minority leadership, science, symbols, and the media: the belgian...

Minority Leadership, Science, Symbols, and the Media: The Belgian Islam Debate and its Relevance for Other Countries in Europe

Johan Leman Catholic University of Leuven

This article discusses the processes that occurred in Belgium during the period of 1989- 2000 in the constructive areas of minority policy decision-making regarding the search for a representative and legitimate partner to represent Muslims vis-h-vis the State: minority leadership, the administration, the academic community, the great social symbolic events, and the media. It concludes with the political decision-making process itself. The conclusions refer to the interpretation of change in terms of continuity and discontinuity, and to the means of coping with historical ethnic otherness. Comparisons are made with other European countries.

Cet article aborde les processus mis en place en Belgique, durant la pdriode de 1989-2000, dans le domaine constructif de Ia politique ddcisionnelle concernant les minoritds, notamment la recherche de repr~sentants et de partenaires Idgitimes pour reprdsenter les musulmans aupr~s de l'Etat : dirigeants des minoritds, administration, milieux universitaires, les grands dvdnements sociaux symboliques et les mddias. L' article conclut sur Ie processus m~me des ddcisions politiques. Les conclusions portent en particulier sur I'interprdtation du changement en terme de continuit~ et de discontinuit6, et sur les moyens de s'adapter h la diffdrence ethnique historique. Des comparaisons sont faites avec d' autres pays europdens.

During the last decade, the debate about Islam in Belgium has focused on w h o m the State can or must accept as a representative and legitimate partner for Muslims in discussions that concern both the State and Mus- lim communities (this can vary depending on the State concerned). The debate has also addressed the organizational setting, keeping in mind the legal and administrative framework of the State.

In describing and analysing minority policy decisions, as in the case of the debate about Islam in Belgium, it is useful to identify five dimen- sions or areas of policy-making. In his book Le Pouvoir sur Sc~nes (1992)

Key wordslMots-clefs: Europe's Islam/L'islam en Europe; political anthropology/ anthropologie politique

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Balandier identified three such areas. First is the area of rational activity "in which are found the authorities and the administrators, those people who have charge of men's [sic] ability to act and the technical solution to problems" (my translation, p. 163). Second is the area of media activity, where reality is shaped by information, words, and images. And third is the area of myth, symbol, and rite: "the function of the most exalted collective values and the emotions that serve them is to unite in creating (or in trying to create) a higher and generalized solidarity" (p. 163).

As a result of the accelerated technological, ecological, and multiethnic developments in Western Europe since the 1960s, administrations can no longer function properly if they do not remain current on issues in society, either through internal study or through outside scientific and academic research. I identify this research and analysis as the fourth dimension.

However, in multiethnic societies, a fifth dimension pertains to West- ern Europe since the 1980s: the minority community leadership and its different segments, which sometimes oppose one another, may join together in mutual loyalty vis-a-vis the majority leadership.

The debate on Islam is not restricted to the Belgian context, but has emerged everywhere in Europe where Muslims have become a substan- tial minority. In this article, however, I confine my analysis of minority policy decision-making in the Western European Islamic debate to the situation in Belgium. Indeed, "involved in a unique experiment in Europe, Belgian Muslims elected their 'organizational head of worship' on 13 De- cember 1998" (Panafit, 2000, p. 12).

I have followed closely from within the Belgian discussion and developments between 1989 and 2000. A disadvantage of this is that my involvement may lead to subjectivity. Conversely, it puts me in an ideal position, aspired to by every socio-cultural anthropologist, as long as sufficient distance is maintained during such participant observation. What may be lost in scholarly detachment can be compensated for by useful inside information that an uninvolved scientific observer could acquire only with difficulty and over much time. 1

I discuss the status quaesfionis in 1989-1990 and the processes that occurred between 1990 and 2000 in all five constitutive areas of minority policy decision-making. I identify (a) leadership from segments of the minorities themselves, (b) the administration, (c) the academic community, (d) the great social-symbolic events, and (e) the media. I conclude with a synthesis of the political decision-making process itself (which in turn reveals certain internal processes and so constitutes a separate area).

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Status Quaestionis in 1989 and Impasse in 1990

There are about 350,000 Muslims in Belgium, most of Moroccan or Turkish origin, and they constitute about 3% of the population. An increasing number have acquired Belgian citizenship as a result of changes in the law starting June 13, 1991. 2 Total religious freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution as long as the actMties of a particular religion do not disrupt public order. Concrete expressions of this in society can be seen in Islamic prayer areas, Islamic education in schools, public gatherings, and the halal, trade in ritually slaughtered meat. 3

On July 19, 1974 the Belgian Parliament enacted a law whereby Islam became a recognized religion with the same rights as other, already recognized denominat ions and religions: Catholicism, Protestantism, Anglicanism, Judaism, and--since April 17, 1985--the Greek Orthodox Church. This was the first law of its kind in the Western world concerning Islam. In response to this law, which was a right guaranteed by the Constitution and not by a simple law, the Minister of Education proposed that classes in Islamic religious practice be introduced into public education in the 1975-1976 school year.

