michael fuller, oregon bar no. 09357media.oregonlive.com/portland_impact/other/1 complaint.pdfaar is...

CIVIL COMPLAINT -

OlsenDaines, P.C. US Bancorp Tower 111 SW 5th Ave., 31st Fl. Portland, Oregon 97204 Direct 503-201-4570

Michael Fuller, Oregon Bar No. 09357 Trial Attorney for Mrs. Jimenez OlsenDaines, P.C. US Bancorp Tower 111 SW 5th Ave., 31st Fl. Portland, Oregon 97204 [email protected] Mobile 503-201-4570

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

SANDRA JIMENEZ, Plaintiff, v. RIVERMARK COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION, AMERICAN ASSET RECOVERY, CHRISTOPHER PAYNE, and ANTHONY PAYNE JR., Defendants.

Case No. 3:15-cv-00128 CIVIL COMPLAINT FOR UNFAIR DEBT COLLECTION, ASSAULT, BATTERY, INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL HARM, FALSE ARREST, INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION, AND NEGLIGENCE 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

1.

INTRODUCTION

Defendants attempted to collect debt that Mrs. Jimenez didn’t owe by (1) forging Mrs.

Jimenez’s signature on falsified loan documents, (2) impersonating TriMet workers, then

physically assaulting Mrs. Jimenez outside her home, in front of her young daughter, and (3)

ruining Mrs. Jimenez’s credit when she refused to pay.

Case 3:15-cv-00128-BR Document 1 Filed 01/26/15 Page 1 of 34

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2.

Mrs. Jimenez has never had an account or loan of any kind with Rivermark and has never

even been to a Rivermark branch.

3.

On January 27, 2014, Mrs. Jimenez was physically assaulted outside her home, in front of

her young daughter, by repossession men posing as TriMet workers, sent by Rivermark.

4.

In March 2014, Rivermark forged Mrs. Jimenez’s signature on falsified loan documents

in hopes of tricking her into paying debt it knew she didn’t owe.

5.

In April 2014, when Mrs. Jimenez refused to pay, Rivermark damaged her credit by

furnishing false information about her to the credit reporting agencies.

6.

Mrs. Jimenez immediately filed a police report but as of the date of this complaint,

defendants have not been charged with any crimes.

7.

Having no other option to make things right, Mrs. Jimenez now brings this civil

complaint to recover fair compensation, to hold defendants publicly accountable, and to deter

defendants from doing this again to someone else in the community.

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8.

JURISDICTION AND THE PARTIES

The United States District Court for the District of Oregon has jurisdiction of this action

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367 because the FDCPA is a federal law and Mrs. Jimenez’s

state law claims form part of the same case and controversy as her federal law claim.

9.

This complaint’s allegations are based on personal knowledge as to Mrs. Jimenez’s own

conduct and are made on information and belief as to the acts of others.

10.

The conduct alleged in this complaint stems from the repossession and loan relating to a

2012 Chrysler Town & Country vehicle (the “vehicle”) with a VIN ending in 6201, financed

with Rivermark by Mrs. Jimenez’s husband’s uncle.

11.

Plaintiff Sandra Jimenez is a “consumer” as defined by the FDCPA at 15 U.S.C. §

1692a(3) because she is a natural person allegedly obligated to pay a debt to Rivermark.

12.

Mrs. Jimenez’s alleged obligation to pay Rivermark is a “debt” as defined by the FDCPA

at 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) because it arises out of a consumer transaction, namely a vehicle loan

made from Rivermark to Mrs. Jimenez’s husband’s uncle.

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13.

The financing of the vehicle was a consumer transaction because the vehicle was used

primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

14.

Mrs. Jimenez never agreed to pay her husband’s uncle’s loan with Rivermark, has never

had an account or loan of any kind with Rivermark, and has never even been to a Rivermark

branch.

15.

Defendant American Asset Recovery is an Oregon d/b/a entity with a bad reputation as a

company that disregards the laws governing collections.

16.

American Asset Recovery is a collection agency with a principal place of business

located at 415 NE 127th, Portland, Oregon 97230, currently registered with the Oregon

Department of Finance and Corporate Securities (the “DFCS”), license number 50011, as

required by ORS 607.005 et seq.

17.

At all times material to the allegations in this complaint, the DFCS debt collection license

search database was available to the public.

18.

Defendant Christopher Payne (“Payne”) is a principal and registrant of American Asset

Recovery.


