993
193
Shi'is (Saudi)/1998-
2000
None None 0 No 2000
Sierra Leoneans/ 1998-2000
None None 0 No 2000
Sikhs/ 1988-2000
None Sikh Coalition (2001 – USA) – diaspora
None 0 No 2000
Somalis/1988-1990
None Somali Solidarity Campaign (2011 – Somalia)
None 0 No 1990
South Koreans/1982-
1983
International Committee of Lawyers for Democracy and Human Rights in South Korean (1976)
Friends of the Korean People (1978) – diaspora? North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea (1975) – coalition of 36 Canadian and US church groups & Synagogue Council of America
2 No 1983
South Koreans/1986-
1986
International Committee of Lawyers for Democracy and Human Rights in South Korean (1976)
Friends of the Korean People (1978) – diaspora? North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea (1975) – coalition of 36 Canadian and US church groups & Synagogue Council of America
2 No 1986
194
Southern Sudanese/ 1989-1997
Coalition against Slavery in Mauritania and Sudan (1995)
Sudan Advocacy Action Form Canadian Aid for Southern Sudan Canadians Against Slavery
None Allen Hertzke. 2004. God’s
Children: The Unlikely Alliance
for Global Rights. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Stephan Hamberg. 2013. “Transnational Advocacy Networks, Rebel Groups, and Demobilization of Child Soldiers in Sudan,” in Jeffrey Checkel (ed.), Transnational Dynamics of
Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 149-172.
4 No 1997
Sri Lankans/ 1985-2000
Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace & Justice (2009 – UK)
None 1 No 2000
Sudanese /1983-1985
Coalition against Slavery in Mauritania and Sudan (1995)
None 1 No 1985
Sudanese /1989-1997
Coalition against Slavery in Mauritania and Sudan (1995)
None 1 No 1997
Sudanese/ 2002-2003
Coalition against Slavery in Mauritania and Sudan (1995)
None 1 No 2003
Syrians/ 1985-2000
None Syria Support Group (USA – State Department) Syria Solidarity Movemenet (2012) Save Syria (USA) - diaspora
None 1 No 2000
195
Tajiks/1996-1999
None None 0 No 1999
Tamils/1985-2000
None Tamil Solidarity (UK – 2009)
Eelam Tamils Association of America (1979) – diaspora Sri Lanka Information Group (1977 – Netherlands) Tamil Rights Group (n/a – UK) Tamil Action Committee (n/a – UK)
1 No 2000
Thailand/ 1986-1987
None Union of Democratic Thais (1976) – diaspora Thailand Information and Solidarity Committee (1977 – West Germany)
0 No 1987
Tibetans /1986-2002
Tibet Justice Center (1989 – USA) International Campaign for Tibet (1988 – USA) International Tibet Network (n/a – UK) Committee of 100 for Tibet (1992 –
Bay Area Friends of Tibet Boston Tibet Network Canada Tibet Committee Colorado Friends of Tibet International Campaign for Tibet (US, Europe) San Diego Friends of Tibet
None See list here: http://tibetnetwork.org/find-a-tibet-group/
John Roberts and Elizabeth Roberts. 2009. Freeing Tibet: 50
Years of Struggle, Resilience and
Hope. New York: AMACOM. Margarat McLagan. 1996. Mobilizing for Tibet:
Transnational Politics and
Diaspora Culture in the Post-
Cold War Era. PhD Dissertation, New York University.
100+ Yes 1988
196
USA) World Artists for Tibet (n/a) Students for a Free Tibet International (1994 – USA)
Students for a Free Tibet (US, Canada, UK, France) Western Colorado Friends of Tibet Free Tibet Les Amis du Tibet (Belgium, Luxembourg) Save Tibet Austria Tibet Support Group Adelaid Tibet Support Group Western Australia
John Powers. 2000. “The Free Tibet Movement: A Selective Narrative,” in Christopher Queen (ed.), Engaged Buddhism in the
West. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
Togolese/ 1999-1999
None None 0 No 1999
Trinidad & Tobago/
1998-2000
None None 0 No 2000
Tunisians/ 1986-1987
None US Committee For Public Liberties in Tunisia (1978)
Sieglinde Granzer. 1999. “Changing Discourse: Transnational Advocacy Networks in Tunisia and Morocco,” In Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). The Power of
Human Rights: International
Norms and Domestic Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 109-133.
0 No 1987
Tunisians/1991-2000
None US Committee For Public Liberties in Tunisia (1978)
Sieglinde Granzer. 1999. “Changing Discourse: Transnational Advocacy
0
197
Networks in Tunisia and Morocco,” In Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). The Power of
Human Rights: International
Norms and Domestic Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 109-133.
Turkmenistani/ 1997-1998
None None 0 No 1998
Turks/1980-2002
None None 0 No 1998
Tutsis/1990-1991
None None 0 No 1991
Tutsis/1994-2000
None None 0 No 2000
Tutsis/1994-2000
None None 0 No 2000
Tutsis/1996-2000
None None 0 No 2000
Ugandans/1984-1985
None None Hans Peter Schmitz. 1999. “Transnational Activism and Political Change in Kenya and Uganda,” In Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). The Power of
Human Rights: International
Norms and Domestic Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39-77.
0 No 1985
Uighurs (Turkmen)/1986
-2002
None Uyghur Human Rights Project (2004 – USA) - diaspora
None
1 No 2002
Ukrainians/ 1995-1997
None Smoloskyp Organization for the Defense of Human Rights in the Ukraine
0 No 1997
198
(1968) – diaspora? Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Ukraine (1978) – diaspora? World Congress of Free Ukrainians, Human Rights Commission (1976) - diaspora
Uruguayans/ 1975-1984
None Uruguay Information Group (1976) Uruguay Information Project (1976) – diaspora? Uruguayan Coordination o Solidarity in Italy (1977 – committees across the country) Uruguay Association (n/a _ Sweden) – diaspora? Uruguay Committee (n/a – Sweden) – diaspora? Uruguay Information and Solidarity Group (n/a – Switzerland)
7 No 1984
199
Committee for Human Rights in Uruguay (n/a – UK)
Uzbeks/1993-1995
None None 0 No 1995
Uzbeks/1996-1999
None None 0 No 1999
Uzbeks/1999-2000
None None 0 No 2000
Vietnamese/ 1990-1993
International Committee for a Free Vietnam (1986 – Belgium) - ?? Free Vietnam Alliance (1990 – France) - ??
Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners in Vietnam (1978) – diaspora Movement for Human Rights in Vietnam (1976) – diaspora?
0 No 1993
Yugoslavs/ 1981-1990
None
Committee to Aid Democratic Dissidents in Yugoslavia (1979)
1 No 1990
Zapatistas/ 1994-2003
None UK Zapatista Network – 7 branches. Mexico Solidarity Network (1998 – US) Canadian Solidarity Alliance for the Zapatistas Edinburgh Chiapas Solidarity Group Chiapas Coalition
Clifford Bob. 2005. The
Marketing of Rebellion:
Insurgents, Media and
International Activism. New York: Cambridge University Press. Thomas Olesen. 2005. International Zapatismo: The
Construction of Solidarity in the
Age of Globalization. London: Zed Books.
11 Yes 1995
200
Zimbabweans/ 1985-1986
None Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (1977) Holland Committee on Southern Africa (1961 – Netherlands) Norwegian Council for Southern African (1967 – Netherlands) International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (1956 – UK) Chicago Committee for African Liberation Southern Africa Support Group Southern Africa Organizing Committee Southern Africa Committee Lutheran Coalition on Southern Africa Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa
David Black. 1999. “The Long and Winding Road: International Norms and Domestic Political Change in South Africa.” In Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). The
Power of Human Rights:
International Norms and
Domestic Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 78-108.
10+ Yes XXXX
201
Action Committee on Southern Africa (Belgium)
Zimbabweans/ 2000-2000
None None
0 No 2000
202
Appendix C: Measuring Diaspora Civil Society Mobilization Distant rebel Homeland Mobilization
Score Sources
Acehnese Indonesia 0.5 Antje Missbach. 2012. Separatist Conflict in
Indonesia: The Long-distance politics of the Acehnese
diaspora. New York: Routledge.
Afghanis Afghanistan 0.5 Jennifer Brinkerhoff. 2004. "Digital Diasporas and International Development: Afghan-Americans and the Reconstruction of Afghanistan,” Public Administration
& Development. No. 24, pp. 397-413. (internet mobilization) Leila Jazayery. 2003. "The Migration-Development Nexus: Afghanistan Case Study" in Nicholas Van Hear and Ninna Nyberg Sorenson (eds.). The Migration-
Development Nexus. Geneva: International Organization for Migration, pp. 207-232. (remittances) Shah Mahmoud Hanifi. 2006. "Material and Social Remittances to Afghanistan.” In C. Wescott and J. Brinkheroff (eds.), Converting Migration Drains into
Gains: Harnessing the Resources of Overseas
Professionals. Manilla: Asian Development Bank, pp. 98-126. Carolin Fischer. 2013. "Afghan Diasporas in Britain and Germany." In Tan Tai Yong and Md Mizanur Rahman (eds.), Diaspora Engagement and
Development in South Asia. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 56-74.
Ahmadis Pakistan 1 Marzi Balzani. 2006. “Transnational Marriage Among Ahmadi Muslims in UK.” Global Networks, Vol. 6 No. 4, pp. 147-157.
Albanians Albania 1 Paul Hockenos. 2003. Homeland Calling: Exile
203
Patriotism and the Balkan Wars. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Maria Koinova. 2013. “Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism For Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK,” Foreign
Policy Analysis. Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 433-453.
Algerians Algeria 0.5 Michael Collyer. 2006. “Transnational Political Participation of Algerians in France: Extra-territorial Civil Society Versus Transnational Governmentality,” Political Geography, No. 25, pp. 836-849. Michael Collyer. 2003. “Are there National Borders in Cyberspace? Evidence from the Algerian Transnational Community,” Geography, Vol. 88 No. 4, pp. 348-356. Paul Silverstein. 2004 Algeria in France:
Transpolitics, Race, and Nation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Argentinians Argentina 0.5 Benedetta Calandra. 2013. “Exile and Diaspora in an Atypical Context: Chileans and Argentinians in the United States (1973-2005), Bulletin of Latin American
Research, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 311-324.
Armenians Azerbaijan 1 Khachig Toloyan. 2000. “Elites and Institutions in the Armenian Transnation,” Diaspora: A Journal of
Transnational Studies. Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 107-136. Yossi Shain. 2002. “The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution,” SAIS Review. Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 115-144. David King & Miles Pomper, “The US Congress and Contingent Influence of Diaspora Lobbies: Lessons from US Policy Toward Armenia and Azerbaijan,” Journal of Armenian Studies (2004).
Azerbaijan Azerbaijanis 0 David King and Miles Pomper. 2004. “The US
204
Congress and Contingent Influence of Diaspora Lobbies: Lessons from US Policy Toward Armenia and Azerbaijan.” Journal of Armenian Studies Vol. 8, No. 1. Sergey Rumyansev. 2012. “Diaspora-Building in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan,” CARIM-East Explanatory Note http://www.carim-east.eu/media/exno/Explanatory%20Notes_2012-35.pdf
Bahrainis Bahrain 0.5 Claire Beugrand. 2008. “The Return of the Bahraini Exiles (2001-2006): The Impact of the Ostracization Experience on the Opposition’s Restructuring,” BRIMES Annual Conference. https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/file/index/docid/511588/filename/The_Return_of_the_Bahraini_Exiles.pdf
Bangladeshis Bangladeshi 0.5 David Garbin. 2005. “Bangladeshi Diaspora in the UK: Some Observations on socio-cultural dynamics, religious trends, and transnational politics,” Conference on Human Rights & Bangladesh. https://www.surrey.ac.uk/cronem/files/BE04B01Ed01.pdf
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Tutsis DRC 0 David Garbin and Marie Godin. 2013. “’Saving the Congo’: Transnational Social Fields and Politics of Home in the Congolese Diaspora,” African and Black
222
Diaspora: An International Journal, Vol. 6 No. 2, pp. 113-130.
Tutsis Burundi 0.5 Simon Turner. 2008. “The Waxing and Waning of the Political Field in Burundi and its Diaspora,” Ethnic &
Racial Studies. Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 742-765.
Tutsis Rwanda 0.5 Simon Turner. 2013 “Staging the Rwandan Diaspora: The Politics of Performance.” African Studies. Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 265-284.
Tutsis Rwanda 0.5 Simon Turner. 2013 “Staging the Rwandan Diaspora: The Politics of Performance.” African Studies. Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 265-284.
