mind misreadin - philpapers
TRANSCRIPT
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MindMisreadingShannonSpaulding
InvitedcontributiontoPhilosophicalIssues,annualsupplementtoNous
Abstract:Mostpeoplethinkofthemselvesasprettygoodatunderstandingothers’beliefs,desires,emotions,andintentions.Accuratemindreadingisanimpressivecognitivefeat,andforthisreasonthephilosophicalliteratureonmindreadinghasfocusedexclusivelyonexplainingsuchsuccesses.However,asitturnsout,weregularlymakemindreadingmistakes.Understandingwhenandhowmindmisreadingoccursiscrucialforacompleteaccountofmindreading.Inthispaper,Iexaminetheconditionsunderwhichmindmisreadingoccurs.Iarguethatthesepatternsofmindmisreadingshedlightonthelimitsofmindreading,revealnewperspectivesonhowmindreadingworks,andhaveimplicationsforsocialepistemology.1.Introduction
Incommonparlance,mindreadingisthetelepathicabilitytoseeintoanother
person’smindanddiscernwhattheyarethinking.Telepathicmindreadingisexotic
andintriguing–atleastjudgingbythenumberofmovies,TVshows,andnovels
aboutit–andnotreal.Inphilosophyandthecognitivesciences,thereisanother
senseofmindreadingthatislessexoticbutjustasinteresting.Thiskindof
mindreadingistheabilitytoattributementalstatestoagentsinordertointerpret
theirbehaviorandanticipatewhattheywilldonext.Itisacentral,ubiquitous
featureofoursociallives.Whenwearedrivingonabusyfreeway,takingcareofour
children,teaching,fieldingquestionsatatalk,weattributebeliefs,desires,emotions,
andothermentalstatestopeopleinordertomakesenseoftheirbehaviorand
interactsuccessfullywiththem.
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Thesocialworldisincrediblycomplex.Ouruniqueexperiences,physiological,
behavioral,andpsychologicalfactorsinfluenceourmentalstates.Moreover,our
mentalstatesaredynamicallyrelatedtoothers’mentalstates.Whatwethink,feel,
andintenddependsonwhatothersarethinking,feeling,orintending.Figuringout
whyanotherpersonbehavedasshedidandanticipatingwhatshewilldonext
involvesgrasping,atsomelevel,howallofthesefactorsinfluencehermentalstates.
Thedynamicsofreal-worldsocialinteractionsaresocomplexthatitis
amazingthatweaccuratelymindreadatall.Mindreadingseemstocomeveryeasily
tomostofus.Weoftenhavelittledifficultyunderstandingothers’mentalstates.We
generallycantellwhatotherdriversaretryingtodoandwhy,whatourchildwants
andwhy,whenourstudentsareboredorinterested,andwhethertheaudience
memberunderstandsouranswers.Givenhowimpressivethisfeatis,itisnaturalto
framethestudyofmindreadingaroundthecognitiveprocessesthatmake
successfulmindreadingpossible.Indeed,thishasbeenfocusofthemindreading
literaturesinceitsinceptioninthelate1970s.
Myfocushere,however,willbeonmindreadingfailures,i.e.,mind
misreading.Mostpeoplethinkofthemselvesasprettygoodatunderstandingothers’
beliefs,desires,emotions,andintentions.However,socialpsychologistshave
discoveredthatwearesignificantlyworseatmindreadingthanwethinkweare
(Ames&Kammrath,2004;Epley,2008;Hall,Andrzejewski,&Yopchick,2009;Realo
etal.,2003).Weconsistentlyandsubstantiallyoverrateourabilitytoaccurately
judgeothers’mentalstatesandinterpretsocialinteractions.Thismaybeduetoa
lackofinterestincorrectingourmindreadingmistakes,alackoffeedbackonerrors,
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oranextremeinstanceoftheDunning-Krugereffect.1Whateverthecause,the
consensusfromtheempiricalliteratureisthatmindmisreadingisverycommon.
Thephilosophicalliteratureonmindreadingdoesnotstudymindmisreading
inanysystematicway.2Thisisunfortunatebecausethereisahightheoreticalpayoff
forexaminingourmindreadingerrors.Specifically,patternsofmindmisreading
shedlightonourvariousmindreadingstrategiesandtheconditionsunderwhichwe
use(andmisuse)thesestrategies.Inthisway,theinvestigationofmindmisreading
revealsthelimitsofourmindreadingabilities,whicharenotapparentwhenone
focusessolelyonsuccessfulmindreading.Inaddition,theexaminationofmind
misreadingsuggestsnovelhypothesesabouthowweunderstandothersthatarenot
evidentsimplyfromstudyingmindreadingsuccesses.
Inthispaper,Iexplorethisdivergencebetweenoursubjectivesenseofour
mindreadingabilitiesandtheobjectiveevaluationofourmindreadingabilities.In
thenextSection,Ibrieflyreviewthetwomainaccountsofmindreading.InSection3,
Idiscusstheempiricalliteratureonthevarietiesofmindmisreading.Iconsiderthe
distinctiveerrorsthatariseforaccuracy-orientedmindreadingandefficiency-
orientedmindreading.InSection4,Idiscusstheimplicationsofmindmisreading.I
arguethatthesepatternsofmindmisreadingindicatespecificlimitsonour
1TheDunning-Krugereffectisacognitivebiaswhereinpoorperformersinsocialandintellectualdomainsareunawareoftheirignorance(Kruger&Dunning,1999).Theirdeficiencyisinvisibletothemperhapsbecauserecognizingtheirdeficiencyrequirestheverycompetencytheylack.2Thisliteratureextensivelydiscussesmindreadingfailuresinchimpanzeesandchildreninthecontextofestablishingaphylogeneticandontogenetictimelineformaturemindreading.Italsoexaminesthemindreadingfailuresofindividualswithautism.However,thereisnosystematicdiscussionofneurotypicaladults’mindreadingerrors,whichiswhatIfocusonhere.
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mindreadingabilities.Furthermore,Iarguethatthesepatternsofmindmisreading
suggestthatself-reflectionplaysanimportantfactorinmindreadingaccuracy.In
Section5,Idiscusstheimplicationsforsocialepistemology.
