milcom 2015 panel 27 october - afcea “in order to create an it [information technology]...

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Assured Communications

MILCOM 2015 Panel

27 October

Dr. Syed Shah

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for Public Release

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Position Statement

Current Environment

• Highly skilled adversaries

• Systems need to work in a wide range of

weather & environmental conditions

• Warfighters have ever increasing

bandwidth demands

• Austere budget environment

Current DoD systems are vulnerable.

The DoD needs new technologies to create

communications systems that are flexible, agile,

protected, and resilient.


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“In order to create an IT [information technology]

environment that enables mission command, requires us

to adapt how we approach information technology,

including the structure and function of our information

systems, and also how we use them.”

General Martin E. Dempsey Chairman Of The Joint Chiefs

of Staff Joint Information Environment White Paper,

January 2013

“Future conflicts will be won in a new arena - that of the

electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace. We must

merge, then master those realms.” -December 2012,

USNI, Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, U.S. Navy

COMMANDER’S INTENT


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Evolving Tactical Networks

• Military communications are rapidly

evolving o From largely voice and short text supported by

point to point communications

o To mostly wide area networked data and

information services while still maintaining the

importance of voice

• Video

• Command and control

• Position location

• Imagery

• Varying demands

• Increasing reliance on SATCOM

• Warfighter expectations are rapidly

changing o Increasingly expect commercial quality

connectivity and services

o Not being connected is not an inconvenience

o Having insufficient information can be fatal


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ASSURED COMMUNICATIONS • Threats

o Kinetic

o Electronic warfare

o Cyber

o Nuclear

o Natural disaster/weather

• Performance Considerations o Coverage

o Mobile user throughput

o Survivability

o Endurance

o Low probability of detection (LPD)

o Restoral

o Situational awareness

o Operations management

o Terminal system synchronization

o Continuity of service

o System availability

o Capacity

o Spectrum

V Disruption Deception Detection Loss of

Equipment

Loss

of Data

Physical Explosives Camouflage Radar Physical

Theft Capture

EW Jamming Spoofing Radiometer Unauthorized

Use Interception

Cyber Denial-of-

Service Spoofing

Traffic

Analysis

Unauthorized

Use Exfil


Assured Communications:

“The certainty of priority electronic transmission capability when needed

throughout the strategic, operational, and tactical areas of operations.”

U.S. Army, Field Manual, FM-100-5, Operations, Glossary-0

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ASSURED COMMUNICATIONS Examples of key

capabilities

1. Robust / improved

tactical data links

2. Resilient weapons

data link

3. Cross-platform air-

to-air connectivity

4. Surface connectivity

without SATCOM

5. Contested ISR

dissemination

6. Robust ground

waveforms

7. Mid-tier ground

connectivity

8. Detection,

correlation and re-

planning

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Assuring communications requires both new solutions to fill

gaps and effective technology for integration.

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ASSURED COMMUNICATIONS - FACETS

Protected

• Able to overcome specific,

directed, defined level of

adversarial attack

o Electronic warfare

o Cyber

o Kinetic, nuclear

electromagnetic pulse

(solutions for this are

already well known and

costly)

o Power adjustments

o Directional antennas

o Stealth waveforms)

Assured Communications

Flexible & agile Failover to another domain

• Spectrum aware

• Spectrum sharing

• Agile across channels,

bands, & waveforms

• Manages links & data

RESILIENT

Networks Able to adapt to changes in

topology

• Capacity/congestion

• Adversarial action

• Mobility

• Equipment failure

• Environment

• Leaving/joining network

• Self-healing networks

• Traffic re-routing

Physical layer Able to maintain the links despite

• Disparate gateways, apertures

• 4-D mobility (time, azimuth,

height)