Because of the strict separation of church and state, it was not pos- sible to enforce the rights and duties of official recognition of Islam (ex- cept those guaranteed by the Constitution) until an official representative, definitive head of Islam was appointed. For example, this prevented the introduction of Muslim chaplains into prisons and hospitals, the nomination of imams in the mosques, and so forth. A provisional head only was appointed with the mandate of managing day-to-day affairs and defining a more definitive mode of management. This was the Director of the Is- lamic Cultural Centre (ICC) in Brussels, which was influenced by the Islamic World League and financially dependent on Saudi Arabia. This provisional head did not wish to end its own leadership, and lack of consensus among Muslims was an additional reason why the provisional leadership continued. 4

In the second half of the 1980s, when no proposal for a definitive arrangement had yet been received, more Belgian Islamic voices con- tested the provisional arrangement. Moroccan Islamic religious teachers believed their interests were poorly defended. Some Turkish teachers leaned toward either the Diyanet or the more fundamentalist Milli G6rfi~. Some Belgian converts felt that the Saudi (Hanbalite) management was too re- mote from social developments in Europe. And some Muslim groups of Maghreb (Malachite) and Turkish (Hanafite) origin considered formation

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of their international network (e.g., some Islamic brotherhoods) at the European level to be more important than allegiance to the foreign embassies that made up the ICC Board of Management. The general, although strongly diversified, dissatisfaction with the course of events became more overt and was occasionally reported in media. In February 1989 the Imam-Director of the ICC was murdered for unknown rea-

, sons. This was the situation faced by the Royal Commission for Minority

Policy (RCMP) when it was asked at the beginning of 1989 to submit to the government an initial report with proposals for a minority policy. From the outset the RCMP (1989) emphasized definitive settlement of the problems regarding the head of Islamic religious affairs as a main component of a series of policy measures including easier access to Belgian citizenship, eligibility for public service positions, and a series of educational m e a s u r e s .

During the drafting of this proposal, several meetings had taken place with spokesmen from the most prominent Islamic groups in the country-al though the Turks remained more or less absent--and with sociologists who had studied this problem area. The Belgian political world (representatives from the party political system and the trade unions) and officials from the Moroccan, Turkish, and Saudi Arabian Embassies were not involved in the preparation of the proposal; nor were members of the local Islamic communities. However, a number of Belgian convert Islamologists well versed in Islamic theology were involved in the discussion.

The solution then proposed in November 1989 consisted of the election of a High Council of Muslims in Belgium (HCMB) composed of two pillars: the mosques and the co-opted members. It would be through mosques that the Muslims would be called to elect their representatives. Voters and candidates would be registered in the mosques. The co-opted members would represent other interests, persons of considerable moral authority, intellectuals, or scientists. The government would determine how the first elections would be organized and offer the necessary logis- tical support (RCMP, 1989).

Although the government decided fairly quickly to ease the acquisi- tion of nationality as proposed by the RCMP, the proposal for an HCMB was first put on the back burner and then passed to a series of working groups. A great deal of opposition then arose, mostly from the French- speakin~ lay, party-political sector, which feared that what was seen as an


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Islamist awakening in Western Europe and the rise of Islamic leadership would gain momentum and thus have an impact on government.

The current Imam-Director of the ICC, Sameer Radhi, a Saudi, had provoked this anxiety by establishing the first Islamic school in Brussels in September 1989, just before the RCMP proposal appeared. He was entitled to do so under the Constitution, but because he did so while the proposal for an elected Council was being drafted, the Belgian establishment saw it as an act of provocation. Nevertheless, Sameer Radhi also declared on September 20, 1989 that the principle by which the ICC Di- rector functioned as the head of Islamic religious affairs had been abol- ished, and that his function could best be replaced by an HCMB elected by Muslims, thus showing his agreement with the RCME Taking the first position isolated him from the Belgian political establishment, and taking the second isolated him from the Islamic Embassies (Morocco, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia). Nevertheless, he was popular with the local Islamic community leadership, which, supported by his authority and encour- aged by the principle of separation of church and state in Belgium, organized elections for an HCMB without waiting for the government decision.

In March 1990 the Belgian government asked Sameer Radhi to stop preparing for elections; when he refused, they ended his provisional mandate as head of religious affairs and declared that the election results would be invalid. On January 13, 1991 the elections took place in most Moroccan mosques and in those of the fundamentalist Milli GOr6~: 26,000 of the 32,000 registered voters participated, but the Turkish pro-government Diyanet mosques did not participate. An HCMB was elected by a general council of 89 people, but the Belgian government refused to recognize it. By ending the mandate of the ICC and refusing to recognize the HCMB, the government created a situation where neither a provisional nor a definitive head of Islamic religious affairs existed, which was counter to the constitutional obligations following the recognition of Islam in 1974. Thus toward the beginning of 1990 the debate on Islamic representation was at an impasse.

