mimesis in the arts in plato's laws

8/10/2019 Mimesis in the Arts in Plato's Laws

1/5

Mimesis in the Arts in Plato's Laws

Author(s): Edith Watson SchipperSource: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Winter, 1963), pp. 199-202Published by: Wileyon behalf of The American Society for AestheticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/427755.

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2/5

EDITH

WATSON

SCHIPPER

imesis

n

t h

r t s

n

P l a t o s

a w s

IN

THE

Laws,

the last and

longest

and most

laborious

of his

dialogues,

Plato

brieflyoutlines a

theory

of the mimetic arts

(rTXvaL

ELKdaTLKaL

r

j,

Li.fU7fLKa)1

which

de-

velops

further and clarifies

what

he

has said

about

art

in

the third book

of

the

Republic.

The mimetic

arts,

mentioned at different

times,

include

music,

dancing,

poetry,

drama,

painting,

and

sculpture;

and

so

correspond

to what

now would be called the

fine arts.

MLirTLKaL,

used of the

arts,

had

a current

and

popularly accepted meaning,

that

of

duplicating

in

another medium the

appear-

ances of things which could be experienced

outside their

representation

in

art.

Many

commentators

and

translators

of

Plato

have

assumed that he held this

popular

opinion

as to artistic

imitation,

largely

due

to the

account

in

the tenth book

of

the

Republic

of

the

painter

from life

(coyp'pos)

who

copies

appearances.

I

think we cannot

say

how

far

Plato,

when he

wrote the tenth

book,

held to

the

popular theory

of

imitation,

illustrated

by

the three couches.

I

am

inclined

to

agree

with

Bosanquet

that

Plato

only

showed-

and this would be in accord with the usual

hypothetical

Socratic

method-that

art,

if

it was

imitative

in

the

popular

sense,

did

not

have

the value

popularly

accorded

to it.2

But,

however

that

may

be,

in

the third

book

only

some

art,

which

is

ridiculed,

is

imitative

of

appearances;

but

not those

arts,

including

painting

(here

ypaCwLK),

hich

have

good

EDITH WATSON

SCHIPPER

is

associate

professor

of

philosophy

at

the

University

of

Miami,

Coral

Gables,

Florida. She has

published

several

articles,

of

which

The Concept f Existence n Plato's Sophist is to ap-

pear

soon in

Phronesis.

harmony,

form,

and

rhythm

(eaappocaria

Kal

evaX-7quoavr

Kal

Evpvt

uia;

397a-b,

400d-

401a).

In

these,

the formal

qualities-the

compositional

elements

of

order,

rhythm,

harmony,

balance,

proportion-constitute

beauty,

as

later

in

a famous

passage

of

the

Philebus

(51c)

where he

speaks

of

beauty

of

form

(aoxirtAowv

KaXX\o)

as

not that

of

animals

or

paintings-from-life

(cwyparl.aTrwv)

ut as

consisting

of

geometric

shapes

and

patterns.

Similarly,

in

the

Laws,

as

I

shall

try

to

show,

Plato

brings

out still

more

clearly

that

the

mimetic

arts,

in

particular

music,

must

have

beautiful form and are not literally repre-

sentative

of

appearances.

The

question

is:

why

are the

arts called

mimetic

and

what

do

they

imitate ?

In

the

Laws

the

mimetic arts

are

of

funda-

mental

importance

to

the

city

which is

being

colonized. The arts of

music and

dancing

are

performed

by

the

three

choruses,

which

are

the foundation and

salvation of

education,

as

always,

for

Plato,

the

bulwark of

a

good

state

(653a).

Plato

emphasizes

that

education

is

not

merely

an

acquisition

of

reasoned

knowledge,

indispensable

for the

good

life

as

this

is,

but a

training

in

pleasure

and

pain,

a

learning

to

take

pleasure

in

and

love

what is

good

in

life and

to

hate

what is

evil

(653).

Those

who,

listening

to and

singing

in

the

choruses,

learn to

take

pleasure

in

the

beauti-

ful

harmonies and

rhythms

of

music

and

dancing,

are

learning

to

love

what

they

may

later

know

as

good,

which

would

hence

have

motive

power

in

their

lives. For

man

has

the

ability

to

perceive

and

delight

in

rhythm

and

melody (piuyos

Kal

apJiovia),

the

order

(rTats)

of

movement and

vocal

sounds.