• Equipment failure

• Adversarial action


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ASSURED COMMUNICATIONS NEW TECHNOLOGY THRUSTS

Robust Waveforms and Networks

• Make links stronger against threats

o Signal processing: improved modulation, multi-user detection, …

o Adaptation: spectrum, data rate, multi-polarization, routing/interfaces, …

o Antenna technologies: multi-beam, adaptive, nulling …

o Multiple frequencies: L, S, Ku, Ka, X, W, optical

o Identify jamming or interference vs. Other network impairments

• Classification of jamming techniques and localization of interfering

emitters

• Maintaining capacity in a robust anti-jam waveform

o Additionally achieves spectrum efficiency

• Adaptive routing around jamming

• Covert communication mode

• Overall robust network architecture including sensing and adaptation to

physical and network attacks

• Incorporate diversion and deception into waveform design

Resilience

Protection

Agility


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Converged Communications & Electronic Warfare

• Cooperation among blue force communications, jamming, and sensing

o Information sharing: network time, location, transmission schedules, …

o Multi-function operation: blue force communications waveform to jam red force

communications …

o Adaptation: modify waveforms

o Spectrum sharing/awareness, agility, …

o Scheduling of disparate asynchronous signals among numerous nodes

o Spatial separation of communications, EA and ES

o Reliable signal reception for communications and ES while performing EA

o Use of EW assets for augmentation of communication transmitters/receivers

and paint masking signals for covert operations

o Interference alignment for higher capacity and covertness

• Continuous contingency planning and war gaming at the network and

physical layers

Protection

Agility


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Resilience Through Autonomous Adaptation

• Make the collection of links stronger than the sum of the individual parts

o Heterogeneous networking: multi-path routing, network coding, …

o Network interface and control: common status reporting, link selection,…

o Rapid network adaptation in the presence of sudden changes in the

electromagnetic operational environment

o Collective reporting and efficient dissemination of the radio environment

characteristics

o Sensing at a fast time scale to detect communications and network attacks

o Vigilant monitoring of network to detect compromise and attempts for

intrusions

o Isolate compromised subnets upon detection and reconstitute compromised

networks

Resilience

Agility


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ASSURED COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES & TRADES

• Spread Spectrum o Direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS)

o Frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS)

o Hybrid systems

• Directional Antennas

• Geo-Location

o Protect confidentiality of blue forces locations

• Example: Allied geo-location of ships via

HF/DF

o Achieving LPD/LPI goals can reduce ability of

adversary to geo-locate our highly mobile

warfighters

• Jamming Resilience

o Communications that are resilient even in

contested environments

• Throughput

o Constantly increasing warfighter demands for

communications capacity

• Antenna Technologies o Adaptive steering

o Spot beams/nulling beams

o Directional antennas

• Robust Networks o Novel modulation & coding algorithms

o Improved networking technology (E.G. Ipv6)

o New frequency bands

• Spread Spectrum o Direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS)

o Frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS)

o Hybrid systems

Candidate Challenges Candidate Technologies

• LPD/LPI/LPE

o Minimize probability of signal detection

o Minimize probability of signal interception

o Minimize probability of signal exploitation

• Signal Emitter ID

o Prevent adversary from identifying different

signal emitters


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Bottom Line: Assured communications are critical to the

warfighter in all aspects and at every military echelon of

DoD’s core missions

Focused and joint (academia, industry and DoD S&T/R&D)

efforts/programs are developing innovative system concepts

and enabling technologies to counter threats to mission

performance and provide assured high-bandwidth mobile

wireless capabilities, with or without access to infrastructure.

The goal is to deliver critical and timely information via assured

communications to U.S. Forces while denying the same

capabilities to our adversaries.


