memorandum - phmsa.dot.gov€¦ · crosses garden banks (gb) 72 platform and terminates at the...
TRANSCRIPT
Memorandum u S Department
of Transportation
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Date sep~20l0
To RM Seeley Southwest Region Director
From Kim Nguyen General Engineer ~~ SUbject Incident Report - Enterprise Products Operating LLC
Operator Number 31618 Unit Number 60534 Accident Location Port Bolivar Galveston TX Date of Accident December 232009 NRC Number 926954
SMART Activity 128212103
Summary
On December 23 2009 at approximately 7 15 am the Galveston City Fire Department (GFD) was notified by a citizen of crude oil spraying up to 15 feet in the air at the Enterprise Products Operating LLC (Enterprise) Bolivar station in Bolivar TX which is part of the Enterprise (EPCO) Cameron Highway Oil Pipeline System (CHOPS) crude oil transmission system GFD arrived at the accident site at 730 am The Galveston County Sheriff Department promptly notified Enterprise of the release at approximately 748 am Enterprise instructed GFD not to close any valves At approximately 8 1 0 am Enterprise started shutting off crude oil from High Island A5 platform going to Bolivar station and isolated the CHOPS system segment A5 There was no fire or explosion as a result of the accident and an estimated 120 bbls crude oil were released to the environment (110 bbls crude oil were recovered via a vacuum truck) There was impact to the public as crude oil sheen was discovered on State Road (SR) 87 (adjacent to the Bolivar Station) causing traffic safety issues and SR 87 was closed to the public by the Galveston County Sheriff Department (GCSD) from approximately 900 AM to 11 00 PM on December 23 2009 There was impact to the environment as a result of the crude oil release and crude oil recovery and soil remediation was completed on December 25 2009 The nearest residential area to the accident site is ~ mile away The cause of the crude oil release was determined to be the failure ofcap screws in a pressure switch PSH-ll 003 due to hydrogen assisted cracking promoted by galvanic corrosion
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During Enterprisersquos response to the accident three Enterprise field operation specialists from Sabine Pass Port Arthur and Texas City TX were dispatched to the accident site on the morning of December 23 2009 Upon arriving at approximately 900 AM they closed frac34 inch (V-11003) Whitley ball valve located on top of the 24-inch pipeline that was used to isolate the failed pressure switch and the release of crude oil into the environment was stopped The release was estimated to have been active from approximately 700 AM to 900 AM on December 23 2009 Enterprise established an on-site incident commander in coordination with GFD and GCSD and TampT Marines Salvages was contracted to provide response clean-up and remediation services The failed cap screws from the pressure switch and associated components were transported to the Stress Engineering Services Inc (SES) laboratory for metallurgical analysis The Bolivar station resumed operation at approximately 600 pm on December 24 2009 without incident TampT Marines Salvages completed crude oil recovery and soil remediation on December 25 2009 Background Over the last five years Enterprise has experienced 1 accident (in 2008) on this PHMSA Inspection Unit 60534 The cause of this accident was due to Hurricane Ike storm surge causing a major washout of concrete supports under the pipeline resulting in a crack on a weld of a 2 inch pipe nipple which allowed crude oil to be released to the environment (2 bbls) System Description PHMSA Inspection Unit 60534 includes the CHOPS offshore crude oil pipeline system which is designed for transportation of approximately 650000 bd of crude oil CHOPS consists of approximately 237 miles of 30 offshore pipeline and approximately 138 miles of dual 24 pipeline The 30 pipeline originates at the Ship Shoal (SS) 332B platform crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24 pipelines with onshore destinations of Port Neches TX and Texas City TX respectively The Port Neches leg is approximately 68 miles in length and the Texas City leg is approximately 69 miles in length CHOPS has a MOP of 2160 psig from SS332B to the onshore spec break platforms (HI A5) the MOP reduces to 1250 psig the meters have a MOP of 275 psig The Bolivar Station where the accident occurred is a midpoint meter station in the 24-inch pipeline as the crude oil is transported on shore and onto the Texas City terminus Findings The SES metallurgy evaluation report concluded that the cause of failed cap screws in the pressure switch was due to hydrogen assisted cracking The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the steel that the failed cap screws were manufactured from probably played a significant role in the cracking process The metallurgy laboratory analysis also indicated that the housing of the failed switch had been fabricated of type 316 stainless steel (16-18 Chromium 10-14 Nickel) and the failed switch had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
-3-
Conclusions The metallurgy laboratory analysis also concluded that the presence of solutions containing zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted The origin of zinc salts are not identified during the investigation As a result of the accident investigation EPCO implemented the following preventive measures on the CHOPS system bull Replaced the failed pressure switch (ITT Neodyne model 122P88CC6448) with a
different pressure switch manufactured by Custom Control Sensors model 646GZE This model has been widely used at the facility and proven to be reliable Enterprise has had no problems in the field with this model to date
bull Installed excess flow valves between the frac34rdquo Whitley isolation ball valve and PSL-11004 and PSH-11003 to prevent overflow
As a result of the accident investigation EPCO implemented the following mitigative measures on the CHOPS system bull Verified the Bolivar Station product containment alarm operated as designed bull Verified with the Liquid Control Center that the lightning and video cameras for the
CHOPS system operated as designed bull Verified that the monitoring of pipeline pressures and pressure switches in the Liquid
Control Center operated as designed bull Emphasized the importance of the monitoring system (video camera and ATMOS leak
detection) with the onshore measurement technicians and the Liquid Control Center Appendices Appendix A ndash NRC 926954 Appendix B ndash PHMSA 7000-1 Form Appendix Cndash Enterprise Bolivar Station PampID and Replaced Pressure Switch Specifications Appendix Dndash Accident Time Line Appendix Endash Metallurgical Evaluation Report Appendix F ndash Post-Accident Photos
-4-
Appendix A
NRC 926954
NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802 For Public Use Information released to a third party shall comply with any applicable federal andor state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws Incident Report 926954 INCIDENT DESCRIPTION Report taken at 0938 on 23-DEC-09 Incident Type PIPELINEIncident Cause UNKNOWN Affected Area The incident was discovered on 23-DEC-09 at 0800 local timeAffected Medium LAND ONTO THE GROUND____________________________________________________________________________
SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY
Organization ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS HOUSTON TX 77002 Type of Organization PRIVATE ENTERPRISE____________________________________________________________________________
INCIDENT LOCATIONCAMERON HWY PIPELINE County CHAMBERSBOLIVAR PENINSULA City GALVESTON State TX
____________________________________________________________________________ RELEASED MATERIAL(S)
CHRIS Code OIL Official Material Name OIL CRUDEAlso Known As Qty Released 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT ____________________________________________________________________________
DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT
CALLER STATED THERE IS A SPILL OF MATERIALS FROM A 24 INCH STEEL TRANSMISSION PIPELINE DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES NO WATERWAYS IMPACTED BUT A HIGHWAY WAS CLOSED ____________________________________________________________________________
INCIDENT DETAILSPipeline Type TRANSMISSION DOT Regulated YES Pipeline AboveBelow Ground ABOVE Exposed or Under Water NO Pipeline Covered UNKNOWN
____________________________________________________________________________DAMAGES
Fire Involved NO Fire Extinguished UNKNOWNINJURIES NO Hospitalized EmplCrew Passenger FATALITIES NO EmplCrew Passenger Occupant EVACUATIONS NO Who Evacuated RadiusArea
Damages NO
Length of Direction of
Closure Type Description of Closure Closure ClosureAir N
Major Artery Road Y HIGHWAY 87 8 EW
Y
Waterway N
Track N
Passengers Transferred NO Environmental Impact UNKNOWN
Page 1 of 2
12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954
Media Interest NONE Community Impact due to Material ____________________________________________________________________________
REMEDIAL ACTIONSCALLER STATED THEY HAVE TECHNICIANS EN ROUTERelease Secured YES Release Rate Estimated Release Duration ____________________________________________________________________________
WEATHER
Weather OVERCAST 55ordmF ____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIEDFederal NONEStateLocal TRRCStateLocal On Scene COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPTState Agency Number NONE____________________________________________________________________________
NOTIFICATIONS BY NRCUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)
23-DEC-09 0947DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947US EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0949FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIST COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIELD UNIT)