2.TheoriesofMindreading
Twocompetingaccountshavedominatedthemindreadingliterature:theTheory
Theory(TT)andtheSimulationTheory(ST).TheTTholdsthatweexplainand
predictbehaviorbyemployingatacitfolkpsychologicaltheoryabouthowmental
statesinformbehavior.Withourfolkpsychologicaltheory,weinferfromatarget’s
behaviorwhathisorhermentalstatesprobablyare.Fromtheseinferences,plusthe
psychologicalprinciplesinthetheoryconnectingmentalstatestobehavior,we
predictthetarget’sbehavior.
Onthisview,interpretingaperson’sbehaviorandanticipatingwhattheywill
donextfundamentallyisthesameasexplainingandpredictingthepositionofthe
electronsinacloudchamber.Inbothcases,werelyonarichbodyofdomain-
specificinformationaboutthetarget,whichweusetoinfercausalstates,andonthe
basisofthiswemakepredictionsaboutthebehaviorofthetarget.Ourtheoryof
mindistacitandlessformalizedthanourscientifictheories,but,itisargued,the
abilitytounderstandothersisbestunderstoodastheapplicationofatheory.
TheST,incontrast,holdsthatweexplainandpredictatarget’sbehaviorby
usingourownmindsasasimulationoftheotherperson’smind.Toexplaina
target’sbehavior,weputourselvesinanother’sshoes,sotospeak,andimagine
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whatourmentalstateswouldbeandhowwewouldbehaveifwewerethatagentin
thatparticularsituation.Topredictatarget’sbehavior,wetaketheattributed
mentalstatesasinputandsimulatethetarget’sdecisionaboutwhattodonext.
Simulationtheoristsrejecttheideathatmindreadingconsistsintheorizing.
AccordingtoST,wedonotrequirealargebodyoffolkpsychologicalinformation
abouthowmentalstatesinformbehaviorinordertomindread.Onthisview,allwe
needistheabilitytoimagineoneselfinadifferentsituation,figureoutwhatone
wouldthink,feel,anddointhatsituation,andattributethoseimaginedmental
statestoanotherperson.Thissimplyrequiresustouseourordinarycognitive
mechanismsinanofflinewayforthepurposeofmindreading.Thus,theSTis
regardedasaninformation-poortheory,whereastheTTisregardedasan
information-richtheory.
InadditiontowhatwemightcallpureTTandpureSTarehybridaccounts
thatincorporateelementsofTTandST.Thesehybridaccountsaimtocapturethe
theoreticaladvantagesofSTandTTwhileavoidingtheproblemswithboththeories.
ShaunNicholsandStephenStich(2003)havedevelopedaTT-centrichybrid
account,andAlvinGoldman(2006)hasdevelopedaST-centrichybridaccount.
Thesetwoinnovativeaccountshaveservedaspillarsforthemindreadingliterature.
3.MindMisreading
Studyingbothsuccessfulandunsuccessfulprocessesisacommonmethodologyin
philosophyandthecognitivesciences.Consider,forexample,thestudyofvision,
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memory,andself-knowledge.Ineachofthesecases,researchersstudyhowthe
capacityworksandhowitbreaksdown.Tolearnhowvisionworks,westudy
veridicalperceptionbutalsomisperception,visualhallucinations,andvisual
illusions.Memoryresearchersstudyhowandwhenwehaveaccuratememories,but
thisispairedwithinvestigationoffalsememories,misremembering,andamnesia.
Similarly,researchonself-knowledgecoverssuccessfulintrospection,confabulation,
andself-deception.Thesethreecasesarerepresentativeofthestudyofcognitionin
general.Theunderlyingrationaleisthattounderstandaprocess,youmust
understandwhenandhowitfails.
ThedebatebetweentheTT,theST,andvarioushybridaccountsprimarily
focusesonexplainingsuccessfulmindreading.Thoughitisimportanttostudy
successfulmindreading,forseveralreasonsthisdiscussionshouldbepairedwithan
examinationofmindmisreading.First,asnotedintheintroduction,wearenot
nearlyasgoodatmindreadingaswethinkweare.Focusingpurelyonsuccessful
mindreadingpresentsamisleadingpictureofouractualabilities.Second,patterns
ofmindmisreadingrevealthelimitsofourmindreadingabilitiesthatarenot
apparentwhenfocusingsolelyonsuccessfulmindreading.Third,anexaminationof
mindmisreadingsuggestsanovelperspectiveonwhatittakestomindread
successfully.
InthisSection,Ishallexamineseveralprevalentbutunderexplorederrors
thatarisefortwotypesofmindreading.Inthephilosophicalliteratureon
mindreading,manytheoriestacitlyassumethattheprimaryaimofmindreadingis
accuracy.Thatis,whenweattributementalstatestoothersinordertointerpret
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andanticipatetheirbehavior,themostimportantgoalistoattributethecorrect
mentalstates.Althoughthiscertainlyistrueinsomecases,accuracyisnotalways
theprimaryconcerninmindreading.Sometimeswearenotmotivatedtoorsimply
cannotengageinathoroughdeliberationaboutatarget’smentalstates,andinthese
casesefficiencytrumpsaccuracy.Whenefficiencyistheprimarygoalin
mindreading,weusevariousmindreadingheuristics,whicharecognitivelyless
demandingandreliablewhenusedappropriately.
Indiscussingthevarietiesofmindmisreading,Ishalldistinguishbetween
theerrorsthatariseforaccuracy-orientedmindreadingandtheerrorsthatarisefor
efficiency-orientedmindreading.Thisisnotahardandfastdistinction.Some
processeswillnotfitcleanlyintotheaccuracy-seekingorefficiency-seeking
categories.Someefficientstrategiesmayplayaroleindeliberativemindreading,
anddeliberativeprocessesmayinfluenceefficientstrategies.Despitethese
complications,thedistinctionbetweenefficiency-orientedandaccuracy-oriented
mindreadingishelpfulinthiscontext,andIwilluseittoillustratethetypesofmind
misreading.3
3.1MindMisreading:AimingforAccuracy
3Idistinguishbetweendeliberativeandefficientmindreadingprocesses,butIremainneutralonthekindofcognitivesystemthatunderliestheseprocesses.Itcouldbethattherearetwoseparatesystems–system1andsystem2–thatrealizeeachtypeofprocess.Alternatively,theremaybeonesystemthatrealizesallmindreadingprocessesbutismodulatedbyexecutivefunctionorsomeotherfactor.Theremaybeotheroptions,aswell.Myargumentsareneutralwithrespecttothesedifferenthypotheses.