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19.

Defendant Anthony Payne Jr. (“Payne Jr.”) is a principal and the authorized

representative of American Asset Recovery.

20.

American Asset Recovery, Payne, and Payne Jr. are collectively referred to as “AAR”.

21.

AAR has a bond with the DFCS as required by ORS 697.031(2)(a).

22.

AAR was not registered with the DFCS as required by ORS 607.005 et seq., at the time

that AAR was hired by Rivermark to repossess the vehicle.

23.

AAR was not registered with the DFCS as required by ORS 607.005 et seq., on January

27, 2014, when AAR repossessed the vehicle.

24.

AAR was not properly registered with the Oregon Secretary of State (the “SOS”) as an

active business entity at the time that AAR was hired by Rivermark to repossess the vehicle.

25.

AAR was not properly registered with the SOS as an active business entity on January

27, 2014 when AAR repossessed the vehicle.

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26.

At all times material to the allegations in this complaint, the SOS maintained a public

database that listed whether Oregon business entities maintained an active or inactive status.

27.

AAR’s conduct in taking possession of the vehicle, including the assault and battery

inflicted upon Mrs. Jimenez, the use of fraud and trickery in taking possession of the vehicle, and

the other intentional torts as alleged in this complaint, breached the peace, and terminated any

legal right that Rivermark or AAR may have otherwise had to take nonjudicial repossession of

the vehicle.

28.

Defendant Rivermark Community Credit Union (“Rivermark”) is a state chartered credit

union regularly doing business in Oregon, with branches in Multnomah County, and a principal

place of business located at 8505 SW Creekside Place, Beaverton, Oregon 97008.

29.

At all times material to the allegations in this complaint, Rivermark’s employees, agents,

officers, managers, and employees were acting within their scope of employment with

Rivermark.

30.

Rivermark had a duty pursuant to ORS 79.0609 not to breach the peace if it chose to take

possession of the vehicle nonjudicially.

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31.

Rivermark’s duty pursuant to ORS 79.0609 to not breach the peace was non-delegable.

32.

AAR is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA at 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) because it

regularly collects debts owed to secured creditors like Rivermark, through its activities as a

repossession company.

33.


took nonjudicial action to effect dispossession of Rivermark’s collateral by breaching the peace

through unfair and unconscionable means.

34.


uses instrumentalities of interstate commerce (i.e. highways, vehicles regularly used in interstate

commerce, the U.S. Mail system, etc.) in a business, the principal purpose of which is the

collection of debts, including the taking of nonjudicial action to effect dispossession of property

claimed as collateral through enforceable security interests.

35.

Payne and Payne Jr. are liable for the conduct of AAR because they either directly

participated in the conduct of AAR as alleged in this complaint, or were material participants in

AAR’s repossession scheme as alleged in this complaint.

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36.

At all times material to the allegations in this complaint, AAR’s employees, agents,

officers, managers, and employees were acting within their scope of employment with AAR.

37.

Rivermark hired AAR for the corporate purpose of repossession and Rivermark shared a

principal-agent, master-servant relationship with AAR for this purpose because AAR was under

Rivermark’s control, and AAR acted on Rivermark’s behalf, and Rivermark had rights to control

the manner in which AAR conducted itself, and AAR acted within the scope of its ongoing

repossession venture with Rivermark.

38.

Rivermark and AAR worked in partnership in an ongoing venture with a shared

economic interest in repossessing Rivermark’s collateral from Mrs. Jimenez’s property.

39.

Rivermark had reason to know, or should have known, that AAR would commit torts

against Mrs. Jimenez.

40.

Rivermark encouraged AAR to commit torts against Mrs. Jimenez.

41.

Rivermark aided and abetted AAR in AAR’s commission of torts against Mrs. Jimenez.

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42.

Rivermark had reason to know that sending AAR to Mrs. Jimenez’s home created an

unreasonable risk that Mrs. Jimenez would be subject to the foreseeable harm that resulted from

AAR’s tortious conduct.

43.

Any wrongdoing committed by AAR against Mrs. Jimenez was in furtherance of AAR’s

principal-agent master-servant relationship with Rivermark and in furtherance of Rivermark and

AAR’s economic interests, and Rivermark is vicariously liable for the wrongdoing committed by

AAR against Mrs. Jimenez.

44.

The venue and division of this Court are proper because the majority of defendants’ acts

and omissions were directed at Mrs. Jimenez while she resided in Clackamas County, Oregon,

and because Rivermark maintains offices in Multnomah County.