23-DEC-09 0947JFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947NOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0948HOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947PIPELINE amp HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))
23-DEC-09 0947SECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0950TCEQ (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 1)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 2)
23-DEC-09 0947TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONCALLER DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION___________________________________________________________________________
END INCIDENT REPORT 926954
Page 2 of 2
12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954
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Appendix B
PHMSA 7000-1 Form
NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047
US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration
ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID
PIPELINE SYSTEMS
Report Date No
(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS
Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov
PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report
1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________
d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code
IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001
2 Time and date of the accident
hr month day year
3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish
c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code
d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)
_________________________________
4 Telephone report
NRC Report Number month day year
5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses
Value of product lost $_______________
Value of operator property damage $_______________
Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________
Total Costs $_______________
6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)
a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________
b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions
CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil
c Estimated amount of commodity involved
Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is
less than one barrel)
Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________
CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)
Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage
Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other
PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE
(type or print) Preparers Name and Title
Area Code and Telephone Number
Preparers E-mail Address
Area Code and Facsimile Number
Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title
Date
Area Code and Telephone Number
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)
1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No
c Is pipeline interstate Yes No
Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)
d Area ___________________ Block ______________
State or Outer Continental Shelf
a Type of leak or rupture
Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)
Puncture diameter (inches) _________
Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation
Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________
Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________
bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control
Check Valve
2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________
3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________
Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld
Other (specify)
Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident
____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident
___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No
c Length of segment isolated _______ ft
d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______
PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT
1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in
2 Wall thickness in
3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year
1 Area of accident In open ditch
Under pavement Above ground
Underground Under water
Insideunder building Other ____________
2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES
1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No
Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people
Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official
b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe
If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min
2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No
2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection
Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test
Local operating personnel procedures or equipment
Remote operating personnel including controllers
Air patrol or ground surveillance
A third party Other (specify) _________________
3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____
PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance
a Pipe Coating Bare Coated
b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________
c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________
H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)
d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started
e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown
H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other
4 Lightning
5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other
6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other
7 High Winds
H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)
a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor
b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________
c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No
H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural
11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe
12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe
13 Vandalism
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES
Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other
Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other
Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5
a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect
b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No
d Date of test yr mo day
e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other
f Time held at test pressure hr
g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG
H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other
H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION
23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________
b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________
H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)
Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
-6-
Appendix C
Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp
Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be
released
- 1-shy
l
i
1 1 I
1 1 1 1 1
I 1
1
- shy - - 1
WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr
INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING
1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7
- - r
-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS
ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT
BO MAX 265 DIA
MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)
335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy
SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ
330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I
I I 25 (TYPPr
OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-
Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi
500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175
PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM
500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480
VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy
Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg
150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~
Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M
646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2
646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7
Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton
646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701
Welted 316 SST
Parts Po~imide ton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM
64 6VZEI 646VZEMI
Pressbull4 to 5000 psi
Vae 10 to 285 Hg
SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA
Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant
Steel Body
AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C
Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts
wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm
IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT
AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M
Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15
-5
15 12gt D
1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4
SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M
COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP
RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J
BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J
GREEN ----1)1
INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O
ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1
HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426
e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom
Appendix D
Accident Time Line
-7shy
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
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- A3D2 m
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- PFAX
- BTPRINT
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- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
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- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