Ugandans Uganda 0 No sources found
Uighurs (Turkmen)
China 0.5 Yu-Wen Chen. 2014. The Uyghur Lobby: Global
Networks, Coalitions and Strategies of the World
Uyghur Congress. London: Routledge.
Ukrainians Ukraine 1 Wsevolod Isajiw, “The Ukranian Diaspora,” in Allon Gal, Athena Leoussi & Anthony Smith (eds.), The Call
of the Homeland: Diaspora Nationalisms, Past and
Present (2010)
Uruguayans Uruguay 0.5 Mario Sznajder and Luis Roniger. 2007. “Exile Communities and their Differential Institutional Dynamics: A Comparative Analysis of the Chilean and Uruguayan Political Diasporas,” Revista de
Ciencia Politica, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 43-66.
Uzbeks Afghanistan 0 Matteo Fumagalli. 2007. “Ethncity, state formation and foreign policy: Uzbekistan and ‘Uzbeks Abroad,” Central Asian Survey. Vol. 26, No. 1 pp. 105-122.
Uzbeks Uzbekistan 0 Matteo Fumagalli. 2007. “Ethncity, state formation and foreign policy: Uzbekistan and ‘Uzbeks Abroad,” Central Asian Survey. Vol. 26, No. 1 pp. 105-122.
Uzbeks Uzbekistan 0 Matteo Fumagalli. 2007. “Ethncity, state formation and foreign policy: Uzbekistan and ‘Uzbeks Abroad,” Central Asian Survey. Vol. 26, No. 1 pp. 105-122.
Vietnamese Vietnam 0.5 David Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul. 2009. Ethnic
Lobbies and US Foreign Policy. Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers.
223
Yugoslav Yugoslavia 0.5 Jan Hupkens, Melina Menguin-Layerenza and Bajro Muric. “Belonging and Not Belonging: The Yugoslav Diaspora in the Netherlands,” Humanity in Action. http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/373-belonging-and-not-belonging-the-yugoslav-diaspora-in-the-netherlands
Zapatistas Mexico 0 No sources found
Zimbabweans Zimbabwe 0 Dominic Pasura. 2011. “A Fractured Transnational Diaspora: The Case of Zimbabweans in Britain,” International Migration Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 143-161
Zimbabweans Zimbabwe 0.5 Dominic Pasura. 2011. “A Fractured Transnational Diaspora: The Case of Zimbabweans in Britain,” International Migration Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 143-161
224
Appendix D: Description of Amnesty Campaigns
Group Short summary From data sources: Final designation
Acehnese (1985-2003)
The Acehnese are seeking independence from Indonesia.
From Minorities at Risk: The Acehnese are led by the National Front for the Liberation for Aceh-Sumatra (or the Free Aceh Movement – GAM) founded in 1976. GAM solicits external support as a primary strategy. From NAVCO data: The Acehnese have campaigned for independence from 1976. This campaign has been violent. It has received external state support (Libya) and diaspora support. From 1998 to 2005 the Acehnese have received significant concessions from the Indonesian government. From the TIES data: From 1975-1976 the US terminated foreign aid to Indonesia. From 1992-1994 it
I put this group into 3 categories:
1. Human rights progress 2. Western sanctions 3. Group seeks external
support but not mass solidarity mobilization support
225
terminated foreign aid and imposed an export restriction. From 1999 to 2005 the US imposed a partial economic embargo on Indonesia. From POLITY data Indonesia is undemocratic from 1970 to 2000 (-6) before improving considerable after 2001.
Ahmadiyya (1991-2000)
Religious minority in Pakistan that suffers political exclusion and repression
Minorities at Risk: The Ahmdiyya in Pakistan are led by Ahmadiyya Jamaat (AJ). AJ was founded in Rabwah, Pakistan but has since relocated to London. They solicit external support as a secondary strategy. From NAVCO data: The Ahmadiyya have not run a domestic campaign. From TIES data: In 1977 the US imposed an export restriction on Pakistan. From CIRI data: From 1991 to 2000 tehre was
I put this group into 1 category:
1. No campaign due to state repression
226
significant decline in human rights protections. Protections of the freedom of association is low (avg = 1.1). From Polity data (POLITY score: The 1990s in Pakistan is a period of factionalism. Dring this period Pakistan is a weak democracy (8) that experiences autocratic backsliding in late 1990s.
Bahrainis 1996-1996 Government repression of activists and civil society
From MAR: No entry because not a minority group From NAVCO: No campaign entry From TIES data: No Western human rights sanctions From CIRI data: No major improvements around AI campaign period. No election rights. From POLITY data: Closed institutions. Very
I put this group into 1 cateogory: 1. No campaign due to
government repression
227
repressive (below -8).
Bangladeshis 1985-1988
From MAR: No entry because not a minority group From NAVCO: From 1987 to 1990 there was the Anti-Ershad campaign against the regime. From 1976 to 1997 there was the Shanti Bahini autonomy struggle. No entry for pro-democracy movement. From TIES data: In 1987 Canada imposed sanctions (N/A end date). From 1992-1994 US imposed sanctions. No data on sanction type. From CIRI data: Minor human rights improvements during AI campaign period, regarding election rights and freedom of speech. From POLITY data: Closed through the 1980s.
I put this group into 3 category: 1. Human rights sanctions
imposed 2. Human rights progress 3. Domestic campaign but
not asking for it.
228
Significant improvements in 1990 but also period of severe factionalism.
Belarusians 1997-2000
The Belarusians face government repression of all forms of opposition and dissent.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No pro-democracy campaign during late 1990s. Mass protests occur in 2006 but this is beyond the period covered by the dataset. From TIES data: No sanctions during the Amnesty International campaign. In 2004 US imposes a partial economic embargo, freeze state assets, imposes travel ban and suspends economic agreements. From CIRI data: There is no significant human rights progress during the Amnesty campaign. Rights protections remain very low, if non-existent during this period.
I put this group into 1 category
1. No campaign due to state repression
229
Freedom of association is not respected at all (avg = 0). From POLITY data: From 1997 through 2000 Belarusia is very repressive (score of -7).
Bolivians (1980-1982)
Bolivians struggle for democracy against military junta.