45.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

On January 27, 2014, AAR entered Mrs. Jimenez’s property without her permission.

46.

Two men from AAR approached the front door of Mrs. Jimenez’s home wearing orange

vests.

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47.

One of the AAR men falsely communicated to Mrs. Jimenez that he was a TriMet

worker.

48.

Another AAR man began pretending to take measurements of Mrs. Jimenez’s driveway.

49.

AAR lied to Mrs. Jimenez by telling her that TriMet required access to Mrs. Jimenez’s

driveway.

50.

AAR lied to to Mrs. Jimenez by telling her that TriMet required her to move her car that

was parked in her driveway.

51.

Mrs. Jimenez called her husband, who was at work.

52.

Mrs. Jimenez’s husband spoke with AAR over the phone and told AAR to leave.

53.

Mrs. Jimenez hung up the phone, then asked AAR to leave her property and come back

the next day when her husband would be home.

54.

A few minutes later, Mrs. Jimenez watched through the window as an AAR man

forcefully broke into her car parked in her driveway.


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55.

AAR’s refusal to leave Mrs. Jimenez’s property breached the peace.

56.

AAR’s forceful break-in of Mrs. Jimenez’s car breached the peace.

57.

When Mrs. Jimenez walked out of her front door, an AAR man physically blocked her

path.

58.

The AAR man assaulted and battered Mrs. Jimenez by physically pinning her into her

garage door, in front of her young daughter.

59.

AAR’s assault and battery of Mrs. Jimenez breached the peace.

60.

While Mrs. Jimenez was pinned, an AAR man put her car in neutral, then pushed her car

back out of her driveway.

61.

A few seconds later, a black truck pulled up, then towed away the vehicle belonging to

Mrs. Jimenez’s husband’s uncle.

62.

The vehicle was parked in front of Mrs. Jimenez’s car in her driveway.


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63.

As AAR left Mrs. Jimenez’s home, its men honked and waived at her, in an attempt to

humiliate and scare Mrs. Jimenez.

64.

AAR left Mrs. Jimenez’s car out in the street.

65.

AAR’s choice to leave Mrs. Jimenez’s car out in the street breached the peace.

66.

As soon as AAR left her home, Mrs. Jimenez immediately called her husband.

67.

Mrs. Jimenez’s husband came home from work as soon as he could, called the police, and

filed a police report. See Police Incident Report No. 14-2536.

68.

On or about January 28, 2014, Mrs. Jimenez received a letter from Rivermark (the “first

collection letter”).

69.

The first collection letter was addressed to Mrs. Jimenez and was entitled, “Notice Of

Our Plan to Sell Property”, and was dated January 28, 2014.

70.

Among other things, the first collection letter stated, “Ref: 2012 Chrysler”.


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71.

The first collection letter also stated that any amount received from the “Private Sale”,

“will be applied directly to the outstanding balance of your loan”, and, “[t]his notice will be sent

to ALL parties who have an interest in the above-described collateral”.

72.

Mrs. Jimenez has never entered into any loan or other agreement with Rivermark,

including any loan related to the vehicle.

73.

Mrs. Jimenez has never had an account or loan of any kind with Rivermark and has never

even been to a Rivermark branch.

74.

Mrs. Jimenez does not have and never has had any interest in the vehicle.

75.

Not understanding why Rivermark had sent the first collection letter, and fearful that

Rivermark was stating that she had an interest in the vehicle and that she may become liable to

Rivermark after sale of the vehicle, Mrs. Jimenez contacted Rivermark on various occasions to

dispute the statements in the first collection letter.

76.

Mrs. Jimenez spoke with Rivermark employees during these disputes.

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77.

However, the Rivermark employees refused to discuss the letter or account with Mrs.

Jimenez and they stated they could not discuss the account with her as she was not on the

account or loan.

78.

On or about March 26, 2014, Mrs. Jimenez received another collection letter from

Rivermark (the “second collection letter”).

79.

The second collection letter was addressed to Mrs. Jimenez only.

80.

Among other things, the second collection letter stated, “Member Number: 0001865170,

Loan Number: 143, Description of Collateral: 2012 Chrysler”.

81.

The second collection letter stated that, [w]e have disposed of the collateral described

above”.

82.

The second collection letter stated, “Net Amount of deficiency: $10,950.71”.

83.

The second collection letter also stated, “[y]ou are responsible for the deficiency balance.

