memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses garden banks (gb) 72 platform and terminates at the...

35
Memorandum u. S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Date: To: R.M. Seeley, Southwest Region Director From: Kim Nguyen, General Engineer SUbject: Incident Report - Enterprise Products Operating LLC Operator Number 31618, Unit Number 60534 Accident Location: Port Bolivar Galveston, TX Date of Accident: December 23,2009, NRC Number: 926954 SMART Activity # 128212103 Summary: On December 23, 2009, at approximately 7: 15 am, the Galveston City Fire Department (GFD) was notified by a citizen of crude oil spraying up to 15 feet in the air at the Enterprise Products Operating LLC (Enterprise) Bolivar station in Bolivar, TX which is part of the Enterprise (EPCO) Cameron Highway Oil Pipeline System (CHOPS) crude oil transmission system. GFD arrived at the accident site at 7:30 am. The Galveston County Sheriff Department promptly notified Enterprise of the release at approximately 7:48 am. Enterprise instructed GFD not to close any valves. At approximately 8: 10 am, Enterprise started shutting off crude oil from High Island A5 platform going to Bolivar station, and isolated the CHOPS system segment A5. There was no fire or explosion as a result of the accident, and an estimated 120 bbls crude oil were released to the environment (110 bbls crude oil were recovered via a vacuum truck). There was impact to the public as crude oil sheen was discovered on State Road (SR) 87 (adjacent to the Bolivar Station) causing traffic safety issues, and SR 87 was closed to the public by the Galveston County Sheriff Department (GCSD) from approximately 9:00 AM to 11 :00 PM on December 23, 2009. There was impact to the environment as a result of the crude oil release, and crude oil recovery and soil remediation was completed on December 25, 2009. The nearest residential area to the accident site is mile away. The cause of the crude oil release was determined to be the failure of cap screws in a pressure switch, PSH-ll 003, due to hydrogen assisted cracking promoted by galvanic corrosion. -1-

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Page 1: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

Memorandum u S Department

of Transportation

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

Date sep~20l0

To RM Seeley Southwest Region Director

From Kim Nguyen General Engineer ~~ SUbject Incident Report - Enterprise Products Operating LLC

Operator Number 31618 Unit Number 60534 Accident Location Port Bolivar Galveston TX Date of Accident December 232009 NRC Number 926954

SMART Activity 128212103

Summary

On December 23 2009 at approximately 7 15 am the Galveston City Fire Department (GFD) was notified by a citizen of crude oil spraying up to 15 feet in the air at the Enterprise Products Operating LLC (Enterprise) Bolivar station in Bolivar TX which is part of the Enterprise (EPCO) Cameron Highway Oil Pipeline System (CHOPS) crude oil transmission system GFD arrived at the accident site at 730 am The Galveston County Sheriff Department promptly notified Enterprise of the release at approximately 748 am Enterprise instructed GFD not to close any valves At approximately 8 1 0 am Enterprise started shutting off crude oil from High Island A5 platform going to Bolivar station and isolated the CHOPS system segment A5 There was no fire or explosion as a result of the accident and an estimated 120 bbls crude oil were released to the environment (110 bbls crude oil were recovered via a vacuum truck) There was impact to the public as crude oil sheen was discovered on State Road (SR) 87 (adjacent to the Bolivar Station) causing traffic safety issues and SR 87 was closed to the public by the Galveston County Sheriff Department (GCSD) from approximately 900 AM to 11 00 PM on December 23 2009 There was impact to the environment as a result of the crude oil release and crude oil recovery and soil remediation was completed on December 25 2009 The nearest residential area to the accident site is ~ mile away The cause of the crude oil release was determined to be the failure ofcap screws in a pressure switch PSH-ll 003 due to hydrogen assisted cracking promoted by galvanic corrosion

-1shy

-2-

During Enterprisersquos response to the accident three Enterprise field operation specialists from Sabine Pass Port Arthur and Texas City TX were dispatched to the accident site on the morning of December 23 2009 Upon arriving at approximately 900 AM they closed frac34 inch (V-11003) Whitley ball valve located on top of the 24-inch pipeline that was used to isolate the failed pressure switch and the release of crude oil into the environment was stopped The release was estimated to have been active from approximately 700 AM to 900 AM on December 23 2009 Enterprise established an on-site incident commander in coordination with GFD and GCSD and TampT Marines Salvages was contracted to provide response clean-up and remediation services The failed cap screws from the pressure switch and associated components were transported to the Stress Engineering Services Inc (SES) laboratory for metallurgical analysis The Bolivar station resumed operation at approximately 600 pm on December 24 2009 without incident TampT Marines Salvages completed crude oil recovery and soil remediation on December 25 2009 Background Over the last five years Enterprise has experienced 1 accident (in 2008) on this PHMSA Inspection Unit 60534 The cause of this accident was due to Hurricane Ike storm surge causing a major washout of concrete supports under the pipeline resulting in a crack on a weld of a 2 inch pipe nipple which allowed crude oil to be released to the environment (2 bbls) System Description PHMSA Inspection Unit 60534 includes the CHOPS offshore crude oil pipeline system which is designed for transportation of approximately 650000 bd of crude oil CHOPS consists of approximately 237 miles of 30 offshore pipeline and approximately 138 miles of dual 24 pipeline The 30 pipeline originates at the Ship Shoal (SS) 332B platform crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24 pipelines with onshore destinations of Port Neches TX and Texas City TX respectively The Port Neches leg is approximately 68 miles in length and the Texas City leg is approximately 69 miles in length CHOPS has a MOP of 2160 psig from SS332B to the onshore spec break platforms (HI A5) the MOP reduces to 1250 psig the meters have a MOP of 275 psig The Bolivar Station where the accident occurred is a midpoint meter station in the 24-inch pipeline as the crude oil is transported on shore and onto the Texas City terminus Findings The SES metallurgy evaluation report concluded that the cause of failed cap screws in the pressure switch was due to hydrogen assisted cracking The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the steel that the failed cap screws were manufactured from probably played a significant role in the cracking process The metallurgy laboratory analysis also indicated that the housing of the failed switch had been fabricated of type 316 stainless steel (16-18 Chromium 10-14 Nickel) and the failed switch had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

-3-

Conclusions The metallurgy laboratory analysis also concluded that the presence of solutions containing zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted The origin of zinc salts are not identified during the investigation As a result of the accident investigation EPCO implemented the following preventive measures on the CHOPS system bull Replaced the failed pressure switch (ITT Neodyne model 122P88CC6448) with a

different pressure switch manufactured by Custom Control Sensors model 646GZE This model has been widely used at the facility and proven to be reliable Enterprise has had no problems in the field with this model to date

bull Installed excess flow valves between the frac34rdquo Whitley isolation ball valve and PSL-11004 and PSH-11003 to prevent overflow

As a result of the accident investigation EPCO implemented the following mitigative measures on the CHOPS system bull Verified the Bolivar Station product containment alarm operated as designed bull Verified with the Liquid Control Center that the lightning and video cameras for the

CHOPS system operated as designed bull Verified that the monitoring of pipeline pressures and pressure switches in the Liquid

Control Center operated as designed bull Emphasized the importance of the monitoring system (video camera and ATMOS leak

detection) with the onshore measurement technicians and the Liquid Control Center Appendices Appendix A ndash NRC 926954 Appendix B ndash PHMSA 7000-1 Form Appendix Cndash Enterprise Bolivar Station PampID and Replaced Pressure Switch Specifications Appendix Dndash Accident Time Line Appendix Endash Metallurgical Evaluation Report Appendix F ndash Post-Accident Photos

-4-

Appendix A

NRC 926954

NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802 For Public Use Information released to a third party shall comply with any applicable federal andor state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws Incident Report 926954 INCIDENT DESCRIPTION Report taken at 0938 on 23-DEC-09 Incident Type PIPELINEIncident Cause UNKNOWN Affected Area The incident was discovered on 23-DEC-09 at 0800 local timeAffected Medium LAND ONTO THE GROUND____________________________________________________________________________

SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY

Organization ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS HOUSTON TX 77002 Type of Organization PRIVATE ENTERPRISE____________________________________________________________________________

INCIDENT LOCATIONCAMERON HWY PIPELINE County CHAMBERSBOLIVAR PENINSULA City GALVESTON State TX

____________________________________________________________________________ RELEASED MATERIAL(S)

CHRIS Code OIL Official Material Name OIL CRUDEAlso Known As Qty Released 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT ____________________________________________________________________________

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

CALLER STATED THERE IS A SPILL OF MATERIALS FROM A 24 INCH STEEL TRANSMISSION PIPELINE DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES NO WATERWAYS IMPACTED BUT A HIGHWAY WAS CLOSED ____________________________________________________________________________

INCIDENT DETAILSPipeline Type TRANSMISSION DOT Regulated YES Pipeline AboveBelow Ground ABOVE Exposed or Under Water NO Pipeline Covered UNKNOWN

____________________________________________________________________________DAMAGES

Fire Involved NO Fire Extinguished UNKNOWNINJURIES NO Hospitalized EmplCrew Passenger FATALITIES NO EmplCrew Passenger Occupant EVACUATIONS NO Who Evacuated RadiusArea

