THE CHINESE OFSOUTH-EAST ASIA

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MINORITYRIGHTS GROUPis an international research and information unit registeredin Britain as an educational charity under the CharitiesAct of 1960. Its principal aims are –

To secure justice for minority or majority groups sufferingdiscrimination, by investigating their situation and publi-cising the facts as widely as possible, to educate and alertpublic opinion throughout the world.

To help prevent, through publicity about violations ofhuman rights, such problems from developing into dan-gerous and destructive conflicts which, when polarised,are very difficult to resolve; and

To foster, by its research findings, international under-standing of the factors which create prejudiced treatmentand group tensions, thus helping to promote the growthof a world conscience regarding human rights.

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Minority Rights Group gratefully acknowledges all theorganizations and individuals who gave financial andother assistance for this report.

Authors’ BiographiesRAMSES AMER, author of all the sections on Indochina,is a Research Fellow at the Department of Peace andConflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden. He is theauthor of The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Sino-Vietnamese Relations, Forum, Kuala Lumpur, 1991.

SUE RABBITT ROFF coordinated the management ofthis report. Formerly of MRG New York, she is now atthe Centre for Medical Education at Dundee University.

MARY SOMERS HEIDHUES, author of the overview ofASEAN states and the individual ASEAN state sections, isbased at the Seminar for Political Science at theUniversity of Göttingen, Germany. She has written exten-sively on the situation of the Chinese in South-East Asia,and is the author of Southeast Asia’s Chinese Minorities(Longman 1974). She was the guest lecturer at the firstJennifer Cushman Memorial lecture at the AustralianNational University, Canberra, April 1991.

MARTIN SMITH, author of the section on Myanmar(Burma) is a journalist who has specialized in humanrights in Burma for a number of years. He is the author ofBurma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (ZedBooks, 1991).

JOHN TAYLOR, author of the section on East Timor, isPrincipal Lecturer at South Bank University, London,UK, where he is also Head of the Centre for ChineseStudies. He is the author of Indonesia’s Forgotten War:the Hidden History of East Timor (Zed Books, 1991) andThe Indonesian Occupation of East Timor, 1974-9: AChronology (Refugee Studies Programme, OxfordUniversity / Catholic Institute for Int’l Relations, 1990).

© Minority Rights Group

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 0 946690 99 5ISSN 0305 6252

Published November 1992

Typeset by Brixton GraphicsPrinted on bleach free paper by Manchester Free PressThis report has been commissioned, and is published, by Minority Rights Group as a contri-bution to public understanding of the issue which forms its subject. It does not necessarilyrepresent, in every detail and in all its aspects, the collective view of Minority Rights Group.

THE CHINESEOF SOUTH-EAST ASIAEdited byMinority Rights Group

CONTENTS

Preface

Glossary

Historical Overview

THE ASEAN STATES:

Malaysia

Indonesia

East Timor

Singapore

Thailand

The Philippines

Brunei Darussalam

INDOCHINA:

Vietnam

Cambodia

Laos

Burma

Conclusions

Footnotes

Select Bibliography

A Chinese couple in

IndonesiaP. ZACHMANN/MAGNUM

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4

DRAFT DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OFPERSONS BELONGING TO NATIONAL ORETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTICMINORITIES*

The General Assembly,Reaffirming that one of the basic aims of the United Nations, as proclaimed in itsCharter, is to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for fundamen-tal freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,Reaffirming faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of thehuman person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large andsmall,Desiring to promote the realization of principles contained in the Charter of theUnited Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention onthe Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the InternationalConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenanton Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Declaration on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, andthe Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as other relevant internationalinstruments that have been adopted at the universal or regional level and thoseconcluded between individual States Members of the United Nations,Inspired by the provisions of article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights concerning the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious orlinguistic minorities,Considering that the promotion and protection of the rights of persons belongingto national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities contribute to the politicaland social stability of States in which they live,Emphasizing that the constant promotion and realization of the rights of personsbelonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, as an integralpart of the development of society as a whole and within a democratic frameworkbased on the rule of law, would contribute to the strengthening of friendship andcooperation among peoples and States,Considering that the United Nations has an important role to play regarding theprotection of minorities,Bearing in mind the work done so far within the United Nations system, in partic-ular the Commission on Human Rights, the Sub-Commission on Prevention ofDiscrimination and Protection of Minorities as well as the bodies established pur-suant to the International Covenants on Human Rights and other relevant interna-tional human rights instruments on promoting and protecting the rights of personsbelonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities,Taking into account the important work which is carried out by intergovernmentaland non-governmental organizations in protecting minorities and in promotingand protecting the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious andlinguistic minorities,Recognizing the need to ensure even more effective implementation of inter-national instruments with regard to the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities,Proclaims this Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National orEthnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities:

Article 11. States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religiousand linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories, and shallencourage conditions for the promotion of that identity.2. States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve thoseends.Article 21. Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities (here-inafter referred to as persons belonging to minorities) have the right to enjoy theirown culture, to profess and practise their own religion, and to use their own lan-guage, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of dis-crimination.2. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in cul-tural, religious, social, economic and public life.3. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in deci-sions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live, in a manner

not incompatible with national legislation.4. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and maintain theirown associations.5. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and maintain, with-out any discrimination, free and peaceful contacts with other members of theirgroup, with persons belonging to other minorities, as well as contacts across fron-tiers with citizens of other States to whom they are related by national or ethnic,religious or linguistic ties.Article 31. Persons belonging to minorities may exercise their rights including those as setforth in this Declaration individually as well as in community with other membersof their group, without any discrimination.2. No disadvantage shall result for any person belonging to a minority as the con-sequence of the exercise or non-exercise of the rights as set forth in thisDeclaration.Article 41. States shall take measures where required to ensure that persons belonging tominorities may exercise fully and effectively all their human rights and fundamen-tal freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the law.2. States shall take measures to create favourable conditions to enable personsbelonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their cul-ture, language, religion, traditions and customs, except where specific practicesare in violation of national law and contrary to international standards.3. States should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, personsbelonging to minorities have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongueor to have instruction in their mother tongue.4. States should, where appropriate, take measures in the field of education, inorder to encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture ofthe minorities existing within their territory. Persons belonging to minoritiesshould have adequate opportunities to gain knowledge of the society as a whole.5. States should consider appropriate measures so that persons belonging tominorities may participate fully in the economic progress and development intheir country.Article 51. National policies and programmes shall be planned and implemented with dueregard for the legitimate interests of persons belonging to minorities.2. Programmes of cooperation and assistance among States should be planned andimplemented with due regard for the legitimate interests of persons belonging tominorities.Article 6States should cooperate on questions relating to persons belonging to minorities,including exchange of information and experiences, in order to promote mutualunderstanding and confidence.Article 7States should cooperate in order to promote respect for the rights as set forth inthis Declaration.Article 81. Nothing in this Declaration shall prevent the fulfilment of international obliga-tions of States in relation to persons belonging to minorities. In particular, Statesshall fulfil in good faith the obligations and commitments they have assumedunder international treaties and agreements to which they are parties.2. The exercise of the rights as set forth in this Declaration shall not prejudice theenjoyment by all persons of universally recognized human rights and fundamentalfreedoms.3. Measures taken by States in order to ensure the effective enjoyment of therights as set forth in this Declaration shall not prima facie be considered contraryto the principle of equality contained in the Universal Declaration of HumanRights.4. Nothing in this Declaration may be construed as permitting any activity con-trary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, including sovereignequality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.Article 9The organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations system shall contributeto the full realization of the rights and principles as set forth in this Declaration,within their respective fields of competence.

* As approved by the Commission on Human Rights at the forty-eighth session(Resolution 1992/16 of 21 February 1992).

The worldwide ethnic Chinese diaspora is one ofthe most extensive in existence today. There is prob-ably a Chinese community, large or small, in everystate or territory. Most of these communities arerelatively recent, for few Chinese emigrated on apermanent basis until the 18th or 19th centuries,and many have established themselves only over thelast century. The diaspora is only a tiny part of thegreater Chinese world, perhaps 28 million peoplecompared to over 1,000 million in China proper, 21 million in Taiwan and 6 million in Hong Kongand Macau. The majority of this diaspora, and the subject of this report, is concentrated in South-East Asia.

The Chinese communities of the region were the subjectof one of the earliest reports published by Minority RightsGroup. In 1972, less than two years after MRG had begunpublishing its successful report series and in the wake ofethnic tension in Malaysia and Indonesia, MRG issuedThe Chinese in Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia. Arevised and extended edition was published in 1982. Thiscompletely new edition extends the subject matter stillfurther and contains case studies of the six ASEAN states,the three Indochinese states, Burma (Myanmar) and EastTimor. There is inevitably more information available onthe Chinese in some of these countries than in others, andthis is reflected in the differing lengths of the articles.

The report is the collective work of its authors: RamsesAmer (Indochina), Mary Somers Heidhues (the historicaloverview and the ASEAN states), Martin Smith (Burma)and John Taylor (East Timor). Sue Rabbitt Roff, formerlyof MRG New York and herself an expert on Indonesia andEast Timor, coordinated the management of the report.

People of Chinese ethnic origin have worked and settledin the societies of South-East Asia for generations. Thelongest settled communities live in the areas closest toChina, where the Chinese empire once claimed (orattempted to claim) suzerainty or where trade links werestrong, while the newer communities have settled furtherafield during the period when European colonial empiresneeded labour for their new industries or middlemen tofacilitate trade. In some territories, such as Singapore andthe Malayan states, the influx of Chinese immigrants deci-sively altered the population balance of the region.

Although large-scale Chinese immigration had finishedbefore the beginning of the Second World War, and thereare many examples of how Chinese enterprise and indus-try have contributed to the economic growth of theregion, the record of the new independent states towardstheir Chinese communities has been mixed. State policieshave ranged from outright discrimination to tolerance,from segregation to integration to assimilation. In a fewcases, people identified as Chinese on ethnic, racial orcultural grounds have found themselves the victims ofgenocidal state policies.

Most South-East Asian governments have been concernedto limit the amount of economic resources (and power)concentrated in Chinese hands. Strategies for achievingthis have ranged from restricted access to education andbusiness activity to the forcible expulsion of ethnicChinese. While in many states some Chinese communities

and families do hold a disproportionately large share inthe urban economic sector, this disguises the fact thatmany ethnic Chinese are farmers, small traders and pro-fessionals. In response, many Chinese communities areaccommodating towards their governments even wherethey feel that government policies have resulted in theirsuffering unfair discrimination.

Some Chinese communities are in a far more precariousposition. In both Indonesia in 1959-60 and 1965 and inVietnam in 1976-9, governments engaged in mass expul-sions of ethnic Chinese as deliberate state policies. ManyASEAN countries, notably Malaysia and Singapore in1979, have refused to accept refugees from theIndochinese countries, especially when these refugeeswere ethnic Chinese, as was the case with the first wavesfrom Vietnam. Under the Khmer Rouge regime inCambodia over 200,000 ethnic Chinese, half of theChinese community, were killed through executions, star-vation or ill-treatment and in East Timor most of theChinese community were rounded up and executed in thefirst week of the Indonesian invasion in December 1975.In Burma (Myanmar) the Chinese community has been aspecific target of the military government since 1962.

Nevertheless, for the various Chinese communities inmost of the states of South-East Asia, the position is nei-ther so urgent nor so vulnerable. The ending of the ColdWar, and the relaxation of relations between the People’sRepublic of China and the states of the region (as well assuperpower rivalry between China, the USA and theUSSR) have produced more amicable relations betweenand within states. It is unlikely that Chinese minoritieswill again be regarded by governments as ‘fifth columnists’for either the People’s Republic or Taiwan. The relaxationof previous restrictions on citizenship for the Chineseminorities in Indonesia and the Philippines has created amore positive climate.

Today, in most states of the region, the ethnic Chinese arecitizens and see their future as belonging to their countryof citizenship. Their future and the future of their fellowcitizens of other ethnic origins (whether indigenous orotherwise) is bound together, politically and economically,and probably also culturally. Every state in South-EastAsia today is ethnically heterogeneous and most (althoughnot all) are prepared to acknowledge the fact. The variedethnic Chinese communities should therefore be encour-aged to play a creative and positive role at all levels withinthe countries in which they have chosen to live.

Alan PhillipsDirectorNovember 1992

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PREFACE

GLOSSARY

Ali-Babaism colloquial term to describe Malay-Chineseor Indonesian-Chinese partnerships, in which ‘Ali’ assurespolitical benefits for ‘Baba’, the Chinese businessman.

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations – regionalconsultative body, with six member states (Brunei,Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand).

Asli lit. indigenous, Malay-Indonesian word, referring tocitizens of indigenous ethnic group (see also pribumi).

Baba similar meaning to peranakan (see below).

Bang system of indirect rule over Chinese communitiesby the governments of pre-colonial Vietnam andCambodia; a bang is a dialect or speech-group association.

Barisan Nasional lit. National Front, governing coalitionin Malaysia.

Batavia former Dutch colonial name for Jakarta.

Bumiputra lit. sons of the soil, Malay term for citizens ofMalaysia who are of Malay or other indigenous descent.

Cochinchina the southernmost part of Vietnam.

Congrégation system French colonial system inIndochina, based on laws of Vietnamese Emperor Gia-Long, establishing a special administration for ethnicChinese which divided them into groups according toplaces of origin and under the jurisdiction of their ownleaders.

Cukong lit. uncle, Hokkien word for wealthy Chinesepatrons, godfathers, bosses, in Indonesia refers specificallyto wealthy Chinese businessmen receiving governmentfavours; but is less used today.

Dayaks diverse tribal groups, inhabiting the island ofBorneo/Kalimantan.

Emergency (in Malaya) period of Communist insurrec-tion 1948-60.

Guangzhou Chinese name for city commonly known toWesterners as Canton.

Guomindang (Kuomintang) Chinese Republican Partyof Sun Yat-sen and later of Chiang Kai-shek, left theChinese mainland for Taiwan after being finally defeatedby the Communists in 1949 and has since ruled only inTaiwan. Some remnants of various Guomindang armieshave been active in parts of Burma and Thailand.

Hakka (Kejia) distinctive Chinese dialect group who livemainly in parts of Guangdong and Fujian.

Hoa term used by the Vietnamese government to desig-nate most Vietnamese citizens of Chinese descent.

Ho Chi Minh City formerly called Saigon, largest city ofVietnam and former capital of South Vietnam.

Hokkien (Minnan) dialect of southern Fujian.

Khmer Rouge lit. Red Khmers, fanatical Communistnationalists who ruled Cambodia from April 1975 toJanuary 1979.

Mandarin (or Guoyu, Putonghua) standard Chineselanguage spoken in most of north and south-west China,later became language of communication for manyChinese in South-East Asia who spoke other Chinesedialects.

Mestizo lit. mixed blood, Spanish word for descendantsof mixed unions, e.g. Chinese and indigenous Filipinos.

Nanyang lit. South Seas, Chinese descriptive name forSouth-East Asian region.

NEP New Economic Policy, economic goals introducedby government in Malaysia after riots of 1969, aimed atreducing poverty and increasing the role of the indigenouspeople (Bumiputras) in the Malaysian economy.

NEZ New Economic Zone, regions of mass resettlementdesignated by the government of reunified Vietnam from1976 to 1979, they were especially used to resettle privatetraders, ethnic minorities (such as the Chinese) and politi-cal dissidents.

ODP Orderly Departure Programme, agreementbetween Vietnam and UN High Commissioner forRefugees to allow citizens of Vietnam, including those ofChinese descent, to emigrate with official approval fromthe Vietnamese government.

Peranakan lit. local born, Malay-Indonesian word whichalso implies a person with local affiliations, speakingMalay-Indonesian or a local language in preference toChinese.

Pribumi lit. indigenous, Indonesian word for those ofIndonesian ethnic descent.

Qing (Ch’ing) Manchu dynasty which ruled China 1644-1911.

Siam former name for Thailand (1781-1939).

Sino-Thai Thai citizens of Chinese or part Chinesedescent.

SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council, dicta-torial ruling military of Burma (Myanmar), seized powerin a coup in September 1988.

Sun Yat-sen first President of China in 1911 and leaderof Guomindang, died 1925.

Teochiu (Chaozhou) dialect of north-easternGuangdong province.

Totok lit. pure, Malay-Indonesian word for culturally‘pure’ Chinese-speaking persons.

UMNO United Malays’ National Organization – mainMalay and leading national political party in Malaysia.

Warganegara Indonesia (WNI) lit. Indonesian citizen,usually used to refer to citizens of foreign descent, asWNI-Chinese.

Vihara lit. temple.

In this report, Mandarin Chinese terms are transcribedaccording to the Pinyin system, except where anotherspelling is widely recognized (e.g. Hokkien, Sun Yat-sen).Sources for boxes at beginning of each section: Third World Guide 1991/92, Instituto del Tercer Mundo, Montevideo, 19901990 figures from The World Bank Atlas 1991, The World Bank, WashingtonDC, 1991.

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HISTORICAL OVERVIEWby Mary Somers Heidhues

Early Chinese Contacts and First Settlements Fifteen hundred years ago, trade took Chinese merchantsbeyond their shores to South-East Asia, or the Nanyang asthey called it. The monsoon winds carried enterprisingindividuals from China’s south-eastern provinces, particularly Guangdong and Fujian, to this meeting pointof long-distance commercial pathways, where they cameinto contact with a mix of peoples. Over time, someexchange passed under cover of the imperial tribute system, through which South-East Asian rulers paid sym-bolic homage to the Chinese emperor, but much contactwas in the form of freelance, small-scale, privately organized trade.

The Chinese who stayed on became traders of all kindsand were well established in the service of various South-East Asian potentates, often as treasurers, tax collectors orharbourmasters, before the first Europeans reached thearea in the 16th Century. The latter found settlements ofChinese, as well as other ethnically distinct trading groupssuch as Arabs, Indians or Bugis from the island ofCelebes, each group living under its own headman in itsown quarter of the town. Some Chinese took local wivesand, over the centuries, some of their descendantsbecame indistinguishable from the local population. TheChinese on the Malayan Peninsula or on the islands ofSumatra and Java sometimes became Muslims, whilesome of those in Siam (now Thailand) adopted TheravadaBuddhism. In Vietnam in the 17th and 18th Centuriespolitical refugees from China who had supported theMing dynasty helped restore or refresh Confucian prac-tices in the bureaucracy and in intellectual life.

In addition to trade, the Chinese entered agriculture inless developed parts of South-East Asia. For example,they planted and processed pepper and gambir and, bythe 17th Century, were growing sugar for export or ricefor distillation into alcoholic beverages in western Java. Atthe beginning of the 19th Century they introduced sugarinto Siam, growing this export crop on plantations runwith imported Chinese coolies (indentured labourers).1

They were also market gardeners on the outskirts of 17th-Century Batavia (now Jakarta), or near 19th-CenturySingapore and Bangkok. Even today, they still help supplymany modern cities of South-East Asia with fresh pro-duce. Although agriculture was second to trade, it was anarea of major innovations: the Chinese introduced an‘industrial’ agriculture2 in Java and, for that matter, inSouth-East Asia as a whole.

