military technology diffusion in the ottoman empir

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Rethinking the Ottoman "Decline": Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire,Fifteenth to Eighteenth CenturiesAuthor(s): Jonathan GrantSource: Journal of World History, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 179-201Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20078753Accessed: 03-03-2015 08:23 UTC

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2/24

Rethinking

the Ottoman

Decline77:

Military

Technology

Diffusion

in

the

Ottoman

Empire,

Fifteenth

to

Eighteenth

Centuries

JONATHAN

GRANT

Florida

State

University

In

the

field

of

Ottoman

history,

scholars

have often

advanced

an

interpretation

of decline.

Traditionally,

the

argument

states

that

the

Ottoman

empire

reached its

peak

in the sixteenth

century

under

Suley

man

the

Magnificent,

and

thereafter

began

an

inexorable

stagnation

and

decline

lasting

until

the twentieth

century.

Historians often

point

to

the

Ottoman

naval

defeat

at

Lepanto

in

1571

or

the failure of the

second

siege

of

Vienna

in

1683

as

events

marking

the

waning

fortunes

of

Ottoman

power

and the

beginning

of

the decline. 1

The

use

of

the

term

decline

as

it

has been

applied

by

Middle

East

scholars

to

the

Ottoman

case

presents

several

problems.

Implicit

in

any

notion

of decline

is

some

kind

of

comparison.

After

all,

an

empire

Journal

of

World

History,

Vol.

io,

No.

i

?1999

by University

of

Hawai'i Press

179

1

Norman

Itzkowitz,

Ottoman

Empire

and

Islamic Tradition

(Chicago:

University

of Chi

cago

Press,

1972),

pp.

67,

73;

Paul

Coles,

The Ottoman

Impact

on

Europe

(London:

Thames

and

Hudson,

1968),

p. 195;

P.

M.

Holt,

Egypt

and the Fertile

Crescent

1516-1922:

A

Political

History

(Ithaca:

Cornell

University

Press,

1966),

pp.

61-70;

Halil

Inalcik,

The

Ottoman

Empire:

The

Classical

Age,

1300-1600

(New

Rochelle:

Orpheus Publishing,

1973),

pp.

41

52;

A?ir

Arkayin,

Ikinci

Viyana

Kusatmasi

1683

(Ankara:

Gnkur. Askeri Tarih

ve

Stratejik

Etiit

Ba?kanligi Yayinlari,

1983);

Bernard

Lewis,

The

Emergence

of

Modern

Turkey

(London:

Oxford

University

Press,

1968),

pp.

21-39.

See also Halil Inalcik

and

Donald

Quataert,

eds.,

An

Economic

and Social

History

of

the

Ottoman

Empire,

1300-1014

(Cambridge:

Cam

bridge

University

Press,

1994),

for the

most

recent

discussions

of

the decline

thesis.


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3/24

i8o

JOURNAL

OF

WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

1999

can

only

be

seen as

declining

in

comparison

to

some

measure,

whether

it

be other

powers

or

its

own

imperial

past.

As

historians have

em

ployed

the

concept,

the

unit

of

measure

(if

mentioned

at

all)

is

often

overly

broad

or

inappropriate

to

the Ottoman

context.

In its

broadest

application,

Ottoman decline

has

served

as a

negative

judgment

on

Islamic

society

as a

whole

and

its

inability

to

match

the

march of

progress

and

rising

power

of

Western

society

since

the seventeenth

century.

In

this

instance

the

unit

of

comparison

is

the civilization.2

Such

a

basis for

comparison

is

ill-chosen

because

the

notion

that the

strength of a civilization can be measured in military success is an

obviously

dubious

proposition,

as

the

examples

of

Renaissance

Italy

or

the

thirteenth-century

Mongols

make clear.

Besides

selecting

a

vague

unit

of

measure,

proponents

of the

decline thesis tend

to

be rather

imprecise

about the

scale

by

which

they

measure

the Ottoman decline.

For

example,

they

may

posit

an eco

nomic

or

cultural/social

decline that contributed

to

a

military

decline,

but

invariably

this so-called decline

was

in

relation

to

an

economically

expanding

West. 3

However,

neither

the

West

nor

Islamic

society

was a

monolithic

entity,

and within each civilization there existed

states

with

varying

degrees

of

military capability.

Most often scholars

have

used the

term

the

West

or

Europe generically,

when

they actually

meant

England,

France,

and Holland.

The

use

of these

western

Euro

pean

states

as

the basis

for

measuring

Ottoman

military

decline

has

obscured the actual Ottoman conditions

by

placing

them

in

the

wrong

context.

The

Ottomans

did

not

operate

in

western

Europe,

but rather

in

eastern

Europe

and the

eastern

Mediterranean.4

In

fact

decline

is

not

a

useful

term at

all,

because

it

reflects

more a

moral

judgment

passed by

Europeans

convinced of their

own

superiority

than

an

accurate

assess

ment

of Ottoman

capabilities

after

1571

or

1683.

To

be

sure,

the

declinists

offer

more

than

a

monocausal

expla

nation.

Halil

Inalcik,

perhaps

the

foremost

advocate of

the

declinist

position,

points

to

population

pressure,

fiscal

crisis,

and

Europe's

new

military

technology

as

contributing

to

Ottoman

decline

by

the

early

2

Reuben

Levy,

An

Introduction

to

the

Sociology

of

Islam

(London:

Harrison and

Sons,

1933).

Marshall

G. S.

Hodgson,

The Venture

of

Islam: Conscience

and

History

in

a

World

Civ

ilization,

vol.

3:

The

Gunpowder

Empires

and Modern Times

(Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1974),

offers

a more

nuanced

assessment

of the

decline

of

Islamic

civilization after

1700.

See also IraM.

Lapidus,

A

History

of

Islamic Societies

(Cambridge: Cambridge

Univer

sity Press, 1988).

3

The foremost

example

of such studies

isH.

A.

R.

Gibb

and

H.

Bowen,

Islamic

Society

and

the

West,

vol.

1,

pt.

1

(London:

Oxford

University

Press,

1950).

4

A notable

exception

is

Virginia

H.

Aksan,

An Ottoman Statesman

in

War and Peace:

Ahmed Resmi

Efendi,

1700-1783

(Leiden:

E.

].

Brill,

1995).




4/24

Grant:

Military

Technology

Diffusion

in

the Ottoman

Empire

181

seventeenth

century.

In his

view,

the

Ottoman

failure

meant

that

a

traditional Asiatic

culture,

even

when

it

borrowed

war

technology

from the

West,

was

doomed before the

rise

of modern

Europe....

The

Ottoman decline

was

as

much the

outcome

of

Western

Europe's

modern

economic

system

as

of

superior

European military

technology. 5

Although

some

aspects

of Ottoman

economic

decline have

been

seri

ously

called

into

question,

the role of

superior

European military

tech

nology

and

its

production

in

contributing

to

Ottoman decline has

remained

an

operative assumption.6

Instead

of

thinking

in

terms

of

decline,

it

is

more

useful

to recon

ceptualize

the

problem

in

terms

of

locating

Ottoman

capabilities

on

the

scale

of

the

international

production hierarchy,

which

includes

arms

production,

arms

transfers,

and

technological

diffusion.

