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MMRCA: A New Strategic Opportunity

Lt Col Peter Garretson, USAF1

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or

position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

"The true aim [of the strategist] is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic

situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce a decision, its continuation

by a battle is sure to achieve this." -- Basil H. Liddell Hart

Recent news articles suggest that the $13bn deal for India to purchase 126+ French Rafale

fighters for its Medium Multirole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) program has crashed, and even the

stop-gap attempt to purchase 36 Rafales is having difficulty.2 If true, this presents a significant

opportunity for both India and the United States to advance their strategic interests.

A US contract in the MMRCA program would have immediately put fighters in India’s hands to

stem the bleeding of aged platforms that is undermining its ability to maintain Air Superiority

and deterrence. It would have—as past contracts have in Korea and Japan—established a robust

indigenous production facility, and would have provided the lowest life-cycle cost with the best

customer support. This article develops an argument for why a US selection is and always has

been the best strategic bet for India.

It is no secret that many within India regretted the selection of the Rafale, not for technical

reasons, but for the lost opportunity a US contract would have provided to advance Indian

security and influence in the global system.3

1 I wish to thank Dr. Ashley Tellis, Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Dr. Namrata Goswami, and Mr. Aidan Milliff for their

thoughtful comments and suggestions. All errors found herein are my own. 2 http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/indias-mmrca-is-officially-dead-now-what/ Other articles describing difficulties,

http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/confirmed-india-to-buy-only-36-rafale-fighter-jets/ ,

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/mirage-2000s-withdrawn-as-indias-mrca-fighter-competition-changes-01989/ 3 Ashley J Tellis, Dogfight: India’s Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft Decision, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dogfight.pdf; Nitin Pai, “How to Lose Friends and Alienate People,” The Acorn,

Takshashila Institute, April 28, 2011, http://acorn.nationalinterest.in/2011/04/28/how-to-lose-friends-and-alienate-people-

3/comment-page-1/; Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Flying into Rough Weather,” Times of India, February 10, 2012,

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Flying-into-rough-weather/articleshow/11825309.cms; Harsh V Pant,

“India’s MMRCA Decision Continues to Create Ripples,” Rediff.com, February 03, 2012,

http://www.rediff.com/news/column/indias-mmrca-decision-continues-to-create-ripples/20120203.htm; Chidanand Rajghatta,

“Strained Ties: MMRCA Rebuff, Envoy Exit, Signal Indo-US Distance,” Times of India, April 29, 2011,

http://lite.epaper.timesofindia.com/mobile.aspx?article=yes&pageid=14&sectid=edid=&edlabel=TOIL&mydateHid=29-04-

2011&pubname=Times+of+India+-+Lucknow&edname=&articleid=Ar01400&publabel=TOI; Sunil Dasgupta, “On A Wing and

A Player,” Times of India, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/02/18-india-dasgupta.

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Recent Facts

Before developing the logic of why a US selection made and still makes the best strategic sense

for India, it is important to address skeptics who did not believe that the US would be a reliable

supplier of defence articles. New evidence has emerged since April 2011 that shows skepticism

in India to have been unfounded.

First, the US’s commitment to Indian security has proved durable and wide ranging contrary to

the expectations of skeptics in India who thought the strategic partnership was fickle, fragile or

merely transactional. Despite a series of significant disappointments for the US—the

unfortunate initial still-birth and long delay of the Civil Nuclear deal, the loss of the MMRCA,

and lack of support on key global governance issues—India can observe that the US remains

committed to India as a strategic partner, and to expanding its role as a net security provider. In

particular, Prime Minister Modi’s leadership has breathed new life into the partnership.

Second, allegations that the US was unwilling to provide India with its “best technology”--the F-

35—are baseless. The United States MMRCA proposal of the F-16IN and F-18E/F were, given

India’s stated goals and cost constraints, the best option the US had to offer. The goals of the

MMRCA were to immediately put into service a large number of relatively low-cost fighters

within a fixed budget and timescale so the Indian Air Force (IAF) could maintain its squadron

strength. The F-35 is a comparatively high-end, high-cost fighter. The cost of the F-35 would

mean India could procure less than half the number of fighters required in the MMRCA program.