A somewhat disillusioned Royal Commissioner for Minority Policy noted in her final report of February 1993, "A great many questions will remain unanswered, including one of the most sensitive, the status of Islamic religious teachers, as long as no definitive solution is found for the representation of Islamic religious worship" (RCME 1993, p. 173). s

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Segments and Leadership in the Islamic Communities

In February 1991 an elected HCMB was formed, but in accordance with the December 1989 decision the government refused to grant it recognition, an additional reason being that they suspected its members were for the most part fundamentalist Muslims. The government then formed a Provisional Council of Wise Men, inspired by Pierre Joxe's French model 6 (Government Decision of March 30, 1990, which took effect on July 2, 1990), using criteria of non-Islamic Belgian organizational logic (e.g., trade union membership). This Provisional Council, which was never accepted by the Islamic communities, was disbanded in November 1991.

The Provisional Council of Wise Men established a Technical Com- mittee to nominate Islamic religious teachers for the schools. This body was active from September 1990 to February 1992, when a second Techni- cal Committee with a somewhat broader social base took over. This followed negotiations with major Islamic groups of various doctrinal and spiritual sensitivities and ethnic-national articulations led by the federal Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism (CEOOR). This official successor of the RCMP began its work in June 1993 and had the mandate of resoMng the impasse.

In June 1994 the CEOOR published its first interim report. Taking up the challenge from the RCMP's final report and indicating the broad negotiations with Islamic communities that preceded its own report, it suggested that, "perhaps a similar approach should be considered to find the head of religious affairs" (CEOOR, 1994, p. 37). It further recommended opening discussions with political parties and the government:

To stop specific factions in the community folding in on themselves and to avoid slipping into more radical expressions of religious practice in confrontation with the present economic and social crisis, it appears indispensable and imperative that support be offered for the establishment of a representative community body that is recognized by the State and that actually functions. (p. 38)

The existing models of the Jewish Consistory and the Protestant Synod were cited to show that such a pluralistically composed council could function in matters of faith.

The year 1994 also marked the 20th anniversary of the recognition of Islarn as a religion in Belgium. Administrators and scientists, but also politicians, accepted that in order to resolve the impasse, the debate

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must be organized at the level of the Islamic federations and their leadership. In 1994 a new, fairly general consultation with the leadership of the national Islamic federations, larger than that of 1993, gave rise to a Constituting Body (51 people, including several who were considered fundamentalists). The issue was not that they should be recognized by the government, but that from their number 17 so-called non-fundamentalist members would be elected to an Executive of Muslims in Bel- gium (EMB), which would be recognized by the government. Further- more, the two bodies would not avoid dialogue with each other. The EMB (not the Constituting Body) would receive the authority of the second Technical Committee, complemented with authority in the hospital and prison systems. The chair of the elected EMB, a convert, would re- tire as chair of the HCMB and become the first chair of the more limited, government-recognized EMB. In October 1994 the Minister of Justice, who is responsible for religious affairs, recognized the EMB for a period of one year. He later extended this period, and then gave it more definitive recognition by Royal Decree (July 3, 1996).

In December 1995 the CEOOR published a new Annual Report about these issues, again after thorough sociological, anthropological, and Islamological research and after repeated contacts with a wide range of federations in the Belgian Islamic world. A good 10 pages were devoted to the representation of Islam in Belgium.

Whatever the accepted solution might be (a council to be established after elections or after negotiations), the CEOOR (1995) recognized that the influence of international Islamic organizations and embassies was unavoidable given the current level of integration of Mus- lim communities in the country, and that even if these external influ- ences could be averted, pragnnatism and realism were preferable to pur- suing a head-in-the-sand policy. Dialogue with "pacifist fundamentalists" was held to be feasible and even desirable.

Every Annual Report from the CEOOR, and the RCMP before it, attracted significant media attention, and the broad outlines of each Re- port received comment in the media. This indicates that the political world and public opinion were informed about developments in the debate on Islam as it unfolded in the national Islamic federations.

A year later the 1996 Annual Report requested that detailed attention be given to the issues of Islamic cemeteries, which is remarkable in the light of events that were to occur some months later (the Loubna Benalssa drama, see below). A government decision was advocated to enable local authorities to designate Islamic plots in their cemeteries

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based on a Law of July 20, 1971, Art. 16, Par. 3, which provides for excep- tions to a ban on burials for religious and philosophical reasons; reference was also made to a Circular from France of November 28, 1975 (CEOOR, 1996).

The EMB had for some time held meetings in the offices of the Min- ister of Justice every two months, with some staff members of the CEOOR, chaired by an advisor to the Minister of Justice. As a result of these meetings the EMB had drawn up a memorandum for the Minister on November 25, 1996 entitled "Funerals and Burial Grounds: The Needs of the Muslim Community in Belgium."

Although the authorities and the Islamic communities were com- municating in a gradually more relaxed manner, suspicion remained on both sides. At that time Algeria and the activities of the GIA in France were often under discussion. Also, there were rumors, not totally ground- less, that a number of European Muslim Brothers had chosen Belgium as a laboratory to develop command structures for their own kind of European Islam.

In March 1997 the Loubna Benafssa drama intervened with the normal developments and with the security-oriented attitudes of the Belgian political establishment, and the EMB, which represented leadership at the level of national Islamic federations, saw the right moment to step forward.

