1.0 INDIAN POLICE SERVICE:EVOLUTION THROUGH A PASSAGE OF TIME

1.1. The Indian Police Service Today - A Factsheet

1.2. Police Administration in India - The Structural Context

1.3. Indian Police Service - Growing Citizen Expectations

1.4. Growing Citizen Expectation - Structural Changes

1.5. Evolution of the Indian Police Service - Pre Independence Period

1.6. Evolution of the Indian Police Service- Post Independence Developments

2.0 PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF PAY

2.1. Introduction

2.2. International Practices

A. Lord Edmund-Davies Committee

B. Sheehy Commission

C. The Winsor Report

2.3. Comparison with Private Sector

2.4. General Principles of determination of Pay

2.5. Principles of Determination of Pay Common to All Services

CONTENTS

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3.0 CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

3.1. Introduction

3.2. Long Working Hours in the Police

3.3. Occupational and Situational Risks Specific to Police

3.4. Impact of Stress on Police Officers

3.5. Police Job Demands and Alienation from Families

3.6. Health Hazards and their Manifestations

3.7. Arguments for Extra Compensation for Adverse Work Conditions

4.0 STRUCTURAL ISSUES, PAY PARITY ANDCAREER PROGRESSION ISSUES

4.1. Introduction

4.2. Parity of Pay with IAS and IFS

4.3 Anomalies in Implementing 6th CPC Reccomendation on “Edge”

4.4. Misrepresentation of the 2 year Gap Between IAS and Other Services

4.5. Intra Service Parity

4.6. Abolition of the Rank of DIG

4.7. Abolition of the HAG+ Scale

4.8. Reinforcing the All India Character of the Service

4.9. Inequities in the Central Staffing Scheme

5. 0 PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF ALLOWANCES,ADVANCES AND INCENTIVES

5.1. Introduction

5.2. General Allowances and Advances

5.3. Allowances Specific to Police

5.4. Allowances Specific for Working Couples and Women

5.5. Performance linked Incentive Scheme

6.0 PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF PENSION

6.1. Basic Principles of Determination of Pension

6.2. Problems with the New Pension Scheme

6.3. One Rank One Pension

6.4. Inequitous Pension Fixation Formula

6.5. Making Pension Tax Free

6.6. Raising the Family Pension

6.7. Gallantry Medal Allowance

7. 0 TRAINING AND CAPACITY BUILDING THROUGHA COMPETENCY BASED MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

8.0 CONCLUSION

ANNEXURES

A - List of IPS Matyrs

B - Cities with Police Commissioner System

ENDNOTES

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INDIAN POLICE SERVICE:EVOLUTION THROUGH A

PASSAGE OF TIME

1.1. THE INDIAN POLICE SERVICE TODAY - A FACTSHEET

1.1.1 The officers of the Indian Police Service, being vested with the mandate to ensure ‘Rule of Law’, prevent and detect crime, and safeguard the country’s internal security, occupy an extremely significant place in the architecture of governance. With a cadre strength of 4720, organised into 24 State/Union Territory Cadres, the service provides leadership to a force of 31,93,808 police personnel spread across State and Central police Forces. In the year 2013, it supervised investigations of 66,40,378 fresh criminal cases, handled multifarious agitations, and oversaw apprehension of 74,20,091 persons in the course of protecting and upholding the rule of Law. While these statistics are in themselves mindboggling, they constitute and capture only a minor part of the immense contribution of the police.

Their real impact, however, resting largely on intangible outcomes, are not amenable to statistics but fall within the nebulous realm of ‘perception of being secure ’. Officers of the service man 711 police districts (of which 176 are terrorist/ LWE affected), as well as the higher formations in the Central and State police Organisations. This mandate is discharged with a meagre strength of 122.5 civil policemen per lakh population, which stands barely half of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported global average of 341.81 . In the discharge of these duties, in the service of the nation, 32 IPS officers (Annexure A) made the supreme sacrifice of laying down their lives, fighting terrorism, insurgency and organised crime.

PUNJAB TERRORISM: THE SAGA OF POLICE VALOUR AND SACRIFICE

Between 1982 and 1992, Punjab witnessed a severe form of terrorist violence. The leadership of Punjab Police, through a series of doctrinal innovations, moulded the force into India’s most effective counter-terrorist force, launched a synchronized counter-offensive that wiped out militancy in Punjab within a short span. The young officers of the Indian Police Service led the force from the front, and were extensively involved in the control of terrorism at the field level. Cohesiveness in ranks, professionalism of the highest order and the dictum of duty before self, kept Punjab Police in very high spirits despite the fact that the mindless and brutal killers amongst militant ranks, not only ambushed the policemen on duty, but also killed them even off-duty and while on leave.

The brutality extended to cold-blooded killing of relatives of Punjab Police personnel. They had to fight their own kith and kin who had gravitated to terrorism being indoctrinated, armed, and trained by agencies of a neighbouring country. The saga of commitment of Punjab Police to its duty, in a situation when the entire state machinery had crumbled, resulted in restoration of peace in Punjab and put the state back on the track of development. Punjab police paid a heavy price with the martyrdom of over 1,700 of its men besides the cowardly killings hundreds of their relatives by the terrorists. Six IPS officers made the supreme sacrifice of their life in the cause of the nation.

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1.2. POLICE ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA - THE STRUCTURAL CONTEXT

1.2.1. The police in India undertake its responsibilities under extremely challenging circumstances. India is today a maturing democracy, with a large citizenry, that is both conscious and assertive of their rights. The country is home to a rare plurality of ethnicity, religion and culture, and brings with it many issues of difference and dissent. The country is today an emerging economic powerhouse, and is subject to consequent churnings, displacements and migrations. Millions of youth, with rising aspirations, seek to dislodge the existing status quo of inequity and discrimination imposed by the weight of history. The globalised village that we live in has brought in considerable interconnectedness that governance must necessarily grapple with. India’s distinctive constitutional architecture, which is unitary in character, but federal in spirit, renders provision of uniform administration across the nation a serious challenge. All of the above, in multifarious ways, has made policing an extremely difficult, albeit a highly enriching experience.

1.3. INDIAN POLICE SERVICE - GROWING CITIZEN EXPECTATIONS

1.3.1. The Indian citizen has high expectations from the IPS. Most importantly, (s)he expects the Service to set in place a mechanism to provide a ‘sense of security’- physical and psychological, so as to freely go about their lives, without undue concern.S(h)e expects that the Rule of Law is in place, and that if wronged, access to justice in a time bound manner is available as a matter of right. The citizen expects the IPS, as the visible arm of the Government, to ensure that the system delivers as an effective first responder in distress of any kind in addition to upholding the rule of law. (S)he expects the police to manage India’s unique diversity, allowing citizens to celebrate their differences, while bringing in ‘order’ and social cohesion to manage dissonance. The nation expects the police to create an enabling environment to facilitate individual and collective growth, assuring the fundamental rights of the citizen. Most importantly, the citizen expects the police to ensure that India is secure from ‘within’ and ‘outside’.

1.3.2. In order to accomplish these critical responsibilities, the Indian citizen expects an IPS officer to be the repository of a daunting array of intellectual and administrative skills. The officer is expected to lead from the front, bringing to bear qualities of courage- both physical and moral, professional excellence, daring innovation and strategic vision to the tasks at hand. (S)he is expected to be a team builder, crisis manager and negotiator. The citizen expects him/her to work extremely long hours, display a high degree of industry, perseverance and unflagging enthusiasm, and be alert and available for him round the clock. The IPS officer is expected to bring about change in remote and difficult places, at times face real risk to life and limb, as well as meet the increasing, often unrealistic, public expectations.

1.3.3. As will be made clear at length in the third chapter, the police work under extremely stressful circumstances of being understaffed, overworked, and underpaid, all of which takes a heavy toll on one’s mental and physical health. Besides the obvious deleterious effect on health, these circumstances lead to extreme frustration, which have very often manifested itself in sub-optimal behaviour at work, and at home. As well as fighting such frustrations within oneself, the Indian Police Service officer has the onerous task of motivating, taking care of and getting the best out of such a force which is far from contended and well-provided for.

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1.4. GROWING CITIZEN EXPECTATION - STRUCTURAL CHANGES

1.4.1. The growing citizen expectation has found expression in a series of reform directives issued by the constitutional courts. These directives have led to a slow but sure footed movement towards police reforms, aimed at converting the Indian police into a people friendly and public service oriented institution. The most significant of these, “seven steps towards a functionally independent and accountable police”, were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006)2 . It called for a State Security Commission, to lay down broad policy and evaluate police functioning, Police Establishment Board to independently decide on transfers and postings and Police Complaints Authorities as an independent oversight mechanism and so on. The judiciary has been in the forefront of ensuring unfettered investigation, the latest example being the Supreme Court decision in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2014)3, in respect of curbs on initiating investigation, under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946.

Various State Governments, recognizing the need to have a more independent Police, have established Police Commissionerates in 47 cities of India (as on date)4 . Internally, police leaders have transformed themselves as change agents to improve internal sub-culture, better processes and meet emerging challenges. The global trend towards greater-community engagement, both as a tool of understanding citizen priorities, as well as in transforming law enforcement into a shared endeavor between the police and the policed, has been a product of citizens’ expectations5 . All of this brings us in line with progressive, mature democracies across the world. The IPS plays a highly critical role in this transformation.

1.4.2. The enhanced citizen expectation has not only changed the way the IPS undertakes business, but has also substantially altered its roles and functions. Maintenance of internal security continues to be a significant component of the IPS charter. However, post 9/11 it has been considerably

integrated with foreign policy, as well as across all the development sectors. The varied roles played by IPS officers in Indian establishments abroad, as well as the primacy of its role in development across theatres- urban/LWE/terrorism infested, all point to the same fact.

1.4.3. The present focus on internal security again highlights the critical role played by the Indian Police Service. From single-handedly fighting the Punjab insurgency, to effectively bringing back normalcy into Jammu and Kashmir and the North-East, the Indian Police Service, by effective leadership of the State and Central police formations under its command, has fought to safeguard the internal security of the country. In the post-2000s, where terrorism and naxalism in the hinterland, have dominated the public discourse, the Indian Police Service has again been in the forefront of fighting the menace, both at the policy and operational levels.

1.4.4. With the advances in communication and transport, national boundaries no longer bind down the criminal. Conspiracy, planning, recruitment, logistics and actual

execution, are spread across multiple jurisdictions, with the criminal taking recourse to the best available resource. On the other hand, the law enforcement agency is tied down not merely by jurisdiction, but by multiple issues of red-tape, conflicting laws, lack of co-operation, amongst others. This brings in sharp focus the role of the IPS officer, who is best positioned to put forth practical domain issues, across diplomatic and ministerial bottlenecks, and effectively produce results.

1.4.5. There has also been a growing recognition of the necessity of the participation of IPS officers in policy formulation. The appointment of IPS officers as Governors in strife torn areas, or as National Security Advisor/Dy National Security Advisor6 , indicates the considerable skill sets and experience they bring to the task. The creation of specialized agencies, and new-age Central Police Organisations - like the National Investigation Agency (NIA), National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) etc., attests to the importance of the internal security dimension. Police Modernization plans

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have also endorsed these changes. 1.4.6. Besides the above, taking into account their unique skills of human resource management, policy implementation, public engagement, inter-agency coordination and quick incident response, there is an increasing trend towards induction of IPS officers in departments like transport, tourism, sports, and in regulatory bodies, both at the Central and State level. This is an acknowledgement of the multifarious competencies of IPS officers in addition to their core competence in discharging functions as Chief Vigilance Officers in Public Sector Undertakings.

1.4.7. In a nutshell, the IPS today straddles the entire realm of governance from a police chowki to foreign policy!

1.5. EVOLUTION OF THE INDIAN POLICE SERVICE - PRE INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

1.5.1 The modern police system in India was introduced by Lord Cornwallis, but the first steps towards a unified police administration, under the British took roots in the mid eighteen hundreds in Sindh, Bombay, and Madras. However, it was the Indian Police Commission of

1860, which was the first effort to have a comprehensive look at the police in India. Interestingly, while its constitution arose from a concern for a more efficient and effective police force, its terms of reference were essentially tailored to bring about savings in public finances7 . The transition from the military police to the civil police was recommended by the Commission, as the method of achieving the same8 . The commission recommended that the lower rank of the constabulary should be divided into three grades, the lowest of which should receive a pay equal at least to the average ordinary wages of unskilled labour, the pay of the head constables and sergeants should be sufficient to place them above temptation, and to make promotion to these appointments, an object of ambition, open to the inferior grades.

1.5.2 The Public Service Commission, 1886 (Aitchinson Commission), recommended an overhaul of the system of recruitment to superior grades, so as to ensure that candidates with good educational qualifications, and habits of industry are recruited9 . It also unanimously suggested that the abuses in the lower ranks were entirely on account of poorer pay.

1.5.3 The Indian Police Commission (1902-03) (Fraser Commission) is the next milestone in the history of Indian police. The Commission identified five reasons for poor police performance which include:

i. Unsatisfactory training and recruitment of superior officers of the department

ii. Undue interference with the police by Magistrates and Commissioners

iii. Inadequate staff-both superior and subordinate

iv. Insufficient remuneration of all ranks10

1.5.4 The Commission, commenting on recruitment and training found fault with the system of nominations, as well as with the practice of sending men to India as Assistant Superintendents of Police, who were too young, without proper training in criminal law, languages and Indian history. It suggested that the pay and prospects of the superior police officers should be improved, as they were not adequate as compared to the other officers in other departments, and the initial pay was ‘too little for a

young man to live on respectably11’.However, when the suggestion of a common examination, and its variants were put forth, the Commission adopted a specious reasoning having no bearing on administrative requirements, and at variance with their earlier exhortations. It said: “The Commission have rejected both these suggestions partly because they are not prepared to say that precisely the same age or class of men is required for the police as well as the civil service; and mainly because they think that men would not work contentedly in the police in the same district or province, alongside of their contemporaries in the Civil Service, unless the Government were prepared to make the former as attractive as the latter.”

1.5.5 The Royal Commission on Public Services, 1916 (Islington Commission), did not make considerable changes to the police system, as the Fraser Commission had only recently put forth its recommendations. However, they recommended retention of the existing system of recruitment wherein candidates between 19-21 years, would appear for a competitive examination, to be selected to the Service.

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1.5.6 The Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India, 1924 (Lee Commission), was of the view that the best type of Indian is not being obtained for the Indian Police Service, partly out of the inadequacy of emoluments, and partly because of the hardships of a career in the police Services12 . It recognised that conditions have changed, and that ‘whilst …more specialized training is now necessary to equip the present day police officer, for the efficient discharge of his duties, his responsibilities on the other hand, have become more onerous and irksome, and require greater intelligence and resource.’ Consequently, while it agreed to improve basic pay, ‘to avoid disturbing the relative position of the Service to other Services’, they did not alter the maximum basic pay. They also recommended differential overseas pay to the detriment of the Indian Police Service, on account of the fact that they are recruited at a lower age, and hence, are likely to be married at a later date in their service life, than their peers in other services13 .

1.5.7 During its initial years, the Indian Police Service had very often been plagued by a lack of clarity on its structure, and organisation. The initial

recruits to the service, were from the military, and later on involved a combination of nominated and selected candidates. The first open competition for the police was held in England in June 1893, and the top ten candidates were appointed as probationary Assistant Superintendents of Police. They were characterised by various names- the Indian Imperial Police, superior grades of police force etc, but were not backed by any official promulgation for the same. In 1907, the Secretary of State’s officers were directed to wear the letters ‘I.P’ on their epaulettes to distinguish them, from officers recruited otherwise. They were still however, referred to as the Imperial Branch of the Police Service. The Islington Commission referred to the Indian Police Service, where-after the name stuck. In 1932, in deference to the wishes of the Indian Police Association, the word ‘Service’ was dropped, and the simpler designation of the ‘Indian Police’ was officially adopted14 . Consequently, while the IPS traces its roots to the Indian Police Act, 1861 and its consequent developments, it never gained purpose and character in the manner it is today, till the advent of independence.

1.6. EVOLUTION OF THE INDIAN POLICE SERVICE- POST INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENTS

1.6.1. The advent of independence, the necessity to protect a nascent democracy, as well as its transformed role in the service of the people, brought in substantial changes to the Indian Police Service. The First Pay Commission (1950), recognizing the above changes, recommended ‘recruitment in the same manner and by the same standards’ in accordance with the standards of Class I service. Accordingly, recruitment and pay rules were modified, and the IPS was re-positioned in the Indian administrative framework, at par with other Class I Central Services15 .

1.6.2. The framers of the Constitution, recognizing the significance of the Indian Police Service, introduced Article 312 in the Constitution of India, by which the IPS along with the IAS was deemed to be an All India Service, created by Parliament, and carried with it, various Constitutional protections. The necessity of the same was ferociously defended by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, in the Constituent

Assembly when he said: “We have difficult times ahead. We are talking here under security kept in very difficult circumstances. These people are the instruments. Remove them and I see nothing but a picture of chaos all over the country.”16 In fact, contrary to the first draft, which only created an enabling architecture for the All India Services, reference to the IAS and the IPS was made in the Constitution, at the insistence of Sardar Patel17 . Successive Pay Commissions as well as other Commissions constituted to go into the issue of police reform, have by and large, followed this progressive trend, and have provided strength to the IPS and the cause of police reform.

1.6.3. The Second Pay Commission (1957-59) did not discuss the pay structure of the All India Services, as the same did not fall within its ambit. However, pursuant to the revision of pay scales for the Central Services, the Government of India, looked into the matter and proposed pay scales for the IPS comparable to Class I Central Services.

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1.6.4. The Study Team on Recruitment, Selection, Union Public Service Commission, the State Public Service Commissions and Training, under the aegis of the Administrative Reforms Commission, 1967, went into the issue of recruitment, and suggested that there must be integrated recruitment to the Higher Civil Services. They also suggested minimisation of the disparities between the services, and recommended that ‘totally identical pay scales for all the higher services would be the ideal solution’. They did not however recommend the same, merely for the reason that they did not want a situation, where a new entrant would prefer the easier jobs in the Central Services to the hazards, stresses and higher responsibility positions, of the IAS and the IPS18 . The first Administrative Reforms Commission, also emphasised the importance of proper personnel planning, cadre management, and recommended that recruitment to all Class I services, must only be through a single competitive examination. They also recommended greater mobility in the services, with staff appointments in the headquarters organisations in the Centre and State being filled up on the basis of a competitive examination, to ward against the tendency to compartmentalise careers19 .

1.6.5. The Report of the Committee on Police Training, 1971 (MS Gore Committee), went to considerable lengths to assess the need for quality improvement in the IPS and said: “Officers of the IAS and the IPS who have to run the district administration, face the same difficult and complex situations, arising out of the problems of social and political confrontation and change, from the beginning of their career. They have to deal with the same crisis situations, and meet the same public criticism. They must have the same qualities of leadership, capacity to take decisions, and ability to rise to the occasion. The calibre, temperament and character of the members of the two services should therefore be of the same standard. We are convinced that this is not ensured in the present system of selection. For all these reasons, we recommend that the lower age limit for the IPS should be raised to 21 years, and the written examination and the marks should be the same as for the IAS20.” . The report also went on to say: “A change in the system of recruitment alone will not ensure that candidates of the required calibre are attracted to the service. The testimony of the witnesses who appeared before us and the replies that we have received show that the main factors which inhibit better quality candidates from entering the IPS, are the general unpopularity of the service due to an unattractive pay structure, not

commensurate with the responsibilities and the arduous and hazardous nature of police duties, meagre promotion prospects, lack of social recognition vis-à-vis other services, and sense of uncertainty arising from political situations.” 21

1.6.6. The Third Pay Commission (1973)22 deliberated at length on the need to attract capable talent for the IPS, and increased a host of allowances to ‘have the effect of reducing the existing disparity between the IAS and IPS scales of pay’.

1.6.7. The Kothari Commission (Committee on Recruitment Policy and Selection Methods) (1976), recommended a common examination for all civil services in all respects. Justifying the same, they said that ‘even though the professional expertise required of a general administrator, or a diplomat or a police officer or a member of any of the other Central Services vary, their general qualities of competence, traits of character and sense of commitment necessarily have a common denominator. The same applies to other qualities needed in an officer such as intellectual cohesion, articulation, sense of awareness and purpose, integrity, depth of understanding, courage of conviction and ability to respond to changing socio-economic and political

situations’. In support of the above, they relied upon the Administrative Reform Commission’s Report on Personnel Administration (1969) and Committee on Police Training (Gore Committee) (1971)23. Accordingly, from 1979, the recruitment to the IPS as well as other Civil Services, including the IAS, was through a common examination.

1.6.8. The National Police Commission, headed by Shri Dharam Vira, a retired ICS officer and Governor of Punjab, West Bengal and Karnataka, was setup in 1977, and produced eight reports between February 1979 and May 1981. It was a watershed development in the history of Indian police.

The sixth report submitted in March 1981, dealt with the police leadership, particularly the Indian Police Service. It stated: “As the functions of the IPS officers have not only multiplied manifold, but are becoming more complex, hard and hazardous, calling for higher professional and technical skills and competence, special measures to attract some of the ablest officers from the lower echelons and also from the outside world are required. This means that the terms and conditions of this service should be comparable with those of the best services.

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There appears, therefore, no justification for the emoluments and prospects of the IPS being in any way inferior to those of the IAS. The minor improvements in the various pay scales of the IPS did not adequately improve the career value of the service because the yawning gap with the IAS has remained. At present the country is facing such serious dangers that its very integrity and unity are threatened. Needed in the IPS are men whose calibre is not only equal to that of the IAS officers but who also profess certain mental qualities, courage and higher physical standards, that are specially needed for effective police work. Therefore, the present differentials are counter-productive and it would be cost-effective for the Government to improve the quality of recruitment, emoluments and career prospects of the IPS by bringing them on par with those of the IAS. This recommendation is made because of the importance of stability in society and, therefore, to improve the calibre and performance of this most essential service. This recommendation also flows logically from the recommendations of the Kothari Committee which should be implemented in full.” 24 It went on to add: “There is persistent public criticism of the police and its role in society which is in contradiction

to the glamour associated with some other services. A service which is thus associated with a high degree of personal risk and professional hazards, which suffers from lack of status because of the very nature of Its work and which does not have within its pay structure and service conditions an adequate element of compensation cannot be expected to be popular with young men while choosing a career from among a number of avenues open to them specially when, in some services, the hazards and risks are negligible, conditions of work are not so exacting, emoluments and benefits are greater and social status and recognition better. While the handicaps and drawbacks inherent in police work cannot be removed they can partially be compensated for, by putting them on par with officers of other services. That is why the equality in the pay scales and parity in prospects of the IPS with the IAS is recommended.”25

1.6.9. The Fourth Pay Commission (1986) brought about measures to improve the career progression in the IPS by merging ranks, as well as by recommending induction of an IPS officer as member of cadre review committee26.

1.6.10. The Fifth Pay Commission (1994-96), emphasized the significance of the AIS, and made various recommendations to improve the backbone and quality of AIS officers. They also introduced the rank of ADG, recommended inclusion of non-IAS Secretary in the Civil Services Board.