From Minorities at Risk: No entry because not a minority. From NAVCO data: From 1977 to 1982 Bolivians run an anti-junta campaign. It is non-violent and is seeking regime change. The opposition obtains limited concessions in 1977 but significant concessions in 1978, 1979 and 1980. The campaign is successful in 1982. From TIES data: From 1979 to 1982 the US terminated foreign aid to Bolivia. From CIRI data:
I put this group into 3 categories:
1. Human rights progress 2. Western sanctions 3. Campaigns but does not
seek external support (MORE RESEARCH NEEDED)
230
There is a major improvement in rights protections form 1981 (2) to 1982 (9). No data pre-1981. From POLITY: 1980-81 sees improvement in democratic rights protections and continued progress towards democracy after 1982.
Brazilians (1988-2000)
Failure of government to live up to ratified human rights treaties and a justice system in crisis, which includes government-backed death squads and widespread use of torture.
From Minorities at Risk data:
No entry because not a
minority group. From NAVCO data: No campaign entry. From TIES data: From 1977 to 1984 US terminates foreign aid. From CIRI data: Fairly high rights protections during AI campaign years (10-14). Freedom of Association
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No domestic campaign
due to institutional openness.
231
average = ~2. From POLITY: There is a significant improvement towards democracy from 1986 although it remains weak through the 1990s (8).
Burundians (1994-2000)
Widespread killings between Hutu and Tutsis seeking to control state institutions. Civilians caught in between.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No Burundian campaign against violence or for democracy. From TIES data: No Western sanctions imposed. From 1996 to 1999, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Ethiopia impose partial economic embargo and a blockade.
From CIRI data: No significant progress during
I put this group into 1 category:
1. No domestic campaign due to state repression (* = case of state collapse)
232
AI campaign years. Right to freedom of association is non-existent. From POLITY: Identifies period as one of state failure (interregnum).
Cambodians/1997-1998 (811)
Increasing level of government repression of civil liberties after period of democratization beginning in 1993.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No domestic campaign during Amnesty campaign years. Khmer Rouge insurgency ends in 1997.
From TIES data: From 1988-2007 the US, Canada and Australia impose partial economic embargo, freeze assets, terminate foreign aid, impose travel ban, and suspend economic agreements. From CIRI data: Big improvement in 1993 (from 3 to 8) and fairly high scores (9
I put this case into two categories:
1. Western sanctions 2. No campaign because of
state repression
233
and above, maxing at 12) in the late 1990s. Freedom of Association average = 1. From Polity data: In 1997 there is a significant authoritarian backslide. In 2000 improvements but it never becomes democracy (~2).
Chechens/1976-2000 (365)
The Chechens are seeking independence from Russia.
From Minorities at Risk data: The Chechen’s main groups are the Caucasian Independence Party (CIP), the Caucasian People’s Federation (CPF) and Daymokhk CIP and CPF seek external support as primary strategy, while Daymokhk does not seek external support. They seek external support from Chechen diaspora, UN, US government, and UNPO (Koinova, Lapidus). From NAVCO data: From 1994-2006 the Chechens waged a campaign for independence. It was violent. It was not successful and no
I put this group into 1 category: 1. Campaigns and seeks
external support but not mass solidarity mobilization support
234
concessions were won. From TIES data: No Western human rights sanctions imposed on Russia duria Chechnya conflict. From POLITY data: Improvement in Russian democracy in early 1990s, but also period of factionalism. Weak democracy through the 1990s. But significant improvement from 1990-1991 from 0 to 5.
Congolese/1996-2000 (490)
Gross violations and use of violence by DRC (Zaire in 1996) government under Kabila. Unarmed civilians caught into the complex web of fighting in the country
From Minorities at Risk dataset: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No campaign entry. From TIES data: No Western sanctions imposed. From CIRI data:
I put this group into 1 category:
1. No campaign due to repression
235
Data suggests collapse of state authority From POLITY: The 1990s are identified as period of interregnum (normal government is suspended) and state failure events occur in early 1990s.
Darfuris (1989-1997)
Black Muslims that face repression from Sudanese Arab government. Seeking self-determination rights and greater share of profits from resource extraction in the region.
From Minorities at Risk data: There is an entry but considerable missing data for this time period. Data suggest through the 1980s and 1990s Darfuris are led primarily by militant organizations. From NAVCO data: No campaign in Darfur during the 1990s. From TIES data: In 1994 onwards US impose a partial economic embargo, asset freeze, termination of foreign aid, travel ban.
I put this case into 1 category 1. No domestic campaign
due to state repression (sanctions imposed are on southern Sudan issue not Darfur)
236
From CIRI Data: No rights protections at all in the 1990s. From POLITY data: In 1989 autocratic backsliding occurs. Very undemocratic (-7) through the 1990s .
Egyptians/1989-2002 (651)
Government repression of all forms of dissent and opposition. Egyptian activists seeking end of one-party rule.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: From 2000-2005 Egyptian Kifaya activists run a pro-democracy campaign. It is a non-violent campaign that seeks major reforms and regime change. Achieves limited concession in 2000, then in 2003-4. Unsucessful by 2005. Does not seek external support (El-Mahdi correspondence). From TIES data: No Western sanctions.
I put this group into 1 category:
1. Domestic campaigning group not seeking external support.
237
From CIRI data: Declining rights protections during AI campaign years. From POLITY data: Highly autocratic (-6) during AI campaign years.
Hazaras (1996-1999)
Hazaras in Afghanistan face repression under Sunni Taliban government. Seek greater political rights, minority rights protections, religious freedoms. Targeted disproportionately by the Taliban. Victims of massacres in late 1990s.
From Minorities at Risk data: The Hazaras are led by Hizb-i-Wahdat, founded in 1989). They seek external support as a secondary strategy, Largely supported by the Iranians who have used them as their primariy Shiite-based client group in Afghanistan. (Emadi; Rubin). From NAVCO data: No Hazara campaign From TIES data: No Western sanctions. From CIRI data:
I put this group into 1 category:
1. No domestic campaign because of state repression
238
No rights protections during AI campaign years. From POLITY: 1996-1997 is a period of interregnum (state collapse). From 1997-2000 the state is highly repressive (-7).
Hondurans (1981-1988)
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No domestic campaign. From TIES data: No Western sanctions From CIRI data: In the 1980s very strong rights protections (~13 – 14) Full protections of rights of freedom of association, speech, voting. From POLITY data: Transition period seeing
I put this group into 1 category
1. No domestic campaign due to institutional openness.
239
considerable improvement through early 1980s from -2 to 6 through to 1990.