In thinly populated Borneo (Kalimantan), on the island ofBangka off the coast of Sumatra, and on the MalayPeninsula, the Chinese mined gold and tin, while commu-nities of agriculturalists sprang up around the mining set-tlements. Some of the men married local women becausefew women migrated from China during this period. Atthe same time, Chinese were also artisans, skilled labour-ers and fishermen, while others came as pirates.

Chinese served local rulers – or even ruled themselves.For example, the 18th Century was a time of substantialrice trade from Siam to Canton, which Chinese managedon behalf of the Siamese court. Gold-mining areas ofWest Kalimantan became almost independent of the localsultans. Elsewhere, adventurers found a niche: the traderMac Cuu controlled Cambodia’s only seaport and estab-lished a small realm of pepper growers in the present-dayarea of Kampot.3 In Siam, Taksin, son of a Chinese immi-grant and a Thai mother, founded the city of Thonburi(now part of Bangkok) and helped re-establish theSiamese monarchy after a devastating war with Burma.4

Early European traders found Chinese useful commercialpartners. They were middlemen, retailers and creditors inthe villages, linking the local producers to the world econ-omy; they ran revenue farms for opium, alcohol and gam-bling; they imported coolie labour and organizedprostitution. However, Chinese were competitors of theEuropeans, too, and Westerners often distrusted or fearedthem. Sometimes the Chinese seemed like a threatbecause they were more numerous, better acquaintedwith local conditions, ‘heathens’ and communicated in anapparently unintelligible language. As a result, theSpanish, for example, attacked the Chinese in Manila anumber of times during the 17th and 18th Centuries,while the Dutch massacred them in Batavia in 1740.

Immigration and OpportunityIn the early 19th Century, the Chinese could immigratefreely to South-East Asian countries and their communi-ties had broad cultural autonomy. The colonial powers,the Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese and British, were nowfully established in the area, and they exacted dispropor-tionately high taxes from the Chinese as well as restrictingtheir travel and settlement patterns. Limitations on immi-gration followed towards the end of the 19th Century, themost drastic of which were introduced in 1902 in thePhilippines, when American ‘exclusion’ policy was extend-ed to the islands, virtually preventing the import ofChinese coolie labourers. In the Netherlands Indies (nowIndonesia) or in French Indochina, immigrants paid asubstantial entry fee, but contract coolies were exempt.Immigration in Singapore and Malaya,5 however,remained high until unemployment and the Depression of1930 prompted the British to restrict admissions of adultmales.

Since Chinese economic activities fitted well with theneeds of early colonialists, these saw the Chinese as nec-essary cogs in the economy, but the local people consid-ered them to be in the forefront of colonial rule. Duringthe 19th Century, therefore, the Chinese consolidatedtheir special position in the economy and society of South-East Asia. When Raffles founded Singapore in 1819, thesettlement soon became a base for Chinese migration tothe Nanyang and, in the long run, a trade and financialcentre for the region. Within a few decades the Britishcolony, Singapore, turned into a ‘Chinese’ city, a majorityof its inhabitants being so to this day. After about 1850,Singapore became a trans-shipment point for coolies fromChina, who disembarked there before being sent on to themines and plantations of Malaya and the Netherlands

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Indies. Their employers were at first Chinese-owned andthen, later, Western enterprises. Only a minority of thisnew wave of immigrants actually settled in the Nanyangduring this period. The rest returned to China after a fewyears or died of mistreatment at work.6

Chinese immigrants replicated certain elements ofChinese society in their new locations. Not only were artifacts and furnishings imported but houses, templesand graveyards were built in imitation of those in the homeland. Various kinds of associations, based on clanties, trades, cooperative enterprises, place of origin, burialinsurance or ritual brotherhood grew up. Tiny traditionalschools catered to children of those who settled and therewere even a few Chinese hospitals. Initially, authoritiestolerated these associations, even the ‘secret societies’, but gradually came to see the latter as criminal, engagingin the drug trade, prostitution, racketeering and armed conflict.

Levels of AssimilationBy the early 19th Century there existed a fairly clear divi-sion within most Chinese communities in South-East Asia.One group, the settled population, consisted of familiesacculturated to local society in language, dress, and per-haps even religion and customs. The other group was typi-cally immigrant – composed predominantly of adultmales, speaking Chinese and often living in isolation inmines and rural areas or sometimes in urban concentra-tions, separated from the local population.

In different countries the Chinese communities adjustedin different ways to the majority population. Whether agroup became completely assimilated or remained distinctwas influenced by several factors: the legal situation, fre-quency and ease of contact with local people, the relativenumber of new immigrants (especially of women) and thereceptivity of the local society itself.

In the 19th Century, in the Netherlands Indies, the Dutchrequired the Chinese to live in ghettos and discouragedtheir conversion to Islam, the religion of the majority.Despite some exceptions, this restrictive system combinedwith other measures (such as the land laws and the differ-entiated legal systems for Europeans, Chinese and‘natives’) to maintain the separation of the peranakan7

(settled) Chinese from natives. In the Netherlands Indies,after the mid-19th Century, it was virtually impossible fora ‘Chinese’, even if local-born, to become a ‘native’.

In the case of Malaya, British policy reinforced differ-ences between Chinese, even the local-born Malay-speak-ing Babas,8 and Malays, but in addition the sheer numbersof new immigrants from China overwhelmed and reab-sorbed (‘resinified’) the settled Chinese. As ‘immigrants’,even the local-born were not entitled to live in Malaya onthe same terms as the Malays.

In other countries, however, settled Chinese were soonabsorbed into local society. In Siam, for example, aChinese might become a ‘native’ by changing his dress,habits and formal legal status. He quickly adjusted to localBuddhist practices.9 Spanish colonial law in thePhilippines allowed Chinese to marry native women onlyif they were Catholics. Their descendants, mestizos, might

in turn apply for legal status as ‘natives’.10 Between 1870and 1930 the high numbers of immigrants from China,who seemed stubbornly to cling to customs of their home-land, made observers think that all Chinese, even local-born, were unassimilable. Increased migration, as well asthe segregation of the Chinese, also set the stage forChinese nationalism. First the imperial Qing government,then nationalists led by Sun Yat-sen, began to try toinvolve Chinese abroad in the politics and development ofthe homeland. New cultural influences from China andeven from Christian missionaries made them more con-scious of their own intellectual and religious heritage.Local groups built new temples, Confucianist societiessprang up, new kinds of community organizations formedand a self-conscious Chinese press appeared. Especiallyimportant was the influence, after 1900, of modernschools which taught in Mandarin11 and introduced anarray of new subjects, soon displacing traditional schools.

In an area like Java or the rural Philippines, the economicactivities of the Chinese were subordinate to largeWestern export interests and consisted typically of tradingactivity by middlemen. When native agriculture changedto producing for export and taxation in kind was abol-ished, Chinese middlemen provided agricultural credit.Local Chinese sometimes organized export and importactivities themselves (as with Siam’s or Vietnam’s riceexports), and they also were pioneers in light and con-sumer industry after the mid-19th Century: rice mills onthe one hand, bottled water, soap and biscuits on theother. These industries frequently competed successfullywith Western enterprises. Furthermore, in Siam theyattracted capital from local sources, in particular from thenobility and the landowners.12 In the Philippines, Chinesemestizos intermarried with the native landholding class.These economic alliances with powerholders continued invarious forms into recent times.

Political and Cultural TurnaroundThe wave of new migrants brought other changes to eth-nic Chinese communities in South-East Asia. For onething, women began to arrive from the mainland.Peranakan, Baba and mestiza women wore an adaptedform of Malay or Philippine dress; many chewed beteland followed other local practices. Immigrant Chinesewomen wore trousers; some even had bound feet. Theirpresence stabilized immigrant societies and, even in landswhere assimilation was common, influences from Chinaovertook those from local societies. Locally rootedChinese began to reconsider what it meant to be Chinese,not just in dress but in religion, culture and politics.

New Chinese schools competed successfully withWestern-language ones for the ethnic Chinese, but didnot replace them completely. Some of the élite still choseWestern education. Old-style Chinese schools, which hadexisted for decades wherever the presence of a few chil-dren made them possible, usually taught in the languageor dialect of the place of origin in China: Hokkien(Minnan) for southern Fujian, Teochiu (Chaozhou) fornorth-eastern Guangdong province, Cantonese for theGuangzhou area, Hakka (who emigrated from variousenclaves in Guangdong and Fujian), and so on. These lan-

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guages (except Teochiu and Hokkien) were mutuallyunintelligible and speakers of various languages wereoften segregated from one another according to residenceand occupation. Modern Chinese schools taught all pupilsin Mandarin, China’s national language, which in timebecame the language of communication for many Chinesein South-East Asia.

Through the schools and the Chinese-language press (inIndonesia a Chinese-operated press appeared in theMalay language), political influences from Chinaincreased, especially among young people. Some travelledto China to continue their education or to work, hoping tobuild a new country there. Philanthropists foundedschools or business enterprises in China while ordinaryworking people sent money home. Tensions betweenChina and Japan and the Western powers aroused patrio-tism and the will to help, which intensified after the out-break of war between Japan and China in 1937.

The Second World War and Problems of AdjustmentThe Japanese occupation of South-East Asia in theSecond World War brought humiliation, oppression anddeath to ethnic Chinese in the region, for the Japanesesaw them as enemies. This common experience increasedcultural and political solidarity but not all were, however,patriots. Some ethnic Chinese were profiteers, withJapanese help, or smugglers, despite Japanese deaththreats. Tensions with native peoples increased, especiallywhere Chinese, as in Malaya, saw themselves as victims ofthe Japanese occupation, or as in Java, where anti-Chineseviolence accompanied the withdrawal of the Dutch in1942 and followed their return in 1945.

Chinese minorities faced new problems in the post-warperiod as colonial powers withdrew from the area, leavingpolitical power in the hands of South-East Asian national-ists. After 1949, the Cold War complicated relations withChina, given the presence of two competitors for the loy-alty of Chinese abroad, the People’s Republic of Chinaand the Republic of China in Taiwan. Cultural solidarityand politicization of Chinese culture were also typical ofthis period, while the number of Chinese schools andenthusiasm for the revolution in China, especially amongyoung people, grew explosively.

During these same years, South-East Asian nationalismchallenged the position of Chinese minorities. Immigrationdeclined to a trickle. To South-East Asian states, Chinaoften appeared as a dangerous neighbour and Chineseminorities a ‘potential fifth column’, eager to extendCommunist Chinese power to the Nanyang. Some statesresponded by making it difficult for Chinese to become cit-izens (Indonesia, Philippines, Malaya), and some by forcingthem to do so (South Vietnam). Chinese law complicatedthe problem because it recognized Chinese born abroad asChinese nationals or overseas Chinese, yet neither thePeople’s Republic of China nor the Nationalist governmenton Taiwan were willing to admit all these supposed citizensto residence. Only students, professionals or the wealthywere welcome. As a result, alien Chinese could not beexpelled from the South-East Asian countries, but theyfaced discrimination if they stayed.

Today, both the People’s Republic of China and Taiwanhave abandoned the idea that ethnic Chinese born abroadare necessarily Chinese citizens and they place good rela-tions with friendly nations above any actions to ‘protect’Chinese abroad. Thus, although the term ‘overseasChinese’ (Huaqiao) is often used, these people are nolonger nationals of China, and the term ‘ethnic Chinese’more appropriately describes their status. ‘EthnicChinese’ includes all persons of Chinese or part Chinesedescent who would, at least in a cultural or family sense,identify themselves as Chinese, even though they may becitizens of another country and also identify with thatcountry.

Today, Chinese in the ten states of South-East Asia arepart of the much larger diaspora of ethnic Chinese world-wide but it is not easy to estimate their numbers. In part,this is because of difficulties in deciding who is Chineseand in part because in some states it is not opportune forethnic groups to advertise their distinctiveness. Ethnictensions in some states have resulted in outbreaks of vio-lence and mass expulsions, most notably in Indonesia in1959-60 and 1965-7, and Indochina in 1976-9. Because ofslower population growth and net emigration, however,the numerical proportion of ethnic Chinese in South-EastAsian countries appears to be (with the possible exceptionof Singapore) steadily declining.

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10

THE ASEAN STATESby Mary Somers Heidhues

Established in 1967, the Association of Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN) originally included Malaysia, Indonesia,Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. Brunei becamethe sixth state at its independence in 1984 and Vietnamhas expressed interest in association. ASEAN has func-tioned as a loose consultative body with a minimum ofcentral organization or official common policy-making,and members differ in relative size, population, develop-ment and attitudes. Politically, these states have beenanti-Communist internally, even where they have beenexternally non-aligned. Economically, they have success-fully pursued rapid, export-oriented development with thehelp of foreign investment. Both their economicdynamism and their political conservatism have hadrepercussions for their Chinese minorities since their gov-ernments have pursued policies of wealth creation whileat the same time inhibiting the accumulation of politicalpower in the Chinese communities.

Although, in the past, Chinese in South-East Asia havebeen sentimentally attached to China and have hoped thatgood relations with their homeland would offer them pro-tection while abroad, recent decades have shown that thebest ‘protection’ lies in a successful accommodation to thecountry of residence. Some professionals have left forWestern countries or sent their children abroad, causing asmall ‘brain drain’, but most ethnic Chinese are probablyhoping for a future in the area, if that means they can par-ticipate in its economic growth. For ethnic Chinese farm-ers, fishermen or the urban poor, restrictive policies havemade their lives more difficult or even precarious for,unlike professionals or successful, internationally orientedbusinessmen, they have no quick or easy escape to anoth-er country available. Therefore, for most Chinese in theASEAN countries, ‘going home’ to China is no real alter-native today and the question is not whether, but how,they will adjust to life in the ASEAN countries.1

Rapid economic growth has expanded opportunities inmany economic fields: export-oriented manufacturing,banking and finance, agro-industry, tourism and realestate, and ethnic Chinese have known how to take advan-tage of these opportunities. They have understood how towork with indigenous political and military powerholdersto achieve their goals and as a result, some Chinese busi-nessmen (there are few Chinese businesswomen at thelevel of big business) have become enormously wealthy,their success stories appearing in local and internationalmedia. At the same time, uneven development, increasinggaps between rich and poor in some countries, and com-petition with indigenous business groups have led toresentment. This is often directed more at the ethnicChinese than at their partners, the political élite and for-eign investors. In many instances, however, the moststriking ‘rags to riches’ examples among businessmencome from the ranks of the China-born, who are actually asmall proportion of all ethnic Chinese in South-East Asia today.

Finally, the fact that many second- and third-generation

Chinese parents still urge their children to enter businessand that they relatively seldom enter the bureaucracy(except in Singapore), either by choice or because ofrestrictions, maintains their disproportionate role in eco-nomic life. If Chineseness is somehow related to businessand to business success, and their disproportionate roleseems to confirm that, then parents may encourage theirchildren to emphasize that part of their background – andreject assimilation or even adaptation to the local culture.

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11

MALAYSIAby Mary Somers Heidhues

Malaya gained independence from the British in 1957 andbecame the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. It is dividedbetween the Malay Peninsula and, across the South ChinaSea, the two states of Sabah and Sarawak on the island ofBorneo. The western side of the peninsula, where thecities of Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Ipoh are situated, isthe most developed part; pockets of poverty still remain inthe country, especially in rural areas and in East Malaysia.

It is in the west that the concentration of ethnic Chineseis the highest, over 30 per cent, whereas they make upabout 25 per cent of the population in East Malaysia.

In the 1950s the Chinese of Malaya were among South-East Asia’s least assimilated groups. Most of their fore-fathers had arrived after 1850 as temporary migrants andsettled in mining, plantation and farming areas or in urbansites far from contact with the Malay population. Since theywere so concentrated, they had the resources to maintain adistinctive Chinese culture in the form of temples, schools,

community associations and political movements. Britishcolonial policy considered ‘Malays’ (now known asBumiputras) to have special claims as the pre-existingpeople. Malays, defined legally according to behaviourrather than descent, were those who habitually spokeMalay and adhered to the Islamic religion and Malay cus-toms. However, the Chinese were, as a group, better edu-cated and wealthier than the Malays. At the end of thecolonial period they were also more urbanized and moreintegrated into the modern sectors of the economy. Theywere second only to foreign firms in control of mining andplantations and dominated much of small industry, retailtrade and distribution. At the same time, a sizeable minor-ity were farmers, market gardeners and fishermen.

By independence in 1957 about 50 per cent of the popula-tion were ethnic Malay, while 37 per cent were Chineseand most of the rest were of South Asian origin.Protection of Malay rights was enshrined in the constitu-tion and meant numerical domination of the civil service,guarantees in education and political hegemony and, atfirst, limited access to citizenship for the non-Malays.‘Political power to the Malays, economic power to theChinese’ was a compromise on which independence wasbased and the government did little to interfere with thisdictum. The government protected foreign investmentsand, in 1963, extended the Malay privileges of the consti-tution to natives of Sarawak and Sabah. During the firstdecade or so of independence, therefore, the Chinese hadfairly free access to business activity.

In 1948 the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) launched arebellion against the colonial government which continuedin the jungles until 1960 and was called, because a state ofemergency was declared, the Emergency. The fact that theMCP drew its support largely from the ethnic Chinese,although in fact only a small proportion of them wereactively committed to the rebellion, made them seem to beof questionable loyalty. Forced resettlement of squatters(for the most part Chinese who had opened farms in unde-veloped areas and who were thought to be supporting theEmergency) was not calculated to win their loyalty, espe-cially where they were expected to earn their living asfarmers, yet did not have access to secure land titles.1

In 1969, however, dissatisfaction with the distribution ofwealth and political power led to serious race riots whichcentred on Kuala Lumpur. By that time, a growing num-ber of educated and urbanized young Malays were nolonger prepared to leave economic domination to theChinese. It was not until 1971 that parliamentary rule wasre-established after the introduction of the NewEconomic Policy (NEP).

Goals of the NEP were to lessen the differences in eco-nomic and social status between Bumiputras and non-Bumiputras and to reduce poverty, especially among ruralMalays. It also promised more educational opportunitiesfor Malays or Bumiputras and included a controversialattempt to redistribute control of share capital away fromforeigners and non-Bumiputras so that by 1990, the targetdate, not less than 30 per cent would be in Bumiputrahands and 40 per cent in non-Bumiputra Malaysian. (In1970 Bumiputras held less than 2 per cent of corporateshares, non-Bumiputra Malaysians 37 per cent and for-eigners 61 per cent.)