Damages NO

Length of Direction of

Closure Type Description of Closure Closure ClosureAir N

Major Artery Road Y HIGHWAY 87 8 EW

Y

Waterway N

Track N

Passengers Transferred NO Environmental Impact UNKNOWN

Page 1 of 2

12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954

Media Interest NONE Community Impact due to Material ____________________________________________________________________________

REMEDIAL ACTIONSCALLER STATED THEY HAVE TECHNICIANS EN ROUTERelease Secured YES Release Rate Estimated Release Duration ____________________________________________________________________________

WEATHER

Weather OVERCAST 55ordmF ____________________________________________________________________________

ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIEDFederal NONEStateLocal TRRCStateLocal On Scene COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPTState Agency Number NONE____________________________________________________________________________

NOTIFICATIONS BY NRCUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)

23-DEC-09 0947DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947US EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0949FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIST COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIELD UNIT)

23-DEC-09 0947JFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947NOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0948HOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947PIPELINE amp HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))

23-DEC-09 0947SECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0950TCEQ (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 1)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 2)

23-DEC-09 0947TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947____________________________________________________________________________

ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONCALLER DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION___________________________________________________________________________

END INCIDENT REPORT 926954

Page 2 of 2

12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954

-5-

Appendix B

PHMSA 7000-1 Form

NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047

US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration

ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID

PIPELINE SYSTEMS

Report Date No

(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS

Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov

PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report

1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________

d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code

IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001

2 Time and date of the accident

hr month day year

3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish

c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code

d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)

_________________________________

4 Telephone report

NRC Report Number month day year

5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses

Value of product lost $_______________

Value of operator property damage $_______________

Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________

Total Costs $_______________

6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)

a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________

b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions

CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil

c Estimated amount of commodity involved

Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is

less than one barrel)

Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________

CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)

Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage

Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other

PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

(type or print) Preparers Name and Title

Area Code and Telephone Number

Preparers E-mail Address

Area Code and Facsimile Number

Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title

Date

Area Code and Telephone Number

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

edchernosky
Text Box
Check one or more boxes as appropriate13

PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)

1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No

c Is pipeline interstate Yes No

Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)

d Area ___________________ Block ______________

State or Outer Continental Shelf

a Type of leak or rupture

Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)

Puncture diameter (inches) _________

Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation

Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________

Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________

bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control

Check Valve

2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________

3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________

Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld

Other (specify)

Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident

____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident

___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No

c Length of segment isolated _______ ft

d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______

PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT

1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in

2 Wall thickness in

3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year

1 Area of accident In open ditch

Under pavement Above ground

Underground Under water

Insideunder building Other ____________

2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES

1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No

Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people

Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official

b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe

If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min

2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No

2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection

Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test

Local operating personnel procedures or equipment

Remote operating personnel including controllers

Air patrol or ground surveillance

A third party Other (specify) _________________

3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____

PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance

a Pipe Coating Bare Coated

b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________

c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________

H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)

d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started

e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown

H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other

4 Lightning

5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other

6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other

7 High Winds

H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)

a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor

b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________

c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No

H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural

11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe

12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe

13 Vandalism

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES

Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other

Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other

Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5

a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect

b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No

d Date of test yr mo day

e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other

f Time held at test pressure hr

g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG

H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other

H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION

23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________

b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________

H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)

Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

-6-

Appendix C

Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp

Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be

released

- 1-shy

l

i

1 1 I

1 1 1 1 1

I 1

1

- shy - - 1

WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr

INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING

1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7

- - r

-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS

ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT

BO MAX 265 DIA

MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)

335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy

SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ

330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I

I I 25 (TYPPr

OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-

Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi

500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175

PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM

500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480

VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy

Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg

150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~

Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M

646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2

646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7

Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton

646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701

Welted 316 SST

Parts Po~imide ton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM

64 6VZEI 646VZEMI

Pressbull4 to 5000 psi

Vae 10 to 285 Hg

SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA

Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant

Steel Body

AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C

Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts

wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm

IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT

AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M

Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15

-5

15 12gt D

1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4

SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M

COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP

RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J

BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J

GREEN ----1)1

INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O

ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1

HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426

e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom

Appendix D

Accident Time Line

-7shy

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 2: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

-2-

During Enterprisersquos response to the accident three Enterprise field operation specialists from Sabine Pass Port Arthur and Texas City TX were dispatched to the accident site on the morning of December 23 2009 Upon arriving at approximately 900 AM they closed frac34 inch (V-11003) Whitley ball valve located on top of the 24-inch pipeline that was used to isolate the failed pressure switch and the release of crude oil into the environment was stopped The release was estimated to have been active from approximately 700 AM to 900 AM on December 23 2009 Enterprise established an on-site incident commander in coordination with GFD and GCSD and TampT Marines Salvages was contracted to provide response clean-up and remediation services The failed cap screws from the pressure switch and associated components were transported to the Stress Engineering Services Inc (SES) laboratory for metallurgical analysis The Bolivar station resumed operation at approximately 600 pm on December 24 2009 without incident TampT Marines Salvages completed crude oil recovery and soil remediation on December 25 2009 Background Over the last five years Enterprise has experienced 1 accident (in 2008) on this PHMSA Inspection Unit 60534 The cause of this accident was due to Hurricane Ike storm surge causing a major washout of concrete supports under the pipeline resulting in a crack on a weld of a 2 inch pipe nipple which allowed crude oil to be released to the environment (2 bbls) System Description PHMSA Inspection Unit 60534 includes the CHOPS offshore crude oil pipeline system which is designed for transportation of approximately 650000 bd of crude oil CHOPS consists of approximately 237 miles of 30 offshore pipeline and approximately 138 miles of dual 24 pipeline The 30 pipeline originates at the Ship Shoal (SS) 332B platform crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24 pipelines with onshore destinations of Port Neches TX and Texas City TX respectively The Port Neches leg is approximately 68 miles in length and the Texas City leg is approximately 69 miles in length CHOPS has a MOP of 2160 psig from SS332B to the onshore spec break platforms (HI A5) the MOP reduces to 1250 psig the meters have a MOP of 275 psig The Bolivar Station where the accident occurred is a midpoint meter station in the 24-inch pipeline as the crude oil is transported on shore and onto the Texas City terminus Findings The SES metallurgy evaluation report concluded that the cause of failed cap screws in the pressure switch was due to hydrogen assisted cracking The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the steel that the failed cap screws were manufactured from probably played a significant role in the cracking process The metallurgy laboratory analysis also indicated that the housing of the failed switch had been fabricated of type 316 stainless steel (16-18 Chromium 10-14 Nickel) and the failed switch had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

-3-

Conclusions The metallurgy laboratory analysis also concluded that the presence of solutions containing zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted The origin of zinc salts are not identified during the investigation As a result of the accident investigation EPCO implemented the following preventive measures on the CHOPS system bull Replaced the failed pressure switch (ITT Neodyne model 122P88CC6448) with a

different pressure switch manufactured by Custom Control Sensors model 646GZE This model has been widely used at the facility and proven to be reliable Enterprise has had no problems in the field with this model to date

bull Installed excess flow valves between the frac34rdquo Whitley isolation ball valve and PSL-11004 and PSH-11003 to prevent overflow

As a result of the accident investigation EPCO implemented the following mitigative measures on the CHOPS system bull Verified the Bolivar Station product containment alarm operated as designed bull Verified with the Liquid Control Center that the lightning and video cameras for the

CHOPS system operated as designed bull Verified that the monitoring of pipeline pressures and pressure switches in the Liquid

Control Center operated as designed bull Emphasized the importance of the monitoring system (video camera and ATMOS leak

detection) with the onshore measurement technicians and the Liquid Control Center Appendices Appendix A ndash NRC 926954 Appendix B ndash PHMSA 7000-1 Form Appendix Cndash Enterprise Bolivar Station PampID and Replaced Pressure Switch Specifications Appendix Dndash Accident Time Line Appendix Endash Metallurgical Evaluation Report Appendix F ndash Post-Accident Photos

-4-

Appendix A

NRC 926954

NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802 For Public Use Information released to a third party shall comply with any applicable federal andor state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws Incident Report 926954 INCIDENT DESCRIPTION Report taken at 0938 on 23-DEC-09 Incident Type PIPELINEIncident Cause UNKNOWN Affected Area The incident was discovered on 23-DEC-09 at 0800 local timeAffected Medium LAND ONTO THE GROUND____________________________________________________________________________

SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY

Organization ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS HOUSTON TX 77002 Type of Organization PRIVATE ENTERPRISE____________________________________________________________________________

INCIDENT LOCATIONCAMERON HWY PIPELINE County CHAMBERSBOLIVAR PENINSULA City GALVESTON State TX

____________________________________________________________________________ RELEASED MATERIAL(S)

CHRIS Code OIL Official Material Name OIL CRUDEAlso Known As Qty Released 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT ____________________________________________________________________________