The

beautiful

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3/5

200

EDITH WATSON

SCHIPPER

(KaXa)

rhythms

and

melodies are the order

of the

motions

and vocal

sounds

of

a

good

man;

and those

who

delight

in

them

come

to

desire

what

is

good

(653e-655b;

664e-

665e). Thus, Plato develops and makes more

explicit

his

view

in the

Republic

hat beautiful

form

(evaXq71,oarvv7),hythm,

melody

of music

express

goodness

of

character,

since-as

he

says

both

there

and

in

the

Symposium-the

form

of the

beautiful

is also the

form

of the

good;

and

those

delighting

in

them

would

learn

to love

what

they

would

later

reason

to

be

good

(Rep.

401b-402c).

However,

the

arts

do not

literally

imitate

a

moral

goodness

extraneous

to them.

The

rhythms

of music

cannot

literally copy

the

manifestations of good character. Moreover,

Plato

continues

to be

adamant

in

condemning

literal

imitation

in

the

popular

sense

in the

arts.

He

ridicules

the

combining

in

art

of

cries

of animals

and humans

and

all

sorts

of sounds...

as

if imitative

of one

thing

(s

(v

TL

LotovyiLEvaL),

or

such

literal

imita-

tion

destroys

the

unity

of the work

and

the

clarity

of the

intention.

He

goes

on

to

deplore

the

show

of mechanical

accuracy

(a7rrarffa)

and

the imitation

of

animal

cries (669d-e). But, though music does

not

imitate

appearances,

if

it

is beautiful

and

expressive

of

goodness,

it must

have

right-

ness

of

mimesis

(utLaercs

bpObr6Ts;

68b)

or

simply

rightness.

One who

is

to

judge

of

the

goodness

or badness

expressed

by

a

creation

(rT

(E

Kal

TO

KaKCi)

must know

its

rightness

(668d).

What

is

rightness?

All

the current

trans-

lations

of the

word

would

seem

to

presuppose

the

popular

theory

of imitation

of an

original

outside

the

work.

Thus,

A. E.

Taylor

often

translates t as correctnessof representation,

and

R.

G.

Bury

as

correctness

of the

copy

(669b).3

Plato

says

that

the

rightness

of

mime-

sis

lies

in

whether

what

is

imitated

is

rendered

according

to

quantity

and

quality

(rT6 jtLtit]Ev

6oov Tr

Kal

olov

tv

4a7roTrXotro;

668b).

Here

bTO

qLftkv,

which

I have

trans-

lated

what

is

imitated,

is

translated

by

both

Taylor

and

Bury

as an

original

which

is

reproduced,

thus

presupposing

the

popular

theory

of imitation.

But,

as

we

have

seen,

whatever

is

imitated,

it cannot

be

an

apparent

original

outside the work. When

Plato

says

that

rightness

depends

on

latrrts

(or

equality,

as

Bury

translates

it)

in

quantity

and

quality,

Taylor misleadingly

translates

it

as accurate

correspondence

(667d). But since in 668a Plato links it with

symmetry

it should

have,

as

in

Jowett's

translation,

its mathematical

meaning

of

equal proportions.

Hence,

it would be

included

under the

formal order

of music

and would involve

no

correspondence

with

an

original

outside it. Plato

says

in

670c

that

a

melody

which has the

appropriate

elements

(ra

7rpoaoKovTa)

has

rightness

which

must

accordingly

be

intrinsic to it.

That

rightness

must

be inherent

in

a work

of

art,

not

lying

in

correspondence

to

an

original outside of it, becomes clearer when

Plato talks about

the

intention

or

aim

(7'

loXra-Ls)

of

a

work

of

art.

He

says

(668c):

It would

seem

to

be

necessary

for one

who

is

not

to

err

(in

his

judgment)

to

know for

each

particu-

lar creation

what it is.

For one

not

knowing

its

nature,

what it

intends,

and of

what it

is

really

an

image

will

scarcely

be able to

judge

of

its

rightness

or

failure

in

fulfilling

its

intention.

My

translation

of

the

last

clause,

while

dif-

fering

some

from

Taylor's

in

supplying

fulfilling,

is close

to that

of

Bury

and

seems

to

clarify

both

this

passage

and the

following

in

making

the

rightness

of a

work consist

in

accomplishing

its

intention

of

having

a

certain

formal

organization

which is

beautiful.

That

intention,

whose

fulfillment

is

what the

work

is,

is

inherent

in

it;

and

so its

rightness

in

fulfilling

that

intention

must

also

be

in-

herent

in

it.

This

intrinsic

rightness

of

music

is to

be

found

in its

rhythms

and

melodies.

Plato

says

(669b):

So,

then,

about

any

work

(eLKcvw)

whether

in

drawing,

music,

or

any

other

art,

it

is

necessary

for

one

who

is

to

be a

wise

judge

to know

three

things:

first,

what it

is;

then how

rightly;

and

third,

in how

good

a

way

(ev)

in

language,

melody,

and

rhythm,

it has been

fashioned.