Moreover, MMRCA was meant to address an urgent problem. Knowing that the F-35

production schedule is already full, the US was honest in not putting forward a fighter that it

knew could not be available in the numbers and on the timeline required for MMRCA. While to

many Indian analysts, it seemed clear from the outset that India would not choose the F-16,

because Pakistan flew earlier variants, the US truly did put forward the two best fighters that

could meet the constraints and timeline of MMRCA.

The perception that the US was unwilling to offer the F-35 to India is false. US Secretary of

Defense Ashton Carter confirmed that "there is nothing on our side, no principle which bars that

on our side, Indian participation in the Joint Strike Fighter.”4 Carter’s Deputy Assistant Secretary

of Defense for South Asia has further stated that “The F-35 is something we would be more than

willing to talk to the government of India about, should they request to find out more information

about purchasing it.”5

The F-35 would indeed be a good option for one of India’s two high-end programs, the India’s

Fifth Generation Fighter Program (FGFP) or Next Generation Fighter Aircraft (NGFA). In fact,

given India’s recent experience with purchasing the Admiral Gorshakov/INS Vikramaditya—

4 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-01-28/news/28431963_1_stealth-fighter-russian-aircraft-f-35 5 http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/11/03/idINIndia-60286320111103

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delivered five years behind schedule, and $1.2Bn over budget— from Russia, India might want

to hedge its bets. Given what appear to be significant delays and dissatisfactions with the

jointly-developed PAK-FA, and the inability of the Russian industrial base to sustain the PAK-

FA program without India’s participation, it may be exactly the right time for India and the US to

begin talks about the F-35 or F-15 Silent Eagle as a hedge for a possible PAK-FA failure. 7

Third, skeptics who question the US role as a reliable supplier have seen in recent years that the

US compares favorably to other suppliers. While suffering late deliveries and poor customer

support from other defense suppliers, India has been able to see for itself that in both of the

recent US aircraft purchases—C-130J and C-17—that the US delivers on-time, and provides

excellent support. It is no secret that the IAF has been more than satisfied with both platforms

and the increase in capabilities they provide for Indian security. The same consistent level of

support is also apparent with the General Electric F404, the jet engine that powers the new

indigenously built Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). It is also notable that despite losing the

MMRCA contest, the US continued to recognize the value of a strengthened US-India

partnership, and continues to express its interest in welcoming India into the Joint Strike Fighter

(F-35) Program, a fairly exclusive club.8

Fourth, India can observe that despite its public selection, few other countries haves selected the

Rafale. The failure to ink deals with other countries means that the Rafale will have a smaller

customer base than expected, meaning smaller production runs, increasing aircraft and support

costs and decreasing the budget available to Dassault research and development to keep the

platform current.

Fifth, the IAF’s (and therefore India’s air superiority) situation has become more desperate while

the GoI and Dassault have been unable to come to agreement. The delays in finalizing the

MMRCA deal have placed the IAF significantly behind its timeline, and the task should be in

identifying ways to rectify these deficiencies? As of mid-August, the United States has indicated

it is in a position to provide an immediate stop-gap response with the F-16IN Super Viper and

associated training, should India be able to make a decision in that regard.9

In light of these developments since the April 2011 decision, Indian analysts have a more basic

question to answer: Would a US selection have made sense for India’s security? Absolutely.

Indian defense analysts needs to put this decision through a broader strategic perspective instead

of a purely tactical lens. The question is not fundamentally about fighter vs. fighter, but about

7 http://www.janes.com/article/42765/indian-air-force-unhappy-at-progress-of-pak-fa-fifth-gen-fighter 8 https://www.f35.com/global 9 https://www.ibcworldnews.com/2015/08/16/the-most-advanced-f-16-ever-in-super-viper-could-get-another-shot-with-the-

indian-air-force/

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the entire system-of-system vs. system-of-system performance, and which offers superior and

continuing advantage in war, deterrence, and peace. 11

From A Grand Strategic Perspective

A proper analysis starts not at the tactical level of the aircraft, but at the Grand Strategy level,

keeping in mind India’s larger strategic objectives. Several analyses and commentaries have

come out since India’s MMRCA decision. Many in the strategic and policy community were

distracted from the real issues by over-emphasis on tactical considerations—such as dogfighting

performance—that actually are quite irrelevant to the sort of modern air combat the MMRCA

would actually be called to perform.12

In the process, these commentaries dismissed strategic

considerations as ‘political’, assuming such considerations were in some manner illegitimate, a

fashion of the times, corruption or coercion.