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

CALLER STATED THERE IS A SPILL OF MATERIALS FROM A 24 INCH STEEL TRANSMISSION PIPELINE DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES NO WATERWAYS IMPACTED BUT A HIGHWAY WAS CLOSED ____________________________________________________________________________

INCIDENT DETAILSPipeline Type TRANSMISSION DOT Regulated YES Pipeline AboveBelow Ground ABOVE Exposed or Under Water NO Pipeline Covered UNKNOWN

____________________________________________________________________________DAMAGES

Fire Involved NO Fire Extinguished UNKNOWNINJURIES NO Hospitalized EmplCrew Passenger FATALITIES NO EmplCrew Passenger Occupant EVACUATIONS NO Who Evacuated RadiusArea

Damages NO

Length of Direction of

Closure Type Description of Closure Closure ClosureAir N

Major Artery Road Y HIGHWAY 87 8 EW

Y

Waterway N

Track N

Passengers Transferred NO Environmental Impact UNKNOWN

Page 1 of 2

12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954

Media Interest NONE Community Impact due to Material ____________________________________________________________________________

REMEDIAL ACTIONSCALLER STATED THEY HAVE TECHNICIANS EN ROUTERelease Secured YES Release Rate Estimated Release Duration ____________________________________________________________________________

WEATHER

Weather OVERCAST 55ordmF ____________________________________________________________________________

ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIEDFederal NONEStateLocal TRRCStateLocal On Scene COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPTState Agency Number NONE____________________________________________________________________________

NOTIFICATIONS BY NRCUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)

23-DEC-09 0947DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947US EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0949FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIST COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIELD UNIT)

23-DEC-09 0947JFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947NOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0948HOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947PIPELINE amp HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))

23-DEC-09 0947SECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0950TCEQ (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 1)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 2)

23-DEC-09 0947TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947____________________________________________________________________________

ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONCALLER DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION___________________________________________________________________________

END INCIDENT REPORT 926954

Page 2 of 2

12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954

-5-

Appendix B

PHMSA 7000-1 Form

NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047

US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration

ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID

PIPELINE SYSTEMS

Report Date No

(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS

Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov

PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report

1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________

d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code

IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001

2 Time and date of the accident

hr month day year

3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish

c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code

d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)

_________________________________

4 Telephone report

NRC Report Number month day year

5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses

Value of product lost $_______________

Value of operator property damage $_______________

Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________

Total Costs $_______________

6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)

a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________

b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions

CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil

c Estimated amount of commodity involved

Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is

less than one barrel)

Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________

CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)

Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage

Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other

PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

(type or print) Preparers Name and Title

Area Code and Telephone Number

Preparers E-mail Address

Area Code and Facsimile Number

Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title

Date

Area Code and Telephone Number

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

edchernosky
Text Box
Check one or more boxes as appropriate13

PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)

1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No

c Is pipeline interstate Yes No

Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)

d Area ___________________ Block ______________

State or Outer Continental Shelf

a Type of leak or rupture

Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)

Puncture diameter (inches) _________

Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation

Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________

Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________

bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control

Check Valve

2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________

3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________

Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld

Other (specify)

Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident

____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident

___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No

c Length of segment isolated _______ ft

d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______

PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT

1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in

2 Wall thickness in

3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year

1 Area of accident In open ditch

Under pavement Above ground

Underground Under water

Insideunder building Other ____________

2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES

1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No

Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people

Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official

b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe

If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min

2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No

2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection

Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test

Local operating personnel procedures or equipment

Remote operating personnel including controllers

Air patrol or ground surveillance

A third party Other (specify) _________________

3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____

PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance

a Pipe Coating Bare Coated

b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________

c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________

H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)

d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started

e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown

H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other

4 Lightning

5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other

6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other

7 High Winds

H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)

a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor

b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________

c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No

H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural

11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe

12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe

13 Vandalism

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES

Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other

Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other

Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5

a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect

b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No

d Date of test yr mo day

e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other

f Time held at test pressure hr

g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG

H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other

H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION

23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________

b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________

H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)

Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

-6-

Appendix C

Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp

Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be

released

- 1-shy

l

i

1 1 I

1 1 1 1 1

I 1

1

- shy - - 1

WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr

INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING

1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7

- - r

-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS

ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT

BO MAX 265 DIA

MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)

335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy

SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ

330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I

I I 25 (TYPPr

OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-

Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi

500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175

PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM

500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480

VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy

Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg

150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~

Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M

646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2

646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7

Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton

646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701

Welted 316 SST

Parts Po~imide ton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM

64 6VZEI 646VZEMI

Pressbull4 to 5000 psi

Vae 10 to 285 Hg

SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA

Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant

Steel Body

AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C

Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts

wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm

IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT

AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M

Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15

-5

15 12gt D

1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4

SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M

COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP

RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J

BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J

GREEN ----1)1

INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O

ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1

HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426

e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom

Appendix D

Accident Time Line

-7shy

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 3: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

-3-

Conclusions The metallurgy laboratory analysis also concluded that the presence of solutions containing zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted The origin of zinc salts are not identified during the investigation As a result of the accident investigation EPCO implemented the following preventive measures on the CHOPS system bull Replaced the failed pressure switch (ITT Neodyne model 122P88CC6448) with a

different pressure switch manufactured by Custom Control Sensors model 646GZE This model has been widely used at the facility and proven to be reliable Enterprise has had no problems in the field with this model to date

bull Installed excess flow valves between the frac34rdquo Whitley isolation ball valve and PSL-11004 and PSH-11003 to prevent overflow

As a result of the accident investigation EPCO implemented the following mitigative measures on the CHOPS system bull Verified the Bolivar Station product containment alarm operated as designed bull Verified with the Liquid Control Center that the lightning and video cameras for the

CHOPS system operated as designed bull Verified that the monitoring of pipeline pressures and pressure switches in the Liquid

Control Center operated as designed bull Emphasized the importance of the monitoring system (video camera and ATMOS leak

detection) with the onshore measurement technicians and the Liquid Control Center Appendices Appendix A ndash NRC 926954 Appendix B ndash PHMSA 7000-1 Form Appendix Cndash Enterprise Bolivar Station PampID and Replaced Pressure Switch Specifications Appendix Dndash Accident Time Line Appendix Endash Metallurgical Evaluation Report Appendix F ndash Post-Accident Photos

-4-

Appendix A

NRC 926954

NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802 For Public Use Information released to a third party shall comply with any applicable federal andor state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws Incident Report 926954 INCIDENT DESCRIPTION Report taken at 0938 on 23-DEC-09 Incident Type PIPELINEIncident Cause UNKNOWN Affected Area The incident was discovered on 23-DEC-09 at 0800 local timeAffected Medium LAND ONTO THE GROUND____________________________________________________________________________

SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY

Organization ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS HOUSTON TX 77002 Type of Organization PRIVATE ENTERPRISE____________________________________________________________________________

INCIDENT LOCATIONCAMERON HWY PIPELINE County CHAMBERSBOLIVAR PENINSULA City GALVESTON State TX

____________________________________________________________________________ RELEASED MATERIAL(S)

CHRIS Code OIL Official Material Name OIL CRUDEAlso Known As Qty Released 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT ____________________________________________________________________________

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

CALLER STATED THERE IS A SPILL OF MATERIALS FROM A 24 INCH STEEL TRANSMISSION PIPELINE DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES NO WATERWAYS IMPACTED BUT A HIGHWAY WAS CLOSED ____________________________________________________________________________

INCIDENT DETAILSPipeline Type TRANSMISSION DOT Regulated YES Pipeline AboveBelow Ground ABOVE Exposed or Under Water NO Pipeline Covered UNKNOWN

____________________________________________________________________________DAMAGES

Fire Involved NO Fire Extinguished UNKNOWNINJURIES NO Hospitalized EmplCrew Passenger FATALITIES NO EmplCrew Passenger Occupant EVACUATIONS NO Who Evacuated RadiusArea

Damages NO

Length of Direction of

Closure Type Description of Closure Closure ClosureAir N

Major Artery Road Y HIGHWAY 87 8 EW

Y

Waterway N

Track N

Passengers Transferred NO Environmental Impact UNKNOWN

Page 1 of 2

12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954

Media Interest NONE Community Impact due to Material ____________________________________________________________________________

REMEDIAL ACTIONSCALLER STATED THEY HAVE TECHNICIANS EN ROUTERelease Secured YES Release Rate Estimated Release Duration ____________________________________________________________________________

WEATHER

Weather OVERCAST 55ordmF ____________________________________________________________________________

ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIEDFederal NONEStateLocal TRRCStateLocal On Scene COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPTState Agency Number NONE____________________________________________________________________________

NOTIFICATIONS BY NRCUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)

23-DEC-09 0947DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947US EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0949FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIST COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIELD UNIT)

23-DEC-09 0947JFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947NOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0948HOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947PIPELINE amp HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))

23-DEC-09 0947SECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0950TCEQ (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 1)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 2)

23-DEC-09 0947TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947____________________________________________________________________________

ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONCALLER DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION___________________________________________________________________________