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Insomesocialinteractions,ourprimaryaimisaccuratemindreading.Thisusually
occurswhensomethingimportantdependsongettingitright,whenitmatterstous
personally,whenwewillbeheldresponsibleforourinterpretationofthe
interaction,orwhenthesituationisunusualorunexpected(Fiske&Neuberg,1990;
Kelley,1973;Tetlock,1992).Whenourprimaryaimisaccuracy,wetendtosearch
forrelevantinformationinacontrolledanddeliberativefashion.Consider,for
example,whatitisliketogoonafirstdate.Youaretryingtofigureoutwhetherthe
personisinterestedinyouromantically,sharesyourbeliefsandvalues,hasagood
personality,willnotcheat,wantstobeinalong-termrelationship,etc.Thestakes
arerelativelyhighforyou;youdonotwanttoinvesttime,energy,andemotionin
someonewhowillturnouttobeapoormatchforyou.Thus,youwillwantto
consideralltherelevantevidenceandmakesureyourjudgmentsarenotbasedon
merelysuperficialcues.
Whenweaimforaccuratemindreading,errorscanoccurunderthree
conditions:whenweareundercognitiveloadandthuscannotengageinathorough
searchforinformation;whenweapplyaninappropriatemodeltothesituation;
whenourinformationsearchisskewedbyothermotivations.
Table1:Typesofmindreadingerrorsforaccuracy-orientedmindreading.
Accuracy-oriented
Mindreading
TypesofMindMisreading
Deliberation Cognitiveloadinterfereswith
informationsearch
Applythewrongmodel
Self-interestbiasesinformationsearch
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Thefirstsortoferrorthatarisesfordeliberativemindreadingoccurswhen
onelacksthecognitiveresourcestoengageinathorough,objectiveinformation
search.Deliberativemindreadingiseffortfulandcognitivelytaxing,anditisdifficult
ifoneisundercognitiveloadornotwellpracticedinthiskindofreflective
reasoning(Gilbert,Krull,&Pelham,1988).Insuchcases,theresultisthatoursocial
inferencesarebiasedtowardthemostreadilyaccessibleinformation,whichmay
leadtoerror.
Consideragainthefirstdateexample.Supposethattheeveningyougoonthe
date,youaretired,stressedaboutwork,anddistractedduringthedate.Athorough,
objectivedeliberationaboutyourdateisdoublydifficultforyou:Notonlymustyou
trytomakeagoodimpressiononyourdatebybeingpersonableandwitty,youalso
mustlistentoandinterpretwhatyourdateistellingyou,figureoutwhatfood
choice,clothes,questionsandanswerstellyouaboutyourdate’smindset,andyou
mustdoallthiswhilephysiologicallyandcognitivelytaxed.Acareful,deliberative
informationsearchrequiresgoingbeyondjustthesalientcues.However,youare
toocognitivelytaxedtodothiswithmuchcare,andasaresultyourdeliberationis
guidedbysuperficialbutpotentiallymisleadingcues.
So,whatarethesalientcuesinsocialinteractions?Forallofus,themost
salientfeaturesofapersontendtobetheirage,race,andgender(Ito,Thompson,&
Cacioppo,2004;Liu,Harris,&Kanwisher,2002).Werapidlysortpeoplebyage,race,
andgenderandothersocialcategories,dependingonthecontent.Onthebasisof
thiscategorization,wespontaneouslyattributepersonalitytraitssuchas
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trustworthiness,competence,aggressiveness,anddominance(Olivola&Todorov,
2010;Rule,Ambady,&AdamsJr,2009).Althoughthespeedofspontaneoustrait
inferencesisamatterofdispute,itoccursveryrapidly:between100milliseconds
and1400to1600milliseconds,evenwhenweareundercognitiveload(Malle&
Holbrook,2012;Todorov&Uleman,2003).
Inaddition,wespontaneouslyandimplicitlyassociatethesesocialcategories
withspecificcharacteristics.Forexample,weassociateoldandincompetent,female
andwarm,baby-faceandunthreatening.Theseassociationsarethesortofthing
testedbytheImplicitAssociationTask,whichmeasurethestrengthofaperson’s
implicitassociations(Greenwald,McGhee,&Schwartz,1998;Greenwald,Poehlman,
Uhlmann,&Banaji,2009).
Puttingallofthistogether,inordinarysocialinteractionsthemostaccessible
informationaboutanotherpersontendstobeanindividual’ssocialcategory,
spontaneouslyinferredpersonalitytraits,andimplicitassociations.Itispossiblein
deliberationtooverridetheimplicitassociationsandspontaneouslyinferredtraits
ifoneismotivatedandhasthecognitiveresourcestodoso.However,ifoneisbusy,
stressed,andtired,overridingtheseinferencesandassociationsisextremely
difficult,andtheymaybiasone’sdeliberation.Thus,itisdifficultforyouonyour
hypotheticalfirstdatetodeliberateobjectivelyaboutwhetheryourdateis
committedtobeinginaseriousrelationship,sharesyourvalues,isloyal,etc.Your
deliberationisinfluencedbyimplicitassociationsandtraitinferences,whichunder
idealcircumstancesyouwouldreflectonandpossiblyreject.However,becauseyou
areundercognitiveloadyoulacktheabilitytooverridethesesalientfeaturesin
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favoroflesssalientbutpotentiallymoreaccuratefeatures.Thus,errorsarisefor
deliberativemindreadingwhenwearecognitivelytaxedandcannotdeliberate
carefully.