1.6.11. In 1998, a Committee was set up under Mr. Julio F. Ribeiro. The Committee was to review action taken to implement the recommendations of the National Police Commission, National Human Rights Commission and the Vohra Committee, and to suggest ways and means to implement the pending recommendations of the above Commissions/Committee. The Supreme Court also asked the Committee to review action taken to implement the recommendations of the NPC. It submitted two reports in Oct 1998 and March 1999, providing a host of recommendations to further the cause of police reform. It recommended the

formation of a Police Performance and Accountability Commission, a Police Establishment Board, and a Police Complaints Authority, amongst others. 1.6.12. Padmanabhaiah Committee on Police Reform, (2000), headed by K Padmanabhaiah, a former Home Secretary, continued on the lines of the earlier reform proposals, proposing a fixed tenure policy, admissibility of confessions of the Police, reform of the criminal justice administration etc.

1.6.13. A committee on the Criminal Justice system (2000) under Justice VS Malimath was constituted which evolved wide-ranging proposals for the comprehensive reform of the criminal justice administration. Besides this, a Review Committee on Police Reforms was set up by Ministry of Home Affairs in 2004, which zeroed in on 49 recommendations for implementation.

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1.6.14. An Expert Committee was constituted in September 2005 under Soli J Sorabjee, an eminent lawyer, who served as Attorney General, to draft a new Model Police Act which submitted its report on 30th October 2006. The model Act provides for well-defined duties and responsibilities of the police and responsiveness, sensitivity of the police towards public especially the weaker and vulnerable sections, accountability to the rule of law Community policing through village police system, policing in urban areas through constitution of citizen policing committee, policing in Public Order & Internal Security challenges with.

1.6.15. Prakash Singh v. Union of India, as already mentioned at pre para 1.4.1, was the most significant step in police reform since the recommendations of the National Police Commission. The implementation of the same was monitored by a Committee chaired by Justice KT Thomas27 , a retired

judge of the Supreme Court of India. As on date, 15 states have enacted new legislations, and 14 states have issued executive orders, in deference to the orders of the Supreme Court.

1.6.16. The Sixth Pay Commission (2006-08) recognized the ‘pivotal role’ of the AIS ‘in upholding the rule of law, and the principles of democratic governance’. It went on to state that ‘they are expected to provide a uniformly high standard of administration and play a critical role in our federal structure.’ They recommended an Apex scale for DsGP in the Centre, which was subsequently extended by Government to all State DsGP.

As can be evinced from the discussions above, a plethora of recommendations were made by various commissions for police reform, right from the pre independence days. However, successive Pay Commissions approached the issues related to Indian Police Service from a

limited perspective of determination of remuneration and allowances, and have often been found wanting in recognising the need to create enabling conditions for attracting the right talent into the service under right conditions for the service officers to occupy their rightful space in the governance structure and leading the process of reforms recommended by various Commissions as demanded by the people of India. The Association therefore, sincerely looks to the 7thPay Commission to act as a catalytic agent in transformation of Indian police completely into a people friendly and public service oriented institution.

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2.1. INTRODUCTION

2.1.1. The first duty of the institutions of the state is the protection and the safety of the people. The police is therefore the most essential of public services of any form of government, and especially in a democratic form of government. It follows that the resources of the police and the uses to which they are put are of the highest importance. The predominant resource of the police is its human capital. By extension, the quality of the senior leadership will define how well the human capital of the police is nurtured and utilized to deliver effective and efficient public service of the highest standards to its nation’s citizens.

2.1.2. The betterment of the police leadership today will beneficially and materially affect the police service and public interest for many years to come. It is therefore necessary that the government provides the police officers a system of remuneration and conditions of

service which not only respects and values the unique nature of policing as a public service, its role in a nascent democracy and the commitment risks, demands and sacrifices that it entails; but also over a course of time embeds a culture of professionalism and high achievement across the police levels and raises the performance of the Indian policing to those of mature democracies; which is the right of every citizen of the country.

2.2. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES

2.2.1. The police system in India, like various other organs of the government, is a legacy of the erstwhile British rule in the country. As such, there is a great degree of similarity in the job content, responsibilities and functions of the various civil services including the police operating in the two countries.

PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF PAYTHE SATYAM SCAM INVESTIGATION

Satyam scam which is the biggest corporate fraud in independent India and one of the top 10 corporate frauds in the world was investigated by a Multi-Disciplinary Investigation Team (MDIT) headed by an IPS officer of the rank of DIG with another IPS officer of rank of Superintendent of Police as the Chief Investigating Officer (CIO) of the case. The MDIT which consisted of CBI investigators, Auditors, Cost Accountants, Bankers, forensic experts, software professionals, legal experts, and tax analysts investigated the case in record time and the first charge sheet was filed in 46 days from the date of registration of the case, and the supplementary charge within 9 months.

The investigation warranted a multi-disciplinary approach that looked into the aspects of forensic audit, cyber forensics, layered banking transaction analysis, corporate law, network forensics, study of financial statements, stock market analysis, investigation of shares transactions, analysis of money-laundering, benami transactions, enterprise software skills, and involved extensive coordination with other enforcement agencies.

This scam involved accounting fraud amounting to more that Rs 5400 crores, loss to investor of Rs 12000 crores and a wrongful gain of around Rs 2700 crores to the accused. This sensational scam had far reaching implications on the economy and was investigated successfully with the leadership provided by IPS officers.

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2.2.2. However, the high policing standards in mature democracies like the United Kingdom have not evolved on their accord. These have come about because of an early realization by the concerned governments that policing is a unique public service and hence must be appropriately compensated.

The process of improving the police delivery system in the UK started in the late 1970s with a realization that better policing can be achieved only by improving the quality of human capital in the police by improving their pay and service conditions.

2.2.3. As a result of these reforms, the service conditions of the police in the UK gradually improved along with substantial improvements in police performance on both tangible and intangible factors. For example, not only has crime in UK has fallen by 50% since 1995 as per the British Crime Survey28 , but UK police is now universally recognized as one of the best police forces in the world. Some of the key events / mile stones in this process of metamorphosis of British police are as below

A. LORD EDMUND-DAVIES COMMITTEEIn the United Kingdom as early as 1978, the Committee of Enquiry chaired by Lord Edmund-Davies recommended a substantial increase (of the order of 45%) in police pay and that police constables pay should be annually updated in accordance with an index of private sector non – manual worker pay. The Edmund-Davies Inquiry concluded that police pay should be linked to “some general index” because of the special features of policing:i) the police had no right to strike and one should not be granted;ii) the risks of assault and injury;iii) disruption to family life;iv) the then manpower and recruitment problem;v) The increased responsibilities and workloads falling to the police service since the previous review.vi) In doing so, the Edmund-Davies committee sought to ensure that police officers should neither financially benefit nor suffer, in comparison with the community that they police.

B. SHEEHY COMMISSION - The Sheehy Commission was appointed in July 1992 under the chairmanship of Sir Patrick Sheehy to examine the rank structure, emoluments and conditions of service of the police in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland which submitted its report in June, 1993. The recommendations of the Commission are reproduced below in their own words.

The police service and other professions“Police officers are ordinary citizens with extraordinary powers. They have a special position under the law but many of the qualities and skills which are required by police officers of various ranks are common to a number of other professions and organizations. These include the ability to:i) articulate clear and measurable objectives, gain internal and external support for them, and ensure that the organization and individuals within it are judged on achievement;ii) identify priorities and plan coherently across a wide spectrum of activities;iii) manage sometimes small, sometimes significant human and other resources so as to provide a quality service and achieve value for money;

iv) Communicate and consult effectively at all levels within the organization, and with all sections of the community, not all of them necessarily well disposed towards the service.”

“A number of features are particular to policing and require its officers to possess special qualities and skills…. These are:i) the extraordinary nature of police powers, in particular police monopoly of the use of legitimate force;ii) the exceptionally high level of integrity required by the nature of police functions;iii) The sensitive, quite often dangerous and sometimes explosive situations in which police are expected to exercise control, often at considerable risk to themselves.”

Pay levels“As Chapter 8 makes clear, we consider that there should be a formula approach to increases in police basic pay and that this should reflect private sector pay settlements. This is on the basis that, like the 1982 Megaw Commission on Civil Service Pay, we consider that private sector pay settlements provide a more accurate reflection of the economic climate and the market than pay settlements in public sector. They avoid the circular effect of comparing public sector pay settlements with one another.

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Our reasons for concluding that a private sector based formula approach is justified (which are set out more fully in Chapters 7 – 8) are:i) to recognize, on grounds of equity, the absence of right to strike;ii) to secure a smooth progression in pay rates reflecting the economic climate and the market;iii) to avoid the management problems associated with pay-related inconsistencies between the calibre of officers recruited over time;iv) to recognize the professional nature of the policing role and reflect the overall package we are recommending;v) to recognize the importance of securing, as indicated in our Terms of Reference, the recruitment, retention and motivation of officers of the right quality, and vi) To recognize the importance of policing to society, particularly in terms of powers that the police alone are able to exercise, including their monopoly of the exercise of legitimate force.”“On this basis we conclude that police officers of high calibre are and will continue to be

required and that this should be reflected in choosing the benchmark against which police pay level should be judged….”

The Commissioner of Police of Metropolis: external pay links“We recognize that this recommendation will break the existing pay link between the rate for the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the rate for the Permanent Secretary of the Home Department. We recommend that the link should be broken; in our view the special features of policing mean that the jobs are not comparable. Since the link was established there has also been substantial reallocation of responsibilities within the Home Office and between the Home Office and other departments.”

Bonus levels“Within this system, performance at constant level with no change to scope of role, circumstances or experience/skills will not achieve progression. We recommend, however, that one-off non-pensionable individual bonuses should be available as should team

bonuses.…the bonuses we have recommended will allow individuals performing satisfactorily to benefit not only from increases in the value of scale points as the basic scale is uprated (see Chapter 8) but also to be rewarded for special contributions they or their team have made during the year in question (Chapter 9 discusses bonus allocation).”

C. THE WINSOR REPORTThe Government of UK in 2010 commissioned the Independent Review of Police Officers and Staff Remuneration and Conditions. The report of this review, known as the Winsor Report provides the best summary of the existing state of police pay in the UK and the developed world. As per the Reporti) The pay scales of police officers in the UK are typically 10-15% higher than those of the emergency services and those of similar ranks in the armed forces29 ii) Earnings of police officers are comparable to those of many white collar and professional occupations.

iii) The police pension scheme has remained the most generous of public pension schemes through a combination of early normal pension age and accelerated accrual of pension rights after 20 years of service. This has remained so even after the shift to the new police pension scheme in 2006 with one of the highest contributions into the scheme by both the employer and employee. iv) Police officers pay the highest contribution rate of any public pension scheme, but contributions from employers to the scheme are also among the highest in public pension schemes. There are roughly 131,000 contributors to the 1987 pension scheme (and 13,000 to the 2006 scheme), but almost 125,000 pension recipients and a further 20,000 deferred beneficiaries. This high ratio of pensioners to contributors is a significant cost burden. Combined pension contributions as a percentage of earnings are over 35% in the 1987 scheme and almost 34% in the 2006 scheme.

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v) The report further states that the police pay in other countries with similar police structures like the Commonwealth countries of Australia, Canada and New Zealand lies at similar points in the earnings distribution in their country while the average police pay in the Northern European countries like Denmark, Germany and Sweden is closer to the national average earnings in the country, thus reflecting a lower positive differential.

vi) Comparisons with police pay in the US is difficult as police is locally recruited and its pay is locally bargained, leading to wide differences and incomparability of data.vii) For Chief Police Officers, remuneration rises from just over £140,000 to over £226,000. In comparison, the pay of Permanent Secretaries in the Civil Service varies between £140,000 and £190,000. The table below gives the salaries of some senior police officers in UK.

2.3. COMPARISON WITHPRIVATE SECTOR

2.3.1. Policing today is far from the relatively simple occupation it was many years ago. The sophistication, intelligence and resources of some who are engaged in crime, the malignancy of their motives and methods, and the technology available to all citizens, mean that the profession of policing will continue to require people of the highest integrity, intelligence and skill. The needs of the police service for such qualities are intensified by the complexity and weight of the modern criminal law, and the demands and expectations of the public and other agencies of the state.

2.3.2. For these reasons, it is important that police officers with skills and competencies which are of importance in modern policing are rewarded appropriately for their development and use. Secondly, people should be paid for what they do, the skills they have and are applying in their work, and conditions under which the jobs are performed.

2.3.3. At the same time, fairness is an essential part of any system of pay and service conditions. Fairness means not only fairness to the police officers but also to the public, and to the police service. As such it is essential that a scientific system of job evaluation is used to compare and determine the relative weight of a police officer’s job vis-à-vis private sector jobs and those in other public services.

2.3.4. The previous Pay Commissions did not adopt Job evaluation as a method for comparing the different jobs / services, despite the fact that it is a universally accepted technique for comparing and evaluating disparate jobs. For example, the Third Pay Commission did not adopt the job evaluation method as it considered the following limitations with the system,i) that there was non-availability of required data ii) that it had “so far been applied mostly to industrial jobs” and rarely to “highest paid jobs”

Metropolitian Police Commissioner

FORCE- LONDON SALARY (2010)

Metropolitian Police Deputy Commissioner

City of London Commissioner

City of London Assistant Commissioner

Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioners (4)

Metropolitan Police Deputy Assistant Commissioners (8)

Source: Police Regulations and Determinations 2003sioners (8)

£260,088

£214,722

£160,902

£132,714

£181,455

£139,119

LONDON POLICE: COMMISSIONER, ASSISTANT ANDDEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER SALARIES

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iii) that it is “time-consuming” and iv) That the “subjective element is still there in any job evaluation”.

2.3.5. However, these objections are not valid in light of the actual experience and practices all over the world in the field of job evaluation and the developments in technology that have made the collection and analysis of large volumes of data relatively easy. In fact, despite the unique nature of policing, in a survey of UK Police forces, 25 out of the total 43 forces responded that they use a job evaluation scheme to evaluate roles in the organization30.

2.3.6. However, it is accepted that such system in the police would need to be customised due to the unique nature of the police service. As such it is suggested that

i) Job evaluation study requires to be commissioned by the 7th CPC and outcome of the same may be made an important input into the process of relative assessment of jobs/services.

ii) Instead of evaluating jobs, “job classes” may be evaluated.

2.3.7. A scientific system of job evaluation would not only help objectively compare services and jobs within the government service but would also lead to an objective assessment of different government services like the police vis a vis the private and the public sector.

2.3.8. This is especially relevant in the present times when the chief differentiators of government service viz an assured pension and security of tenure have been negated. The new pension scheme has, in a way removed the chief attraction of government service i.e. of an assured and defined pension. In addition, the pressures of service including the threat of suspension and the reality of frequent transfers have made government service particularly that in the IPS as stressful and uncertain as employment in a private organization, if not more. At the same time, the fact that government salaries are significantly lower than private sector salaries needs no substantiation and has been well accepted by subsequent Pay Commissions themselves.

2.4. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF PAY

2.4.1. Based on the above, the following basic principles for the determination of pay for the police in India are proposed.

A. FAIRNESS – The system of pay should be fair in its procedure, conduct of the review, its analysis and its recommendations for the different sections of employees.

B. COMPENSATION FOR SKILLS, EXPERIENCE AND JOB COMPLEXITY – Policing has over the years become a complex, onerous and intellectual exercise, a far cry from what the service used to be at the turn of the century. The role of a Superintendent of Police in a district is infinitely more complex than the role of a Lt Col in an Army battalion or a Superintendent of Post or a Manager in a private company. Similarly, there is little parallel in the current times between the role of a police constable and an Army sepoy, a postman or a clerk in a private company. In addition, the numbers of specialist roles, such as counter-terrorism, organised crime, cyber-crime, forensics, VIP protection and fraud investigation have significantly increased. As such, the changed role of

police officers must be recognized and they must be compensated for the job performed by them in all its complexity.

C. DIFFICULT CONDITIONS OF WORK SHOULD BE COMPENSATED - Proper weight must be given to the difficult demands which the occupation places on police officers and their families and the ways in which they live their lives, including the long working hours, risks of personal injury and death, and public responsibility and scrutiny if things go wrong. Successive studies have also shown that night working and rotating shift patterns can significantly and adversely affect an individual’s physical health31. Similarly the effects of continued stress on the health and longevity are well documented.

D. MERIT AND GOOD PERFORMANCE MUST BE REWARDED Progression up the pay scales based purely on length of service is unfair. High performers should be paid more than those who perform adequately and higher again than those who perform poorly.

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E. TALENT OF HIGH CALIBRE SHOULD BE ATTRACTED AND RETAINED - The pay and service conditions for the IPS will affect the calibre of the people who wish to join, their motivation through their career, their retention in service; and consequently the effectiveness and efficiency of policing in India. A motivated and committed police leadership is the starting point for any attempt at reform in police functioning and inculcating a culture of professionalism and high achievement across all levels in Indian police. Thus, it is essential that pay and service conditions are such that the police system delivers service of a quality that the citizens of the country demand and deserve. F. SIMPLICITY AND FLEXIBILITY – Lastly, the system of pay and allowances should be simple to administer and not be too rigid.

2.5. PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF PAY COMMON TO ALL SERVICES

2.5.1. The Pay Commission has circulated a questionnaire in April 2014, which contains some questions on salaries and pay scales, on which the individual departments responded. The response of the IPS association on the relevant issues thereof, subject to any fundamental changes on account of job evaluation study, proposed above, is as under:

A. THE CONCEPT OF PAY BANDS:The concept of pay bands has worked well and the association recommends for retention of the system.

B. MINIMUM MAXIMUM SALARY RATIO: The sixth Pay Commission fixed the minimum-maximum salary ratio as 1:12 and observed that “while fixing the ratio, differentials that exist between the salaries in the private, public and the Government sectors may also need to be kept in view32 ”. The same report, quoting the commission assigned

XLRI study report on comparison with the Private sector observed, “while the compensation provided by the Government is higher at Group C and D levels, private sector compensation packages are marginally higher for employees comparable to Group B employees and substantially higher for posts comparable to Group A officers in the Government33 ”. When the actual scales were worked out this factor was not taken into consideration and on the contrary, much of the benefit of the minimum- maximum ratio was absorbed by the lower ranks. This can be explained by the following table:

PB-1 7000 - -

PB-2 13500 1.93 1.93

PB-3 21000 1.56 3

PB-4 46100 2.2 6.59

HAG 67000 1.4 9.57

HAG+ 75500 1.13 10.79

Apex Scale 80000 1.06 11.43

STARTING

POINT OF

THE PAY BAND

BASIC +GRADE PAY AT THE

LOWEST LEVEL(IN RS.)

JUMP FROM THE PREVIOUS

PAY BAND

CUMULATIVE JUMP

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The association feels that All India Services officers and officers of Group A enter at PB-3 level and spend most of their career at the PB-3 and PB-4 levels. Similarly, for direct entrants at Group B and Group C respectively, promotion will be more rewarding and a better recognition of their merit if there is higher pay jump. Therefore for the purpose of attracting suitable talent into the highest level direct recruits and to incentivise promotion of the Group B and Group C recruits into higher grades, the minimum to maximum salary may be slightly enhanced to 1:14 and restructure the inter pay band jump in the following manner.

C. MERGING OF THE PAY SCALES: The association recommends for total abolition of the HAG+ scale and removal of Rs.8900/-- grade pay for the IPS for the reasons to be explained in chapter 4.

D. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE GRADE PAY SYSTEM: The sixth Pay Commission recognised the concept of grade pay for providing fitment benefit, and uniformly applied the formula of 40% of the highest level of the previous pay scale for calculation of the grade pay . When it was implemented, there was no uniformity in grade pay elevation among successive pay scales. Also, the levels of grade pay34 within respective pay band were not

uniform. The association recommends for a uniform grade pay progression formula that from PB-1 to PB-4, within each pay band there may be four grades. There should be equal spacing between the grades both within and across the pay bands. At present, the ratio between the highest and the lowest grade pay is a little less than 1:6. The ratio may be slightly enhanced to 1:8, and to distribute the grade pay into 16 equal increments.

E. ANNUAL INCREMENTS: There has been a constant demand from various associations for a 5% annual increment, in line with the PSUs and Banks. The IPS Association recommends the same.

STARTING POINT OF THE

PAY BAND

JUMP FROM THE PREVIOUS PAY BAND CUMULATIVE JUMP

PB-1 - -

PB-2 1.75 1.75

PB-3 2 3.5

PB-4 2 7

HAG 1.5 10.5

HAG+ Recommended for abolition for reasons explained in chapter.

-

Apex Scale 1.33 14

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CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

3.1. INTRODUCTION

3.1 The primary purpose of this memorandum is to present the case of IPS officers. However, this chapter as well as chapter 5 of the memorandum also presents facts, figures and submissions on behalf of the entire police fraternity. This has been done as non gazetted ranks of police are not permitted by statute to form associations and it is the responsibility of IPS officers, as leaders of the force, to advance the cause of their subordinates.

3.2. LONG WORKING HOURS IN THE POLICE

3.2.1. The issue of long working hours of police personnel is often discussed in various fora. One of the earliest available empirical evidence on this issue is job

analysis conducted by National Productivity Council in 1977. Para 2.19 of the 1st National Police Commission Report highlighted the fact that the job analysis conducted by the National Productivity Council has shown that the working hours of the subordinate police officers range from 10 to 16 hours every day for all seven days in a week. It also revealed that a computerized survey conducted by Tamil Nadu police during that period had shown that an average Constable worked for 14 hours every day without any respite. It points out: “....long and arduous hours of work without facilities for rest and recreation, continuous employment on jobs under extreme conditions of stress and strain, both mental and physical, prolonged stagnation in the same rank without even one rank promotion throughout their service

THE INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN GRANDCONSPIRACY CASE

In September 2012, the National Investigation Agency registered a case against the leadership of Indian Mujahideen (IM) to investigate a conspiracy to wage war against the Government of India. The investigation was taken up in a context where the banned organisation was conducting attacks with impunity and at regular intervals across India. The gigantic investigation not only spanned many states but also extended to countries as disparate as Netherlands, Canada, United States of America, Dubai, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The assiduous investigation jointly conducted by young IPS officers and others, intricately supervised by IPS officers of the level of IG/DIG, uncovered the entire IM terror enterprise, including their complex financial and cyber trails, which included proxy Servers, TORs, encryption tools, Virtual Private Networks, and virtual currency transactions. Central intelligence agencies, NIA, as well as State Police forces were instrumental in collecting high quality intelligence and effecting important arrests in the face of physical risk. Thirty three people were arrayed as accused in the case, in which two charge-sheets have been laid till date.

This case is a model investigation which demonstrates complexities in conducting transnational investigations, underlining extensive requirements of information technology, forensic accounting, and international law skills, besides high level of coordination, team building, and the courage to face physical risks, which IPS officers exhibited in ample measure.

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for a majority of them, constant exposure to criticism and ridicule by a demanding public, a totally inadequate pay structure with no compensation for the handicaps and privation they undergo in their jobs, low status and lack of involvement in planning and executing field jobs with a full understanding of the objectives set by the police organization, etc., have all had their telling effect on the morale of the constabulary throughout the country. The increasing educational level of the Constables-a trend noticeable in the recent years-has sharpened the edge of their frustration with their existing lot within the police system. During our visits to several police stations and discussions with the constabulary, their highly demoralized state was strikingly noticeable. They have nothing to motivate them into meaningful and positive performance of police tasks with a full understanding of the implications and objectives of police action. They function as automatons in situations where they are required to exercise their discretion and judgment. They function rigidly in circumstances which require flexibility of approach and understanding of the opposite point of view. We are convinced that mere changes in their training schedule will not bring about the necessary improvement in their motivation or performance unless

some serious deficiencies in their living and working conditions which have long been neglected are immediately taken up and remedied. We consider this exercise to be of primary importance in any attempt at police reform…..”