END INCIDENT REPORT 926954

Page 2 of 2

12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954

-5-

Appendix B

PHMSA 7000-1 Form

NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047

US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration

ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID

PIPELINE SYSTEMS

Report Date No

(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS

Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov

PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report

1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________

d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code

IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001

2 Time and date of the accident

hr month day year

3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish

c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code

d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)

_________________________________

4 Telephone report

NRC Report Number month day year

5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses

Value of product lost $_______________

Value of operator property damage $_______________

Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________

Total Costs $_______________

6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)

a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________

b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions

CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil

c Estimated amount of commodity involved

Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is

less than one barrel)

Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________

CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)

Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage

Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other

PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

(type or print) Preparers Name and Title

Area Code and Telephone Number

Preparers E-mail Address

Area Code and Facsimile Number

Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title

Date

Area Code and Telephone Number

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

edchernosky
Text Box
Check one or more boxes as appropriate13

PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)

1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No

c Is pipeline interstate Yes No

Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)

d Area ___________________ Block ______________

State or Outer Continental Shelf

a Type of leak or rupture

Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)

Puncture diameter (inches) _________

Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation

Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________

Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________

bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control

Check Valve

2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________

3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________

Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld

Other (specify)

Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident

____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident

___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No

c Length of segment isolated _______ ft

d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______

PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT

1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in

2 Wall thickness in

3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year

1 Area of accident In open ditch

Under pavement Above ground

Underground Under water

Insideunder building Other ____________

2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES

1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No

Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people

Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official

b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe

If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min

2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No

2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection

Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test

Local operating personnel procedures or equipment

Remote operating personnel including controllers

Air patrol or ground surveillance

A third party Other (specify) _________________

3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____

PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance

a Pipe Coating Bare Coated

b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________

c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________

H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)

d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started

e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown

H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other

4 Lightning

5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other

6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other

7 High Winds

H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)

a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor

b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________

c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No

H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural

11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe

12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe

13 Vandalism

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES

Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other

Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other

Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5

a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect

b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No

d Date of test yr mo day

e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other

f Time held at test pressure hr

g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG

H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other

H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION

23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________

b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________

H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)

Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

-6-

Appendix C

Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp

Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be

released

- 1-shy

l

i

1 1 I

1 1 1 1 1

I 1

1

- shy - - 1

WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr

INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING

1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7

- - r

-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS

ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT

BO MAX 265 DIA

MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)

335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy

SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ

330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I

I I 25 (TYPPr

OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-

Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi

500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175

PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM

500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480

VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy

Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg

150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~

Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M

646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2

646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7

Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton

646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701

Welted 316 SST

Parts Po~imide ton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM

64 6VZEI 646VZEMI

Pressbull4 to 5000 psi

Vae 10 to 285 Hg

SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA

Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant

Steel Body

AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C

Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts

wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm

IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT

AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M

Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15

-5

15 12gt D

1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4

SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M

COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP

RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J

BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J

GREEN ----1)1

INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O

ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1

HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426

e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom

Appendix D

Accident Time Line

-7shy

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 4: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

-4-

Appendix A

NRC 926954

NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802 For Public Use Information released to a third party shall comply with any applicable federal andor state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws Incident Report 926954 INCIDENT DESCRIPTION Report taken at 0938 on 23-DEC-09 Incident Type PIPELINEIncident Cause UNKNOWN Affected Area The incident was discovered on 23-DEC-09 at 0800 local timeAffected Medium LAND ONTO THE GROUND____________________________________________________________________________

SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY

Organization ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS HOUSTON TX 77002 Type of Organization PRIVATE ENTERPRISE____________________________________________________________________________

INCIDENT LOCATIONCAMERON HWY PIPELINE County CHAMBERSBOLIVAR PENINSULA City GALVESTON State TX

____________________________________________________________________________ RELEASED MATERIAL(S)

CHRIS Code OIL Official Material Name OIL CRUDEAlso Known As Qty Released 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT ____________________________________________________________________________

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

CALLER STATED THERE IS A SPILL OF MATERIALS FROM A 24 INCH STEEL TRANSMISSION PIPELINE DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES NO WATERWAYS IMPACTED BUT A HIGHWAY WAS CLOSED ____________________________________________________________________________

INCIDENT DETAILSPipeline Type TRANSMISSION DOT Regulated YES Pipeline AboveBelow Ground ABOVE Exposed or Under Water NO Pipeline Covered UNKNOWN

____________________________________________________________________________DAMAGES

Fire Involved NO Fire Extinguished UNKNOWNINJURIES NO Hospitalized EmplCrew Passenger FATALITIES NO EmplCrew Passenger Occupant EVACUATIONS NO Who Evacuated RadiusArea

Damages NO

Length of Direction of

Closure Type Description of Closure Closure ClosureAir N

Major Artery Road Y HIGHWAY 87 8 EW

Y

Waterway N

Track N

Passengers Transferred NO Environmental Impact UNKNOWN

Page 1 of 2

12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954

Media Interest NONE Community Impact due to Material ____________________________________________________________________________

REMEDIAL ACTIONSCALLER STATED THEY HAVE TECHNICIANS EN ROUTERelease Secured YES Release Rate Estimated Release Duration ____________________________________________________________________________

WEATHER

Weather OVERCAST 55ordmF ____________________________________________________________________________

ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIEDFederal NONEStateLocal TRRCStateLocal On Scene COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPTState Agency Number NONE____________________________________________________________________________

NOTIFICATIONS BY NRCUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)

23-DEC-09 0947DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947US EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0949FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIST COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIELD UNIT)

23-DEC-09 0947JFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947NOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0948HOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947PIPELINE amp HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))

23-DEC-09 0947SECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0950TCEQ (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 1)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 2)

23-DEC-09 0947TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947____________________________________________________________________________

ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONCALLER DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION___________________________________________________________________________

END INCIDENT REPORT 926954

Page 2 of 2

12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954

-5-

Appendix B

PHMSA 7000-1 Form

NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047

US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration

ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID

PIPELINE SYSTEMS

Report Date No

(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS

Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov

PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report

1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________

d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code

IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001

2 Time and date of the accident

hr month day year

3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish

c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code

d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)

_________________________________

4 Telephone report

NRC Report Number month day year

5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses

Value of product lost $_______________

Value of operator property damage $_______________

Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________

Total Costs $_______________

6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)

a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________

b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions

CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil

c Estimated amount of commodity involved

Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is

less than one barrel)

Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________

CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)

Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage

Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other

PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

(type or print) Preparers Name and Title

Area Code and Telephone Number

Preparers E-mail Address

Area Code and Facsimile Number

Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title

Date

Area Code and Telephone Number

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

edchernosky
Text Box
Check one or more boxes as appropriate13

PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)

1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No

c Is pipeline interstate Yes No

Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)

d Area ___________________ Block ______________

State or Outer Continental Shelf

a Type of leak or rupture

Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)

Puncture diameter (inches) _________

Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation

Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________

Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________

bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control

Check Valve

2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________

3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________

Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld

Other (specify)

Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident

____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident

___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No

c Length of segment isolated _______ ft

d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______

PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT

1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in

2 Wall thickness in

3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year

1 Area of accident In open ditch

Under pavement Above ground

Underground Under water

Insideunder building Other ____________

2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES

1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No

Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people

Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official

b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe

If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min

2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No

2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection

Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test

Local operating personnel procedures or equipment

Remote operating personnel including controllers

Air patrol or ground surveillance

A third party Other (specify) _________________

3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____

PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance

a Pipe Coating Bare Coated

b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________

c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________

H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)

d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started

e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown

H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other

4 Lightning

5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other

6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other

7 High Winds

H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)

a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor

b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________

c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No

H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural

11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe

12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe

13 Vandalism

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES

Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other

Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other

Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5

a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect

b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No

d Date of test yr mo day

e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other

f Time held at test pressure hr

g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG

H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other

H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION

23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________

b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________

H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)

Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

-6-

Appendix C

Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp

Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be

released

- 1-shy

l

i

1 1 I

1 1 1 1 1

I 1

1

- shy - - 1

WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr

INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING

1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7

- - r

-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS

ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT

BO MAX 265 DIA

MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)

335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy

SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ

330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I

I I 25 (TYPPr

OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-

Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi

500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175

PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM

500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480

VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy

Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg

150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~

Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M

646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2

646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7

Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton

646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701

Welted 316 SST

Parts Po~imide ton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM

64 6VZEI 646VZEMI

Pressbull4 to 5000 psi

Vae 10 to 285 Hg

SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA

Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant

Steel Body

AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C

Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts

wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm

IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT

AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M

Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15

-5

15 12gt D

1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4

SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M

COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP

RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J

BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J

GREEN ----1)1

INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O

ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1

HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426

e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom

Appendix D

Accident Time Line

-7shy

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 5: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802 For Public Use Information released to a third party shall comply with any applicable federal andor state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws Incident Report 926954 INCIDENT DESCRIPTION Report taken at 0938 on 23-DEC-09 Incident Type PIPELINEIncident Cause UNKNOWN Affected Area The incident was discovered on 23-DEC-09 at 0800 local timeAffected Medium LAND ONTO THE GROUND____________________________________________________________________________

SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY

Organization ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS HOUSTON TX 77002 Type of Organization PRIVATE ENTERPRISE____________________________________________________________________________

INCIDENT LOCATIONCAMERON HWY PIPELINE County CHAMBERSBOLIVAR PENINSULA City GALVESTON State TX

____________________________________________________________________________ RELEASED MATERIAL(S)

CHRIS Code OIL Official Material Name OIL CRUDEAlso Known As Qty Released 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT ____________________________________________________________________________

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

CALLER STATED THERE IS A SPILL OF MATERIALS FROM A 24 INCH STEEL TRANSMISSION PIPELINE DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES NO WATERWAYS IMPACTED BUT A HIGHWAY WAS CLOSED ____________________________________________________________________________

INCIDENT DETAILSPipeline Type TRANSMISSION DOT Regulated YES Pipeline AboveBelow Ground ABOVE Exposed or Under Water NO Pipeline Covered UNKNOWN

____________________________________________________________________________DAMAGES

Fire Involved NO Fire Extinguished UNKNOWNINJURIES NO Hospitalized EmplCrew Passenger FATALITIES NO EmplCrew Passenger Occupant EVACUATIONS NO Who Evacuated RadiusArea

Damages NO

Length of Direction of

Closure Type Description of Closure Closure ClosureAir N

Major Artery Road Y HIGHWAY 87 8 EW

Y

Waterway N

Track N

Passengers Transferred NO Environmental Impact UNKNOWN

Page 1 of 2

12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954

Media Interest NONE Community Impact due to Material ____________________________________________________________________________

REMEDIAL ACTIONSCALLER STATED THEY HAVE TECHNICIANS EN ROUTERelease Secured YES Release Rate Estimated Release Duration ____________________________________________________________________________

WEATHER

Weather OVERCAST 55ordmF ____________________________________________________________________________

ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIEDFederal NONEStateLocal TRRCStateLocal On Scene COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPTState Agency Number NONE____________________________________________________________________________

NOTIFICATIONS BY NRCUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)

23-DEC-09 0947DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947US EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0949FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIST COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIELD UNIT)

23-DEC-09 0947JFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947NOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0948HOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947PIPELINE amp HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))

23-DEC-09 0947SECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0950TCEQ (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 1)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 2)

23-DEC-09 0947TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947____________________________________________________________________________

ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONCALLER DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION___________________________________________________________________________

END INCIDENT REPORT 926954

Page 2 of 2

12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954

-5-

Appendix B

PHMSA 7000-1 Form

NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047

US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration

ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID

PIPELINE SYSTEMS

Report Date No

(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS

Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov

PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report

1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________

d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code

IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001

2 Time and date of the accident

hr month day year

3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish

c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code

d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)

_________________________________

4 Telephone report

NRC Report Number month day year

5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses

Value of product lost $_______________

Value of operator property damage $_______________

Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________

Total Costs $_______________

6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)

a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________

b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions

CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil

c Estimated amount of commodity involved

Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is

less than one barrel)

Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________

CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)

Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage

Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other

PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

(type or print) Preparers Name and Title

Area Code and Telephone Number

Preparers E-mail Address

Area Code and Facsimile Number

Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title

Date

Area Code and Telephone Number

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

edchernosky
Text Box
Check one or more boxes as appropriate13

PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)

1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No

c Is pipeline interstate Yes No

Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)

d Area ___________________ Block ______________

State or Outer Continental Shelf

a Type of leak or rupture

Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)

Puncture diameter (inches) _________

Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation

Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________

Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________

bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control

Check Valve

2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________

3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________

Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld

Other (specify)

Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident

____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident

___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No

c Length of segment isolated _______ ft

d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______

PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT

1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in

2 Wall thickness in

3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year

1 Area of accident In open ditch

Under pavement Above ground

Underground Under water

Insideunder building Other ____________

2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES

1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No

Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people

Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official

b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe

If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min

2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No

2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection

Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test

Local operating personnel procedures or equipment

Remote operating personnel including controllers

Air patrol or ground surveillance

A third party Other (specify) _________________

3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____

PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance

a Pipe Coating Bare Coated

b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________

c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________

H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)

d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started

e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown

H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other

4 Lightning

5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other

6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other

7 High Winds

H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)

a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor

b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________

c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No

H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural

11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe

12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe

13 Vandalism

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES

Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other

Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other

Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5

a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect

b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No

d Date of test yr mo day

e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other

f Time held at test pressure hr

g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG

H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other

H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION

23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________

b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________

H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)

Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

-6-

Appendix C

Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp

Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be

released

- 1-shy

l

i

1 1 I

1 1 1 1 1

I 1

1

- shy - - 1

WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr

INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING

1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7

- - r

-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS

ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT

BO MAX 265 DIA

MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)

335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy

SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ

330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I

I I 25 (TYPPr

OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-

Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi

500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175

PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM

500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480

VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy

Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg

150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~

Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M

646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2

646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7

Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton

646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701

Welted 316 SST

Parts Po~imide ton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM

64 6VZEI 646VZEMI

Pressbull4 to 5000 psi

Vae 10 to 285 Hg

SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA

Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant

Steel Body

AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C

Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts

wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm

IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT

AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M

Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15

-5

15 12gt D

1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4

SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M

COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP

RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J

BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J

GREEN ----1)1

INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O

ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1

HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426

e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom

Appendix D

Accident Time Line

-7shy

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 6: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

Media Interest NONE Community Impact due to Material ____________________________________________________________________________

REMEDIAL ACTIONSCALLER STATED THEY HAVE TECHNICIANS EN ROUTERelease Secured YES Release Rate Estimated Release Duration ____________________________________________________________________________

WEATHER

Weather OVERCAST 55ordmF ____________________________________________________________________________

ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIEDFederal NONEStateLocal TRRCStateLocal On Scene COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPTState Agency Number NONE____________________________________________________________________________

NOTIFICATIONS BY NRCUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)

23-DEC-09 0947DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947US EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0949FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIST COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIELD UNIT)

23-DEC-09 0947JFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947NOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0948HOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947PIPELINE amp HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))

23-DEC-09 0947SECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0950TCEQ (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (MAIN OFFICE)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 1)

23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 2)

23-DEC-09 0947TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER)

23-DEC-09 0947____________________________________________________________________________

ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONCALLER DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION___________________________________________________________________________

END INCIDENT REPORT 926954

Page 2 of 2

12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954

-5-

Appendix B

PHMSA 7000-1 Form

NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047

US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration

ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID

PIPELINE SYSTEMS

Report Date No

(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS

Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov

PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report

1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________

d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code

IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001

2 Time and date of the accident

hr month day year

3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish

c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code

d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)

_________________________________

4 Telephone report

NRC Report Number month day year

5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses

Value of product lost $_______________

Value of operator property damage $_______________

Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________

Total Costs $_______________

6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)

a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________

b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions

CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil

c Estimated amount of commodity involved

Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is

less than one barrel)

Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________

CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)

Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage

Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other

PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

(type or print) Preparers Name and Title

Area Code and Telephone Number

Preparers E-mail Address

Area Code and Facsimile Number

Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title

Date

Area Code and Telephone Number

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

edchernosky
Text Box
Check one or more boxes as appropriate13

PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)

1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No

c Is pipeline interstate Yes No

Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)

d Area ___________________ Block ______________

State or Outer Continental Shelf

a Type of leak or rupture

Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)

Puncture diameter (inches) _________

Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation

Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________

Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________

bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control

Check Valve

2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________

3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________

Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld

Other (specify)

Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident

____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident

___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No

c Length of segment isolated _______ ft

d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______

PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT

1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in

2 Wall thickness in

3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year

1 Area of accident In open ditch

Under pavement Above ground

Underground Under water

Insideunder building Other ____________

2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES

1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No

Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people

Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official

b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe

If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min

2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No

2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection

Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test

Local operating personnel procedures or equipment

Remote operating personnel including controllers

Air patrol or ground surveillance

A third party Other (specify) _________________

3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____

PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance

a Pipe Coating Bare Coated

b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________

c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________

H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)

d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started

e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown

H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other

4 Lightning

5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other

6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other

7 High Winds

H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)

a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor

b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________

c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No

H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural

11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe

12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe

13 Vandalism

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES

Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other

Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other

Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5

a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect

b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No

d Date of test yr mo day

e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other

f Time held at test pressure hr

g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG

H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other

H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION

23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________

b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________

H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)

Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

-6-

Appendix C

Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp

Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be

released

- 1-shy

l

i

1 1 I

1 1 1 1 1

I 1

1

- shy - - 1

WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr

INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING

1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7

- - r

-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS

ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT

BO MAX 265 DIA

MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)

335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy

SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ

330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I

I I 25 (TYPPr

OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-

Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi

500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175

PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM

500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480

VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy

Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg

150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~

Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M

646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2

646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7

Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton

646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701

Welted 316 SST

Parts Po~imide ton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM

64 6VZEI 646VZEMI

Pressbull4 to 5000 psi

Vae 10 to 285 Hg

SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA

Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant

Steel Body

AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C

Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts

wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm

IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT

AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M

Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15

-5

15 12gt D

1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4

SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M

COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP

RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J

BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J

GREEN ----1)1

INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O

ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1

HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426

e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom

Appendix D

Accident Time Line

-7shy

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 7: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

