National Security Concepts Professor: Ephraim Kam Tel Aviv University 26/9 - 2012 Spring Semester 2012

The Impact of the Iran-Iran War on Iran’s National Security Concept

Michael J. Lederman

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Table of Contents

Introduction 3

Background 5

The Iran-Iraq War 6

Analysis: Impact of the Iran-Iraq War on Iran’s National Security Concept 9

Threat perception, allies and international isolation 9

National Strategic Aims 12

Answers 13

Impact on Iran’s arms import and domestic weapons industry 14

Ballistic missile program 18

Pursuit for special weapons capability 19

Nuclear Weapons 21

The rising power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 23

Deterrence 25

Conclusion 27

References 30

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Introduction

Over the years, there have been numerous attempts to locate the roots of the

Islamic Republic’s intentions and motivations in the realm of its national security concept,

given the distinctiveness of its political culture and strategic isolation. In spite of being a rich

and ancient nation historically, Iran has also come to embody the notion of being outsiders in

the international community, in particular after the Iran-Iraq war. This complexity, combined

with the external worlds lack of access to Iran since the Revolution in 1979, has produced a

peculiar view of the Islamic Republic and its seemingly aggressive tone in regards to its

security doctrine, a view defined by mystique and a superficial reading that often places

significant emphasis on Iran’s current regime’s unique and religious characteristics.

Since the Iranian Revolution molded and inspired the actions, conduct and

organization of the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), one can argue the

Revolution had as much, or if not more, of an impact on Iran’s national security concept, than

the war itself. However, I shall argue that the Iran-Iraq war was the defining moment for the

Iranian military and that it continues to underpin most aspects of the Iranian national security

concept. Few wars in history have changed a country’s perception of themselves, and its

relation to the outside world, more than the Iran-Iraq war did for Iran. Furthermore, it left Iran

increasingly isolated and with a deep feeling of victimization and abandonees. From being a

vibrant westernized state under the Shah with many allies and suppliers of sophisticated arms,

Iran was transformed during the course of the war to a nation in doubt, distress, widespread

poverty, religious zeal and international seclusion.

The question I intend to answer in this paper is: How did the Iran-Iraq war

impact on Iran’s national security concept? In the realms of Iran’s national security concept;

ranging from extreme self-reliance, the use of deterrence, the development of a domestic

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weapons production and ballistic missile program to the covert chemical and nuclear weapons

program or the use of proxy terror organization, the Iran-Iraq war was by far the principal

influencing factor in changing the regime’s attitude and dedication to these concepts. The aim

of this study is not to defend the religiously driven authoritarian regime, which has verbally

threatened to eliminate other nations, but instead attempt to provide an answer to the research

question when viewing the issue from an Iranian perspective.

This study considers war to be the most important factor that changes national

security concepts. Concerning which of the three notions of Iran's national security concept

(threat perception, national strategic aims and answers) that has been impacted most by the

war, and hence altered most radically, I shall argue throughout the paper that the answers are

the notion that was effected more than the other two. Therefore, a large emphasis of this

paper will be put on analyzing the impact of the Iran-Iraq war on the answers Iran has

constructed and provided since the war. However, in order to understand the Iranians’

motivations for changing its answers, the beginning of the analysis contains a discussion of

how the war impacted on Iran’s threat perception and its national strategic aims.

Considering periods of time, the paper will focus on how the war impacted on

Iran’s national security concept in the years during the war and more specifically after its end,

but will also analyze how the legacy of the war has had long-term consequences for Iran’s

security doctrine. The paper is composed with a background part, entailing the build-up to the

Iran-Iraq war and the reasons behind the outbreak of hostilities. The following section

describes the different characteristics of the war itself and its decisive moments. After this

introductory part, follows the analysis of the impact of the Iran-Iraq war on Iran’s national

security concept, starting with threat perceptions, followed by national strategic aims, and

finally the answers. Lastly, the conclusion discusses the paper’s findings in regards to the

research question.

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Background

The Iran-Iraq war was initiated over a border dispute in the vicinity of the Shatt

al-Arab river, a dispute originally dating back to the sixteenth century, while political and

economical antagonism between Arabs and Persians, in addition to Sunni and Shi’a Muslims,

can be traced even further. While the countries viewed each other as adversaries during the

greater part of the 1900s, it was in the late 1970s that the true animosity, which led up to the

war, started between the two oil rich nations. (Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 46) The road to the

Iran-Iraq war was facilitated in Saddam Hussein’s personal dissatisfaction with the 1975

Algiers Accords, concerning the border by the Shatt al-Arab river, in combination with his

fear for a spread of the Islamic Revolution, which took power in Iran 1979. Under the Algiers

Accords, Iraq ceded areas of the borderlands along the Shatt al-Arab river to Iran in exchange

for an Iranian agreement not to support the Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. The loss of full

control of the river was humiliating for Saddam Hussein, since Iraq’s minor coastline is

unsuitable for major ports or naval traffic beyond that provided of the Shatt al-Arab river.

(Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 48) The Iranian ruler at the time, the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi

signed the accord for the Iranians. In Iran, the continuing growth of discontent among most

parts of the Iranian population as the Shah’s repression grew in the 1970s, as promised

political and economic reforms failed to materialize, and economic difficulties grew despite

huge oil revenues, led to an outbreak of fierce opposition in the late 1970s. (Keddie, 214) The

Islamic revolution, spearheaded by the charismatic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, overthrew

the Shah in February 1979.