In April 1997 the EMB asked the Minister of Justice to draft a proposal to establish a body to be the head of religious affairs. Permission to make such a proposal had not been granted by the Royal Decree of July 3, 1996. However, on June 24, 1997 the Minister of Justice assented after consultations with the Prime Minister. And after much discussion in and outside the non-recognized elected HCMB, which still existed (EMB, 1998), in March 1998 the EMB submitted a proposal to the Minis- ter of Justice. This document proposed elections for a Constituting Gen- eral Assembly of 68 members (including co-opted persons), which would then constitute an Executive for the Head of Religious Affairs with 17 members: seven Moroccans, four Turks, three converts, and three representatives of other nationalities. Everyone 18 years or older could regis- ter to vote, and 25 would be the minimum age for candidates. Having a secondary education diploma would also be a prerequisite for membership of the Executive. The elections would take place in 104 mosques and 20 public locations throughout the country. Admission to the Execu- tive for the Head of Religious Affairs would be by approval of the Min- ister of Justice, which would indicate that the State Security Service had n o (or few) objections. The Minister would grant recognition to the Ex-


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ecutive for the Head of Religious Affairs, and not the Constituting Gen- eral Assembly. A clause to this effect was included in the proposal of the EMB at the explicit request of the Minister of Justice.

The proposed agreement was supported by the HCMB, which was chosen, but not recognized in 1991, as well as by the Constituting Body established by the negotiations of 1994, and by the EMB. Two important steps remained, the first toward the government and the second toward the local Islamic communities, as the agreement was situated at the level of the national federations. The local imams were convened or were visited in each province, and despite a temporary resistance of the imams leaning toward the Turkish Diyanet, the agreement seemed to receive wide approval in the local sphere.

Administrators and Scientists Seeking a Solution to the Impasse

It was apparent that the administrators, specifically those in the federal CEOOR and the Ministry of Justice, did not stand aloof from the debate that took place at the level of the national Islamic federations between 1993 and 1998. However, the scientific community also joined in the debate.

The first scientific publications about events in the Belgian Islamic world were written not by Islamologists, but by sociologists who had studied integration processes in depth and by anthropologists (see, among others, Dassetto & Bastenier, 1984; Leman, 1987).

The first call from this time for a wider non-Islamic public came from a Belgian convert to Islam, Van Den Broeck (1987), an ICC em- ployee who was responsible for assisting Islamic religious teachers in Dutch-language education. He also took the initiative of forming the first action group to press for higher education for Islamic religion teachers in Belgium regardless of their country of origin.

These early publications supported the few representatives of Is- lamic groups in their criticism of the current lack of any definitive regu- lation for a head of religious affairs, and their suggestions for interim alternatives such as the nomination of a head of Islamic religious teachers only. The criticism was striking of how the Belgian government had failed to establish a definitive arrangement and had seldom gone be- yond formulating half measures. The predominant theme was that the way forward was to form a council constituted as were the heads of religious affairs in the Protestant churches and in Judaism.

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Why did scientists perceive it as important to find a definitive arrangement? Because this was the only way to regulate the financing of Muslim leaders in the mosques and to establish a method of inspection of Islamic religious education, two tasks of great importance in the Bel- gian context if equality between the recognized churches was to be achieved. This was continually in evidence in the early publications.

It is also striking that apart from a few publications by Belgian converts, Islamologists, especially in Flanders, between 1974 and 1989 were not interested in the Muslims who were settling in Belgium in increasing numbers. However, the role of two Belgian converts to Islam cannot be ignored, the above-mentioned Van Den Broeck (1987) and Michot (then still working at the Universit6 catholique de Louvain). Both were heavily involved in developments in Belgian Islam, but did not under- take research into the nature of Belgian Islam.

This absence of Belgian academic Isl~mology in Flanders had much to do with the nature of Islamology in Flemish universities, which until well into the 1990s was exclusively focused on the past; even after this time its first pronouncements on current Islam were made with this bias. Moreover, in the early 1990s academic authorities and university bodies that coordinated research displayed little interest.

In mid-1994, with the celebration of 20 years of Islam in Belgium, scientific researchers suddenly joined in the discussion about the establishment and representation of Belgian-European Islam. More so than in the past, academics contributed to the discussion and called on the media or formed lobbying structures. A number of academics at the University of Ghent published "A Summons to the Academic Commu- nity" on June 13, 1994 with a view to forming an inter-university plat- form "Academics for the Equal Rights of Islam." This later led to more concerted action directed toward "a better understanding of Islam in Europe," which involved scholars such as the Dutch professor Van Koningsveld, who was specifically interested in this subject (compare Shadid & Van Koningsveld, 1996).

The idea of Belgian Muslims electing a board to be a representative partner with the government was proposed by many academics in discussions with the leadership of the national Islamic federations and with politicians from all the democratic parties. Opinions differed about how much influence the government should have in organizing the elections. Several academics said the government should remain completely aloof and not interfere. The CEOOR took the middle ground. It wished to be in a position to defend to the government any compromise reached by


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the Islamic federations, which had received the general endorsement of the scientific world, and thus arrive at a solution.

The Media

Between 1989 and 1994 the media remained relatively aloof from the debate. The matter was complex, and no one from the Islamic federations, the political parties, or the government approached the media about it. Nor did the CEOOR wish to develop a strategy other than to gather essential information about developments and about how a solution was being sought. After 1994, influenced by the above-mentioned pressure group of academics, the media gave more attention to the issue.