Thesecondkindoferrorthatmayoccurwhenweareaimingforaccurate
mindreadingconcernstheframeworkweemploytomakesenseofasocial
interaction.Eveningooddeliberativemindreading,wedonotconsiderallofthe
availableinformation.Thatwouldbeimpossiblebecausethereisfartoomuch
informationforhumanbeingstoprocess.Instead,wesearchforthemostrelevant
informationandbasemindreadingjudgmentsonthatinformation.4Thesituational
contextandone’spastexperiencesdeterminewhatistakentoberelevant
information.Theyshapeexpectationsinsocialinteractions,andtheymakecertain
interpretationsmoreaccessibletous,i.e.,ourattentionisprimedforthese
interpretations(Wittenbrink,Judd,&Park,2001).
Considerthefollowingsimpleexample.Havingspentmuchofmylifeon
universitycampuses,IgenerallyknowwhattoexpectwhenIvisitauniversity
campus,evenonethatisunfamiliartome.Iunderstandthegeneralinstitutional
structure,socialroles,andtypicalbehaviorofadministrators,faculty,andstudents.I
haveamodelthatguidesmyinterpretationandexpectationsofwhathappenson
campuses.Someonewhohasneverattendedauniversityandhasnoexperience
withlifeonauniversitycampusmaynothavethesameinterpretationsand
expectationsasIdo.Theywilluseadifferent,lessappropriateframeworkto4Someerrorsoccurbecausetheinformationweattendtoincludesstatisticaloutliersorourinformationsampleissmalland/orbiased.Thesestatisticalerrorsarecommontoeverytypeofreasoning,soIwillnotdevotespecialattentiontothemindiscussingmindmisreading.
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understandandanticipatebehaviortheyencounteronauniversitycampusandthus
arelikelytomisunderstandsomeoftheidiosyncraticbehaviorsonuniversity
campuses.
Thetheory-ladennessofsocialobservationiskeytothesecondtypeoferror
indeliberativemindreading.Wearelikelytoattendtoirrelevantormisleading
informationwhentheframeworkthatguidesourinformationsearchisfaultyin
somerespect.If,forexample,theframeworkdoesnotapplytothesituation,orifthe
frameworkitselfinaccurate,thenwearelikelytomisinterpretothers’behavior.
Consideragainmymodelforuniversitycampuses.Itisusefulandappropriatefor
mostAmericanandEuropeanuniversities,butdespitesomesuperficialsimilarities
itisnotappropriateforcontemporarytechnologycampuseslikeGoogleplexor
MicrosoftCampus.IfIapplymyuniversitymodeltoGoogleplex,Iamlikelyto
misunderstandtheinstitutionalandsocialdynamics,andIamlikelyto
misunderstandthebehaviorandmotivationsofpeopleinthisenvironment.
Ingeneral,applyinganinappropriateorfaultymodeltoasituationcanlead
ustomisinterpretsocialinteractions,whichpavesthewayformindmisreading.
Thisisespeciallylikelytohappenwhenweareundercognitiveloadbecausewe
mayfailtonoticethatourmodeldoesnotfitthesituation.Thiskindoferroralsois
likelytooccurwhenweareoverlyconfidentinoursocialinterpretation,whichis
commonwhenasituationseemsveryfamiliartous.Insuchcases,becauseweare
confidentweunderstandthesocialdynamics,wedonotreflectonour
interpretationorconsiderthepossibilitythatweareemployinganinappropriateor
faultymodelofthesocialinteraction.
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Athirdsortoferrorinaccuracy-orientedmindreadingariseswhenthe
mindreadingprocessisskewedbyself-interest.Inmanysocialinteractions,our
socialinterpretationsareshapedbytheneedforanxietyreduction,self-esteem
preservation,andconfirmationofone’sworldview.Inthesecases,ourmindreading
inferences,inonewayoranother,serveself-interestedpurposes(Dunning,1999;
Kunda,1990).Thesemotivationsleadtoseveralspecificmindreadingerrors.
ConsiderfirsttheSelf-ServingAttributionalBias,whichdescribesour
tendencytotakecreditforsuccessanddenyresponsibilityforfailure.(Miller&Ross,
1975).Weoftenattributeoursuccessestosomeinternalfactor,e.g.,diligenceor
talent,andattributeourfailurestoexternalmitigatingfactors,e.g.,badluckorbias.
Inthisway,wecometofeelgoodaboutoursuccessesandbrushoffourfailures.
Thispatternisfoundforjudgingin-groupandout-groupbehaviors,aswell.
ThisiscalledtheGroup-ServingAttributionalBias(Brewer&Brown,1998;
Pettigrew,1979).Onetendstojudgethesuccessofanout-grouptobetheresultof
external,mitigatingsituationalfactorsandthefailureofanout-groupastheresult
ofinternalfactors,whereasonejudgesthesuccessofone’sin-grouptobetheresult
ofinternalfactorsandthefailureofone’sin-grouptobetheresultofsituational
factors.Oneseesthispatternofreasoningveryclearlyinsportsfans.Whenthe
Badgerswinitisbecausetheyaretalentedandhardworking,butwhentheBadgers
loseitisbecausetheywereofftheirgamethatday,theotherteamgotluckyafew
times,andtherefereeswerebiasedagainsttheBadgers.
TheSelf-andGroup-ServingAttributionalBiasestendtooccurinacontextof
threatorcompetition.Insuchcontexts,weemploydifferenttypesofexplanations
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dependingonwhosebehaviorweareexplaining.Whetherwecitesituationalfactors
ormentalstatesdependsonourperceivedsimilaritytothetarget,notwhether
situationalfactorsormentalstatesactuallycausedthebehavior.Thus,thesebiases
distortourjudgmentsaboutourownandothers’behavior.
NaïveRealismisanothersortofmindmisreadinggeneratedbyself-interest.
Itdescribesthetendencytoregardothersasmoresusceptibletobiasand
misperceptionthanoneself(Pronin,Lin,&Ross,2002).Wethinkthatwesimplysee
thingsastheyarebutotherssufferfrombias.Thistendencyisprevalentin
interactionsinwhichpeopledisagree.Forexample,oneregardsthoseofadifferent
politicalpartyasmisguidedandbiasedbytheirpersonalmotivations,whereasone
regardsoneself(andtosomeextentothermembersofone’spoliticalparty)simply
ascorrect.Weassumethatwesimplyseethingsastheyreallyare.NaïveRealism
influencesthementalstatesweattributetoourselvesandtoothers.Thisbiasis
entrenchedinourreasoning,butitisespeciallycommonwhenweareoverly
confident.Inthosecases,wefailtoconsiderseriouslytheideathatwearetheones
whoarebiasedandmisperceiving.