Good strategic analysis always starts at the top, seeking the best possible option that advances

the totality of India’s long-term strategic interests, and providing the best balance between

mitigating danger and broadening opportunity. And the MMRCA provides significant

opportunity to advance India’s total security, and advance India’s larger policy goals.

The key question a strategist (either an Indian security or airpower strategist) must ask in regard

to the MMRCA decision is: “How do I use this one buy to advance India’s total security

situation now and into the foreseeable future?” In the process of answering the ‘key’ question, a

strategist must also consider the following subordinate questions:

Which MMRCA decision best maximizes India’s chance for inclusive growth,

uninterrupted by conflict?

Which MMRCA decision expands India’s strategic options and freedom of action?

Which MMRCA decision ensures that should conflict be unavoidable, will provide the

best chance of victory or conflict resolution favourable to Indian interests?

This paper will consider the impact of the MMRCA decision on three different levels of India’s

security: the strategic, the operational, and the tactical, analyzing the risk and opportunity at each

level, and then making a bet as to what will best advance Indian security.

11 The System-of-System are the fighters, their weapons, and maintenance and logistics systems. Pitting 126 fighters from one

supplier vs 126 from another supplier is not necessarily an equal contest even if the fighters are evenly matched because

differences in maintenance times and reliability may mean that one side might be ready to launch more fighters for an air-to-air

engagement vs the other side. Over time, and with attrition, that advantage gets magnified.

12 See for example John Stillion’s excellent recent report, “Trends In Air-To-Air Combat: Implications For

Future Air Superiority”, CSBA, 2015, available online at: http://csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Air-to-Air-Report-

.pdf

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The Strategic Level: Security through Posture

“The forms of policy are six. Of these, agreement with pledges is peace; offensive

operation is war; indifference is neutrality; making preparations is marching; seeking

the protection of another is alliance; and making peace with one and waging war with

another, is termed double policy (dvaidhibhaava).” – Kautilya’s Arthashastra

For the moment, India has clearly chosen as its grand strategy inclusive growth and nation-

building toward its political and social ideals of inclusiveness, tolerance, and democracy. It has

chosen a foreign policy it believes will best serve this goal, looking East and West to absorb

opportunities and markets, and pursuing an independent, non-interventionist non-militarily

aggressive foreign policy to lessen the chances of being drawn into an expensive and costly

conflict.

Having a first class military backed by a policy of restraint enhances India’s foreign policy.

India’s modern professional forces project an image of economic and technological vibrancy as

well as a capability and resolve to contribute to global public goods and maintenance of the

commons. This combination makes India a desired economic and security partner. It also

diffuses the possibility that a strategic competitor might try to bully potential third parties to lock

India out of key markets or trade deals.

However India cannot only consider the opportunities for inclusive growth afforded by a strong

deterrent posture, it must also consider the possibility of war. India’s neighborhood is not

benign, and while most of its immediate neighborhood are relatively poor states with significant

resource and governance problems, the two nuclear powers with significant conventional forces

on its border present a strategic and existential threat. Both China and Pakistan have territorial

disputes, resource disputes and ideological differences with India.

India has articulated a need to have a credible minimum deterrent both in nuclear and

conventional forces to protect its security.13

The MMRCA is a key component of both India’s

defense and deterrence strategy, enhancing India’s ability to deter either by denying an adversary

success of their objectives, or to deter by punishment, by raising the costs to an adversary of

initiating a conflict.