Incidentally, Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini came to power the same

year in their respective states. The two newly appointed leaders, Saddam Hussein as the Iraqi

President, and Ayatollah Khomeini as the Supreme Leader of Iran until his death, differed

radically in ideology and method, but were both insecure, ruthless men with a grand vision for

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their countries; a vision that far exceeded their military means. Iran’s former secular

dictatorship, under the Shah, had sought stability in relations with its neighbors. However,

soon after taking power, Khomeini and his Islamic clerics, began to call for exporting the

Islamic revolution to other parts of the Muslim world. (Miller & Mylroie, 1990: 106) It is

important to note that Khomeini’s vision was not just aimed for the future Iran or the Shi’a

Muslim world; instead he openly called for a revolution extending throughout the entire

Islamic world that would erase all existing borders. Iraq was an ideal target for expansion

because of its large majority Shi’a population, and Saddam feared that they might rise against

him. Driven by fear of the spread of the Islamic Revolution, and ambition to become a new

regional hegemony, Saddam and his Iraqi forces attacked Iranian territory on September 22,

1980. (Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 49-50)

The Iran-Iraq war

The Iran–Iraq War was one of the longest and most costly conventional wars of

the twentieth century. Iraq, responding to Iranian provocations of exporting the Revolution,

and with ambition of expanding its role in the region, had started what it thought would be a

short, victorious war against a Iran, which was in a turmoil in the aftermath of the Islamic

Revolution. Iran’s army was in chaos and disarray, lacking trained and experienced officers as

the Ayatollah brutally restructured it from within through executions, demotions and coerced

emigration. Saddam Hussein expected a quick easy victory within two or three week, but this

was a mistake of historic proportions. Instead, Iranians rallied behind their new Supreme

Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, and repelled the Iraqi invaders, prolonged the war to eight years

and paid a massive cost in human lives. The war settled into a bloody stalemate between the

smaller but heavily armed Iraq and Iran, which was abandoned and isolated by the

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international community. After its failed invasion, the Iraqi army was able to rebuild and

resurrect itself through economic aid and arms sales, thereby building effective defenses and

hence being able to repel an Iranian invasion initiated in 1982. The result was a military

balance, which facilitated Iraq’s ability to stem Iran’s attempts for advancement on the

battlefield. The most prominent factor that kept Iran fighting and even allowed it to go on the

offensive in 1982 was the permeation of religious zeal and ideological fervor in the Iranian

public, its soldiers and commanders. (Potter & Sick, 2004: 1ff)

The Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers was one of the

gravest crimes committed in the war, a conflict which the Iranians refer to as “The Holy

Defense” or “The Imposed War”. Overall international preference for an Iraqi victory was

evident in the failure to react to these war crimes, and Iraq’s chemical weapons program was

allowed to flourish, and hence, Iraq’s deployment of chemical weapons in the battlefield

continued throughout the war. (Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 61) The phenomenon showed to Iran

how utterly isolated they were internationally. This realization, in addition to the western

arms embargo implemented against Iran, pushed the Revolutionary regime to adopt a security

doctrine based on self-reliance. In the “the war of the cities” Iran had an upfront experience of

ballistic missiles fired at civilian population centers, in particular Teheran and major cities

along the border with Iraq. Saddam began launching air strikes and SCUD surface-to-surface

missiles in 1982 and Iran responded in kind, with the limited capabilities they had at the time.

“The war of the cities” would continue intermittently for the entire conflict (Dodds & Wilson,

2009: 60) and was a representation of the stalemate and the military balance between the two

nations. While Iran lacked adequate counter-measures until the late 1980s, this experience

shaped Iran’s perception of themselves and their initial lack of defensive capabilities in this

realm convinced Iran for the need to develop ballistic missiles of their own.

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A new development in the end of the war was “the war of the Tankers,” which

entailed that each side attacked oil tankers and merchant ships in the Gulf in a bid to deprive

the other of trade, in particular revenue from export of petroleum. This part of the war served

to internationalize the conflict (Keddie, 259), as the Untied States and the Soviet Union acted

to secure their own interest, namely regional influence and the steady import of oil.

In the latter years of the war, the Iranian economy was collapsing, enthusiasm

for prolonged hostilities had completely faded and the US was increasing its financial and

military support for Iraq. On July 20, 1988, Khomeini agreed to an UN-brokered ceasefire,

which he likened to drinking a cup of poison, but according to the Ayatollah “it was needed to

save the Revolution.” (Keddie, 259) In a struggle that pitted Iranian religious zealots against a

smaller, but modernized Iraqi army, discipline and modern arms prevailed. (Pelletiere &

Johnson, 1991: 3) The Iran-Iraq war ended after eight years of brutal fighting, and with broad

estimates between 400.000 and one million casualties combined on both sides. The failure to

achieve the aims of the war is vividly reflected in Iran’s terms of peace, where they fell short

on almost all levels. Khomeini demanded the removal of the Ba’th party in Iraq as well as

large payment of war reparations. However, neither of these sizeable terms was granted in the

ceasefire agreement. Over the course of the war, Khomeini’s ambition was to prove his divine

power to the Muslim world by gaining a decisive military victory over Iraq. Instead, the

failure on the battlefield, in addition to the prolonged war efforts that resulted in incalculable

numbers of widows and the feeling of ultimate sacrifice without sufficient reward among

Iranians, effectively halted the initial glory and advance of the Islamic Revolution.