However, only after March 1997, the time of the Loubna BenaYssa drama, did the media begin to pay full attention to the debate and continue to do so. Thus they played an important role in promoting the election of the Islamic board on December 13, 1998. From this time on, the media reported in detail on the tensions between moderates and fundamentalists that surfaced during the elections. Generally speaking, after March 1997 the media favoured complete equal rights for Islam in a Belgium free of political and financial control by the Islamic countries of origin.

The Loubna Benafssa Drama: "A Higher and Widespread Solidarity" (March 1997) At the beginning of 1997 Belgians were following a major paedophile case. Several girls had been kidnapped by one or more paedophiles, and some had been found murdered. A Moroccan Muslim girl, Loubna Benaissa, was missing, and it appeared later that the investigation had been severely negligent. After much delay and a short, intense investigation, she was found murdered.

On March 8, 1997 the funeral service for Loubna Benafssa was held in Brussels in the ICC's Great Mosque. The ceremony was seen on television throughout the country. The following day she was buried in Tangiers, where her parents were from, and once again this was broadcast nationally by all the television channels. The emotions surrounding the murder and the fact that Loubna--who was seen as a child who belonged to Belgian society just like the other victims--could not be buried in Belgium for religious reasons but had to be "exported" to Morocco outraged the Belgian public. The issues of lack of equal rights for the resident alien (allochthon) population were discussed emotionally. "Why

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had the search for this girl been neglected for such a long time?" "Why can't she be buried in Belgium, where she was born?"

In the first political reaction, the then Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene suggested the possibility of granting the right to vote in local government elections to residents from non-EU countries (the Belgian Parliament was about to begin debating the right of EU citizens to vote in local government elections). As to discussion of Islamic representation, the option of returning to the earlier ICC arrangement where foreign authorities through their embassies would supervise Muslims re- siding in Belgium had de facto lost considerable ground with the public and the policy-makers as a result of this uproar. The embassies of Is- lamic countries also understood that the ICC option would remain dif- ficult for some time to come. A "higher and widespread solidarity" had been created as a result of the Loubna Benafssa case, borne by "the most exalted collective values and the emotions that serve them" (Balandier, 1992, p. 163): Islam would henceforth be a Belgian matter.

Thus through a dramatic event in the area of myth, symbol, and rite, the processes and consensual solutions in local minority leadership, administration, and the scientific community enabled political decision- makers to find solutions. The public, however, would not completely accept these as consistent with the historical and moral value system, even though they did not openly oppose them. Granting a recognized religion equal rights demonstrates continuity, but the social model of Islam--which some people fear--may demonstrate discontinuity.

The Political Decision

On June 12, 1998 the Council of Ministers agreed to the EMB's proposal. The government wished to take an important step toward the complete equal rights of aliens in the aftermath of the Loubna Bena'issa drama and the public promises--albeit implicit--that had been made. However, the debate on the rights of non-EU residents to vote in local government elections had led only to a partial solution. The government saw the settlement of the Islam issue as a clear signal to many non-EU residents to request a further relaxation in the procedures to obtain Belgian citizenship.

Elections for the head of Islamic religious affairs took place on De- cember 13, 1998. Of those eligible to vote 72,000 registered, as did 264 candidates; 48,000 people voted. On January 6, 1999 the specially created external ad hoc Electoral Commission validated the result. On Feb-


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ruary 25, 1999 the Minister of Justice on behalf of the government recognized the new Head of Islamic religious affairs in Belgium, which consisted in principle of 17 members, 16 of whom were eventually desig- nated. After 25 years the problems of establishing a head of religious affairs to supervise temporal matters in Islam was at last settled. 7

It may appear that the solution was in the end "political" (Panafit, 2000). But should solutions in such matters be purely "technical"? In this sense any solution is political. It is interesting, however, that at about the same time, and totally removed from the Belgian debate, an eminent learned Muslim, Mohamed Charfi (1998), proposed a solution--this time in Islamic countries--for the "management of religious affairs" that in principle was similar to the Belgian solution and favoured elections to further the debate. The supervision of religious affairs:

must itself be organized democratically: the election of imams in each mosque, the election of a mufti in each region by the imams and the choice by the same electoral body of a higher Islamic Council and a grand mufti at the national level. The practical ways and means for these elections must be worked out in detail at the appropriate time. The basic principle is that the imam of every mosque must be chosen by those who habitually pray there. (p. 196)

The Brussels-Saudi Imam-Director Sameer Radhi, as noted above, came to a conclusion in 1989 on completely independent theological and social grounds that strongly resembled the final "political" Belgian solution of 1999. At the CEOOR meeting on June 26, 2000 the Secretary- General of the Islamic World League Prof. Abdutlah bin S. al Obaid told me that, in his view, the "Belgian" solution for Islamic representation in European countries seemed to be the right approach, and very accept- able for ehe Islamic World League.

What changed between 1989 and 1999 in Belgium was not so much the fundamental issues, but the increasing involvement of important spokespersons in all relevant areas in such political decision-making and "the step-by-step realization of the objectives" (Ferrari, 2000 p. 17).