Therefore, India’s strategic problem is to maximize inclusive growth while minimizing defense

expenditures, and to structure defense acquisition programmes in a way that maximizes the

opportunities for enabling inclusive growth--both through growth of domestic industry and

competitiveness, and ensured access to market opportunities abroad.

13 Such deterrents are costly, and most of India’s military expenditures go abroad and do not benefit India’s primary goal of

inclusive growth.

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At the strategic level, security and opportunity are not only about the security that the MMRCA

platform itself provides, but the security and opportunity that a $13bn long-term state-to-state

deal could provide. MMRCA is thus an opportunity both to advance national competitiveness

through technology transfer in a strategic industry, and to enhance deterrence of potential

adversaries by cementing relationships with centers of influence and power that affect India’s

security, influence, and freedom of action.

The key questions for a strategist to ask at this level are:

Security through Partnerships: Which partnership enhances my ability to avoid or deter

war, and if I cannot avoid it, which partner offers the best chance of a sympathetic center

of power and influence that could better my chances of winning, or at least exert pressure

to limit my damage?14

Freedom of Action: Which partnership expands my freedom of action and influence on

the global centers of gravity and governance, allowing me to shape my environment for

inclusive growth?

National Competitiveness: Which partnership offers me the best chance of improving my

overall economic competitiveness and future freedom of action by maximizing my long-

term potential for technology transfer and linking my technical and industrial base with

the largest and most significant market for the totality of my products and services?

Regional Influence: Which MMRCA platform provides India the greatest opportunity to

shape its security environment or future security architecture through security

cooperation and training, military diplomacy, and logistical support for Indian presence

across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)?15

The Operational Level: Prevail In the Air War

“A crisis is an opportunity riding the dangerous wind”—Chinese Proverb

At the strategic level, the resort to force is a question of policy; at the operational level, war is

assumed.

No modern war has been won without air superiority, and air superiority is the necessary

precursor to and chief enabler of any joint action to forestall, eject, punish or counter-threaten an

adversary. Quality (range, payload, probability of kill) of aircraft is not the only consideration,

14 A simpler way to put this might just be: “Which MMRCA selection provides the most credible deterrent to my adversaries.”

15 The choice of aircraft is also a communication of values and vibrancy. An allied question a strategist might ask is: “Which

MMRCA selection has the best chance of securing market opportunity abroad with the most significant markets by conveying an

image and reality of technological vibrancy and professionalism, and commitment to the global commons?”

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total numbers (driven by platform cost) matter, as does sortie generation (driven by maintenance

reliability).

India faces an immediate and worsening operational problem where the IAF has less than the

minimum number of fighter aircraft needed to confidently win an air campaign against Pakistan.

From the IAF perspective, there has been a shortage of fighter squadrons since the 1960s when

the IAF defined an ideal strength of 64 squadrons for its national security missions, 45 of which

were squadrons of combat aircraft. However, given a variety of factors including the economic

deficiencies, India could establish only 45 total squadrons and only 40 combat aircraft

squadrons. Analysts suggest that this resulted in a 3:1 lead over the Pakistani air force.

However, the situation has changed drastically since then. India’s fighter aircraft inventory is

declining rapidly. The necessary retirement of its older fighters coupled with a lack of timely

and adequate replacements has placed the IAF in an extremely worrisome position, with just 29

squadrons of combat aircraft. Meanwhile, Pakistan and China are both steadily replenishing

their fleet. 16

While a 2:1 numbers advantage vs. Pakistan might be sufficient for stability on the

subcontinent, it hardly seems adequate for India’s total security needs. Nor does it seem

adequate to cope with the advantages that India’s eastern neighbor China enjoys.

The operational planner begins by looking at simple correlation of forces. They ask: how many

aircraft of a particular type do I have? How many of a particular type does the adversary have?

How capable are they against my type?

The graphic below provides one such simple overview. It illustrates the crisis in the number of

Indian combat aircraft. India currently has about 630 combat aircraft but is rapidly losing end

strength because obsolete tails are being retired without a replacement available. In the same

time period both China and Pakistan are able to field greater numbers of higher end (4th

Generation) fighters.