3.2.2. All the issues mentioned in the report are still very much relevant even after more than 35 years. Moreover the challenges faced by police officers have increased manifold. The police officers working in the police stations and other field formations have to face the perennially growing challenges of terrorism, left wing extremism, threat to internal security from our hostile neighbours, increased crime, caste and communal strife, student and labour unrest, increasing use of police resources for law and order duties. This hypothesis has been substantiated by subsequent studies.

3.2.3. A survey conducted by McKinsey & Co. in 2003 of approximately 1400 officers and constables across commissionerates and districts in Maharashtra identified a very demanding lifestyle driven by long working hours

(average of 14 hours per day) and limited leave (average of 35 days in a year against an entitlement of 90 days, including 52 weekly offs) as the prominent key factor responsible for low motivation and high stress levels.3.2.4. Another study of 286 police officers working in police stations in Karnataka has revealed that many police officers stated that they work an average of 12 to 16 hours a day without any weekly or monthly days off 35 .

3.2.5. While preparing this memorandum, a survey was conducted in 14 police stations spread over six districts in 4 different states to see as to whether the observations of NPC report of 1977 are still relevant or not. Since most of the police work is police station based, data about the number of hours police officers work at police stations was collected from few police stations in districts/ cities- Lucknow, Bhiwani, Karimnagar, Adilabad, Khammam and New Delhi. After March 2014, there had been increase in police activity due to the General Election; therefore the data was gathered for the month of January 2014 (presumed to be a normal working

month). The number of hours of duty was calculated on the basis of arrival/departure information in General Diary (GD) maintained in the police station. In all, the study captures data regarding the average working hours of 680 police personnel based at the police stations. The findings were, in average civil police staff in the police stations work between 12-13 hours a day. Quite often, they report to duty on Sundays. Moreover their duty hours are staggered due to the nature of police work. A typical police officer in the police station may be working 4-6 hours in the morning and 6-8 hours in the evening. This clearly means that even if that officer may have actually worked for 12-13 hours, but adding up the time for commuting, the actual time spent was much more.

3.2.6. Ever increasing responsibilities and perennial shortage of staff contribute to shouldering of additional burden by available hands. If we compare the relative availability of police officers per lakh of population, we find that in India we have 122.5 civil police officers per lakh of population as compared to global average of 341.836 .

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Nobody can dispute the fact that nature of job is much more challenging and the responsibilities shouldered by police officers in India are significantly higher than police officers of several other countries.

Indian police is not adequately equipped with force multipliers such as vehicles and technological tools compared with the police forces in developed countries where manpower is greatly supplemented by the extensive use of technology. Therefore in practical terms the shortage of staff is even more acute than what the figures indicate.

3.3. OCCUPATIONAL AND SITUATIONAL RISKS SPECIFIC TO POLICE

3.3.1. As compared to several other professions related to public service, police officers are exposed to a disproportionate risk of occupational hazards. Main categories of occupational hazards faced by the police include risk of physical assault, accidents, stress and fatigue and risk of lifestyle and area specific diseases. As per Crime in India, 2013 published by National Crime Records Bureau 3,714 police personnel died during the year 2013 as compared to 3,375 deaths in the year 2012 showing an increase of 10.3.% over the previous year. During the same period, 3723 personnel were injured in the line of duty, showing an increase of 10.2 % over the previous year.

3.3.2. Risk of physical assault: Foremost amongst the occupational hazards faced by police officers is the risk of assault. Several professional situations which police officers face while performing their day to day duties such as public disorder situations, dealing with disputes, arresting suspects, escorting prisoners, and conducting anti-militancy operations make them vulnerable to physical assault. 3.3.3. Risk of accidents: Police personnel face enhanced risk of accidents, while chasing criminals, diffusing explosive devices, driving in extremely hostile weather conditions, performing border duties and managing traffic.

3.3.4. Risk of fatigue induced stress: Police personnel are obliged by law to be available for duty round the clock to meet emergencies, even when they are off duty. They suffer fatigue induced stress due to constant exposure to danger, traumatic events, short-staffed stations, and continuous work in isolated rural areas. Additionally persons stationed in armed guards, escorts and static pickets, where the nature of work requires constant alertness but no physical action, coupled with uncertainty of facing unforeseen threats, experience fatigue due to drudgery of the work. Excessive fatigue often has long term consequences for mental and physical health, which will be discussed in a later sub section.

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3.3.5. Other risks: There are a wide variety of other risks that police personnel face during the performance of their duties. Police personnel working in the Traffic police, in addition to facing greater risks of accidents, are also prone to contact lung and respiratory diseases due to the continuous exposure to toxic emissions. Police personnel deployed in long running agitations face the risk of contracting lung infections from continuous inhalation of tear-gas. Bomb squad and Investigating Officers may inhale harmful vapours while inspecting crime scenes involving explosions. Such examples may be too many to compile an exhaustive list but there is no gainsaying that police personnel – given the nature of their jobs- are more susceptible to physical and internal injury than are most, if not all, other professions related to public service.

3.4. IMPACT OF STRESS ON POLICE OFFICERS

3.4.1. Police personnel deal on a regular basis with an assortment of unique situations and stressors. Unlike other jobs, the police officers start the day with bad news. There is only negative feedback in terms of how many murders and robberies have taken place the previous night. The job pattern of a policeman is not structured like his counterparts in other departments. His work life follows a sequence of unpredictable events with uncertain consequences - crimes by their very nature do not follow a linear time cycle; receiving a phone call in the middle of the night is a recurring, yet unpredictable experience which is invariably linked to a call of emergency; there is always a split second difference between a crowd turning into a mob. Often he ends up disappointing members of the public who approach him, as the visible symbol of the government, on matters on which he has no mandate to intervene.

Saha et. al. (2010) evaluated cardio-vascular risk factors in police officers and reported comparative health complaints of police officers in relation to non-police personnel as depicted in table below. The risk of having a heart attack in fact doubles with each decade of law enforcement service (Jahnavi et al; 2012).

COMPLAINTS OF POLICE OFFICERS (OCCURRENCE IN PERCENTAGE) ABOUT HEALTH PROBLEMS

(Source: Jahnavi G; Patra, S. R; Chandrasekhar C. H and Rao N. B. (2012) Unmasking the health problems faced by the police personnel. Global Journal of Medicine and Public health. Vol. 1(5). Pp: 64-69Saha A., Saha, S and Paul G. (2010) Evaluation of cardio-vascular risk factor in police officers. International Journal of Pharma and Bio Sciences. Vol.1: Issue-4)

Type of Complaints

Gastro Intestinal Problems 45.8 16.3

38.2 21.2

52.8 15.3

24.8 11.2

50.5 2.2

30.3 25.3

Cardio vascular problems

Pain in different body parts

Sleep disturbance

Other Problems

Nervousness/ Anxietyproblems

Police Officers Non Policepersonnel

Occurrences increase afterjoining the job

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A Human Rights Watch report in August 2009 highlights the poor working conditions of the police officers and the fact that low ranking police are over-worked and often exhausted due to requirement that they be available for duty for 24 hours a day. Page 29 of the Report reveals:“....police are required to be available for work 24 hours day, 7 days a week – a gruelling cruelty for constables and other low ranking officers. As Government employees, police are allowed paid leave. However, in practice, the police chief or district officials may order standing orders to recall officers on vacation and some- times no leave is permitted for a certain period or when there are exigencies or staff shortages. Superior officers often deny leave because of staff shortages.......”.

(Accessed at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/india0809web.pdf-

accessed on 20/05/2014)

Xavier and Prabhakar (2013) reported that in the Indian police force, policemen in higher ranks have increased work load and areas of jurisdiction. Further, there are conflicting job demands, responsibilities of subordinates, time pressure and deadlines, physical strain of work environment, long hours and having to cope with changes at work and at the expense (monetary and career) of making mistakes. It is seen that since subordinates are incapable of performing their tasks properly, the senior officers tend to take on their responsibilities also. Increased accountability of any act within their area of jurisdiction, political interference, fear of explanation of any indiscipline or irresponsibility on the part of subordinates, fear of the unknown, lack of communication and cooperation from other departments result in unresolved frustrations and personal conflicts which further lead to stress and anxiety among officers at higher levels.

(Source: Xavier P. and Prabhakar K. (2013) Stress among Indian Police and conceptual issues. Abhinav. Vol. II; pp. 60-66.)

Officers who experience high levels of occupational stress report a high incidence of physical ailments and psychological problems that affect their work performance. Specifically, they commonly have poor health (Kirkcaldy et al; 1995), experience burnout (Brown et al; 1996), are dissatisfied with their jobs and because of weak organizational commitment, they may not fully invest themselves in their work or they may retire prematurely (Kop et al; 1999). When individuals are overwhelmed by occupational stress they suffer from increased chronic stress, depression, heart disease, stomach disorders, alcohol and drug use and abuse, divorce, and even suicide attempts (Walker, 1997).

Brown, J., Cooper C. L. and Kirkcaldy B. (1996). Occupational stress among senior police officers. British Journal Psychology, 87, 31-41.

Kirkcaldy B., Cooper C. L. and Ruffalo P. (1995), Work stress and health in a sample of U.S. police. Psychological Reports, 76, 700-702

Anger has also been found to have negative impacts on emotional as well as the physical well-being of the people (Sharma et al., 1996). Mearns and Mauch (1998) observed that anger and hostility predispose people to serious health problems. They also observed that police officers who reported more anger also reported more distress. For police personnel, the inability to effectively manage stress has its most dangerous consequences in decision making during the line of duty. Stress management programmes have been implemented successfully by police organizations in the West (Wagner, 1981).

(Source: Sharma, S., Ghosh, S. N., and Spielberger, C. D. (1996). Anxiety, Anger Expression and Chronic Gastric Ulcer. Psychological Studies, 187-191Mearns, J., &Mauch, T. G. (1998). Negative mood regulation expectancies predict anger among police officers and buffer the effects of job stress. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 186(2), 120-125.

Wagner, M. (1981). Action and Reaction: The Establishment of a counseling service in the Chicago Police Department. In Territo, L., & Vetter, H. J. (Eds.), Stress and Police Personnel. Boston: Allyn& Bacon, Inc.)

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Agitations are collective expression of dissatisfaction with the state authorities and others on a variety of issues like education, essential services, transport facilities, wages etc. and a policeman who is on the forefront to perform his duty is often the target for venting the public anger and frustration. A policeman is always under public gaze -a momentary lapse of concentration due to fatigue and consequent error of judgement is captured and magnified through the lens of a 24x7 media and haunts him with a lifelong taint. The shock of each tragedy and violent event takes cumulative physical and mental toll on each police officer in some way or the other. Increased demands of work impinging upon home life, lack of control over workload and inadequate support have been identified as the potential factors responsible for the stress in the policemen37.

3.4.2. From the Bureau of Police Research and Deveopment publication data on police organisations 2013, it can be seen that police faced 78,444 agitations in the year 2012 which was 6.96% higher than the previous year. In these agitations, 13 civilians and 6 policemen were killed whereas 354 civilians and 863 policemen were injured. The hostile clientele with which police personnel deal and interact predisposes them to additional stressors38. Two types of stressors that police officers experience have been identified - those that engender anxiety and those that arouse anger and hostility39. Anger-related stress is particularly important in interactions with hostile clientele, and its negative effects are heightened because officers are prohibited by the decorum of their job from publicly expressing anger and hostility. The police subculture tends to protect the macho image of the police and informally teaches its members to follow a code of silence.

They are conditioned to respond to a variety of situations and be under complete emotional control while doing so. Suppression of emotions like anger, fear, and grief has negative consequences on the immune system which causes deterioration of physical health.40 To alleviate stress the police officers tend to go into maladaptive behaviours like drinking, smoking and overeating, which contribute significantly, to this deterioration.

3.4.3. Frequent transfers are another problem faced among various ranks, more prominently by young IPS officers. Such transfers cause emotional disturbance to the entire family of the officer too. The above-mentioned BPR&D study reports that 221 district SPs were transferred in less than a year’s tenure and 173 in less than two years, which means that even after discounting some multiple transfers,

nearly half the district superintendents in the country are unable to complete the minimum tenure as stipulated by the government. The corresponding figures for the range DIGs are, as against 178 ranges, 35 range DIGs were transferred within one year and 38 were transferred within two years of posting. Reply to a Right to Information Act petition in 2013 disclosed that 43 officers were transferred for more than 40 times in their career in the state of Uttar Pradesh alone, which was widely reported by the media41 .

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3.5. POLICE JOB DEMANDS AND ALIENATION FROM FAMILIES

3.5.1. Civil police personnel feel alienation from their families for most of their career. A significant proportion of the civil police also are unable to keep their families with them because of their rural postings. Even those who are fortunate to keep the family with them are unable to spend quality time with them because of the long hours of duty, including on weekends and holidays.

3.5.2. Consequent to the Mckinsey Maharashtra study conducted in 2004, it was reported that on festive days, police force is on the streets rather than celebrating festivals42 . This means that police officers and other ranks in the commissionerate cannot avail holidays or leave due to this. For various reasons, police work in 12 hour shifts while the labour law provides for an 8 hour shift. In view of the shortage of man power heavy crime work and uncertain law and order duties, policemen have to work for 16 hours at a strech. They are also not able

to avail weekly holidays, casual leave, earned leave and the other gazetted holidays.

3.5.3. Insufficient time for the family has been among the top ranking stressors43. During festivals, constables often work for more than 24 hours at a stretch, away from their families, and while on duty they see the rest of the world celebrating and enjoying their holiday. The families of police personnel are often neglected when head of the family is out on duty. The classic model of a police line or a battalion can only partially take care of their burden, as only about 30% of the police personnel are fortunate to get government quarters. Therefore by and large, the families are not unable to get the care and attention by the department in organized manner nor the individuals are able to do so themselves because of commitment of duty in terms of time and place. This keeps on hurting policeman internally44.

He understands that he is neither able to fulfil aspirations of parents and spouse nor able to bestow love and guidance to their kids during their growing age. This results mostly in violent and insensitive manifestation in his behaviour.

3.5.4. A study conducted in Delhi police shows that policemen deployed at police stations, railways, traffic, intelligence, security, PCR and Armed Police account for 81.72 % of the sanctioned strength. A deeper analysis conducted in 2 districts – West and South West- shows that only 7.85 % of policemen posted in these units are able to avail leave on festivals.Thus about 76.8% of policemen are not

able to meet their families to celebrate such festivals. In Delhi police the satisfaction percentage of housing has been hovering around 18% to 20% for last 25 years. Rest of the policemen are forced to keep their families in villages as they can’t afford the high rents and other costs of living in Delhi. Therefore, a policeman is not able to visit his family for weeks and sometimes months together. He spends his off duty time in the barracks and has to be available on call. Therefore, it is not just the issue of spending 12 to 14 hours on the job but also of the poor quality of rest in the barracks where he is mentally preoccupied waiting for an emergency call to respond to.

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3.6. HEALTH HAZARDS AND THEIR MANIFESTATIONS

3.6.1. The Apex court acknowledged through various judgements that Right to health care is an integral part of right to life guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution of India. Stress is an important factor contributing to poor health of police personnel. The stressful nature of the police work affects the health and family lives of many officers which encourages alcoholism and other vices amongst them. A majority of police personnel suffer from various problems such as high blood pressure, heart disease, diabetes, mental stress disorder etc. due to job induced stress. Stress and related health and personal problems should therefore be the concern of every police administrator not only because of the humanitarian aspects but also because a failure to deal with them can have a profoundly negative effect upon the overall performance of the police organization.

3.6.2. At the psychological level, the stress of police work may result in chronic negative emotions such as anger, anxiety or depression. Police officers operating under severe and chronic stress may well be at greater risk of error and over-reaction that can compromise their performance and public safety. The unrealistic expectations imposed by this occupational culture discourage officers from admitting feeling stressed and openly expressing negative emotions.

3.6.3. The sleep-wake cycle, under the circadian control of endogenous regulators or oscillators, is disrupted by a misalignment between the external demands of police work and biological rhythms. This produces mood disturbances, decreased work performance, general physical malaise; sleep-wake complaints and increased intake or addiction to alcohol besides drugs and suicidal tendencies.

3.7. ARGUMENTS FOR EXTRA COMPENSATION FOR ADVERSE WORK CONDITIONS

3.7.1. Increased level of education of junior police officers, increased awareness and constant comparison with other similarly placed government servants has given rise to lot of resentment. This has a huge impact on the delivery of police services. A feeling has developed that despite working for longer hours, performing duty on holidays and festivals and many times not being able to avail leave due to nature of job, the police officers are not being suitably compensated.

3.7.2. Non gazetted police officers in several police departments including the Delhi police, are presently compensated for extra work by giving them extra salary for one month in Delhi police. However this is highly inadequate and does not compensate for the extra work done by the police. Moreover many police officers are not able to avail the leave because many times leave is temporarily

stopped by the supervisory officers due to exigencies of duty. If one only considers the average 72 hours of work per week and not count the work done during the gazetted holidays, which is much higher than the standard norm of 40 hours of work per week; one month s’ extra pay is far less compensator even by the aforementioned modest calculation. In addition, taking into account the stress in job due to constant threat to life and injury, unnatural working hours, difficult working condition and staying away from family, they deserve much higher increase in the compensation package.

3.7.3. A police officer, including starting level of a civil police constable, under various sections of the Criminal Procedure Code and various statutes has the power to stop and search person or premises; to arrest anyone under reasonable suspicion of his having committed an offence; to interrogate,

4746

to use force to disperse a mob, refrain a person from evading arrest. Apart from the negative powers of restraining people, (s) he needs to use immense amount of discretion, make quick decisions and at times take unpopular decisions in the larger interest of the society. Successive pay Commissions missed the point that remuneration package to level of government functionaries who has the power to impact upon any person’s life and liberty has to be commensurate with the need to attract, motivate and retain right kind of talent.

3.7.4. Police reforms mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court are lagging behind in many states in spite of the continuous court driven monitoring. Contribution of the cutting edge level police officers will be highly critical for the success of police reform agenda. As already submitted in the beginning the Pay Commission can make a vital contribution and act as a catalyst for the much needed police reforms through

its recommendation. Remuneration and allowances commensurate with the responsibilities of police will greatly help in intake of quality human resources and upkeep of their motivation levels throughout their career. Further, cardinal to success of the police reforms and turning the Indian police truly into a people’s police is shedding of the colonial vestiges, one of which is the fairly static and low status of the constable. While the primary responsibility for effecting structural reforms is of the central government, attraction of right talent being one of its terms of reference, Pay Commission can play a proactive role in this regard.

3.7.5. Successive Pay Commissions have carried forward the legacy of equating a constable with a semi-skilled worker which is an anachronistic approach for the 21st century policing needs. In most of the states the basic qualification level for a civil police constable is now class XII and quite often majority of

the successful candidates are graduates. After recruitment, constables undergo two years of rigorous training where considerable enhancement of knowledge and skill takes place ranging from inputs in Law (all three major Criminal Acts), Constitution, investigation techniques, managing law and order, forensic science and medicine, criminology apart from skills of weapon, explosive and riot handling, swimming, field craft, operations and survival skills.

3.7.6. Government of India constituted a Committee in September 2005 to draft a new Police Act to replace the Police Act of 1861. The Committee was chaired by Shri Soli Sorabjee, former Attorney General. The committee had submitted a Model Police Act in 2006, which formed the basis of recommendations of the Apex court in the Prakash Singh case (already mentioned in a previous section) and also a guiding document for enactment of Police Acts in various states. As per

the report, the rank structure of Group ‘C’ posts in the Civil Police shall consist of Civil Police Officer Grade II, Civil Police Officer Grade I, Sub Inspector and Inspector. The committee also proposed that, “Every Civil Police Officers Grade II will undergo three years intensive training before being posted to the Service as a stipendiary cadet, and will, upon successful completion of training, have a graduation degree in police studies. Their scales of pay and conditions of service shall therefore be commensurate with ranks in other services under the state, which require similar levels of educational qualifications and training”.

3.7.7. In view of the above discussion, the IPS Association sincerely urges the Pay Commission to consider adopting a similar approach as the Soli Sorabjee committee and consider the following scales of pay, which essentially would involve stepping up the existing levels of grade to the next level.

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3.7.8. The above discussion amply demonstrates the extreme challenges faced by the police in discharging their duties under poor conditions of service. Even a B class police district has about 2,000 to 3,000 policemen, and 4-6 sub divisions with 3-4 staff wings. An IPS officer therefore leads thousands of men. This calls for a high order of management skills and sound knowledge of HRM practices. The stress levels increase manifold at the level of SP and above, due to accumulation of stress inducing circumstances and events in their areas of responsibility. It is therefore very important to acknowledge this factor while deciding on the remuneration for the IPS officers.

EXISTING

RANK

PROPOSED

RANK

MODE OF

RECRUITMENT

PROPOSED SALARY

(AS PER THE

PRESENT SCHEME,

SUBJECT TO THREVISION BY THE 7

CPC)

Constable Civil Police

Officer- Grade II

Direct Recruitment of

class XII passed

candidates. Will be

imparted three years

training after which a

degree is awarded to

them.

Pay revision

corresponding to the

existing PB1- Rs. 5200-

20020 + grade pay 2400/-

Head

Constable

Civil Police

Officer- Grade I

By promotion Pay revision

corresponding to the

existing PB1- Rs. 5200-

20020 + grade pay 2800/-

Sub Inspector Pay revision corresponding to the existing scales, but the allowances need to

be revised

Inspector Pay revision corresponding to the existing scales, but the allowances need to

be revised

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STRUCTURAL ISSUES, PAY PARITY

AND CAREER PROGRESSION ISSUES

4.1. INTRODUCTION

4.1. One of the terms of reference before the Commission is “To work out the framework for an emoluments structure linked with the need to attract the most suitable talent to Government service, promote efficiency, accountability and responsibility in the work culture, and foster excellence in the public governance system to respond to the complex challenges of modern administration and the rapid political, social, economic and technological changes, with due regard to expectations of stakeholders, and to recommend appropriate training and capacity building through a competency based framework”. Keeping in view the complex

governance challenges before the country and in recognition of the critical contribution of the Indian Police Service in ensuring good governance and effectively implementing police reforms, there is a need to identify and rectify the issues that are causing impediments to attracting and retention of right talent in the Indian Police Service and their career progression. The following paragraphs highlight some of the concerns of the service officers and suggest recommendations to set right the existing anomalies.

TRANSPARENT RECRUITMENT PROCESS (TRP) IN UTTAR PRADESH POLICE

UP Police Recruitment and Promotion Board, set up in Dec 2008, showed the way for the rest of the Police forces in the country by effecting merit based, transparent, corruption free and intervention free recruitment to the posts of 35000 constables from among a staggering 7,50,000 applicants. It simultaneously conducted scrutiny of documents and Physical standards test at 75 locations, Physical Efficiency Test at 25 locations, written examination at over 450 centres, and decentralised scanning at 18 locations. Each process was conducted using the latest scientific tools including RFID chips, biometric devices, CCTV cameras, barcoded OMR sheets, with all processes logged and reported in real time. Scanned individual OMR answer sheets, answer keys, and mark lists were all placed online to ensure transparency. Each process was managed by separate teams so that no individual would be able to form an interest into the outcome of a particular candidate.