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- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
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- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
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- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
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- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
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- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
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- CAUSE6 m
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- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
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- PIPE_SEAM6 m
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- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
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- FAIL_TYPE1 m
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- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
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- MALFUNC4 m
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- THREADS1 m
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- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
-2-
During Enterprisersquos response to the accident three Enterprise field operation specialists from Sabine Pass Port Arthur and Texas City TX were dispatched to the accident site on the morning of December 23 2009 Upon arriving at approximately 900 AM they closed frac34 inch (V-11003) Whitley ball valve located on top of the 24-inch pipeline that was used to isolate the failed pressure switch and the release of crude oil into the environment was stopped The release was estimated to have been active from approximately 700 AM to 900 AM on December 23 2009 Enterprise established an on-site incident commander in coordination with GFD and GCSD and TampT Marines Salvages was contracted to provide response clean-up and remediation services The failed cap screws from the pressure switch and associated components were transported to the Stress Engineering Services Inc (SES) laboratory for metallurgical analysis The Bolivar station resumed operation at approximately 600 pm on December 24 2009 without incident TampT Marines Salvages completed crude oil recovery and soil remediation on December 25 2009 Background Over the last five years Enterprise has experienced 1 accident (in 2008) on this PHMSA Inspection Unit 60534 The cause of this accident was due to Hurricane Ike storm surge causing a major washout of concrete supports under the pipeline resulting in a crack on a weld of a 2 inch pipe nipple which allowed crude oil to be released to the environment (2 bbls) System Description PHMSA Inspection Unit 60534 includes the CHOPS offshore crude oil pipeline system which is designed for transportation of approximately 650000 bd of crude oil CHOPS consists of approximately 237 miles of 30 offshore pipeline and approximately 138 miles of dual 24 pipeline The 30 pipeline originates at the Ship Shoal (SS) 332B platform crosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5 platform Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24 pipelines with onshore destinations of Port Neches TX and Texas City TX respectively The Port Neches leg is approximately 68 miles in length and the Texas City leg is approximately 69 miles in length CHOPS has a MOP of 2160 psig from SS332B to the onshore spec break platforms (HI A5) the MOP reduces to 1250 psig the meters have a MOP of 275 psig The Bolivar Station where the accident occurred is a midpoint meter station in the 24-inch pipeline as the crude oil is transported on shore and onto the Texas City terminus Findings The SES metallurgy evaluation report concluded that the cause of failed cap screws in the pressure switch was due to hydrogen assisted cracking The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the steel that the failed cap screws were manufactured from probably played a significant role in the cracking process The metallurgy laboratory analysis also indicated that the housing of the failed switch had been fabricated of type 316 stainless steel (16-18 Chromium 10-14 Nickel) and the failed switch had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
-3-
Conclusions The metallurgy laboratory analysis also concluded that the presence of solutions containing zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted The origin of zinc salts are not identified during the investigation As a result of the accident investigation EPCO implemented the following preventive measures on the CHOPS system bull Replaced the failed pressure switch (ITT Neodyne model 122P88CC6448) with a
different pressure switch manufactured by Custom Control Sensors model 646GZE This model has been widely used at the facility and proven to be reliable Enterprise has had no problems in the field with this model to date
bull Installed excess flow valves between the frac34rdquo Whitley isolation ball valve and PSL-11004 and PSH-11003 to prevent overflow
As a result of the accident investigation EPCO implemented the following mitigative measures on the CHOPS system bull Verified the Bolivar Station product containment alarm operated as designed bull Verified with the Liquid Control Center that the lightning and video cameras for the
CHOPS system operated as designed bull Verified that the monitoring of pipeline pressures and pressure switches in the Liquid
Control Center operated as designed bull Emphasized the importance of the monitoring system (video camera and ATMOS leak
detection) with the onshore measurement technicians and the Liquid Control Center Appendices Appendix A ndash NRC 926954 Appendix B ndash PHMSA 7000-1 Form Appendix Cndash Enterprise Bolivar Station PampID and Replaced Pressure Switch Specifications Appendix Dndash Accident Time Line Appendix Endash Metallurgical Evaluation Report Appendix F ndash Post-Accident Photos
-4-
Appendix A
NRC 926954
NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802 For Public Use Information released to a third party shall comply with any applicable federal andor state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws Incident Report 926954 INCIDENT DESCRIPTION Report taken at 0938 on 23-DEC-09 Incident Type PIPELINEIncident Cause UNKNOWN Affected Area The incident was discovered on 23-DEC-09 at 0800 local timeAffected Medium LAND ONTO THE GROUND____________________________________________________________________________
SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY
Organization ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS HOUSTON TX 77002 Type of Organization PRIVATE ENTERPRISE____________________________________________________________________________
INCIDENT LOCATIONCAMERON HWY PIPELINE County CHAMBERSBOLIVAR PENINSULA City GALVESTON State TX
____________________________________________________________________________ RELEASED MATERIAL(S)
CHRIS Code OIL Official Material Name OIL CRUDEAlso Known As Qty Released 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT ____________________________________________________________________________
DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT
CALLER STATED THERE IS A SPILL OF MATERIALS FROM A 24 INCH STEEL TRANSMISSION PIPELINE DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES NO WATERWAYS IMPACTED BUT A HIGHWAY WAS CLOSED ____________________________________________________________________________
INCIDENT DETAILSPipeline Type TRANSMISSION DOT Regulated YES Pipeline AboveBelow Ground ABOVE Exposed or Under Water NO Pipeline Covered UNKNOWN
____________________________________________________________________________DAMAGES
Fire Involved NO Fire Extinguished UNKNOWNINJURIES NO Hospitalized EmplCrew Passenger FATALITIES NO EmplCrew Passenger Occupant EVACUATIONS NO Who Evacuated RadiusArea
Damages NO
Length of Direction of
Closure Type Description of Closure Closure ClosureAir N
Major Artery Road Y HIGHWAY 87 8 EW
Y
Waterway N
Track N
Passengers Transferred NO Environmental Impact UNKNOWN
Page 1 of 2
12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954
Media Interest NONE Community Impact due to Material ____________________________________________________________________________
REMEDIAL ACTIONSCALLER STATED THEY HAVE TECHNICIANS EN ROUTERelease Secured YES Release Rate Estimated Release Duration ____________________________________________________________________________
WEATHER
Weather OVERCAST 55ordmF ____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIEDFederal NONEStateLocal TRRCStateLocal On Scene COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPTState Agency Number NONE____________________________________________________________________________
NOTIFICATIONS BY NRCUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)
23-DEC-09 0947DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947US EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0949FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIST COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIELD UNIT)
23-DEC-09 0947JFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947NOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0948HOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947PIPELINE amp HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))
23-DEC-09 0947SECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0950TCEQ (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 1)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 2)
23-DEC-09 0947TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONCALLER DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION___________________________________________________________________________
END INCIDENT REPORT 926954
Page 2 of 2
12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954
-5-
Appendix B
PHMSA 7000-1 Form
NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047