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DATE OF INDEPENDENCE: 1957Constitutional status: constitutional monarchy, with

revolving kingship (five year term) elected fromthe nine regents (sultans) as head of state, centralbicameral parliament and a legislative assemblyfor each state

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, Commonwealth

RATIFICATION OF:UN Int. Cov. on Civil and Political Rights: noUN Opt. Protocol to the Int. Cov. on Civil and

Political Rights: noUN Int. Conv. on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination: noUN Conv. on the Rights of the Child: noPolitical/military alliances: ASEAN, Five-Power

Defence Arrangements

AREA: 329,750 sq.kmPOPULATION: 17,752,000 (1990)LITERACY: 73%LIFE EXPECTANCY: 70PER CAPITA GNP: $2,340 (1990)ECONOMY: largest sector is agriculture

and resource-based, butmanufacturing and servicesare a growing component

PRINCIPAL ETHNIC GROUPS: Malay, Chinese (32%),Indians

RELIGIONS: Islam (official religion),Buddhism, Taoism,Christianity, Hinduism,Sikhism

LANGUAGES: Malay (official language),English, Chinese dialects,Tamil

In addition, electoral districts were redrawn to ensureMalay dominance of representative government. The con-stitution was amended to forbid public challenges, even inParliament, to the position of the Malay rulers, toBumiputra privileges, to the status of Islam as official reli-gion, or to the citizenship of any ethnic group.

Crucial to these ambitious plans was rapid economicgrowth and provision of jobs to cut unemployment andpoverty: the promise that growth would make redistribu-tion possible without anyone having to face decliningprosperity may have made the NEP more palatable tonon-Bumiputras. By 1990 the redistributive goals werenearly reached when Bumiputras held 20.3 per cent ofcorporate wealth, while non-Bumiputras held 46.2 percent and foreign corporations 25.1 per cent.2 Yet this wasnot without cost to the ethnic Chinese. For example, gov-ernment efforts to alleviate poverty were meant forBumiputras and overlooked, many felt, impoverished non-Bumiputras (despite the predominance of this group inbusiness, many did live in poverty).3

Political ExpressionThe United Malays’ National Organization (UMNO) hasdominated the government since the 1950s and todayplays a central role in the governing coalition called theBarisan Nasional (National Front). The MalaysianChinese Association (MCA) participates in this coalitionalong with a second largely non-Bumiputra party, theGerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People’sMovement). Since independence, most Chinese haveattained citizenship with full voting rights.

However, when it comes to defending minority rights,Chinese voters, especially those of the lower classes, seethe MCA as tied to Malay interests and a majority of themwill vote, as they did in October 1990, for the Chineseopposition Democratic Action Party (DAP). As a result,probably only a multiracial coalition could topple UMNOor the Barisan Nasional coalition since the issues whichpull Chinese voters to DAP tend to repel Malays andthose which pull Malay voters to PAS, a conservativeIslamic party, tend to fend off Chinese, while UMNO(since 1988 UMNO-Baru) presents itself successfully asthe party of all Malays.

In parts of East Malaysia, a different picture of inter-ethnic political expression has emerged. There has been atendency for non-Malay Bumiputra groups to combinepolitically with the Chinese to oppose federal encroach-ments on local autonomy or favoritism for Malays inappointments to official posts.

BusinessThe NEP has also affected the position of the ethnicChinese in business. Various government measures suchas requirements that shares be transferred, sometimesbelow market price, to Bumiputras, and quotas foremployment of Bumiputras, have led Chinese business-men to resort to a variety of strategies to circumvent gov-ernment interference in business decisions. For example,they limit the size of their businesses, or divide them,because small businesses are exempt from employment

and ownership quotas. They also concentrate their invest-ment in retailing, distribution, real estate development orspeculative enterprises instead of, for example, manufac-turing to escape favouritism for Bumiputras.

The device of ‘Ali-Babaism’ (collaborating with a Malay‘Ali’ but keeping control for themselves, ‘Baba’ meaning aChinese) has been used in the past, not just in Malaysia.Today, this arrangement is apparently not often used tocircumvent share ownership requirements, but has grownin other fields where activities are reserved forBumiputras, as in taxi licences or possibly landholding.4

Bumiputra favouritism can tempt collection of illegal andextra-legal fees and observers believe that corruption hasincreased, which is not a good basis for mutual respect ininter-ethnic relations.

Malaysia has enjoyed high levels of foreign investmentand economic growth in the past two decades butinvestors from abroad have tended to seek partners instate firms or among influential Bumiputras for joint ven-tures, and less among the Chinese. It has not been lost onethnic Chinese owners of small- and medium-sizedChinese businesses, for example, that investors fromTaiwan (whose numbers have increased almost explosivelyin the last few years) are exempt from requirements toemploy or share ownership with Bumiputras since export-oriented industries can be up to 100 per cent foreign-owned. However, most ethnic Chinese-owned businesses,not producing for export, do not benefit from this kind ofliberalization.

Some economists have argued that NEP has actuallyretarded economic growth. The government appeared toacknowledge this in mid-1991 when its new ‘NationalDevelopment Policy’ was announced as a ten-year plan toemphasize growth more than ethnic redistribution.5

Nevertheless, NEP favouritism for Bumiputra economicactivities can be expected to continue into the 1990s.

EducationMalaysia has South-East Asia’s most comprehensiveChinese-language system of education, with publicly sup-ported primary schools teaching in Chinese (the nationallanguage, Malay, is a required subject).6 English-languageprimary schools were phased out in 1971.

Secondary schools changed to teaching in Malay in 1977,thus eliminating publicly supported English-language sec-ondary education, which had increasingly appealed to theChinese. However, there are about 50 privately supportedChinese-language secondary schools, which about 12 percent of ethnic Chinese students attend.

Since 1983 university instruction has also been in Malay.The plan for setting up the Chinese-medium MerdekaUniversity, first proposed in 1968, was finally scotched bythe courts in 1982 with the argument that tertiary educa-tion must be in the national language.7

In 1987 the Ministry of Education tried to place non-Mandarin-speaking administrators in Chinese-languageprimary schools. In the same year the Senate of theUniversity of Malaya refused to allow elective courses inChinese, Tamil or English. The government, claiming thatethnic disorder threatened, intervened by detaining,

13

under the Internal Security Act, about 100 influential peo-ple, the largest group being from the Chinese oppositionDemocratic Action Party (DAP).8

Apart from limitations on Chinese-language education,the opening up of education to Bumiputras has reducedopportunities for the ethnic Chinese. In 1970, 44 per centof Malaysian university students were Bumiputras but by1977 this figure had grown to 68 per cent. During thisperiod, Chinese numbers had dropped from 46 per centto 26 per cent, less than their proportion of the popula-tion.9 Today, more Chinese Malaysians study at collegesand universities outside the country than inside Malaysia,partly because of ethnic quotas.

ProspectsSince the definition of ‘Malay’ is behavioural, based onreligion, language and custom, a local-born ethnicChinese, by becoming a Muslim and distancing himselffrom the Chinese community, could conceivably becomea Malay and enjoy Bumiputra privileges. But only in theory.In practice, it seems only those who are adopted asMalays make the leap (infant daughters of Chinese aresometimes adopted and raised as Malays, which showsthat racism is not an issue here); those who are not, can-not. Assimilation is closed to others; an adult Chinese whoconverted to Islam would normally remain a Chinese, nota Bumiputra.

Although ethnic Chinese have little chance of expressingtheir interests politically, except in greatly diluted form, thepossibility that they might resort to violence is remote. TheEmergency of 1948-60 was clothed in anti-colonial rhetoricbut failed to attract genuinely widespread or multi-ethnicsupport. Furthermore, top posts in the army and policeforce are, not surprisingly, in the hands of the Malays.

Cultural loyalty to ‘Chineseness’ does not imply disloyaltyto the nation. Ethnic Chinese identify with their birth-places in Malaysia as well as with their sub-ethnic ordialect group (Hokkien, Teochiu, Hakka, Cantonese, etc.),and even the residents of the isolated and relatively homo-geneous Chinese farming community of Pulai, Kelantan,think of themselves, concentrically, as ‘Pulai HakkaChinese Malaysian’.10

Although there is some emigration of ethnic Chinese,their share of the population continues to drop, primarilybecause of much lower birth rates than those ofBumiputras. Thus, the proportion of Chinese in the popu-lation fell from 37 per cent in 1957 to 32 per cent in1990.11 Bumiputras, including non-Malay indigenousgroups, now make up about 61 per cent of the population.

Malaysia presents itself to tourists and other outsiders as amulti-ethnic, multi-cultural society. Yet frequent emphasison the Malay and not the pluralistic nature of the nation, aswell as concessions to Islam, leave the impression that theethnic Chinese may become second-class citizens whileBumiputra politician-bureaucrats determine what they andtheir children will be allowed to do. Many Chinese per-ceive increasing, state-sponsored, discrimination.

INDONESIA by Mary Somers Heidhues

The largest of the ASEAN states, this archipelago of thou-sands of islands has ASEAN’s lowest per capita income.Java contains about two-thirds of the population whileother major but less densely settled islands are Sumatra,Kalimantan (three-quarters of the island of Borneo),Sulawesi (Celebes) and West Irian.

Indonesia’s Chinese make up less than 3 per cent of thepopulation, although in absolute numbers they are nearlyas numerous as Malaysia’s: four to five million. However,since the census counts only aliens, this number is a roughestimate and depends on the answer to the question ‘Whois Chinese?’ – a judgement based on name, descent, edu-cation, habits, and self-identification.

Like ethnic Chinese elsewhere, they are geographicallyunevenly distributed, being concentrated in urban areasof Java and in the cities and rural areas of eastern

14

DATE OF INDEPENDENCE: 1945 (Dutch recognizedsovereignty in 1949)

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS: authoritarian parliamentarygovernment through Sekber Golker Party (from1971) with strong military and presidential control

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN.

RATIFICATION OF:UN Int. Cov. on Civil and Political Rights: noUN Opt. Protocol to the Int. Cov. on Civil and

Political Rights: noUN Int. Conv. on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination: noUN Conv. on the Rights of the Child: yesPolitical/military alliances: ASEAN

AREA: 1,904,570 sq.kmPOPULATION: 181,580,000 (1990)LITERACY: 74%LIFE EXPECTANCY: 62PER CAPITA GNP: $560 (1990)ECONOMY: largest sector is agriculture

and resource-based butmanufacturing and servicesare a growing component

PRINCIPAL ETHNIC GROUPS: Malay, Indonesian (abouthalf Javanese, othersSundanese, Balinese,Minangkabau, Batak, etc.),Chinese (2.7%), Indians,various tribal ethnic groups

RELIGIONS: Islam, Christianity,Buddhism, Hinduism

LANGUAGES: Bahasa Indonesia (officiallanguage), various localand minority languagesand dialects

Sumatra, the islands of Bangka and Belitung, the RiauArchipelago and West Kalimantan. On the whole, theymake their living in business, trade, market gardening andthe professions.

However, as the historian Wang Gungwu has pointed out,they differ from Chinese minorities elsewhere in oneimportant respect: nowhere else in South-East Asia arerelations between the indigenous people and the ethnicChinese so brittle or so prone to violent outbreaks.1 In1959-60, for example, over 100,000 ethnic Chinese leftIndonesia following the enforcement of a regulation pro-hibiting non-citizens from engaging in retail trade in ruralareas (in some provinces even from living there).Similarly, after the attempted coup of October 1965, eth-nic Chinese were among the hundreds of thousands ofvictims of violence. In particular, the organizationBaperki, a left-wing organization which was founded in1954 and called for cultural pluralism and the retention ofChinese identity, was forcibly disbanded. Former mem-bers are still branded as politically unreliable.2

In some areas, such as Aceh (northern Sumatra) or EastJava, Chinese were driven from the hinterland when theban on aliens living in rural areas was extended to theseprovinces for the first time in 1966. In 1967 attacks onChinese by Dayaks in West Kalimantan forced thousandsfrom the interior. They found refuge in badly equippedcamps in coastal cities like Pontianak and Singkawang3

but, because they were not Indonesian citizens, it wasdoubly difficult for them to find work or exercise a trade.Only gradually, with the extension of citizenship rights inlater years, were more humane living conditions for thesepeople achieved.

DiscriminationResentment against the ethnic Chinese erupted in the1974 riots when the Japanese Prime Minister, Tanaka, vis-ited the country. Although Japanese investment was prob-ably also their target, students and other rioters destroyedthousands of dollars worth of vehicles and other propertybelonging to Chinese. About this time, a new word cameinto use: cukong, from the Hokkien for uncle or boss,describing wealthy ethnic Chinese who were patrons or‘godfathers’, dispensing favours to bureaucrats and politi-cians. In fact, during the 1970s and early 1980s, some ofthe cukongs were recipients of substantial governmentfavours: import monopolies, exclusive contracts and easy credit.

The fact that terms for ethnic Chinese change frequentlyis indicative of the sensitivity of the Chinese ‘problem’.Even in colonial days, laws distinguished between ‘native’and ‘Chinese’ and favoured the natives over the Chinese,for example in education and access to land. In the 1950s,asli (indigenous) received favours in business to help themcompete against non-asli. In independent Indonesia, thecolonial laws have been replaced by a modern definitionof Indonesian nationality (Warganegara Indonesia(WNI)). In practice, however, ‘WNI’ means ethnicChinese. Orang Indonesia (Indonesian person, in thesense of ‘real’ Indonesian) means an indigenousIndonesian in everyday usage. In the 1980s, pribumi(indigenous, related to Bumiputra) and non-pribumi, or

simply pri and non-pri came into use. In all cases, the dis-tinction between Javanese, Batak, Sundanese and theother local ethnic groups on the one hand andIndonesians of Chinese descent on the other, was beingemphasized. Thus, the ethnic Chinese are seen as differ-ent from other ethnic groups in Indonesia, and somehowless acceptable.

Yet, since the late 1970s, government policies have madenaturalization easier and probably fewer than 10 per centof ethnic Chinese are now aliens, as against over 50 percent in the 1960s. Any discussion, therefore, of the situa-tion of the Chinese minority in contemporary Indonesiahas to take account of the differences between public atti-tudes and official policies: outbreaks of violence and otherproblems contrast with a policy which says all citizens areequal. In the long run, the opening of citizenship to ethnicChinese should eliminate many excuses for discriminationor bureaucratic chicanery. Since restoration of diplomaticrelations with the People’s Republic of China, the govern-ment has increased efforts to regulate the status of alienChinese. In the future, since many aliens are now quiteold and their numbers are diminishing, no one should sus-pect that a Chinese-looking person, or one with a Chinesename, is not a citizen.

However, this utopia is still distant since, in practice, eth-nic Chinese are asked to prove their citizenship, whichcan mean paying a bribe and avoiding further questions.Corruption is often the nexus between the Chinese on theone hand and the bureaucracy, police and military on theother, and is a relationship which discourages mutual respect.

There is no ‘Chinese’ political party, as in Malaysia, butthere are ways of protesting discrimination. Since manyChinese have adopted Indonesian names it is not alwayseasy to tell from appearances who is indigenous. In orderto distinguish the ethnic Chinese, officials of the Ministryof Interior began inserting the letter ‘A’, or, later, a codenumber, into the identity cards of those of Chinesedescent in the 1970s. As a result, Bakom PKB, an officiallylinked but privately financed organization which descend-ed from the so-called ‘assimilationist’4 group of the 1960s,reminded the Ministry that citizens of whatever descentwere equals. The Ministry has since assured them thatcodes will be removed from the cards, and it looks as ifthis is now happening.

Business in the New OrderEven during the Indonesian Revolution (1945-9), militaryofficers formed business links with ethnic Chinese busi-nessmen in order to break the Dutch blockade and smug-gle raw materials abroad to exchange them for weapons.In that situation Chinese businessmen with contacts inSingapore were eminently valuable.

In the 1950s, some regional commanders also usedChinese confidants to export local products illegally or toengage in business on the side, in some cases to financethe welfare of their men during a period of rampant infla-tion. Since 1967 the so-called New Order government,under military leadership and with Suharto as President,has emphasized economic development. Their militaryconnections have helped some of the ethnic Chinese to

15

take advantage of the new era, but some of the militaryhave made use of Chinese partners to gain a foothold inbusiness for themselves.

The fact that many of the most prominent Chinese busi-nessmen are, in contrast to most Indonesian Chinese,China-born, China-educated or Chinese-speaking(totok)5adds to their foreign image. Relatively few of themare culturally peranakan. Some Indonesian observers fear,therefore, that they might siphon off substantial amountsof capital from Indonesia for investments in the People’sRepublic of China or other countries. Although that fearis certainly exaggerated, they are able to transfer fundsthrough their international networks, some of which reachbeyond South-East Asia and even to the developednations. This international aspect distinguishes them frommost pribumi businessmen.

Policy towards ethnic Chinese businessmen entered a newphase in the mid-1980s when planners and politiciansrealized that oil and raw-material exports would not suf-fice to keep Indonesian development going. Emphasischanged to non-oil, non-gas production and in particularto a greater diversity of exports, many taking advantage ofthe tropical forest as a resource, of other natural products,or of cheap labour. Chinese businessmen were welcomedfor their expertise in finding foreign partners for joint ven-tures and export-oriented industries, financing and mar-kets. Even capitalism ceased to be a bad word: pribumibusinessmen were encouraged to accept and emulatethose of Chinese descent and to do battle against a ‘high-cost economy’ which might inhibit exports.6

The attempt to rehabilitate ethnic Chinese capitalism,however, has not been entirely successful. If the wordcukong has nearly disappeared from daily vocabulary,‘conglomerate’ (used somewhat pejoratively for an indi-vidual person) has risen to replace it, since Chinese busi-nessmen often do choose diversification rather thanspecialization in a single branch of the economy, buildingconglomerates.

The opening of the Jakarta stock market in 1989 raisedthe discussion of wealth and power to a new level. Stock-market fever gripped urbanites as a number of firms wentpublic with share offerings, which were promptly oversub-scribed. In a short time, share prices soared but firmsgoing public had to disclose their assets. The press publi-cized the names of those richest entrepreneurs with assetsof billions of rupiahs and, as a result, an incredible sumappeared to be concentrated in the hands of a few dozenconglomerates. The gap in wealth between a few very richand many very poor seemed to be in reality a gap betweenethnic Chinese and the rest of the Indonesians.

At this point President Suharto intervened. Having pre-sented figures to show that distribution of wealth in thenation was actually becoming more equal, he proposed, inJanuary 1990, a surprising solution. Public companies, hesaid, should turn over 25 per cent of their shares to coop-eratives. The latter are, in theory, a basic form of econom-ic organization in modern Indonesia but many of them,perhaps most of those at village level, do not operate satis-factorily because of undercapitalization and poor manage-ment. On 4 March 1990 Suharto lent force to his proposaland emphasized its relevance to Chinese by inviting 31

businessmen, 29 of them ethnic Chinese (a number ofpribumi big businessmen were conspicuous by theirabsence) to his country estate to discuss implementation.

While it is difficult to feel great sympathy for the ‘victims’of the plan, they faced genuine problems in complying.Most conglomerates are family-owned and run, and theydid not want to jeopardize control of management bypassing out shares. Furthermore, they did not want to dis-sipate the capital gained by going public. There was alsothe problem of finding recipients for the shares. In theend, major public companies promised to distribute 1 percent of publicly issued but non-voting shares to carefullyselected cooperatives. Further disbursement would awaitresults of this distribution.7 By the end of 1991, shareprices had fallen sharply, problems of oversight and con-trol plagued the stock exchange, and most people realizedthat passing out shares might not be the best means toovercome the weaknesses of cooperatives after all. Theidea remains a sword of Damocles over businessmen’sheads and, furthermore, the whole hubbub focused atten-tion on the Chinese as wealthy businessmen. However,perhaps as many as 10 per cent of ethnic Chinese inIndonesia are farmers, while others are labourers or livenear the margin of existence in small towns or crowdedinto urban near-ghettos. More of them are agriculturaliststhan tycoons.