16 Ashley J Tellis, Dogfight: India’s Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft Decision, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dogfight.pdf; Praveen Swami, “Why the Critics of India’s Combat Jet Deal are

Wrong,” The Hindu, May 02, 2011, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/why-the-critics-of-indias-combat-jet-deal-are-

wrong/article1983674.ece.

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But pure number of aircraft is only part of the equation. The operational planner must also ask:

How many sorties can my adversary generate in a given space and time? How many of my type

do I need to be able to generate to outmatch him at that space and time to be confident I will win

that battle? How many of my forces will actually be available and not otherwise engaged? How

many will be tied up in training or maintenance? What sort of numbers and sortie generation

rate do I need to field that advantage over and over? What sort of maintenance reliability do I

need to support that? What sort of access to war readiness material, munitions and spares do I

need to support that? How affordable is it to initially purchase this force posture, and how

affordable is it to maintain this posture over time?

The key questions a strategist must ask at this level with respect to the MMRCA are:

Numbers on Time: Which entrants provide the least risk to rapidly fielding significant

numbers of fourth generation fighters to fix my current deficit of combat aircraft?

Sortie Generation: Which entrants have proven high maintenance reliability and high

sortie generation that maximize the utility of the limited numbers I will have?

Largest Numbers: Which entrants have the lowest per-unit acquisition costs that allow

my limited budget to go farthest, and field best mix and largest number of platforms and

weapons?

Lowest Sustainment: Which entrants have the lowest lifecycle maintenance and

sustainment costs that allow me to maintain this posture and have fiscal freedom of action

to make future acquisitions as my adversary adapts and innovates?

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Repertoire Expansion: Which entrants allow me to expand my repertoire of courses of

action and degrees of freedom by providing new weapons and tactics, techniques and

procedures the adversary must counter?

A grand strategist considers the degrees of freedom provided by partnerships and alliances, but

the operational planner must assume the worst case of fighting with only one’s own resources,

asking:

Which choice offers me the best chances of winning the campaign, assuming I may have

to depend on my own resources?

Beyond the strategic utility of indigenization, there is operational utility in being able to

manufacture spares and aircraft in the midst of conflict. Therefore the operational planner also

cares about:

Indigenous Sourcing: Which entrants have proven track records of setting up production

lines within host nations?

Third Party Sourcing: Which entrants provide the greatest freedom of action in a conflict

to get additional spares or compatible aircraft from multiple third parties?

The Tactical Level: Prevail In the Engagement

At the tactical level, the MMRCA buy is about which aircraft is the best, and the most

individually capable in an engagement. The MMRCA is a multi-role aircraft and it must be

capable of performing Air-to-Ground strikes, but the most important performance is in the Air-

to-Air arena.

The key question for the strategist is:

Qualitative A2A Advantage: Which MMRCA selection best advances Indian security by

providing the most credible qualitative advantage in an air-to-air engagement?

Many external analysts not familiar with modern air combat were clearly confused by the

overwhelming amount of material released during the MMRCA competition, comparing the

various entrants on all kinds of minute detail such as weapons, range, payload, sensors, displays,

radar signature, defensive systems, number of engines and maneuverability. How is one to know

what matters? The differences that matter most are: value for cost, transfer of experience, and

proven integrated operational AESA radar. One might also add proven record in combat vs.

risks of delay and unanticipated problems in new or experimental platforms.

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Modern air combat begins in a “beyond visual range” environment, and is heavily biased toward

first look, first shoot, first kill. Maneuverability becomes important either once you close within

visual range or if you are the unfortunate one to be fired upon first. Maneuverability is

important, but secondary. By analogy, it is nice to know that if needed your soldiers possess

hand-to-hand combat skills with a knife if they miss with all their bullets, but you are going to

make your primary investment not in training such skill but rather in a long-range rifle with the

best possible sniper scope so he never has to employ them. AESA radars provide an asymmetric

advantage because they are able to detect and track the enemy at longer distances with

significantly less possibility of being detected or jammed. AESA radars also have significant air

to ground and electronic warfare capabilities. They are very hard to produce and integrate. As

shown in an excellent analysis of air-to-air combat by CSBA’s John Stillion, since 1970, the

majority of air-to-air kills were by missiles, not guns, and since 1990, more than half of all air-to-

air kills were the result of “beyond visual range” air-to-air missiles.17

Discussions on the

maneuverability and dogfighting aspects are a distraction. What matters is the radar.