Finally,confirmationbiasdescribesageneraltendencytoseekonly
informationthatconfirmsone’spreconceivedideasandinterpretambiguous
informationinlightofthesepreconceivedideas.Withrespecttosocialcognition,we
havepreconceivedideasaboutotherindividualsandgroups,andwetendto
interpretsocialinteractionsintermsofthosepreconceivedideas.Forexample,
racistsnoticewhenindividualsbehaveinwaysthatconfirmtheirracistbeliefsbut
theyoftendonotattendtothemanycaseswhereindividualsactinwaysthat
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disconfirmtheirracistbeliefs.Confirmationbiasoccursregardlessofhowthe
preconceivedideaoriginated,howlikelyitistobetrue,andwhetheraccuracyis
incentivized(Skov&Sherman,1986;Slowiaczek,Klayman,Sherman,&Skov,1992;
Snyder,Campbell,&Preston,1982).
3.2MindMisreading:AimingforEfficiency
Section3.1explainsthreewaysinwhichthoughtfuldeliberationaboutothers’
mentalstatescangoawry.ThisSectionexplainsthetypesoferrorsinefficient
mindreading.Althoughsometimesourprimaryaimisaccuratemindreading,thisis
notalwaysthecase.Oftenthereareconstraintsonourmotivation,time,and
attentionthatprohibitevenattemptingtoengageinathoroughsearchfor
information.Insuchcases,accuracyisasecondaryaimandefficiencyistheprimary
aim.Whenthesocialinteractionseemsordinaryandfamiliar,whennotmuchhangs
onit,orwhenweareotherwisecognitivelytaxed,weusecognitiveshortcuts.
Whenourprimarygoalisefficientmindreading,severalstrategiesare
available.Thestrategiesweusedependonwhetherornottheindividualweare
mindreadingispartofourin-group.Weidentifypeopleaspartofourin-groupor
partofanout-grouponthebasisofperceivedsimilarity(Ames,2004a,2004b;Ames,
Weber,&Zou,2012).Thatis,thosewhoweperceivetobelikeusarecategorizedas
partofinourin-group,andthosewhoweperceivetobeunlikeusarecategorizedas
partofanout-group.Onetendstoidentifypeoplewhoshareone’sage,race,gender,
religion,ornationalityaspartofone’sin-group.However,becausepeoplehave
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multiple,overlappingidentities,andperceivedsimilarityisrelativetoacontext,
socialcategorizationextendsbeyondthesebasicclassifications.Thus,Imay
considersomeoneaspartofmyin-groupinonecontextbutnotinanother.5
Firstconsidertheheuristicsweusewhenweperceiveanindividualtobe
similartoourselvesinsomesalientrespect.Inthesecases,weoftensimplyproject
ourownmentalstatestothatindividual(Ames,2004a,2004b;Amesetal.,2012).
Thisisanefficientstrategybecausewedonothavetodeliberateaboutthetarget’s
situationandlikelymentalstates.Rather,wesimplyinferthatthetargetbelieves,
desires,orfeelsaboutsomeeventthewaywedo.Forexample,inmanycontextsI
considerphilosophersasmyin-group.Ihavelearnedthatphilosopherstendtohave
similarsocialandpoliticalviews.IfIlearnthatSallyisaphilosopher,Iassumethat
shesharesmanycharacteristicsincommonwithme,includingpoliticalopinions.In
suchacase,Isimplyprojectmyownpoliticaljudgmentsonherwithoutany
deliberation.
Sometimeswealsouseourmentalstatesasananchorandadjustthe
interpretationbasedonhowsimilartheindividualistous.Forexample,ifIlearn
thatSallyspecializesinsocialandpoliticalphilosophy,Imaythinkthatsheprobably
hasmorenuancedviewsonpoliticsthanIdoandadjustmyattributionsaccordingly.
Projectionandanchoring-plus-adjustmentareegocentricheuristics.Ifour
perceptionsofsimilarityarecorrect,andifweaccuratelyintrospectourownmental
states,theseegocentricheuristicsareusefulandaccurate.Errorsoccurwhenthese
twoconditionsarenotsatisfied.5Importantly,perceivedsimilarityisasubjectiveandsometimesidiosyncraticjudgment,notanobjectivemeasureofactualsimilarity(Amesetal.,2012).
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Errorsarisewhenweoverestimatethesimilaritybetweenourselvesandthe
otherperson(s)andthusengageinmoreprojectionthaniswarranted.Theresulting
errorsarecalledtheFalseConsensusEffectandtheCurseofKnowledge(Clement&
Krueger,2002;Epley&Waytz,2010,p.512).TheFalseConsensusEffectoccurs
whenwefalselyassumethatagroupofpeoplesharesourperspectiveonsomeissue.
TheCurseofKnowledgeisarelatedphenomenoninwhichwefalselyassumethat
anotherindividualknowswhatweknow.Forbothkindsofmindmisreading,we
inappropriatelyprojectourownmentalstatesontoothersbecauseweassumethat
wearemoresimilarthanweinfactare.Thespecificdetailsonhowthishappens
willdifferfromcasetocase.Ingeneral,inappropriateprojectionoccurswhenwe
attendtosuperficialsimilaritiesbetweenothersandourselvesandfailtonoticeor
appreciatedissimilarities,e.g.,intermsofsituationalcontext,personalbackground,
knowledge,attitudes,andemotions.
Asecondkindoferrorforegocentricheuristicsoccurswhenwecorrectly
diagnosethesimilaritybetweenthemindreadingtargetandourselvesbut
inaccuratelyintrospectourownmentalstates.Insuchacase,projectingourown
mentalstatesontoatargetiswarrantedbecausewearesimilartothetargetinthe
relevantrespect,butwefailtounderstandourownbeliefs,desires,motivations,and
feelingsandthusattributethewrongmentalstates.Consider,forexample,aself-
unawareracistwhothinksofhimselfas“colorblind”butinfactharborsmanyracist
attitudes.Inmindreadingasimilarperson,themindreadercorrectlyjudgesthatthe
otherpersonissimilarandthusprojectshisownattitudestothatperson.Inthis
case,heattributestotheotherpersonthebeliefthatallracesareequal.However,he
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makesamindreadingerrorbecauseneitherhenorthesimilarotheractuallyhave
racialegalitarianattitudes.Ifhehadintrospectedcorrectly,hewouldhave
recognizedhisWhiteSupremacistattitudesandprojectedthosetothesimilarother
person.Thiskindoferrorislikelytooccurwhenwearelessself-reflectiveandthus
donotunderstandourownmentalstates.