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that not all wealthybusinessmen are ethnic Chinese. Many government andmilitary officials and members of President Suharto’s fam-ily have extensive business interests.

Cultural Differences among ChineseThe journalists’ fascination with Chinese big businessmenas a group obscures differences within the Chinese minor-ity. For example, they can be differentiated according tocitizenship, though only a tiny proportion are still aliens,according to wealth, and also according to culture.Historically, they were divided between the locally rootedperanakan, who used a local language, and the totok, or‘pure’ Chinese, who spoke Chinese and were orientedstrongly towards Chinese culture.

One of the determinants of this difference was education.Indonesian policy, however, has made a clean sweep of aChinese education system which at its peak in 1957 main-tained about 2,000 schools. All children must now attendIndonesian schools and the last institutions which offeredpart-time instruction in Chinese were closed in 1975.8

Some parents have their children tutored in Chinese, butpublic use of the language is discouraged. Chinese-lan-guage publications (except an official newspaper inChinese published in Jakarta and Medan), even importedones, are officially banned, as is Chinese-language adver-tising; shop signs in Chinese characters are forbidden, andeven spoken Chinese is frowned upon. This is not only amatter of policy. Many young ethnic Indonesians arekeenly resentful of these relics of Chinese language andculture, as conversations and letters to the press testify.

Chinese ReligionNearly 90 per cent of Indonesians are Muslim, making it

16

the world’s largest Islamic population. Most of the ethnicChinese, however, practise a mixture of Buddhism andtraditional Taoism and Confucianism, though a significantminority are Christians. Officially, Indonesia recognizesthe practice of Buddhism (and of Islam, Christianity andHinduism) and traditional Chinese practices are sub-sumed under Buddhism. Their temples, shrines andgraveyards do exist, but since the public use of theChinese language is discouraged, the temples have nocharacters on the exterior and most call themselves vihara(Buddhist temples). Ceremonies are confined to templeprecincts or to the home. As urban expansion is threaten-ing graveyards, cremation is becoming more popular.9

On the other hand, even a casual visitor to Indonesia cantestify that Chinese temples are being improved andexpanded and government officials are present at dedica-tion ceremonies. In an isolated instance in January 1990the city of Bandung banned the use of Chinese charactersin temples and cemeteries, as well as such external fea-tures as carved animal ornaments (common on Chinesetemples) and elaborate graves (again, a frequent practiceamong wealthy Chinese). Commenting on the ruling, anIndonesian intellectual pointed out that implementationof the regulation would mean tearing down thousands ofbuildings of all kinds, especially along Java’s north coast, where Chinese cultural influences have beenabsorbed by the native population and even mosquesshow Chinese influence. Two months later, the regulationwas withdrawn.10

ProspectsInter-ethnic relations in Java (especially West Java) and incertain other provinces are often tense, but they are notuniformly bad. In many rural areas, as on the island ofBangka, where Chinese make up about 25 per cent of thepopulation, inter-ethnic tension is low. Intellectuals seemto associate comfortably and Islamic business organiza-tions have recently forged links with Chinese conglomer-ates. This may defuse the especially sensitive area ofeconomic competition.

Official measures to promote assimilation may reduce thediversity among Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese, but strikingdifferences in wealth, education and adaptation to localsociety remain. Chinatowns, relics of a colonial systemwhich required ethnic Chinese to live in certain ‘quarters’,are giving way to new housing developments, althoughsome have almost exclusively ethnic Chinese residents.Schools follow an Indonesian curriculum, but some have avery high proportion of Chinese. The same is true of uni-versities: ethnic Chinese are not freely admitted to publicuniversities, but in some private universities they are the majority.

Furthermore, the gap between official policy and grass-roots reactions remains. Factors behind outbreaks of anti-Chinese violence have included political and economiccrises, perceived grievances and the complicity of localmilitary or police authorities who hesitated to intervene indeveloping troubles or else allowed a vacuum of power toarise. The worst anti-Chinese incidents, for example, tookplace when there was a sudden change of rulers: when theJapanese replaced the Dutch in 1942, during the revolu-

tion of 1945-9 when territory changed hands between theDutch and Republican forces, and in 1965-7 with theousting of the political Old Order of Sukarno. Even if thegovernment is determined to maintain security and toprevent outbreaks of violence towards the Chinese andother ethnic groups, this is not always easy, given the highproportion of volatile youth and unemployed in theIndonesian population. It is clear that there is a need forthe authorities to foster and strengthen mutual respect inthe coming years, if stable inter-ethnic relations are to beassured in the future.

●

17

EAST TIMORby John Taylor

Chinese contacts with the island of Timor date back to the15th Century, when Chinese traders first began to pur-chase the island’s abundant sandalwood. In subsequentcenturies, following the entry of the Dutch andPortuguese into Western and Eastern Timor respectively,the Chinese maintained a prominent trading position. Bythe middle of the 20th Century, of approximately 400retailing outlets in East Timor, all but four were owned byethnic Chinese families. Many Chinese thus played theclassic middleman role, buying grain or coffee fromTimorese farmers and selling it to Portuguese administra-tors. None the less, despite their predominance in trading, large numbers of Chinese in East Timor were vil-lagers who, alongside their Timorese neighbours, cultivat-ed the land.

Historically, the ethnic Chinese have managed to main-tain their cultural identity, speaking Cantonese (and aminority, Mandarin) as well as Tetum (the East Timoreselingua franca), educating their children in Chineseschools, stressing the importance of kinship ties and mar-rying within their community. The majority of Chineselived in Dili, the capital of East Timor, and in the towns ofBaucau, Ermera and Bobonaro.

Following the overthrow of the Caetano regime inPortugal in April 1974 and the emerging process of decol-onization in East Timor, most ethnic Chinese eitheravoided involvement in political issues or tended to sup-port the continuation of colonial rule. This was largelybecause the main indigenous political parties – theTimorese Democratic Union and the Timorese SocialDemocratic Association (later to become Fretilin, theRevolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) –were critical of the predominant role of the Chinese intrading, and aimed to undermine what they saw as‘Chinese monopolies’. On the part of some political lead-ers, these criticisms began to develop into a general hostil-

ity towards the Chinese, regardless of their economic role.As the neighbouring Indonesian government began itsattempt to annexe East Timor in 1975, and particularlyafter the Indonesian military had sponsored a coupattempt in August that year, many of the wealthierChinese families left for Australia, concluding that theywould benefit neither from an independent nor anIndonesian-controlled East Timor. Most Chineseremained, however, and relations between the Chinesecommunity and the independence movement, led byFretilin, improved markedly in the latter part of 1975,largely due to the acknowledgement by leading Fretilinmembers that many of their earlier views of the ethnicChinese had been unfair stereotypes.

The position of the Chinese was altered profoundly by theIndonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor, datingfrom 7 December 1975. The Chinese featured promi-nently in the brutal killings that took place in the initialdays of the invasion, as Javanese racism was given a freerein by the Indonesian military. During the first days ofthe invasion, 700 Chinese people were killed. One eye-witness described how: ‘At the harbour (in Dili) weremany dead bodies...We were told to tie the bodies to ironpoles, attach bricks, and throw the bodies in the sea. Afterwe had thrown all the bodies in the sea, about 20 peoplewere brought in, made to face the sea and shot dead.They were Chinese...more came later. After the killingstopped, we spent another one or two hours tying the peo-ple as before and throwing them into the sea.’1 WhenIndonesian soldiers entered the towns of Liquica andMaubara, they killed nearly all the members of theChinese communities.

In the years of Indonesian occupation since 1975, manyChinese families have tried to maintain their trading rolebut this has only been possible under Indonesian militarytutelage, which has involved severe economic exploitation.Others have managed to leave East Timor by paying sub-stantial bribes to military officers. A reporter visiting EastTimor in 1985 concluded that the 1974 Chinese popula-tion of 20,000 (around 3 per cent of the population) hadbeen reduced to ‘a few thousand’.2

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18

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS: under Indonesian militaryoccupation, the UN recognizes Portugal as thecolonial power

AREA: 14,870 sq.kmPOPULATION: 710,000 (1989)LITERACY: naLIFE EXPECTANCY: naPER CAPITA GNP: naECONOMY: mainly agriculturalETHNIC GROUPS: Belu, Atoni, other indige

nous ethnic groups,Malays, Chinese

RELIGIONS: Islam, Catholic, variousindigenous beliefs

LANGUAGES: Bahasa Indonesia(Indonesian official language), Tetum

SINGAPOREby Mary Somers Heidhues

When Singapore was founded in 1819, the Chinese quick-ly appreciated its importance as a base. Its excellent har-bour was a free port, useful as an entrepôt for rawmaterials from Malaya, Indonesia and elsewhere on theirway to buyers in Asia, Europe and North America. Thecity soon became a financial centre as its businessmendeveloped networks of credit and investment reachingthroughout South-East Asia. Singapore also became aplace of cultural exchange where ideas and influencesfrom China were passed on to Chinese throughout theregion, and where Chinese schools, press and communityorganizations could develop with little interference fromcolonial authorities.

The People’s Action Party gained a political majority whileSingapore was still a British colony and it continued togovern the republic after its separation from Malaysia in1965. It was led by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew from1965 to 1991 and since then his successor, Goh ChokTong, has emphasized continuity. The PAP’s main policieshave been to promote foreign investment while at thesame time trying to balance the interests of the Chinesewith those of the Indian and Malay minorities and to create one ‘Singaporean’ identity. Limited populationgrowth has also been a feature as well as controlling theinfluence of opposition parties. Official policy has been

friendly towards the People’s Republic of China, withextensive trade and also exchange of official visitors, butdiplomatic recognition of Beijing came only in 1990, afterIndonesia restored relations with the PRC.

Ethnic Chinese make up over 75 per cent of the popula-tion and thus they are not a disadvantaged group. In fact,their financial and trading success gives them a uniqueposition in the Chinese community of the Nanyang. Percapita income (GNP) has grown from under US$800 in1965 to US$2,500 in 1977 and US$12,310 in 1990. Realannual per capita growth rates for 1980-90 averaged 5.7per cent but climbed to 8 per cent in 1988-90. Populationgrowth is only 1.2 per cent.1 However, although allincomes have risen, housing has drastically improved andunemployment is low, critics believe income disparitiesare higher and opportunities less equal than they shouldbe because of the strong emphasis on competition andhigh attainment.

In its early years, the multiracial People’s Action Partyunited men like Lee, who had an English-language educa-tion, with those who were politically more radical andmostly Chinese-educated. This left wing broke with theparty before independence and, as a result, the Chinese-language education system was associated with strong leftsympathies and also, in the 1950s, with violent demonstra-tions. It is likely that this coloured the PAP government’sattitude to the independent Chinese-medium school sys-tem and that is one reason why its educational and cultur-al policies now emphasize English as the first language ofschooling, apart from the international importance ofEnglish. All Chinese children learn Mandarin as their sec-ond school language, while others learn Malay or Tamil.

English is also promoted as the language of national unitysince it is not specific to any one ethnic group. On theother hand, the government has promoted Mandarin as a‘mother tongue’ for the population of Chinese origin,whose actual mother tongues are Chinese dialects such asHokkien, Hakka and so on. Mandarin is widely acceptedamong Chinese, but is seldom learned by people fromother ethnic groups.2

Government leaders and bureaucrats have, in the past,come from the English-educated group and they haveusually had better job opportunities in the wider econo-my. This dominance of English is unlikely to change. TheChinese-language Nanyang University began teaching inEnglish in 1975 and finally merged with the English-medium University of Singapore in 1980, thus bringing toan end the only institution of higher education teaching inChinese in South-East Asia.3

Historic Chinese temples and typical shop-house resi-dences have, over the years, fallen victim to urban devel-opment: most Singaporeans now live in high-rise publichousing. Former rural settlements have also disappearedfor the same reason. On the other hand, the governmenthas recently displayed an admiration for Confucianism, inparticular as a motor for East Asian economic develop-ment and for promoting family care for the aged (a neces-sity as the population ages). Chinese culture, in this case,seems to be being used as an instrument of economic andsocial policy, and not an end in itself.

Since Singapore’s economy is already dependent on

19

DATE OF INDEPENDENCE: 1965CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS: authoritarian parliamentary

government (with People’s Action Party in powersince independence), president head of state

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, Commonwealth

RATIFICATION OF:UN Int. Cov. on Civil and Political Rights: noUN Opt. Protocol to the Int. Cov. on Civil and

Political Rights: noUN Int. Conv. on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination: noUN Conv. on the Rights of the Child: noPolitical/military alliances: ASEAN, Five-Power

Defence Arrangements

AREA: 620 sq.kmPOPULATION: 2,722,000 (1990)LITERACY: 86%LIFE EXPECTANCY: 74PER CAPITA GNP: $12,310 (1990)ECONOMY: mainly commerce and

services, manufacturingPRINCIPAL ETHNIC GROUPS: Chinese (76.4%),

Malays, IndiansRELIGIONS: Buddhism, Christianity,

Hinduism, Islam, SikhismLANGUAGES: English, Mandarin

Chinese, Malay, Tamilare all official languages

imported labour and lacks space for much further growth,the island is looking to cooperate with neighbouringstates, through ASEAN, in the formation of internationalindustrial zones such as the growth triangle formed withJohor in Malaysia and Batam Island in Indonesia. Theseventures enjoy government support but also depend onthe cooperation of ethnic Chinese businessmen acrossinternational boundaries.

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THAILANDby Mary Somers Heidhues

Approximate numbers of ethnic Chinese amongThailand’s 56 million inhabitants are hard to estimatebecause of the long tradition of assimilation and becausedefining who is ‘Chinese’ presents difficulties. The num-ber of aliens is given officially as fewer than 200,000 but itis estimated that 8 or more per cent (4-5 million) of thepopulation are Sino-Thai, of which 50 per cent or morelive in the Bangkok area.

Government attitudes and policies towards the Chineseminority have gone through several stages. In the 19thCentury the economic activities of the Chinese were seenas complementary to those of the Thai. The successfulones were merchants, holders of opium and other revenuemonopolies or provincial officials, and were allies of thecrown. At this time, thousands of coolie labourers wereimported to develop roads and railways, relieving Thaifarmers of corvée burdens. This meant that most of thoseworking in construction, plantations, mines and industrywere Chinese, while some Chinese were cash-crop farm-ers. Above all, they established themselves as middlemenand creditors in the essential rice export trade.

20

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS: monarchy, with governmentalternating between military and parliamentarygovernment, king head of state.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN.

RATIFICATION OF:UN Int. Cov. on Civil and Political Rights: noUN Opt. Protocol to the Int. Cov. on Civil and

Political Rights: noUN Int. Conv. on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination: noUN Conv. on the Rights of the Child: noPolitical/military alliances: ASEAN

AREA: 513,120 sq.kmPOPULATION: 55,801,000 (1990)LITERACY: 91%LIFE EXPECTANCY: 66PER CAPITA GNP: $1,420 (1990)ECONOMY: mainly agricultural, with

growing industrial and service (including tourism)sectors

ETHNIC GROUPS: Thai, Chinese (8%),Malay, Khmer, Indians,Vietnamese, various hilltribal peoples (Karen,Shan, Meo etc.)

RELIGIONS: Buddhism (official religion), Taoism, Islam,Christianity, Hinduism

LANGUAGES: Thai (official language),various minority languages

By the early 20th Century a separate community of theChinese was forming because of the rise in the number ofimmigrants (which included women from China) andbecause Chinese institutions, such as modern schools,were gaining influence. There were clashes between theThais and Chinese. The Thai elite, in particular, began toresent the increasing numbers of apparently aloof Chinesein the country.

Twentieth century governments therefore promoted theassimilation and naturalization of the ethnic Chinese butrestricted Chinese cultural influences. Although it was rel-atively easy for local-born Chinese to become Thai citi-zens, Chinese cultural and political influences on them,especially in education, were soon controlled. As early as1919 regulations limited the amount of instruction inChinese which private Chinese schools could give Thaicitizens. In the end, this amounted to only a few hours aweek. After the Second World War Chinese educationrevived strongly but, from the late 1940s, strongly anti-Communist Thai governments brought in more restrictivemeasures which virtually eliminated Chinese secondaryschools and allowed only limited instruction in Chinese inother schools. By 1956 fewer than 200 Chinese schoolsremained and their pupils were being educated more inthe Thai than in the Chinese language.

G. William Skinner’s studies1 of the Chinese in Thailand,which appeared over thirty years ago, emphasized the rel-ative ease with which descendants of Chinese immigrants,in the course of three or four generations, melted intoThai society. Many prominent Thais, including the royalfamily, members of the cabinet or of Parliament, alsointellectuals and technocrats, are of Chinese or part-Chinese ancestry. However, while the bureaucracy isopen to Sino-Thais, ‘the difficulties encountered by Thaicitizens of Chinese parentage in acquiring immovableproperty and in entering national military and policeacademies’ persisted as late as the 1970s.2 Only in 1975did Thailand recognize the People’s Republic of China. In1979 Thai citizens with alien (meaning in most casesChinese) fathers (perhaps a quarter of all voters inBangkok) were excluded from the voting lists.3

Political and Economic TransitionsThailand has been a constitutional monarchy since 1932but, during most of the post-war period, military (and for-mer military) strongmen have dominated politics. Forexample, the elections of May 1992 were supposed torestore democracy after a military coup the previous yearbut the military took control of the system and a formergeneral, Suchinda Kraprayoon, became Prime Minister.After large-scale pro-democracy demonstrations, whichmilitary elements attempted to suppress by violence, aninterim civilian government took office and called newelections for September 1992.

Before the Second World War some of the Chinese (andVietnamese) minority in Thailand supported Communistactivities. The Communist Party in Thailand was an off-shoot of that in China and coolies were a fertile recruitingground. In the 1960s, however, the party began to diversi-fy and launched activities in the regions and amongminority tribes in the north or in the disadvantaged north-

east. In the south, Chinese disaffection with Bangkoklinked up with the largely ethnic Chinese MalayanCommunist Party, some of whose members had crossedthe border into Thailand after being defeated during theEmergency. Then, in the 1970s, some students and urbanintellectuals turned to Marxism. After a period of repres-sion in 1976 many of the younger intellectuals fled to jointhe rebels in the ‘jungle’, only to find themselves as out-siders:4 top leaders of the Communist Party of Thailandwere said to speak Chinese better than Thai.