Consequently, the Supreme Leader had to abandon the idea of spreading the Revolution, and

focus shifted to safeguarding the Revolutionary regime’s survival domestically. (Dodds &

Wilson, 2009: 67) The war became one of the longest conventional wars in modern history,

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due to military ineptitude, strong ideological and political influences, and finally geopolitical

factors. (Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 47)

Analysis: Impact of the Iran-Iraq War on Iran’s National Security Concept

Threat perception, allies and international isolation

The largest threat to the pre-war Revolutionary Iran was the collapse and fall of

the new regime and hence the Revolution. Khomeini’s hope was to turn the attention of the

Iranian people outward, rather than focusing on domestic political uncertainty and economic

difficulties inside Iran. (Dobbs & Wilson, 49) In spite of this, opposition elements against the

Revolutionary regime and the power of the Supreme Leader were still prevalent. However,

Khomeini was able to rally support and unite the Iranian nation, mainly through the sudden

war with Iraq and the emphasis of religious zeal, sacrifice and martyrdom as the means to be

triumphant in the war. Since the Shah’s alignment with the Untied States ended on the eve of

the Revolution, the United States posed one of the gravest threats against the regime’s

survival. However, it was still the neighbor in the west, Iraq, who posed the most severe threat

against Iran in the year between the Revolution and the outbreak of the war.

With the eruption of hostilities, Iran’s situation changed drastically. During the

war, Iraq received extensive arms and military support from the Soviet Union, France, China

and, most importantly, the United States. The US provided economical, intelligence and

military support for Iraq, particularly in the latter years of the war. Iran found itself

abandoned by its former allies and arms suppliers, and completely isolated from the Arab

world, with the rare exception of alignment with Syria, from 1980, followed by Libya in

1985. (Lotfian, 1997: 21) Teheran had to scrounge the world for new sources of arms, finding

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suppliers in China, Soviet Union, North Korea, Libya and elsewhere. When it comes to the

two Superpowers of the world during the Cold War, both declared neutrality in the beginning

of the war, only to eventually restore relations with Iraq, (Dobbs & Wilson, 58-59) and

simultaneously neglect Iran and its Islamic regime. Once again, Iran found themselves alone

in a hostile world without any real friends or allies. This experience and feeling of

victimization of being deserted in the midst of a national crisis, in addition to the effect of the

relative international silence on Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, made Iran reevaluate their

threat perception, and its ever shrinking list of allies.

The war ended when Khomeini agreed to the UN-proposed ceasefire agreement 598,

and the Ayatollah defended his decision to end hostilities by stating: “it was needed to save

the Revolution.” (Keddie, 259) This highlights the regime’s highest priority threat, namely

security of the regime and the Revolution. Moreover, the threat of potential secessionist

movement in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan was also prevalent in the post-war period.

Since Iran came out of the war as the defeated power, Iran consequently gained in

threat level in Iranian eyes. Therefore, the threat perception against future military incursions

from regional states such as Iraq or Saudi Arabia was high, in particular the fear for reignited

hostilities against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which came out of the war somewhat of a Arab

regional hegemony. However, Shahram Chubin argues that in the aftermath of the war, Iran

had no pressing regional threats. Iraq, despite its dangerous ambitions and clandestine

progress, was not an immediate threat. (Chubin, 1994: 81)

When it comes to superpower support, the impact of the war for Iran was that it found

itself without significant allies, especially the lack of superpower allies. Therefore, the US

presence after the war in the Persian Gulf was seen as a potential threat that Iran would prefer

to neutralize, or in worst-case scenario, eliminate through its own means. In other words, with

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a mounting US presence in the early 1990s in the Gulf, combined with the uncertainty about

continuity of conventional arms supplies, or future oil revenues to fund them, and the general

sense of embattlement and isolation; Iran’s legacy of the Iran-Iraq war concerning the notion

of threat perception was higher, more volatile and less assuring than before the war.

The Gulf Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, were also seen as a threat in the eyes of

the Iranians, in particular when we examine their action and alignment during the Iran-Iraq

war. The Gulf States feared the expansion of Iran’s Revolution, which threatened to

overthrow the monarchial regimes of the Gulf. For them, Iraq was the first line of defense

against the spread of the Islamic Revolution and hence received substantial economic and

political assistance from them. Even before the outbreak of hostilities, Iran had engaged in

irresponsible rhetoric and in actions that appeared to threaten the stability and to bring into

question the legitimacy of the Arab regimes of the Gulf. Once the tide of war turned in Iran’s

favor in 1982, the Gulf States were alarmed by the implications for themselves of an Iranian

victory. At the height of Iran’s military successes, Khomeini gave an indication of his future

vision of the region. He predicted that after Saddam’s defeat, the Iraqi people “will set up

their own government according to their wishes; an Islamic one. If Iran and Iraq merge and be

amalgamated, all the smaller nations of the region will join them.” The prospect of a merger

of Iran and Iraq, with the small states of the Gulf being drawn into the union was hardly a

reassuring one. (Bakash, 2004: 24) Israel poses a severe threat to Iran today over its nuclear

weapons program, however in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war this was not the case.

Nevertheless, the very close relationship between Israel and the Shah’s regime, in particular

in the realms of military and intelligence cooperation, (Bar, 2004: 14) has always permeated a

deep suspicion against the Jewish state within the echelon of Iran’s Revolutionary top

echelon.

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National Strategic Aims

Iran’s national strategic aim in the years of the Shah was primarily stability of

the regime, securing oil revenue and regional security. The Shah’s ultimate aim was to mould

Iran into a superpower on the level of the great powers of the world in the mid 1970s.

Furthermore, keeping good relations with the West, in particular the US, was an important

part for enabling these aims. With the Islamic Revolution came a radical change in the

strategic aims of Iran. Before the Iran-Iraq war, exporting the Revolution was the primary aim

of the regime. Survival of the regime was another aim, but since the Islamic regime was

riding high on popularity and status in 1979, amongst other factors for defying the United

States in the hostage taking of the US embassy in Teheran, hence survival of the regime was

an implicit aim; the Ayatollah felt during the post-war period that his regime was invincible

and that God would protect it, and furthermore bring them glory and regional influence.

Becoming a regional hegemony and the leader of the Islamic world was yet another strategic

aim before the war.