Thepreviouskindsofefficiency-orientedmindreadingarebasedon
egocentricheuristics,whichweemploywhenweperceiveanindividualtobe
similartous.Whenweperceiveanindividualtobedifferentfromus,weuse
alternativeefficientstrategies,namely,stereotypesabouttheindividual’ssalientin-
group(Ames,2004a;Amesetal.,2012;Krueger,1998;Vorauer,Hunter,Main,&Roy,
2000).Stereotypesmaybepositive,negative,orneutralbeliefsaboutsomegroup.
Table2:Typesmindreadingerrorsforefficiency-orientedmindreading.
Efficiency-oriented
Mindreading
TypesofMindMisreading
Projection Overestimatesimilarity;
inappropriatelyprojectone’smentalstates
Overestimatesimilarity;insufficiently
adjustprojection
Correctlyjudgesimilarity;incorrectlyintrospectone’s
mentalstates
Stereotyping Underestimatesimilarity;
baselesslyapplystereotype
Employfalsestereotype
Employmisleading,unrepresentative
stereotype
Stereotypesarereliableheuristicsforunderstandingothers’behaviorwhen
theyareappliedappropriatelyandthestereotypesareaccurateandrepresentative.
Wemaymakemistakeswheneitherofthesetwoconditionsisnotsatisfied.When
19
weunderestimatethesimilaritybetweenourselvesandtheotherperson,we
baselesslyapplystereotypeswhereprojectionordeliberativemindreadingwould
bemoreappropriate.
Contrarytowhatonemightexpect,wearelikelytomakethistypeoferror
whenweareinfamiliarsituations.Whenweareinunusualorunfamiliarsituations,
wetendtodeliberateabouttheinteractionmorethanwedoinnormalandfamiliar
cases.Asparticularsituationsbecomefamiliartous,certaininterpretationsofthose
situationswillbecomemoreaccessible,moreroutinized,andincreasinglydifficult
tooverride(Higgins,King,&Mavin,1982).Thus,inveryfamiliarsituationswemay
failtonoticeorappreciatestereotype-inconsistentbehaviorandthus
inappropriatelyapplystereotypes.
Asecondtypeoferrorforstereotype-basedmindreadingoccurswhenwe
correctlydiagnosethedissimilaritybetweenourselvesandtheotherpersonbutthe
stereotypesweemployarefalseorunrepresentativeoftheout-group.Thispattern
isevidentinracistindividuals’mindreadingpractices.TheWhiteSupremacist,for
example,isinclinedtouseraciststereotypestoinferthemotivationsand
perspectivesofmembersofdifferentracialcategories.Falseorunrepresentative
stereotypeshavemanysources,includingexplicitandimplicitbias,idiosyncratic
experienceswithagroup,poorstatisticalreasoning,andsimplyfalsebeliefsabout
thegroup.Howevertheyarise,employingfalseormisleadingstereotypesislikelyto
generatemistakesininterpretingothers’mentalstatesandbehavior.
Insummary,sometimeswehavethemotivationandabilitytoexhaustively
reviewtheavailablesocialinformationandattributementalstatestoothersinthat
20
way,whereasothertimeswetakeshortcutsbecausewelackthemotivationor
abilitytodoanexhaustivesearch.Intheformercase,mindmisreadingoccurswhen
cognitiveloadinterfereswiththeinformationsearch,weapplythewrong
frameworktothesituation,orwhenself-interestskewsourdeliberation.Inthe
lattercase,mindmisreadingariseswhenwemisdiagnosethesimilarityor
dissimilaritybetweenourselvesandthetarget,failtounderstandourownmental
states,orapplyfalseorinappropriatestereotypes.
4.TheLimitsofMindreading
Thephilosophicalliteratureonmindreadingprimarilyfocusesonsuccessful
mindreading.Althoughexplaininghowwemanagethecomplextaskofaccurately
attributingmentalstatestoothersisinterestingandimportantforunderstanding
socialcognition,focusingexclusivelyonsuccessfulmindreadingobscuresthelimits
ofourmindreadingabilities.Withthedistinctionbetweenaccuracy-orientedand
efficiency-orientedmindreading,wecanseethatconditionsforsuccessdifferfor
eachtypeofmindreading.Deliberativeandefficientmindreadinggoawryin
distinctiveways.SeeTable3below.
Table3:Typesofmindreadingerrorsforaccuracy-orientedandefficiency-orientedmindreading.MindreadingAim TypesofMindMisreading
Accuracy Cognitiveload
interfereswithinformationsearch
Applythewrongmodel
Self-interestbiasesinformationsearch
Efficiency Misdiagnose Correctlydiagnose Employbaseless,
21
similaritybetweenoneselfandother
similarity,butincorrectly
introspectone’smentalstates
false,orunrepresentative
stereotype
Errorsinmindreadingrevealthelimitsofmindreadingabilitiesinawaythat
isnotpossiblewhenwefocussolelyonsuccessfulmindreading.Toillustrate,
comparewhatthedatahereindicatewithrespecttotheprocessespositedbyTT
andST.Theevidencesuggeststhatwesuccessfullyusethedeliberativeprocesses
positedbyTTandSTonlywhenwehavethemotivation,time,andcognitive
capacitytoengageinathorough,deliberativesearchforinformation.Whenwe
attempttoengageinsuchsearcheswhenwelackthecognitivecapacityorhaveself-
interestedbiasesthatskewourinformationsearch,wearelikelytomakemistakes.
Theseerrors,whicharediscussedin3.1,arenotpredictedbyTTorST.