This successful experiment was lauded as a social revolution in UP and recommended by the then Union Home Minister to all CMs and compliance on TRP was linked with grant of modernisation funds. In its 5th year of operation, most states have not only implemented it, but have also improved upon it with technological upgradation thereby facilitating a positive impact on police public image.

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4.2. PARITY OF PAY WITH IASAND IFS

4.2.1 Parity of pay with the Indian Administrative Service and Indian Foreign Service has been consistently sought by officers of the Indian Police Service officers with successive Pay Commissions but the same has not found favour with the commission. Unfortunately, the reasons for turning down the request were never based on merit but through direct acceptance of flawed arguments made by the other side on the basis of specious premises. The approach was status-quoist, aimed at perpetuation of colonial practices. Instead of addressing legitimate concerns expressed by IPS, IFoS and the Central services on merits from an analytic perspective, the issue was often erroneously examined with a colored view from a ‘inter service rivalry’ perspective. In view of the importance of the issue not only to the All India Services but across the entire group-A central services, the association sincerely urges this commission to examine threadbare the contentions being made and resolve it through a reasoned speaking decision.

4.2.2 Before venturing into the parity argument, certain historical facts are being presented below for the kind perusal of the Commission.

4.2.3 In the constituent assembly, when the clause for creating All India Services was moved it was accepted with the observations of the president that “All-India Services will be desirable, I take it, in cases where you wish to attract to the highest services the best material that may be available in the country, and you will have to transgress provincial boundaries for the purpose of attracting this material if you want such material to take service whether under the Provincial Governments or under the Federal Government45”. Further, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar had clarified to the Constituent Assembly on Thursday, the 4th November 1948, “India’s Constitution provides that there shall be an All India Service recruited on an all-India basis with common qualifications, with uniform scale of pay and the members of which alone could be appointed to these

strategic posts throughout the Union46”.This underscores two points; that the makers of constitution considered all India services as a single class and supported the need to attract the best talent for all the All India Services and not just one service.

4.2.4 In the British India, the Secretary of State controlled the recruitment and service conditions of the “Indian Civil Service” and the “Indian Police” and the article 244 of the Government of India Act, 1935 reinforced the status and distinctively mentions the services in addition to a third service, “The Indian Medical Service”. The origin of the respective services, qualification requirements of aspirants and the method of recruitment were different. Therefore a distinct classification existed in the pre independence time. However, the situation was altered after adoption of the Constitution: Article 312 of the Constitution does not distinguish among the All India Services and laid down

a uniform process for the creation, regulation of the recruitment, and laying down the conditions of service. Therefore in the absence of any specific constitutional sanction of the further classification of the All India Services, any such legal provision determining the service condition by virtue of any act or rule shall have to necessarily pass the doctrine of reasonable classification under article 14 of the Constitution. The All India Services Act 1951 was enacted for the purposes of creation and regulation of service conditions of the All India Services. Rules framed under section 3 of the said Act, which are amended for time to time, address issues concerning service conditions. While some of the rules, such as conduct rules and rules on allowances and benefits are common to all the three services, some others such as the pay and cadre rules are different with each service. Significantly, except the pay rules rest of the service specific rules are identically worded.

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4.2.5 Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India lays down the principle of equal pay for equal work. The spirit of this article can be reasonably interpreted in the present context that services and posts whose duties and responsibilities are comparable should carry substantially same or comparable remuneration47.

4.2.6 After the adoption of the Constitution of India, since 1951 although officers for the civil services were recruited through the same process by the Union Public Service Commission, the services were divided, for the purposes of examination, into three categories as below:

4.2.7 The Committee on Recruitment Policy and Selection Methods (1976), popularly known as the Kothari Commission recommended a common examination for all civil services in all respects. In support of the above, they relied upon the Administrative Reform Commission’s Report on Personnel Administration (1969) and Committee on Police Training (Gore Committee) (1971). The Government accepted the recommendations of the Commission and 1979 onwards; officers of the IAS, IPS and Central Services Group A are presently being recruited through a common examination.

4.2.8 The IPS has consistently, especially post 1979 been among the most preferred service in the Civil Service examination by the candidates. Statistics collected on the basis of the data from the recent batches of the civil services examinations (from the table below), indicates that these days candidates equally prefer IPS and the Indian Foreign Service. If the artificial edge provided to IAS/IFS is removed, some of the candidates who presently prefer to joining these services, even though they have aptitude for Police, will definitely change their preference in favour of IPS over IAS.

S.NO. CATEGORYPAPERS IN CIVIL SERVICES

EXAMINATION

1 Category I Services

(IAS & IFS)

5 optional subjects &3 compulsory subjects

2 Category II Services

(IPS & Police Service Class II

of Union Territories)

2 optional subjects &3 compulsory subjects

3 Category III Services

(Central Services

Class I and II)

3 optional subjects & 5 compulsory subjects

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4.2.9 Various commissions beginning from the Kothari Commission have consistently advocated the principle of aptitude based choice of service selection. The Kothari commission had recommended that the allotment of service may be done after the final stage of their three-stage sequential process, i.e. Prelims, Mains and Post Training exams. The Alagh Committee, 2001 had also looked at the question of allotment of services. To help selected candidates to make an informed choice of service, it recommended that: “the selected candidates may be required to exercise their service preferences only on the completion of the Foundation Course at LBSNAA but

the allocation would continue to be on the basis of the original merit list prepared by the UPSC.” The 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission, 2008 also agreed with the recommendation of the Alagh Committee and recommended that allotment of services to the successful candidates should be done only on the completion of the Foundation Course, on the basis of the merit list prepared by the UPSC. The Hota Committee, 2004 also recommended that aptitude and leadership tests may be introduced for selection, and that probationer may be allowed one month’s time after commencement of training to exercise their option for Services.

SERVICE PREFERENCE TRENDS 2005-12

2005 56 43 1 0 63 9 2 0

2006 50 35 0 0 75 10 9 1

2007 78 46 1 1 92 8 4 0

2008 81 50 1 1 103 12 7 2

2009 70 49 1 1 108 13 12 0

2010 83 56 0 0 140 17 21 2

2011 97 77 0 0 162 22 19 7

2012 116 76 0 0 134 14 4 1

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4.2.10 Position taken by Pay Commissions in the pre Kothari commission era on relativities of pay scales among various services: For having a correct perspective on the parity issue, it would be worthwhile to divide the successive Pay Commission recommendations into two different periods, i.e. pre Kothari commission and post Kothari commission. The pre independence commissions and the first three Pay Commissions covered the pre Kothari Commission period and the position taken by the respective commissions on relativity of pay scales is as under:

i) At Paragraph 66 (page 41) of the First pay Commission report it was acknowledged that the reasons for lower pay scales to the Indian Police Service in comparison was earlier age of entry and lower educational qualifications. The commission had advocated for common standards of recruitment with the Class-I services and in consequence of the same pay structure with the class I services but less than IAS/IFS, which were to be recruited through different standards.

ii) While the Second Pay Commission (1957-59) did not discuss the pay structure of the All India Services, but pursuant to the revision of pay scales for the Central Services the Government looked into the matter and proposed pay scales for the IPS as compared to Class I Central Services48.

iii) The Third Pay Commission (1973) deliberated at length on the need to attract capable talent for the IPS, acknowledged the job complexities and recommended parity with the IAS in the Junior Scale49 . Although parity was not maintained with the senior scale onwards, the commission had recommended for increasing some allowances to ‘have the effect of reducing the existing disparity between the IAS and IPS scales of pay’50 . As regards relativities between the IAS and the Class I services, the commission came to a conclusion that there was a case for gradual narrowing down of the difference over the years depending upon the prevailing circumstances51 .

4.2.11 Flawed justifications adopted by the previous Pay Commissions to deny parity with the IAS/IFS: Post the Kothari Commission report; officers of the Indian Police Service from 1980 batch onwards are being recruited through a common examination under uniform criteria for selection. However, successive Pay Commissions thereafter have still denied the parity of pay among the services and continued to allow edge to the IAS/IFS officers in their initial career. Some of the reasons quoted for continuation of status quo are presented below, with the inherent flaws in the justifications offered therein.

4.2.12 The Fourth Pay Commission (1986) made a passing mention of the suggestions made by various services on the issue of parity52 but evaded a discussion on the subject. Instead, the commission recommended improvements in the career progression aimed at reducing disparities. This is a flawed approach, particularly since the third Pay Commission had elaborately dealt with the issue in an objective and highly analytical manner and set

a platform for visiting the issue by the future commissions on the basis of relative importance of the respective services as per the prevailing situation of governance priorities. Specific to the IPS, the commission brought about measures to improve the career progression by merging ranks, as well as by recommending induction of an IPS officer as member of cadre review committee.

4.2.13 The approach of the Fifth Pay Commission was status quoist. Firstly the commission erroneously equated performance in the civil service examination as the criterion for pay determination and observed,“…It is not correct to compare the last man of the IAS with the first man of the Central Services… the fact is that there is a split-second difference between a gold medallist and the also ran in an Olympic race53 ”. In fact, just for preservation of the status quo, the commission went on to the extent of recommending scrapping of the common civil service examination system which was introduced with a public interest in mind54.

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If the commission’s logic of examination performance as a pay determinator is accepted, all the candidates higher on the merit list who joined the IPS in preference to IAS/IFS55 should draw pay equal to them and as a consequence their pay would be more than their other batch mates of the IPS and as a further consequence this defeats the concept of ‘equal pay for equal work’! In any case determination of emoluments is not an exercise of providing incentive for examination performance, but as the third Pay Commission had rightly approached issue, it should be based on the complexity and difficulty of the duties and responsibilities of the job. Without discussing merits of the other arguments placed by the service associations, the commission abruptly concluded by stating that “56As far as the edge enjoyed by the IAS and IFS over the other Services is concerned, we do not find any persuasive reason that would impel us to do away with the edge currently enjoyed by them…”. Curiously, on the question of parity between IPS and Indian Forest service the argument of parity were accepted.

4.2.14 The Sixth Pay Commission attempted to give a functional justification for retaining the edge, but again the logic

was flawed. The commission observed, “The role of IAS is still very important in the overall scheme of governance. They have an important coordinating, multi-functional and integrating role in the administrative framework with wide experience of working across various levels in diverse areas in Government. They hold important field level posts at the district level and at the cutting edge at the start of their careers with critical decision making and crisis management responsibilities. The leadership function, the strategic, coordinating and integrative role at this level requires the best talent available. The existing position would, therefore, need to be maintained. It will ensure that IAS officers near the beginning of their career are given slightly higher remuneration vis-à-vis other services and act as an incentive for the brightest candidates to enter this service. This is essential as the initial postings of IAS officers are generally to small places, they face frequent transfers and the pulls and pressures they have to stand up to early in their career are much more intense. The slight edge in the initial stages of their career would, to an extent, neutralize these problems57”. It essentially laid down three principles, i.e. i) The functions of coordination, integration and experience of working across various levels in diverse areas in Government are considered superior within the administrative framework; ii) Slight edge

in the initial career helps in attracting the brightest talent which is required for performing such roles; and iii) Sight edge mitigates the hardships faced by the IAS officers in their initial careers and also rewards the leadership roles exercised. The flaws in this line of argument will be dealt with in the following paragraphs.

4.2.15 Arguments in support of parity in the initial career: As per the sixth Pay Commission, the edge of pay between IPS and the IAS/IFS extends from senior scale to the selection grade, i.e. from the fifth to fifteenth year of service. As explained above the arguments behind the recommendations of the previous Pay Commissions are flawed, they do not satisfy the test of reasonable classification in favour of IAS /IFS and are liable to be rejected for use by the present Pay Commission. The following are some arguments in favour of a full parity, for the kind consideration of the commission which find strength from the extensive discussion made above.i) For achieving objectives of governance, the multi dimensional specialist’s role of an IPS is as important the multi dimensional generalist’s role of an IAS officer: Ensuring Rule of Law, Public Order and Internal Security rank among top governance priorities of any country,

as absence of the same can threaten the very existence of the nation. As already explained in chapter-I, the Police in India currently undertake these responsibilities under extremely challenging circumstances. Successive Pay Commissions have failed to recognise the importance of these issues, more often accorded primacy to the departments concerned with the general administration, development, revenue collection, finance and audit activities, and successively ignored the fact that the working mandate of Police is highly complex and it occupies a multi dimensional specialist’s role as compared to the multi dimensional generalist’s role of an IAS and uni-dimensional specialized roles of an IFS officer. Country needs best talent in equal measure in each of these services for achieving its governance objectives.

ii) It is incorrect to state that the Central Government attaches a premium to the functions of coordination, integration and experience of working in diverse areas, as a matter of policy: The 6th CPC succeeded in propagating a misconception that it is the government’s policy that functions of coordination, integration and experience of working across various levels in diverse areas in

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government are considered superior within the higher echelons of the administrative framework, and therefore it is necessary to attract the best possible talent towards the IAS, the job profile of which matches the aforementioned description. On the contrary, the policy of the Central Government for selecting officers for manning the senior posts is through the Central Staffing Scheme58 and the stated policy of selection to the CSS posts has been expressed as, “The raison d’etre is the Centre’s need for fresh inputs at senior levels in policy planning, formulation of policy and implementation of programmes from diverse sources, viz., the All-India Services and the participating organised Group ‘A’ Services”. Therefore, no such premium is attached to a particular service by the government as a policy.

iii) Persons recruited through the same examination for the comparable jobs should be treated at par: Justifying the recommendation for having a common examination, the Kothari Commission said “even though the professional expertise required of a general administrator, or a diplomat or a police officer or a member of any of the other Central Services vary, their general qualities of competence,

traits of character and sense of commitment necessarily have a common denominator. The same applies to other qualities needed in an officer such as intellectual cohesion, articulation, sense of awareness and purpose, integrity, depth of understanding, courage of conviction and ability to respond to changing socio-economic and political situations”. With the acceptance of recommendations of the Kothari commission, Government had long back accepted the principle of common denominator of traits for a civil service aspirant, and implemented a system uniform examination with equal opportunity to the selected candidates to choose a particular service as per their aptitude. Inducement into two specific services through offer of extra increments goes against the policy.

iv) Complete parity would spur the candidates with right kind of aptitude and inclination to opt for the service: The requirements of modern day policing are different from the conventional policing. While the erstwhile regimental police administration model may, to some extent, still serve the needs of the conventional policing requirements of maintaining Law & Order and handling

of localized crime, the same is highly inadequate to handle complex organised and economic crimes, cyber crimes, transnational organised crimes and terrorism, human rights issues, mega city policing, crimes against women and weaker sections etc. There is an increasing need for attracting persons with right kind of aptitude and inclination to opt for the service. The edge factor is driving even those candidates having aptitude for police into the IAS, as a result not only is police at a loss but IAS is also saddled with persons without any special aptitude for generalized administrator’s work. The service preference trend table at Para 3.1.2.6 demonstrate that in spite of adverse pay conditions there are still some persons every year opting for IPS out of their passion and special aptitude in preference to the other services , but instead of getting rewarded they are being unfairly discriminated throughout their career. As already submitted, if the impeding factors are removed, candidates will choose services as per aptitude and will be motivated to perform better.

v) Adequate Compensation to mitigate the hardships and risks: IPS officers face more risks in their career than any other civil service: As the table enclosed in Annexure A shows, since Independence 32 members of the IPS have made the supreme sacrifice in the service of the nation across all corners of the country. The job of an IPS officer is not becoming any safer by day. In fact the young officers at the level of SDPOs and SPs are increasingly being called upon to lead their men from the front at grave risk to their life and well being. The government needs to have a comprehensive HR policy in place that provides adequate incentives for those fighting India’s domestic wars but this issue was sidelined by the 6th CPC. The arguments of posting to smaller places, frequent transfers, pulls and pressure etc. are more prominent in the case of IPS compared to IAS.

Also, IFS officers, who are posted either in foreign countries or in New Delhi, do not face such difficulties at all but they are rewarded with same pay scales as IAS.

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vi) Changed dynamics of district administration has altered the traditional relativities of DM and SP: The role of a District Magistrate in relation to district policing has witnessed a paradigm change over a period of time. As per the 1861 police act, the District Magistrate was the executive head of the administration and administration of the police was vested in a Superintendent of police under the general control and direction of such Magistrate. However, in the past decade, after the model police act of the Soli Sorabjee committee was circulated by the government and after the directives of the Hon’ble Supreme Court were significantly based on the model act, 15 states have so far enacted their respective police acts and a majority of them are drafted on the basis of the model act. Remaining states are at various stages of legislative process. In these

acts, the role of the district magistrate is that of a coordinator and does not wield general control and direction on police, and as such justification of an edge as a symbol of superior authority does not exist any longer. These changes have taken place after the implementation of the recommendations of the 6th cpc and therefore highly relevant for the consideration of the 7th cpc. As for the argument of whether DM as a coordinator should draw more pay than all the others posted in the district, the same was rarely the case even in the past, as it was a fairly common experience that some of the ADMs and almost all of the district heads of the technical departments were many a time drawing higher pay by virtue of their longevity in service, and that had never affected the efficiency of coordination functions.

4.3 ANOMALIES IN IMPLEMENTING 6TH CPC RECCOMENDATION ON “EDGE”

4.3.1 While a discussion has been made in the previous paragraphs regarding the edge allowed to two services in an unjustified manner by the previous Pay Commissions, the Association submits to the commission that glaring anomalies were created in the fitment tables prepared for implementation of the government decisions made in this regard, which caused greater benefit than what was allowed to these services. In spite of representations from several services which found support from the DOPT, the Ministry of Finance, Department of Expenditure has so far resisted to set right the anomalies. The matter therefore deserves attention of the present Pay Commission not only for prevention of carry forward of the irregularly awarded inflated edge, but also to set right the previous Pay Commission fitment tables with a retrospective effect.

4.3.2 Pursuant to the cabinet resolutions on the recommendations of the sixth Pay Commission, the Government of India issued a Gazette Notification No 470 dated 29 August, 200859 notifying the Central Civil Services (Revised Pay)

Rules, 2008. In continuation, an Office Memorandum (F.No.1/1/2008-IC) dated 30th August, 200860 has been issued for fixation of salaries. As per the Gazette notification, two increments were allowed in three grades, viz. senior time scale, junior administration grade and the non functional selection grade (NFSG) in the form of two increments @3% which will be adjusted in the pay band.

4.3.3 However, the actual implementation had resulted extra benefits, because the 2 additional increments given to the IAS at the STS grade in the running pay band PB3 and at the NFSG grade in the running pay band PB4 continue to get carried forward to JAG grade in PB3 and SAG grade in PB4, respectively. In effect, IAS has been given at least 2 additional increments over other services throughout their career. This is against the Cabinet decision to limit the edge to middle levels and that too limited to two increments.

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4.3.4 In addition, certain further anomalies had crept in due to wrong fitment tables. Following table shows the anomaly in fixation of pay in respect of pre-revised scale of Rs.14300-400-18300 (S-24) which is Non Functional Selection Grade (NFSG) of all services vis-à-vis pre-revised pay scale of Rs.15100-400-18300 (S-25) which is NFSG of IAS:

4.3.5 From the above chart, it is clear that IAS had been given 2 extra increments over and above the 2 year edge they already had built into the scale S-25. Hence, if an IAS officer got into the NFSG on 1.1.2006, his pay in pay band was fixed at 39690, whereas the pay of an officer of other service gets fixed at Rs 39690 after completion of four years of service.

Thus, the edge increases to 4 increments at the start of PB-4.This was not the decision of the Cabinet. An IAS officer drawing a basic pay of Rs 15100 will get Rs 39690 as per the fitment table, whereas officers of other services drawing the same basic pay of Rs 15100 will get Rs 38530. There cannot be any difference in fixation of equal pay of the two NFSGs with equal grade pay. It may be noted that in PB-3, the pre-revised pay of Rs 10650 in S-20, which is 2 increments ahead of starting pay of Rs10000 in S-19, has been fixed at the same level that is indicated

by the fitment table of S-19 at Rs 19810. Similarly, the pre-revised pay of Rs 12750 in S-22, which is 2 increments ahead of starting pay of Rs 12000 in S-21, has been fixed at the same level that is indicated by the fitment table of S-21, Rs 23720.Thus, in PB-4, a pay of Rs 15100 in S-24 must be fixed at the same level that is indicated by the fitment table of S-25, i.e. 39690. In order to fix pay in compliance of the decision of the Cabinet, the fitment tables should be modified as suggested at Para 3.3.5 below.

PRE-REVISED

BASIC PAY

REVISED PAY IN THE

PAY BAND IN CASE OF

ALL OTHER SERVICES

REVISED PAY IN

THE PAY BAND IN

CASE OF IAS

14300 37400

14700 37400

15100 38530 39690

15500 38530 39690

15900 39690 40890

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4.3.6 The following table shows the relativities in fixation of pay in respect of pre-revised scale of Rs.16400-450-20000 (S-26) for Conservator of Forests for IFS/DIG of Police for IPS and other CPMFs/Brigadiers of Armed Forces/SEs of Engineering Services/Scientific Officers Grade ‘F’, etc vis-à-vis pre-revised NFSG of IAS pay scale of Rs.15100-400-18300 (S-25):

4.3.7 From the above chart, it is clear that the basic pay of Rs.16400/- for IFS/IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc has been fixed as Rs.39690/- whereas the basic pay of Rs.15100/- for IAS has been fixed at the same stage though there was a difference of Rs.1300/- at initial stage itself in the pre-revised scales. The basic pay of Rs.16400/- for IFS/IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc has been fixed as Rs.39690/- whereas the lower basic pay of Rs.16300/- for IAS has been fixed as Rs.40890/-. In the pre-revised pay, officer in NFSG of IAS, even after three increments, was at a lower basic pay (Rs 16300) than IFS/IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc (Rs 16400). However, in the new fitment table, the officer of IAS on entry to NFSG will get the same pay of Rs 39690 as a Conservator of IFS/DIG of IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc. This has adversely impacted the existing relativities between the services. Thus, the Super time Scale-I of IFS/IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc has been downgraded even

below NFSG of IAS. This was neither the recommendation of the Pay Commission, nor decision of the Cabinet. Thus, the fitment tables should be modified as suggested at Para 3.3.5 below.

4.3.8 Suggested Fitment table: The following fitment table is suggested to be worked by the seventh Pay Commission as a starting point of working out the recommendations, instead of compounding the patent errors committed by the earlier Pay Commissions.