Evaluating Based On the Above Criteria

If those are the important questions for a proper strategic analysis regarding the opportunity of

the MMRCA selection, how might we answer them?

Clearly, as proponents of the Indo-US strategic partnership, we see great utility in an Indian

MMRCA selection of a US-designed aircraft and for US interests. While it is for the

government and the armed forces to decide what maximizes their interests, below is our analysis

and argument for why a US sourced MMRCA provides the best strategic choice for India.

The Strategic Argument: Enabling India’s Security By Posture

Four are the modes of alliance, 'namely—of mutual help—of friendship—of blood—and

of sacrifice….'There is no Peace like the Golden "Sangata," which is made between good

men, based on friendly feeling, and preceded by the Oath of Truth,' -- Hitopadesa

Security Through Partnerships: Of all the MMRCA competitors (France, Russia, Sweden,

Germany, and the United States), only the United States has either the capability or will to

enhance deterrence and provide leverage with respect to Pakistan, or a rising China. It seems

unlikely that France or any of the other entrants have the capability or will to come to India’s aid

in the event of a conflict, or to provide coercive pressure to bring it to a close. Therefore, from

the standpoint of deterrence, a US option would offer the best chance of avoiding war or

concluding it on favorable terms.18

17 John Stillion, “Trends In Air-To-Air Combat: Implications For Future Air Superiority”, CSBA, 2015, available online at:

http://csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Air-to-Air-Report-.pdf 18 The counter would be that a US selection sends too strong a message to China, creating an impression of encirclement or anti-

Chinese alliance, and prompting it to escalate in posture, become more hostile or create incentives for pre-emption, making its

strategic value ambiguous or counter-productive.

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Freedom of Action: With regard to freedom of action, of the potential MMRCA options,

cementing the partnership with United States offers the best chance to expand India’s influence

and freedom of action globally.19

While India has secured US presidential support for India’s

UN Security Council seat and the solidity of the Indo-US strategic partnership is assured (despite

occasional interruptions that have temporarily derailed the relationship), it is nowhere near its

full potential. An enhanced partnership expands the scope and speed at which India can expand

its influence and freedom of action.

A portion of the US policy community remains skeptical regarding how far the US should extend

itself to India’s benefit. MMRCA, being a large, visible purchase continues to offer an

opportunity to signal to skeptics that US efforts are appreciated and India deserves still greater

investment in its security and prosperity. Purchasing a US combat airplane would strengthen the

hand of Indian proponents within the US, emboldening them to push for more significant steps.

Such steps might include access to still more sensitive technologies and expansion of India’s

voice in the key centers of global governance (including NSG, MTCR, Wassenaar, Australia

Group, among others), all of which would significantly expand India’s influence and freedom of

action.

National Competitiveness: With regard to national competitiveness, there is no doubt that of the

entrants, the US offers the largest market, and enjoys the most competitive aviation sector. None

of the other entrants have done well in sales abroad, and it is quite possible that some those

nations may not even be able to sustain their aviation industries over the life of the MMRCA—a

significant risk for India to incur.20

Setting up licensed production lines for combat aircraft

abroad is not easy, with Russia and the US being the most successful. And, as proven in both

Japan and Korea, US contractors have succeeded in sparking an indigenous aircraft industry in a

foreign country where none of the others have succeeded. A US selection is the best bet for

Indianization and indigenization.