TheSTpredictstheuseofegocentricheuristics,namely,projectionand
anchoringandadjustment.Theseefficientstrategiesareemployedsuccessfullyonly
whenwecorrectlydiagnosetherelevantsimilaritybetweenthetargetand
ourselvesandweunderstandourownmentalstates.Wearelikelytoerrwhen
theseconditionsdonothold.Theotherefficientstrategy–stereotyping–isnot
predictedbyeitherTTorST,thoughitiscompatiblewiththeTTifthestereotypes
arepartofthetheory.Thisefficientstrategyissuccessfulonlywhenwecorrectly
diagnosetherelevantdissimilaritybetweenthetargetandourselvesandthe
stereotypeemployedisaccurateandrepresentativeofthetarget’srelevantin-group.
Stereotypingisinaccuratewhenitfailstomeettheseconditions.
22
Typically,mindmisreadingismorelikelytooccurwhenthesituationis
ambiguous,whichsocialinteractionsoftenareespeciallywhentheyinvolvepeople
outsideone’sclosecircleoffamilyandfriends.Inaddition,severalgeneral
psychologicalfactorsmayleadtomindmisreading,e.g.,memoryfailure,
psychosocialdisorder,orlowintelligence.TheerrorsIdiscussabovearise
specificallywhen(1)wearetoocognitivelytaxedtoengageinthoroughinformation
search,(2)wepayattentiontosuperficialcues,(3)wearebiasedbyself-interest,
(4)wefailtounderstandourownmentalstates,(5)andweinappropriatelydeploy
stereotypes.
Investigatingtheselimitsofourmindreadingabilitiespavesthewayfor
differentperspectivesonmindreading.Aninterestingupshotofthisdiscussionis
thatwearelikelytomakemindreadingerrorswhenwearenotself-awareorself-
reflective.Self-awarenessisapsychologicalstateinwhichonetakesoneselfasthe
subject,specifically,one’straits,mentalstates,feelings,andbehavior.Beingself-
awareinvolvesreflectingonmental,physical,behavioral,andrelationalfactsabout
oneself.Onemighthavethoughtthatthelimitationsonmindreadingwouldhaveto
dowithothers’behaviorandmentalstates,i.e.,thatwewouldbeunabletomake
senseofsomebehaviorsinsomecontexts.Thoughthatcertainlyhappens,this
investigationsuggeststhatthemoreimmediatelimitationsonmindreadingare
internaltothemindreader.
Theideasuggestedbyexaminationofthelimitsofmindreadingisthatself-
awarenesspredictsmindreadingsuccess.Ceterisparibus,anindividualwhoisless
self-awarewillmakemoremindreadingmistakesthananindividualwhoismore
23
self-aware.6Incircumstanceswhereindividualsarelessself-aware,theyaremore
likelytomakemindreadingerrors.Fordeliberative,accuracy-orientedmindreading,
individualswhoarelessself-awarearelesslikelytonoticethattheyareunder
cognitiveload,thattheyarebeingoverlyconfident,thatdespitetryingtodeliberate
carefullytheyarepayingattentiontomerelysuperficialcues,andtheylikelywillnot
noticehowtheirownmotivationsskewtheinformationsearch.Individualswhoare
lessself-awarearelikelytomakemistakesinefficientmindreading,aswell.They
arelesslikelytoconsiderhowmuchorlittletheyresembleanotherperson,
appropriatelyadjusttheirprojectionsoftheirownmentalstates,correctly
introspecttheirownmentalstates,andexaminetheirstereotypes.
Thecentrallessonhereisthatexaminingmindmisreadingshedslightonthe
limitsofourmindreadingabilitiesandsuggestsnewperspectivesonhow
mindreadingworks.Studyingthewaysinwhichweerrinmindreadingwillgiveusa
betterpictureofhowweunderstand–andsometimesmisunderstand–other
people.Iproposedahypothesisabouttheroleofself-awarenessinmindreading.
Thishypothesisisnotendofthedebate.Infact,itisjustthestart.Investigating
mindmisreadingopensupahostofnewdebates,whichpromisetoadvanceour
understandingofmindreading.
6Self-awarenessdoesnotuniquelypredictmindreadingsuccess.Executivefunctionwillplayanextremelyimportantroleinself-awarenessinsofarasitregulatesattention,inhibitorycontrol,andworkingmemory.Moreover,higherintelligenceandhealthypsychologicalfunctioning(e.g.,conscientiousness,tolerance,openness)arepositivelyrelatedtoaccuratemindreading(Halletal.,2009).Andcertainlyone’srelationtothetargetandmotivationtounderstandthetarget’smentalstatesplayacrucialroleintheaccuracyofone’smindreadingjudgments.
24
5.ImplicationsofMindMisreading
Thediscussionsofarclearlyisrelevanttothefieldofsocialcognition,butitalsohas
implicationsforsocialepistemology.Inparticular,mindmisreadingbearsonhow
wejudgewhetherothersareourepistemicpeers.YouandIareepistemicpeers
withrespecttosometopictotheextentthatwearecomparablyknowledgeableand
competenttoreasonaboutthattopic.Thatis,wepossessthesameevidenceaboutX
andareequallyintelligent,freefrombias,competentatperceiving,reasoning,etc.
(Kelly,2010).
Thenotionofepistemicpeerarisesintheepistemologyofpeerdisagreement
debate.Proponentsoftheconciliationviewarguethatwhenyoudisagreewith
someoneyoutaketobeanepistemicpeeryoushouldreduceyourconfidencein
yourjudgment(Christensen,2007),whereasproponentsofthesteadfastviewargue
thatinsuchacaseyoushouldremainsteadfastinyourview(Kelly,2010).The
notionofepistemicpeercomesupinthediscussionofepistemicinjustice,aswell.
Epistemicinjustice,inparticulartestimonialepistemicinjustice,occurswhena
hearer’sprejudicesresultindowngradingaspeaker’scredibility(Fricker,2007).
Thatis,invirtueofepistemicallyirrelevantfactsaboutthespeakerthehearer
downgradesthespeaker’sepistemicstatus.Centraltobothphilosophicaldebatesis
theissueofhowwejudgeothers’knowledge,intelligence,reasoningabilities,bias,
etc.Ourdiscussionofmindmisreadingshedslightonthisissue.