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THANK YOU


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BACKUPS


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GIG Services

Joint, Allied,

Coalition

SOF

Host Nation

Agencies

NGOsGovernment

Agencies

Civilian

Agencies

JTF/Corps/ Division

II II

Marine Expeditionary

Force

Allied & Coalition

Forces

BCT

Battalions

JTRS

EW & C4 systems

Challenging Spectrum Environment

Strategic Reachback Permanent

Provides Reachback From Forward

Elements To Sustaining Base Or Between

Tactical Units Through High Capacity

Backbones

Resources Centrally Controlled And

Managed Outside Theater

Robust Mostly SATCOM Based

Tactical Maneuver Layer Tactical Warfighter

Communications

Includes All Front Line

Communications

Dismounted Soldiers

Tactical Vehicles

Tactical Aircraft

Ships At Sea

Mission Specific

Generally

Disadvantaged

Mostly Inter-platform

Communications

Tactical BLOS Wide Area High

Capacity Backbone Supports Tactical Maneuver Layer

More Robust With Mix Of SATCOM

And Aerial Elements

May Or May Not Be Mission Specific

Provides Range Extension For

Dispersed Elements

Provides Interconnectivity Between

Large Units Or Between Larger

Tactical Units

COMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT


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Joint Publication 6-0, Joint Communications System

Overview, 10 June 2015

All Joint Functions — Command And Control (C2),

Intelligence, Fires, Movement And Maneuver, Protection,

And Sustainment — Depend On Responsive And

Available Communications Systems That Tie Together

All Aspects Of Joint Operations And Allow The Joint

Force Commanders And Their Staffs To Initiate, Direct,

Monitor, Question, And React.

Section 931 Of The Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense

Authorization Act (NDAA) Directs The Department Of

Defense (DoD) To Submit To Congress A Strategy To

Implement The Joint Information Environment (JIE).

LEADERSHIP INTENT


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Joint Publication 6-0, Joint Communications System Overview, 10 June 2015

Communications System Principles

Interoperable When Information Can Be Exchanged Between Communications

Systems/Equipment Directly And Satisfactorily Between Them And/Or Their

Users. Facilitated By: Common Equipment

Compatibility Of Equipment

Standardization

Liaison

Agile System Agility Attributes

Responsiveness

Flexibility

Innovation

Adaptation

Trusted Trusted Communications Attributes

Survivability

Security

Sustainability

Shared Use Of Information, Services, Or Capabilities Mutual

Vulnerabilities

Require New

Technologies


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• Network Communication Capabilities • Robust/Improved Tactical Data Links

• Resilient Weapons Data Link

• Detection, Correlation And Re-Planning

• Cross-Platform Air-to-Air Connectivity

• Surface Connectivity Without SATCOM

• Contested ISR Dissemination

• Robust Ground Waveforms

• Mid-Tier Ground Connectivity

• Interoperability

• Dealing With Heterogeneity

• Covert Communications Mode

• Adaptive Robust Defense Network Architecture

• Agility With Diminished Spectrum

• Resilient Multi-Layer Communication Capabilities • Correlated Actionable Awareness By Fusing Sensor Data From IP Network, SATCOM Terminal, And

RF/EMI Sensor

• Near Real-time Identification Of Root Cause Of Communications Impairment

• Real-Time ID Of Working Vs Impaired Communications Paths

• Provide Peer Level Visibility Of Network Resources To Tactical Edge Network Users

• Ability To Rapidly Characterize Jamming Environment And Adapt Communications Plans To Maintain

Mission Operations

• Anti-Access/Area-Denial

Communication Capabilities • Situation Awareness Based On System And

Local Metrics For Loads, Contention,

Congestion, And Jamming Effects

• SA Causality And Prediction Analysis Support

User Tools

• Based On SA Information, Dynamic Bandwidth

Allocations Support Commander’s Intent

• During A Jammed A2/AD Situation, Dynamic

Bandwidth Allocations Can Be Made Across

Multiple Satellites To Support Enhanced

Processing And Improved Anti-Jam (AJ)

Resilience

ASSURED COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES


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Robust Waveforms And Networks Make Links Stronger Against Threats

Converged Communications & Electronic Warfare Cooperation Among Blue Force Communications, Jamming, And

Sensing

Resilience Through Autonomous Adaptation Make The Collection Of Links Stronger Than The Sum Of The

Individual Parts


Resilience

Protection

Agility


20 20 “Capturing The Power Of The Network To Achieve Information Dominance And Information Superiority

Through The Deployment Of Ever Increasingly More Capable Sensors And Platforms That Can Be Fully

Networked And Fused To Support Rapid Decision Making With Limited Warfighter Intervention6. ”

DSB6 Figure 4. Metcalf’s Law: The Power of a Network

DSB6 … achieving “the

power of networks”

… increases the ability

to “connect,”

… increase the number

of connectors

… enables an increase

in the information

exchanged as well as

the utility and value of

information exchanged

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS (DoD MILITARY STRATEGY)


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DEPENDENCE ON SATCOM

Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Provide Global, Persistent Means To Move Critical

Information.