Conclusions and Final Considerations

Conclusions regarding how this Belgian context developed can be drawn on three levels. The first is the field of the minority policy where both continuity and discontinuity in the value systems and self-understanding of the communities concerned are at stake. A second consideration

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is the need for convergence on the five different fields when political changes in such serious matters must be achieved and where the crucial role of science is also under discussion. The third is a limited comparison with several neighbouring countries as follows.

In the interpretation of changes in terms of continuity and discontinuity, discontinuity is where the appreciation of the Islam is concerned and continuity is where systems of religious representation are concerned (for those countries where this type of system is under discussion, see my third and final consideration below).

"Values that are central to the self-understanding of different societies are certain to influence how they perceive the stranger in their midst" (Glenn, 1996, p. 178). Glenn's observations on educational policy to do with minority children in the 12 countries of his study and his notes in a Belgian context about educational policy were also seen byVerlot (1999) in his comparison of educational policy in the Flemish and French communities in Belgium to be eminently applicable to how Belgium sought a solution for the organization of Islam. Certain differences in approach in neighboring European countries can also be seen here. In the French Le Monde diplomatique Panafit (2000) could call his article "In Belgium, the Ambiguities of Ethnic Representation" (2000) because, as he wrote, "It is in terms of national bodies ('Moroccan,' 'Turkish,' 'other nationalities,' 'converted') that the candidates and the fifty-one mandates were aUotted, while the final body of 17 members consists of seven Moroc- cans, four Turks, three Belgians, and three 'other nationalities.'" This same reality was not felt so much in Belgium where ethnic representation was perceived as a technical means in the first election to guarantee the diversity of Islamic communities; and this is organized in Belgian poli- tics with respect to the pragmatic arrangement of situations in society. In Belgium no implications were intended for the self-understanding of the State as they were in France. In fact, this technique will be applied only once for the Islamic elections; it will be discarded in future elections.

However, in principle the problem for the Belgian political authorities is not with the ambiguities of ethnic representation. If the Belgian political world hesitated for so long to take steps toward a definite representation, then the mutual dissension between the Islamic communities did indeed play a part, as did the influence of foreign embassies and the fear of Islamic integrism. But the primary fear was how the electorate would react, particularly as this question might be interpreted as an attack on the historical and moral value system. Didn't Islam stand for a


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non-Western form of society and a non-Western interpretation of the democratic-laic-pluralism ?

This was the question that engaged the political world and that politicians believed their supporters were asking. Of course, the situation is complex, and others (e.g., progressive intellectuals) argued in favour of considering Islam as one of the three constitutive monotheistic systems in the heritage of European thought, together with Judaism and Christianity (Str/ith, 2000). However, historically, part of the European population considers Islam as "ethnic Otherness" (Armstrong, 1982; Leman, 1998; Morin, 1987). This explains why political authorities fear emotional resistance from those among their supporters who expect them to guarantee the continuity of the "historical and moral value system" of their community. As noted in my second final consideration, a similar preoccupation may also live in the mind of minority leadership.

However, political authorities and democratic public opinion face an equal challenge to stay in continuity with their own value system on a different level: the granting of equal rights to recognized religions, with all its consequences. Once Islam becomes the second largest religion in a country, it would be undemocratic not to recognize it as such and not to treat it as equal. This reflects the tension that was present in the 1980s and 1990s in most Western European countries.

The second conclusion shows that in such a sensitive debate--when a community seems to be facing a basic historical ethnic Otherness-- constructive decision-making can only happen when convergent steps are taken in five distinct but relevant areas: administration, scholarship, minority leadership, the media, and the major socially symbolic events. In addition, there must be sufficient political will to break the impasse. Scholarship must bring sufficient consensus to support the political solution and therefore plays a crucial role in changing existing opinions of Islam. Administration should not oppose this change of perception. The media must present the issues in a favourable light; and, as can be seen from events in Belgium, certain symbolic events and gestures can greatly accelerate the process of political decision-making--certainly about issues where discontinuity with the "historical and moral value system" or integration of a fundamentally felt �9 are concerned.

Minority policy decisions conserve the need for elementary political will and are the result of sufficient convergence between scholarship and the administration and between minority leadership lobbying and media support. Thus socially symbolic events, planned or unplanned, affect the general public as disclosures that point in the same direction:

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they can facilitate the process of political decision-making. This is important when a decision must be made that appears to be in discontinuity with the current dominant historical and moral value system or with the traditional self-understanding of a large segment of the population.

Just as political leadership at the state level, depending on circum- stances, must have some discontinuity accepted, so must minority leadership foster acceptance of some discontinuity in the value system of its own communities. Ramadan (1999) points out with respect to the policy area considered in this article that Islamic leadership is rightly charged with the task of making the first attempt to work out the minority position of Muslims in Europe, without clinging to traditional Islamic opposition between the world of war (Dar al Harb) and the world of submis- sion (Dar al Islam).