Hutus – Burundi (1994-2000)
Majority group in Burundi but repressed by Tutsis. Face political, economic and social exclusion by Tutsi controlled government institutions.
From MAR data: The Hutus in Burundi are led by three main organizations: 1) The Front for Democracy (FD); 2) Party for the Liberation of the Hutus/National Liberation Forces (FLN); 3) National Council for Defence. FD and NCD do not seek external support. FLN seeks external support as primary strategy, mainly from Tanzania (Byman et al). From NAVCO data: From 1993-2002 the Hutus rebelled against the government seeking regime change. This campaign was violent. From TIES data: No Western sanctions imposed. From POLITY:
I put this group into 1 category:
1. Campaigning group seeking external support but not a mass solidarity mobilization.
240
POLITY defines this period as one of state collapse (interregnum).
Hutus – DRC (1996-2000)
Hutus in the DRC suffer economic exclusion and political restrictions, including denial of citizenship and right to vote.
From MAR data: The Hutus main organization is the Catholic Church. It does not seek external support for the Hutu struggle in the DRC. From NAVCO data: No campaign entry From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data: Data suggests collapse of state authority From POLITY: 1990s are period of interregnum and state failure events
I put this group into 1 category:
1. No domestic campaign due to state repression
241
Indigenous Peoples – Mexico (1994-2003)
Indigena in Mexico face loss of land due to gov’t policy and NAFTA, political exclusion, poor living conditions. They seek regional autonomy, government investments, and removal of paramilitaries.
From Minoritis at Risk data: The indigena in Mexico are led by two main organizations: 1) National Indigenous Institute and 2) National Council of Indigenous People. Neither group seeks external support. From NAVCO data: No campaign From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data: Strong rights protections during AI campaign years (8-12). Average 2 on freedom of associations, and ~ 1.5 from speech and electoral rights. From POLITY Periods of factionalism through the 1990s but steady improvements to democracy
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No domestic campaign
due to institutional openness.
.
242
from 1994 (0) to 2000 (6).
Karens (1988-2000)
Seeks an independent state. Suffers from ethnic cleansing, extrajudicial executions, massacres, restrictions on movement, forced labour.
From Minorities at Risk data: The Karen are led by three main organizations: 1) Karen State National Organization (KSNO); 2) Karen National Union (KNU); and 3) Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization (DKBO). None seek external support.
From NAVCO data: The Karens have waged a violent campaign against the state from 1948-2006. Until 1983 they sought secession. Until 1987 they sought autonomy. They now seek regime change. From TIES data: In 1999 the US terminated foreign aid to Myanmar. From CIRI data: Very low protections of rights (0-2) during AI campaign years
I put this group into 1 category:
1. Campaigning group not seeking external support.
243
From POLITY data: Very undemocratic during this period (-6).
Kenyans (1991-1991)
Government repression of dissent and use of ethnic violence to justify crackdown on human rights organizations
From MAR data: No entry because not a minority group From NAVCO data: Anti-Arap Moi campaign from 1990-1991. Sucessful in 1991. From TIES data: No Western sanctions From CIRI data: No major human rights progress after campaign From POLITY data: Repressive before and after campaign (-6 range)
I put this group into 1 category: 1. Human rights
progress (campaign success)
2.
Kenyans (1995-1998)
Government repression of dissent and use of ethnic violence to justify crackdown on human rights organizations.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data:
I put this group into 1 category:
1. No campaign due to domestic repression
244
No campaign during AI campaign years (anti-Arap Moi campaign was in 1990-91). From TIES data: No Western sanctions From CIRI data: Poor rights protections for freedoms of association and speech, and voting. From POLITY: Undemocratic during the 1990s (-5).
Malawis/1992-1993 (553)
Government repression of civil society, use of extrajudicial executions, inhumane prison conditions, repression of labour activists and the church.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: In 1992-1993 there was the anti-Banda campaign. It was non-violent. It sought regime change. The campaign
I put this group into two categories:
1. Human rights Progress
2. Domestic campaign but does not seek mass solidarity mobilization support (NEED MORE
RESEARCH ON
THIS)
245
achieved significant concessions in 199 and was successful in 1993. From TIES data: No Western sanctions. From CIRI data: Clear progress from 1992 (3) to 1993 (7) to 1994 (9). From POLITY: Very repressive until 1992 then significant bump until by 1993-5 when state becomes democratic (6).
Malaysians/1987-1991 (820)
Government use of torture and imprisonment of political prisoners including opposition leadership and activists.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No campaign entry during AI campaign. From TIES data:
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No campaign due to
domestic repression.
246
No Western sanctions From CIRI data: Fairly strong rights protections during AI campaign period. From POLITY: Period of factionalism. Not fully democratic during this period.
Malaysians/1996-2000 (820)
Government use of torture and imprisonment of political prisoners including opposition leadership and activists.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No campaign entry during AI campaign. From TIES data: No Western sanctions From CIRI data: Not horrible but not great on rights protections. No major
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No campaign due to
domestic repression.
247
improvements during this period. From POLITY: Period of factionalism in late 1990. Barely democratic (~3) during this period.
Mauritanians/1989-1990 (435)
Extreme violence against black community and government repression of civil society and dissidents, including secrete detention, torture, unfair trials, extrajudicial killing.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No campaign From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI: Very poor rights protections (~0). From POLITY: Very undemocratic (-7)
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No domestic campaign
due to state repression
248
Mons/1988-2000 (775)
Mons suffer from land dispossession, forced labour, political restrictions, no civil liberties, on-going state repression. Seeking independence.
From Minorities at Risk data: Mons are led by 2 main organizations: 1) Mon Nationalist Democratic Front (MNDF) and 2) New Mon State Party (NMSP). Both seek external support as secondary strategy, mainly from Thailand. From NAVCO data: No Mon Campaign From TIES data: US termination of foreign aid in 1999. From CIRI: Almost no rights protections. From POLITY data: Very undemocratic (-6).
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No campaign due to
domestic repression.
Nepalese 1991-1991
Government corruption and repression in context of Maoist insurgency. Use of torture and extra-judicial killings by the
From MAR data: No entry because not a minority group
I put this group into 1 category:
1. Human Rights Progress
249
state against opposition, lawyers and activists.