With the Iran-Iraq war, came a realization and a following shift in the regime’s

national strategic aims. Regime security, or the security of the Revolution, now became the

top priority aim. (Chubin, 1994: 84) Over the commencing period of the war, Khomeini’s

ambition was to prove his divine power to the Muslim world by gaining a decisive military

victory over Iraq. Instead, the failure on the battlefield, in addition to the prolonged war

efforts that resulted in incalculable numbers of widows and the feeling of ultimate sacrifice

without sufficient reward, effectively halted the initial glory and advance of the Islamic

Revolution. Consequently, the Supreme Leader had to abandon his strategic aim of spreading

the Revolution, and focus shifted to safeguarding the Revolutionary regime’s survival

domestically. (Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 67) As Michael Connell comments, “after the war,

Tehran gradually scaled back its efforts to export its Revolution.” (Connell, 2010: 2) The

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second strategic aim of exporting its own model of the Islamic Revolution was not prioritized,

but was still relevant, which in turn created a threat perception among other Muslim countries.

Another important aim after the war was national security, meaning the maintenance of

territorial integrity and regional influence. This is a direct legacy of the war, since for the first

time in decades, the Iranians were invaded by a foreign army, and struggled over eight years

to come out victorious at the end of the hostilities. Therefore, territorial integrity is a top

priority for the Islamic regime to this day. Moreover, becoming a regional hegemony and a

leader of the Muslim world is still a national strategic aim. (Chubin, 1994: 84) The imperative

need for self-reliance as a strategic aim is also a consequence of the war with Iraq, where

domestic weapons production, the development of chemical and nuclear weapons, and the

increasingly advanced ballistic missile program are essential components. This entails

securing a self-dependent way of life for the nation. Iran’s clerical leaders have acknowledged

that they have been making a major, even asymmetric, investment in defense, defending it as

a prudent policy. They say that the weapons systems are “intended to protect the Revolution”.

Former President Rafsanjani, who also was the commander in chief of the armed forces

during the last years of the Iran-Iraq war, summarizes Iran’s experience and lesson from the

war adequately: “We live in a world in which one cannot afford to neglect one’s defensive

capability.” (Chubin, 1994: 86)

Answers

As mentioned before, the gravest impacts on Iran’s national security concept

came in the realm of the answers Iran provided as a product of its experience during the war.

This section will start by discussing the wars impact on Iran’s arms imports and domestic

weapons industry, followed by its ballistic missile program and its pursuit for special weapons

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capability. After, a analysis of the wars impact on Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the rising power

of the IRGC, and finally discuss the use of deterrence as a part of Iran’s national security

concept.

The wars impact on Iran’s arms imports and domestic weapons industry

The arms embargo and sanctions implemented against Iran during and after the

war gave it experience in utilizing the black market and highlighted the need to expand the

sources for arms. But what it taught Iran more than anything else, was the imperative and

impending need for an increase of self-reliance, mainly through the development of a

domestic weapons production, in order to reduce the vulnerability to a surprising halt in

supply of arms, weapons system and supplies. In addition, the need for utter self-reliance was

enhanced when Iran saw its former international allies and the United Nations unwilling to

condemn Iraq for its initial aggression in starting the war, but more importantly, for using

chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and ballistic missiles against city centers. This

reinforced the Iranians’ resolve to shift its national security doctrine to a pillar of self-

reliance. (Chubin, 1994: 70) The legacy of the Iran-Iraq war has steered Iran’s view on arms

and weaponry to notions such as domestic production, development of chemical and nuclear

weapons, ballistic missiles used for deterrence, and above everything else, no self-deception

concerning the reliance on the international community to defend its position, or any powerful

ally that could work to deter any future aggressor. (Chubin, 1994: 71) Most of Iran's weapons

before the Islamic Revolution were imported from the United States and Europe. For instance

between 1971 and 1975, the Shah went on a shopping spree, ordering $8 billion in weapons

from the US alone. (Keddie, 165) While Iranian urban society was becoming increasingly

westernized under the Shah, the rising revenues from oil exports provided a massive resource

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bank for arms purchases from western countries, especially the US. At the time of the

Revolution and the overthrow of the Shah, Iran had a modern arsenal of state of the art

weapons systems, an advanced air force and an overall sophisticated military establishment.

After the Islamic Revolution and the start of the Iran-Iraq war, economic

sanctions and an international arms embargo led by the United States, coupled with a high

demand for military hardware, required Iran to rely on its domestic arms industry for repair

and spare parts. When the war ended in 1988, Iran was confronted with a military in extreme

distress, suffering from losses over eight years of war, and turmoil in the ranks of its armed

forces. Furthermore, during the course of the war Iran had lost its’ previously reliable arms

supplier, mainly the US and Western nations, leaving it’s regime and military forced to seek

arms from alternative markets. Under the pressures of war, most Iranian western military

supplies were quickly exhausted and replacements became increasingly difficult to come by.

Consequently, the replacing supply and arms providers were improvised, since

Iran was not in a position to choose its sellers any longer, leaving the country with military

equipment from over 20 countries. As Chubin puts it: “given the US, and later Western, arms

embargo, Iran primarily sought East bloc sources. From 1985-88 Europe accounted for 41

percent and China 34 percent, with North Korea also an important supplier. From 1988-92

Russia accounted for 64 percent, China 16 percent and Europe only 8 percent.” (Chubin,

1994: 72) The radical shift in markets, as the numbers clearly shows, made Iran pursue a

complete switchover for its defense needs from the US and Europe to countries like Russia,

North Korea and China. The reorientation extracted a heavy price in terms of professionalism

and growth of the Armed Forces. In sharp contrast to the regime under the Shah, the

Revolutionary Iran saw grave dangers in dependence on foreign sources of supplies; reliance

in ourselves, and no one else, was the motto of the future Revolutionary regime.