This leads to a third consideration. How should the Belgian case be assessed in a European context? I make no attempt to be exhaustive. I restrict discussion to Germany, Italy, Spain, and Belgium on one hand: countries that are looking for a collective representative organ to represent all Muslims in the relation between religion and the state; and France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (specifically England) on the other hand. Moreover, I discuss only the establishment of the centralist organizational frameworks as negotiating partners.

In Germany the relationship between religion and the state is not only an affair of the federal state: it also concerns the various Lfinder (Sunier & Meyer, 1997). Attempts to reach a collective representation of Muslims have been made for years, but remained unsuccessful (Guntau, 2000). This was the case not only at the federal level, but also for the Lfinder, where Islam as a "religious community" never qualified as a "religious society" (Sunier & Meyer, 1977, p. 108), nor even the chance to be recognized as a corporate body (K6rperschafi des Offentlichten Rechts), which is allowed to collect taxes for the benefit of its activities.

In Italy the concordat between the Catholic Church and the state gives the Church considerable status, and agreements have been made with the Jews, the Evangelicals, the Waldensians, and the Methodists. Four Islamic federations have applied to the government to represent the various Islamic communities (about 400,000 Muslims in 1999, Pacini, 2000): the moderate Italia-COREIS, the Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy, the militant and fundamentalist UcoiL and the Associazione dei musulmani italiani (representing only Muslims with Italian citizenship). The Moroc- can embassy intervened directly to bar any official agreement between the state and the representative Italian organizations (Ramadan, 2000).


MINORITY LEADERSflIR SCIENCE, SYMBOLS, AND THE MEDIA

In 1992 Spain opted for recognition without a gradual advancement, and this decision resulted in an impasse (Motilla, 2000). Although the council (which was established following a single decision and without a growth process) is completely independent, it is immobilized because the presence of both parties with different and hostile intent toward one another prevents the development of proposals based on consensus.

Although in Belgium the stakes with regard to financial consequences (resulting from a consequent application of the formal recognition of Islam) may indeed be the highest, this did not necessarily offer a greater incentive for Islamic communities to welcome a joint representative council that would overcome mutual differences. After all, the existing individual leaderships received sufficient support from their countries of origin. What might have facilitated the (temporary?) truce with regard to mutual differences might be traced back to a remark of Ferrari (2000) who compared the situations in Italy, France, Germany, Spain, and Belgium with each other.

We are dealing with a track full of obstacles, but the Belgian experience could offer a useful indication: the path toward the construction of an Islamic representation got started there by entrusting the Executive of Muslims in Belgium with the task of indicating teachers and spiritual counsellors in the pr isons and hospitals, and later it deve loped into a representa t ive organ that soon could possibly be commissioned to indicate which imams should enjoy a state salary. A program which is very tangible...and that placed Belgium before any other European Union country on its path toward the const ruct ion of an efficient Islamic representation. (p. 17)

Ferrari concludes from his comparison that for those countries where the need for a central representative organ for Islam is under discussion (or highly desirable), a step-by-step establishment of this representative organ and a step-by-step consignment of powers could be the best way to achieve it.

Ferrari (2000) does not include the Netherlands and the UK in his comparison. Also, in France the discussion concerning a similar council is different from that in the other countries included in Ferrari's comparison. Whereas in Belgium the formal recognition of a religion, in this case Islam, constitutes the core of the discussion, Article 2 of the French constitution stipulates that the Republic may not recognize or fund any religion, although Sunier and Meyer (1997) rightly argue that "the church-

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state separation is less strictly observed than the constitution would lead one to believe" (p. 111).

In France (with between 4 to 5 million Muslims, among whom 27% are practicing believers, Ifop-Le Monde Survey, 1994) where the prime concerns are mosques and the training of imams (Ternissier & Tincq, 2000), it appears to Muslims that:

There is now a complete split between "the conciliators," often the older generation, who are committed to the great federations or the embassies, and the "young Muslims," who are more rebellious (and of whom I, Tariq Ramadan, would be the dminence grise) and who do not trust the "hidden agenda" of Minister Chev6nement. (Ramadan, 2000, April)

However, the debate in France predates Chev6nement, more specifically when Pierre Joxe established the Conseil de Rdflexion sur l'Islam en France (CORIF) between 1990 and 1994 (Fregosi, 2000). In Pasqua's time (1995) the Conseil R@rdsentatif des Musulmans de France (CRMF) replaced the CORIF. However, with reference to the situation in France "the dialogue between public officials and representatives of associations, when it comes to questions about Islam, very often looks like a dialogue of the deaf" (Cesari, 1998, p. 29). The coming generations "who are better edu- cated and are less sensitive to ethnic loyalties will only intensify the protest" (p. 32).

In the Netherlands the authorities would like a central liaison body for Muslims as an interlocutor, but it is not a necessity and has never been established. The interpretation of the separation of church and state in the Netherlands is similar to that in France. However, since 1983 in the Netherlands the principle of equal treatment has been well guarded. This applies to all ideologies, and even with the development of school networks private initiatives based on ideologies receive the same funding as governmental initiatives. This has led to the development of a stronger Islamic educational network than in other European countries. The government cultivates a tradition where the countries of origin are hardly involved in the minority debate, and what is granted under minori ty policy is automatically transferred to the Islamic communities (Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, & Meyer, 1996), which then receive generous support for the development of their places of worship.