In the economic sphere, Thailand offers a good exampleof the changing roles of the Chinese minority in South-East Asia. The 19th Century positions of trader, officialand coolie gave way to new activities in the 20th Century.Especially in the period from 1938 to 1957, Thai govern-ments prevented non-citizens from exercising a variety ofoccupations and attempted to compete with ethnicChinese businesses and to move economic power into thehands of the ethnic Thai by establishing state-ownedindustries. In the 1950s, therefore, the Chinese began todiversify their economic activities. Large-scale business-men began to form alliances with Thai powerholders,above all in the military and police, by putting them onboards of directors, forming personal links and marriagealliances with them. When, after 1958, economic policyturned from state enterprise to import substitution indus-try, opening new fields to private businesses, Chineseentrepreneurs reaped the benefits. The transition toexport-oriented manufacturing in the 1970s onlyincreased their influence. Successful businessmen, havingstarted in trade, moved to manufacturing, finance, realestate, travel and other fields.

Today, approximately 30 large business groups, all con-trolled by ethnic Chinese, are said to dominate most fieldsof economic activity in Thailand, with the exceptions ofagriculture and wage labour, where ethnic Thai predomi-nate. These companies, originally family-based, are nowinterlinked horizontally and vertically. Having outgrownthe political patronage of the 1950s and 1960s, they never-theless cultivate influence with political powerholderswherever possible.5

TrendsOnly in the last decade have Skinner’s important findingson the assimilation of the Chinese in Thailand been chal-lenged or revised, but his paradigm still influences manyobservers. Newer studies argue that assimilation has notbeen as sweeping as Skinner’s widely accepted model pre-dicted. Bangkok and other cities still have their‘Chinatowns’. The use of Thai names is common amongsecond- and third-generation Sino-Thai (although someThai names are recognizably Chinese), but some recentstudies show that intermarriage between Chinese and eth-nic Thais is not the rule.

One reason for this is the persistence of certain kinds ofeconomic activity among the ethnic Chinese. On the onehand, Chinese or Sino-Thais prefer trade and business,while ethnic Thais, if they do not remain farmers, entergovernment service, the Buddhist monasteries and themilitary. Different life perspectives result yet little overthostility disturbs inter-ethnic relations. A rival, ethnic

21

Thai business class seems not to exist and Sino-Thai busi-nessmen interact freely with the Thai elite in business andin politics.

With Thais controlling the military and bureaucracy, eth-nic Chinese are increasingly concentrated in a narrowrange of economic activities. Conscious or unconsciousrestriction of professional opportunity could reinforce thisas businessmen and traders intensify contacts with oneanother and Chinese parents urge their children to de-velop a ‘Chinese’ attitude to making money which wouldinhibit further assimilation.

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THE PHILIPPINESby Mary Somers Heidhues

Over 80 per cent of Filipinos are Catholics, but there areimportant Protestant and Islamic minorities. Americancolonialism left a political system modelled on that of theUnited States and an economy and foreign policy largelytied to the USA; only in 1992 were the last US militarybases closed. President Marcos (1968-86) scrapped NorthAmerican-style democracy for martial law and dictator-ship, bringing the economy to a near-standstill; from 1980to 1990, GNP fell by an annual average of 1.5 per cent.After a relatively non-violent ‘revolution’, President CoryAquino tried to restore a democratic system, strugglingagainst élite infighting, growing poverty, financial difficul-ties and a restive military, elements of which staged sever-al unsuccessful coups. Growth improved in 1988-90 to 2.4per cent annually, but problems continue under PresidentFidel Ramos, a former military leader.

As in Thailand or Indonesia, it is difficult to estimate thenumber of ethnic Chinese in the Philippines since, unlessthey are aliens, they are not specified in any census. Thenumber of aliens in no way corresponds with the Chinesecommunity: some Philippine citizens feel very Chinese,while some aliens feel very Filipino. In the same way,descendants of Chinese immigrants have intermarriedwith Filipinos over generations and many members of thenational elite are of mixed parentage. In a narrow sense,

22

DATE OF INDEPENDENCE: 1946CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS: republic, parliamentary

democracy, president head of stateINTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN

RATIFICATION OF:UN Int. Cov. on Civil and Political Rights: yesUN Opt. Protocol to the Int. Cov. on Civil and

Political Rights: yesUN Int. Conv. on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination: yesUN Conv. on the Rights of the Child: yesPolitical/military alliances: ASEAN

AREA: 300,000 sq.kmPOPULATION: 61,358,000 (1990)LITERACY: 86%.LIFE EXPECTANCY: 64. PER CAPITA GNP: $730 (1990)ECONOMY: mainly agricultural, with

growing industrial and service (including tourism)sectors

ETHNIC GROUPS: Filipinos, Chinese (lessthan 2%), Moros, varioustribal ethnic groups

RELIGIONS: Christianity, IslamLANGUAGES: Tagalog (Pilipino) (official

language), English, variousminority languages

estimates of the numbers of ethnic Chinese vary from600,000 to 900,000, of whom fewer than 150,000 are for-eign-born. Ethnic Chinese in this sense would probablyspeak Chinese, were only recently admitted to citizenship,belong to Chinese associations, and socialize with otherChinese. About half of them live in Manila, the rest inprovincial cities. In a broad sense, however, because ofmixed marriages, Filipinos of at least part Chinese ances-try may number two to four million.

Up to the late 19th Century the strong assimilative pull ofthe Spanish-Philippine society influenced local Chinese tobecome Filipino. Many intermarried with the landowningelite at this time. After 1902, however, the application ofAmerican ‘exclusion’ policy (forbidding Chinese immigra-tion) sharply restricted their admission. Thereafter, it waspossible only for a limited number of Chinese to enter the country, and virtually impossible for them to acquirePhilippine citizenship. As a result, they tended to remain separate.1

During the 20th Century, these recent immigrants andtheir families have mostly concerned themselves withsmall-scale trade and money-lending, despite legislationfrom the 1930s to prohibit non-citizens from engaging inretail trade. They also, as in Thailand, provided the bulkof the urban labour force until replaced by Filipinos in theyears before the Second World War. Since their wives andchildren, even where Philippine-born, were also aliens,the group faced continued barriers to eventual assimila-tion. As a result, their position invited various kinds ofblackmail and bureaucratic corruption.

In 1975, shortly before recognition of the People’sRepublic of China, President Ferdinand Marcos made iteasier to obtain Philippine citizenship by administrativeaction rather than court procedure, which was costly andtook up to ten years. Most of the Philippines’ relativelysmall minority of ethnic Chinese are therefore nowPhilippine citizens. They maintain limited cultural activi-ties: a small Chinese-language press, Chinese organiza-tions, and a few hours of Chinese instruction in schools(Chinese schools were ‘filipinized’ in 1973). At the sametime, the larger society influences young PhilippineChinese, who speak Pilipino and English better thanHokkien and Mandarin.

Until the 1970s, the Philippines maintained an anti-Communist posture and official relations with theNationalist government on Taiwan. The ChineseChamber of Commerce and other major community organizations were Guomindang-influenced and resistantto any kind of assimilation to Philippine society. This ledto much tension and to battles within the Chinese com-munity, not only with pro-PRC people, who could bedenounced to the authorities, but with younger ethnicChinese, who favoured more integration. Since the recog-nition of the PRC in 1975, Taiwan’s position has beenanomalous; but its representation in Manila, the PacificCultural and Economic Centre, plays an important eco-nomic role in the country.

Although the Philippines has not quite matched the eco-nomic growth of other ASEAN nations, it, too, hasspawned a group of active and successful ethnic Chinesebusinessmen in the past two decades. Besides the opening

of citizenship, two other factors contributed to their suc-cess. One was Marcos’s policy of making use of ethnicChinese to attack the entrenched positions of the old eco-nomic elites, which may have made enemies of them. Thisalliance with Marcos helped bring the change in citizen-ship laws in 1975. The second factor was the very rapidgrowth of investments from Taiwan. In 1987 Taiwan pro-vided 1 per cent of total planned foreign investment; in1989 investments from Taiwan were 18 per cent ofplanned foreign investment. Frequently, Taiwan investorscooperate with Chinese-Filipino businessmen; the factthat both groups speak Hokkien facilitates mutual trust.2

The local vocabulary contains derogatory expressions forChinese, those who are not wealthy may especially facesome discrimination, but the minority is relatively smalland has not awakened the kind of resentment known inIndonesia. Naturalized citizens are not distinguished fromothers, thus making way for full acceptance of those whorecently regularized their citizenship status. On the otherhand, the rapid expansion of economic investments fromTaiwan or Hong Kong, as well as from local tycoons, maycause strain and tensions. Ethnic Chinese businessmenhave, thanks to links with these foreign investors, access tocapital which local businessmen do not have. In addition,their growth in wealth and power may awaken resentmentas gaps between rich and poor appear to increase. At thesame time, their links with Chinese investors abroad maymake them emphasize their Chinese and not theirFilipino culture.

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23

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM by Mary Somers Heidhues

This tiny country measures only about 6,000 square kilo-metres and its total population is only a quarter of a mil-lion strong. The majority people are ethnic Malays butChinese make up about 25 per cent of the population,perhaps 58,000 in all. However, the emphasis on theMalay and Islamic character of the Sultanate leaves ethnicChinese little room to be other than outsiders.

Plans to link this former British protectorate withMalaysia failed in 1962 and it became fully independentin 1984, promptly joining ASEAN as the first non-found-ing member. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah and his relativescontrol government decisions and the Chinese are gener-ally apolitical (the Chinese Chamber of Commerce is theirlargest organization). Perhaps this is not surprising whenrecent estimates say that anywhere from 50 to 90 per centof them are not citizens. Indeed, one source says that30,000 of them may be stateless, though an unknownnumber are citizens of neighbouring countries.

Before independence, Chinese living in the country wereBritish protected persons (holding British travel docu-ments but neither British subjects nor subjects of theSultan). Today, it can be extremely difficult for non-ethnicMalays to gain citizenship. Even if the requirement of res-idence for 20 out of the past 50 years is met, the

language and culture test forms an extra barrier to nat-uralization. For those who remain stateless, having nopassport can cause problems when travelling abroad or re-entering the country.

Most Chinese live in urban areas where they engage inpetty trade and commerce or work as skilled labourers, forexample in the oil industry (most of the country’s wealthcomes from oil and natural gas). At independence, non-Bruneians made up well over half of the labour force andmost of these foreign labourers were ethnic Chinese.1

However, by 1986, the share given to non-citizens hadfallen to only 37 per cent, probably as the result of a con-scious policy on the part of the government.

Unemployment among young ethnic-Malay Bruneians isnow high. Aside from petroleum, there is little industryand, since the ethnic Chinese cannot be absorbed in tradi-tional occupations like agriculture and fishing, there aresome reasons to doubt whether the Chinese have anassured future in the country. Certainly, a number ofthem have expressed their uncertainty by moving abroad.

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24

DATE OF INDEPENDENCE: 1984.CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS: absolute monarchy, sultan

head of state, state of emergency in operationsince 1962.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN,Commonwealth, Organization of the IslamicConference.

RATIFICATION OF:UN Int. Cov. on Civil and Political Rights: noUN Opt. Protocol to the Int. Cov. on Civil and

Political Rights: noUN Int. Conv. on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination: noUN Conv. on the Rights of the Child: noPolitical/military alliances: ASEAN

AREA: 5,770 sq.kmPOPULATION: 256,000 (1990)LITERACY: 77% (1985)LIFE EXPECTANCY: 74PER CAPITA GNP: $15,390 (1987)ECONOMY: main income is from gas

and petroleum ETHNIC GROUPS: Malays, Chinese (24%),

EuropeansRELIGIONS: Islam (official religion),

Buddhism, ChristianityLANGUAGES: Malay (official language),

Chinese, English

INDOCHINA by Ramses Amer

Before French DominationThe Chinese ruled Vietnam directly between 111 BC and939 AD and during this period two categories of Chinesemigrants to the area can be distinguished. The first werethose administrators, farmers and landlords who came tocolonize Vietnam, and the second those seeking refugefrom political upheavals in other parts of the Chineseempire.

Cambodia has not been part of the Chinese empire, norhas it had any common border with China. However, asizeable Chinese community seems to have been based inPhnom Penh ever since its first spell as the capital in the15th Century.

Political upheavals in China continued to lead to outflowsof refugees to Vietnam even after Vietnam’s indepen-dence from China and it was the fall of the Ming dynastywhich led to Chinese refugees settling down in south-east-ern Cambodia in the 1670s. From the 18th Century, asteadier flow of Chinese migration to both Cambodia andVietnam began and, in reponse to the growing influx ofChinese migrants, the Vietnamese emperor Minh Mang(1820-41) introduced legislation regulating their migrationto Cochinchina, the southern part of today’s Vietnam.

In Vietnam, a system of indirect rule over the Chinese wasintroduced whereby they were organized into communi-ties called bangs, according to their place of origin, andeach group was placed under the jurisdiction of its ownleaders. Furthermore, officers called bang truong wereresponsible for the good behaviour of the Chinese and thepayment of taxes to the Vietnamese emperors. TheCambodian kings introduced a similar system.

The trading and agricultural activities of the Chinesemigrants gained momentum in the 17th and 18thCenturies in both Cambodia and Vietnam. They played animportant role, for example, not only in expandingVietnamese control over the Mekong delta during thisperiod, but also in overall development of the region.

During French RuleDuring the period of French rule in Vietnam, whichextended fully throughout the country after the conquestof Tonkin in 1883, the Chinese were the subject of muchattention by the French in the form of different attemptsat taxation and measures aimed at controlling their migra-tion to Vietnam. Furthermore, the system of congrégationwas introduced, based on the indirect administration ofthe Chinese which the Vietnamese emperors had institut-ed in the previous century. In Cochinchina there werefive such congrégations during the French period:Cantonese, Hainanese, Hakka, Hokkien and Teochiu.

In Cambodia a French protectorate was formally estab-lished in 1863 and in Laos in 1893, both countries admin-istering the Chinese according to the congrégation system.

The Chinese in Cambodia and Vietnam were predomi-

nant in trade and industry. Important business, centredaround rice, was controlled by Chinese merchants andChinese syndicates. The Chinese were also the mainmoney-lenders. In Laos they were mostly involved incommercial activities.

The number of Chinese immigrants to Cambodia andVietnam increased substantially during the French colo-nial period. However, far fewer settled in Laos for geo-graphical and economic reasons. Since Laos does not havea coastline, it was impossible to reach by sea and its moun-tainous terrain made internal travel difficult. Also, Laoswas economically more backward than Cambodia andVietnam and, as a result, did not attract many Chinese.

During the Second World War, the French authorities inIndochina were allowed to continue administering theregion, even though it was occupied by Japanese troops,since they were loyal to the Vichy regime in France,which the Japanese regarded as a friendly government.Although the Japanese finally took over full administrationof the area in March 1945, they did not hold it long and apuppet regime was installed under Bao Dai. Ho ChiMinh, the leader of the Vietminh independence move-ment in Vietnam, swept away this regime and establisheda new Democratic Republic of Vietnam controlled by aCommunist-dominated government. France refused torecognize the new republic and set out to reconquer thecountry in 1946, establishing a non-Communist state inthe south in 1949.

The war affected all three Indochinese countries andCambodia gained independence from France in 1953 andLaos and Vietnam in 1954. Vietnam was ‘temporarily’divided at the 17th parallel until a general election couldbe held for the whole country in 1956. However, thisnever took place and the northern part, which was con-trolled by the Vietminh, formed the Democratic Republicof Vietnam (DRV). In the southern part, Ngo Dinh Diernbecame chief of state and proclaimed the Republic ofVietnam (RV).

●

25

VIETNAMby Ramses Amer

The Chinese Community in theDemocratic Republic of VietnamThe majority of the Chinese in the Democratic Republicof Vietnam (DRV) lived in Quang Ninh province border-ing China and were mainly fishermen, foresters andcraftsmen. In the urban areas they were mainly workersand technicians. Taken as a whole, they played a role inthe economy which was different from that of the Chinesein the RV.

The overall policies of the DRV aimed at a transformationof the country into a socialist society which would involvethe nationalization of private trade, private enterprisesand privately owned land. The ethnic Chinese in the DRV

seem to have had living conditions similar to those of theVietnamese. Nevertheless, the fact that they were to agreater extent involved in the private sector of the econo-my meant that its suppression hit them harder.

In 1955 the Chinese Communist Party and the Workers’Party of Vietnam reached an agreement covering the rightsand the status of the Chinese in the DRV. The essence ofthe unpublished agreement was that the Chinese in theDRV would gradually become Vietnamese citizens.

The prominent Chinese leader Zhou Enlai, during a visitto Hanoi in 1956, encouraged the Chinese to integrateinto Vietnamese society. Furthermore, in 1961, the twostates agreed that the Chinese embassy in Hanoi would nolonger issue Chinese passports to the Chinese. It wouldonly issue tourist visas to those who wanted to visit China,while the Vietnamese authorities were to give them traveldocuments and exit permits. Thus, by the early 1960s, theVietnamese authorities had become responsible for thewell-being of the Chinese. Furthermore, the members ofthe Chinese community in the DRV had becomeVietnamese citizens or were going to be so in the near future.

Between independence and 1958 China had great influ-ence over the education of the ethnic Chinese in theDRV, carried out under the auspices of the Commissionof Overseas Chinese Affairs. In late 1958, however,authority over Chinese schools in the DRV was trans-ferred to the Vietnamese and, in an effort to transform theChinese schools, by the mid-1960s, the Chinese languagewas downgraded to the level of a foreign language.

The Chinese Community in the Republic of Vietnam In the RV, by contrast, the Chinese community formed alarger, more urbanized sector of society and played a pre-dominant role in the economy.

Through a series of decrees, the RV authorities movedswiftly to turn the Chinese into Vietnamese citizens and tobreak their economic predominance. First, on 7December 1955, Decree No.10 stated that all childrenborn of mixed marriages between Chinese andVietnamese were considered to be Vietnamese citizens.Second, on 21 August 1956, Decree No. 48 prescribedthat all Chinese born in Vietnam were automatically tobecome Vietnamese citizens. Third, on 29 August 1956,Decree No. 52 ordered all Vietnamese citizens to takeVietnamese names or face a heavy fine. Fourth, on 6September 1956, Decree No. 53 banned all non-Vietnamese citizens from engaging in eleven specifiedoccupations: fishmonger and butcher; retailer of productsin common use (chap-pho); coal and firewood merchant;dealer in petroleum products; second-hand dealer; textileand silk merchant handling less than 10,000 metres; scrapmetal dealer; cereal dealer; transporter of persons andmerchandise by surface vehicle or boat; rice miller or pro-cessor; commission agent.1 If any of these occupationswere carried out, the payment of a heavy fine or deporta-tion was likely.