Therefore,

I

shall

attempt

to

compare

Ottoman

military

and

naval

capabilities

against

the

Ottomans'

own

past

accomplishments

and the achievements

in

war

technology

and

production

made

by

the

Ottomans'

European

rivals

and

neighbors.

When

placed

in

the

proper

context,

it

becomes

appar

ent

that

up

to

the

early

nineteenth

century

the decline

was

certainly

not inexorable.

Keith

Krause

has

recently

put

forth

a

model for the

spread

of

mili

tary

technology

as

a

diffusion

wave

that settles

into

a

hierarchy

of mili

tary

producers. Typically

a wave

begins

as a

period

of

rapid

innovation,

followed

by

the diffusion

of

military

technology

from

the

first-tier

inno

vators to

second-tier

exporters,

and concludes with

attempts

by

third

tier

states to create

their

own

indigenous

arms

industry through

tech

nological

imports.

Accordingly, producers

in

the

first

tier

innovate

at

the

technological

frontier,

those

in

the

second

tier

adapt

weapons

at

the

technological

frontier,

and

third-tier

producers

copy

and

reproduce

existing technologies but do not capture the underlying process of

innovation

or

adaptation.7

The first

wave was

triggered

by

the

gun

powder

revolution

in

the

early

fifteenth

century

and had

largely

run

its

course

by

the

mid-seventeenth

century.

By

that

time

the

centers

of

first-tier

production

were

England,

the

Low

Countries,

and

(ephemer

5

Inalcik

and

Quataert,

eds.,

An

Economic

and

Social

History

of

the Ottoman

Empire,

1300-1914, p.22.

6

Suraiya Faroqhi,

Crisis

and

Change,

1590-1699,

in

An

Economic

and Social

History

of

the

Ottoman

Empire, 1300-1914,

ed.

Inalcik

and

Quataert, p. 468.

For

a

thorough

refuta

tion

of

the

interpretation

of

Ottoman

economic

decline

in

the

period

1500-1800,

see

Roger

Owen,

The Middle East

in

theWorld

Economy,

1800-1914

(London:

Methuen,

1981),

pp.

1-23.

7

Keith

Krause,

Arms

and

the State: Patterns

of

Military

Production

and

Trade

(Cam

bridge:

Cambridge University

Press,

1992),

pp.

30-31.




5/24

l82

JOURNAL

OF

WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

I999

ally)

Sweden.8

After

the

initial

revolutionary

wave

came

a

period

of

incremental

innovation

that

began

in

the

late seventeenth

century

and

ended

in

the

early

nineteenth

century.

Among

the

innovations

of

this

secondary

wave

were

the

development

of

boring

cannon

(rather

than

casting

cannon

in

a

mold),

the

conversion

from matchlock

fire

arms

to

flintlocks,

and

the

lightening

of field

guns

and

carriages.9

The

second-tier

producers

were

a more

fluid

group.

The

Italian

states

of

Milan,

Venice, Genoa,

and

Brescia had

been

first-tier

manu

facturers

in

the

first half

of the fifteenth

century,

but

gradually

declined

into the second tier.

By

1500

Milan was

importing

cannon, and

by

1606 half the

Venetian

fleet

was

built

abroad.

Although

Italian

pro

ducers

had

dropped

into

the

second

tier,

they

remained

important

arms

exporters.

Migration

of skilled

workers

served

as

the

main mechanism

for

the

technological

diffusion

into

Sweden,

Russia,

France,

Spain,

and

the

Ottoman

empire

between

1450

and

1650.

Among

these

newcomers,

however,

only

France,

Russia,

and

Spain

successfully

reached

the

second

tier. For the

Ottomans,

Italy

proved

an

important

supply

source,

especially

in

the

early

period

of Ottoman

expansion,

1450-1500.10

By employing

Krause's

model

it

is

possible

to

reformulate

the

ques

tion

of

Ottoman

decline

in

a

more

precise

way:

Did

the

Ottomans

decline

from

their initial

position

in

the

production

hierarchy?

Based

on

Krause's

schema,

it

becomes

clear that

the Ottomans

remained

a

third-tier

producer

throughout

the

period

from

the

fifteenth

century

to

the

early

nineteenth

century.

In

other

words,

the

Ottomans

did

not

drop

a

tier

in

their

military

technological

capabilities,

and

it

is

mislead

ing

to

view them

as

in

decline

by

comparing

them

to

first-tier

producers,

such

as

England

and

Holland.

Furthermore,

their

immediate

rivals

in

Poland,

Hungary,

and

the

Balkans

possessed

comparable

capabilities,

while Egypt and Iran were actually below the third tier and

were

import-dependent.11

Given

this

regional

context,

the Ottomans

were

able

to

maintain themselves

as

a

regionally

dominant

power.

The

comparison

with

Iranian

capabilities

is instructive.

In

their

struggle

with Safavid

Iran,

Ottoman

forces

initially

held

a

distinct

tech

nological

advantage.

At the

battle

of Chaldiran

in

1514

Ottoman

troops

armed

with

firearms

and

artillery

crushed

a

Safavid

force

that

lacked

guns.

In

1528

the

Iranians

were

victorious

over

the

Ozbegs

because

of

their

artillery,

which

they

obtained

from the

Portuguese.

In

8

Krause,

Arms

and

the

State, p.

38.

9

Krause,

Arms

and

the

State,

p.

54.

10

Krause,

Arms and

the

State,

pp.

37~45

11

Krause,

Arms

and the

State, pp.

43,

51-52.




6/24

Grant:

Military Technology

Diffusion

in

the Ottoman

Empire

183

general,

the

Iranians

chose

to

avoid

pitched

battles

with the Ottomans

in

favor

of defensive scorched-earth

tactics.

Under Shah Abbas

(1587

1629)

Persian

forces

included

an

artillery

corps

of about

500

guns,

and

a

series

of

sieges

and

counter-sieges

of

Baghdad

resulted

in

a

reassertion

of

Ottoman control

in

the

region

and

an

effective stalemate of

the

Ottoman-Iranian border

by

1639.

However,

the

Safavid

artillery

force

deteriorated

rapidly

under Abbas

II

(1642-66).

Safavid rule ended

in

1722

when the

Persian

army,

equipped

with

twenty-four

cannon,

under

a

French commander but

lacking

unified

command,

suffered

defeat

at

the hands of

Afghan

forces without

artillery.

Iranian

artillery

and fire

arms

were

imported

throughout

the

period

rather than

manufactured

domestically.

Thus,

the

Ottomans'

capacity

to

produce

their

own arma

ments

stood them

in

good

stead

in

relation

to

their Safavid

opponents.12

It

has often

been assumed that the decline

in

the

military

fortunes

of the

empire

after

1683

was

continual and irreversible.