-5-

Appendix B

PHMSA 7000-1 Form

NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047

US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration

ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID

PIPELINE SYSTEMS

Report Date No

(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS

Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov

PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report

1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________

d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code

IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001

2 Time and date of the accident

hr month day year

3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish

c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code

d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)

_________________________________

4 Telephone report

NRC Report Number month day year

5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses

Value of product lost $_______________

Value of operator property damage $_______________

Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________

Total Costs $_______________

6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)

a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________

b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions

CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil

c Estimated amount of commodity involved

Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is

less than one barrel)

Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________

CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)

Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage

Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other

PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

(type or print) Preparers Name and Title

Area Code and Telephone Number

Preparers E-mail Address

Area Code and Facsimile Number

Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title

Date

Area Code and Telephone Number

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

edchernosky
Text Box
Check one or more boxes as appropriate13

PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)

1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No

c Is pipeline interstate Yes No

Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)

d Area ___________________ Block ______________

State or Outer Continental Shelf

a Type of leak or rupture

Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)

Puncture diameter (inches) _________

Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation

Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________

Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________

bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control

Check Valve

2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________

3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________

Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld

Other (specify)

Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident

____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident

___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No

c Length of segment isolated _______ ft

d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______

PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT

1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in

2 Wall thickness in

3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year

1 Area of accident In open ditch

Under pavement Above ground

Underground Under water

Insideunder building Other ____________

2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES

1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No

Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people

Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official

b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe

If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min

2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No

2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection

Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test

Local operating personnel procedures or equipment

Remote operating personnel including controllers

Air patrol or ground surveillance

A third party Other (specify) _________________

3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____

PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance

a Pipe Coating Bare Coated

b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________

c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________

H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)

d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started

e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown

H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other

4 Lightning

5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other

6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other

7 High Winds

H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)

a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor

b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________

c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No

H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural

11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe

12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe

13 Vandalism

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES

Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other

Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other

Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5

a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect

b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No

d Date of test yr mo day

e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other

f Time held at test pressure hr

g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG

H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other

H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION

23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________

b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________

H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)

Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

-6-

Appendix C

Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp

Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be

released

- 1-shy

l

i

1 1 I

1 1 1 1 1

I 1

1

- shy - - 1

WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr

INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING

1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7

- - r

-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS

ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT

BO MAX 265 DIA

MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)

335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy

SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ

330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I

I I 25 (TYPPr

OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-

Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi

500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175

PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM

500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480

VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy

Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg

150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~

Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M

646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2

646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7

Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton

646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701

Welted 316 SST

Parts Po~imide ton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM

64 6VZEI 646VZEMI

Pressbull4 to 5000 psi

Vae 10 to 285 Hg

SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA

Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant

Steel Body

AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C

Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts

wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm

IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT

AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M

Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15

-5

15 12gt D

1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4

SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M

COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP

RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J

BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J

GREEN ----1)1

INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O

ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1

HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426

e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom

Appendix D

Accident Time Line

-7shy

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 8: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047

US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration

ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID

PIPELINE SYSTEMS

Report Date No

(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS

Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov

PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report

1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________

d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code

IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001

2 Time and date of the accident

hr month day year

3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish

c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code

d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)

_________________________________

4 Telephone report

NRC Report Number month day year

5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses

Value of product lost $_______________

Value of operator property damage $_______________

Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________

Total Costs $_______________

6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)

a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________

b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions

CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil

c Estimated amount of commodity involved

Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is

less than one barrel)

Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________

CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)

Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage

Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other

PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

(type or print) Preparers Name and Title

Area Code and Telephone Number

Preparers E-mail Address

Area Code and Facsimile Number

Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title

Date

Area Code and Telephone Number

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

edchernosky
Text Box
Check one or more boxes as appropriate13

PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)

1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No

c Is pipeline interstate Yes No

Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)

d Area ___________________ Block ______________

State or Outer Continental Shelf

a Type of leak or rupture

Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)

Puncture diameter (inches) _________

Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation

Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________

Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________

bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control

Check Valve

2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________

3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________

Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld

Other (specify)

Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident

____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident

___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No

c Length of segment isolated _______ ft

d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______

PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT

1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in

2 Wall thickness in

3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year

1 Area of accident In open ditch

Under pavement Above ground

Underground Under water

Insideunder building Other ____________

2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES

1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No

Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people

Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official

b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe

If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min

2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No

2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection

Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test

Local operating personnel procedures or equipment

Remote operating personnel including controllers

Air patrol or ground surveillance

A third party Other (specify) _________________

3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____

PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance

a Pipe Coating Bare Coated

b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________

c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________

H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)

d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started

e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown

H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other

4 Lightning

5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other

6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other

7 High Winds

H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)

a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor

b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________

c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No

H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural

11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe

12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe

13 Vandalism

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES

Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other

Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other

Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5

a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect

b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No

d Date of test yr mo day

e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other

f Time held at test pressure hr

g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG

H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other

H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION

23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________

b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________

H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)

Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

-6-

Appendix C

Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp

Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be

released

- 1-shy

l

i

1 1 I

1 1 1 1 1

I 1

1

- shy - - 1

WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr

INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING

1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7

- - r

-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS

ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT

BO MAX 265 DIA

MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)

335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy

SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ

330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I

I I 25 (TYPPr

OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-

Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi

500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175

PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM

500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480

VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy

Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg

150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~

Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M

646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2

646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7

Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton

646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701

Welted 316 SST

Parts Po~imide ton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM

64 6VZEI 646VZEMI

Pressbull4 to 5000 psi

Vae 10 to 285 Hg

SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA

Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant

Steel Body

AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C

Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts

wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm

IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT

AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M

Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15

-5

15 12gt D

1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4

SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M

COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP

RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J

BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J

GREEN ----1)1

INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O

ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1

HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426

e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom

Appendix D

Accident Time Line

-7shy

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 9: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)

1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No

c Is pipeline interstate Yes No

Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)

d Area ___________________ Block ______________

State or Outer Continental Shelf

a Type of leak or rupture

Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)

Puncture diameter (inches) _________

Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation

Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________

Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________

bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control

Check Valve

2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________

3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________

Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld

Other (specify)

Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident

____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident

___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No

c Length of segment isolated _______ ft

d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______

PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT

1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in

2 Wall thickness in

3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year

1 Area of accident In open ditch

Under pavement Above ground

Underground Under water

Insideunder building Other ____________

2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES

1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No

Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people

Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official

b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe

If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min

2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No

2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection

Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test

Local operating personnel procedures or equipment

Remote operating personnel including controllers

Air patrol or ground surveillance

A third party Other (specify) _________________

3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____

PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance

a Pipe Coating Bare Coated

b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________

c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________

H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)

d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started

e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown

H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other

4 Lightning

5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other

6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other

7 High Winds

H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)

a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor

b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________

c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No

H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural

11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe

12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe

13 Vandalism

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES

Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other

Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other

Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5

a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect

b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No

d Date of test yr mo day

e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other

f Time held at test pressure hr

g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG

H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other

H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION

23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________

b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________

H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)

Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

-6-

Appendix C

Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp

Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be

released

- 1-shy

l

i

1 1 I

1 1 1 1 1

I 1

1

- shy - - 1

WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr

INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING

1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7

- - r

-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS

ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT

BO MAX 265 DIA

MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)

335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy

SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ

330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I

I I 25 (TYPPr

OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-

Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi

500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175

PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM

500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480

VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy

Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg

150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~

Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M

646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2

646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7

Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton

646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701

Welted 316 SST

Parts Po~imide ton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM

64 6VZEI 646VZEMI

Pressbull4 to 5000 psi

Vae 10 to 285 Hg

SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA

Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant

Steel Body

AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C

Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts

wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm

IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT

AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M

Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15

-5

15 12gt D

1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4

SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M

COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP

RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J

BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J

GREEN ----1)1

INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O

ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1

HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426

e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom

Appendix D

Accident Time Line

-7shy

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 10: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No

2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection

Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test

Local operating personnel procedures or equipment

Remote operating personnel including controllers

Air patrol or ground surveillance

A third party Other (specify) _________________

3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____

PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance

a Pipe Coating Bare Coated

b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________

c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________

H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)

d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started

e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown

H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other

4 Lightning

5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other

6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other

7 High Winds

H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)

a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor

b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________

c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No

H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural

11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe

12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe

13 Vandalism

Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES

Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other

Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other

Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5

a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect

b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No

d Date of test yr mo day

e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other

f Time held at test pressure hr

g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG

H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other

H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION

23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________

b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________

H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)

Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

-6-

Appendix C

Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp

Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be

released

- 1-shy

l

i

1 1 I

1 1 1 1 1

I 1

1

- shy - - 1

WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr

INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING

1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7

- - r

-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS

ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT

BO MAX 265 DIA

MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)