Failure to remit by 04/11/14 may result in the credit union taking legal action. Interest continues

to accrue on the unpaid balance at a rate of 5.790%”.


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84.

On or about April 7, 2014, Mrs. Jimenez, with the help of her husband, drafted and

mailed a dispute letter to Rivermark (the “dispute letter”).

85.

Among other things, the dispute letter identified the member number and loan number

that Rivermark had provided in its second collection letter and stated, “I am in received [sic] of

your letter dated 03/26/2014 talking about a loan. Note that I Sandra Jimenez never had an

account or loan with your Financial Institution. Please forward me the document to verify my

signature to match it with my own and a copy of my ID card that you must have obtain and keep

in your file required by State and Federal law”.

86.

On or about April 9, 2014, Mrs. Jimenez received an undated cover letter and loan

document package from Rivermark (the “loan documents”).

87.

The loan documents included pages appearing to be an information search by Rivermark

entitled “Individual Lookup” showing Mrs. Jimenez’s name, a membership number of

“1865170” and listing Mrs. Jimenez as a “Co-borrower” on the account, and listing Mrs.

Jimenez’s full social security number and her address, and also included an agreement entitled,

“Loan Agreement and Consumer credit Disclosure Statement” (the “agreement”).

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88.

Among other things, the agreement stated that the “Loan Number” was “146”, the “Date”

was “07/19/2013” and the total “Amount Financed” was “25,540.49”.

89.

The agreement provided that Rivermark was entitled to recover reasonable attorneys fees

in the event collection efforts were required to obtain payment on the account.

90.

The agreement listed the “Security Interest” as “2012 Chrysler Town & Country” with a

“V.I.N./Serial No.” ending in “6201” and the last page of the agreement stated that “you have

signed this agreement on 07/19/2013 and acknowledge that You have read it, that You

understand it, and that You have received a completely filled-in copy of it”.

91.

The third page of the agreement showed digital signatures in signature type font of

“Alberto Aroche” and “Sandra Jimenez” with the dates of the digital signatures listed as

“07/18/13”.

92.

On or about April 10, 2014, Mrs. Jimenez sent another letter to Rivermark disputing

liability for the deficiency debt/loan.

93.

On or about April 16, 2014, Mrs. Jimenez received a letter from Rivermark (the

“admission letter”).


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94.

The admission letter was dated April 16, 2014, and was addressed to Mrs. Jimenez only,

and stated, “After a review of the loan documents regarding L146 Rivermark CU has determined

that there is no evidence you physically signed any loan documents in reference to L146. We

have removed you from this loan and have deleted all records with the Credit Bureaus. We

apologize for any inconvenience this might have caused you. If you have any information on

Alberto Aroche that you can give us in regards to possible employment it would be appreciated.”

95.

The admission letter was signed by “Bruce Holbrook, Collector III”.

96.

Rivermark has no evidence Mrs. Jimenez ever physically signed any of its loan

documents.

97.

On or about April 23, 2014, Mrs. Jimenez received another letter from Rivermark, dated

April 23, 2014 (the “credit reporting letter”).

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98.

The credit reporting letter is addressed only to Mrs. Jimenez, and states, “Rivermark

Community Credit Union has received a dispute regarding information furnished to a Credit

Reporting Agency for the membership and account number referenced above. As a result of your

request, we have reviewed all pertinent information on file as well as the information provided

with the dispute form. At this time, this dispute has been resolved as follows… We have

corrected our reporting in accordance with your request. Please allow up to 7 business days for

these changes to appear on your credit report.”

99.

The credit reporting letter is signed by “Samantha Samuels, Collections Dept”.

100.

Rivermark failed to completely correct its reporting in accordance to Mrs. Jimenez’s

request on April 23, 2014.

101.

More than a week after April 23, 2014, and at various dates thereafter, Mrs. Jimenez

applied for various credit and banking accounts from various entities and was either denied for

these accounts, or these entities demanded deposits to obtain the accounts.

102.

Mrs. Jimenez’s applications were denied, or a higher deposit was demanded, in

substantial part because of Rivermark’s wrongful credit reporting and/or Rivermark’s failure to

properly correct the negative credit reporting as promised.


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103.

FAIR COMPENSATION

As a direct and proximate result of AAR’s FDCPA violation, Mrs. Jimenez suffered

actual damages including, but not limited to, fear, humiliation, invasion of privacy, and other

severe emotional harm consistent with unfair debt collection, in an amount to be determined by a

jury.