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Under the Shah, Iran had established a relatively small but effective weapons

industry, which mainly produced small arms, ammunition, batteries, tires, explosive and

mortar rounds. However, the Revolution halted all activities and by 1981 the industry had lost

almost its entire managerial staff and thus the regime had no control of its facilities. This

situation changed radically in the early years of the Iran-Iraq war. The eruption of hostilities

with Iraq, in addition to the arms embargo implemented by the West, worked as a catalyst for

reorganizing and expanding Iran’s defense industries. In 1981, the Revolutionary regime

merged the country's military industrial units and placed them under the Defense Industries

Organization (DIO), which would supervise production activities and was under the auspices

of the chairman of the Supreme Defense Council (SDC), namely Iran’s President. By 1986, a

large number of infantry rifles, machine guns, and mortars were being manufactured

domestically. By 1987, Iran claimed to have manufactured an undisclosed number of ballistic

missiles, the Oghab rockets, presumably an attempt to plagiaries the Soviet-made Scud-B

surface-to-surface missiles. (FAS, 2000) Domestic arms production was however not seen as

a universal remedy from the weapons suppliers lost in the Iran-Iraq war. This kind of industry

could replace imports of items such as small arms and spare parts and serve as a base to

develop Iran’s own technology, but in the long run it could not be a substitute for imports of

completed weapons system such as aircrafts or tanks, neither in economical nor qualitative

terms. In the three years after the war, Iran accelerated its military effort between 1988-91,

importing military equipment for an average two billion dollars a year. (Chubin, 1994: 73) Its

emphasis during those years, as a direct impact of the war, was to rebuild or replace forces

and equipment lost in the war, rather than efforts of expansion.

The main focus for imports was laid on air force and navy, the latter through the

procurement of submarines, shore-to-sea missiles, mines and a large number of fast patrol

boats. The navy was organized and structured after Iran’s experience during the latter years of

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the Iran-Iraq war, when the "war of the tankers" materialized. In fact, the “war of the tankers”

served to internationalize the conflict. After repeated Iranian attacks on its vessels, Kuwait

appealed to outside powers for protection, as both the US and the Soviet Union stepped in. In

response to Iranian attacks on US-flagged Kuwaiti vessels, the US destroyed a number of

Iranian ships and oil platforms. (Keddie, 259) This development increased the suspicion and

antagonism against the US and the west, in the post-war period and this suspicion is prevalent

even until the present day. Furthermore, it became more evident for Iran that it ought to

develop its own ability in an attempt to mirror the technology of its likely enemies, the US

and the west, and hence provide a stable and self-reliant source of military equipment for the

future.

Today’s conventional weapons defense industry includes the production of

ships, aircraft, missiles, tanks and rifles. However, the quality of this industry is highly

questioned, depending much on the brain drain that Iran suffered in the post-Revolution

period, its deficiency in technological knowhow as well as the international sanctions it has

suffered for its refusal to declare clear intentions over its nuclear program.

Moreover, the Iran-Iraq war was the definite starting point of Iran’s ballistic

missile program, developed and manufactured domestically. In the "war of the cities", both

sides pounded their adversary's civilian population from the air with missiles, resulting in

devastation of infrastructure and a overall feeling of terror among the population in each

country. The experience of the “war of the cities”, which saw hundreds of rockets targeting

civilians in Iran’s capital Teheran and other major cities, pushed Iran’s regime to pursue its

own ballistic missile production.

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Ballistic missile program

Once Iran could repel Iraq’s initial advances from the beginning of the war, a

new form of war of attrition evolved. From 1982-1988, one of the most devastating aspects of

the Iran-Iraq war was Iraqi and Iranian air and missiles attacks on each other’s population

centers, known as the “war of the cities”. These relentless attacks against Teheran, Baghdad

and other major cities took out a huge cost in human lives and city infrastructure. But above

anything else, it had a devastating impact on the national morale in the two countries. (Karsh,

2002: 41) Hence, the legacy of the war in Iranian eyes was more than many other

consequences; an upfront experience of ballistic missiles fired at civilian population centers in

the “war of the cities,” in addition to the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iranian

soldiers. This experience shaped Iran’s perception of themselves and their lacking defensive

capabilities in this realm, as for years Iraqi missiles crashed through day and night to spread

terror among Iranian city dwellers hundreds of miles from the front, while Iran lacked

adequate counter-measures until the late 1980s. Relentless Iraqi and Iranian shelling

practically destroyed each other’s cities and towns near the international border during the

latter part of the war. (McNaugher, 1990: 5) Iran’s ballistic missile program dates back to this

period and its initial encounter with the “war of the cities.” For the regime in Tehran, Iraq’s

use of ballistic missiles against Iranian strategic targets highlighted a critical vulnerability in

Iran’s defenses. As a step to deter Iraq from further attacking its population centers and

strategic industries, Iran initiated its own ballistic missile program, beginning with the first

shipment of a limited number of SCUD-B missiles, purchased from Libya. By the conclusion

of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran had successfully launched over 100 ballistic missiles at Iraqi targets,

varying from Baghdad to military installations. (Connell, 2010: 5)

With the end of hostilities with Iraq, Iranian officials, drawing on recent

experience, viewed ballistic missiles as a means of defense that was easily accessible to them.