For

example,

Bernard Lewis

wrote,

The Ottomans found

it

more

and

more

difficult

to

keep

up

with the

rapidly advancing

Western

technological

innova

tions,

and

in

the

course

of the

eighteenth

century

the

Ottoman

Empire,

itself far ahead of the

rest

of

the

Islamic

world,

fell

decisively

behind

Europe

in

virtually

all

arts

of

war. 13

Later he

remarks,

And

by

the late

eighteenth

century

the

Ottomans,

for

so

long

self-sufficient

in

armaments,

found themselves

obliged

to

place

orders for

ships

in

for

eign

shipyards. 14

Such

statements

are

less than

accurate accounts

of the

Porte's

war

industries.

It

is

true

that

a

growing

disparity

between

the

products

of

Ottoman

war

industries and those of

their

neighbors

did

occur

over

the

eighteenth

century,

but this

gap

was

caused

by

the

Porte's

neigh

bors

borrowing

the

incremental

innovations,

such

as

galleons,

frigates,

techniques of cannon-boring, light field guns, new-formula gunpowder,

12

Rudi

Matthee,

Unwalled Cities

and Restless

Nomads:

Firearms

and

Artillery

in

Safavid

Iran,

in

Safavid

Persia,

ed.

Charles Melville

(London:

I.

B.

Taurus,

1996),

pp.

391

410;

David

Morgan,

Medieval

Persia,

1040-1797 (London:

Longman,

1994),

pp.

116-17,

125-26,

135, 147,

150-51;

Palmira

Brummett,

Ottoman

Seapower

and

Levantine

Diplomacy

in

the

Age

of Discovery

(Albany:

State

University

of

New York

Press,

1994),

pp.

55,

64-87;

Faroqhi,

Crisis

and

Change,

1590-1699,

pp.

420-22;

Louis

Dupree,

Afghanistan

(Prince

ton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1980),

p.

325.

13

Bernard

Lewis,

The Muslim

Discovery of Europe

(New

York: W.

W.

Norton,

1982),

p.

226.

14

Lewis,

The

Muslim

Discovery

of Europe,

pp.

226-27.

Similar

interpretations

can

be

found

in

Gani

Ozbaran,

War

Industry

Plants of

the

Ottoman

Armed

Forces,

Revue

inter

nationale d'histoire

militaire

67

(1988): 67-76;

Wayne

S.

Vucinich,

The

Ottoman

Empire:

Its

Record and

Legacy

(Princeton:

Van

Nostrand,

1965),

pp.

78-87;

lu. A.

Petrosian,

Osmans

kaia

imperiia

mogushchestvo

i

gibel'

(Moscow: Nauka,

1990),

p. 134.




7/24


8/24

Grant:

Military Technology

Diffusion

in

the

Ottoman

Empire

185

because he

has

plenty

of

wood,

iron

parts,

skilled

workers,

pitch,

tal

low,

and all the

other

things

needed.

True,

at

present

they

do

not

have

at

hand all

the

armament

they

would need

to

outfit the

as

yet

uncom

pleted

galleys,

much less those

the

Grand

Signor

has ordered

made,

and

they

are

short of

cotton

sailcloth

and other

things.

But

his

re

sources

are so

great

that

if

he wanted

to

he

could

quickly

assemble

what

he

needs;

he has

already

begun

to

attend

to

this.18

Placing

the battle

of

Lepanto

into

the

context

of Ottoman

naval

production,

it

becomes

clear

that this

seemingly

profound

turning point

in

Ottoman

affairs

actually proved

to

be

quite

superficial.

True,

the

battle

itself

was a

decisive defeat

for

the

Ottoman

navy.

Out

of

230

Ottoman

galleys,

80

vessels

were

sunk and

130

captured.19

Yet

Otto

man

naval

production

capabilities

were

left unaffected.

The

huge

naval

arsenal

at

Kasimpa?a

was

still the

largest

in

the

world,

and

together

with the

other Ottoman

dockyards

it

could

make

good

the losses

quite

quickly.

Indeed,

the

French

ambassador

reported

on

8

May

1572

that

the

Turks

had

built

150

galleys

in

five

months.20

In

terms

of naval

con

struction, the Porte seemed

to

possess ample materials for

a

substantial

navy.

Paul

Rycaut,

an

English

observer,

appeared

to

be rather

perplexed

about the

inability

of the Ottomans

to

maintain

a

larger

fleet

in

the

seventeenth

century.

He

wrote,

Their

Ports

are

several

of

them

con

venient

for

building

both

ships

and

Gallies;

the Arsenal

of

Constanti

nople

hath

no

less than

a

hundred

thirty-seven

Voltas,

or

Chambers for

Building,

and

so

many

vessels

may

be

upon

the

stacks

at

the

same

time. 21

He

continued,

At

Sinopolis

[Sinop]

near

Trapesond

[Trebizond]

is

another

Arsenal:

at

Midia

and

Anchiale,

Cities

on

the Black

Sea,

are

the like

...

;

and

yet

the

Turk for several

years,

especially

since

the

War with Cand?a, and their defeat at Sea, have not been able at most

to

Equippe

a

Fleet of above

100

sail of Gallies. 22 From his

description

it

is

obvious that

the Ottomans

had the

facilities

to

produce

a

more

formidable

navy.

The observations

of

Morosini

and

Rycaut

require

some

comment.

The

striking

feature for

these observers

in

the sixteenth and

seven

teenth

centuries

was

the

size

of Ottoman

naval

yards.

We

should

not

18

James

C.

Davis,

ed.,

Pursuit

of

Power:

Venetian Ambassadors'

Reports

(New

York:

Harper

and

Row, 1970), p. 134.19

Coles,

The

Ottoman

Impact

on

Europe,

p.

91.

20

Jack

Beeching,

The

Galleys

at

LePanto

(London: Hutchinson,

1982),

p.

228.

21

Paul

Rycaut,

The Present State

of

the

Ottoman

Empire

(1968;

reprint,

Westmead,

England:

Gregg

International,

1972),

p.

213.

22

Rycaut,

The

Present State

of

the Ottoman

Empire,

p.

213.




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confuse

size

with

efficiency.

Although

the

arsenal

in

Istanbul

was

maintained

as a

permanent

facility,

the

size

of the work

force varied.

The

majority

of workers

were

employed only

for the short

term,

and

the

core

of

permanent

staff

was

relatively

small.

Also,

coerced

labor

figured

prominently

in

meeting

the

labor needs

at

the

arsenal.

Many

of

the workers

languished

without

pay

for

extended

periods

of

time

be

cause

the

treasury

was

insolvent.

Meanwhile,

the official

tax

farmers,

who

were

charged

with

paying

the

arsenal's

bills,

proved

slow

and

un

reliable.23 The

physical

capacity

of

Ottoman

yards rightly

impressed

ob

servers, but the arsenal's fiscal weaknesses remained invisible to them.

Much

has been made

of

the

fact

that the

Ottomans

were

very

slow

in

making

the

transition

from

galleys

to

galleons.