335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy

SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ

330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I

I I 25 (TYPPr

OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-

Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi

500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175

PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM

500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480

VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy

Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg

150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~

Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M

646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2

646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7

Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton

646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701

Welted 316 SST

Parts Po~imide ton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM

64 6VZEI 646VZEMI

Pressbull4 to 5000 psi

Vae 10 to 285 Hg

SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA

Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant

Steel Body

AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C

Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts

wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm

IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT

AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M

Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15

-5

15 12gt D

1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4

SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M

COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP

RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J

BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J

GREEN ----1)1

INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O

ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1

HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426

e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom

Appendix D

Accident Time Line

-7shy

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 11: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES

Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other

Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other

Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5

a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect

b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No

d Date of test yr mo day

e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other

f Time held at test pressure hr

g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG

H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other

H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION

23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________

b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________

H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)

Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile

-6-

Appendix C

Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp

Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be

released

- 1-shy

l

i

1 1 I

1 1 1 1 1

I 1

1

- shy - - 1

WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr

INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING

1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7

- - r

-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS

ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT

BO MAX 265 DIA

MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)

335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy

SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ

330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I

I I 25 (TYPPr

OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-

Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi

500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175

PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM

500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480

VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy

Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg

150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~

Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M

646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2

646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7

Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton

646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701

Welted 316 SST

Parts Po~imide ton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM

64 6VZEI 646VZEMI

Pressbull4 to 5000 psi

Vae 10 to 285 Hg

SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA

Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant

Steel Body

AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C

Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts

wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm

IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT

AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M

Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15

-5

15 12gt D

1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4

SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M

COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP

RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J

BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J

GREEN ----1)1

INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O

ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1

HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426

e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom

Appendix D

Accident Time Line

-7shy

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 12: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

-6-

Appendix C

Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp

Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be

released

- 1-shy

l

i

1 1 I

1 1 1 1 1

I 1

1

- shy - - 1

WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr

INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING

1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7

- - r

-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS

ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT

BO MAX 265 DIA

MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)

335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy

SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ

330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I

I I 25 (TYPPr

OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-

Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi

500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175

PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM

500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480

VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy

Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg

150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~

Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M

646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2

646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7

Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton

646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701

Welted 316 SST

Parts Po~imide ton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM

64 6VZEI 646VZEMI

Pressbull4 to 5000 psi

Vae 10 to 285 Hg

SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA

Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant

Steel Body

AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C

Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts

wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm

IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT

AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M

Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15

-5

15 12gt D

1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4

SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M

COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP

RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J

BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J

GREEN ----1)1

INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O

ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1

HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426

e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom

Appendix D

Accident Time Line

-7shy

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 13: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

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ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT

BO MAX 265 DIA

MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)

335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy

SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ

330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I

I I 25 (TYPPr

OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-

Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi

500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175

PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM

500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480

VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy

Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg

150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~

Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M

646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2

646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7

Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton

646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701

Welted 316 SST

Parts Po~imide ton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM

64 6VZEI 646VZEMI

Pressbull4 to 5000 psi

Vae 10 to 285 Hg

SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA

Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant

Steel Body

AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C

Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts

wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm

IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT

AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M

Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15

-5

15 12gt D

1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4

SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M

COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP

RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J

BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J

GREEN ----1)1

INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O

ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1

HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426

e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom

Appendix D

Accident Time Line

-7shy

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 14: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr

INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING

1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7

- - r

-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS

ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT

BO MAX 265 DIA

MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)

335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy

SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ

330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I

I I 25 (TYPPr

OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-

Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi

500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175

PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM

500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480

VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL

MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM

Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy

Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg

150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~

Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M

646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2

646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7

Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton

646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701

Welted 316 SST

Parts Po~imide ton

MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM

64 6VZEI 646VZEMI

Pressbull4 to 5000 psi

Vae 10 to 285 Hg

SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA

Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant

Steel Body

AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C

Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts

wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm

IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT

AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M

Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15

-5

15 12gt D

1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4

SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M

COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP

RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J

BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J

GREEN ----1)1

INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O

ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1

HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426

e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom

Appendix D

Accident Time Line

-7shy

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 15: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

Appendix D

Accident Time Line

-7shy

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 16: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954

December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 17: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am

1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public

December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting

December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished

Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 18: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

Appendix E

Metallurgical Evaluation Report

-8shy

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 19: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638

Website wwwstresscom

an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE

SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E

Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE

Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE

PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E

Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE

Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE

Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE

SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE

Leo Vega

STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE

Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E

ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE

February 2 2010

Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002

Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch

Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation

Introduction

Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch

Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed

Discussion

A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph

Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident

The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph

Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 20: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM

The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium

The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel

Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate

On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface

Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical

The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427

The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning

The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure

Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 21: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1

Conclusions

Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions

1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking

2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process

3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw

4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted

Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience

K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc

Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 22: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Appendix A

Photographs

Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 23: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph

Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow

Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 24: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws

Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph

Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 25: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

500 11m

Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1

500 flm

Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel

Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 26: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking

SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc

Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7

Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 27: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010

Appendix B

SEM-EDS Test Results

Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 28: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19

Fe

Ke llt

75

Fe Cr

Fe rli Mo Mill

Si Cr I~ i rH

100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV

900

D

Elemellf Wt ---shy -

At ---

SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 29: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

142

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN II

o

Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99

237 Fe

13

KC

95 n

CrFe

Fe

Si

100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV

-shy - - -

Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 30: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

------- -

00

Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122

Fe

172

129

IC n Cr

n

Fe

43 Ni Mn Fe

~Ji

Cr

100

Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938

Matrix Correction ZAF

Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 31: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010

Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010

SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99

154shy

Zn

123shy

o

93 shy

Kent

62 -

Zn

31 shy Fe C

s Si Mn

AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound

00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0

Energy- keV

I Elemet -

CK OK

MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK

Matrix

~Vt shy

1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction

~

3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP

Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 32: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

-9-

Appendix F

Post-Accident Photos

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 33: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

-10-

Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 34: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

-11-

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m
Page 35: Memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24" pipelines,