The first three decrees were discriminatory since theywere directed only against the ethnic Chinese community

26

DATE OF INDEPENDENCE: declared 1945, made effec-tive 1954 under Geneva Agreement, Vietnamdivided into two states, North (DemocraticRepublic of Vietnam) and South (Republic ofVietnam). Reunited as Socialist Republic ofVietnam in 1976

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS: one-party system underleadership of Workers’ (Communist) Party, presi-dent head of state

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN

RATIFICATION OF:UN Int. Cov. on Civil and Political Rights: yesUN Opt. Protocol to the Int. Cov. on Civil and

Political Rights: noUN Int. Conv. on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination: yesUN Conv. on the Rights of the Child: yesPolitical/military alliances: treaty of friendship and

cooperation with Laos

AREA: 329,650 sq.kmPOPULATION: 66,473,000 (1990)LITERACY: 84%LIFE EXPECTANCY: 67 (1990)PER CAPITA GNP: naECONOMY: overwhelmingly agricul-

tural, now trying to enc-ourage foreign investment

ETHNIC GROUPS: Vietnamese, Chinese(1.5%), Khmer, varioustribal ethnic groups

RELIGIONS: Buddhism, CatholicChristianity, indigenoussyncretic religions HoaHao, Caodai, Animism

LANGUAGES: Vietnamese (official lan-guage), various minoritylanguages

in the RV. The fourth, prohibiting certain occupations,although directed against all non-Vietnamese, affected theChinese the most.

The authorities also tried to gain control over the Chineseeducation system. They required that the Vietnamese lan-guage be used in all Chinese high schools and thatVietnamese be appointed principals of Chinese schools.However, during 1957 adverse reactions by the Chinesecommunity, in the form of demonstrations and the with-drawal of large sums of money from banks, made theauthorities modify the decrees and the educationalreforms in a way that was more acceptable to the Chinese.As a result, the foreign-born Chinese eventually didchoose to become Vietnamese citizens.

The economic predominance of the Chinese communitywas not much affected. On the contrary, by becomingVietnamese citizens they could freely continue their busi-ness activities and even expand them during the period upto 1975. A contributing factor was their success in creatingeconomic activities which prospered from the larger influxof American aid to the country.

In the RV a militarized conflict began in the second halfof the 1950s. By 1960 the Front de Libération National(FLN) had been formed by political groups opposing theRV government, and it obtained support from the DRVand its allies. The USA, on the other hand, provided thebulk of support for the RV, at first solely in the form ofmaterial aid, then through advisers and finally, from themid-1960s, ground and air forces were committed indirect combat activities.

The involvement of American troops was ended throughthe Paris Agreement of January 1973 but, in spite of itsprovisions, the fighting continued until 1975 when the RVwas defeated and its capital (Saigon) fell on 30 April 1975,thus ending the Vietnam War. Vietnam was officially re-unified as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976.

The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam since 1975The policies of the Vietnamese authorities between 1975and 1978 were aimed at transforming the southern econo-my from a capitalist to a socialist one and hence werebound to affect the Chinese community to a larger extentthan other population groups because of their importantrole in the economy. However, these policies provedunsuccessful so, in March 1978, harsher measures againstthe capitalist-dominated economy of the south werelaunched. Although the authorities claimed that their goalwas to transform the whole economy, and not only thepart controlled by the ethnic Chinese, the latter were nevertheless severely affected.

In response, and coupled with the threat of being trans-ferred to New Economic Zones (NEZ), people tried toleave the country. From April 1978 those leaving Vietnamby boat for other South-East Asian countries increasedsteadily, most of them from the south of Vietnam.

Another problem for the ethnic Chinese was the issue ofcitizenship. According to the Vietnamese, immediatelyafter the ‘liberation’ of southern Vietnam, a registration of

foreign residents was undertaken by the new authoritiesand officially no ‘Vietnamese of Chinese origin’ registeredas such. However, it can be presumed that a certain num-ber of ethnic Chinese refused to register themselves asVietnamese citizens. Two important reasons were that asnon-Vietnamese citizens they would be exempted frommilitary service and as foreign citizens they hoped to beallowed to leave Vietnam. Because they refused to registerthey were treated as ‘foreign residents’, with all therestrictions this entailed as to their right to engage in cer-tain professions.

By 1977, the plight of the Chinese community in Vietnamwas beginning to attract attention from China. The firstopen reaction came on 30 April 1978, when the Head ofthe Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Councilin Beijing made an announcement that 40,000 Chinesehad returned suddenly from Vietnam to China during theearly part of that year. China continued to report a steadyincrease in the number of Chinese arriving from Vietnamand by mid-July the number exceeded 160,000. Most ofthese people came from the north of Vietnam.

Why did so many ethnic Chinese suddenly leave thenorthern parts of the country? The most important reasonbehind the exodus from the bordering provinces was thefear of a war between China and Vietnam. Relationsbetween the two countries had been deteriorating overissues such as disputed borders as well as divergent viewson relations with Kampuchea, and during 1978 the ethnicChinese in Vietnam became aware of the mounting ten-sion between the two countries. In this situation, manychose to leave in order to avoid getting caught in a war,thus triggering off the outflow of ethnic Chinese from theborder provinces. In the rest of the north, rumours of warwere somewhat less threatening since the border wassome distance away. However, the clampdown on thestill-existing private trade, as well as the problems of citi-zenship, affected many ethnic Chinese and contributed tothe continuing outflow of people to China.

During 1978, the exodus of ethnic Chinese was the sub-ject of talks between China and Vietnam. The talks endedwithout any agreement or understanding being reachedbut the exodus was to a large extent halted when Chinasealed off its border with Vietnam on 12 July. Yet, thealternative of leaving northern Vietnam by boat was stillopen. The outflow of predominantly ethnic Chinese byboat from the whole of Vietnam continued during the sec-ond half of 1978 and into 1979. From March to June 1979the number of arrivals in other South-East Asian countriesand in Hong Kong increased sharply.

The accounts given by refugees who reached Hong Kongfrom northern Vietnam during these months painted apicture of the policy of the Vietnamese authorities, whichwas tantamount to a large-scale expulsion of ethnicChinese. Some refugees said that the Chinese had beenassembled at information meetings by the Vietnameseauthorities and told that, for their own security, they hadone of two choices: either to be transferred to NEZ at asafe distance from the border with China, or to leave the country.

This forced exodus occurred in the wake of the Chinesemilitary intervention in Vietnam in February-March 1979.

27

Several factors help to explain the Chinese military action:first, the disputed bilateral issues concerning borderzones; second, China’s displeasure with Vietnam’s closerrelations to the Soviet Union; third, China’s condemnationof Vietnam’s military intervention in Kampuchea in lateDecember 1978.

The outflow of boat people from April to June 1979 led toa conference on refugees in Geneva in July that year. Atthis conference the Vietnamese representatives pledgedto stem the outflow of people, while at the same timerefuting all accusations of being involved in the depar-tures. However, Vietnam seems already to have takenmeasures to halt the outflow by June 1979, as shown bythe fact that the number of refugees arriving in neigh-bouring countries declined in July and during the rest ofthat year.

From the fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975 to the end ofSeptember 1979, an estimated 200,000-236,000 ethnicChinese left Vietnam by boat for other South-East Asiancountries and for Hong Kong. Furthermore, approximate-ly another 230,000 ethnic Chinese left for China. Thus, anestimated 430,000-466,000 ethnic Chinese fled Vietnamduring this period.

In this context, official figures of the numbers of ethnicChinese in the country are relevant. In 1976 the figurewas 1,236,000 ‘Hoa’ (the term used by the Vietnamese forthe largest group of ethnic Chinese). In the census of 1October 1979 the Hoa numbered 935,074. In the mostrecent general census of l April 1989 the number of Hoawas put at 900,185. Thus, there has been a continuousdecline in the number of Hoa in Vietnam.

The country faced worsening economic problems in late1978 and 1979 and the authorities responded by liberaliz-ing the economy in September 1979, which led to the re-emergence of private markets and private distributionsystems. In spite of this, Vietnam’s economic developmenthas continued to be disappointing, leading to the implementation of more thorough economic reforms fromlate 1986.

Liberalization of the economy has given the ethnicChinese a new opportunity to use their abilities andmeans to become involved in private business and othercommercial activities. Their success in gaining control of alarger part of the economic life of the country has beenmade possible by the policies of the Vietnamese authori-ties towards them, which have shifted during the 1980sfrom perceiving and even treating the ethnic Chinese as akind of ‘fifth column’ to attempts aimed at gradually rein-tegrating them into Vietnamese society.

Since mid-1979, most of those ethnic Chinese who haveleft Vietnam have been doing so legally through the‘Orderly Departure Programme’. Statistics indicate thatthe percentage of ethnic Chinese leaving the country hasbeen diminishing because of changes in economic policiesas well as changes in the authorities’ attitudes towards them.

●

CAMBODIAby Ramses Amer

From Independence to 1975The Chinese population at the time of Cambodia’s inde-pendence in 1953 has been estimated at some 425,000people. This figure remained roughly constant up untilthe mid-1970s with a ratio of rural- to urban-basedChinese of about 40 to 60. However the war, which beganafter the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1970and lasted until 1975, caused an influx of ethnic Chinesefrom the countryside to Phnom Penh. This war evolvedinto a conflict between Prince Sihanouk and theCambodian communists, known as Khmer Rouge, backedby China and the DRV on the one hand and the Lon Nolled government backed by the USA and the RV on the other.

Two laws of the mid-1950s give a good insight into theattitude of the Cambodian authorities towards theChinese. First, on 30 November 1954, a law on nationalitywas promulgated in which Article 22 stipulated that any-one with at least one Cambodian parent was to be regard-ed as a Cambodian citizen. Furthermore, anyone born inCambodia with at least one of his parents also born in thecountry was to be regarded as a Cambodian citizen: this

28

DATE OF INDEPENDENCE: 1953.CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS: transitional multi-

party/faction government installed in early 1992under UN Peace Plan and with supervision fromUN officials and troops.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN.

RATIFICATION OF:UN Int. Cov. on Civil and Political Rights: signed

but not ratified.UN Opt. Protocol to the Int. Cov. on Civil and

Political Rights: noUN Int. Conv. on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination: yesUN Conv. on the Rights of the Child: noPolitical/military alliances: none for the moment

AREA: 181,040 sq. kmPOPULATION: 7,870,000 (1988)LITERACY: 75% (1985)LIFE EXPECTANCY: 48 (1985)PER CAPITA GNP: naECONOMY: overwhelmingly subsis-

tence agricultureETHNIC GROUPS: Khmer, Vietnamese,

Chinese (%na), Cham,various tribal ethnicgroups

RELIGIONS: Buddhism, CatholicChristianity, Islam

LANGUAGES: Khmer (official language)

rule was to be applied to all children born after 13November 1954.

Second, on 19 March 1956, an Immigration Act was putinto effect. Its Article 26 stipulated that all foreign nation-als were prohibited from engaging in 18 specified occupa-tions: customs agent; boat consignee or shipping agent;intelligence agent or private police; immigration or emi-gration agent; director of an employment agency; licensedgeneral dealer; arms and munitions merchant; maker of,or dealer in private radio sets or parts of these sets; print-er; hairdresser for men, either employer or employee; sec-ond-hand dealer or money lender; river or coastal ships’pilot; jeweller or goldsmith, either employer or employee;chauffeur of cars, taxis and transport vehicles; longshore-man; woodcutter; grain merchant; salt dealer.2

These prohibitions resulted in widespread unemploymentamong the ethnic Chinese since an estimated 90 per centof their community was dependent on commercial activi-ties for their living.

Compared with the decrees promulgated by the RV, theCambodian regulations on nationality were less discrimi-natory against the Chinese since, in Cambodia, all foreignnationals were subject to the same rulings. Also, the latterwere not enforced retroactively upon anyone born inCambodia. However, the number of specified activitieswas more extensive than in the Vietnamese ruling.

In contrast to the reaction of the Chinese in the RVtowards the nationality law, there was no negativeresponse among the Chinese in Cambodia and, as a result,the naturalization process went ahead smoothly. Bybecoming Cambodian citizens, many ethnic Chinese wereno longer affected by the prohibition on engaging in cer-tain professions and consequently unemployment amongthem decreased.

During the civil war the Khmer Rouge gradually gainedstrength and took control over the rural parts of the coun-try in spite of heavy American bombing. The latter diddelay their advance on the capital Phnom Penh between1973 and 1975 but eventually they did capture the capitalin April 1975 and established a new administration underthe name Democratic Kampuchea (DK).

As noted above, the civil war caused rural-based Chineseto seek refuge in urban areas. Here, the social life of theethnic Chinese was not affected by the conflict and theirassociations continued to operate up to 1975, as did theirChinese schools.

The Democratic Kampuchea Years:April 1975 to January 1979The domestic policies of the DK authorities contrastedsharply with those of the previous administrations. Oneexpression of the changes in policy were the forcefulmovements of people beginning with the evacuation ofPhnom Penh in April 1975. All facets of Cambodian soci-ety were changed, including the dismantling of the healthsector, radical changes in the education system andnationalization of all private assets including farm land.These radical and sweeping changes, coupled with theoppressive ways in which they were enforced, resulted in

a high number of executions and an obvious disregard forthe human costs of malnourishment, overwork and dis-ease. The result was an estimated one million deathsabove the normal death rate.

In this context, attention will be focused on how the ethnicChinese were affected by these policies. It seems they weretargeted by the authorities because of their traditional com-mercial role in the society and because many of them werein Phnom Penh in April 1975 as a result of the war. Beingviewed as both capitalists and urban dwellers they weretherefore subject to the same harsh treatment as others inthis situation. However, more ethnic Chinese than ethnicKhmers were affected by the authorities’ policies.

When Phnom Penh was evacuated in April 1975 many ofthe ethnic Chinese went back to their villages of origin,mainly in the Eastern and South-Western Zones of thecountry. Later that year another large scale movement ofpeople was carried out by the authorities and many of theevacuees from Phnom Penh were moved to the North-West Zone bordering Thailand.

It has been estimated that possibly as many as 50 per cent(some 200,000) of the ethnic Chinese in Cambodia per-ished between April 1975 and January 1979 and it seemslikely that starvation and disease rather than executionswere the main causes of their deaths. This can partly beexplained by the fact that ethnic Chinese, whether of ruralor urban origins, had not earlier been involved in agricul-ture and their new life of hard work in the fields, togetherwith a scarce supply of food proved fatal for many of theevacuees from Phnom Penh.

At the same time, the ethnic Chinese as well as other eth-nic minorities in Cambodia were denied their own cultur-al identity through the prohibition of the use of their ownlanguages as well as the suppression of their religiouspractices (the latter being also the case for the Khmermajority population).

To sum up, the ruthless policies of the authorities werethe main reason why such a high number of Cambodiansof different social origins perished during the DK years.The ethnic Chinese do not seem to have been singled outfor racial discrimination but nevertheless about half ofthem perished. As well as suffering from general maltreat-ment (along with the rest of the population), they weretargeted because they were considered not to be of poorsocial origin.

The End of the RegimeIt was not the domestic policies of the DK authorities thatled to its downfall in early January 1979 but their policiestowards neighbouring Vietnam. Relations between thetwo countries can be summarized in the following way:border clashes between Kampuchea and Vietnamoccurred in May 1975. A settlement was reached during avisit to Hanoi in June 1975 by a delegation of theKampuchean Communist Party, headed by its Secretary-General, Mr Pol Pot, and a fairly stable situation prevailedon the common border during the remainder of 1975 and 1976.

In early 1977, Kampuchea started to ‘patrol’ disputed bor-der areas, which they regarded as Kampuchean territory

29

but under Vietnam’s control. From March, Kampucheabegan artillery shelling and armed attacks againstVietnam. During the second half of 1977, the conflictescalated into a full scale war that continued during 1978until the Vietnamese launched a military intervention on25 December 1978. Phnom Penh was captured on 7January 1979 and the overthrown DK authorities wereforced to leave the capital and retreat to the western partsof the country bordering Thailand. In Phnom Penh a newadministration was established with Vietnamese assistanceand the country was renamed the People’s Republic ofKampuchea (PRK).

The People’s Republic of Kampuchea: 1979-91The PRK was denied a large measure of internationalrecognition and badly needed international developmentaid to rebuild the country. Despite continued militaryactivities by the Khmer Rouge forces as well as by twonon-communist groups against the PRK the latter man-aged to restore a measure of stability and normality toCambodia. There has been little information availablesince then about the situation of the remaining Chinesecommunity in the country, although some general obser-vations can be made.

First, it is known that an unspecified number of ethnicChinese left Cambodia after the overthrow of the DK.Second, the PRK government aimed to rebuild the countryand this has resulted in, among other things, the reconstruc-tion of the health care and educational system. Rural life hasbeen thoroughly changed through a process of recovery andreconstruction followed by reforms aiming to increase agri-cultural output and improve the living standards of thepeasants. Religious freedom has been established and thecities have been repopulated. All these changes have beento the benefit of the Cambodian population as a whole.

Third, from 1979 onwards, the government allowed theelements of a market economy to begin functioning againalthough the overall economic policy was centrallyplanned. Since 1989 this centralized economic system hasbeen gradually transformed into what is today a free mar-ket economy. Thus, from 1979, it has been possible forethnic Chinese to resume some of their earlier commer-cial activities.

Fourth, relations with China were strained because theChinese government had supported the Khmer Rouge,which may have been one reason why the Kampucheangovernment did not restore all the civil and religiousrights of the ethnic Chinese until 1991.

In 1991 celebration of the Chinese New Year was official-ly allowed for the first time since the establishment of thePRK. Furthermore, an official Chinese Association waslegally founded in 1991. According to representatives ofthis Association there are an estimated 200,000-300,000ethnic Chinese in Cambodia today.3 However, no officialcount has been carried out since 1979.

A UN sponsored peace agreement for Cambodia wassigned in Paris on 23 October 1991. It was signed by thefour major Cambodian parties as well as the major exter-nal powers, including the five permanent members of the

UN Security Council. The agreement provides for amongother things a cease-fire, disarmament of 70 per cent ofthe armed forces of each of the four groups and the hold-ing of free and fair elections to a new parliament. In orderto assist and supervise the implementation of the agree-ment the UN has been assigned an extensive administra-tive and military presence in the country. At this stage it ispremature to speculate about the possible political situa-tion after a UN disengagement from Cambodia.

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30

LAOSby Ramses Amer

From Independence to 1975At the time of independence from France in 1954 therewere about 35,000 Chinese in Laos. By 1959 there weresome 40,000, of whom the majority were living in urbanareas (15,000 lived in the capital Vientiane). It is knownthat, for example, in the town of Pakse, the Chinese num-bered 7,500 out of a total population of 8,000 while, in thetown of Savannakhet, there were 3,500 Chinese out of atotal population of 8,500. By the mid-1970s estimates ofthe number of Chinese in the country vary considerably.Western sources estimated that, by 1975, they numberedapproximately 30,000, whereas a local Chinese estimateput the figure at around 80,000.4

Before 1975 the Chinese community was organized intoassociations based on the old congrégation system. Themost important task of an association was to operate aschool if a local Chinese community was large enough tosupport one. These schools were under the formal controlof the Laotian government but, due to the fact that theydid not teach French, their graduates had to go to Chinaor Taiwan for higher education.