Stability of the Deal: Additionally, due to the maturity of the US weapons sales system and the

degree of oversight, a deal with the US stands the highest chance of being entirely above board,

19 The counter of course is that the US will do this anyway because of convergent interests, and therefore its support can be taken

for granted, and therefore there is more to be gained by courting other centers of influence. That is an unwise assumption

because the United States on many issues of importance is a transactional actor, looking for reciprocity before executing the next

step. Recent history matters greatly in the degree of US support, and an Indian strategist cannot know when it might desire to

“call in a favor.” 20 The counters here are: that India might have an interest in keeping alive a second source of Western combat aircraft

manufacturing as a hedge against US monopoly; that the United States might be less inclined toward true technology transfer;

that the US is an unreliable arms supplier. The first is irrelevant because the MMRCA will be built in India and Russian industry

appears relatively secure as a second source. The second is that the US has a proven track record of creating indigenous aviation

industries in Japan and Korea, and setting up production lines of combat aircraft in several countries. The third is increasingly

unlikely given the convergent geopolitical trends, deepening economic relationship, deepening influence of Indian-Americans on

US politics, and the tremendous political force of defense contractors servicing large contracts such as the MMRCA.

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with the least chance of embarrassment due to corruption that could slow down the fielding of a

capability India truly needs for its strategic security.

Regional Influence: A US fighter also offers India the maximum leverage to shape its

environment through security cooperation and military diplomacy.21

Many of India’s

neighbours—from the Gulf to Southeast, East Asia and Australia—operate and maintain US

designed aircraft. Large numbers of these aircraft exist both in India’s area of interest, as well as

further abroad and in the United States. Many of these will be in service into the 2030s and India

would likely have the only open production line that could provide spares to a global community

of users, as other lines have shut or will shut down. With India building its own production line,

and its own major training range, that creates an opportunity for India to sell parts, provide

training, train abroad with compatible aircraft and procedures and reduced cost. The ability to

provide deeper and lower-cost engagement of regional air forces (through emulation in training,

cooperative exercises, and mutual logistical support) expands India’s ability to project soft-

power. Should India need to operate abroad, a US-designed aircraft means it has access to a

wide network of spares and maintenance support, and compatibility with other regional air

forces.

The Operational Argument: Addressing India’s Security Deficit

Numbers on Time: Of all the entrants, it is the proven, US-designed aircraft that offer least risk

of failing to rapidly field significant numbers to fix India’s current deficit of combat aircraft.

The US contractors have proven experience setting up these production lines abroad, and a

recent track record of delivering on-time and under budget to India. Open production lines

continue to exist for the F-16, F-18, as well as the F-15 Silent Eagle (purchased by South Korea).

Moreover, should further delays put India in a desperate position where requires and immediate

influx of fighters to maintain its minimum numbers, the US has an adequate supply of legacy

fighters in its US fleet it could transfer.

Sortie Generation: As proven combat aircraft, the US aircraft have the proven high maintenance

reliability and high sortie generation requirements that multiply the utility of each individual

aircraft.

Largest Numbers: At an estimated cost significantly less than the Rafale or Eurofighter, the US

entrants offer tremendous value. For close to the same cost, India could acquire 200 US-sourced

MMRCA fighters vs. just 120 of the European designs. And every rupee not spent on the

fighters can be spent on the necessary weapons to arm them.

21 A possible counter here would be that this signals too strong an alignment with the US, and India would be less likely to be

perceived as an independent actor and separate center of gravity and influence.

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Lowest Sustainment: While it is conceivable that at least one of the other entrants might have

had a competitive per-unit cost, US aircraft are almost surely the winners with respect to lowest

lifecycle costs, or total costs. That becomes important in the out-years when India will need

additional fiscal freedom of maneuver either to keep pace in the defence field or budget from

military to social programs without incurring additional strategic risk.