104.

As a direct and proximate result of AAR’s tortious conduct as alleged in this complaint,

Mrs. Jimenez suffered actual damages including, but not limited to, fear, humiliation, invasion of

privacy, and other severe emotional harm consistent with being assaulted and battered, in an

amount to be determined by a jury.

105.

Mrs. Jimenez has a right to recover additional statutory damages against AAR pursuant to

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2).

106.

Mrs. Jimenez has a right to recover her costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee incurred in

prosecuting the FDCPA claim against AAR, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

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107.

As a direct and proximate result of Rivermark’s conduct as alleged in this complaint,

Mrs. Jimenez suffered actual damages including, but not limited to, fear, humiliation, invasion of

privacy, damage to her reputation, damage to her credit, lower credit scores, lost opportunities to

receive credit and refinance, lost opportunities to obtain a bank account, and other severe

emotional harm, in an amount to be determined by a jury.

108.

Mrs. Jimenez has a right to recover her costs and reasonable attorneys fees incurred in

this action against Rivermark, pursuant to ORS 20.083 and ORS 20.096, based on the terms of

Rivermark’s agreement.

109.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Defendants’ intentional conduct as alleged in this complaint constitutes an extreme,

outrageous, and malicious attempt to profit through unfair collection practices.

110.

Defendants’ malicious conduct showed a conscious indifference to the health, safety, and

welfare of Mrs. Jimenez and her family.

111.

Defendants’ wrongful conduct provided it an unfair advantage over other collectors and

credit unions in the community that chose to follow the law.

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112.

As a result of defendants’ malicious conduct, defendants should be required to pay

punitive damages to the State of Oregon and Mrs. Jimenez, according to the harm they caused

Mrs. Jimenez, in amounts that will deter defendants from doing this again to someone else in the

community.

113.

CAUSES OF ACTION

CLAIM ONE AGAINST AAR ONLY

UNFAIR DEBT COLLECTION

(15 U.S.C. § 1692k)

Mrs. Jimenez re-alleges all of the above paragraphs by reference.

114.

ORS 79.609 states that “(1) After default, a secured party: (a) May take possession of the

collateral; and (b) Without removal, may render equipment unusable and dispose of collateral on

a debtors premises under ORS 79.0610… (2) A secured party may proceed under subsection (1)

of this section: (a) Pursuant to judicial process; or (b) Without judicial process, if it proceeds

without breach of the peace.”

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115.

Therefore, pursuant to ORS 79.609 after default Rivermark had a right to take possession

of the vehicle. AAR’s right to effect dispossession of the vehicle can only extend from its agency

relationship and scope of employment with Rivermark. However, Rivermark and AAR had no

right to self-help nonjudicial repossession of the vehicle if a breach of the peace was committed

during the repossession process.

116.

AAR breached the peace when it took possession of the vehicle, as alleged in more detail

above, thus removing any right that Rivermark and AAR may otherwise have had to take

nonjudicial action to take possession of the vehicle. Thus AAR’s actions in taking possession of

the vehicle when it did not have the present right to do so was in violation of U.S.C. §

1692f(6)(A).

117.

AAR’s failure to comply with the FDCPA caused Mrs. Jimenez actual damages as

alleged above.

118.

As a result, Mrs. Jimenez is entitled to recover fair compensation in an amount to be

determined by the jury for her actual damages, including emotional distress damages, additional

statutory damages, costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee to be determined by the Court, pursuant

to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.

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119.

CLAIM TWO AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

ASSAULT


120.

AAR assaulted Mrs. Jimenez on January 27, 2014, by physically approaching her as she

attempted to leave her front door, and intentionally putting both hands out to cause offensive

physical contact with Mrs. Jimenez, with intent to physically pin her against her garage door.

121.

AAR, in its capacity as agent and servant for Rivermark, pursuant to a non-delegable

duty, directly and proximately caused injury to Mrs. Jimenez by assaulting her on January 27,

2014, and Mrs. Jimenez is entitled to recover fair compensation and punitive damages in

amounts to be determined by the jury, and reasonable attorneys fees, based on the terms of

Rivermark’s agreement, and pursuant to ORS 20.083, and ORS 20.096.

122.

AAR’s assault of Mrs. Jimenez constituted a substantial step towards AAR’s subsequent

battery of Mrs. Jimenez.

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123.