The ethnic Chinese were badly affected when the Laotianauthorities followed the governments of Cambodia andthe RV in restricting certain occupations to Laotian

nationals. This was done through a Royal Ordinancewhich became law in July 1959. The ordinance prohibitedforeign nationals from engaging in fourteen specifiedoccupations: customs (officials); land and water transport;immigration; trade in arms and ammunition; trade inradios and radio parts; printing; taxi-driving; lorry-driving;samlor-driving; the granting of forestry concessions; tradein firewood and charcoal; pawn-broking; butchery andfishmongering; hairdressing.5

The Vietnamese minority in Laos was exempt from thisnew law which meant that almost the whole effect of theordinance fell on the Chinese community. However,Chinese businessmen were successful in adapting them-selves to these regulations by becoming Laotian citizensand/or by engaging Laotian citizens as formal owners oftheir enterprises.

From the second half of the 1950s, there was a civil war inLaos which saw right-wing groups backed by the USAfighting against the Pathet Lao (Laotian Communists)who, in turn, were backed by China and the DRV. It wasnot until 1973 that a formal settlement and power-sharingagreement was concluded between the parties. From1973 to 1975 the Laotian communists gradually took overmore and more power.

The Chinese Community in Laos from 1975Partly as a result of the Laotian Communists’ accession toexclusive power during May 1975, many Chinese merchantsand businessmen were reported to have crossed the MekongRiver to Thailand. According to local Chinese, about 90 percent of the Chinese community left Laos during this period.6

Apart from the purely political reasons for leaving thecountry, the economic policies aimed at creating a class-less socialist society also contributed to the outflow of eth-nic Chinese. Nevertheless, the Chinese school inVientiane, as well as the Chinese Association, functionedcontinuously during the post-1975 period.7

For those ethnic Chinese who remained in Laos, the situ-ation must have been difficult, not only because of thegovernment’s policies but also because of the deteriora-tion in relations between Laos and China in 1979 and theearly 1980s which led to increased tension along the com-mon border as well as termination of all kinds of Chineseassistance to Laos. The Laotian Communist Party hadclose political links to its Vietnamese counterpart whichmeant that, when relations between Vietnam and Chinadeteriorated to open warfare in early 1979, Laos had tomake a stand. It opted to side with Vietnam, whichinevitably affected relations with China adversely.

However, by 1985, the situation along the border betweenLaos and China was back to normal and was followed byfull restoration of relations between the two countries.Since the late 1980s a general liberalization of economicpolicies has taken place which has certainly benefited theremaining ethnic Chinese engaged in business. Thus,more normal living conditions have been restored for theChinese in Laos and it is estimated that they now numbersome 8,000, of whom about half live in Vientiane.

31

DATE OF INDEPENDENCE: 1954 under GenevaAgreement.

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS: one-party system underleadership of Lao People’s Revolutionary Party,president head of state.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN.

RATIFICATION OF:UN Int. Cov. on Civil and Political Rights: noUN Opt. Protocol to the Int. Cov. on Civil and

Political Rights: noUN Int. Conv. on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination: yesUN Conv. on the Rights of the Child: noPolitical/military alliances: treaty of friendship and

cooperation with Vietnam.

AREA: 236,800 sq. km.POPULATION: 4,186,000 (1990).LITERACY: 44% (1990).LIFE EXPECTANCY: 50 (1990).PER CAPITA GNP: $200 (1990).ECONOMY: overwhelmingly subsis-

tence agriculture.ETHNIC GROUPS: Lao, Vietnamese, Chinese

(%na), various tribal eth-nic groups.

RELIGIONS: Buddhism, Catholic,Christianity, Animism

BURMA (MYANMAR)by Martin Smith

Despite their historic and economic importance, theChinese are one of the least documented and researchedof the diverse ethnic minority groups in modern-dayBurma (Myanmar).1 Chinese influence in the country canbe dated back to 1287 AD and the fall of the ancient capi-tal Pagan to the Mongol armies of Kublai Khan. In the fol-lowing centuries, the imperial court in Beijing laid claimto suzerainty over large areas of Burma and Chinese inva-sion forces were repelled by different ethnic Burman orShan rulers several times. Throughout these conflicts, themountainous border region remained loosely defined anda steady stream of Chinese migrants (predominantlyYunnanese) and various hill-peoples moved back andforth across the unmarked frontier.2

The ethnic map then became even more complicated fol-lowing the British annexation of Burma in the 19thCentury when a flood of new (mostly male) Chineselabourers and migrants came by sea from Guangdong(Canton) and Fujian (Fukien) provinces to set up shopsand businesses in Rangoon, Moulmein and other towns incentral and lower Burma.3

After Burma’s independence in 1948, Chinese claims for a77,000-square-mile (200,000 sq. kms.) region of north-east Burma were continued by both the Communist gov-ernment of Mao Zedong in Beijing and the Kuomintang(KMT) government of Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa(Taiwan). In the early 1950s refugee KMT forces fromYunnan province fought a fierce, undeclared war with theBurmese government as they secretly prepared a 12,000-strong army in Burma’s eastern Shan State for an attempt-ed re-invasion of the Chinese mainland.4 Indeed, thoughin 1960 a joint 2,100 kilometre border demarcation wasfinally agreed between Rangoon and Beijing, even todaymaps in Taiwan continue to mark parts of Kachin State asChinese territory.

Communist China’s intrusion into Burmese politics hasalso persisted, largely through support for the insurgentCommunist Party of Burma (CPB). In 1968 Chinese mili-tary instructors and Red Guards were sent into Burma tohelp build up the CPB’s 20,000-strong People’s Armywhich, for over 20 years, governed vast ‘liberated zones’along the Burma-China border.5 Following the break-upof the People’s Army as a result of ethnic mutinies in1989, a number of these Chinese volunteers, includingLin Ming Xian, Li Ziru and Zhang Zhi Ming, remainedbehind in Burma and have taken leading roles in newpolitical movements which have negotiated cease-fireswith the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council(SLORC) in Rangoon.

As with other ethnic minority communities in Burma, pre-sent-day statistics are contentious and there has been noattempt to make an accurate survey of the Chinese popu-lation in Burma since the last British census of 1931.6 The1931 census, for example, recorded 193,594 Chineseinhabitants of Burma, comprising three major sub-groups,the Yunnanese, Fukienese and Cantonese, but in the1950s a Chinese population of anywhere between 350,000and 600,000 was more commonly mentioned. By contrast,the SLORC, which seized power in a military coup inSeptember 1988, today quotes a 1983 figure of just230,000.7 Generally speaking, however, the Chinese havebeen calculated at just over 1 per cent of Burma’s popula-tion which, with an estimated 42 million inhabitants in1991, would mean over 400,000 citizens of Chinese ethnicorigin today.

Part of this confusion over statistics can be attributed tothe large number of Chinese families who have long sincesettled in Burma and intermarried. Such prominentnational figures as the Burmese Army veterans, ex-Brigadiers San Yu and Aung Gyi, and the country’s long-time military ruler, General Ne Win (Shu Maung), havemixed Sino-Burman ancestries. In addition, Burma’s toughcitizenship rules have encouraged many inhabitants to playdown their ethnic backgrounds. Under the 1982 citizen-ship law, for example, which exempts ‘indigenous races’such as the Burmans, Karens and Shans, the rights of fullcitizenship are, in theory, confined only to those who canprove ancestors resident in Burma before the first Britishannexation in 1824. On the basis of this law, ethnicChinese and Indian holders of Foreign Residents Cards,even if born and brought up in Burma, are banned fromstudying ‘professional’ subjects such as medicine and tech-nology at university. Not surprisingly, then, the children of

32

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS: military dictatorship. TheState Law and Order Restoration Council(SLORC) took control in 1988. Leader ofSLORC head of state. Opposition NationalLeague for Democracy won elections in 1990 butwas not allowed to take power.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN.

RATIFICATION OF:UN Int. Cov. on Civil and Political Rights: noUN Opt. Protocol to the Int. Cov. on Civil and

Political Rights: noUN Int. Conv. on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination: noUN Conv. on the Rights of the Child: no

AREA: 676,550 sq. km.POPULATION: 41,609,000 (1990).LITERACY: 71%.LIFE EXPECTANCY: 61 (1990).PER CAPITA GNP: $200 (1987).ECONOMY: mainly agricultural and

resource-based (especiallylogging).

ETHNIC GROUPS: Burmese, Karens, Kayan,Shan, Kashin, Nagas,Chinese (1%), Indians,various other minoritypeoples.

RELIGIONS: Buddhism, Hinduism,Islam, Christianity.

LANGUAGES: Burmese (official lan-guage), various minoritylangages.

many Chinese, whose citizenship could be in question,prefer to register under different ethnic categories.

It is, however, in the turbulent Shan State that ethnicarguments have often been at their most extreme. Notonly are there substantial Chinese-majority communities,notably in the Kokang substate, but Chinese remains acommonly spoken language for trade and travel in thehills.8 Burma’s illicit opium trade, for example, has forover two decades been largely controlled by KMT rem-nants and local ethnic Chinese or Shan Chinese militialeaders, such as Pheung Kya-shin, Lo Hsing-han andKhun Sa (Chan Shi-fu), who have frequently changedsides between different insurgent armies and Rangoon.9

This complex and dislocated history has left many Chinesecommunities, especially in the towns, with an uncertainplace in Burmese society and, like the larger Indian com-munity, the Chinese have often been portrayed by nation-alist politicians as a relic of the colonial past. In the 1930s,the Chinese were several times the victims of communalviolence in which hundreds of Indians (the main target ofthe crowds) were killed. However, in the short-lived par-liamentary era of the 1950s, despite widespread angerover the KMT invasion, many Chinese business communi-ties flourished and there were six Chinese-language dailynewspapers and over 250 Chinese vernacular schools(split along pro-Beijing or pro-Taipei lines).10

Anti-Chinese resentment, however, swiftly resurfacedafter General Ne Win seized power in March 1962 andintroduced his idiosyncratic Burmese Way to Socialism.An estimated 100,000 Chinese merchants and traders leftBurma in the years 1963-7 following Ne Win’s massnationalization of the economy. All Chinese schools andnewspapers were closed down and the publication ofChinese literature was subject to tough censorship laws.11

The exodus was completed by violent anti-Chinese riotswhich broke out in towns across Burma in mid-1967.Many observers believe these disturbances, which includ-ed an attack on the Chinese embassy in Rangoon, weredeliberately provoked by the Ne Win government.Dozens, and possibly hundreds, of Chinese were killed orinjured and many Chinese properties and buildings werelooted and destroyed.12

The violence was the cue for China’s open military back-ing for the CPB insurrection which had begun back in1948. Relations only started to thaw in the mid-1980swhen, apparently as part of Deng Xiaoping’s economicreforms, Burma was selected for a vast expansion of offi-cial trade with Yunnan province (there has always been athriving, cross-border black market trade). Legalizedtrade, which was negligible in the early 1980s, hadreached US$1.5 billion per annum by 1988.13

This closening of ties with China was then hastened bythree unrelated developments which brought militaryhardliners in Rangoon and Beijing together: the SLORCcoup in 1988 in which hundreds of students and unarmeddemonstrators were killed; the virtual collapse of the CPBin early 1989; and the crushing a few months later of stu-dent protests in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. By 1991,China was estimated to account for over 40 per cent ofBurma’s foreign trade, and this new partnership appearedto be cemented by Beijing’s agreement to sell sophisticat-

ed modern weaponry, worth a massive US$1.2 billion, tothe SLORC.

As a result of this dramatic change in the economic cli-mate many ethnic Chinese from China, Hong Kong andThailand have already visited or returned to Burma. SinceWestern governments cut off virtually all official aid andinvestment to the SLORC in protest at the 1988 killings,in many parts of the country it has been largely the capitalof Chinese entrepreneurs which has revived Burma’s fail-ing economy – especially in Mandalay and the north-east.

None the less, despite this improvement in SLORC’s rela-tions with its neighbours, for Burma’s Chinese populationthe situation remains ambiguous. There has been norelaxation in the government’s tough restrictions on theexpression of ethnic minority languages, religions and cul-tures. The draconian publishing laws which existed underthe Burmese Way to Socialism have been tightened inevery respect, and the SLORC has consistently refused tohand over power to the National League for Democracy,headed by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, which won a landslidevictory in the 1990 election.14 Indeed, since 1989 theSLORC, masterminded by Military Intelligence chiefMajor General Khin Nyunt, has been waging an openlyxenophobic ‘Cultural Revolution’ campaign of its own.

Once again, Burma’s Chinese and Indian communitiesappear to be a target, and the government’s continuedsuspicion of their loyalties was expressed in a series of arti-cles published in the country’s only newspaper under thetitle, ‘We Fear Our Race May Become Extinct’. One com-mentary was seen as particularly threatening: ‘ManyBurmese girls have become wives of Indians and Chinese.They have given birth to impure Burmese nationals.Foreigners marrying Burmese girls and trying to swallowup the whole race will continue to be a problem in the eraof democracy in future.’15

In the face of official sanction of such discriminatory sen-timents, many Chinese, mindful of the violence of thepast, see uncomfortable signposts to the future.

●

33

CONCLUSIONS

For centuries, the Chinese have been leaving China andsettling in different parts of South-East Asia. Their rea-sons for doing so have been as varied as the languagesthey spoke and the areas they came from. Their circum-stances today are equally varied. Yet this diaspora hasoften had a profound effect on the economic and culturallife of the ten countries of the region considered in this report.

This long history of settlement means that many thou-sands of ethnic Chinese have lived in the countries ofSouth-East Asia for generations. Yet in none, except forSingapore, do they constitute more than a small percent-age of the population.

Information on their numbers is difficult to establish,partly because in different circumstances people havebeen more or less willing to identify themselves as mem-bers of a minority in national censuses. Equally, there is adearth of material available on the situation of womenethnic Chinese, and Minority Rights Group recommendsthat future researchers try to rectify this situation. Thereis also a need for more analysis of the different aspirationsof older and younger generations.

Since the People’s Republic of China no longer recog-nizes ethnic Chinese born abroad as Chinese citizens, theChinese in South-East Asia have faced different degreesof access to citizenship. There are positive moves, forexample, in Indonesia where the recent re-opening ofdiplomatic ties between the Chinese and Indonesian gov-ernments may lead to a resolution of the situation of state-less ethnic Chinese, while in Malaysia the constitutionalrights of ethnic Chinese are being eroded.

The recently restrained role which China has played innot exploiting the issue of the ‘overseas Chinese’ has notprevented, during the last few decades, the ethnicChinese from being perceived as a kind of fifth columnfor Chinese Communism: this was very much the attitudeof the Vietnamese authorities towards them, for example,up until the 1980s. Territorial disputes, especially inBurma and Indochina, have often increased the local gov-ernments’ and people’s animosity towards them.

The perceived status of the ethnic Chinese in many of thecountries of South-East Asia is often that of wealthy mid-dlemen, with all of the jealousies and potential violencethat that assumption entails. When the pressures becometoo great, the wealthiest do sometimes quit the country(taking their valuable skills and business acumen withthem). Yet the majority are poor fisher-farmers who can-not afford to leave and have to deal as best they can withthe prejudices bestowed on their whole community by themajority people.

There has been a major misunderstanding by the West ofthe origins of many refugees from Vietnam, and their eth-nic Chinese composition. Too often it has been assumedthat they were economic migrants seeking economicadvantages in the West rather than people escaping preju-dice and, on occasions, persecution in Vietnam because oftheir ethnic origins.

Co-existence does not mean assimilation and a loss of cul-tural identity, which is a painful experience for the gener-ations who suffer it. Language and education are crucialto the maintenance of cultural identity. Traditionally, theethnic Chinese have spoken the language or dialect fromtheir place of origin in China, or in more modern timeshave used Mandarin amongst themselves. In the last fewdecades, however, many governments in the region, suchas those in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, haveplaced limits on Chinese language education. Some havediscouraged the public use of Chinese.

Article 1 of Paragraph 4 of the International Conventionon the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination(CERD) states that Special measures taken for the solepurpose of securing adequate advancement of certainracial or ethnic groups...shall not be continued after theobjectives for which they were taken have been achieved’.It might be argued, for example, that the special measureswhich the Malaysian government have taken in favour ofthe Malays were justified to redress social injustices.However, there is a serious danger in this case of the gov-ernment continuing beyond CERD’s defined boundaryand excluding the poor ethnic Chinese from educationand advancement.

As shown in this report, for example in Burma andIndonesia, a minority can be used time and time again as ascapegoat in times of major change, when the social orderis threatened or when there is a new government. Yet aminority such as the ethnic Chinese can offer many usefulthings to the whole society, not least in this case theirtrading links, business skills and contacts. There is a needtherefore to reinforce areas of cooperation, rather thanconflict. There are examples in this study of scholars,teachers, businessmen and traders from all communitiesincluding Chinese working successfully together. In thesecircumstances, misunderstandings and prejudice are bro-ken down and stability, trust and growth occur betweenthe minority ethnic Chinese communities and the majority populations.

●

34

NOTESHistorical Overview, pp.7-101 Skinner, G. William, Chinese Society in Thailand,

Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1959, pp.46, 112.2 Lombard, Denys, Le Carrefour javanais, Éd. de

l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales,Paris, 1990, Vol.2, p.213ff. Chinese agriculture was‘industrial’ because its products were processed insmall factories, such as sugar mills, arak distilleries,oil presses, for dyeing textiles, and so on, p.223. Alsoon Chinese frontier agriculture, Jackson, James C.,Planters and Speculators: Chinese and EuropeanAgricultural Enterprise in Malaya, University ofMalaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1968.

3 See Gaspardone, Émile, ‘Un Chinois des mers dusud: le Fondateur de Hà-Tiên’, Journal asiatique 240(1952), pp.363-385; Sellers, Nicholas, The Princes ofHà-Tiên (1682-1867), Thanh Long, Brussels, 1983.

4 Skinner, op. cit., pp.20-3.5 When the British colonies (except Singapore) on the

Malayan Peninsula became independent in 1957,they formed the Federation of Malaya. The namewas changed to Malaysia in 1963, when Singaporeand the north Bornean states of Sarawak and Sabahjoined the Federation. In 1965, Singapore leftMalaysia, becoming the Republic of Singapore.

6 Compare Wang Gungwu, ‘Patterns of ChineseMigration in Historical Perspective’, in May, R. J.,and O’Malley, William, eds., Observing Change inAsia, Crawford House Press, Bathurst, 1989, pp.33-48.

7 Peranakan is a Malay-Indonesian word meaninglocal-born; in contemporary usage it usually impliessomeone who is also locally rooted, speaking Malay-Indonesian or a local language rather than Chinese.

8 Baba is practically a synonym for peranakan; thelargest settlement of Baba Chinese is in Melaka(Malacca), Malaysia, but they also lived in Singaporeand Penang (Pinang) and the word was used in theIndies, too.

9 Skinner, op. cit., p.128.10 See Wickberg, Edgar, The Chinese in Philippine

Life, 1850-1898, Yale University Press, New Haven,1968.

11 Mandarin (putonghua, guoyu) is spoken in most ofnorth and south-west China. South-East Asia’sChinese seldom or never spoke Mandarin before theadvent of modern schools, and Mandarin-speakingteachers had to be imported.