US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration
ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID
PIPELINE SYSTEMS
Report Date No
(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS
Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov
PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report
1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________
d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code
IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001
2 Time and date of the accident
hr month day year
3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish
c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code
d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)
_________________________________
4 Telephone report
NRC Report Number month day year
5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses
Value of product lost $_______________
Value of operator property damage $_______________
Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________
Total Costs $_______________
6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)
a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________
b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions
CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil
c Estimated amount of commodity involved
Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is
less than one barrel)
Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________
CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)
Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage
Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other
PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE
(type or print) Preparers Name and Title
Area Code and Telephone Number
Preparers E-mail Address
Area Code and Facsimile Number
Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title
Date
Area Code and Telephone Number
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)
1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No
c Is pipeline interstate Yes No
Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)
d Area ___________________ Block ______________
State or Outer Continental Shelf
a Type of leak or rupture
Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)
Puncture diameter (inches) _________
Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation
Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________
Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________
bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control
Check Valve
2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________
3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________
Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld
Other (specify)
Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident
____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident
___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No
c Length of segment isolated _______ ft
d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______
PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT
1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in
2 Wall thickness in
3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year
1 Area of accident In open ditch
Under pavement Above ground
Underground Under water
Insideunder building Other ____________
2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES
1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No
Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people
Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official
b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe
If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min
2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No
2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection
Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test
Local operating personnel procedures or equipment
Remote operating personnel including controllers
Air patrol or ground surveillance
A third party Other (specify) _________________
3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____
PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance
a Pipe Coating Bare Coated
b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________
c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________
H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)
d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started
e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown
H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other
4 Lightning
5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other
6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other
7 High Winds
H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)
a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor
b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________
c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No
H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural
11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe
12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe
13 Vandalism
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES
Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other
Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other
Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5
a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect
b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No
d Date of test yr mo day
e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other
f Time held at test pressure hr
g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG
H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other
H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION
23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________
b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________
H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)
Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
-6-
Appendix C
Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp
Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be
released
- 1-shy
l
i
1 1 I
1 1 1 1 1
I 1
1
- shy - - 1
WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr
INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING
1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7
- - r
-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS
ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT
BO MAX 265 DIA
MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)
335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy
SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ
330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I
I I 25 (TYPPr
OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-
Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi
500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175
PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM
500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480
VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy
Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg
150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~
Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M
646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2
646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7
Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton
646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701
Welted 316 SST
Parts Po~imide ton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM
64 6VZEI 646VZEMI
Pressbull4 to 5000 psi
Vae 10 to 285 Hg
SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA
Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant
Steel Body
AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C
Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts
wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm
IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT
AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M
Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15
-5
15 12gt D
1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4
SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M
COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP
RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J
BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J
GREEN ----1)1
INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O
ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1
HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426
e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom
Appendix D
Accident Time Line
-7shy
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
-3-
Conclusions The metallurgy laboratory analysis also concluded that the presence of solutions containing zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted The origin of zinc salts are not identified during the investigation As a result of the accident investigation EPCO implemented the following preventive measures on the CHOPS system bull Replaced the failed pressure switch (ITT Neodyne model 122P88CC6448) with a
different pressure switch manufactured by Custom Control Sensors model 646GZE This model has been widely used at the facility and proven to be reliable Enterprise has had no problems in the field with this model to date
bull Installed excess flow valves between the frac34rdquo Whitley isolation ball valve and PSL-11004 and PSH-11003 to prevent overflow
As a result of the accident investigation EPCO implemented the following mitigative measures on the CHOPS system bull Verified the Bolivar Station product containment alarm operated as designed bull Verified with the Liquid Control Center that the lightning and video cameras for the
CHOPS system operated as designed bull Verified that the monitoring of pipeline pressures and pressure switches in the Liquid
Control Center operated as designed bull Emphasized the importance of the monitoring system (video camera and ATMOS leak