The

first

point

is

to

know

what the

work

of

art

is

(which,

at

least,

must involve

its

in-

tention);

the

second

point

is

to know

how

rightly

it

fulfills

its

intention

in

its

rhythms

and

melodies;

and

the

third

point-to

judge

from

what

follows-is

to

know

whether

these

rhythms

and melodies express goodness.



4/5

Mimesis

in

the

Arts in Plato's

Laws

201

These

points

would seem

to

overlap,

and

their criterion

is

not

explicit,

though

it

would

seem

to lie

in the formal

order.

The older

men

who

are

to

sing,

at least

in

private gatherings, in the third chorus, the

Dionysian

chorus,

are

the

judges

of

the

rightness

of the

music to

be

sung.

For,

as

Glenn

Morrow

points

out,

they

are

the

arbiters

of

moral

and artistic

taste in

the

community 4

They

must have

knowledge

of

and a

quick

perception

of

rhythms

and

melodies

(670e).

But,

further,

they

must

be

thoroughly

trained-as

the

creators

need

not be-to

recognize

the

third

point

men-

tioned

above,

whether

the

work is

expressive

of

what

is

good (670e).

These older

choristers

are

qualified

to

judge

since

they

are

the

wise

men,

excelling

in

goodness,

education,

and

experience.

Their

pleasure

in

certain

music,

rather

than the

pleasure

of

anyone

or

any

set rule

which

may

be

laid

down,

is the

cri-

terion

of

the

rightness

of

music

(654a-d;

659a-c).

However

skeptical

we

may

be

about en-

trusting

the

criterion

of

the

rightness

of music

to the taste

of

the

older

and more conserva-

tive

men,

perhaps

to be

perpetuated

in

law,

we may ask what Plato meant in doing so.

And I should like to

hazard

a

possible

an-

swer

in

terms

of Plato's

unsensed

and

intelligible

forms,

though

forms

are

not

mentioned

by

name

in

this context.

How-

ever,

beautiful

rhythms

and melodies are

said to

imitate

beauty

(Tr

KaXbv,

668b),

the

word

Plato has

always

used

for

the

form

of

beauty.

This

beauty

must

be

known and

delighted

in

by

the

rightly

educated man

(654c-d).

Moreover,

such an educated

judge

must

know

about

a

work of

art

what

it

is

(5

Tt

EarL),

its essence

(oVaiav),

and

what it

really

imitates,

all

ways

in

which

Plato

usually

refers to

forms.

Thus,

what

Plato

would seem to

mean

by

that

which

beautiful

art imitates

is

the

form of

beauty,

which he identifies

with

the

form of

goodness.

Yet

how

may

works of

art imitate an

un-

sensed

form?

Mimesis

or

imitation

is

a

metaphor

borrowed from the

Pythagoreans

for

the

relation

of

sensed

things

to

forms

which characterize

them,

used

especially

in

the

Republic

and Timaeus. We will

not

consider

here

the

much-discussed relation

of

things

to

forms,

a

relation

about

whose

exact nature

Plato confessed himself

in

doubt

in

the

Phaedo

(lOOd),

and

whose

nature,

whatever

it

is,

seems

to be

funda-

mentally re-conceived in the later dialogues.

Yet imitation

of

the

form cannot be a literal

copying

of it

by appearances,

since

sensed

things

can

never

iterally

be like the unsensed

nd

intelligible

orms

which define them.

In

rea-

soned

knowledge

a

logos,

an

account or

argument,

must

be

given

of

the forms

which

formulate

things,

make them

definite,

and

express

them

so that

they may

be

grasped by

intelligence.

In

art,

on

the other

hand,

where

no

logos

is

given

for

the

form of

beauty,

which is

recognized by

the taste of

the

wise

and

good

man,

the

form

differs

from

the

forms of

which there

is

reasoned

knowledge.

But

it, too,

defines and

expresses

beautiful

things

for

intelligent

perception. Though,

being

unsensed,

it cannot be an

original

to

be

literally

copied,

it is said

to

be

imitated

by

the music

whose

rhythms

and

melodies,

in

having

a certain

order

and

rightness,

are

recognized

as beautiful.

Here

a

difficulty

arises.

So

far the

beauty

of

music

seems to lie

in

its formal

qualities,

the order of its rhythms and melodies, which

is

also

the order

of

goodness.