12 Hewison, Kevin, ‘The State and CapitalistDevelopment in Thailand’, in Hewison, K., Powerand Politics in Thailand, Journal of ContemporaryAsia Publishers, Manila, 1989, pp.32-3.

The ASEAN States, p.111 See, for example, the remarks of Indonesian Chinese

banker Mochtar Riady prepared in summer 1990 forthe Cornell University conference ‘The Role of theIndonesian Chinese in Shaping Modern IndonesianLife’.

Malaysia, pp.12-141 Loh Koh Wah, Beyond the Tin Mines, Singapore

University Press, Singapore, 1988, discusses the landproblem at length.

2 According to a Reuters dispatch in International

Herald Tribune (hereafter IHT), 18 June 1991. Theremaining 8.4 per cent was held by mixed groups.The official statistics may actually underestimate theBumiputra share.

3 Jomo, K.S., ‘Whither Malaysia’s New EconomicPolicy?’, Pacific Affairs 63:4 (Winter 1990-1), p.499,gives slightly different figures for the 1988 distribu-tion of wealth. He also shows (p.494) that the inci-dence of poverty was reduced for all ethnic groupsbetween 1976 and 1987.

4 This discussion of the NEP is based primarily onJesudason, James V., Ethnicity and the Economy,Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1989 and Jomo,op. cit.

5 IHT, 18 June 1991, calls it the ‘New DevelopmentPolicy’.

6 An informant points out that Chinese and Tamil pri-mary schools receive ‘much less’ state support thando schools teaching in Malay; in addition, theEducation Act empowers the government to closevernacular schools, which raises suspicion amongChinese.

7 See Heidhues, Mary F. Somers, ‘Chinese Educationin Malaysia and Indonesia’, in Rothermund, Dietmarand Simon, John, eds., Education and theIntegration of Ethnic Minorities, Frances Pinter,London, 1986, pp.48-63, and Tan Liok Ee, ‘ChineseIndependent Schools in West Malaysia: VaryingResponses to Changing Demands’, in Cushman andWang, loc. cit., pp.61-74. According to Tan, therewere 37 independent Chinese (secondary) schools inWest Malaysia in 1983.

8 Mauzy, Diane K., ‘Malaysia in 1987’, Asian SurveyXXVIII:2 (February 1988), pp.219-20. It has beencharged that the arrests were in reality an attempt todivert attention from a crisis in UMNO itself.

9 Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER), 16July 1982. Later figures are more balanced, and, asnoted, many Chinese study abroad.

10 Carstens, Sharon A., ‘Pulai Hakka ChineseMalaysian: A Labyrinth of Cultural Identities’, inGosling, L. A. Peter and Lim, Linda Y. C., TheChinese in South-East Asia, Singapore, 1983, Vol. 2,pp.79-98.

11 Figures cited by Jomo, K. S., in a private communication.

Indonesia, pp.14-171 Wang Gungwu, ‘Are Indonesian Chinese Unique?

Some Observations’, in Mackie, J. A. C., ed., TheChinese in Indonesia, Nelson for the AustralianInstitute of International Affairs, Melbourne, 1976,pp.199-210.

2 Coppel, Charles A., Indonesian Chinese in Crisis,OUP, Kuala Lumpur, 1983, pp.52-72. Baperki is anabbreviation for Badan PermusyawaratanKewarganegaraan Indonesia (Consultative Body forIndonesian Citizenship).

3 Feith, Herbert, ‘The Legacy of the Dayak Raids’,FEER, 25 January 1968. Members of the militaryare thought to have instigated the anti-Chinese activ-ities.

4 Tempo (Jakarta), 17 March 1990; FEER, 16 August1990. Bakom PKB is an abbreviation of BadanKomunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa(‘Communication Body for the Appreciation ofNational Unity’). The assimilationist group first pro-pounded the idea that Indonesian citizens of Chinese

35

descent adopt Indonesian-sounding names and oth-erwise adapt to Indonesian life.

5 Totok is a Malay-Indonesian word meaning pure,here it means culturally more ‘pure’ Chinese and isthe opposite of peranakan.

6 Yoon Hwan Shin, ‘The Role of Elites in CreatingCapitalist Hegemony in Post-Oil Boom Indonesia’, inIndonesia, Special Issue on The Role of theIndonesian Chinese in Shaping Modern IndonesianLife, 1991, pp.127-44.

7 Tan, Mély G., ‘The Social and Cultural Dimensionsof the Role of Ethnic Chinese in Indonesian Society’,Indonesia Special Issue 1991, pp.113-25; Heidhues,Mary Somers, ‘From BAKOM to Prasetiya Mulya’,paper presented to 8th European Colloquium onIndonesian and Malay Studies, Kungälv, Sweden,June 1991.

8 Suryadinata, Leo, Pribumi Indonesians, the ChineseMinority and China, Heinemann, Singapore, 1978,pp.148-59.

9 Salmon, Claudine and Lombard, Denys, Les Chinoisde Jakarta: Temples et vie collective, SECMI, Paris,1977.

10 Pikiran Rakyat, 4 March 1990, 15 March 1990;Kompas, 19 March 1990. Clippings from VanVollenhoven Institute, Leiden.

East Timor, p.181 East Timor: Violations of Human Rights, Amnesty

International, London, 1985.2 Kaye, Lincoln, ‘East Timor Depends on Jakarta’s

Largesse’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 8September 1985.

Singapore, pp.19-201 Statistics on population and income from The World

Bank Atlas, 1991.2 Riedlinger, Heinz, ‘Die Bewegung zur Verbreitung

des Hochchinesischen (Tuiguang Huayu Yundong)in Singapur’ (the movement for propagation ofMandarin in Singapore), ASIEN 16 (July 1985),pp.75-83. Riedlinger asserts that 97 per cent of allChinese in Singapore and 77.9 per cent of allSingaporeans understood Hokkien; in that case,Mandarin was not to replace English but to replacedialects.

3 Nanyang was originally a private institution, butbecame a government-run one when financial diffi-culties arose. Borthwick, Sally, ‘Chinese Educationand Identity in Singapore’, in Cushman, Jennifer W.and Wang Gungwu, eds., Changing Identities of theSouth-East Asian Chinese since the Second WorldWar, Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong,1988, pp.35-59.

Thailand, pp.20-221 Skinner, op. cit., also Skinner, G. William,

Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community ofThailand, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1958.

2 Boonsanong Punyodyana, Chinese-Thai DifferentialAssimilation in Bangkok: An Exploratory Study,Cornell University South-East Asia Programme DataPaper, Ithaca, 1971, p.9.

3 Girling, John L. S., Thailand: Society and Politics,Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1981, p.223.

4 Compare Girling, op.cit., pp.252-8; 265-76.5 Hewison, Kevin, ‘The Development of Industrial

Capital and Its Situation in the 1980s, in Hewison,K., Power and Politics in Thailand: Essays inPolitical Economy, Journal of Contemporary AsiaPublishers, Manila, 1989, pp.151-5.

Philippines, pp.22-231 Tan, Antonio S., ‘The Changing Identity of the

Philippine Chinese, 1946-84’, in Cushman andWang, loc. cit., pp.177-203 and Amyot, Jacques, TheManila Chinese, Institute of Philippine Culture,Quezon City, 1973.

2 Special report by Rigoberto Tiglao in FEER, 15February 1990, pp.68-72.

Brunei, p.241 Leake, David, Brunei, McFarland, Jefferson, 1989,

pp.108-111; Suryadinata, China and the ASEANStates, op. cit., pp.120-122.

Indochina, p.251 As listed in Fall, 1958, p.67.2 Willmott, William E., The Chinese In Cambodia,

University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1967,p.12.

3 The author is indebted to Dr Michael Vickery for theinformation pertaining to the Chinese Associationwhich he gathered during a visit to Cambodia in lateOctober-early November 1991.

4 Information obtained through discussions inVientiane in February 1992.

5 Purcell, Victor, The Chinese in South-East Asia,OUP, London, 1965, p.219.

6 See note 4.7 See note 4.

Burma, p.32-331 The renaming of Burma as Myanmar by the ruling

State Law and Order Restoration Council in June1989 has yet to become widely accepted colloquialusage and is not used hereafter. The title is alsorejected by many ethnic minority parties as the eth-nic Burman name for their country.

2 Smith, M., Burma: Insurgency and the Politics ofEthnicity, Zed Books, London, 1991, p.38.

3 Working People’s Daily, 22 February 1989.4 Smith, op. cit., pp.39, 153-8.5 Ibid., pp.248-52, 310-13, 355-8, 364; for a vivid, eye-

witness description of the China frontier, seeLintner, B., Land of Jade, Kiscadale, Edinburgh,1990, pp.109-299.

6 For a discussion, see Smith, op. cit., pp.29-38.7 Working People’s Daily, 24 February 1989.8 Smith, op. cit., pp.39, 434.9 Ibid., pp.314-15, 333-44, 374-81.

10 E.g., one survey in 1962 recorded that of the 39,000students attending the 259 Chinese schools inBurma, 22,000 attended pro-Beijing schools(Murray, D., ‘Chinese Education in SE Asia’, ChinaQuarterly, 20, October-December 1964, p.79.

11 Article 19, State of Fear: Censorship in Burma,Article 19, London, 1991, pp.18-25.

12 For a discussion, see Smith, op. cit., pp.224-7.13 Ibid., pp.360-3.14 Article 19, op. cit., pp.43-70.15 Working People’s Daily, 20 February 1989.

36

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The ASEAN States

The interested reader will profit from consulting a recent,well-informed bibliographical survey of literature onChinese in five of the six ASEAN states: SURYADINA-TA, Leo, ed., The Ethnic Chinese in the ASEAN States:Bibliographical Essays, Institute of South-East AsianStudies, Singapore, 1989.

CUSHMAN, Jennifer and Wang Gungwu, eds., ChangingIdentities of the South-East Asian Chinese since theSecond World War, Hong Kong University Press, HongKong, 1988.

HEIDHUES, Mary F. Somers, South-East Asia’s ChineseMinorities, Longman Australia, Hawthorn, 1974.

HEWISON, Kevin, Power and Politics in Thailand,Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, Manila, 1989.

INDONESIA, Special Issue, The Role of the IndonesianChinese in Shaping Modern Indonesian Life, Ithaca, NY,Cornell South-East Asia Programme, 1991.

JESUDASON, James V., Ethnicity and the Economy: TheState, Chinese Business, and Multinationals in Malaysia,OUP, Singapore, 1989.

LIM, Linda Y. C. and Gosling, Peter, L. A., The Chinesein South-East Asia, Maruzen Asia, Singapore, 1983.

MACKIE, J. A. C., ed., The Chinese in Indonesia, Nelsonfor the Australian Institute of International Affairs,Melbourne, 1976.

PURCELL, Victor, The Chinese in South-East Asia,OUP, London, 1965.

ROBISON, Richard, Power and Economy in Suharto’sIndonesia, Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers,Manila, 1990.

SURYADINATA, Leo, China and the ASEAN States: theEthnic Chinese Dimension, Singapore University Press,Singapore, 1985.

WANG Gungwu, China and the Chinese Overseas, TimesAcademic Press, Singapore, 1991.

Vietnam

AMER, Ramses, The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam andSino-Vietnamese Relations, Forum, Kuala Lumpur, 1991.

BENOIT, Charles, ‘Vietnam’s “Boat People”’, in Elliot,David W. P. (editor), The Third Indochina Conflict,Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1982, pp.139-62.

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PURCELL, Victor, The Chinese in South-East Asia, 2ndEdition, OUP, London, 1965.

STERN, Lewis M., ‘The Eternal Return: Changes inVietnam’s Policies Toward the Overseas Chinese, 1982-8’,Issues and Studies, XXIV, 7, July 1988, pp.118-38.

The Boat People: An ‘Age’ Investigation with Bruce Grant(editor), Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex,1979.

The Hoa in Vietnam: Dossier II, edited by VietnamCourier, Hanoi, 1978.

Those Who Leave (‘The problem of Vietnamese refugees’),Vietnam Courier, Hanoi, 1979.

TSAI, Maw-Kuey, Les Chinois au Sud-Vietnam, Ministèrede l’éducation nationale comité des travaux historiques etscientifiques, Mémoires de la section de géographie, 3,Bibliotèque nationale, Paris, 1968.

UNGER, Esta, ‘The Struggle Over the ChineseCommunity in Vietnam, 1946-86’, Pacific Affairs. LX, 4,Winter, 1987-8, pp.596-614.

WAIN, Barry, The Refused: The Agony of the IndochineseRefugees, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1981.

Cambodia

KIERNAN, Ben, ‘Kampuchea’s Ethnic Chinese UnderPol Pot: A Case of Systematic Social Discrimination’,Journal of Contemporary Asia, XVI, 1986.

PURCELL, Victor, The Chinese in South-East Asia, 2ndEdition, OUP, London, 1965, pp.18-29.

VICKERY, Michael, Cambodia 1975-82, South EndPress, Boston, 1984.

VICKERY, Michael, Kampuchea: Politics, Economics, andSociety, Frances Pinter (Publishers), London, 1986.

WILLMOTT, William E., ‘History and Sociology of theChinese in Cambodia Prior to the French Protectorate’,Journal of South-East Asian History, VII, 1, March 1966,pp.15-38.

WILLMOTT, William E., The Chinese in Cambodia,University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1967.

WILLMOTT, William E., ‘The Political Structure of theChinese Community in Cambodia’, Monographs on SocialAnthropology, 42, London School of Economics,University of London, The Athlone Press, London, 1970.

37

WILLMOTT, William E., ‘The Chinese in Kampuchea’Journal of South-East Asian Studies, XII, 1, March 1981,pp.38-55.

Laos

HALPERN, J. M., The Role of the Chinese in LaoSociety, P-2161, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica,California, (December 15, 1960, Revised March 1, 1961).

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STUART-FOX, Martin, Laos: Politics, Economics andSociety, Frances Pinter (Publishers), London, 1986.

VAN-ES-BEEK, Bernard J., ‘Refugees from Laos, 1975-79’, in Stuart-Fox, Martin (editor), Contemporary Laos,Studies in the Politics and Society of the Lao People’sDemocratic Republic, University of Queensland Press, StLucia, 1982, pp.324-34.

Burma

ARTICLE 19, State of Fear: Censorship in Burma,Article 19, London, 1991.

LIANG, C., Burma’s Foreign Relations, PraegerPublishers, Westport, 1990.

LINTNER, B., Land of Jade, Kiscadale, Edinburgh,1990.

PETTMAN, R., China in Burma’s Foreign Policy,Australian National University Press, 1973.

SMITH, M., Burma: Insurgency and the Politics ofEthnicity, Zed Books, London, 1991.

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AFRICABurundi since the genocideChadEritrea and TrigrayThe FalashasIndian South AfricansInequalities in ZimbabweJehovah’s Witnesses in AfricaThe NamibiansThe New Position of East Africa’s AsiansThe Sahel: The peoples’ right to developmentThe San of the KalahariSomalia: a Nation in TurmoilThe Southern SudanUgandaThe Western Saharans

THE AMERICASAmerindians of South AmericaCanada’s IndiansThe East Indians of Trinidad and GuyanaFrench Canada in CrisisHaitian Refugees in the USInuit (Eskimos) of CanadaThe Maya of GuatemalaThe Miskito Indians of NicaraguaMexican Americans in the USThe Original Americans: US IndiansPuerto Ricans in the USThe Position of Blacks in Brazilian and Cuban society

ASIAAfghanistan: A Nation of MinoritiesThe Baluchis and PathansThe Adivasis of BangladeshThe Biharis of BangladeshThe Chinese of South-East AsiaJapan’s Minorities – Burakumin, Koreans, Ainu, OkinawansMinorities of Central VietnamThe SikhsThe Tamils of Sri LankaThe Tibetans

THE MIDDLE EASTThe ArmeniansThe Baha’is of IranThe Beduin of the NegevIsrael’s Oriental Immigrants and DruzesThe KurdsLebanonMigrant Workers in the GulfThe Palestinians

SOUTHERN OCEANSAboriginal AustraliansDiego Garcia: a contrast to the FalklandsEast Timor and West IrianFijiThe Kanaks of New CaledoniaThe Maori of Aotearoa – New ZealandMicronesia: the problem of PalauThe Pacific: Nuclear Testing and Minorities

EUROPEThe Basques and CatalansThe Crimean Tatars and Volga GermansCyprusMinorities and Autonomy in Western EuropeMinorities in the BalkansNative Peoples of the Russian Far NorthThe RastafariansRefugees in EuropeRoma: Europe’s GypsiesRomania’s Ethnic HungariansThe Saami of LaplandThe Two Irelands

WOMENArab WomenFemale Genital Mutilation: Proposals for ChangeLatin American WomenWomen in AsiaWomen in sub-Saharan Africa

GENERAL INTERESTChildren: Rights and ResponsibilitiesConstitutional Law and MinoritiesInternational Action against GenocideThe International Protection of MinoritiesJews of Africa and AsiaLanguage, Literacy and MinoritiesMinorities and Autonomy in Western EuropeMinorities and Human Rights LawRace and Law in Britain and the USThe Refugee Dilemma: International Recognition and

AcceptanceThe Rights of Mentally Ill PeopleThe Social Psychology of MinoritiesTeaching about Prejudice

Complete catalogue available

MRG REPORTS

ISBN 0 946690 99 5

An indispensable resource, sympathetic yet objective,which will prove of great value to students, academics,development agencies, governments and all thoseinterested in minorities.

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The Minority Rights Group, aninternational human rights groupand registered educational charity,investigates the plights of minority(and majority) groups sufferingdiscrimination and prejudice – andworks to educate and alert publicopinion.

We produce readable and accu-rate reports on the problems ofoppressed groups around theworld. We publish 6 new andrevised reports a year. To date wehave produced over 90 reports, aWorld Directory of Minorities andother publications.

MRG works through the UN andelsewhere to increase the aware-ness of human rights issues and –with your help – are supportingminorities in the internationalarena.

For full details:Minority Rights Group379 Brixton RoadLondon SW9 7DEUK

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COEXISTENCE ORCONTROL?Many Chinese have worked and lived in the countries of South-East Asia for generations, and are part of the much larger dias-pora of ethnic Chinese worldwide. They make their livingsgenerally from business, farming, fishing: while a few enjoy high-profile wealth, the vast majority do not.

THE CHINESE OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA shows just how varied are the experiences of the ethnic Chinese in the ten statesof the region. Some coexist reasonably well with the majoritypopulation in their country; elsewhere, ethnic tensions havebrought outbreaks of violence and discrimination against them.Some communities have limits placed on their access to Chineselanguage education; others have not. Some governments haveencouraged ethnic Chinese participation in the economic arenawhile others have controlled or restricted their business activities.

This report illustrates how much the future of South-East Asia’s ethnic Chinese is bound together – politically, economically andculturally – with the majority population and other minority ethnic groups within each country. Written by four experts onthe region, this is an essential survey of the history and presentcircumstances of the ethnic Chinese as they strive to foster andenjoy stability, trust and growth

MRG