After

all,

it

was

not

until

1682

that the Grand Vezir

Kara

Mustafa

Pa?a accepted

the

prin

ciple

of

a

fleet based

on

sailing galleons

rather

than

galleys.24

But

it

is

important

to

bear

in

mind that

the

sailing galleon

did

not

immedi

ately

demonstrate

superiority

over

the

oar-powered galley

in

the mid

sixteenth

century.

Into

the

seventeenth

century

galleys

in

the

Medi

terranean

could

get

the

better

of

sailing

ships.

In

consequence

Spain

maintained

its

position

as

the

premier galley power

in

the

mid-seven

teenth

century

until

the French under

Louis

XIV revived their

galley

fleet

to

make

it

the

largest

one

in

Europe

at

the end of that

century.

Even

in

the

eighteenth

century

the

galley proved

its

effectiveness for

the Russians

in

their

operations

against

the Swedes

in

the Baltic.25

One

possible

explanation

is

that the Turkish

reluctance

to

adopt

galleons

stemmed from material considerations?that

is,

that the

Otto

man

preference

for

a

galley

fleet

over

sea-going

galleons

was

linked

to

reduced timber

supplies.26

The decline of the sancak of

Kocaeli

as

the

main

source

of Ottoman timber

in

the mid-seventeenth

century,

and

the growing importation of hemp from Italy also at that time, indicate

23

Faroqhi,

Crisis

and

Change,

1590-1699,

pp.

461-63.

24

Uzun?ar?ili,

Bahriyya,

p.

948.

25

Geoffrey

Parker,

The

Military

Revolution:

Military

Innovation

and

the

Rise

of

the

West,

1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press,

1988),

pp.

87-88;

John

Francis GuiL

martin

Jr.,

Gunpowder

and

Galleys (Cambridge: Cambridge

University

Press,

1974),

pp.

252-73;

Andrew

C.

Hess,

The

Forgotten

Frontier

(Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1978),

pp. 15,

90-91;

Paul W

Bamford,

Fighting

Ships

and Prisons: The Mediterranean

Galleys

of

France

in

the

Age of

Louis

XIV

(Minneapolis:

University

of Minnesota

Press,

1973),

pp.

11-24.

26

Rhoads

Murphey,

The Ottoman Attitude towards the

Adoption

of

Western Tech

nology:

The

Role

of the Efrenci

Technicians

in

Civil

and

Military

Applications,

in

Contri

butions ?'l'histoire

?conomique

et

sociale de

l'empire

Ottoman

(Leuven:

Editions

Peeters,

1983),

p.

292.




10/24

Grant:

Military Technology

Diffusion

in

the

Ottoman

Empire

187

some

kind of domestic shortfall.27

Nevertheless,

this

argument

is

not

completely

satisfying.

In

the

1760s

much of

the accessible

coastal

areas

had been

vastly

deforested,

and

as a

result the

price

of

timber had

tripled

from the

1740s

to

the

1760s.28

Yet

the

Ottomans

managed

to

produce galleons

at

that

time.

The

provinces

were

still

delivering

wood

to

the

arsenal

as

part

of their

tax,

and

in

fact

the

archipelago

islands

were

required

to

construct

one or

two

ships

called

fricata

in

proportion

to

their

size

or

revenue.29

Moreover,

Selim

Ill's

whole naval

modernization

program

in

the

1790s

was

implemented

with the

same

timber

supply

conditions in effect. So it is difficult to see how reduced

timber

supplies

could

have been

a

determining

factor

in

the

tardiness

of

Ottoman

galleon

construction.

A

more

compelling

explanation

can

be found

in

the

Porte's

long

naval

rivalry

with the Venetians.

Ottoman naval

developments

had

always

been

closely

intertwined

with

those

of

Venice.

Back

in its

infancy,

in

1416,

the Ottoman

navy

had

fought

its

first

sea

battle

against

the

Venetians.30

Also, many

of the

experts

who

supervised

the

building

of

war

galleys

in

the

sultan's

yards

had

served

as

shipwrights

in

Venice,

and

the

Ottoman methods of construction

were

therefore

largely

copied

from those of the Venetians.31

This

rivalry

had

great

sig

nificance for

Ottoman

naval

development

because the

Venetians

were

also

reluctant

to

adopt

galleons.

Both the

Ottomans

and

Venetians

were

latecomers

to

the idea of

galleon

fleets,

and

for

both

the

impetus

for the

adoption

of

sailing

galleons

came

from

the Atlantic

powers

in

the

seventeenth

century.

In

the late

1640s

and

early

1650s

the

Ottomans

made

considerable

efforts

to

increase

the

number of

their

sailing

vessels

in

response

to

their

defeats

by

Atlantic

sailing

vessels

operating

as

auxiliaries for

the

Vene

tian fleet.32 Somewhat later, the Venetians began to encounter diffi

culties

in

retaining

the

services

of

these

foreign

auxiliaries.

Recogniz

ing

the

vital role of

sailing

warships

by

this

time,

the

Venetians

began

building

their

own

in

1667.33

Throughout

the

first

half of the

eighteenth

27

C. H.

Imber,

The

Navy

of

Suleyman

the

Magnificent,

Archivum

Ottomanicum

6

(1980):

232.

28

Henry

Grenville,

Observations

sur

l'?tat actuel

de

l'empire

Ottoman

(Ann

Arbor: Uni

versity

of

Michigan

Press,

1965),

p.

54.

29

Grenville,

Observations,

pp.

3-4.

30

Uzun?ar?ili,

Bahriyya,

p.

947.

31

Beeching,

The

Galleys

at

LePanto,

p.

152.

32

Katip

?elebi, Tuhfetul

Kibar

Fi

Esfari'

l-Bihar, pp.

185,

190,

225;

R. C.

Anderson,

Naval

Wars

in

the

Levant,

1559-1853

(Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1952),

p.

142.

33

Anderson,

Naval Wars

in

the

Levant,

p.

194.




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i88

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OF WORLD

HISTORY,

SPRING

1999

century

the

Ottomans

maintained

a

naval

balance with the

Venetian

forces.

Henry

Grenville still

considered the Ottoman fleet

comparable

to

that of Venice

from what he observed

in

1765.34

Unfortunately, by

merely keeping

pace

with the

Venetians,

the Ottomans fell

behind

the

Atlantic

maritime

powers.

The

inferiority

of

Mediterranean naval

power

to

Atlantic

power

only

became clear when the

main

naval

activ

ity

in

the

western

Mediterranean

passed

to

Britain

and

France

in

the

second

half

of the

1700s.35

Judging

by

the

sporadic

naval

construction

programs

in

the

first

decades of the

eighteenth

century, a lack of resolve seems to have

played

the

major

role

in

limiting

the

size

of the

navy.