PRE-REVISED BASIC

PAY IN THE PAY

SCALE OF RS.15100-

400-18300 (S-25)

FOR NFSG FOR IAS

REVISED PAY IN

THE PAY BAND FOR

NFSG FOR IAS

PRE-REVISED BASIC

PAY IN THE PAY

SCALE OF RS.16400-

450-20000 (S-26) FOR

CONSERVATOR/

DIG/BRIG/SE, ETC

REVISED PAY IN THE

PAY BAND FOR

CONSERVATOR/

DIG/BRIG/SE, ETC

15100 39690

15500 39690

15900 40890

16300 40890 16400 39690

16700 42120 16850 40890

17100 42120 17300 40890

17500 43390 17750 42120

17900 43390 18200 42120

PRE-

REVISED

BASIC PAY

IN THE PAY

SCALE OF

RS.15100-

400-18300

(S-25) NFSG

FOR IAS

REVISED

PAY IN THE

PAY BAND

PRE-REVISED

BASIC PAY IN

THE PAY SCALE

OF RS.14300-400-

18300 (S-24)

SELECTION

GRADE FOR

OTHER

SERVICES

PROPOSED

REVISED PAY

IN PAY BAND

PRE-REVISED

BASIC PAY IN

THE PAY SCALE

OF RS.16300-

450-20000 (S-26)

FOR IFS /IPS/SE/

BRIGADIER, ETC

PROPOSED

REVISED PAY IN

THE PAY BAND

14300 37400

14700 38530

15100 39690 15100 39690

15500 39690 15500 39690

15900 40890 15900 40890

16300 40890 16300 40890

16700 42120 16700 42120 16400 42120

17100 42120 17100 42120 16850 42120

17500 43390 17500 43390 17300 43390

17900 43390 17900 43390 17750 43390

18300 44700 18300 44700 18200 44700

18700 44700 18700 44700 18650 44700

19100 46050 19100 46050 19100 46050

19500 46050 19500 46050 19550 46050

20000 47440

20450 47440

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4.4. MISREPRESENTATION OF THE 2 YEAR GAP BETWEEN IAS AND OTHER SERVICES

4.4.1. In order to mitigate the hardships due to slow promotions in some of the Group-A services, the sixth Pay Commission has provided that; “The Government should, accordingly, consider batch-wise parity while empanelling and/or posting at Centre between respective batches of IAS and other organised Group A services with the gap being restricted to two years. Whenever any IAS officer of a particular batch is posted in the Centre to a particular grade carrying a specific grade pay in pay bands PB-3 or PB-4 , grant of higher pay scale on non-functional basis to the officers belonging to batches of organised Group A services that are senior by two years or more should be given by the Government61 ”. The facility was subsequently extended to IPS and IFS in the states and the centre. What was introduced as stagnation mitigation measure has in practice being misinterpreted as a mandatory gap of two years between IAS and the rest of the services.

4.4.2. It has been experienced many a time that even when vacancies exist and the officers of a particular batch meet the minimum qualifying service requirement, the promotions are stalled unless two years junior to them in the IAS get first promoted. This has no only created demoralization among the officers, but such a practice is against the public interest since vacancies remain unfilled. The commission should address this issue and clarify that the two years gap is the maximum and not the minimum gap , and further clarify that if the vacancies exist and the pool of officers meeting the eligibility criteria are available, promotions should not be stalled showing the two year gap.

4.5. INTRA SERVICE PARITY

4.5.1. As per the existing policy of cadre allotment, IPS officers are allotted different state cadres. While the conditions of pay and service are uniform across the cadres, in some cadres promotions are delayed compared to others and the gap sometimes extends to more than two years. The delays are often caused due to faulty cadre management, sluggish response of the state home departments etc. on which the officers do not have any control .This results in demoralization of the officers of the affected cadres, who suffer because of no fault from their side. In the sixth Pay Commission the concept of grant of higher pay scale on non-functional basis to reduce the inter service gap, extending the same principle, the commission may recommend that whenever any IPS officer of a particular batch is posted in a state cadre to a particular grade carrying a specific grade pay in pay bands PB-3 , PB-4 or HAG , grant of higher pay scale on non-functional basis to the IPS officers of the same batch belonging to the other cadres or those serving in the centre.

4.6. ABOLITION OF THE RANK OF DIG

4.6.1. The super time scale for the IAS/IFS and Central Services has been uniformly fixed at Pay-Band - 4: Rs.37400-67000; plus Grade Pay Rs.10000, where as in the case of IPS and the IFoS the same has been split into two levels, i.e. Grade pay Rs 8900/- (DIG/Conservator of Forests) and the Grade pay Rs 10000/-(IG/Chief Conservator of forests). Historically this factor was a major impediment in the promotion prospects of IPS/IFS officers.

4.6.2. The police ranks were traditionally equated with the corresponding ranks. The rank of DIG was equated with the rank of Brigadier in status, and his duties in the states primarily included supervision of policing in the ranges. Earlier there were two levels of DIGs, and in their endeavour to reduce the total number of pay scales, the fourth Pay Commission had amalgamated the levels, but the exercise was of adverse consequence to the service, as the amalgamation was into the lower of the two levels.

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On the contrary, the SAG grades of the Central Services, which had also existed in two levels, were merged into a single level, which was at higher of the two. The fifth Pay Commission had formally given approval for creation of the Additional Director General rank raising the supervisory ranks above the SP into four, i.e. DIG.IG.ADG and DG. Rank proliferation continued with the sixth Pay Commission, when the DG rank was split into two levels, i.e. HAG+ level and Apex scale.

4.6.3. From time to time, IPS Association has been demanding for abolition of the rank of DIG. When the matter came up before the fifth Pay Commission, the commission has declined the request on the grounds of i) functional utility of the scale as head of the range; and ii) traditional relativities between the armed forces and the police62 . The matter again came up before the sixth Pay Commission. The Commission, accordingly, recommends that the grade o be retained on similar grounds as mentioned in the fifth Pay Commission report. However, the commission had left the option for reconsideration on the issue, by stating that, “ the government may, however, review the position in future in case functional justification for continuing with this grade ceases to exist completely 63”.

4.6.4. The Association recommends for abolition of entry of the super time scale of the IPS having grade pay of Rs 8900/- and direct promotion from the NFSG to the Super time scale having grade pay Rs 10, 000/-, as is the case with the IAS/IFS and other central Services. In order to achieve parity among the All India services, the scale should be started at 16th year of service as in the IAS. For implementing this recommendation, half of the existing cadre posts of DIG can be upgraded to the rank of IG and the rest half can be downgraded to the rank of SP (NFSG). Typically IPS officers spend four years time as DIGs, and for the purpose of avoiding reversions, a gradual up gradation /down gradation exercise may be undertaken over a period of time. The justification for the abolition of scale is presented below:

i) Reduction of levels in police does not adversely affect the functionality: In the IPS, majority of the posts (more than 80%) are with the states. In a democracy charter of responsibilities of the armed forces and the civil police are vastly different and their mutual interaction is very minimal, except in the Border States or disturbed states. Therefore relativity argument with the armed forces does not stand the scrutiny of ground realities. Coming to

the aspect of functional utility, range level supervision is an important component of the state police functioning. In the distant past, IGP was head of state police and DIG was the only intermediate rank between the district superintendent of police and the IGP. Therefore only a DIG rank officer could have head the police range. However, at present there are three intermediate ranks between the head of the state police, i.e. DGP and the District Superintendent of Police- These are ADG, IG and the DIG. Therefore, it is not mandatory that only a DIG rank officer should head the range- the function can be performed by the IG as well. In fact such a system has already been successfully implemented in various states, as observed by the commission itself. Further, the IAS counter part of DIG is the Divisional Commissioner, who is an officer equivalent to IG in police. Usually, the District Collector and the Superintendent of Police are of comparable seniority and most of the time they would be at similar stages of the time scales. Therefore, it is logical to extend similar working relation at the division /range level.

ii) Abolition of DIG posts in the states will provide more hands for the field level posts: At present the eligibility level for promotion to the rank of DIG is 14 ears. IPS officers

typically serve for more than 30 years and 14 years is not even the mid-point of their career. Therefore, allowing them to serve as SsP for at least two more years will benefit the system, with more number of experienced officers available for field postings.

iii) Uniformity of ranks across the civil services is in the interest of harmonious working relations in the states: Although officers of the rank of DIG are placed at a lesser grade pay than their IAS counter parts in the Super time scales and end up getting promoted later to the equivalent rank of IG, the fact that the post is termed as super time scale and the IPS officers usually get promoted in their 14th year of service to that scale, heart burn is experienced by their IAS counterparts and in the past this had triggered a race for reducing the qualifying service. In fact, in the year 2008 the qualifying service for super time scale was reduced to 14 years for the IAS, but after realizing the folly that officers are getting promoted at a very early stage of their career which is depriving the system of the capable hands for field postings, the earlier position of 16 years eligibility criterion was restored. Uniformity of ranks between the IAS and IPS therefore, is in the interest of harmonious working relations in the states.

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iv) Functionality in the Central Armed Police Forces(CAPF) can be maintained by retaining the rank of DIG at grade pay of Rs. 8700/:IPS being an All India Service, it is expected that an appropriate number of posts are created at the centre for enabling officers to come on deputation. At present there are about 120 posts of DIG earmarked for IPS officers in the CAPFs. As the CAPFs are organized similar to Army pattern, relativities with the armed forces have a functional utility in maintaining inter organizational coordination. Therefore the rank of DIG may be allowed to remain intact for the purposes of central deputation.

v) Retention of DIG posts in centre with lesser grade pay does not conflict with the service rules:The practice of IPS officers of the rank of DIG and even the IAS officers already promoted in their cadres to the grade pay of 10,000/- join as directors (for which the qualifying service is 14 years, same as for DIG), in the central staffing scheme with a reduced grade pay of Rs 8700/-. Having IPS officers join CAPFs with grade pay of Rs 8700/- does not set any new precedent in the government of India. All of the central deputation posts are

non cadre posts and their pay is regulated by schedule II under rules 10 and 11 of the IPS (pay) rules as amended from time to time. Therefore a simple amendment of the schedule II-B would suffice to implement the changes, and that is not a big issue since the pay rules any way get amended after every Pay Commission. Now coming to inter personal relations between the IPS officers with Rs 8700/- grade pay and their CAPF colleagues with Rs 8900/- grade pay, firstly the difference is very minimal, and secondly, there are precedents available in the states where IAS and IPS officers posted in the districts get lesser pay even compared to not only their state service colleagues but even their subordinates. Further, if the government desires it can adjust the tiny gap in the grade pays through award of personal pay to the concerned officers.

vi) There will be no additional financial burden on the exchequer: At present the level jump between DIG and IG is Rs 1100/- . Also, it is being proposed to upgrade only half of the existing posts of DIG, which are roughly 250 cadre posts and 26% more state deputation reserve/ex-cadre posts. Therefore the financial burden of the exercise is miniscule minimum.

4.7. ABOLITION OF THE HAG+ SCALE

4.7.1. The DG rank in the IPS now carries two pay scales; i) Apex Scale of Rs.80, 000 (fixed) which is allowed to DGs of most of the CPOs, IB, CBI, RAW etc. and one DG in each State who is HoPF (Head of Police Force); and ii) HAG+ Scale of Rs.75, 500-80,000 for other DGs in the States and some CPOs.

4.7.2. Due to the classification of DGs into Apex scale and the HAG+ scale several difficulties have arisen while implementation in the states resulting in several petitions in the courts/tribunals. Quite often selection to the post of HoPF is not done on the basis of seniority, selection process is not transparent and HoPFs are sometimes transferred out without adhering to the two years tenure rule. The legal challenges arise when: an apex scale DGP (HoPF) is removed to a post carrying the inferior HAG+ scale and his pay scale is reduced from apex to HAG+. This technically amounts to demotion without disciplinary proceedings; and when a junior DG is posted to the apex scale post, ‘superseding’ the senior DG who languishes in the inferior scale. This results in subversion of the NBR (Next below Rule). The aforementioned

situation has resulted in a plethora of litigations all over the country against the Govt as well as against the ‘superseded’ officers. Government has so far not one a single case.

4.7.3. The Government erroneously insists that grant of apex scale to one of the DGs is not a promotion though it is a superior scale. It ignores the fact that the status/rank of an officer is defined solely by the Pay Scale. The following facts clearly prove the superiority of Apex Scale over HAG+ scale:

i) In the ‘Order of Precedence’, an Apex Scale holder precedes all the others;

ii) In respect of official residential accommodation, Apex Scale officers are entitled to the highest category type houses in Delhi. No such priority is given to the HAG+ officers who are placed in the general waiting list;

iii) CPOs like CRPF and BSF are headed by a DG in the Apex Scale. Under him are two more DGs designated as special DGs to distinguish them from the head DG. They are placed in the HAG+ scale. They are directly subordinate to the DG holding the Apex Scale;

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iv) Officers who retire from the HAG+ scale draw significantly draw fewer pensions compared to their colleagues who retire in the Apex scale.

Vide Notification No. G.S.R 692(E) dated 27th September, 2008 of Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions regarding the recommendations of the 6th Central Pay Commission dealing with Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules, 2007, the post of Director-General of Police as head of police force was identified and given a higher pay scale [the Apex Scale of Rs 80,000/- (fixed)] while the rest of the DGs were given a lower pay scale of HAG+ of Rs 75,500-80,000, as extracted: “Rule 3(D) (iii) Apex Scale: Rs 80000 (fixed), Grade Pay: nil (by up gradation of one existing post of Director General of Police as head of police force in each State cadre [with effect from the date of issue of notification of the Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules, 2008”

4.7.4. Thus, on the one hand, the Govt says DGP (HoPF) is not a promotion/up gradation while, on the other hand, it clearly describes the post as ‘up gradation’. These contradictions remain unexplained by the Govt till date and no corrective action has been taken so far.

4.7.5. Factually speaking, the use of the word “up gradation” in the above amendment is legally untenable, as it goes against the Cabinet decision taken vide GOI Gazette Notification No.1/1/2008-IC dated 29.8.08. This notification is regarding the implementation of the accepted Recommendations of the Sixth CPC. It mentions about “up gradation” to the Apex Scale of Rs. 80,000/- (Fixed) only of the additional posts of two DGs of CPOs, namely, DGs of SSB and ITBP. There is no mention of the “up gradation” of the posts of DGPs of States / HoPF to the Apex Scale. In the Schedule, it specifically mentions that in each State, one of the DGPs, who is the HoPF, will be placed (as against upgraded) in the

Apex Scale. It is to be noted that the GOI (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961, particularly Schedule II, clearly forbids any Ministry, Minister and/or Department etc from superseding, amending, modifying or changing any decision of the Union Cabinet. Only the Union Cabinet is empowered to do so. It clearly proves that the use of the word “up gradation” in the above DOPT Notification is wrong.

4.7.6. After the revision of the pay scale of the post of DGP (HoPF), there is no additional qualification added for appointment to that post nor there is any change at all in the responsibilities, powers and functions of the post which the previous incumbents did not exercise. The so called up gradation is absolutely illusory, a mere re-designation of a particular post in the rank of DGP with a higher pay scale. Whenever there is change in the power structure in the State Government, very often, the incumbent DGP (HoPF) is removed to an innocuous

post. If the argument of the Government about up gradation is accepted, then how can an officer holding a superior post are transferred to an inferior post without framing charges against him for disciplinary action? How can a person be demoted without any departmental proceedings? This only confirms that all posts of DG are equal and they exercise/draw powers from an equivalent post. What logic, therefore, can there be to discriminate between DGs and allow the benefit of higher pay to only one DG? The facts are clear: there is no up gradation of the post but merely up gradation of the pay scale of the same post.

4.7.7. In view of the above reasons, and also keeping in view the fact that government has been consistently losing all the cases on this issue, the commission may consider confirming the principle that discrimination between DGs is arbitrary and all the DGs are entitled to the same Apex Scale.

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4.8. REINFORCING THE ALL INDIA CHARACTER OF THE SERVICE

4.8.1. As per the scheme of the All India Services, officers serve both in the states and the centre. For facilitating such movement, a central deputation reserve at the scale of 40% of the cadre posts has been created in the state cadres. As per the present strength of IPS, there is a requirement of 1022 posts for fulfilling the central deputation obligations as per the cadre rules. At present there are only 569 posts (just a little more than 50% of the CDR quota) available with the CAPFs/CPOs for deputation of IPS officers. Therefore there is a need to identify more posts where IPS officers can be inducted at the centre. It is also relevant to mention here that between the years 1999- 2003, intake in the service was drastically reduced to 30-35 officers per year implement a downsizing strategy. Therefore states were highly reluctant to spare the officers for central deputations since there was huge shortage of officers at the field level, and as a consequence there was not much pressure on the central deputation posts in the ranks of SP and DIG.

4.8.2. Subsequent cadre reviews had realized the need to increase the number of officers in order to tackle the difficult internal security challenges, and as a

result the intake in the past 10 years has sharply increased. Between the years 2005-2013, the intake was as much as 1189. These trends indicate that in the near future there will be significant pressure on the central deputation posts. Also, the profile of the officers inducted into the IPS indicates that most of them are highly educated with professional degrees64. This, added with the exposure to complex governance challenges which they receive in their initial career in the state police grooms them to develop rich domain knowledge on public order, security, human resource management, regulatory and enforcement functions, handling natural disasters, elections and major events etc. which will make them suitable candidates for competing to the central staffing scheme posts. Therefore, in addition to maintaining the present strength of earmarked posts in CPOs/CAPFs there is also a need to create a level playing field for enabling IPS officers to compete in the open competition posts, including the Central Staffing Scheme for reinforcing the spirit of All India Service character of the IPS as well as gainfully utilizing the domain expertise of the IPS officers in the Central Government Ministries/departments.

4.8.3. At present, when the country is facing highly complex internal security problems which include Terrorism, Insurgency, Left Wing Extremism, and Transnational Organised Crime in addition to onerous challenges of managing Police force of more than 30 lakhs in strength, out of which 10 lakhs are under the direct control of the Union Government, policy framing and effective handling of these issues would essentially require domain expertise. Also, the matters related to internal security require dedicated and undivided attention, as any delay in response from the Government could have dire consequences leading to irreparable damage. At present the Internal Security Department within the Ministry of Home Affairs is headed by an IPS officer of the rank of Special Secretary but the formations down below do not have representation from the IPS. On the other hand, other ministries such as External Affairs, Railways, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, and all the Scientific Departments are run by the officers of the respective specialized cadres. Therefore, there is a strong case for restructuring the Department of Internal Security as an independent

department within the Ministry of Home Affairs, headed by an IPS officer with adequate representation of the IPS officers in the ranks of Joint Secretaries and below.

4.9. INEQUITIES IN THE CENTRAL STAFFING SCHEME

4.9.1. The central staffing scheme has been existing for almost the past 50 years in the present form. Postings under the central staffing scheme are done as per the instructions contained in the DOPT office memorandum no. 36/77/94 – EO (SM I), dt. 5th January, 1996. As already submitted earlier, as per the stated policy, “The raison d’etre is the Centre’s need for fresh inputs at senior levels in policy planning, formulation of policy and implementation of programmes from diverse sources, viz., the All-India Services and the participating organised Group ‘A’ Services”. If one goes by the letter, it provides equal opportunity for selection to 37 participating services and is mutually beneficial to service cadres and Government of India. However, in operation the system secures neither.

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The sixth Pay Commission aptly summed up the situation in its report as “While the system appears to be very equitous on paper, it is non-transparent and does not inspire confidence amongst the concerned officers about its fairness65 ”.

4.9.2. In addition to the opaqueness of the process, there is ample evidence to suggest that it is highly iniquitous and does not value domain expertise of various competing services. The following table explains the breakup of the officers at various points of time.

4.9.3. Although no separate figures are available in respect of the IPS and IFoS for the years of 1972, 1984 and 1995 it will not be inaccurate to assume that they had accounted for less than 10%. The trends clearly indicate that there is a skewed distribution in favour of a single service, and that over a period of time, instead of becoming more egalitarian, the distribution is getting more skewed.

4.9.4. Much of the unfairness of the system could be attributed to a flawed Process of Empanelment. Annual exercise of drawing suitability lists of eligible officers from the participating services, known as ‘empanelment’ has been the biggest bottleneck for non-IAS officers to get appointments under the Central Staffing Scheme. The following table shows the service wise status of empanelment. Huge gap among services in empanelment is highly unusual and this causes serious doubts in the minds of the officers regarding the fairness of the system.

4.9.5. Unfairness of the present system has been a matter of scrutiny of several commissions in the past. The 2nd Administrative Commission has remarked, “The Commission is of the view that the present procedure for empanelment of officers to the level of Joint/Additional Secretary and above needs to be replaced by a transparent, objective and a fair placement system67.” The Commission recommended that an independent ‘Authority’ should deal with matters of assignment of domains, preparing panels for posting of officers at the level of SAG and above, fixing tenures for various posts, deciding on posts which could be advertised for lateral entry68 etc. Similar recommendations were also made by the Surindernath Committee (2003) to review and make recommendations with regard to the present systems of performance appraisal, promotions and lateral movement in respect of the All India Services and other Group a services; and by the P.C.Hota Committee on Civil Service Reforms (2004).

# Based on the fifth CPC report (page 470); @Based on the Centre for Good Governance Report66 .

LEVEL #1972 #1984 #1995 @2010

Secy. 30 15 0 36 25 0 71 21 0 69 2 5 1 13

AS 20 11 1 27 38 1 72 12 0 44 0 0 0 3

JS 86 60 23 50 1 44 4 198 7 3 3 60

*A

IS

CE

NT

RA

L G

RO

UP

A

CS

S *A

IS

CS

S

CE

NT

RA

L G

RO

UP

A

*A

IS

CE

NT

RA

L G

RO

UP

A

CS

S

IAS

IPS

IFS

IFoS

CE

NT

RA

L G

RO

UP

AA

ND

CS

S

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The sixth Pay Commission observed that, “The Commission is fully aware that in theory these posts are already open to all AIS as well as Central Group A Services., However, in practice, the selection procedure for these posts has been made so non-transparent that the credibility of the entire selection procedure is now being questioned. The pressing need is to ensure a selection process that is open, transparent and gives equitable chance to all the eligible officers69 ”.

4.9.6. After comprehensively dealing with the issue, Sixth Pay Commission recommended a new system of appointment, vide paras 6.1.8 to 6.1.12 of the report as per which all the posts filled by deputation in the Senior Administrative Grade and Higher Administrative Grade should be filled through an open selection process conducted by an independent agency.

The function of the independent agency should be done by the UPSC by involving few outside experts in the relevant field. The commission has also recommended for doing away with preparation of panels and observed that, “for officers belonging to AIS, appointment of any one officer of the service in any State cadre in the scale attached to the posts in SAG or HAG, as the case may be, would be a sufficient condition for consideration of all the officers of a particular year of allotment”.

4.9.7. Unfortunately, the DOPT did not act further on the recommendations, and continued with the earlier system. As a consequence, huge frustration has set in the cadres of IPS, IFoS and Group A central services. This Pay Commission may therefore address this important issue.

S.No. Name of the Service Junior-most

Batch Empanelled for appointment to Secretary, Special Secretary & Secretary Equivalent at the Centre

Junior-most Batch Empanelled for Additional Secretary & Additional Secretary Equivalent at the Centre

Junior-most Batch Empanelled for Joint Secretary & Joint Secretary Equivalent at the Centre

1 Indian Administrative Service (IAS)

1980 1984 1995

Indian Police Service (IPS)

- - 1990

2 Indian Revenue Service (IT)

1977 1979

3 Indian Forest Service (IFoS)

1977 1981 1988

4 Indian Audit & Accounts Service

1977 1981 1993

6 Indian Economic Service (IES)

1976 1979 1986

7 Indian Revenue Service (C&CE)

1976 1980 1985

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5.1. INTRODUCTION

5.1.1 Allowances, Advances and Incentives for police personnel should be based on following basic principles:

i) Reasonable expenses incurred in the course of police work should be promptly reimbursed.ii) Police duty often places officers in extenuating and difficult circumstances. In such cases, the Government should attempt to provide relief to the affected officer through appropriate monetary compensation.iii) Police officers should neither benefit nor suffer a loss from the payment of allowances.iv) Allowances should remain stagnant and net value should not erode with inflationv) Advances should be realistic with respect to market trends

vi) Incentives should be introduced as means to reward exceptional performance and integrity and progression up the pay scales based purely on length of service is unfair.