From NAVCO data: Campaign over in 1990. Anti-Regime (“The Stir”) - successful From TIES data: No Western human rights sanctions From CIRI data: Slight improvements (election rights, association) in 1991 but not major. From POLITY data: Becoming more democratic in early 1990s, but weak (below 5)
due to campaign success.
Nepalese 1999-2003 (790)
Government corruption and repression in context of Maoist insurgency. Use of torture and extra-judicial killings by the state against opposition, lawyers and activists.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because group is not a minority. NAVCO data: Maoist (Community Party of Nepal) Campaign from 1996-2006. The campaign was violent, seeking regime change. No concessions during AI
I put this group into 1 category:
1. Domestic campaign seeking external support but not mass solidarity mobilization support
250
campaign years (only in 2006). It has been unsuccessful. From TIES data: No Western sanctions From CIRI data: No progress during AI campaign years. Fairly strong rights protections From POLITY data: Weakly democratic during AI campaign years but significant decline in early 2000s.
Nigerians/1988-1991 (475)
Government repression of civil society, including use of executions, unfair trials, and detention of journalists.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No campaign. From TIES data: No Western sanctions.
I put this group in 1 category: 1. No campaign due to state
repression
251
From CIRI data: No major rights protection progress at the time. From POLITY data: Very repressive and undemocratic (~7) during this period.
Nigerians/1994-2000 (475)
Government repression of civil society and democracy activists.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because group is not a minority. From NAVCO data: Anti-military government campaign from 1993-1998. It was non-violent and seeking regime change. Received significant concessions in 1994 and 1995, and was successful in 1998. From TIES data: From 1993 to 1999 US, Canada, and the UK imposed import restrictions, asset freezes, and
I put this group into 3 categories: 1. Human rights progress 2. Economic sanctions 3. Campaigning group but
not seeking external support (MORE
RESEARCH NEEDED)
252
travel bans. From CIRI data: No clear improvements in rights protections during AI campaign FROM POLITY: Very undemocratic until significant shift in late 1990s towards a weak democracy.
Nuba - Sudan (1989-1997)
Repressed by government in Khartoum. Face violent, even genocidal, pressure to convert to Islam. Widespread use of rape as part of ethnic cleansing campaigns. Denied international humanitarian aid. 100,000-200,000 dead since 1989. Seeking autonomy.
From Minorities at Risk data: The Nuba are led primarily by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA). Seeks external support from Ethiopia, Eritea, Uganda, Libya (Lesch; Jalata) From NAVCO data: No Nuba campaign From TIES data: From 1994 US imposed partial economic embargo, asset freeze, travel ban.
I put this group in 1 category: 1. No domestic campaigning
due to government repression.
253
From CIRI data: No major improvement in rights protections. From POLITY: Very repressive through this period (-7).
Nuba/2002-2003 (625)
• Repressed by government in Khartoum. Face violent, even genocidal, pressure to convert to Islam. Widespread use of rape as part of ethnic cleansing campaigns. Denied international humanitarian aid. 100,000-200,000 dead since 1989. Seeking autonomy.
From Minorities at Risk data: The Nuba are led primarily by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA). Seeks external support from Ethiopia, Eritea, Uganda, Libya (Lesch; Jalata) From NAVCO data: No Nuba campaign From TIES data: From 1994 US imposed partial economic embargo, asset freeze, travel ban. From CIRI data:
I put this group in 1 category: No domestic campaigning due to government repression.
254
No major improvement in rights protections. From POLITY: Very repressive through this period (-7).
Ogonis – Nigeria (1994-2000)
Faced economic discrimination by state and MNCs (Shell) and suffer political exclusion. See autonomy.
From Minorities at Risk data: The Ogoni are led by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). They sought external support as a primary strategy, primarily from leading INGOS (Bob). From NAVCO: Ogoni campaigned form 1990 to 1995. The campaign was non-violent and it sought autonomy. They received significant concesions in 1993 but were not successful. From TIES data: Fro 1993 to 1999 US, UK, and Canada import restriction, asset freeze, travel bans.
I put this group into 3 categories:
1. Human rights progress 2. Economic sanctions 3. Campaigning group
seeking external support but not mass solidarity mobilization support
255
From CIRI data: No significant improvement during this period. From POLITY: Very repressive through mid-1990s with a shift in the late 1990s towards a weak democracy.
Pakistanis (1979-1988)
Increasing government repression, erosion of judiciary, weakening rights protections, political parties banned, unions outlawed, government critics arrested, use of torture and executions. Martial law in late 1970s and 1980s.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: Pro-democracy campaign in 1983. It was non-violent and sought regime change. Only achieved very minor gains (less than concessions). From TIES data: No Western sanctions. From CIRI data:
I put this group into 1 category: 1. Campaigning domestic
group but not seeking external support (MORE
RESEARCH NEEDED)
256
No major rights protections improvements during AI campaign years. From POLITY: Very repressive and undemocratic period (-6).
Paraguayans (1985-1988) Government repression of civil society and opposition.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No campaign From TIES data: No Western sanctions From CIRI data: Severe repression of association, speech and voting rights. Significant improvement from 1988 to 1989 (from 4 to 10). From POLITY:
I put this group into 1 category: 1. Human rights progress
257
Very repressive and undemocratic in 1985-1988 but sig improvement in late 1980s towards democracy by early 1990s.
Roma – Romania (1993-1998)
Suffer from poor living conditions, under-investment, social exclusion and discrimination, forced assimilation.
From Minorities at Risk data: The Roma are led by the Democratic Union. Does not seek external support. From NAVCO data: No campaign From TIES data: No Western sanctions From CIRI data: Strong rights protections during AI campaign (9-12). From POLITY: After 1990 strong democracy, especially by 1996 (8).
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No domestic campaign
due to institutional openness.
258
Romanians (1978-1980)
Government repression of human rights activists and critics. Use of force labour, death penalty, and confinement in psychiatric institutions.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group From NAVCO data: No campaign From TIES data: No sanctions. From CIRI data: No data pre-1981 From POLITY: Very repressive and undemocratic (-8).
I put this group in 1 category: 1. No campaign due to state
repression
Romanians (1989-1990)
Government repression of human rights activists and critics. Use of force labour, death penalty, and confinement in psychiatric institutions.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: Anti-Ceaucescu campaign from 1987-1989. Successful in 1989. From TIES data:
I put this group into 1 category: 1. Human rights progress
259
From CIRI data: Significant rights protections improvements 1989 (1) to 1990 (10). From POLITY: 1990 is start of democratization process.