Under

the

ener

getic

leadership

of

Mezamorto

Huseyin Pa?a

toward the end of the

i6oos,

the

Ottomans followed

the

European

naval switch from

oar

powered

to

sail-powered

galleons,

which had occurred

at

the

beginning

of that

century.36

Mezamorto's reforms continued

into

the

reign

of

Ahmet III

(1703-30),

and the

number of

new

ships

with

large-caliber

cannons

increased.37

During

the

war

against

Peter

the

Great

the

Turks

were

superior

in

number

and

size

of

ships

on

the

Azov. In

1711

the

Azov

fleet

comprised

eighteen

men-of-war and fourteen

galleys.38

Evi

dently

the

Ottomans

were

quite

capable

of

significant

naval

construc

tion,

because

the

vigilant

Venetians worried

about

rumors

of

the

Porte

forming

a

fleet of

forty

to

sixty

vessels

in

1720.39

Whether

or

not

the Venetian

intelligence

reports

were

exact

is

less

important

than

the

fact

that such

an

Ottoman

response

was

deemed credible

by

Venetian

authorities.

According

to

Baron

de

Tott,

a

French

aristocrat

who

served

as a

foreign

expert

in

Ottoman

arsenals,

frigates

were

only

introduced

into

the

Ottoman fleet

during

the Russo-Turkish

War

(1768-77),

when

they participated

in

the

Ottoman

defeat

at

Chesme.40

It

is

likely

that

frigates

actually appeared

slightly

earlier.

Henry

Grenville mentioned

34

Grenville,

Observations,

p.

29.

35

Uzun?ar?ili,

Bahriyya,

p.

948.

36

Stanford

Shaw,

Empire

of

the

Gazis:

The

Rise and Decline

of

theOttoman

Empire

1280

1808,

vol.

1

of

History

of

the Ottoman

Empire

and Modern

Turkey (Cambridge:

Cambridge

University

Press,

1987),

p.

226.

37

Shaw,

Empire

of

the

Gazis,

p.

229.

38

B. H.

Sumner,

Peter

the

Great

and the

Ottoman

Empire

(Hamden,

Conn.:

Archon

Books,

1965),

p.

25.

39

Mary

Lucille

Shay,

The Ottoman

Empire

from 1720 to 1734 as Revealed in Des

patches

of

the

Venetian

Baili,

University

of Illinois Studies

in

the Social Sciences

27,

no.

3

(Urbana:

University

of Illinois

Press,

1944),

pp.

74-76.

40

Baron

Francis

de

Tott,

Memoirs

of

Baron De

Tott,

vol.

2,

pt.

3 (New

York: Arno

Press,

1973),

p.

25.




12/24

Grant:

Military Technology

Diffusion

in

the

Ottoman

Empire

189

frigates

with

forty

to

fifty

cannons

each

in

1765.41

In

any

case,

it

was

not

until

after Selim

Ill's

naval

reforms that the

Ottoman

fleet

again

became

competitive

with Atlantic

Europe,

although

the Turkish defeat

at

Chesme

was

not

due

to

any

technical deficiencies.

The

Turkish

fleet

actually

had

larger

vessels than

the

Russian

fleet,

and

their

artillery

was

comparable.42

The naval reforms of Selim

III

(1789-1807)

demonstrated that the

empire's

domestic

production

was

still

capable

of

rising

to

the

chal

lenge.

In

1784

the

navy

consisted of

twenty-two

ships

of

the line and

fifteen

frigates

(of

which

nine

were

in

poor

condition).43

In

the

period

1784-88

there

were

twenty-five

vessels

carrying

over

sixty

guns

within

the

Ottoman

navy.

One

of

these,

a

seventy-four-gunner,

had

been

built

by

French

engineers.44

Between

1789

and

1798

some

forty-five

modern

fighting ships

were

built and launched

from the

empire's ship

yards.

Among

these

were

three of the

largest

ships

ever

present

in

the Ottoman fleet: the

Selimiye

(122

cannons),

the BadiA Nusret

(82

cannons),

and

the

Tavus-u

Bahri

(82 cannons).

By

1806

the

fleet

con

sisted of

twenty

ships

of the

line and

twenty-five frigates,

with

a

total

of 2,156 cannon.45 Additionally, shipbuilding at the arsenal had been

reorganized

on

European

lines.

The

two

old

wooden

drydocks

were re

placed by

three

permanent

stone

ones,

five

new

ship-building

forms

were

constructed,

and

a new

drydock

was

built,

modeled

on

that

of

Toulon.46

Istanbul

was

clearly

the

dominant

center

for

Ottoman naval

con

struction.

The

Selimiye,

Tavus-u

Bahri,

BadiA

Nusret,

AsarA

Nusret,

Sedd

ul

Bahir,

and the

BahrA

Zafer

were

all

launched

from

the

naval

yards

in

Istanbul.47

These

ships

made

up

over

one-third of the

complement

of

galleons

constructed

during

the

reign

of

Selim

III.

They

also

repre

sented most of the navy's firepower. Besides galleons, the Istanbul

yards

also

produced

two

frigates,

the

MerkenA

Gazi

and the

HumayA

Zafer,

and

six

corvettes.48

While

Istanbul

played

the

most

important

role

in

naval

construe

41

Grenville,

Observations,

p. 3.

42

Petrosian,

Osmanskaia

imperiia

mogushchestvo

i

gibel',

p.

164.

43

Shaw,

Empire

of

the

Gazis,

p.

154.

44

Fernand

Braudel,

Civilization

and

Capitalism: i5th-i8th

Century,

vol.

3:

The

Perspec

tive

of

the

World

(New

York:

Harper

and

Row,

1984),

p.

477.

45

Shaw,

Empire

of

the

Gazis,

p.

158.

46

Shaw,

Empire of

the

Gazis,

p.

158.

47Nejat

G?len,

D?nden

B?gune

Bahriyemiz

(Istanbul:

Kastas A.

S.

Yayinlari,

1988),

p.

118.

48

G?len,

D?nden

B?gune

Bahriyemiz,

pp.

118-19.




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I999

tion,

other

ports

made

significant

contributions.

In

Bodrum

three

galleons

were

built between

1790

and

1796.49

Facilities

at

Sinop

also

made three

galleons

in

the

years

1789-93.

?anakkale,

Gemlik, Midilli,

and

Rhodes

contributed

an

additional

one

galleon

each

to

Selim's

pro

gram.

Rhodes served

as

the

principal

construction site

for

frigates,

and

four

came

out

of there from

1793

to

1797?

Also,

two corvettes

were

launched from

Rhodes,

the

first

in

1796

and the second

in

1799?

Other naval

yards

at

Eregli,

Limni, Kemer,

Kalas,

and

Sinop

were

responsible

for

one

frigate apiece.50

The Ottomans had relied on

foreign

expertise

and had

copied

for

eign

technology

in

their naval

construction

from the

very

beginnings

of their

navy.

As

the

innovations

from the

first-tier Atlantic

producers

diffused

across

the Mediterranean

via

Spain

to

Venice,

the

Ottomans

became

cognizant

of them and

incorporated

these

new

types

of

ships

into

their

own

fleet. First

galleons

and then

frigates joined

the ranks

of Ottoman naval

service

after

neighboring

powers

had

similarly

borrowed

them.