5.1.2 A number of allowances are payable to Central Government employees at present, which can be categorized into those which are common to all the services, and those which are specific to the police service. Submissions in respect of the commonly granted allowances, in the context of police officers, are presented separately. In addition, allowances specific to women, couples in government service, and incentives for police personnel have also been discussed.

PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF ALLOWANCES, ADVANCES AND INCENTIVES

THE ‘GREYHOUNDS’ SUCCESS STORY

Greyhounds is a professionally trained and well - motivated specialist commando force of the Andhra Pradesh Police, visualized, conceptualized and raised in 1989 by late Shri. K.S. Vyas IPS to combat Left-Wing extremist violence in the State. It was conceived as being a force self- sufficient in all respects - capable of staying and operating in interior and inhospitable jungles for one week at a stretch with a view to take on extremists in their strong – holds. It is presently capable of reaching inaccessible, remote and interior forest areas throughout the State and border areas in the shortest possible time and conducting swift operations, excelling with speed, surprise and skill. It is a 100% deputationist force so as to ensure that the force is always young and fighting – fit, with personnel drawn from various State Police Units. Willingness, physical fitness, mental alertness and age are the main criteria for induction, and they are rewarded with sufficient incentives and protected with strong welfare measures.

Over the last 25 years, IPS officers have provided outstanding, continuous and dynamic leadership in undertaking result-oriented anti-extremist operations and in revitalizing the elite force with modern training strategies, professional skills and conflict resolution tactics. Shri. K.S. Vyas IPS , Shri. Pardesi Naidu IPS and Shri. C. Umesh Chandra IPS laid down their lives in this cause.

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5.2. GENERAL ALLOWANCESAND ADVANCES

5.2.1. Extension of the NE/J&K allowance to LWE affected and other hard areas- Presently the Government of India grants a hardship allowance to personnel posted to J&K and the North Eastern States. However, in the recent years, LWE has emerged as a major threat to the peace and security of the nation and government employees working in LWE affected districts face a grave threat to their well being and also suffer from various hardships. Hence it is requested that the NE / J&K allowance be extended to the notified LWE affected districts in the country also. In addition, as a matter of principle, there should be a uniform yardstick for granting hardship allowance to all such government servants who are faced with comparable hostile working conditions and life threatening situation in remote and isolated areas.

5.2.2. Automatic adjustment of allowances with increase in DA- As per 6th CPC recommendations all allowances automatically increase by 25% for every 50% increase in DA. This increase is not commensurate with inflation to retain the value of allowances

granted. Hence, it is proposed that all allowances should be fully neutralized with the DA, and enhanced whenever DA crosses 25%.

5.2.3. Travelling Allowance/Daily Allowance – The sixth Pay commission had recommended an increase of allowances under this head and it is urged that the present Pay Commission may also continue the same with the following revisions:

i) Many of the district SPs are in the grade pay of Rs 6600/-. They are required to frequently travel to state head quarters/ range head quarters, which are in bigger cities where the hotel charges are higher and police mess facilities are limited. The present level of reimbursement of Hotel charges is insufficient to cover their expenses. Therefore they may be allowed the same rates as Rs 7600/- grade pay officers.

ii) For local transport, Taxi charges up to 50 Km are reimbursed. In case of X and Y category cities this should be enhanced to 100 KM and 75 KM respectively because of the distances involved.

iii) Reimbursement of expenses incurred on food are too less for the ranks up to Rs 6600/- grade pay. In fact, when it comes to food, the nutritional requirements of individuals are similar irrespective of pay scales / grade pay and difference is only in terms of the higher cost associated with the type of restaurants expected to be visited by officers of the higher scales. Therefore it is recommended to have only two slabs under this sub head, one up to PB-2 and one above.

5.2.4. Children Education Allowance – As the cost of education is considerably higher in metros and other cities in comparison to smaller towns, it is proposed that CEA should be granted based on classification of various cities/ towns (as is the case of HRA) where the employee is posted. CEA initially granted by 6th CPC was Rs. 12000 per annum, which has increased to Rs. 18000 per annum now, consequent to two increases in DA by 50% between 2006 and 2014. This increase is insufficiently keeping pace with increase in cost of education especially in metros and bigger cities. Hence it is proposed for CEA to be granted as a percentage of pay of the

employee. It can initially be pegged at 7% and 5% of the basic pay +grade pay of employee per month per child up to two children, for metro cities and other cities respectively with a lower cap ofRs. 1500/- per child per month and upper cap of Rs. 3,000/- per month per child (neutralised with DA). Also, the benefit may be extended for college going children.

5.2.5. Transport Allowance: Entire amount of transport allowance should be exempted from taxation and the allowance should be indexed with petrol prices and not with the D.A. rates, to render it realistic.

5.2.6. Deputation Allowance:At present deputationists transferred from the same station are paid a reduced allowance of 5%. In some of the central police organisations like CBI/NIA, induction of officers on deputation from the local police works to the advantage of the organisation and reduced Deputation Allowance is mutually disadvantageous to the employee and the organisation. Therefore same rate of deputation allowance should be applied in all the cases.

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5.2.7. Higher Deputation Allowance for the All India Service Officers: CDTA as a percentage of the minimum basic pay of the post has considerably diminished over a period of time for the IPS officers. Between 1948 (when it was in the nature of special pay) to 1986 it came down from 50% to 16% of the basic pay, in case of officers of the rank of SP and in almost similar proportion in case of the rest. As already explained earlier, in order to reinforce the All India Service character of the IAS, IPS and IFtS and to ensure that the Central Deputation Reserve is filled up, the government should create sufficient incentives to attract officers to serve in the central deputation. At present the comparative incentive structure in the states and the centre discourages officers to come on deputation. Keeping this in view, it is recommended that CDTA rates for All India Services may be enhanced to 20% subject to the ceiling that the aggregate of pay in the pay band and Deputation (Duty) Allowance/Central (Deputation on Tenure) Allowance does not exceed the starting point of the HAG scale.

5.2.8. Extension of Child Care Leave to Male employees: The provision of Child Care Leave should be extended to single parent male employees.

5.2.9. Enhancement of Paternity Leave: At present, the male employee is entitled to 15 days paternity leave on birth of a child. It is felt that this paternity leave may be increased to 30 days from the existing 15 days (for up to two living children) so as to ensure that the employee is able to take care of his wife and the new-born child. However, the paternity leave may be restricted from the date of delivery to 6 months after child birth.

5.2.10. Issues related to Government Housing: Lack of proper housing is a considerable de-motivating factor. Government housing at present suffers from a number of shortcomings viz. inadequate housing stock in metro cities, poor maintenance and poor management. The Government should ensure that these deficiencies are taken care of. In addition, there are also issues related to allotment of government housing. The well accepted principle of allotment of housing is that it should be done on the basis of grade pay. However, often there is an attempt to frame rules in a manner to circumvent this basic principle in order to favour a few. This should be avoided and it is suggested that Pay Commission may consider making a specific recommendation that grade pay alone

should be the criterion for determining the seniority and the inter-se seniority among the same grade pay holders should be the number of years of service put in by the officer in the pay band.

5.2.11. Advances: Some of the advances extended by government to its employees like HBA and Vehicle purchase Advance are not realistic and in tune with present day requirements. Besides, many of these advances are usually not granted for lack of fund allocation leaving the employee with the only option of availing bank loans at higher interest rates. Public sector banks extend soft loans to their employees towards their requirements of housing, conveyance etc. Hence, it is proposed that the government extend to police personnel interest subsidy of 2% in respect of advances and loans availed through public sector banks towards requirements of housing, car, and other basic amenities.

5.3. ALLOWANCES SPECIFIC TO POLICE

5.3.1. Police Service Pay: At present defence personnel are getting Military Service Pay. On similar lines, police personnel should also be granted Police Service Pay as police is also a uniformed service of the government with a unique set of roles and responsibilities. This demand is also supported by the international practices for police pay. As per the Winsor Report quoted earlier in Chapter II, the pay scales of police officers in the UK are typically 10-15% higher than those of the emergency services and those of similar ranks in the armed forces70. More importantly, this position of police officers in the earnings structure has remained roughly constant in the last decade and is strongly correlated with improvements with the crime scenario in the country.

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5.3.2. Uniform Allowance – The following rates of Uniform Allowances are presently payable to the personnel and officers of CPMFs/CPOs /IPS.

The IPS (Uniform) Rules 1954 mention 39 different uniform related items for an IPS officer. In view of the high rate of inflation, initial grant of Rs. 14000/- is highly inadequate and the officers are compelled to meet the expenses from their pocket. The grant therefore needs to be enhanced. As a minimum, it needs to be doubled. The renewal grant of Rs. 3000/- after every 3 years is also highly inadequate. The uniform allowance, therefore, may be revised as under:

5.3.3. Kit Maintenances Allowance (KMA) / Washing Allowance–Police personnel are presently paid KMA at the rates mentioned along side:

As evident, the amount of KMA is highly inadequate. The DA as on 1.1.2014 stands at 100%, meaning thereby that the cost of living has doubled since 1.1.2006. The 7th CPC recommendations are likely to be implemented w.e.f. 1.1.2016, which is still two years away. The inflation over the next 2 years is going to further increase the cost of living. Therefore, the KMA needs to be enhanced as along side:

GRANT PRESENT RATE

Initial grant Rs. 14000

Renewal grant Rs. 3000

(payable after every three years)

GRANT PROPOSED RATE

Initial grant Rs. 30000

Renewal grantRs. 15000

(payable after every two years)

Constable Rs. 90

Head Constable

Rs. 90

Assistant Sub Inspector

Rs. 90

Sub Inspector Rs. 450

Inspector Rs. 450

Dy. Sp Rs. 450

IPS Officer Rs. 450

Constable Rs. 200

Head Constable

Rs. 200

Assistant Sub Inspector

Rs. 200

Sub Inspector Rs. 1000

Inspector Rs. 1000

Dy. Sp Rs. 1000

IPS Officer Rs. 1000

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5.3.4. Training Allowance –Deputationist trainers working as faculty members in National/Central Training Academies and Institutes are paid training allowance @ 30 % of the basic pay. On the other hand, those working in Police Training Academies and Police Training Colleges are paid training allowance only at the rate of 15% of the basic pay. There is a strong need to attract and retain the best talent in Police Academies/Colleges. Therefore their training allowance should also be increased to 30% of the basic pay. Similarly, the Sumptuary Allowance in Police Training Academies/Colleges should also be paid on the same scale as is being done in National/Central Training Academies.

5.3.5. Allowance to the medal awardees: At present, monetary allowance is limited to the awardees of the President Police Medal for Gallantry and Police Medal for Gallantry at the rate of Rs 3,000 and Rs 2,000 respectively. No monetary allowance is provided to the recipients of the President’s Police Medal for Distinguished Service and the Police Medal for Meritorious Service, which are awarded at the national level to a select few on the basis of their

outstanding track record over a period of decades. Hence, it is proposed that recipients of President’s Police Medal for Distinguished Service and Police Medal for Meritorious Service be granted at the rate of Rs 2,000/- and Rs 1,500/ respectively per month which should be neutralised with DA increase.

5.3.6. Special Compensatory Earned Leave Surrender facility: Presently, Cash Compensatory Allowance equal to one month pay and allowances in a calendar year is admissible to the executive police officials from the rank of constable to Inspector in lieu of working late hours and on holidays. As explained in chapter III, one month pay is highly inadequate to compensate for the extra hours of work and the alienation from families for duties performed on gazetted holidays/ festival days. As such, this facility needs to be significantly enhanced. Firstly, the upper cap should be increased to at least 45 days as a compensation for working on weekends, and this should apply to all ranks of police including IPS officers working in field / operational duties. Also, police officers should be eligible to earn two-days of additional EL per each day of duty performed on gazetted

holidays/ festivals, and allow encashment on yearly basis subject to a maximum of 30 days per financial year. Police officers of all ranks should also be allowed to accumulate EL up to 450 days in their career. Similar practices are also followed in the private sector and international police organizations. The Winsor report (2011-12) has alsorecommended for UK police staff double over time rates for working on public holidays while recommending plain over time rates for additional working on Sundays .

5.3.7. Insurance cover to police personnel: As discussed in Chapter-III, police personnel and their families are exposed to a great degree of occupational risk in comparison to any other class of government servants except defence forces. In case of death in action or permanent total disability, the police officer and his family would be left to fend for themselves till a dependant is enrolled in government service as per the existing policy of central/ state government. This issue would be of greater concern to post-2004 batches of policemen and officers covered under the New Pension Scheme; without any provision for family pension. It is worth

mentioning that even if an individual police officer wishes to avail life/ risk cover, insurers normally do not cover occupational risk of police personnel in term policies and often charge additional premium towards occupational risk cover in other life insurance policies. Hence, it is proposed that police personnel be provided by the government with term insurance cover for their life and against permanent total disability through public sector insurers.

5.3.8. Overtime Allowance: Unpredictable demands on a police officer’s time mean that he may have to work beyond his ordinary scheduled hours. A police officer is subject to restrictions on his private life, one of which is the obligation to obey an order to return to duty. As explained in Chapter III, the usual duty hours of a police officer in India are 14 to 16 hours / day. Hence there is a need to introduce an Overtime Allowance for police personnel. In the UK, the Winsor report (2011-12) concluded that it is important to ensure that police officers are being adequately paid for the role they undertake, which in some cases requires the regular working of overtime.

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5.3.9. Allowance for Un-Social Hours: Similarly working unsocial hours (8:00pm to 6:00am) is an accepted part of life for a police officer, depending on the type of role to which he has been deployed. To offset this effect, an Allowance for Un-Social Hours should be paid to all affected police personnel. Winsor report (2011-12) recommended additional 10% in pay for each unsocial hour worked by officers while recommending payment to police staff at the rate of 100% uplift in pay (double time) for each unsocial hour worked.

5.3.10. Health Insurance schemes: The CGHS cover provided to central government employees also suffers from a number of deficiencies, chiefly for specialist treatment. As explained in chapter III, police personnel face extra health risks, and even those who get injured while performing duties have to suffer the indignity of poor and casual treatment. As such the government should make special provisions to ensure that at least police personnel who are wounded / injured in action get the best possible treatment. A scheme similar to Andhra Pradesh Arogya Bhadrata or Maharashtra Kutumb Arogya Yojana that provides the benefit of cashless entry to designated private and multi-speciality hospitals needs to be offered to police officers.

5.4. ALLOWANCES SPECIFIC FOR WORKING COUPLES AND WOMEN

5.4.1. LTC: As per the existing CCL (LTC) Rules, when husband and wife both are government servants they can choose to declare separate home towns and can claim LTC separately. But this is subject to the condition that if the husband or wife avails the facility as a member of the family of the other, he or she is not entitled for claiming the LTC for independently for himself / herself. Thus, practically in case of couples even if they have declared separate home towns, they are put to disadvantage by being treated as member of family of one of them. Hence, it is proposed that for claiming LTC, couples who have declared separate home towns should be treated at par with other officers i.e. non-couples and allowed to claim LTC independently for themselves and their families.

5.4.2. Transfer Allowance: At present, in case of couples when they are transferred either together or within 6 months of each other to the same station, transfer allowance is not admissible to both of them as independent government servants. It is generally observed that posting and relieving of couples greatly varies and one of the spouses may be

relieved on transfer much earlier to the other. More often than not the couple actually has to continue to live at two separate stations and the displacement for the family occurs in a piecemeal manner. It is, therefore, proposed that if the transfer and relieving of the couple is not within one month of each other then Transfer Allowance and Composite Grant may be given to both of them as independent government servants.

5.4.3. Transport Allowance during Transfer: As per extant rules, like Transfer allowance, transport allowance is also applicable for only one of the spouses in case of transfer of the spouses for same station to another similar station. In the eyes of the government. both govt. servants are taken as any other house-hold unit. This is a faulty assumption as due to higher mobility in case of working couples in terms often being posted separately and special requirements of working women, the composition of house-hold articles is very different to that of other house-holds. In most cases they have duplicate consumer durables and vehicles to meet the individual needs especially when they had been posted separately.

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Hence, this provision needs to be revised to meet the requirements of these realities. It is proposed that even if both spouses are transferred from the same station to another same station, both should be eligible for transport allowance separately.

5.4.4. Distress Allowance: As per DoPT instructions, couples are required to be posted together at the same station as far as possible. It is generally observed that in practice for a large part of their service career couples remain posted far away from each other. Separate postings result in maintenance of two households by a single family unit which results in extra financial burden. Hence, it is proposed that distress allowance @ 20% of Basic Pay + DA may be paid to one spouse.

5.4.5. Child Care Allowance: Women in Govt. service have to perform dual roles - that of an employee and also that of the nurturer of the family. In order to perform both these roles, women employees need to take help of

outsiders (individuals or facilities) to take care of their children. It is proposed that Child Care Allowance @ 10% of Basic Pay + Dearness Allowance may be given to the women employees till their children attain the age of 18 years.

5.4.6. Special Uniform allowance for Women: Pregnancy and child birth during service takes a toll and impacts the female police officer more than any other service. As she wears a uniform, it needs no further justification that she needs to get new uniforms stitched, which entail a cost twice as much as her male counterparts. It is proposed that Women police officers who are given maternity leave should also be given special uniform allowance to cater for stitching of new uniforms to cater to the change in dimensions due to pregnancy and child birth. This may be given coterminous with maternity leave as a special allowance over and above uniform allowance otherwise applicable to them.

5.5. PERFORMANCE LINKED INCENTIVE SCHEME

5.5.1. Progression up the pay scales based purely on length of service is unfair. High performers should be paid more than those who perform adequately and higher again than those who perform poorly. Hence, there is a need to introduce the concept of incentives as means to reward exceptional performance and integrity. However, given the unique nature of policing it is necessary to exercise caution in the design of incentives. This is because excellence in policing and internal security is not only the outcome of several quantitative and qualitative factors, but also marked more by an absence, rather than a presence of tangible outcomes.

5.5.2. A solution to this problem is to grant incentives by ranking individuals on a forced distribution curve method. This will not only avoid the common problem of incentives being received by the overwhelming majority rather than minority of employees, but will also ensure that the supervisory officer retains the freedom to choose his own priorities and incentivize accordingly.

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6.1. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF PENSION

6.1.1. Retirement benefits, particularly in Government, are essentially deferred wages for work done today, rightfully due to an employee. Unfortunately in public perception, they have very often been characterised as doles, which encourages Governments to adopt a step-motherly treatment to its pensioners. The CIPSA believes that the pensioner must be given his rightful due, and that pensions must be inflation adjusted and linked to a basket of basic goods and services necessary to maintain a certain basic quality of life in the non- productive years. In today’s time, there are grave issues across the spectrum in respect of pensions, both as regards the existing pensioner as well as the existing and prospective employee. The Government must desist from adopting short run solutions of

addressing issues of fiscal constraint through reduced emoluments and pension, without takings hard steps to improve productivity. In other words, CIPSA requests that the Pay Commission require that the government must remain a model employer.

6.1.2. The terms of reference vests the Seventh Pay Commission with the mandate to examine issues relating to pension as below:“To examine the principles which should govern the structure of pension and other retirement benefits, including revision of pension in the case of employees who have retired prior to the date of effect of these recommendations, keeping in view that retirement benefits of all Central Government employees appointed on and after 01.01.2004 are covered by the New Pension Scheme (NPS)”.

PRINCIPLES OFDETERMINATION OF PENSION

MAHA KUMBHMELA IN ALLAHABAD-THE MEGA EVENT

Maha Kumbh Mela is known as the greatest congregation on this earth, where millions of pilgrims from all over the world converge to have a holy dip in the Holy Ganges. The event is spread over 50 days, with five peak days, and on the day of Mauni Amavasya 2012, the estimated figure of devotees was around 3 crores. This makes the management of the event, particularly the policing arrangements extremely challenging and unique. Innovations and improvisations in policing the Kumbh Mela have been structured to make working practices in organizing mega events. Managing security, traffic, crowd control, team building, leadership, management of critical situations and fail proof communication systems are the key areas which have been integrated. Leading a police force of seventeen thousand men drawn from fifteen different formations is an outstanding example of team building, leadership and inter-agency coordination across over 50 civilian departments. Securing a porous area of hundreds of square Kilometers with innovative techniques is by no means an easy task, but which has been successfully achieved at every Kumbh over the past decades. The successful policing of this event by the IPS leadership has caught the imagination of police forces across the world and has been recognized by leading institutions including IIM Ahmedabad, Cambridge University and Harvard University.

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6.2. PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW PENSION SCHEME

6.2.1. The NPS started by the Government of India for employees joining government service after 1/1/2004 is an ill-conceived scheme, whose deficiencies have been compounded by its poor implementation. As the affected parties are junior government employees, who further form a minority, little attention has been paid to the plight of these affected officers. CIPSA strongly urges the 7th CPC to conduct an in depth evaluation of the NPS as grave injustice is being done to these budding officers, especially in cases where the officer dies in harness or resigns for some reason.

6.2.2. The deficiencies in the NPS are enumerated belowi) Retirement benefits are essentially deferred wages for work done today, rightfully due to an employee. By paying two employees doing the same job (A pre 2004 and a post 2004 employee), a different net present value of wages (current salary plus pension), the Government is violating the fundamental right to equality. SC judgment of D.C. Nakara & Others Vs. UOI (1982) has upheld that under article 14 of the constitution, Pensioners forms one class.

ii) Further, all categories of Central Civil pensioners are not included in NPS viz. President, Vice-President, MPs, Armed forces which is against the fundamental right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In fact, the Government has taken a step in the opposite direction in case of the Armed forces by committing to a One Rank One Pension Scheme, which has significantly increased its pension liability for the Defence personnel in one stroke.

iii) The current scheme does not take care of employees belonging to backward classes. Because as per the existing rules, candidates from SC/ST category can enter the services as late as 35 years in central Government and 45 years in some of the state Governments. This late entry has adverse impact on the rate on return. For central Government employees their contribution will accrue for only 25 years (if they enter at the age of 35 and for only 15-20 years if they enter in State Government). This does not ensure that they will be getting basic minimum pension suitable to sustain themselves or family after retirement. Thus NPS does not ensure social security to these strata, after retirement.iv) NPS was implemented in a hurry

through a presidential ordinance. NPS should have been implemented only after framing the rules and getting inputs from the stakeholders. Scheme should be implemented after it gets proper legislative sanction & with prospective effect only i.e. it should be made applicable to the batches coming after this Act has come into force. As per the OM of Government of India, Rules under any legislation need to be framed within 2 years of the enactment of the Act or personal responsibility is to be fixed. In the instant case, Act itself was passed after about ten years of ordinance.

v) NPS modelled defined contribution pension scheme has been in force in Latin American & African countries, where it has failed miserably.

vi) In discussion paper of PFRDA, it has been stated that there has been increase of total pension liability of the government over the past decades. But having a close look at the figures, we can see that total liability of the government on account of pension of Central government employees has increased from 0.6% of GDP in 1993-94 to 1.66% of GDP in 2002-03. This increase was

with respect to the total pension liability of Government and not only for Central Civil employees. However report has not given any bifurcation of the increase due to armed forces and that on account of central civil employees, who are the only target group under NPS. Figures at point no. 2.5 of the paper give details of number of employees under various categories for the year 2002-03. Analysis of this data brings out that ratio of pensioners to the total employees is 0.55% for civilian & 1.68% for defence. Thus, the amount of financial burden of pension is much higher for defence personnel as compared to the civilian employees and that too without adding the additional burden due to One Rank One Pension. The data unequivocally brings out that the civilian government employees have been discriminated against and a grave injustice done to them.

vii) State Governments have adopted NPS, but at different points of time, which has already caused inequality/disparity with respect to the amount credited for investment to NSDL. This will have long term impact in return, which NPS subscribers will get after investment of mandatory contribution.