detection) with the onshore measurement technicians and the Liquid Control Center Appendices Appendix A ndash NRC 926954 Appendix B ndash PHMSA 7000-1 Form Appendix Cndash Enterprise Bolivar Station PampID and Replaced Pressure Switch Specifications Appendix Dndash Accident Time Line Appendix Endash Metallurgical Evaluation Report Appendix F ndash Post-Accident Photos
-4-
Appendix A
NRC 926954
NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802 For Public Use Information released to a third party shall comply with any applicable federal andor state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws Incident Report 926954 INCIDENT DESCRIPTION Report taken at 0938 on 23-DEC-09 Incident Type PIPELINEIncident Cause UNKNOWN Affected Area The incident was discovered on 23-DEC-09 at 0800 local timeAffected Medium LAND ONTO THE GROUND____________________________________________________________________________
SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY
Organization ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS HOUSTON TX 77002 Type of Organization PRIVATE ENTERPRISE____________________________________________________________________________
INCIDENT LOCATIONCAMERON HWY PIPELINE County CHAMBERSBOLIVAR PENINSULA City GALVESTON State TX
____________________________________________________________________________ RELEASED MATERIAL(S)
CHRIS Code OIL Official Material Name OIL CRUDEAlso Known As Qty Released 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT ____________________________________________________________________________
DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT
CALLER STATED THERE IS A SPILL OF MATERIALS FROM A 24 INCH STEEL TRANSMISSION PIPELINE DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES NO WATERWAYS IMPACTED BUT A HIGHWAY WAS CLOSED ____________________________________________________________________________
INCIDENT DETAILSPipeline Type TRANSMISSION DOT Regulated YES Pipeline AboveBelow Ground ABOVE Exposed or Under Water NO Pipeline Covered UNKNOWN
____________________________________________________________________________DAMAGES
Fire Involved NO Fire Extinguished UNKNOWNINJURIES NO Hospitalized EmplCrew Passenger FATALITIES NO EmplCrew Passenger Occupant EVACUATIONS NO Who Evacuated RadiusArea
Damages NO
Length of Direction of
Closure Type Description of Closure Closure ClosureAir N
Major Artery Road Y HIGHWAY 87 8 EW
Y
Waterway N
Track N
Passengers Transferred NO Environmental Impact UNKNOWN
Page 1 of 2
12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954
Media Interest NONE Community Impact due to Material ____________________________________________________________________________
REMEDIAL ACTIONSCALLER STATED THEY HAVE TECHNICIANS EN ROUTERelease Secured YES Release Rate Estimated Release Duration ____________________________________________________________________________
WEATHER
Weather OVERCAST 55ordmF ____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIEDFederal NONEStateLocal TRRCStateLocal On Scene COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPTState Agency Number NONE____________________________________________________________________________
NOTIFICATIONS BY NRCUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)
23-DEC-09 0947DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947US EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0949FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIST COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIELD UNIT)
23-DEC-09 0947JFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947NOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0948HOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947PIPELINE amp HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))
23-DEC-09 0947SECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0950TCEQ (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 1)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 2)
23-DEC-09 0947TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONCALLER DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION___________________________________________________________________________
END INCIDENT REPORT 926954
Page 2 of 2
12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954
-5-
Appendix B
PHMSA 7000-1 Form
NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047
US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration
ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID
PIPELINE SYSTEMS
Report Date No
(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS
Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov
PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report
1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________
d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code
IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001
2 Time and date of the accident
hr month day year
3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish
c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code
d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)
_________________________________
4 Telephone report
NRC Report Number month day year
5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses
Value of product lost $_______________
Value of operator property damage $_______________
Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________
Total Costs $_______________
6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)
a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________
b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions
CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil
c Estimated amount of commodity involved
Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is
less than one barrel)
Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________
CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)
Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage
Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other
PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE
(type or print) Preparers Name and Title
Area Code and Telephone Number
Preparers E-mail Address
Area Code and Facsimile Number
Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title
Date
Area Code and Telephone Number
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)
1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No
c Is pipeline interstate Yes No
Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)
d Area ___________________ Block ______________
State or Outer Continental Shelf
a Type of leak or rupture
Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)
Puncture diameter (inches) _________
Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation
Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________
Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________
bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control
Check Valve
2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________
3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________
Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld
Other (specify)
Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident
____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident
___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No
c Length of segment isolated _______ ft
d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______
PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT
1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in
2 Wall thickness in
3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year
1 Area of accident In open ditch
Under pavement Above ground
Underground Under water
Insideunder building Other ____________
2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES
1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No
Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people
Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official
b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe
If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min
2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No
2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection
Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test
Local operating personnel procedures or equipment
Remote operating personnel including controllers
Air patrol or ground surveillance
A third party Other (specify) _________________
3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____
PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance
a Pipe Coating Bare Coated
b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________
c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________
H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)
d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started
e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown
H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other
4 Lightning
5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other
6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other
7 High Winds
H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)
a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor
b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________
c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No
H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural
11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe
12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe
13 Vandalism
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES
Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other
Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other
Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5
a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect
b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No
d Date of test yr mo day
e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other