This is similar to an emphasis that is also found in England, although the effects are at the local level rather than the national (e.g., Bradford, Birmingham). Nevertheless, here too we find another important difference with all the above-mentioned countries. "There is no formal recognition


MINORITY LEADERSH1R SCIENCE, SYMBOLS, AND THE MEDIA

of religions as in Germany and Belgium, nor is the state founded on secular principles as in France and the Netherlands" (Sunier & Meyer, 1997, p. 114). In England (and Scotland) there is an established church, which does not imply that other religions are excluded, but that certain groups may be able to organize spiritual care. However, organization of Islamic schools or the presence of the Islamic religion in the state schools is strongly curbed or even forbidden based on the principle of the established Church of England. Therefore, solutions often must be sought at the local level based on a local minori ty policy currently in place (Rathet al., 1996).

Does this mean that in Europe the organization of Islamic communities will continue going in different directions? Not necessarily. In some countries the government attaches more or less importance to the development of a single representative executive body for the Muslim communities as negotiating partner; in others the Islamic communities themselves collectively try to affirm their presence more clearly with the government. The result is not always a single executive body. However, it is clearly a trend in all these European countries that an internal Islamic pluralism either finds its way into one body (as in Belgium and Spain), or that an initially large diversity converts into a couple of organizations (as in France and the Netherlands). Moreover, Ramadan (2000, June) is probably right w h e n he de te rmines that the discussion in Europe nevertheless has gained m o m e n t u m and is clearly moving in a single direction.

The official line is clear: in Great Britain, in France, in Ger- many, and in Belgium, it is accepted that Islam from now on is a constitutive element of Europe, that one hopes that Eu- ropean Islamic citizens will come into their own and take charge of their own destiny by means of representative organizations and by becoming politically and financially au- tonomous. (Ramadan, April 2000)

Or as he stated it in an article about France, The representative structure of French Muslims must be that of its citizens: they must be chosen independently, pluralistically, and democratically; and it is incumbent on all the players in the state and in the Islamic community to make the means available--in time, in skills, and in discussions. (Ramadan, April 2000)

What Ramadan describes for these countries is also relevant for the Netherlands.

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In the professional and critical guidance of these developments, the scientific world will have to play a fair role and listen to each other across the country borders, as the Islamic minority leaderships themselves will also increasingly inspire each other.

A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t

Thanks to Dr. Hans Vermeulen (1MES) for his comments and suggestions.

No te s

1 From 1994 - 20001 attended the meetings with the members of the EMB at the cabinet of the Minister of Justice. I had discussions with members of the embassies of Turkey, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. In 1989-90 1 had conversations with Sameer Radhi, then Imam-director at the ICC, and with the Royal Commissioner. In 1993 - 1998 I met more or less on a daily basis with the person responsible for mediating between the various leaders of the Islamic communities and I regularly met with people of the various democratic parties that followed-up the Islam files. On decisive moments I had discussions with both the Minister of Justice and the Prime Minister regarding the current developments. In 1998 1 attended a meeting organized by the EMB, with imams of entire Belgium and together with the members of the EMB we went to locally defend the agreement in a number of places. I exchanged views on the issues with people from several embassies of European countries, seated in Brussels. This is a position which, from a social-anthropological point of view, can be regarded as ideal for participant observation, on condition that the distinction between participation and observation is well guarded. I hope to be able to work up the necessary distance.

2 In Belgium, the presence of minority communities differs greatly in the three Belgian regions. In 1996, Muslims made up 13.5% of the Brussels Region, 2.2% of the Flemish Region, and 2.1% of the Walloon Region (Dassetto, 1997: 17-20).

3 The dossiers of the current EMB show that the leadership of Belgian Muslims sees the most important issues that have to be settled are the training and appointment of teachers of the Islamic religion (at present 750 have been appointed), the recognition of mosques and their imams (in 1980 there were about 100 mosques and already 204 in 1995), and a ruling about Islamic burial plots in community cemeteries.

4 Sameer Radhi, the ICC-director, returned to Saudi Arabia. s For an analysis of the process of recognition of the Islamic religion in Belgium, see Blaise and

de Coorebyter (1993, 1997), Brion and Ma%o (1999), Dassetto (1993), Leman and Renaerts (1996), Renaerts (1996), Panafit (1997) and Lo Giacco (2000).

6 Pierre Joxe's "Conseil de R6flexion sur l'Islam en France" (CoriJ) (1990-1994). 7 As one of his major criticisms about what has happened in Belgium, Panafit writes in Le

Monde Diplomatique of June 2000, that the elections have led to nothing: "Thus, a year and a hail after the vote no mosque and no imam have received a public subsidy." However, two weeks previously an agreement was reached in the Cabinet of the Minister of Justice that by 2002 a hundred mosques would be recognized and their imams would be paid, as are the ministers of the other recognized religions in Belgium. The elected Executive of the Mus- lims was invited to have these applications prepared in a timely fashion, an activity that has to be completed while the Executive itself had to deal with much internal dissension and at the same time prepare examinations for the appointment of new teachers of Islamic religion for the non-confessional schools.

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