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Further, for majority of NPS subscribers, deductions have been started by the State governments after 2010. No directions have been provided on contribution and rates to be applied on the contribution from 1.1.2004 till the NPS is notified by the State governments.

viii) Return promised by PFRDA was 14-29% p.a. (as per lecture details of chairman of PFRDA), while in the past 4 years, return given by PFRDA averaged at 9% p.a. for central government employees & approx. 6-7% for state government employees. At this rate of return, it is unlikely that NPS subscribers will get intended returns, which will reduce the amount of pension annuity that an individual will receive on retirement on purchase from the PFM.

ix) No disclosure has yet been made by PFRDA for the amount of pension that NPS subscriber will get, category/grade pay wise. If they come out with any data in future, it should convey factors like Net Present Value of future pension, what is the rate of inflation they have taken into consideration etc. It is doubtful if PFRDA/Market forces can assure minimum 50% pension & dearness relief thereon for normal pension & 30% family pension as applicable to all pensioners at present.

x) Though selection of fund managers has been proposed to be based on their track record and ability to offer guaranteed returns, however, Indian stock markets have seen a history of scams and failure of the regulatory agencies to monitor financial sector agencies. Any major market shock at the time of retirement will expose the subscriber retiring at that time to market risk which will cause disparity in the pension of subscribers. xi) Performance snapshot of fund managers given on page 24 of SFC report (2010-11) give glaring picture of diminishing returns every year as against the promises made by PFRDA, which is worrying. The same has been highlighted by SFC also.

xii) As per details in Standing Finance Committee Report shortfall in the return needs to be made up by the government from the yearly budget. Modalities of the same have not been spelt out and are also not being done at present. In addition, in case of major market crash in any year, or recession which may last for more than a year, the total government liability in those particular year/years can be exceptionally high.

xiii) The Act provides for a penalty of Rs. 1 Lakh per day by the Insurance Company with the maximum penalty of Rs. 1 crore for violation of the provisions of the Act. This amount is insignificant when compared to the quantum of monthly contribution which runs into thousands of crores.

xiv) Under NPS, option has been given to subscribers to invest in tier-II contribution. But this contribution is taxable and average return on this investment has been less than 7 %. It is requested that, instead of this possibility may be explored for continuation of GPF facility to NPS subscribers. This will ensure that at certain exigencies, NPS subscribers will have at least one secured source of finance. Further no withdrawal option should be there for Tier I. This will ensure at least basic minimum pension to the pensioner on retirement as withdrawal from Tier I will reduce the total contribution based on which NPS subscribers are liable to get Annuity.

xv) 6th CPC recommendations of additional pension are not applicable to NPS subscribers. Their pension is based on annuity purchased for Annuity Service Providers which will not take into consideration effects of inflation or additional benefits related to age.

xvi) Service gratuity given under Rule 49 of CCS Pension Rules 1972 is not given under NPS.

xvii) Death cum retirement gratuity under rule 50 of CCS Pension Rules not given under NPS, as their returns is totally dependent on market forces.

xviii) DA relief on pension for which government has taken full responsibility is not given to NPS subscribers. xix) As per the existing CCS pension Rules, 1972, after completion of 10 years of service, minimum guaranteed pension is 50% of last pay drawn or average of 10 months, whichever is more beneficial. This kind of minimum guarantee cannot be there, if the money is invested in the capital market.xx) No advances admissible under NPS for educational/personal /house building purposes as available under GPF for the old pensioners (U/Rule 15 of GPF rules).

xxi) Investment return on NPS contribution has been between 8-9% for central government employees and it is 6-8% for state government employees.

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xxii) The Government has not conducted any actuarial estimation of the proportion of its contribution required to obtain a certain pension payout level, but has arbitrarily fixed the Government’s contribution as a matching contribution of 10%, which is extremely low. The practice the world over with well run defined contribution pension schemes is that the government assures a level of pension based on the salary earned over an employee’s service and then estimates the yearly contribution required to reach this pension level. Typically the employee’s contribution is fixed at 10% of the salary and the balance (in the range of 25%) is contributed by the Government. The Government also commits to make good any unfunded liability as and when it arises.

xxiii) The Government’s problems with respect to the NPS have occurred as it has tried to shirk its responsibility and has

attempted to give an impression of fiscal consolidation through unrealistic means. The current NPS is presently significantly unfunded and poorly managed. The outcome would be that either the future governments would have to make a significant addition of cash to make good the unfunded liability or the government would shirk its responsibility to the pensioners under the NPS.

6.2.3. CIPSA urges the 7th CPC to study some of the well run international defined contribution schemes so as to adopt their best practices. In this respect the New Police Pension Scheme of the UK Government deserves mention. Some of the salient features of this scheme which was introduced in 2006 are as below.

i) The New Police Pension Scheme 2006 (NPPS) allows officers to earn one 70th of final salary for each year of service for 35 years.

This provides a target pension of half final salary. Officers also earn four 70ths of final salary for each year of service for 35 years, to provide a target lump sum of twice final salary. Officers in the NPPS currently pay contributions of 9.5% of their pensionable pay; Police Authorities pay the employer contribution of 24.2%.

ii) The scheme has been open to new entrants since 6 April 2006. The normal minimum pension age under NPPS is 55. It also provides a more modern range of benefits, including survivor pensions for nominated unmarried partners.

iii) In addition to ordinary pensions paid on normal retirement, the scheme provides for compulsory retirement on the grounds of ill-health, age or in the interests of the effectiveness and efficiency of the police force. In the case of ill-health retirement, an ill-health pension will be paid, as an officer is required to retire

when permanently disabled for police duty. In case of compulsory retirement on other grounds, the appropriate ordinary pension is payable.

iv) There is also a system of police injury benefits, which is separate from the pension schemes and funded from forces’ operating accounts. This provides additional payments to former officers who have left the police and are permanently disabled as a result of receiving an injury in the execution of duty. In the event of an officer’s death as the result of such an injury, the scheme provides for certain payments to be made to the deceased officer’s surviving family.

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6.3. ONE RANK ONE PENSION

6.3.1. CIPSA strongly feels that as IPS is a uniformed service, it must also be brought under the One Rank One Pension scheme recently offered to the Defence services. As earlier mentioned, police in developed countries like the UK, Canada and Australia is typically receive remuneration which is 10-15% higher than other public servants including the armed forces. The practice in India on the contrary is the opposite, which must be rectified, particularly as the police in India perform not only the basic policing duties but also roles typically performed by the armed forces due to high internal security threats that the country faces.

6.4. INEQUITOUS PENSION FIXATION FORMULA

6.4.1. Clause 4.2 of the Office Memorandum No. F.No.38/37/08-P&PW(A) dated 1.9.08 of the Department of Pension & Pensioners’ Welfare, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions, Govt of India, Lok Nayak Bhawan, New Delhi-110003 reads as under71 :-“ The fixation of pension will be subject to the provision that the revised pension, in no case, shall be lower than 50% of the minimum of

the pay in the pay band plus the grade pay corresponding to the pre-revised pay scale from which the pensioner had retired. In the case of HAG+ and above scales, this will be 50% of the minimum of the revised pay scale”.

6.4.2. The above formula, as analysed below, is arbitrary and devoid of logic and rationale as it has led to ridiculous consequences in that the seniors draw less pension than juniors of not only the same rank but also of the lower rank.

6.4.3. As per the formula, in case of HAG+ scale (applicable to DG rank in the IPS), basic pension cannot be more than 50% of the minimum of the revised pay scale (Rs.75,500-80,000), i.e. Rs.37,750 though no such rider has been placed on other ranks and pay scales. This renders the formula arbitrary and irrational because in the pre-revised scale (Rs.24, 050-650-26,000), most of the DG rank officers had retired at the maximum of the scale, i.e. Rs.26, 000. Their pension was fixed at 50% of their last pay, i.e. at Rs.13, 000. Fixing their pension in the revised scale at the minimum, instead of the maximum, of the scale deprives them of the benefit of the increments they had earned and the number of years they had

remained in DG rank while in service. A reasonable and logical fixation of pension should have been at the corresponding (maximum) level of the revised pay, i.e. 50% of Rs.80, 000 = Rs.40, 000 instead of Rs.37, 750. Fixation of pension at the minimum of the revised scale makes pre-2006 retiree DGs inferior to the post-2006 retiree DGs most of whom retire at the maximum of the scale and draw Rs.40, 000 as pension. Not only this, it makes pre-2006 retiree DGs inferior even to the post-2006 retiree ADGs whose HAG pay scale is Rs.67, 000-79,000. Their maximum pay takes them to Rs.79, 000, thus fixing their pension at Rs.39, 500 against Rs.37, 750 of pre-2006 retiree DGs. In effect, a pre-2006 retiree gets demoted to the level of a beginner in that rank. This reduction of Rs.2250 in basic pension becomes Rs.4275 p.m. on adding the current DA/DR of 90% (which is revised every 6 months).The sad truth is that this discrepancy is recurring, cumulative and life-long. The loss increases with every increase in Dearness Relief. This cascading financial loss is not confined to the present but will continue to operate in the future as well. It further has the evil effect of reducing the quantum of family pension also after the death of the Pensioner.

6.4.4. A junior officer who retired as DG on 1.1.2006 gets more pension than a senior officer who retired only a day earlier on 31.12.2005. Almost all the DGs, who retired on or after 1.1.2006, are getting basic pension of Rs.40, 000 per month. There is absolutely no change in duties, powers and functions of the Pre-2006 and post-2006 DGs which could justify the reduction in pension. Both the above officers and several others had stagnated at the maximum of the DG’s scale for several years when they were in service. But all these factors get ignored in fixing the pension in the revised scale which is prima facie unjust and needs to be corrected.

6.4.5. The posts of ADGs are the feeder posts for promotion to the rank of DG. Still, they have been granted more pension than their bosses.

6.4.6. This discrimination continues despite crystal clear Orders of the Supreme Court of India to the contrary in two cases: (i) D.S. Nakara & Others Vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 (at page 323), AIR 1983 SC 130 and (ii) Union of India Vs. Major General (Rtd) SPS Vains, (2008) 9 SCC 125. Light has been thrown on these rulings in subsequent paras.

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6.4.7. A legal analysis of the irrational pension formula is presented below:

i) Last Pay and Not Last Pay Scale Relevant for Pension Fixation: As per Rule 18 of the All India Services (DCRB) Rules, 1958, the pension of an officer is fixed on his retirement on the basis of the average of the pay drawn during the last 10 months or the last pay drawn, whichever is more beneficial to the retiree. The pension is thus fixed only on the basis of the last pay drawn and not on the basis of the last pay scale drawn. “Pay Scale” is relevant only for the serving officers, but is irrelevant for pensioners for whom the last “Pay” drawn is the only relevant issue and criterion to determine their pension. Obviously, the pay scale from which this pay is drawn has no relevance for fixation of pension. Pension once sanctioned cannot be revised/reduced subsequently to the disadvantage of the pensioner except as a punishment or to correct a clerical error in calculation of the original pension.

ii) Wrong Classification of Pensioners: Pensioners have been wrongly divided into two classes: pre-2006 retirees and post-2006 retirees. This is contrary to the crystal clear Orders of the

Supreme Court of India in two cases: (i) D.S. Nakara & Others Vs. Union of India and (ii) Union of India vs. Major General (Rtd) SPS Vains. These cases will be discussed in subsequent paras. To elaborate the above point, if an officer X retired from the pre-revised running HAG+ scale of Rs.24050-650-26000 and his last pay drawn was Rs.26000, then, as per rule, his pension was fixed at Rs.13000 p.m. Likewise, if another officer Y retired from the pre-revised Apex Pay Scale of Rs.26000 (Fixed), then also his pension was fixed at an identical figure of Rs.13000 p.m. This created perfect equality between both types of pensioners, X and Y irrespective of their retiring pay scales which become irrelevant and only the last pay drawn matters for fixation of initial pension. This clearly implies that retired officers receiving the same basic pension belong to the same class and the principle of equality applies to them. Their pension revision to Rs.37,750 p.m. in the case of X and to Rs.40,000 p.m. in the case of Y after the 6th Pay Commission amounts to creation of two different classes of pensioners who were identical and belonged to the same class at the time of retirement.

iii) Violation of Article 14 (Fundamental Right to Equality):The instance of X and Y quoted above contemptuously goes against the above cited Supreme Court orders, leading to an unwarranted disadvantage to X, in clear and patent violation of the principle of natural justice and the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14 (equality before law). A fundamental principle of law settled in several cases is that Article 14 of the Constitution forbids class legislation. Equals have been made unequals and vice versa. Since Pension rules determine pension on the basis of last pay drawn (and not last pay scale drawn), pension so determined once cannot be later revised arbitrarily in a discriminatory way so as to create two different classes of pensioners who were earlier drawing identical pensions. Such discrimination is clearly a violation of the fundamental right to equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

iv) Prejudicially Affecting Retrospective Effect Not Permissible: The pay revision notification certifies that its implementation would not adversely affect any pensioner but it clearly does. Section 3(1A) of the All India Services Act, 1951 deals with the rule making power of the Government and requires that “.... no retrospective effect shall be given

to any rule so as to prejudicially affect the interests of any person to whom such rule may be applicable.” The All India Services (DCRB) Rules, 1958 have been framed under the aforesaid rule-making power under the All India Services Act. Therefore, it is not permissible to prejudicially affect the interests of the old pensioners by a subsequent provision that came into effect after their retirement.

v) Violation of Supreme Court Rulings: Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has laid down certain principles which are a settled law in D.S. Nakara etc. Vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 (page 323), AIR 1983 SC 130:The highlights of this case are: Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the fixation of a cut off date, as a result of which equals were treated as unequals, was wholly arbitrary. One of the questions posed in the aforesaid decision was whether a class of pensioners could be divided for the purpose of entitlement and payment of pension into those who retired by a certain date and those who retired thereafter. The question was answered by the Constitution Bench that such division, being both arbitrary and unprincipled; the classification did not stand the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The question regarding creation of different classes within the same cadre on the basis of the Doctrine of Intelligible differentia having nexus with the object to be achieved was

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taken up in this case by a Constitution Bench. It was observed that the date of retirement of an employee cannot form a valid criterion for classification, for if that is the criterion, those who retired by the end of the month will form a class by themselves. It was held that Article 14 of the Constitution had been wholly violated, in as much as, the pension rules being statutory in character, the amended rules, specifying a cut off date resulted in differential and discriminatory treatment of equals in the matter of calculation of pension. It was further observed that it would have a traumatic effect on those who retired just before that date. The division which classified pensioners into two classes was held to be artificial and arbitrary and not based on any rational principle and whatever principle, if there was any, had not only no nexus to the objects sought to be achieved by amending the Pension Rules, but was counterproductive and ran counter to the very object of the pension scheme. It was ultimately held that the classification did not satisfy the test of Article 14 of the Constitution. Liberalisation in computation of pension effective from specified date divides pensioners so as to confer benefit on some while denying it to others. Such classification was held arbitrary, devoid of rational nexus

to object of liberalisation and violative of Article 14.All pensioners entitled to receive pension under the relevant rules form a class irrespective of the dates of their retirement and there cannot be a mini-classification within this class. The differential treatment accorded to those who had retired prior to the specified date is violative of Article 14 as the choice of specified date is wholly arbitrary and the classification based on the fortuitous circumstance of retirement before or subsequent to the specified date is invalid.

vi) HELD: Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It is attracted where equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis. The principle underlying the guarantee is that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike, both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation and there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation, their position is substantially the same. Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. The classification must

be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group and that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. In other words, there ought to be causal connection between the basis of classification and the object of the statute. It is indisputable that pensioners for payment of pension form a class. When the State considered it necessary to liberalise the pension scheme in order to augment social security in old age to government servants, it could not grant the benefits of liberalisation only to those who retired subsequent to the specified date and deny the same to those who had retired prior to that date. The division which classified the pensioners into two classes on the basis of the specified date was devoid of any rational principle and was both arbitrary and unprincipled, being unrelated to the object sought to be achieved by grant of liberalised pension and the guarantee of equal treatment contained in Article 14 was violated in as much as the pension rules, which were statutory in character, meted out differential and discriminatory treatment to equals in the

matter of computation of pension from the dates specified in the impugned memoranda.

vii) Union of India Vs. Major General (Rtd) SPS Vains, (2008) 9 SCC 125:In this case, the issue was whether there could be a disparity in payment of pension between officers of the same rank who had retired prior to the introduction of the revised pay scales and those who retired thereafter. The dispute arose due to disparity in determination of pension of pre-1.1.96 and post-1.1.96 retirees who retired from Defence services as Major General or equivalent. The Pension of the pre-1.1.96 retiree Major Generals was fixed lower than the post-1.1.96 retiree Major Generals. The Court held that the date of retirement was immaterial. The highlights of this case are as under:-The judgement was rendered on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution and in consonance with the principle of administrative fair play. Differentiation between officers holding the same rank on the date of retirement is wholly erroneous and violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution.

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“The said decision of the Central Govt does not address the problem of a disparity having created within the same class so that two officers both retiring as Major Generals, one prior to 1.1.96 and the other after 1.1.96, would get two different amounts of pension. While the officers who retired prior to 1.1.96 would now get the same pension as payable to a Brigadier on account of the stepping up of pension in keeping with the Fundamental Rules, the other set of Major Generals who retired after 1.1.96 will get a higher amount of pension since they would be entitled to the benefit of the revision of pay scales after 1.1.96. In our view, it would be arbitrary to allow such a situation to continue since the same also offends the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution”. It has to be kept in mind that the rank of Brigadier is a feeder post for the promotional rank of Major General having higher and more onerous responsibilities.“The object sought to be achieved was not to create a class within a class, but to ensure that the benefits of pension were made available to all persons of the same class equally. To hold otherwise would cause violence to the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. It could not

also have been the intention of the authorities to equate the pension payable to officers of two different ranks by resorting to the step up principle envisaged in the Fundamental Rules in a manner where the other officers belonging to the same cadre would be receiving a higher pension”. It was directed that the pay of all pensioners in the rank of Major General and its equivalent rank in the two other Wings of the Defence Services be notionally fixed at the rate given to similar officers of the same rank after the revision of pay scales with effect from 1.1.1996, and, thereafter, to compute their pensionary benefits on such basis with prospective effect from the date of filing of the writ petition and to pay them the difference within three months from date with interest at 10% per annum.

viii) The principle laid down by the Supreme Court is squarely applicable to all the services. By this judgement, a principle has clearly been laid down that a senior shall not draw less pension than a junior. The Government’s view in GOI, DOP&PW F.No. 38/37/08-P&PW(A) dated 18/11/2009, stating that “the

judgment dated 9-9-08 in CA No. 5566 of 2008 SLP (Civil) No. 12357/2006, UOI vs Maj. Genl. SPS Vains, would not apply in the case of civil pensioners” is misconceived and amounts to Contempt of the Apex Court. The Supreme Court has nowhere limited the principles propounded in this Order to the defence personnel and has not said anywhere that these will not apply to the civilians.

6.4.8. A such, a suggested pension fixation formula, briefly stated is presented below:i) The pension fixation formula should give due weightage to the length of service in the last rank and to the number of increments one had earned in that rank. There is absolutely no justification in forfeiting the increments which should be kept intact in the replacement scale.ii) The equivalent of the last pay drawn must not be diluted in the replacement scale.iii) As per the settled law, the formula should clearly state that seniors (intra-service seniors as well as rank seniors) will not draw less pension than juniors.

6.4.9. Keeping the settled law in view, the pension fixation formula may be modified as under:-i) “The fixation of pension will be subject to the provision that the revised pension, in no case, shall be lower than 50% of the equivalent of the last pay drawn in the pay band plus the grade pay corresponding to the pre-revised pay scale from which the pensioner had retired, subject to the following conditions:- ii) The same number of increments which the pensioner had earned while in service in the last rank and equivalent of the last pay drawn before retirement will be taken into account for fixation of pension in the revised pay scale;iii) The revised pension will, in no case, be lower than the pension of the lower rank retirees; iv) Further, the revised pension will, in no case, be lower than the pension of the intra-service juniors as per the seniority list of the same/similar rank.”

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6.5. MAKING PENSION TAX FREE

6.5.1. Pension is described in Section 60 of the CPC and Section 11 of the Pension Act as a periodical allowance or stipend granted on account of past service, particular merits, etc. It involves three essential features: firstly, pension is a compensation for the past service, secondly, it owes its relationship to a past employer-employee relationship or master servant relationship. Lastly, it is paid on the basis of earlier relationship or agreement of service as opposed to an agreement for service. Therefore, pension is on an entirely different footing and cannot be equated with salary. It was held by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in D.S. Nakara etc. Vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 (page 323), AIR 1983 SC 130 that “the pension payable to a Government employee is earned by rendering long and efficient service and, therefore, can be said to be a deferred portion of the compensation for the service rendered”.

6.5.2. By a general analogy and understanding, compensation is not taxable. The difficulty is caused by Section 17(1) (ii) of the Income Tax Act which defines salary to include pension as well though both are distinct. There is no justification to include pension in the definition of salary. Pension of UN personnel, pension of the recipients of medals like gallantry, Paramveer Chakra, Mahaveer Chakra etc. is exempt from tax under Section 10 of the Income Tax Act. Similarly, most of the retirement benefits like gratuity, leave encashment, GPF and commuted pension are tax exempt. On the same reasoning, pension of Govt employees (who earn their pension by way of compensation for the past service) should be delinked from salary and exempted from income tax as a social welfare measure for senior citizens.

6.6. RAISING THE FAMILY PENSION

6.6.1. Family pension is calculated at the uniform rate of 30% of the basic pay. Our submission is that the family pension be raised to 50% of the basic pay including the increments earned by the retiree. This is justified because the family pensioners, particularly the women, who become helpless after the death of the pensioner, need more sympathy in supporting them financially and otherwise.

6.7. GALLANTRY MEDAL ALLOWANCE

6.7.1. As per orders of the Secretariat of the President of India this allowance for holders of Gallantry Medal is payable by the Government of the State to which state cadre an IPS officer is allotted. This causes problems to those who are drawing pension from the Central Govt. and not the State Govt. of the Cadre. It is suggested that the VII CPC may recommend that all those IPS pensioners who opt to draw pension from GOI may also get the Gallantry Medal Allowance from the GOI.

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7.1 Competency’ and ‘competencies’ may be defined as the behaviours (and, where appropriate, technical attributes) that individuals must have, or must acquire, to perform effectively at work – that is, the terms focus on the personal attributes or inputs of the individual which may relate to a system or set of minimum standards required for effective performance at work. Simply put, a competency based framework sets out how we want officers at various levels of Police Service to work. Keeping the desired outcome in the frame, an assessment is required to be undertaken of the knowledge, skills, attitudes required to perform tasks or jobs performed by virtue of being at the level in question, while at every stage reinforcing the values of honesty, integrity, objectivity and impartiality.