Military

Production

The

question

of when the Ottomans first

employed

cannon

and fire

arms

in

their

military

operations

has

not

been

definitively

answered,

but

Ottoman

cannon

production gradually

became

more

centralized

over

the

course

of

the fifteenth

century.51

In

1440,

during

the

reign

of

Mur?t

II,

a cannon

foundry

was

established

at

Germe

Hisar.52

After the

conquest

of

Constantinople,

a

permanent

cannon

foundry

was

estab

lished

in

the Galata

district.53

Bayezid

II

(1481-1512)

extended this

49

Guien,

D?nden

B?gune Bahriyemiz,

p.

118.

50

Guien,

D?nden

B?gune

Bahriyemiz,

pp.

118-19.

51

There

is

evidence that

cannoneers

were

present

with

Murat

Han

during

the

1422

siege

of

Constantinople,

and

important

fortresses used cannon?for

example,

Antalya

in

1423.

In

the

following

years

the

Ottomans

must

have made the

transition

from

siege

guns

to

field

guns,

because

during

the

time

of Murat II

(1421-51)

the

first clear

usage

of

field

guns

occurred

at

the second battle

of

Kossovo

in

1448.

Sevin?,

Osmanli

Sosyal

ve

Ekonomik

D?zeni,

pp.

141-42;

Paul

Wittek,

The Earliest References

to

the

Use

of

Firearms

by

the

Ottomans,

in

Gunpowder

and

Firearms

in

the

Mamluk

Kingdom,

ed.

David

Ayalon

(London:

Vallentine,

1956),

pp.

142-43;

V.

].

Parry,

Barud,

in

Encyclopaedia

of

Islam:

New

Edition,

1:1061;

Mark C.

Bartusis,

The Late

Byzantine Army:

Arms

and

Society,

1204-1453 (Phila

delphia:

University

of

Pennsylvania

Press,

1992),

pp.

336-41.

521.H.

Uzun?ar?ili,

Osmanli Devleti

tesjdlatindan

Kapukulu

Ocaklari, vol. 2

(Ankara:

Turk

Tarih Kurumu

Basimevi,

1944),

p. 35.

See also

Sevin?,

Osmanli

Sosyal

ve

Ekonomik

D?zeni,

p.

142.

53

Tursun

Bey,

Tarih-i

Eb?'1-Feth,

trans.

A. Mertol Tulum

(Istanbul:

Baha

matbaasi,

i977)>

P-

72.




14/24

Grant:

Military

Technology

Diffusion

in

the

Ottoman

Empire

191

production

site,

and

Suleyman

I

(1520-66)

had

it

renovated. In

addi

tion

to

the

central arsenal

at

Istanbul,

the

Ottomans

established

Bel

grade,

Buda,

I?kodra,

Teme?var,

Pravi?te,

and

G?lamber

as

important

provincial

centers

of

cannon

production.54

Besides

these

permanent

establishments,

other

locations served

as

foundries,

depending

on

the

needs of the

moment.

Included

in

this

category

were

Bilecik,

Van,

Kigi,

Kamengrad,

Rudnik,

and

Novobrdo.55

The

size

and

quality

of Ottoman

cannons

in

the

fifteenth

and

six

teenth

centuries

were

quite

impressive.

Chemical

analysis

of

Ottoman

guns cast in 1464 reveals that the bronze was of excellent quality.56

Among

the

monstrously

huge

guns

produced

by

the

Ottomans

was

the

balyemez.

This

term

was

derived

from

the

Italian

word

pallamezza

and

applied

to

Ottoman

guns

that

fired

the

biggest

shot.57

The

use

of

an

Italian

loanword reveals

the

origins

of

the

technology copied

by

the

Ottomans.

During

the

reign

of

Selim

I,

cannon

of

this

type

were

820

cm

in

length

and

weighed

up

to

17

tons.

Also

under

Selim

I,

the

Otto

mans

developed

grooved

cast

cannon

425

cm

long

and

100 cm

wide,

a

feat

not

matched

by

the

Germans until

the

nineteenth

century.58

Unfortunately

for Ottoman

military

fortunes,

the

methods

and

tech

niques

that had served the Ottomans so well in the

sixteenth

century

began

to

be

liabilities

in

the

seventeenth

century.

The

Ottoman

pref

erence

for

the

production

of

siege

guns,

which

were

too

heavy

for

use

in

a

war

of

movement,

continued

through

the

seventeenth

century.59

It

was

precisely

at

this

time

that

European

developments

in

the

manu

facture

of

mobile

field

artillery

moved

ahead.

Raimondo

Montecuc

coli,

the

Habsburg

commander who

defeated

the

Ottomans

at

the

battle

of

St.

Gothard

in

1664,

commented

on

Ottoman

cannon:

This enormous artillery produces great damage when it hits, but it is

awkward

to

move

and

it

requires

too

much

time

to

reload

and

site.

Furthermore,

it consumes

a

great

amount

of

powder,

besides

cracking

and

breaking

the

wheels

and

the

carriages

and

even

the

ramparts

on

which

it is

placed

. . .

our

artillery

is

more

handy

and

more

efficient

and here

resides

our

advantage

over

the

cannon

of

the

Turks.60

54

Parry,

Barud,

p.

1063.

55

Midhat

Sertoglu,

Osmanli

Tarih

Lugati

(Istanbul:

Enderun

Kitabevi,

1986),

p.

341.

56

Parry, Barud, p. 1061.

57

Sertoglu,

Osmanli

Tarih

Lugati,

p. 33.

58

Sevin?,

Osmanli

Sosyal

ve

Ekonomik

D?zeni,

p.

143.

59

Coles,

The Ottoman

Impact

on

Europe,

p.

186.

60

Coles,

The Ottoman

Impact

on

Europe,

p.

186.




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192

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Generally,

though,

Ottoman cannons were

still

regarded highly

in

the seventeenth

century.

Rycaut

wrote,

The Guns

are

the

biggest

and

as

well

cast

and moulded

as

any

in

the

world;

for

the

last

Expedition

in

Hungary

there

were

40

pieces

of

new

Cannon

cast

and

transported by

way

of

the black

Sea,

and thence

by

the Danube

unto

Belgrade

and

Buda. 61

Domestic

cannon

production

remained

strong

throughout

the

eighteenth

century,

but the Ottomans'

penchant

for

big, heavy

guns

placed

them

at

a

disadvantage

in

mobile field battles

against

European

forces armed with

rapid-fire

cannons.

The Ottomans

remained

partial

to

the old

balyemez

and shaki

cannons,

and

consequently

their

artillery

was

no

longer comparable

to

that of

European

powers.62

In

effect,

the

empire

was

manufacturing

the

wrong

type

of

pieces.