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Unlike an air force (which would inevitably be foreign-supplied, costly to train and maintain,

need frequent upgrading and involve dependence on foreign powers), missiles could become

the future foundation of a domestic defense industry, given Iran’s relative autonomy in

security planning after the war. (Chubin, 2002: 54) Today, Iran develops its ballistic missiles

and strategic missile program to be a key in its deterrence strategy, in part since it is widely

perceived to be an integral part of Iran’s chemical and nuclear weapons programs. (Connell,

2010: 7) In 2010, estimates showed that Iran had the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in

the Middle East. Iran continues its efforts to expand the range and improve the performance

of its ballistic missiles, several classes of which can reach Israel and US military installations

in the Persian Gulf. However, many Western experts question the accuracy of these surface-

to-surface missiles. Furthermore many assess that they are, besides its deterrent factor, likely

to be intended for strategic target such as cities, oil production facilities, ports and water

desalination plants. (Connell, 2010: 6) According to Shmuel Bar, this ballistic missile

capability serves Iran threefold in the aftermath of the war: first, as a substitute for long-range

modern aircraft, which Iran cannot purchase due to American sanctions and pressures;

second, as a deterrent vis-à-vis Iraq, Israel, and the United States; and third, as a national

symbol of pride for Iran's membership in the club of regional powers possessing a long arm,

and thus, a country that should be suitably respected. (Bar, 2004: 49)

Pursuit for special weapons capability

Iran’s emphasis on rebuilding, reorganizing and pursuing its independent

domestic arms production for both conventional weapons and special weapons capabilities

was not only driven from, but rested its foundations on, its experience and feeling of

victimization during the Iran-Iraq war. In this case, special weapons capabilities mainly entail

20

chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. During the war, Iran found itself in a position

where it lacked the capabilities to respond effectively to the Iraqis' use of chemical weapons

and ballistic missiles, and furthermore understood how lonely and helpless it was in the arms

realm through the international arms embargo initiated by the West. (FAS, 2000) I argue that

the absence of a tough and unambiguous response or condemnation from the international

community of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in the war, and the relative Western support of

Iraq generally throughout the war, gave the incentive for the Iranians to initiate programs of

weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, I argue that the use of chemical weapons and gas

against soldiers and civilians was the most serious war crimes committed during the war.

Because of the severity of the war crime, the use of chemical weapons was the war’s only

feature over which the international community had a moral, and possibly legal, obligation to

intervene militarily. In addition, the great powers of the world also had a security interest

because of the threat of proliferation of these heinous weapons of mass destruction. In the

eyes of Iran, who was the victim of most these attacks, the fact that the international

community had the opportunity and perhaps even the interest to intervene, yet failed to do so,

(Hiltermann, 2004:152) once again showed how utterly isolated and friendless Iran was, and

that self-reliance was the only viable solution to this problem.

Consequently, the effect of the relative international silence on Iraq’s use of

chemical weapons and gas was the decision by the Iranian regime to launch its own chemical

weapons program, in addition to the development of biological and nuclear weapons. As Joost

R. Hiltermann suggests: “the Iranian chemical weapons program is thus a direct result of the

Iraqi chemical weapons program, Iraq’s repeated chemical weapons use in the war, and the

failure of the international community to put an end to it, or even give it the serious and

sustained attention it was due.” (Hiltermann, 2004: 159) This implies that Iran’s initial pursuit

for and most of its active, or inactive, existing programs for special weapons capabilities

21

today, would thus be a direct result of this failure, resting upon the international communities

shoulders. Furthermore, in the perception of the Islamic regime, the reluctance of the

international community to point out Iraq as the aggressor to the war or to condemn its use of

chemical weapons also demonstrated to the regime and the its protector, the IRGC, the West’s

determination in bringing down the Islamic Republic. (Samuel, 2012: 9) Today, Iran is a

signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which allows for relatively intrusive

inspection. Upon signing, Iran officially confessed that it had a chemical weapons program

developed towards the end of the Iraq-Iran war. However, they claim that it was later

dismantled, which western expert highly doubt, (Bar, 2004: 50) in particular because of their

close alignment with the al-Assad regime in Syria, widely known to have one of the largest

chemical weapons stockpiles in the world.

The permeated sense of victimization due to having been attacked by chemical

weapons in the war has enabled Iran to emphasize the importance of possession of arms that

are equivalent to those of its enemies. This assertion relates to the Iranian concept of “like for

like deterrence.” Therefore, the possession of chemical weapons is dictated by the fact that

these weapons were in the hands of Iraq and used against Iran. Therefore, the future

acquisition of nuclear weapons will eventually be justified by the fact that Israel, Pakistan and

India have such weapons. (Bar, 2004: 45)

Nuclear Weapons

The pursuit for nuclear weapons capability would be consistent with Iran’s

perception of the world and themselves, including the role they aspire to play in it. The Iran-

Iraq war left Iran with an overall feeling of siege and hostility from the international

community, and a strong permeated sense of victimization and unfair treatment of itself. In

22

turn, Iran has aspired to achieve recognition as a regional hegemonic power with equal

influence as the great nations of the world. (Chubin, 1994: 80) The apparent primary

motivation for Iran’s decision to develop its nuclear weapons program was the Iraqi threat and

its embodiment in the Iran-Iraq War, which effectively illustrated to Iranian regime the

meaning of the chemical threat and the devastation ballistic missiles can cause. (Kam, 2007:

25) The decision to develop nuclear weapons was taken as a direct impact and legacy of the

war and Iran’s experience during it, in addition to a determination that in a future conflict

never again stand alone without an efficient deterrent against the country’s enemies. In

particular, the war exposed Iranian military and strategic weakness and vulnerability, for

which a nuclear weapons capability could function as compensation. Iran's emphasis on

pursuing nuclear weapons production was therefore driven by its encounters throughout the

war with Iraq, during which it was unable to respond adequately to Iraqi chemical and missile

attacks, and suffered the effects of an international arms embargo.