CLAIM THREE AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

BATTERY


124.

AAR battered Mrs. Jimenez on January 27, 2014, by intentionally causing offensive

contact with Mrs. Jimenez and physically pinning her against her garage door.

125.


duty, directly and proximately caused injury to Mrs. Jimenez by battering her on January 27,

2014, and Mrs. Jimenez is entitled to recover fair compensation and punitive damages in


Rivermark’s agreement, and pursuant to ORS 20.083 and ORS 20.096.

126.

AAR’s assault and battery of Mrs. Jimenez constituted a substantial step towards AAR’s

subsequent false arrest of Mrs. Jimenez.

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127.

CLAIM FOUR AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

FALSE ARREST


128.

AAR falsely arrested Mrs. Jimenez on January 27, 2014, by unlawfully and intentionally

blocking her path, then pinning her against her garage door, for several moments, under protest

against her will.

129.


duty, directly and proximately caused injury to Mrs. Jimenez by falsely arresting her on January

27, 2014, and Mrs. Jimenez is entitled to recover fair compensation and punitive damages in



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130.

CLAIM FIVE AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL HARM


131.

AAR intentionally inflicted emotional harm on Mrs. Jimenez on January 27, 2014,

including by lying to her, breaking into her car, physically pining her against her garage door in

front of her young daughter, and humiliating her as AAR drove off.

132.

AAR intended to inflict severe emotional harm on Mrs. Jimenez, in hopes of repossessing

Rivermark’s collateral by breaching the peace.

133.

AAR intended to inflict severe emotional harm on Mrs. Jimenez, in hopes of scaring her.

134.

AAR intended to inflict severe emotional harm on Mrs. Jimenez, in hopes of falsely

arresting her.

135.

AAR did in fact inflict severe emotional harm on Mrs. Jimenez by physically pining her

against her garage door, in front of her young daughter.

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136.

AAR’s choice to lie to Mrs. Jimenez, break into her car, physically pin her against her

garage door, then humiliate Mrs. Jimenez is an extraordinary transgression of the bounds of

socially tolerable conduct.

137.


duty, directly and proximately caused injury to Mrs. Jimenez by intentionally inflicting

emotional harm on her on January 27, 2014, and Mrs. Jimenez is entitled to recover fair

compensation and punitive damages in amounts to be determined by the jury, and reasonable

attorneys fees, based on the terms of Rivermark’s agreement, and pursuant to ORS 20.083 and

ORS 20.096.

138.

CLAIM SIX AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION


139.

AAR invaded Mrs. Jimenez’s privacy on January 27, 2014, including by lying to her,

refusing to leave her real property, breaking into her car, physically pining her against her garage

door, and humiliating her.

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140.

ARR’s intentional conduct above constitutes the tort of intrusion upon seclusion because

AAR physically intruded into Mrs. Jimenez’s private home life in a way that was highly

offensive to any reasonable person.

141.


duty, directly and proximately caused injury to Mrs. Jimenez by intruding into her seclusion on

January 27, 2014, and Mrs. Jimenez is entitled to recover fair compensation and punitive

damages in amounts to be determined by the jury, and reasonable attorneys fees, based on the

terms of Rivermark’s agreement, and pursuant to ORS 20.083 and ORS 20.096.

142.

CLAIM SEVEN AGAINST RIVERMARK ONLY

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL HARM


143.

Rivermark intentionally inflicted emotional harm on Mrs. Jimenez, including by forging

her signature on the loan documents/agreement, attempting to collect upon the deficiency

balance of the loan through multiple collection letters mailed to her home, and reporting negative

credit information to third parties.

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144.

Rivermark’s intentional infliction of severe emotional harm, through the conduct alleged

above, was done to scare Mrs. Jimenez, and to attempt to defraud her and trick her into paying

the deficiency balance on a loan/debt that she was not obligated on, as Rivermark realized that

the deficiency balance would be difficult or impossible to collect from her husband’s uncle.

145.

Rivermark’s conduct represents an extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially

tolerable conduct and/or exceeds any reasonable limit of social toleration.

146.

Rivermark’s civil tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm directly and proximately

caused Mrs. Jimenez severe emotional harm, and Mrs. Jimenez is entitled to recover fair

compensation and punitive damages in amounts to be determined by the jury, and reasonable

attorneys fees, based on the terms of Rivermark’s agreement, and pursuant to ORS 20.083 and

ORS 20.096.

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147.