-12-

Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E

  1. DOE jan 042010
  2. RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
  3. ORIGINAL
  4. SUPPLEMENT 8
  5. FINAL 8
  6. OPERATOR_ID 31618
  7. OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
  8. NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
  9. STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
  10. STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
  11. IHOUR 800
  12. IDATE_MM 12
  13. IDATE_DD 23
  14. IDATE_YY 2009
  15. LATITUDE 29418782
  16. LONGITUDE 94704811
  17. ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
  18. ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
  19. POSTSURV
  20. TELDT_MM 12
  21. TELDT_DD 23
  22. TELDT_YY 2009
  23. TELRN 926954
  24. PPPRP 2500
  25. EMRPRP 118433
  26. ENVPRP 60981
  27. OPCPRP 0
  28. PRODPRP 780
  29. OPPRP 0
  30. OOPPRP 0
  31. PRPTY 182694
  32. OPCPRPO
  33. OOPPRPO
  34. COMM CRUDE OIL
  35. LOSS 120
  36. RECOV 110
  37. PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
  38. PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
  39. A3D1 m
  40. A3D2 m
  41. SPILLEDY l
  42. SPILLEDN m
  43. SPUNIT1 l
  44. SPUNIT2 m
  45. GEN_CAUSE1 m
  46. GEN_CAUSE2 m
  47. GEN_CAUSE3 m
  48. GEN_CAUSE4 m
  49. GEN_CAUSE5 m
  50. GEN_CAUSE6 m
  51. GEN_CAUSE7 m
  52. GEN_CAUSE8 m
  53. PHONE 9858041376
  54. PFAX
  55. BTPRINT
  56. CLASS1 m
  57. CLASS2 m
  58. CLASS3 m
  59. CLASS4 l
  60. LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
  61. OFFAREA
  62. BNUMB
  63. OFFST
  64. OCS
  65. OPPROP 8
  66. PIPEROW 8
  67. HCA 8
  68. HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
  69. SYSPRTO
  70. FAIL_OCO
  71. PRTYR 2008
  72. INC_PRS 693
  73. MOP 1250
  74. PUNC_DIAM
  75. RUPLN
  76. PROPLN
  77. LRTYPEO
  78. UBLKVM
  79. UBLKVC
  80. UBLKVA
  81. UBLKVR 8
  82. DBLKVM
  83. DBLKVC
  84. DBLKVA
  85. DBLKVR 8
  86. SEGISO 1
  87. VLVDIST 5
  88. DRHRMF 8
  89. DRLRMF
  90. DRUT
  91. DRGEO 8
  92. DRCAL
  93. DRCRK
  94. DRHARD
  95. DROTH
  96. DRHRMFY 2009
  97. DRLRMFY
  98. DRUTY
  99. DRGEOY 2009
  100. DRCALY
  101. DRCRKY
  102. DRHARDY
  103. DROTHY
  104. NPS 24
  105. WALLTHK 32
  106. SPEC API 5L
  107. SMYS 65000
  108. SEAM ERW
  109. VALVE BALL VALVE
  110. MANU GROVE
  111. MANYR 2004
  112. LOCLKO
  113. DEPTH_COV 0
  114. EFAT 0
  115. NFAT 0
  116. GPFAT 0
  117. FATAL 0
  118. EINJ 0
  119. NINJ 0
  120. GPINJ 0
  121. INJURE 0
  122. SHUTDAY 0
  123. SHUTHR 15
  124. SHUTMIN 0
  125. EVACNO
  126. EVAC
  127. STHH 14
  128. STMN 30
  129. SOIL_YRD 140
  130. AMT_IN_WATER
  131. RSURFACE
  132. RGROUND
  133. RSOIL 8
  134. RVEG
  135. RWILD
  136. OFFSHOREY m
  137. OFFSHOREN l
  138. INTERY l
  139. INTERN m
  140. IFEDY m
  141. IFEDN l
  142. SYSPRT1 m
  143. SYSPRT2 m
  144. SYSPRT3 m
  145. SYSPRT4 m
  146. SYSPRT5 l
  147. SYSPRT6 m
  148. LRTYPE1 l
  149. LRTYPE2 m
  150. LRTYPE3 m
  151. LRTYPE4 m
  152. LEAK1 m
  153. LEAK3 m
  154. LEAK2 l
  155. RUPTURE1 m
  156. RUPTURE2 m
  157. SEGCONFN m
  158. SEGCONFY l
  159. INLINE1 l
  160. INLINE2 m
  161. INLINE3 m
  162. INLINE4 m
  163. FAIL_OC1 m
  164. FAIL_OC2 m
  165. FAIL_OC3 m
  166. FAIL_OC4 m
  167. FAIL_OC5 m
  168. FAIL_OC6 m
  169. FAIL_OC7 l
  170. FAIL_OC8 m
  171. FAIL_OC9 m
  172. FAIL_OC10 m
  173. FAIL_OC11 m
  174. FAIL_OC12 m
  175. FAIL_OC13 m
  176. FAIL_OC14 m
  177. OPRSN l
  178. OPRSY m
  179. LOCLK1 m
  180. LOCLK2 m
  181. LOCLK3 l
  182. LOCLK4 m
  183. LOCLK5 m
  184. LOCLK6 m
  185. LOCLK7 m
  186. IGNITEY m
  187. IGNITEN l
  188. EXPLOY m
  189. EXPLON l
  190. EVAC_REASON1 m
  191. EVAC_REASON2 m
  192. SHUTDOWNY l
  193. SHUTDOWNN m
  194. FISHY m
  195. FISHN l
  196. BIRDSY m
  197. BIRDSN l
  198. TERRESTRIALY m
  199. TERRESTRIALN l
  200. SOILY l
  201. SOILN m
  202. REMEDIALY l
  203. REMEDIALN m
  204. IMPACTY m
  205. IMPACTN l
  206. OCEANN m
  207. OCEANY m
  208. SURFACEN m
  209. SURFACEY m
  210. GROUNDWN m
  211. GROUNDWY m
  212. DRINKN m
  213. DRINKY m
  214. DRINKSRC1 m
  215. DRINKSRC2 m
  216. WATERY m
  217. WATERN l
  218. DETECTEDO
  219. DURLEAK_DAY
  220. DURLEAK_HR 2
  221. COMP_BASEDY l
  222. COMP_BASEDN m
  223. DETECTED1 m
  224. DETECTED2 m
  225. DETECTED3 m
  226. DETECTED4 m
  227. DETECTED5 m
  228. DETECTED6 l
  229. DETECTED7 m
  230. PIPE_COAT1 m
  231. PIPE_COAT2 m
  232. VIS_EXAM1 m
  233. VIS_EXAM2 m
  234. VIS_EXAM3 m
  235. COR_CAUSE1 m
  236. COR_CAUSE3 m
  237. COR_CAUSE5 m
  238. COR_CAUSE6 m
  239. COR_CAUSE7 m
  240. COR_CAUSE8 m
  241. PROTN m
  242. PROTY m
  243. PREV_DAMN m
  244. PREV_DAMY m
  245. COR_CAUSE4 m
  246. COR_CAUSE2 m
  247. VIS_EXAMO
  248. COR_CAUSEO
  249. CPYR
  250. PREV_DAM_YR
  251. PREV_DAM_MO
  252. PREV_DAM_UK
  253. EARTH_MOVE1 m
  254. EARTH_MOVE2 m
  255. EARTH_MOVE3 m
  256. EARTH_MOVE4 m
  257. FLOODS1 m
  258. FLOODS2 m
  259. FLOODS3 m
  260. FLOODS4 m
  261. TEMPER1 m
  262. TEMPER2 m
  263. TEMPER3 m
  264. TEMPER4 m
  265. FLOODS5 m
  266. EARTH_MOVEO
  267. FLOODSO
  268. TEMPERO
  269. THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
  270. THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
  271. THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
  272. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
  273. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
  274. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
  275. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
  276. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
  277. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
  278. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
  279. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
  280. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
  281. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
  282. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
  283. THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
  284. THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
  285. EXCAV_TYPE1 m
  286. EXCAV_TYPE2 m
  287. EXCAV_ONY m
  288. EXCAV_ONN m
  289. EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
  290. NOTIF_DATE_MM
  291. NOTIF_DATE_DD
  292. NOTIF_DATE_YY
  293. NOTIFY m
  294. NOTIFN m
  295. NOTIF_RCVD1 m
  296. NOTIF_RCVD2 m
  297. NOTIF_RCVD3 m
  298. NOTIF_RCVD4 m
  299. MARKEDN m
  300. MARKEDY m
  301. TEMP_MARK1 m
  302. TEMP_MARK2 m
  303. TEMP_MARK3 m
  304. PERM_MARK m
  305. ACC_MARK1 m
  306. ACC_MARK2 m
  307. MKD_IN_TIMEY m
  308. MKD_IN_TIMEN m
  309. FIRE_EXPLO1 m
  310. FIRE_EXPLO2 m
  311. CAUSE1 m
  312. CAUSE2 m
  313. CAUSE3 m
  314. CAUSE4 m
  315. CAUSE5 m
  316. CAUSE6 m
  317. CAUSE7 m
  318. CAUSE8 m
  319. CAUSE9 m
  320. CAUSE10 m
  321. CAUSE11 m
  322. CAUSE12 m
  323. CAUSE13 m
  324. PIPE_BODY1 m
  325. PIPE_BODY2 m
  326. PIPE_BODY3 m
  327. PIPE_BODY4 m
  328. PIPE_BODY5 m
  329. COMPONENT1 m
  330. COMPONENT2 l
  331. COMPONENT3 m
  332. COMPONENT4 m
  333. COMPONENT5 m
  334. JOINT1 m
  335. JOINT2 m
  336. JOINT3 m
  337. JOINT4 m
  338. BUTT1 m
  339. BUTT2 m
  340. BUTT3 m
  341. FILLET1 m
  342. FILLET2 m
  343. FILLET3 m
  344. FILLET4 m
  345. FILLET5 m
  346. PIPE_SEAM1 m
  347. PIPE_SEAM2 m
  348. PIPE_SEAM3 m
  349. PIPE_SEAM4 m
  350. PIPE_SEAM5 m
  351. PIPE_SEAM6 m
  352. PIPE_SEAM7 m
  353. PIPE_SEAM8 m
  354. PIPE_BODYO
  355. COMPONENTO
  356. JOINTO
  357. BUTTO
  358. FILLETO
  359. PIPE_SEAMO
  360. FAIL_TYPE1 m
  361. FAIL_TYPE2 l
  362. CONS_DEF1 m
  363. CONS_DEF2 m
  364. CONS_DEF3 m
  365. PIPE_DAMAGEY m
  366. PIPE_DAMAGEN l
  367. PRS_TESTY l
  368. PRS_TESTN m
  369. TEST_YR 2004
  370. TEST_MO 5
  371. TEST_DAY 29
  372. TEST_MED1 l
  373. TEST_MED2 m
  374. TEST_MED3 m
  375. TEST_MEDO
  376. TEST_TP 4
  377. TEST_PRS 1595
  378. MALFUNC1 m
  379. MALFUNC2 m
  380. MALFUNC3 m
  381. MALFUNC4 m
  382. MALFUNC5 m
  383. MALFUNC6 m
  384. MALFUNC7 m
  385. MALFUNC8 m
  386. THREADS1 m
  387. THREADS2 m
  388. THREADS3 m
  389. THREADS4 m
  390. SEAL1 m
  391. SEAL2 m
  392. SEAL3 m
  393. SEAL4 m
  394. MALFUNCO
  395. THREADSO
  396. SEALO
  397. IO_TYPE1 m
  398. IO_TYPE2 m
  399. IO_TYPE3 m
  400. IO_TYPE4 m
  401. IO_TYPEO
  402. IO_DRUG
  403. IO_ALCO
  404. MISC
  405. UNKNOWN1 m
  406. UNKNOWN2 m
  407. NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
  408. CAUSE14 m
  409. CAUSE15 l
  410. CAUSE16 m
  411. CAUSE17 m
  412. CAUSE18 m
  413. CAUSE19 m
  414. CAUSE20 m
  415. CAUSE21 m
  416. CAUSE22 m
  417. CAUSE23 m
  418. CAUSE24 m
  419. CAUSE25 m