Moreover, acquiring nuclear weapons capability would serve the Islamic regime

in many other aspects, besides being a reaction the Iran-Iraq war: first, it would further assert

Iran’s self reliance and demonstrate the progress and advancement of its technology; second,

it would enable the Iranian regime to divert attention from domestic issues and failures, as it

would affirm the success of the Islamic Revolution; third, it might reduce the high need for

conventional military expenditure in the future; fourth, it would provide Iran with a tool

through which they could play a more assertive regional and international role. Nuclear

weapons would make Iran a contender, a nation that no other state can push around, but

instead be coerced to take seriously. (Chubin, 1994: 80)

Foreign attempts to deter Iran from achieving this goal, whether it has been

through economic sanctions or threat of military intervention, have been seen by the regime

as an affront to Iran’s national pride and have resulted in stronger patriotic support of its

23

nuclear weapons efforts. The fact that the United States attacked Iraq in 2003, despite Iraq

having chemical and biological weapons, only strengthened the Iranian resolve to achieve

nuclear capability. This capability is, in the perception of the Iranian regime, the only non-

conventional capability that effectively can deter the US or any other nation from attacking

Iran’s nuclear facilities. (Bar, 2004: 49-50)

The rising power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

In the year of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the loathing of the Ayatollah and

his clerics toward the former Shah’s Imperial army was profound. He viewed it as the

principal agency whereby secular ideas were spread into Iranian civil society. Furthermore,

Khomeini saw it as a remnant of imperialist and American influence, and would have most

likely disbanded and destroyed the army, had not the Iran-Iraq war forced him to concede and

instead utilize what was left of its structure. During the course of the war most of the former

Shah’s prominent officers were executed. All in all, over 10 000 military personnel of all

ranks were purged during the first year of the Islamic Revolution. When the war started Iran’s

army was in disarray, lacking officers with military experience and adequately trained

soldiers to handle its western supplied sophisticated weapons system. (Schahgaldian, 1987:

17ff) Khomeini needed a force he could trust, in addition to safeguarding the survival of the

regime and thus ensuring the endurance of the Revolution. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards

Corps (IRGC) was the military and political organization that helped consolidate the Islamic

Republic under Khomeini in the wake of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and was therefore

the natural choice for the Ayatollah. The IRGC, which has been charged with guarding the

Revolution ever since, has played an imperative part in defending the new regime. (Samuel,

2012: 1-2) It was during Iran’s counter-offensive against Iraq in 1982, that the IRGC gained

24

in reputation and popularity, and became the primary fighting arm of the Iranian forces.

(Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 54) The importance of the war for the IRGC, or Pasdaran as they are

often referred to, cannot be understated. They went from being, in the early days of the war, a

small force with limited resources and personnel, to the primary Iranian military

establishment with their own bases, facilities, businesses, intelligence and weapons

production facilities.

The IRGC is almost a parallel-armed force to the regular army, enjoying greater

proximity and trust of the dispensation than the regular Armed Forces. It is a reflection of the

distrust toward the regular Armed Forces that the IRGC has not only been allowed to develop

its own Navy and Air Force, but has also been allowed to set up and run its own defense

industries. The IRGC was most effective in its operation during the war in the invaded

Khuzestan, as the numerically superior Iranians overcame technologically superior Iraqi

forces at the cost of heavy casualties. However, the Revolutionary convinced and zealous

IRGC commanders and troops were willing to accept this price. (Dodds & Wilson, 2009: 55)

The Iran-Iraq war taught the Revolutionary Guards that strength in numbers and commitment

to Jihad are not enough for national defense. Many of them were personally affected by Iraq’s

superior weaponry and chemical weapons capabilities, and recognized their destructive force

on Iranian moral and consequently war fatigue. Ensuring that Iran possessed a quantity and

quality of armaments more equal to that of its enemies thus became a top priority for the

IRGC. Possessing such destructive power would deter most enemies from attacking Iran in

the first place, and it would make an attack costly for any state that chose to initiate a conflict.

(Samuel, 2012: 15) A way for the IRGC to sustain their heightened position is to continue

exaggerate the threats against the Islamic Republic. However, they see the Iraqi invasion in

1980 and the actions of the United Stated and western powers during the war, as proof that the

threats are real, and this have shaped their actions and conduct ever since. Furthermore,

25

keeping the “Holy Defense” alive allows the IRGC to shape the historical and contemporary

significance of the war and to secure their position as Iran’s main defenders and provider of

the country’s most inflammatory rhetoric. (Samuel, 2012: 20) The international isolation of

Iran in the post-war period enabled the IRGC to further enhance military and financial support

for Islamic terrorist groups elsewhere in the Middle East, in particular Hezbollah in Lebanon

and Islamic Jihad in Gaza. It is believed that the IRGC is also responsible for the Iranian

ballistic missile stockpile and its operations, in addition to essential elements of Iran’s nuclear

weapons program. (Bar, 2004: 30)

Deterrence

After the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian strategic doctrine took a primarily defensive

nature and was instead based on deterring perceived adversaries. Given the costs and the

difficulty of catching up conventionally after the war to more superior states and armies, it

made sense for Iran to examine other means to deter these advanced states. As for Iraq, it was

clear that Iran could not afford any similar surprises in the future; it would need chemical

weapons for deterrence; ballistic missiles to supplement an air force that would be weak for

many years, and to deter the use of an adversary's missiles or other means of attack. (Chubin,

1994: 71) For instance, Iran’s ballistic missile program is now key to its deterrence strategy,

in part because it is implicitly linked to Iran’s weapons of mass destruction programs.