Tactical And Strategic Battle Information

Logistics Data

Tech Manuals

Software Upgrades,

Training, Parts & Supply

“Moral Welfare And Recreation" Data

E.G., Troops Keeping In Touch With Families & Friends

Email, Video, Facebook And Other Emerging Social Media).

Adversaries Matching Our Growing Dependence On SATCOM With Countermeasures &

Exploitation

High-Powered Jamming Systems And Signal Detection & Tracking Systems Available In Foreign

Military Supplier Market

Cyber & Physical Attacks On Space Assets & Ground Equipment

Challenge Exacerbated By Growth In Our Reliance On Advanced Unmanned And Manned

Aircraft Systems With Sophisticated Sensor & Data Fusion Systems.

This In Turn Has Increased Our Dependence On Resilient And Protected Communication

Channels Between The Forward Operating Forces And The Control And Planning Centers That

Command Those Forces. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for Public Release

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TECHNICAL CHALLENGES (Network Science)

DoD Networking and Communications Needs To Be Resilient and Assured Across Varying

Sets Of Missions, User Bases, and Bandwidth Changes Of 6 Orders Of Magnitude In An

Operational Environment That Is Mission Critical, Safety Critical, and Time Critical As Well

As Supports “Commander’s Intent”

Committee on Network Science for Future Army Applications, National Research Council in drafting the report on Network Science recommends seven major research challenges, the surmounting of which will enable progress in network science:

Dynamics, spatial location, and information propagation in networks. Better understanding of the relationship between the architecture of a network and its function is needed.

Modeling and analysis of very large networks. Tools, abstractions, and approximations are needed that allow reasoning about large-scale networks, as well as techniques for modeling networks characterized by noisy and incomplete data.

Design and synthesis of networks. Techniques are needed to design or modify a network to obtain desired properties.

Increasing the level of rigor and mathematical structure. Many of the respondents to the questionnaire felt that the current state of the art in network science did not have an appropriately rigorous mathematical basis.

Abstracting common concepts across fields. The disparate disciplines need common concepts defined across network science.

Better experiments and measurements of network structure. Current data sets on large-scale networks tend to be sparse, and tools for investigating their structure and function are limited.

Robustness and security of networks. Finally, there is a clear need to better understand and design networked systems that are both robust to variations in the components (including localized failures) and secure against hostile intent.


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NETWORK RESEARCH AREAS TABLE ES-1 Network Research

Areas


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Sources

– Anant Sahai & Danijela Cabric, "Cyclostationary Feature Detection", Online Presentation, Berkeley Wireless Research Center, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA 2005

– David Nicholson, "Spread Spectrum Signal Design: LPE and AJ Systems", WH Freeman & Co, USA, May 1988.

– Richard Poisel, "Modern Communications Jamming: Principles & Techniques", 2nd Edition, Artech House, Norwood, MA, USA, December 2011.

– Iker Sobron, et alia, "Energy Detection Technique for Adaptive Spectrum Sensing", IEEE Transactions on Communications, Volume 63, Number 3, March 2015.

– Mark Sturza, "Spread Spectrum Techniques & Technology", online briefing (PDF), 3C Systems Company, undated.

– Don Torrieri, "Principles of Secure Communications Systems", 2nd Edition, Artech House, Norwood, MA, USA, 1992.

– Y. Yuan, Zh. Huang, et alia, "Radio Specific Emitter Identification based on non-linear characteristics of signal", Proceedings of IEEE Black Sea Conference on Communications & Networking, IEEE, Constanta, Romania, May 2015.


milcom 2015 panel 27 october - afcea “in order to create an it [information technology]...

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