Inexplainingthewaysmindreadingfails,Idescribedseveralverycommon
self-enhancingbiases:theSelf-ServingandGroup-ServingAttributionalBias,which
25
resultinoverestimatingourowncompetenceandunderestimatingthecompetence
ofothers(especiallyout-groupmembers);theDunning-KruegerEffect,wherein
individualswhoarenotknowledgeableorcompetentwithrespecttosomeissue
egregiouslyoverestimatetheirownknowledgeandcompetenceandfailto
recognizeothers’equalorsuperiorknowledgeandcompetence;andNaïveRealism,
whichdescribesthetendencytoregardothersasmoresusceptibletobiasand
misperceptionthanoneselfespeciallyinthecontextofdisagreement.Thesethree
self-enhancingbiasesinfluencehowwejudgeourownknowledgeandcompetence
inrelationtoothers.
Inadditiontotheself-enhancingbiases,Ialsodiscussedseveralbiasesin
assessingothers’knowledgeandcompetence.Socialcategorizationandimplicit
associationswithsocialcategoriesinfluencehowwedecidewhoisanepistemic
peer.Simplyinvirtueofbeingpartofparticularsocialcategorywemayupgradeor
downgradeaperson’sknowledgeorcompetence.Forexample,wetendtoassociate
spontaneouslyandimplicitlyelderlywomenwithwarmthandincompetence.We
habituallydowngradetheepistemicstatusofanelderlywomanjustinvirtueofher
socialcategory.Ofcourse,wecanoverrideimplicitassociations,butdoingso
requiresawarenessoftheassociationsandtheireffectonone’sbehavior,attention,
andcognitiveeffort.Forthisreasonimplicitassociationsaredifficulttoexcisefrom
one’sjudgments.
Furthermore,in-group/out-groupstatussignificantlyaffectsourjudgments
ofotherpeople’sepistemicstatus.Weusuallyhavemorefavorableattitudestoward
andempathizemorewithin-groupmembers,especiallypeoplewhoshareour
26
gender,race,age,religion,ornationalitythantowardpeopledonotsharethese
features.Thedatasuggestthatwearelesslikelytoregardout-groupmembersas
epistemicpeers,i.e.,asbeingequallyknowledgeableandcompetent.Wetendto
simplifyandcaricaturethementalstatesofthosewhoweperceivetobeunlikeus.
Althoughwesometimeshavepositivestereotypesaboutout-groups–e.g.,an
AmericanstereotypeaboutAsiansisthattheyarehardworkingandsmart–mostly
weupgradethestatusofourin-groupanddowngradethestatusofout-groups.This
tendencyisespeciallystronginacontextofthreat,e.g.,whenpeopledisagreeabout
someimportantissue.
Combiningself-enhancingbiaseswithdataonother-downgradingbiases
yieldsableakpictureofhowwejudgeothers’knowledgeandcompetence.Itseems
thatwearemostlikelytoregardanotherpersonasanepistemicpeerwheninfact
sheisanepistemicsuperiorandsheispartofourrelevantin-group.Inmostother
conditions,otherthingsbeingequal,wearelikelytoregardanepistemicpeeras
inferior,andwearelikelytoregardmoderatelyepistemicallysuperiorout-group
membersasinferior.
Thesedatasuggestthatoftenwearenotreliablejudgesofourepistemic
peers.Inparticular,wetendtooverestimateourownknowledgeandcompetence
andunderestimateothers’,especiallyotherswhoarepartofanout-group.This
discussionofmindmisreadinghasimplicationsfortheepistemologyofpeer
disagreement.Inlightofthesefacts,whenwetakeourselvestobeinadisagreement
withanepistemicpeerweoughttoconciliate.Thatis,weoughttodecrease
confidenceinourownjudgmentswhenwedisagreewithsomeoneweregardasan
27
epistemicpeerbecauseitislikelythatthatpersoninfactisanepistemicsuperior.7
Indeed,whenwetakeourselvestobedisagreeingwithanout-groupmemberwhom
weregardasmoderatelyepistemicallyinferior,weshouldconciliatethenaswell
becauseourjudgmentsabouttheout-groupmemberarelikelytobeevenmore
skewedinthatcase.
Thediscussionofmindmisreadinginjudgingepistemicpeersisrelevantto
epistemicinjustice,aswell.Thedowngradingofepistemicpeersandout-group
epistemicsuperiorsjustdescribedisaninstanceofepistemicinjustice,i.e.,ofa
hearer’sprejudicesdiscountingaspeaker’scredibility.AboveIdiscussedthe
conditionsforsuccessfulmindreadingandthevariouswaysinwhichwefailto
understandotherswhentheseconditionsarenotmet.Thesedatarevealwhenand
howepistemicinjusticeislikelytoarise.Socialcategorization,implicitbias,andin-
grouping/out-groupingbehaviorsareparticularlyimportantforunderstanding
whenarelikelytobebiasedinassessingothers’epistemicstatus.Understanding
whenandhowepistemicinjusticearisesisanimportantstepinmitigatingitseffects.
Mindmisreadingsofarhasbeenanunder-exploredtopicinphilosophy,
whichisunfortunatebecauseitisaninterestingandimportanttopic.Mind
misreadingiscrucialtothestudyofsocialcognition,andithasimplicationsbeyond
philosophyofmindandcognitivescience.Inparticular,itisrelevanttothe
epistemologyofpeerdisagreementdebateandepistemicinjustice.Ihopethispaper7Thecaseofdisagreeingexpertsmaybemorenuancedthanthecaseofdisagreeingnon-experts.Ifoneisanexpertinsomedomain,onemaybebetteratidentifyingfactorsthatdistortone’sownjudgmentsinthatdomain,haveamorerealisticassessmentofone’sknowledgeandcompetenceinthatdomain,andbebetterabletoidentifyothers’expertise.EvenexpertsarenotimmunetomanyofthecognitivebiasesdiscussedinSection3,buttheymaybebetterabletomitigatetheireffects.
28
showsjusthowmuchthereistobegainedinphilosophyofmindandepistemology
fromasystematicevaluationofthewaysinwhichweunderstandandoftenfailto
understandotherpeople.8
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