During

the Otto

man

campaign

against

Ada Kale

in

1738,

the

Austrians

captured

fifty

cannons

at

Orsovo,

but

they

could

only

take

forty

of them due

to

the

weight

of

the

pieces.63

It

was

not

until

1774

that

a

train

of

light

field

artillery

was

cast

for Ottoman

service.64

While

Rycaut

had

praised

Ottoman

cannon

production

in

the

seventeenth

century,

barely

over a

century

later Baron de Tott had

no

similar inclination.

In Tott's

assessment,

the Founderies

which

they

already had were useless; . . . and the metal. . .was not hot enough

when

it

reached the

Moulds;

the

improper

make of which added

yet

another

defect

to

the

Pieces

they produced. 65

Accordingly,

the

baron

suggested improved

furnaces

and the

use

of

machines

to

bore the

cannon.66 After

successfully

casting

twenty

cannons

with

the

new

method,

he

was

ordered

to

prepare

fifty

four-pounders.

He

recorded

that,

The first

work of the

New

Foundery

was

to

be

a

Train

of Field

Artillery,

with which the Turks

were

entirely

unprovided. 67

Much

to

Tott's

chagrin,

the

impact

of his

modern

foundry

was

not

as

great

as

he

had

hoped.

After

the

completion

of the

pieces

for the

field

train,

some new cannons were cast for the new forts on the

Dardanelles.68

Still,

the

new

foundry

remained

underutilized.

Soon after

the

baron's

departure,

it

ceased

to

manufacture

cannons

at

all.

The

failure of the

facility

was

due

primarily

to

financial difficulties. As

the

61

Rycaut,

The Present

State

of

the

Ottoman

Empire,

p.

200.

62

Shaw,

Empire of

the

Gazis,

p.

121.

63

A. Z.

Hertz,

The

Ottoman

Conquest

of Ada Kale

1738,

in

Archivum Ottomanicum

6

(1980):

169.

64

Tott,

Memoirs,

p.

155.

65

Tott,

Memoirs,

p.

114.

66

Tott, Memoirs,

p.

97.

67

Tott,

Memoirs,

p. 155.

68

Tott,

Memoirs,

p.

197.




16/24

Grant:

Military

Technology

Diffusion

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the

Ottoman

Empire

193

baron himself

remarked,

We

have

already

seen

that the

Establish

ment

of the

new

Foundery

had

not

abolished

the old.

The Funds

intended for the

Artillery

were

spent

upon

that;

and

it

was

with

diffi

culty

that the

necessary

supplies

were

obtained

for

what

was

acknowl

edged

to

be much

more

useful. 69

Baron

de

Tott's

enterprise

did

yield

some

results.

In

the

1780s

each

artillery

regiment

received

ten

cannons:

four of the

new

rapid-fire

sweat,

two

smaller

abus,

and four older

balye

mez

and shahi

cannons,

for

a

total of

250

pieces.70

However,

this

proved

to

be

inadequate.

As

reported

to

the French

Foreign

Ministry

in

1793,

until

today,

the Turks have founded

only

bronze cannon and their

army

and

navy

have

no

other. Their

foundries and their

forges

are

pitiful. 71

Selim

III

must

have

agreed

with

this

opinion,

because

in

March

1793

the sultan initiated

a

modernization

program

for

artillery

produc

tion.

Selim's

program

relied

on

an

infusion

of

foreign

machinery

and

expertise.

New

machinery

for the

Imperial

Cannon

Foundry

(Tophane)

was

imported

from

Britain

and

France.

At the

same

time

a

group

of

cannon

founders

sent

by

the

French Directorate

occupied

the

old

foundry buildings

in

Hask?y.72

These

buildings

had

originally

been

erected

by

Baron

de

Tott

to

manufacture the

rapid-fire

cannon,

but

had been converted for the

assembly

of

old-style

muskets and

bullets,

which

were

reintroduced after Tott's

departure.

In

addition

to

modern

izing

existing

works,

the

sultan

sought

to create

new

foundries.

With

this

goal

in

mind, seventy

master

workers

were

to

establish

a

cannon

foundry.73

With the introduction of

cannon-boring

techniques

and the

cast

ing

of

light artillery by

Baron

de

Tott

in

the

early

1770s,

the Ottomans

became

the

recipients

of

two

important

technological

innovations,

which constituted part of the second wave of Krause's model. To ap

preciate

the

context

one

should

note

that

Russia

had

adopted

these

techniques only

a

decade before

the

Ottomans,

and

that

the

Russians

also

had made

use

of

a

foreign

expert

to

acquire

the

knowledge

for

cannon-boring.74

When

viewed from

an

eastern

European

perspective,

69

Tott, Memoirs, p.

178.

70

Shaw,

Empire

of

the

Gazis,

p.

121.

71

Shaw,

Empire

of

the

Gazis,

p.

139.

72

Shaw,

Empire

of

the

Gazis,

p.

140

73

Shaw,

Empire

of

the

Gazis,

p.

140.

74

In the

Russian

case

the

expert

was

a

Dutch

prisoner

of

war

captured

in

Berlin

in

1760.

William

H.

McNeill,

The

Pursuit

of

Power:

Technology,

Armed

Force,

and

Society

since

A.D.

1000

(Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1982),

p.

167;

Krause,

Arms and

the

State,

p.

56.




17/24

194

JOURNAL

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HISTORY,

SPRING

1999

the Ottomans

were not

significantly

behind,

and

the

Russian

com

parison

should

mitigate

some

of

Tott's

negative

characterizations

of

Ottoman

capabilities.

Similarly,

before

faulting

the

Turks and the

backwardness

of

Islamic

society

for

their need

to

import

technical

assistance

in

artillery

production,

one

needs

to

remember

that Russia

under

Catherine

the Great

(1762-96)

was

not

self-sufficient

in

pro

ducing

military technology

either.75

Why

did

it

seemingly

take

so

long

for the

Ottomans

to

accept

lighter

field

artillery?

The

Ottoman

timing

was

directly

connected

to

Russian tactical developments in the eighteenth century. Sieges were

the backbone of

military

operations

in

eastern

Europe,

and

therefore

siege

and

fortress

artillery

were

necessarily

vital

components.

The Turk

ish

fortresses

guarding

the northern

approaches provided

formidable

defense and

set

the

conditions for the Russo-Turkish

struggles.

The

Turks

eschewed

field battles

and withdrew

into

their

fortresses,

thereby

forcing

the Russians

to

engage

in

siege

operations.

In

1769

the Rus

sians'

lack of

large

guns

prevented

them from

sustaining

the

siege

against

the

Turkish

fort

at

Hotin,

and

as

a

result

the

Ottomans scored

a

victory

as

the

Russians

were

forced

to

retreat.

The

Russian tactical

innovations of

aimed

infantry

fire,

mobile field

artillery,

the use

of

infantry

squares,

and the

overall

stress

on

speed

and

shock

grew

out

of

challenges posed by

the

Turkish

campaigns

in

the

eighteenth

century.

In

effect,

Russian commanders had

changed

the rules

of

engagement

by

the

1770s,

and

the Turks had

to

compensate.76

The

heavy

Ottoman

guns

were

still viable

in

defending

their

strongholds,

but the

greater

Russian

potency

in

the field

now

required

the

adoption

of

lighter

field

guns.