(Connell, 2010: 7) Iran makes no apologies for seeking ballistic missile capability,

considering it an essential part of its deterrent strategy. Iran therefore equates missiles with

advanced weapons, precision, and most importantly deterrence. It seeks a deterrent force and

arms with effective deterrent capabilities, which, together with defense preparedness, have

become the basis of Iran’s strategic strategy after the Iran-Iraq war. (Chubin, 2002: 53)

26

Hence, Iran argues that the ballistic missiles are both for defense and deterrence, and

occasionally state that they are for the benefit of the wider Islamic and Arab world, thereby

reflecting their quest for regional influence and ultimately hegemony. Iranian officials have

often referred to ballistic missiles as intended for deterrence and reserved for defense and

retaliation, rather than for initiating any hostile action. (Chubin, 2002: 58) However, the

parallel development of chemical and nuclear weapons programs raises the question of

whether missiles will be armed with such weapons of mass destruction in the future. (Chubin,

2002: 58) This ambiguity and unpredictability increases Iran’s deterrence level towards its

enemies, since it is becoming ever more difficult to make a reliable military assessment about

these programs.

Furthermore, Iranian deterrence is based on threatening any aggressor with the

capability to withstand a first strike and consequently enjoy the capacity to deliver a “like for

like” second strike, a non-proportional response and escalation. Moreover, Iran experience

from the Iran-Iraq war is indicative that they have a willingness to prolong a potential war and

accept casualties, widening the scope of the war to other theaters, escalation of means,

including the use of terrorist organization. Terrorism, in particular the use of Hezbollah and

Islamic Jihad, has served Iran as a deterrent tool towards its enemies since the late 1980s.

Despite formal denials of involvement in terrorism, Iran's reputation also serves as part of its

deterrent image. (Bar, 2004: 2) Hence, when pending the development of reliable long-range

ballistic missiles in the aftermath of the war, or a potential nuclear weapon, Iran had the

capacity to arrange a interim deterrent by using Hezbollah as a strategic ally and launching

pad, providing capabilities to commit terror acts world wide and arming it with missiles with

enough range to reach deep into Israel. (Chubin, 2002: 59)

In building their deterrent power, the IRGC seem to have learned from their

experiences in the Iran-Iraq war. When Jafari, commander-in-chief for the IRGC, stated in

27

2008 that Iranian forces would strike U.S. bases in the Gulf if they were used for an attack on

Iran, he warned that Iran would defend itself “with all its might and that this might is far

greater than its strength at the time of the war against Saddam Hussein’s regime.” (Samuel,

2012: 15) The rhetoric used by Iranian leaders is often inflammatory, provocative and used as

an instrument to garner domestic support, while simultaneously is intended to deter foreign

elements from confronting the Islamic Republic.

Conclusion

I have argued that Iran’s war with Iraq has been the defining moment for

Iranian strategic thinking and that it continues to underpin most aspects of the Iranian national

security concept. As a direct impact of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran was left increasingly isolated

and with a deep feeling of victimization and abandonees, which completely altered their

thinking concerning their security doctrine. With a mounting US military presence in the early

1990s in the Persian Gulf, combined with the uncertainty about continuity of conventional

arms supplies, and the general sense of embattlement and international isolation, Iran’s legacy

of the war concerning the notion of threat perception was higher, more volatile and less

assuring than before the war. Iran’s threat perception in the post-war period was primarily

focused internally to survival of the regime and the Revolution, and externally toward Iraq,

the United States, the Gulf States and Israel. The Islamic regimes initial national strategic

aims were halted after the war by the fact that the regime had to abandon its primary aim of

spreading the Revolution, and focus instead shifted to safeguarding the Revolutionary

regime’s survival domestically. Another important aim after the war was national security,

meaning the maintenance of territorial integrity, securing oil revenue and gaining regional

influence. The overall need for self-reliance as a strategic aim had its consequences in Iran’s

28

concept of answers, to its threat perception and national strategic aims. Regional hegemony

was something Iran aspired for, but in the years following the war it was to weak to

materialize this ambition.

The experience in the Iran-Iraq war taught Iran above anything else, the

imperative need for a drastic increase in self-reliance, mainly through the development of a

domestic weapons production, in order to reduce the vulnerability to a surprising halt in

supply of arms and weapons systems. The need for utter self-reliance was enhanced when

Iran saw its former international allies and the United Nations unwilling to condemn Iraq for

its initial aggression in starting the war, but more importantly, for using chemical weapons

against Iranian soldiers and ballistic missiles against population centers. The Iran-Iraq war

was therefore the definite starting point of Iran’s ballistic missile program, developed and

manufactured domestically. Iran has developed its ballistic missiles and strategic missile

program to be the foundation of its deterrence strategy, in part since it is widely perceived to

be an integral part of Iran’s chemical and nuclear weapons programs. Iran’s emphasis on

rebuilding, reorganizing and pursuing its independent domestic arms production for both

conventional weapons and special weapons capabilities was therefore not only driven from,

but rested its foundations on, Iran’s experience and feeling of victimization during the Iran-

Iraq war. Furthermore, the Iraqi use of chemical weapons gave the incentive for the Iranians

to initiate programs for weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, I have argued that the

absence of a tough and unambiguous response or condemnation from the international

community of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, in addition to the severe Iraqi threat and its

embodiment in the Iran-Iraq war, was the primary motivation for Iran’s decision to develop

its nuclear weapons program. The importance of the war for the IRGC cannot be understated,

who ascended in power and influence due to its expanded fighting role during the war and its

close connection to the regime’s security and the survival of the Revolution.

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Few wars in history have changed a country’s perception of themselves, its relation to the

outside world, and its national security concept more than the Iran-Iraq war did for the

unique, revolutionary Islamic regime in Teheran. The aim of this study was not to defend the

religiously driven authoritarian Iranian regime, but instead attempt to offer an Iranian

perspective into why, by what catalysts and how the Iran-Iraq war impacted on Iran’s national

security concept. With a wider comprehension of Iran's perspective we may or may not yield

greater empathy for their cause, but it will provide us with a tool to improve our own

understanding of Iran’s motivations, incentives and likely behavior in the future.

30

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