Nevertheless,

music is

not

purely

instrumental but is

song

(c57v, 664e);

it must have words

sung

to its

rhythms

and

melodies

which,

in

turn,

must

be

appropriate

to the words

(669d-e).

And

what these

words

signify,

not

only

their

formal

qualities,

is

important

to their

good-

ness. The

appropriate

content,

what Plato

holds to

be the

right

ethical

views

about the

nature

of

goodness

and

happiness,

which

are to be

sung,

are

discussed

for four

Stepha-

nus

pages

(660e-664c).

Since the

significance

of

the words

of

beautiful

songs

is

basic,

their

beauty

would

seem to lie

in

wider

ethical

considerations,

beyond

their

formal

qualities

of

order.

In

spite

of his

stress

on

the

moral

doctrines

to

be

sung,

it

would

seem to

me

that Plato

still maintains

his formalism.

Nowhere

in

his

discussion

of

the

rightness

of

music

does

he

mention the

content

of

the

words.

Nowhere

does he

make the

rightness

of

music

dependent

on

the views

sung

with it.

True, the beauty

and

rightness

of

music,

being

also

the

order



5/5

202

EDITH WATSON

SCHIPPER

of

the

good,

are

adaptable

only

to

right

views

about

the

good.

Moreover,

if music is to be

the

salvation

and

foundation

of

education,

a

training

in

feeling pleasure

in what

is

good,

those delighting in it should associate their

delight

with

doctrines

about

what is

good.

Yet

this

educational

role

of

music,

along

with

the

censorship

of

songs

containing

wrong

doctrines

about

what

is

good,

is dic-

tated

by

Plato's

social

and

educational

views,

not

by

his

aesthetic

views

of what constitutes

beauty

in

music.

That

beauty

and

rightness

lies

not

in

anything

extraneous

to

the

work

but

in the

order

which

is

to

be

found

within

it.

According

to this

interpretation

of the

beauty

of

art,

Plato

would

not

hold

to

the

moralistic

theory

of art commonly attributed

to

him.

That

theory,

as it

is held

by

Tolstoi,

holds

that

the

moral

effect

of

a

work

of

art

is

essential

to its

goodness.

For

Plato,

on

the

other

hand,

all beautiful

art

does

have

a

moral

effect.

Anyone

delighting

in

beautiful

music

is

also

delighting

in the

order

of

the

good

which

will

hence

be

welcomed

when

there

is

knowledge

of

it.

Consequently,

the

singing

and

dancing

of what

is

beautiful

by

the

choruses

is the salvation

of

education.

Yet this moral effect of beautiful music,

while

contributing

to

its

value,

does

not

constitute

its

beauty.

The

criterion

of

its

beauty

lies not

with

moral

considerations

but

with

the

rightness

inherent

in

its

rhythms

and

melodies.

This

comports

with

the

well-known

Platonic

view

(i.e., Rep.

601c-603b)

that

the mimetic

art,

having

no

logos

and

not

relying

on

reasoning

(XoyLayuJL),

s not

knowl-

edge,

even

of moral

truths.

Its

beauty

does

not

consist

in

the

doctrines

which

it

may

convey. As has been said, censorshipof those

doctrines

depends

on

Plato's

social

and

edu-

cational,

not

his

aesthetic,

views.

In

summary,

the

mimetic

arts are

beauti-

ful

when their

order,

rhythms,

melodies,

and

formal

qualities

have

rightness.

They

are

right

and

beautiful,

not because

they

reproduce appearances

or

anything

outside

the

work of

art,

but

because

they

imitate

the

form

of

beauty

which

may

be

said

to

char-

acterize

and

express

them.

This

beauty

of

order has no stated criterion-when has a

rule

been

given

for beautiful

form?-but

is

recognized

by

the taste

of the

good

man.

For,

though

this

beautiful

order

is inherent

in

the

work,

it

may

be

said to be

that

of the

good

and

the

good

man.

Hence,

those

who

take

pleasure

in

beautiful

rhythms

and

melodies

come

to

love what later

they

learn

to

know

as

good.

And

these

beautiful

rhythms

and

melodies,

in

having

the

order

of what

is

beautiful

and

good,

have

rightness

of

mimesis.

1

Laws,

II,

667d,

668a.

All translations

are

mine.

2

History

of

Aesthetic

(New

York,

1934),

pp.

29-30.

8

Laws,

tr.

Taylor,

in

Plato's

Collected

Dialogues,

eds.

Hamilton

and

Cairns

(Pantheon

Books);

Laws,

tr.

Bury

(Loeb

Classical

Library).

4

Plato's

Cretan

City

(Princeton,

1960),

pp.

313-314.


mimesis in the arts in plato's laws

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