The

Ottoman

system

for the

production

of

gunpowder

followed

the

pattern

of

that used

for

cannon.

The

state

created factories backed

by

state

resources

and directed

by government-appointed

commis

sioners.

One such

factory

was

the

gunpowder plant

(baruthane)

at

Kagi

than? ,

which

produced

seventeen tons

of

powder

per

month

in

1571.77

Additionally

there

were

large

baruthanes

at

Belgrade,

Konya,

Birecik,

Aleppo,

Hama,

Van,

Baghdad,

Rhodes,

Gallipoli,

Izmir,

Selanik,

and

75

For

a

broad

overview

of

Russia's

technical

backwardness,

see

Hans-Heinrich

Nolte,

Tradition

des

R?ckstands: Ein

halbes

Jahrtausend

'Russland

und

der

Westen',

Vierteiljahr

schrift f?r Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 78 (1991): 344-64; Krause, Arms and the State,

P-55

76

Aksan,

An

Ottoman

Statesman, pp. 145,

151;

William

C.

Fuller,

Strategy

and Power

in

Russia,

1600-1914

(New

York: Free

Press,

1992),

pp.

147-66.

77

Inalcik,

The

Ottoman

Empire:

The Classical

Age,

p.

160.




18/24

Grant:

Military

Technology

Diffusion

in

the Ottoman

Empire

195

Teme?var.78

According

to some

sources,

the first baruthane

was

estab

lished

at

Kagithane

during

the

time

of

Bayezid

II.79

Production of

gun

powder

was

subject

to

centralized

direction,

and the

whole

process

of

manufacturing,

transporting,

collecting,

and

using

gunpowder

was

con

stantly

monitored

by

the central

government.

The

center

was

continu

ally

urging improvements

in

both

quality

and

quantity

of

gunpowder,

and

surplus

powder

was

sent

back

to

Istanbul for

storage

and

redistri

bution

to

other

munitions

locales. Provincial

powder

works

provided

a

significant portion

of the

empire's

production.

Besides

Egypt,

there

were

fourteen

powder

factories in

Baghdad,

and ten in Buda. The Buda works

were

supposed

to

provide

200-300

kantars

(1

kantar

=120

lb)

to

three

other

fortresses

in

Hungary

and

another

500

kantars

to

Belgrade

annu

ally.

Meanwhile,

Baghdad

factories

endeavored

to

supply

1,000

kantars

annually

to

Istanbul

via

the

Aleppo

road.80

It

is

difficult

to

gauge

to

what

extent

the

Ottomans

relied

on

for

eign

sources

for

their

supplies

of

gunpowder.

Paul

Rycaut

noted

already

in

the latter half of the

seventeenth

century

that

their

Gunpowder

is

made but

in

small

quantities

about

Constantinople,

but

comes

from

divers

places

of

Europe

but

that

from

Damascus

is

most

esteemed. 81

In

1678

a

baruthane

was

built

near

Istanbul. This

new

powder

works,

along

with

an

older

works

at

Kagithane, produced

3,000

kantars of

black

powder

each

year.

From

Egypt,

some

1,200

kantars

of

saltpeter

were

received

for

use

in

these

baruthanes.82 After

the

one

baruthane

was

destroyed by

a

fire

in

1697,

a new

powder

works

was

established

on

the

outskirts

of

Istanbul

in

1698.

In

addition,

the

Ottomans

maintained

provincial powder

works

in

Salonika,

Gallipoli,

Baghdad,

Cairo,

Bel

grade,

and

Izmir.83

During

the second half

of the

eighteenth

century

a

powder factory

was

built

in

Damascus

to

meet

the

needs

of

the

janis

saries.84 Evidently, these production centers did not provide sufficient

quantities

of

powder,

because

by

the

second half of

the

eighteenth

cen

78

Sertoglu,

Osmanli

Tarih

Lugati,

p.

34;

Sevin?,

Osmanli

Sosyal

ve

Ekonomik

D?zeni,

p. 144.

79

Sertoglu,

Osmanli

Tarih

Lugati,

p.34.

80Turgut

I?iksal,

Gunpowder

in

Ottoman

Documents

of

the Last

Half

of

the

16th

Century,

International

Journal

of

Turkish

Studies

2

(winter

1981-82): 81-91.

81

Rycaut,

The

Present State

of

theOttoman

Empire,

p.

200.

82

Ismail Hakki

Uzun?ar?ili,

Osmanli

Tarihi TV.

Cilt.

2.Kisim

XVIIII

Y?zyil

(Ankara:

Turk

Tarih Kurumu

Basimevi,

1959),

p.

579.

83Stanford

J.

Shaw,

Between

Old and

New:

The

Ottoman

Empire

under Sultan

Selim

III,

ij8g-i8oj

(Cambridge:

Harvard

University

Press,

1971),

p.

142.

84

Abdul

Karim

Rafeq,

The

Local

Forces

in

Syria

in

the

Seventeenth and

Eighteenth

Centuries,

in

War,

Technology

and

Society

in

the

Middle

East

(London:

Oxford

University

Press,

1975),

p.

301.




19/24

196

JOURNAL

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HISTORY,

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1999

tury

the

Porte

was

buying powder

from Sweden and

Spain.85

Henry

Grenville found

Ottoman

powder

to

be

of

poor

quality,

and he ob

served

rifle

and

pistol powder

being imported

from Holland and

Venice

in

1765.86

The Ottomans continued

to

produce

powder

using

the

six

teenth-century

formula,

while

Europe

had been

using

a more

stable,

higher quality powder

since

the

early

1700s.87

Finally,

in

the last decade

of

the

eighteenth

century

the

Ottomans

initiated

measures

to

improve

their

powder production

in

both

quan

tity

and

quality.

In

the

summer

of

1794,

under the

leadership

of Tevki'i

'Al

Ratik

Efendi,

modernization

of

the

existing

powder

works

was

attempted.

The

Porte

ordered

European equipment

for

the baruthanes

at

Bakirk?y, Gallipoli,

and Salonika. The

goal

was a

production

level

of

5,000

kantars

of

European-type

powder

per year.

Although

this first

attempt

was

unsuccessful,

efforts the

next

year

were more

rewarding.

In

April

1795

Mehmed

?erif

Efendi and

some

British

gunpowder

experts

remodeled

twenty

old wheels

at

Bakirk?y

and added five

new

wheels.

Within

a

year

production

doubled from

1,500

kantars of old

powder

to

3,000

kantars of

European

powder.

While

similar modifications

were

carried out at Gallipoli and Salonika, an entirely new powder factory

was

constructed

at

Azadli

on

the Sea of

Marmara. This

factory

em

ployed

water

power

instead of animal

power.

Azadli

was so

successful

that after

1797

Bakirk?y

served

only

as a

storage

house

and

the

works

at

Gallipoli,

Salonika,

and

Izmir

were

closed

entirely.

After

1795

the

Ottomans could

domestically

produce

suffic