Rwandans/1990-1991 (517)
Government violations against Tutsis and moderate Hutus in context of RPF invasion from Uganda.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group From NAVCO data: No campaign
From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data: No huge improvement in rights protections during this period. From POLITY:
I put this group into 1 category 1. No domestic campaign
due to state repression.
260
Government is very repressive and undemocratic (-8).
Rwandans/1994-2000 (517)
Repression of activists working on matters related to genocide and rights violations in Rwanda. Increasing violence resulting in unarmed civilian deaths. Numerous detained without charge, government use of disappearances.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No campaign
From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data: Slight improvements over this period in rights protections (5-8) From POLITY data: Government remains repressive and undemocratic during this period.
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No campaign due to state
repression
Saudis (1989-1989)
Government repression of civil society and all dissent.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No domestic campaign
I put this group into 1 category 1. No campaign due to state
repression
261
From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data: No significant improvement From POLITY: Very repressive and undemocractic (-10)
Saudis/1998-2000 (670)
Government repression of civil society and all dissent.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No domestic campaign From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data: No significant improvement From POLITY:
• Very repressive and undemocractic (-10)
I put this group into 1 category No campaign due to state repression
Shans -1988-2000
Shans victim of government repression.
From MAR data:
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No domestic campaign
262
The Shans are led by three organizations: 1) Shan Nationalist League (SNL); 2) Mong Tai Army (MTA); 3) Shan State Kokang Democratic Party. None seek external support. From NAVCO data: No Campaign From TIES data: 1999- US termination of foreign aid From CIRI data:
No significant improvement (0-2) From POLITY: Very repressive (-8)
due to government repression
Shi'is – Iraq (1988-1993) Severe government repression
From Minorities at Risk data: The Shia in Iraq are led by two organizations: 1) Al-Da’wa (AD) and 2) Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of
I put this group in 1 category: 1. Domestic campaigning
seeking external support but not mass solidarity mobilization support
263
Iraq (SCIRI). Both seek external support as primary strategy, namely from Iran (Byman) From NAVCO data: 1999 Shia campaign for regime change. The campaign was violent and achieved no concessions. From TIES data: No Western sanction From CIRI data: No significant improvement in human rights protections. FROM POLITY: Very repressive (-9)
Shia – Saudi Arabia (1998-2000)
Severe government repression.
From Minorities at Risk data: Shia in Saudi Arabia are led by two main organizations: 1) Organization for Islamic
I put this group in 1 category: 1. No campaign due to
government repression
264
Revolution (OIR) and 2) Hizbullah OIR seeks external support as secondary strategy from Iran (Byman). Hizbullah does not seek external support From NAVCO data: No campaign From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data: No significant improvement improvement in rights protections From POLITY: Very repressive (-10 score)
Sierra Leoneans (1998-2000)
Military coup in 1997 leads to collapse of rule of law and widespread rights abuses, especially of government opponents.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No domestic campaign
I put this group into 1 category: 1. Human rights progress
265
From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data: Significant improvement in rights protections in 2001 when state authority is re-established. From POLITY: Signiciant improvements in democratic standing in early 2000s.
Somalis (1988-1990)
Government crackdown on opposition
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No mass campaign (only clan faction campaigns). From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data: No significant improvement in
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No
266
rights protections during this period. From POLITY: State collapse (interregnum)
Soviets 1976 - 1990 Government repression
From MAR data: No entry because not minority group From NACVO data: No campaign From TIES data: US sanctions from 1972 to 1989 with human rights stipulation. From CIRI data: No human rights progress. Very repressive. From POLITY data: Closed institutions. Very repressive (-7)
I put this group into 1 category:
1. Western sanctions
Sri Lankans (1985-2000)
Government repression of dissidents, use of emergency regulations, weak rule of law, impunity for security forces.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group.
I put this group into 1 category:
1. No domestic campaign due to institutional openness.
267
From NAVCO data: No campaign From TIES data: No sanctions. From CIRI data: Strong rights protections (8-12). From POLITY: A weak democracy (~5)
Southern Sudanese (1989-1997)
Civil war with central government in Khartoum over matter of autonomy/independence.
From MAR data: SPLM sought external support as tertiary strategy From NAVCO data: SPLA-led campaign from 1983-2005. Violent. Seeking regime change. Not successful. No major progresses made. From TIES data: US sanctions imposed in 1994 From CIRI data:
I put this group into X categories 1. Domestic campaign
seeking external support but not mass solidarity mobilization support
2. Western sanctions
268
Very repressive From POLITY data: Closed institutions,. Very repressive.
Sudanese (1983-1985)
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No domestic campaign. From TIES data:; No santions. From CIRI data: Weak rights protections in mid-1980s (4-7). From POLITY: Very repressive and undemocratic at this time but significant improvement in 1985 towards democracy until 1989.
I put this group into 2 categories: 1. No domestic campaign
due to government repression
2. Human rights progress
Sudanese (1989-1997)
1989 coup ushering in severe rights violations by the
From Minorities at Risk data:
I put this group in to 1 category: 1. No domestic campaign
269
government.
No entry because not a minority group From NAVCO data: No campaign From TIES data; In 1994-onwards US imposes partial economic embargo, asset freeze, termination of foreign aid, and suspension of economic agreements. From CIRI data: Very poor rights protections and no significant improvement during this period. From POLITY: Authoritarian backslide in 1989. Very repressive through the 1990s.
due to government repression
Sudanese (2002-2003)
Government repression of civil society and dissent.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group From NAVCO data:
I put this group into 2 categories: 1. Western sanctions 2. No campaign due to
state repression
270
No campaign From TIES data:; In 1994 US imposes partial economic embargo, asset freeze, termination of foreign aid, suspension of economic agreements. From CIRI data: No rights protections and no significant improvements. From POLITY: Very repressive and undemocratic (-7)
Syrians (1985-2000)
Government repression of civil society and dissent.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group From NAVCO data: No campaign From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data: Poor rights proteections. No
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No campaign due to
state repression
271
significant improvement during this period. FROM POLITY: Very repressive and undemocratic (-7 to -9)
Tajiks (1996-1999)
Government repression of civil society and dissent in context of internal violent conflict with opposition.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group From NAVCO data: Campaign from 1992-1997 by United Tajikistan Opposition. IT was violent and sought regime change. 1993 and 1995 visible gains but short of concessions. 1995 limited concessions and in1996 significant concessions. It was not successful. From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data Weak rights protections (5-7). No significant improvement during this period.