Repertoire Expansion: Of all the entrants, a US selection most expands the Indian repertoire of

potential courses of action. It provides access to top-of-class weapons previously not available

to the IAF. It alone expands India’s access to evaluate and Indianize tactics, techniques,

procedures, and organizational factors that have made the US Air Force successful. Of all the

competitors, the US Air Force is most like the IAF in its size and breadth of missions. Being

able to leverage the learning of the largest, best resourced, and most broadly combat experienced

Air Force is precisely what India’s potential adversaries worry is India’s asymmetric

advantage.22

Indigenous Sourcing: As remarked already, the US has a proven track record of setting up

production lines within host nations. Therefore the US is the lowest risk option to provide India

with a capability to produce aircraft and aircraft parts in the midst of a conflict. Because the lack

of a concerted industrial policy and the wide latitude US defense contractors enjoy, US industry

is the most likely to locate significant aspects of the industry beyond just the production line to

India, and the most likely to transfer creative know-how to innovate and adapt to changing

circumstances. The fact that the US aviation industry does its business in English is also likely

to increase the chances of transfer of important know-how and speed future innovation.

Third Party Sourcing: The very large number of countries in the region and globally that operate

US designed aircraft and employ US weapons provides India with the greatest freedom of action

to access spares or surge in aircraft or weapons in actual conflict.23

That is definitely not the

case with the Rafale, which to date has a very small customer base.

The Tactical Argument: Providing The Best Capability

Qualitative A2A Advantage: Only the F-16 and F-18 offer proven operational second generation

AESA radars. All the other competitors offered only experimental first generation AESA

radars—that is a significant risk to take on the most important discriminator. Only the F-16 and

F-18 are going to bring with them the range of new weapons that expand India’s existing

freedom of action. Only the F-16 and F-18 offer India access to the world standard of training

22 The counter-argument is that India would be in danger of being socialized into America’s ways, or becoming so naturally close

that India might become entangled in America’s conflicts. For the former, I have strong confidence in the ability of India’s

policymakers and military officers to decide what is worth adoption and what is in their best interests. For the later, I don’t

believe India will ever be in a position to surrender its sovereignty. If India ever chooses to fight alongside the US, it will be

because it believes its interests and values demand it. 23 The counter argument is that the US could exert pressure on these nation’s to deny such support. However, with India being

the only existing production line of these aircraft, will such nations want to risk their own access to Indian support?

14

and expertise for air and maintenance crews, which are as much a determinant of success in

combat as hardware alone. Despite the recent success of the Rafale in Libya, the F-16 and F-18

remain the most combat proven aircraft. Many falsely imagine that because the initial F-16 and

F-18 designs began in the 1970s, that they are somehow out-of-date. Both platforms got the

maneuver part of the equation right at the start of their lifecycles, and have continued to evolve

in design to where modern variants are the equal of any 4th

generation fighter, and still comprise

the majority of the US air superiority fleet for a reason. The F-16IN and F-18E/F are not “last

year’s model” but rather are the latest version of the most successful aircraft reflecting decades

of experience of updating what works.

Summary

MMRCA source selection remains a significant opportunity for India to advance its security and

expand its freedom of action at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Maximizing Indian

security requires an analysis of all levels, and cannot or should not just be confined to comparing

a list of performance parameters between the list of competitors. Some parameters matter far

more than others to India’s security, and some of the things that matter most—such as how it will

shape India’s regional security architecture—are not even in the requirements. A strategic choice

that enhanced India’s deterrence but could not actually get off the ground might be more

valuable than a tactical winner that undermined India’s strategic influence.

Fortunately the best tactical choice is also the best operational and strategic choice. Principally

because of their proven AESA systems, the F-16 and F-18 offer India the best bet to win the

tactical Air-to-Air engagement. Their low per-unit and lifecycle costs, coupled with a track

record of setting up licensed production lines mean they are the lowest-risk bet to affordably

field the required numbers of aircraft on time to meet the challenge of an operational air

campaign. Strategically, any adversary must give pause and consider the fact that India has a

powerful friend that has significant investment and equities in its military industrial base it does

not want to see disrupted or proven lacking. They must calculate what they can’t see—what

other help, transfer of know-how or intelligence come with it. That enhances both deterrence

and dissuasion and protects Indian hard security interests. A US selection also provides

unparalleled opportunity for India to expand its influence globally, as the US is and is likely to

remain India’s chief patron as it seeks increased global influence. Overall, a US selection best

serves the Indian grand strategic goal of inclusive growth by deepening its economic

relationship, linking technical and industrial bases, and lessening the chance of distracting

conflict.