7.2 Competencies are gained through a multitude of ways—life experience; formal education; apprenticeship; on-the-job experience; self-help programs; and also training and development programs. All of these together contribute to job competence in an officer.

7.3 Capacity building measures within a competency based framework can only effect sustainable changes if they are consciously linked to a comprehensive and long term reform strategy. That strategy is initiated and sustained by a determined political will on the part of the Government, articulated in appropriate changes in legislation and given direction by a Policing Plan with clear, realistic and achievable priorities and objectives. Next the organisation structure and staffing will be reviewed in

TRAINING AND CAPACITY BUILDING

THROUGH A COMPETENCY BASED

MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

POLICE EFFORTS DURING CYCLONE“PHAILIN”: A LANDMARK ACHIEVEMENT IN DISASTER MANAGMENT & INTER DEPARTMENTAL COORDINATION

“PHAILIN”, the 2nd strongest tropical cyclone to ever hit India, made landfall on 12/13.10.2013 at Gopalpur in Ganjam District, Odisha. The first and foremost challenge before the Police was to save precious lives at any cost and for this, Police had to ensure that each and every person within 5 KMs from the Coast was shifted to the cyclone shelter or safer areas. The task was not easy, as nobody was willing to leave their homes but it was performed with patience and dedication. After the cyclone, in Ganjam district, almost every residential house within the affected region was damaged. The District police played a prominent role in providing shelter to the displaced person in addition to their regular mandate.The police also organized camp, “KARUNA”, which provided cooked food and drinking water to the distressed and homeless, for thousands of people for over a fortnight. This was when the police themselves had no shelter as their own barracks and houses had been damaged due to the cyclone. Due to the commitment and devotion towards duty and exemplary initiative shown by the police leadership, no lives were lost.

Post cyclone relief were distributed to around one million people in Ganjam District alone. No incidents of looting or disruption in distribution of relief material took place and the Civil administration could perform their work in peace as the Police provided them with conducive work environment.

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the light of these priorities and objectives and, where necessary, subject to carefully managed changes. Within this context of institution building measures, capacity building provides police with the necessary knowledge, skills, character traits, attitudes and values to achieve the priorities and objectives through a systematic process of establishing ‘desired’ performance standards and identifying gaps in ‘actual’ performance. Training and development is directly linked to capacity building.

7.4 ‘Police training, which shall be based on the fundamental values of democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights, shall be developed in accordance with the objectives of the police’. (Article 26, Recommendation (2001)10 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Code of Police Ethics.

7.5 The SVP National Police Academy, Hyderabad is tasked with training of IPS officers for almost 20 months after a four month Foundation Course at LBSNAA Mussoorie. The Foundation Course at Mussoorie is conducted for All India Services and introduces the officers to the concept of civil services, law, public

administration, economics, public policy and planning, apart from facilitating an interaction across officers of all services with a view to encourage coordination in future.

7.6 The professional training at NPA grooms the IPS officer for his future responsibilities, provides him with the requisite knowledge, skills, and attitudes and inculcates the right kind of values in the officer to enable him to efficiently and effectively lead the men under him and deliver the desired outcome. If consistency is required to be brought about in policing all over the country, NPA must serve as the focal point and be reinforced accordingly.

7.7 Competency based framework for the police with a view to use training to effect capacity building would entail the following:

i) Defining the objectives, desired performance level, assessing the actual performance level and identifying the gap.

ii) Setting about planning how to bridge the gap through a systematic approach

iii) Job assessment - listing out of jobs / tasks required to be performed by each level in the IPS.

iv) Identifying the core competencies required to perform the above jobs/ tasks. This would include functional, technical as well as behavioural competencies.

v) Listing out the Knowledge, Skills, Attitudes (KSA) required to acquire the core competencies identified above.

vi) Assessing the pre- training level of the officer with respect to KSA on the basis of which he was selected through the common examination. Officers come in from diverse educational, social and regional backgrounds.

vii) Bringing the subject coordinators on board and working out a modular based approach to design the right training methodology for imparting the above to the officers as per their pre- training levels.

viii) Supporting training material and reading material, lesson plans would then be finalised.

ix) Developing a time line and a time frame within which the KSA is required to be imparted to the officer.

x) Spreading this proposed input over the basic course and various subsequent in-service courses, as also deciding at

which year of service or at which rank or even for which post pertinent KSA is required to be imparted.

xi) Specialization in any of the core competencies. Each officer must be facilitated to attain a desired level of specialization along with a post graduation, diploma or a certification, as the subject may require, at 10 - 20 years of service, in an area of police expertise, of his choice, or as his post demands.

xii) Listing out the reputed and established institutions, universities where officers could be sent to attain such specialization and certification.

xiii) Having attained specialization, the officer must then be used for the core competency that he has expertise in. He should be posted where he can be used fruitfully. Using the wrong man for the job or ensuring that the right man languishes for not being able to ‘manage’ the system or be ‘tactful’ is the bane of any Civil Service. It is all the more for the IPS due to the very specialized nature of the job impacting the security of all individuals that exist within our jurisdiction, which collectively extends the length and breadth of India. Therefore the right man with the right skills for the right job should be ensured.

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xiv) Evaluation, impact assessment and a ten-year review may be undertaken to ensure constant up gradation.

7.8 Commissioning studies:Points i to viii above have already been taken care of by SVP NPA and basic training is constantly upgraded to suit the needs of the changing scenario. However inputs are increased to the detriment of quality and a comprehensive review is required to stem unnecessary additions to training input while seriously considering some deletions. What has largely been an in-house exercise so far now requires professional validation. Formal studies by experts need to be commissioned for Job Assessment, Training Needs Assessment and Competency Mapping with respect to Police Service.

7.9 Systematic approach to training design and identifying appropriate stage of delivery of inputs: Point ix needs to be dealt with on a top priority after such studies are concluded to assess the appropriate time for delivering inputs. The Mid Career Training Programmes interspersed during the career span of IPS

officers have attempted to take care of a staggered delivery of inputs. However, post the study, a review of Mid Career Training Programmes being conducted by SVP NPA would be required. SVP NPA must also be given the administrative and financial independence as well as adequate budget to ensure that the quality of such programmes attains the desired outcome.

7.10 Specialization: Specialization will eventually define us and have a force multiplier effect with respect to the quality of service we are able to provide, thereby positively impacting the internal and external security of India, in particular and providing the much desired boost to all-round development, in general.

7.11 Point xi entails another study by the Bureau of Police Research and Development. This may be commissioned to be concluded within the timeframe of the 7th CPC so as to provide a comprehensive report which will stipulate the nature of the study, time intervals and the Institution(s) whose

qualifications are acceptable, as the Commission seeks. This will also ensure better utilisation of Domestic Funding for Foreign Training (DFFT).

7.12 Utilisation of study leave: Two years Study leave is permitted as per rules. However it is looked upon as a sabbatical by sanctioning authorities and made hard-to-get. IPS officers must be encouraged or even sent to reputed universities to avail of study leave, twice during their career span at the junior (5 to 15 years service) and senior levels (20 to 25 years service), during which they could acquire a professional specialization of their choice and a post-graduate degree or diploma from the best universities in the world.

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8.1 The IPS (Central) Association has prepared this memorandum in response to the opportunity provided by the Seventh Central Pay Commission to all the service associations, unions, institutions, other organisations and interested individuals to send memoranda containing their views on the issues which find place in the terms of reference of the commission. In pursuance of the association’s belief that improved service conditions of IPS officers, are a sine qua non, in ensuring effective discharge of its duties, as well as advancing the cause of police reform, the association has made sincere efforts to focus on the task on hand, and has compiled and presented its views in the previous chapters.

8.2 In the first chapter, the memorandum has sought to lay out the evolution of the Indian Police Service through history to the present, the

present structural context in which duties are performed, and the citizen’s growing expectations from the service. Notable achievements, experience with successive pay commissions, and the relevance and importance of the service in the scheme of governance have been discussed.

8.3 In the second Chapter, the principles of determination of pay, including some of the best practices internationally have been discussed. In addition to assessing the feasibility of comparison with Private Sector, specific suggestions have been made as to how the 7th Pay Commission should address the issues of determination of Pay scale and of Pay Bands, Grade pay within the Pay Bands, Maximum/Minimum Salary Ratio, Merging of Pay Scales, and the rate of Annual Increments.

CONCLUSION

THE JANAMAITHRI SURAKSHA PROJECT AND THE STUDENT POLICE CADET PROJECT- KERALA POLICE EXPERIMENTS IN COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

Written into the Kerala Police Act, the Janamaithri Suraksha Project, or the Kerala model of community policing, was envisaged as a distinct method of policing which seeks the ‘community’s’ cooperation, understands and gives priority to ‘community’ needs, and, taking into account the resources available within the ‘community’, attempts to streamline the activities of police personnel at local police stations to address their particular problems. Launched in twenty selected Police Stations in March, 2008 after extensive public deliberations, the Project is presently implemented in half of Kerala’s Police Stations and has won complete bipartisan support, and people’s confidence.

The Student Police Cadet, is a school-based youth development initiative that trains high school students to evolve as future leaders of a democratic society by inculcating within them respect for the law, discipline, civic sense, empathy for vulnerable sections of society and resistance to social evils. Resting on a unique partnership between the local schools and the jurisdictional police station, the project boasts of nearly 16,000 Student Police Cadets, and is being studied by NCC. Both the projects have been feted at various international fora, are the subject of various academic studies and are being replicated in various other States, with the active intervention of the Union Home Ministry.

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8.4 In Chapter 3, difficulties faced by all ranks of Police, which include long working hours, occupational and situational risks, factors that induce stress and fatigue, and health hazards faced by the police have been explained with empirical research findings on the subject. The arguments have been summed up by making a case for adequate compensation to the Police personnel for working under extremely challenging and stressful conditions.

8.5 Structural, pay parity and career progression related issues have been discussed in Chapter 4. A strong case has been presented for complete parity with IAS/IFS, in addition to specific suggestions on removal of anomalies, rationalization of Pay Scales, abolition HAG+ and Rs 8900/- grade pay posts, adequate representation of the IPS in the Central Deputation and removing the inequities in the Central Staffing Scheme.

8.6 Chapter 5 deals with the principles which should govern various allowances and incentives which are applicable generally to all Services, especially to Police and specifically to working couples and women employees. Rational arguments have been presented for extension of hardship allowance for new areas, enhancement of TA/DA (to certain ranks), Children Education Allowance, Deputation Allowance, Uniform Allowance etc. It has been advocated that Police Service Pay needs to be introduced similar to the Military Service Pay. Special Compensatory Earned Leave, Overtime allowance and Un-Social Time allowance are some of the concepts presented for consideration, in line with similar facilities available in other countries. Considering the harsh conditions of service faced by the police, a better health insurance scheme in the lines of those existing in some states has also been recommended. A separate section has been dedicated to discuss the special problems faced by the working couples and women police officers.

8.7 Chapter 6 has dealt with the issues of pension and a case has been presented for discontinuation of New Pension Scheme. The removal of anomalies created by pension formula worked out by the previous Pay Commission, introduction of some new allowances, enhancement of rates for certain categories and a more liberal approach are some of the other recommendations.

8.8 Chapter 7 has discussed training and capacity-building issues through a competency based management framework and recommended an overhaul of the present system. With the goal of ensuring that the right man with the right skills are available for the right job, specific recommendations for commissioning studies, systematic approach to training design identifying appropriate stage of delivery of inputs, and rationalisation of study leave policies have been suggested.

8.9 CIPSA’s expectations from the 7th CPC are both with respect to the outcomes expected to result from the recommendations of the 7th Central Pay Commission as also of the process to

be followed by the Commission to arrive at these recommendations. While the outcomes have been well delineated in the preceding chapters, in particular, it is expected that the Commission would ensure optimal utilization of domain expertise in governance, resolve pre-existing anomalies in pay patterns and central staffing, as well as recognise and reward the pivotal role played by the Police in the governance of the nation.

8.10 In respect of processes, it is urged that the Commission follow certain processes, which would considerably assist the Commission in arriving at a proper understanding of the issues that plague the Services. CIPSA urges that the 7th Central Pay Commission hold regular dialogues with all stakeholders both by interacting with the service associations and also by visiting the various theatres of operations of IPS officers, especially in their early career in districts, including those in LWE/NE States, State Police HQs besides the CPOs. This will enable the members to gain a first-hand exposure to the adversities faced by the IPS officers especially early in their career.

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8.11 The Police force in this country has very often been treated as instruments of colonial oppression, rather than as instruments of democratic governance on which the people have reposed their faith and trust. CIPSA requests that the 7th Central Pay Commission, win the hearts and minds of the over thirty lakh strong police force by not only being fair but also by being perceived to be fair and equitable. This would in itself ensure that the Police force in the country is motivated and geared up to meet the challenges of 21st century. 8.12 CIPSA further believes that the role of the 7th Central Pay Commission is not to be confined to mere issues of incremental pay hikes, or provision of allowances to momentarily satisfy the government employee. It has a fundamental role in bringing about reform of governance structures, ushering in police reform, and in effectively safeguarding the internal security of the nation. We believe that the Commission will rise up to the challenge, and leverage its terms of reference, so as to achieve these ends.

“Cowardice asks the question “Is it safe?”Expediency asks the question “Is it politic?”

Vanity asks the question “Is it popular?”But Conscience asks the question “Is it right?”

And there comes a time...When one must take a position that is...Neither safe, nor politic, nor popular...

but one must take it because it is Right”.

Martin Luther King

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ANNEXURES

A - LIST OF IPS MATYRS

SL

NO

NAME OF THE MARTYR

IPS OFFICERS

S/Shri

BATCH CADRE

1 G.S. Arya 1950 UP

2 L.B. Sewa 1958 A&M

3 K Panchapagesan 1974 UT

4 A.S. Atwal 1964 Punjab

5 V.K. Mehta 1971 WB

6 A.K. Arora 1984 RAJ

7 A.S. Brar 1979 Punjab

8 K.R.S. Gill 1982 Punjab

9 Sital Dass 1976 Punjab

10 Vandan Malik 1987 M/T

11 Gobind Ram 1975 Punjab

12 Daulat Singh 1976 A&M

13 R.P. Verma 1974 Bihar

14 Ajit Singh 1968 Punjab

15 K.S. Vyas 1974 A.P.

16 G. Paradesi Naidu 1987 A&M

1990

25 PK Lohia 1993 A&M

26 Jaswinder Singh 1990 Orissa

27 Mohammad Amin Bhat 1990 J&K

28 T. Harikrishna 1983 Karnatak

29 SK Deb 1973 A&M

30 Hemant Karkare 1982 Mah

31 Ashok Kamte 1989 Mah

32 Narendra Kumar 2009 MP

17 Ved Prakash 1989 Nagaland

18 Raman Prakash 1990 Gujarat

19 R.N.Hopingson 1992 M/T

20 Ravi Kant Singh 1987 A&M

21 C. Umesh Chandra 1990 AP

22 Ajay Kumar Singh 1995 Bihar

23 KC Surendra Babu 1997 Bihar

24 A.P.

Thang Thuam 1979 M/T

131130

SERIAL

NUMBERSTATES/ UTS

NUMBER

OF CITIESNAME OF CITIES

1 Andhra Pradesh 4Visakhapatnam, Vijayawada,

Hyderabad, Cyberabad

2 Punjab 3 Amritsar, Jalandhar, Ludhiana

3 Gujarat 4Baroda, Ahmedabad,

Rajkot, Surat

4 Haryana 3Gurgaon, Faridabad,

Ambala-Panchkula

5 Karnataka 4Bangalore City, Mysore City, Hubli-

Dharwad City, Mangalore City

6 Kerala 5

Thiruvananthapuram City, Kochi

City, Kozhikkode City, Kollam City,

Thrissur City

7 Maharashtra 10

Mumbai, Nashik, Aurangabad,

Solapur, Pune, Thane, New

Mumbai, Nagpur, Amravati,

R.Mumbai

8 Odisha 2 Bhubaneshwar, Cuttack

9 Rajasthan 2 Jaipur, Jodhpur

10 Tamil Nadu 6

Greater Chennai, Salem,

Coimbatore, Madurai, Trichy,

Tirunelveli

11 West Bengal 3Howrah, Asansol-Durgapur,

Kolkata

12 NCT Delhi 1 NCT Delhi

TOTAL 47

B - CITIES WITH POLICE COMMISSIONER SYSTEM

(Data as on 1.1.2013, Source: Data on Police Organisation, BPR&D, 2013)

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1International data on crime and criminal justice: UN office on Drugs and Crime 201; http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/International_Statistics_on_Crime_and_Justice.pdf

2JT 2006(12) SC225, 2006(4) KLT482 (SC), 2006(9) SCALE444, (2006)8SCC1.

3Writ Petition (Civil) No. 38 OF 1997 (Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr) with Writ Petition (Civil) no. 21 OF 2004

4List of cities with Police Commissionerate system may be seen at Annexure B. Police Commissionerate system is a system envisaged under S.8, and S.20(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, wherein all or any of the powers of the executive magistrate in a metropolitan area, is vested in the Commissioner of Police. In states of Haryana, Punjb and Rajasthan Police Commissionerates have been created under the respective state police acts.

5Community Policing, as an acceptable and effective method of policing has been recognised and adopted in various jurisdictions over the last three decades. In some states like Kerala, the system has been written into the new Police legislation.

6Out of the five National Security Advisors, two of them, including the incumbent is an officer of the Indian Police Service, as is the present Deputy National Security Advisor.

7Griffiths, Percival, “To Guard My People- The History of the Indian Police”, Allied Publisher, Bombay, p.88.

ENDNOTES

8Indian Police Commission, 1860, para 18.

9Report of the Public Service Commission, 1886, para 116-117.

10Griffiths, p.98.11Griffiths, p.100.

12Royal Commission on Superior Civil Services, p.19

13Ibid, at p.28-31.14Griffith, at p.95-97.

15First Pay Commission, 1950, para 6316Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol X, p.51.

17Shiva Rao, B.(ed), The framing of India’s Constitution- A Study, Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1968, p.711

18Study team on recruitment, selection, Union Public Service Commission, State Public Service Commissions, and training, Administrative Reforms Commission, New Delhi, 1967, p.19-21.

19Ibid at p.9.

20Report of the Committee on Police Training, 1971, p.36

21Ibid at p.37.

22Report of the Third Central Pay Commission, 1973, Volume 1, p.120.

23Report of the Committee on Recruitment Policy and Selection Methods, 1976, p.50

24National Police Commission, Sixth Report, March 1981, Paras 44.14, 44.15 and 44.16

25Ibid, Paras 44.20, 44.21 and 44.22

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26Report of the Fourth Central Pay Commission, Part I, June 1986, p.212

27The status of the implementation may be seen at http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/police/india/initiatives/SC_Compliance_Chart_Feb_2014.pdf(Accessed 26-07-14)

28Crime in England and Wales 2009/10, Home Office Statistical Bulletin 12/10, Ed. J. Flatley, C. Kershaw, K. Smith, R. Chaplin & D. Moon, London, Home Office, July 2010

29Independent Review of Police Officers and Staff Remuneration and Conditions - Part I Report, Government of United Kingdom, march 2011, Page 13

30Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions – Final Report, Page 537

31Quality of life, life satisfaction and happiness in shift and non-shiftworkers, K. Lipovcan, P. Larsen, N. Zganec, Revista de Saude Publica 38 (2004) suppl; pages 3-10.

32Para 2.2.17 Page 43, 6 CPC report

33Para 2.2.13 Page 34, 6 CPC report

34Para 1.7 page 7 6CPC

35A Profile of Junior Rank of Karnataka Police – A Survey of Their Attitude, Behaviour, Mental Make Up and Stress Levels- December 2008 (http://media.ksp.diqtech.com/files/Survey_of_attitudes.htm, accessed on 20/05/2014).

36International data on crime and criminal justice: UN office on Drugs and Crime 201; http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/International_Statistics_on_Crime_and_Justice.pdf

37Collins and Gibbs; 2003; Gisli et. al. 1985

38Can be accessed at http://bprd.nic.in/showfile.asp?lid=1216

39Sarason, I. G., Johnson, J. H., Berberich, J. P. and Siegel, J. M.(1979). Helping Police Officers to Cope with Stress:A Cognitive–Behaviour Approach. American Journal of CommunityPsychology, 7, 593-603.

40Leal H. (2006) “Benefits of physical fitness for police officers” Texas Police Journal; April, 2006.

41May be accessed at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/43-IPS-officers-in-UP-transferred-40-times-in-their-career/articleshow/20202799.cms

42Umranikar, J. Y. (2009) Police Reforms in India, A Sisyphean Saga, Functional Review of Indian Police, A step towards good governance, AmeyaPrakashan, Pune, p. 292.

43Kumar, B. M. (1995). Stress Profiles of Police Personnel Posted in the Police Stations of Hyderabad City. NPA Magazine, 47(1), SVPHyderabad: NPA Press.

44Nagar D. (2009) A study of occupational stress and health inpolice personnel. The Indian Police Journal; Vol. LVI-No.4,October-December.

45Debate of Tuesday, the 29th July 1947 which can be accessed at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol4p12.htm

46Debate of Thursday, the 4th November 1948 which can be accessed at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol7p1b.htm

47This argument finds support from the second Pay Commission report (Chapter X; Section I; Para 8; page 103) and the third Pay Commission report Chapter 11.

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48Para 39; Chapter 11 (Page 117) of the Third Pay Commission report

49Para42-43; Chapter 11 (Page 118) of the Third Pay Commission report

50Para 54; Chapter 11 (Page 120) of the Third Pay Commission report

51Para 20; Chapter 11 (Page 113) of the Third Pay Commission report

52Para 12.9; Chapter 12 (Page 212) of the Fourth Pay Commission report

53Para 47.30 Chapter 47(page 519) of the fifth Pay Commission report

54Para 47.36 (i)Chapter 47(page 520) of the fifth Pay Commission report

55There a significant number of such candidates as the table in thefollowing paragraph 3.7 would indicate

56Para 47.36 (ii)Chapter 47(page 520) of the fifth Pay Commission report

57Para 3.2.7 (Page 167) of the sixth Pay Commission report

58Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training O.M. N0.36177194-EO(SM-I) dated the 5th January, 1996

59May access at http://finmin.nic.in/6cpc/6cpcdecision.pdf

60May access at http://finmin.nic.in/6cpc/6cpcmemo.pdf

61Para 3.3.12 page 173 6 CPC report

62Para 47.46 page 523 of the 5th CPC report

63Para 3.2.9 page 1686th CPC report

64 The education profile of the IPS Probationers who received training at the SVP National Police Academy in the recent past has been:

65Para 6.1.7 page No. 355 of the 6th cpc report

66Survey on Status of the civil services in India, conducted by the Centre for Good Governance in 2010, commissioned by the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Administrative Reforms & Public Grievances67Chapter 9, para 9.3.8, page 204

68Chapter 9, para 9.7, pages 210-11

69Para 6.1.9 page 356 6 cpc

70Independent Review of Police Officers and Staff Remuneration and Conditions - Part I Report, Government of United Kingdom, march 2011, Page 13

71http://circulars.nic.in/WriteReadData/CircularPortal/D3/D03ppw/pensiontable_sixthpc.pdf (Accessed on 28 July 2014)