I put this group into 1 category: 1. Campaigning group not
seeking external support (MORE RESEARCH
NEEDED).
272
From POLITY: Repressive, no democracy and factionalism.
• scores around -2 to 0
Thais 1986-1987 Government violations
From MAR data: Not a minority group From NAVCO data: Thai communist rebel campaign ends in 1981. No other campaigning through the 1980s. From TIES data: No Western sanctions From CIRI data No major improvements. From POLITY data: 1970s – 1990s lots of regime instability and transitions.
I put this group into X categories: 1. No campaign due to
government repression
Togolese (1999-1999) Government abuses against opposition.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group From NAVCO data: No campaign From TIES data:
I put this group into two categories:
1. Western sanctions 2. No campaign due to state
repression
273
From 1992-2007 US, France Germany terminate foreign aid From CIRI data: Weak rights protections (~5) and no sig improvement around this time. From POLITY data: Very repressive and undemocratic (-2). Period of factionalism
Tunisians (1986-1987)
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No campaign From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data: Weak-Medium rights protections (6-8). No significant improvement during this period. From POLITY Very repressive and
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No campaign due to state
repression
274
undemocratic (-7)
Turkmenistani (1997-1998) Government abuses, including use of death penalty
From Minorites at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group. From NAVCO data: No campaign From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data: Poor rights protections (3-4) and no significant improvement during this period. From POLITY Very repressive and undemocratic (-9)
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No campaign due to
government repression.
Tutsis - Rwanda (1990-1991)
Government repression of Tutsis in context of RPF invasion.
From MAR data: Tutsis in Rwanda are led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front. RPF sought external support as primary strategy (Byman) From NAVCO data:
I put this group into 1 category: 1. Campaigning group
seeking external support but not mass solidarity mobilization support
275
Tutsi campaign to overthrow Hutu government. Goal was regime change. Violent campaign. From TIES data:
• No sanctions From CIRI data: Medium rights protections and gradual improvements. FROM Polity: Repressive period and undemocratic (-7).
Tutsis –Rwanda(1994-2000)
Faced genocidal violence in 1994.
From MAR data: Tutsis in Rwanda are led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front. RPF sought external support as primary strategy (Byman) From NAVCO data: RPF campaign ends in 1994 and is successful.
I put this case into 1 category: 1. Human rights progress
because Tutsis campaign wins and they assume control of the government under Kagame.
276
From CIRI data: Medium rights protections (~7) during this period. From Polity: Very repressive and undemocratic (~ -6).
Tutsis – Burundi (1994-2000)
Minority group in Burundi but controls some state institutions. Struggle with Hutu for control of the state.
From MAR data: The Tutsis are led by the National Union Party which does not seek external support. From NAVCO data: No campaign From TIES data: From 1996 to 1999 Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Rwanda impose partial economic embargo and blockade From CIRI: Weak rights protections (4-6). No significant improvements.
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No domestic campaign
due to state repression
277
FROM POLITY: Period of interregnum
Tutsis – DRC(1996-2000)
Subject to severe political and economic discrimination. Seek political rights.
From MAR data: The Tutsis are led by the Catholic Church. It does not seek external support. From NAVCO data: No campaign From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data: Collapse of central authority FROM POLITY: Period of interregnum
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No campaign due to state
repression.
Ugandans (1984-1985)
Government violations in context of “Bush war” between government and rebels.
From MAR data: No entry because not minority group. From NAVCO data: From to 1986 the National Resistance Army led a
I put this group in 1 category: 1. Domestic campaign not
seeking external support (NEED MORE
RESEARCH)
278
campaign led by Musseveni against the Okello regime. The campaign was violent and sought regime change. It was successful in 1986. From TIES data: No sanction From CIRI data: Medium rights protections and improvement from interregnum (-77) to 1986 (9). From POLITY:
• period of factionalism
• score around 3.
Uighurs (Turkmen)/1986-2002 (710)
Repressed Muslim minority in China seeking self-determination rights.
From Minorities at Risk data: The Uighurs are led by the East Turkistan Islamic Party. It does not seek external support. From NAVCO data:
• No campaign From TIES data: In 1989-1990 US, UK, France, Germany and Japan imposed export restriction and suspension of economic
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No campaign due to state
repression
279
agreements (Tiananmen square issue, not Uighurs) From CIRI data: Very low rights protections. No significant improvements. From POLITY: Very repressive and undemocratic (-7)
Uruguayans (1975-1984) Government repression civil society and opposition.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group From NAVCO: No campaign From TIES data: From 1977 to 1981 the US terminated foreign aid From CIRI data: Medium protections in 1984 and improvement in 1985 onwards. From Polity: Very repressive and undemocratic but big improvement in 1985 towards democracy to score of 9 in late
I put this group into 1 category: 1. Western sanctions
280
1980s.
Uzbeks (1993-1995)
Government repression of civil society and opposition.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group From NAVCO: No campaign From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data: Poor rights protections. No significant improvements. From POLITY data: Very repressive and undemocratic (-9)
I put this group into 1 category: 1. No domestic campaign
because of state repression
Uzbeks (1996-1999)
Government repression of civil society and opposition.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group From NAVCO: No campaign From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data:
I put this group into 1 category: No domestic campaign because of state repression
281
Poor rights protections. No significant improvements. From POLITY data: Very repressive and undemocratic (-9)
Uzbeks (1999-2000)
Government repression of civil society and opposition.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group From NAVCO: No campaign From TIES data: No sanctions From CIRI data: Poor rights protections. No significant improvements. From POLITY data: Very repressive and undemocratic (-9)
I put this group into 1 category: No domestic campaign because of state repression
282
Zimbabweans/2000-2000 (552)
Government repression of opposition during election campaigning.
From Minorities at Risk data: No entry because not a minority group From NAVCO: No domestic campaign From TIES data: In 2000 US, Canada, Australia Japan impose partial economic embargo, asset freezes, termination of foreign aid, travel bans. CIRI data: Weak rights proteectios (3-5). No significant improvement. From POLITY: Very repressive and undemocratic (-4)
I put this group into 2 categories: 1. Western sanctions 2. No domestic campaign
due to government repression