CLAIM EIGHT AGAINST RIVERMARK ONLY

INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION


148.

Rivermark committed the civil tort of intrusion upon seclusion against Mrs. Jimenez by

intentionally invading her solitude, forging her signature on falsified loan documents, reporting

false information about her to the credit reporting agencies, attempting to collect upon the

deficiency balance of the loan through multiple collection letters mailed to her home, and

reporting negative credit information to third parties which caused her to be denied extensions of

credit and demands for increased deposits in order to secure various accounts.

149.

Rivermark’s intentional invasions into Mrs. Jimenez’s personal, family, and economic

affairs and concerns would be highly offensive to any reasonable person.

150.

Rivermark’s civil tort of intrusion upon seclusion directly and proximately caused injury

to Mrs. Jimenez, and Mrs. Jimenez is entitled to recover fair compensation and punitive damages

in amounts to be determined by the jury, and reasonable attorneys fees, based on the terms of


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CIVIL COMPLAINT -


151.

CLAIM NINE AGAINST RIVERMARK ONLY

NEGLIGENCE


152.

Rivermark is liable in negligence for the intentional torts of AAR against Mrs. Jimenez.

153.

Rivermark had reason to know that hiring AAR to collect its debt created an

unreasonable risk of causing foreseeable harm to Mrs. Jimenez.

154.

Rivermark knew or should have know that AAR was highly likely to commit torts against

Mrs. Jimenez, based on the circumstances of the joint venture and AAR’s bad reputation.

155.

Rivermark knew or should have known that AAR was likely to breach the peace by

committing torts when taking possession of the vehicle because AAR was not registered with

DFCS, and was also not properly registered with the SOS as an active business entity, as

required by law at the time that it was hired by Rivermark to repossess the vehicle and/or at the

time that the vehicle was repossessed.

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CIVIL COMPLAINT -


156.

The DFCS debt collection license search database and the SOS business registry database

are available to the public and Rivermark should have known that AAR had a history of not

complying with the laws governing collections.

157.

Rivermark’s gross negligence constituted a reckless and outrageous indifference to Mrs.

Jimenez’s safety, and directly and proximately caused injury to Mrs. Jimenez, and Mrs. Jimenez

is entitled to recover fair compensation and punitive damages in amounts to be determined by the

jury, and reasonable attorneys fees, based on the terms of Rivermark’s agreement, and pursuant

to ORS 20.083 and ORS 20.096.

158.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL.

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CIVIL COMPLAINT -


WHEREFORE, plaintiff seeks judgment against defendants as follows:

A. An award of compensatory damages, attorneys fees, and costs against Rivermark for

the harm Rivermark caused Mrs. Jimenez;

B. An award of punitive damages against Rivermark based on Rivermark’s malicious

conduct as alleged in this complaint;

C. An award of compensatory damages, attorneys fees, and costs against Rivermark,

American Asset Recovery, Payne, and Payne Jr., jointly and severally, for the harm

AAR’s tortious conduct caused Mrs. Jimenez;

D. An award of punitive damages against Rivermark, American Asset Recovery, Payne,

and Payne Jr., jointly and severally, based on AAR’s malicious conduct as alleged in

this complaint;

E. An award of compensatory damages against American Asset Recovery, Payne, and

Payne Jr., jointly and severally, for the harm AAR’s FDCPA violation caused Mrs.

Jimenez, and an award of additional statutory damages, and an award reimbursing

Mrs. Jimenez for the costs of prosecuting the FDCPA claim, together with a

reasonable attorney’s fee;

F. A supplemental award for recovery under AAR’s bond or letter of credit should

judgment be obtained against AAR and no satisfaction of the judgment be

forthcoming, pursuant to ORS 697.031(2)(b); and

G. Any other equitable relief this Court may determine to be fair and just.


CIVIL COMPLAINT -


Mrs. Jimenez reserves her right to further amend this complaint to allege additional

claims against defendants, now known and unknown, as she learns and confirms new

information throughout this case.

DATED: January 26, 2015

RESPECTFULLY FILED,

s/ Michael Fuller Michael Fuller, Oregon Bar No. 09357 Trial Attorney for Mrs. Jimenez OlsenDaines, P.C. US Bancorp Tower 111 SW 5th Ave., 31st Fl. Portland, Oregon 97204 [email protected] Mobile 503-201-4570 Kelly Jones, Oregon Bar No. 074217 Of Attorneys for Mrs. Jimenez


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