f Time held at test pressure hr
g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG
H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other
H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION
23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________
b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________
H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)
Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
-6-
Appendix C
Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp
Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be
released
- 1-shy
l
i
1 1 I
1 1 1 1 1
I 1
1
- shy - - 1
WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr
INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING
1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7
- - r
-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS
ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT
BO MAX 265 DIA
MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)
335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy
SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ
330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I
I I 25 (TYPPr
OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-
Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi
500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175
PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM
500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480
VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy
Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg
150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~
Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M
646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2
646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7
Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton
646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701
Welted 316 SST
Parts Po~imide ton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM
64 6VZEI 646VZEMI
Pressbull4 to 5000 psi
Vae 10 to 285 Hg
SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA
Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant
Steel Body
AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C
Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts
wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm
IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT
AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M
Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15
-5
15 12gt D
1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4
SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M
COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP
RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J
BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J
GREEN ----1)1
INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O
ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1
HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426
e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom
Appendix D
Accident Time Line
-7shy
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
-4-
Appendix A
NRC 926954
NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802 For Public Use Information released to a third party shall comply with any applicable federal andor state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws Incident Report 926954 INCIDENT DESCRIPTION Report taken at 0938 on 23-DEC-09 Incident Type PIPELINEIncident Cause UNKNOWN Affected Area The incident was discovered on 23-DEC-09 at 0800 local timeAffected Medium LAND ONTO THE GROUND____________________________________________________________________________
SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY
Organization ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS HOUSTON TX 77002 Type of Organization PRIVATE ENTERPRISE____________________________________________________________________________
INCIDENT LOCATIONCAMERON HWY PIPELINE County CHAMBERSBOLIVAR PENINSULA City GALVESTON State TX
____________________________________________________________________________ RELEASED MATERIAL(S)
CHRIS Code OIL Official Material Name OIL CRUDEAlso Known As Qty Released 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT ____________________________________________________________________________
DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT
CALLER STATED THERE IS A SPILL OF MATERIALS FROM A 24 INCH STEEL TRANSMISSION PIPELINE DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES NO WATERWAYS IMPACTED BUT A HIGHWAY WAS CLOSED ____________________________________________________________________________
INCIDENT DETAILSPipeline Type TRANSMISSION DOT Regulated YES Pipeline AboveBelow Ground ABOVE Exposed or Under Water NO Pipeline Covered UNKNOWN
____________________________________________________________________________DAMAGES
Fire Involved NO Fire Extinguished UNKNOWNINJURIES NO Hospitalized EmplCrew Passenger FATALITIES NO EmplCrew Passenger Occupant EVACUATIONS NO Who Evacuated RadiusArea
Damages NO
Length of Direction of
Closure Type Description of Closure Closure ClosureAir N
Major Artery Road Y HIGHWAY 87 8 EW
Y
Waterway N
Track N
Passengers Transferred NO Environmental Impact UNKNOWN
Page 1 of 2
12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954
Media Interest NONE Community Impact due to Material ____________________________________________________________________________
REMEDIAL ACTIONSCALLER STATED THEY HAVE TECHNICIANS EN ROUTERelease Secured YES Release Rate Estimated Release Duration ____________________________________________________________________________
WEATHER
Weather OVERCAST 55ordmF ____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIEDFederal NONEStateLocal TRRCStateLocal On Scene COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPTState Agency Number NONE____________________________________________________________________________
NOTIFICATIONS BY NRCUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)
23-DEC-09 0947DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947US EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0949FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIST COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIELD UNIT)
23-DEC-09 0947JFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947NOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0948HOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947PIPELINE amp HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))
23-DEC-09 0947SECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0950TCEQ (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 1)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 2)
23-DEC-09 0947TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONCALLER DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION___________________________________________________________________________
END INCIDENT REPORT 926954
Page 2 of 2
12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954
-5-
Appendix B
PHMSA 7000-1 Form
NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047
US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration
ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID
PIPELINE SYSTEMS
Report Date No
(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS
Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov
PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report
1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________
d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code
IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001
2 Time and date of the accident
hr month day year
3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish
c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code
d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)
_________________________________
4 Telephone report
NRC Report Number month day year
5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses
Value of product lost $_______________
Value of operator property damage $_______________
Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________
Total Costs $_______________
6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)
a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________
b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions
CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil
c Estimated amount of commodity involved
Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is
less than one barrel)
Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________
CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)
Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage
Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other
PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE
(type or print) Preparers Name and Title
Area Code and Telephone Number
Preparers E-mail Address
Area Code and Facsimile Number
Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title
Date
Area Code and Telephone Number
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)
1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No
c Is pipeline interstate Yes No
Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)
d Area ___________________ Block ______________
State or Outer Continental Shelf
a Type of leak or rupture
Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)
Puncture diameter (inches) _________
Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation
Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________
Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________
bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control
Check Valve
2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________
3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________
Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld
Other (specify)
Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident
____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident
___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No
c Length of segment isolated _______ ft
d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______
PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT
1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in
2 Wall thickness in
3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year
1 Area of accident In open ditch
Under pavement Above ground
Underground Under water
Insideunder building Other ____________
2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES
1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No
Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people
Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official
b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe
If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min
2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No
2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection
Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test
Local operating personnel procedures or equipment
Remote operating personnel including controllers
Air patrol or ground surveillance
A third party Other (specify) _________________
3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____
PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance
a Pipe Coating Bare Coated
b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________
c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________
H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)
d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started
e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown
H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other
4 Lightning
5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other
6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other
7 High Winds
H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)
a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor
b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________
c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No
H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural
11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe
12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe
13 Vandalism
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES
Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other
Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other
Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5
a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect
b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No
d Date of test yr mo day
e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other
f Time held at test pressure hr
g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG
H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other
H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION
23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________
b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________
H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)
Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
-6-
Appendix C
Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp
Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be
released
- 1-shy
l
i
1 1 I
1 1 1 1 1
I 1
1
- shy - - 1
WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr
INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING
1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7
- - r
-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS
ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT
BO MAX 265 DIA
MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)
335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy
SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ
330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I
I I 25 (TYPPr
OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-
Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi
500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175
PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM
500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480
VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy
Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg
150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~
Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M
646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2
646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7
Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton
646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701
Welted 316 SST
Parts Po~imide ton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM
64 6VZEI 646VZEMI
Pressbull4 to 5000 psi
Vae 10 to 285 Hg
SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA
Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant
Steel Body
AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C
Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts
wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm
IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT
AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M
Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15
-5
15 12gt D
1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4
SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M
COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP
RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J
BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J
GREEN ----1)1
INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O
ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1
HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426
e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom
Appendix D
Accident Time Line
-7shy
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802 For Public Use Information released to a third party shall comply with any applicable federal andor state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws Incident Report 926954 INCIDENT DESCRIPTION Report taken at 0938 on 23-DEC-09 Incident Type PIPELINEIncident Cause UNKNOWN Affected Area The incident was discovered on 23-DEC-09 at 0800 local timeAffected Medium LAND ONTO THE GROUND____________________________________________________________________________
SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY
Organization ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS HOUSTON TX 77002 Type of Organization PRIVATE ENTERPRISE____________________________________________________________________________
INCIDENT LOCATIONCAMERON HWY PIPELINE County CHAMBERSBOLIVAR PENINSULA City GALVESTON State TX
____________________________________________________________________________ RELEASED MATERIAL(S)
CHRIS Code OIL Official Material Name OIL CRUDEAlso Known As Qty Released 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT ____________________________________________________________________________
DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT
CALLER STATED THERE IS A SPILL OF MATERIALS FROM A 24 INCH STEEL TRANSMISSION PIPELINE DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES NO WATERWAYS IMPACTED BUT A HIGHWAY WAS CLOSED ____________________________________________________________________________
INCIDENT DETAILSPipeline Type TRANSMISSION DOT Regulated YES Pipeline AboveBelow Ground ABOVE Exposed or Under Water NO Pipeline Covered UNKNOWN
____________________________________________________________________________DAMAGES
Fire Involved NO Fire Extinguished UNKNOWNINJURIES NO Hospitalized EmplCrew Passenger FATALITIES NO EmplCrew Passenger Occupant EVACUATIONS NO Who Evacuated RadiusArea
Damages NO
Length of Direction of
Closure Type Description of Closure Closure ClosureAir N
Major Artery Road Y HIGHWAY 87 8 EW
Y
Waterway N
Track N
Passengers Transferred NO Environmental Impact UNKNOWN
Page 1 of 2
12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954
Media Interest NONE Community Impact due to Material ____________________________________________________________________________
REMEDIAL ACTIONSCALLER STATED THEY HAVE TECHNICIANS EN ROUTERelease Secured YES Release Rate Estimated Release Duration ____________________________________________________________________________
WEATHER
Weather OVERCAST 55ordmF ____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIEDFederal NONEStateLocal TRRCStateLocal On Scene COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPTState Agency Number NONE____________________________________________________________________________
NOTIFICATIONS BY NRCUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)
23-DEC-09 0947DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947US EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0949FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIST COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIELD UNIT)
23-DEC-09 0947JFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947NOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0948HOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947PIPELINE amp HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))
23-DEC-09 0947SECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0950TCEQ (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 1)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 2)
23-DEC-09 0947TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONCALLER DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION___________________________________________________________________________
END INCIDENT REPORT 926954
Page 2 of 2
12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954
-5-
Appendix B
PHMSA 7000-1 Form
NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047
US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration
ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID
PIPELINE SYSTEMS
Report Date No
(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS
Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov
PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report
1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________
d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code
IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001
2 Time and date of the accident
hr month day year
3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish
c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code
d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)
_________________________________
4 Telephone report
NRC Report Number month day year
5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses
Value of product lost $_______________
Value of operator property damage $_______________
Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________
Total Costs $_______________
6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)
a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________
b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions
CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil
c Estimated amount of commodity involved
Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is
less than one barrel)
Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________
CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)
Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage
Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other
PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE
(type or print) Preparers Name and Title
Area Code and Telephone Number
Preparers E-mail Address
Area Code and Facsimile Number
Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title
Date
Area Code and Telephone Number
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)
1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No
c Is pipeline interstate Yes No
Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)
d Area ___________________ Block ______________
State or Outer Continental Shelf
a Type of leak or rupture
Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)
Puncture diameter (inches) _________
Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation
Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________
Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________
bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control
Check Valve
2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________
3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________
Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld
Other (specify)
Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident
____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident
___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No
c Length of segment isolated _______ ft
d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______
PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT
1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in
2 Wall thickness in
3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year
1 Area of accident In open ditch
Under pavement Above ground
Underground Under water
Insideunder building Other ____________
2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES
1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No
Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people
Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official
b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe
If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min
2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No
2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection
Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test
Local operating personnel procedures or equipment
Remote operating personnel including controllers
Air patrol or ground surveillance
A third party Other (specify) _________________
3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____
PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance
a Pipe Coating Bare Coated
b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________
c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________
H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)
d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started
e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown
H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other
4 Lightning
5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other
6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other
7 High Winds
H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)
a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor
b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________
c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No
H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural
11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe
12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe
13 Vandalism
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES
Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other
Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other
Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5
a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect
b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No
d Date of test yr mo day
e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other
f Time held at test pressure hr
g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG
H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other
H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION
23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________
b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________
H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)
Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
-6-
Appendix C
Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp
Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be
released
- 1-shy
l
i
1 1 I
1 1 1 1 1
I 1
1
- shy - - 1
WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr
INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING
1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7
- - r
-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS
ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT
BO MAX 265 DIA
MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)
335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy
SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ
330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I
I I 25 (TYPPr
OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-
Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi
500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175
PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM
500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480
VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy
Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg
150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~
Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M
646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2
646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7
Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton
646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701
Welted 316 SST
Parts Po~imide ton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM
64 6VZEI 646VZEMI
Pressbull4 to 5000 psi
Vae 10 to 285 Hg
SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA
Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant
Steel Body
AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C
Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts
wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm
IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT
AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M
Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15
-5
15 12gt D
1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4
SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M
COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP
RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J
BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J
GREEN ----1)1
INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O
ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1
HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426
e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom
Appendix D
Accident Time Line
-7shy
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
Media Interest NONE Community Impact due to Material ____________________________________________________________________________
REMEDIAL ACTIONSCALLER STATED THEY HAVE TECHNICIANS EN ROUTERelease Secured YES Release Rate Estimated Release Duration ____________________________________________________________________________
WEATHER
Weather OVERCAST 55ordmF ____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIEDFederal NONEStateLocal TRRCStateLocal On Scene COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPTState Agency Number NONE____________________________________________________________________________
NOTIFICATIONS BY NRCUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)
23-DEC-09 0947DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947US EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0949FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIST COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIELD UNIT)
23-DEC-09 0947JFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947NOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0948HOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947PIPELINE amp HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))
23-DEC-09 0947SECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0950TCEQ (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (MAIN OFFICE)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 1)
23-DEC-09 0947TX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 2)
23-DEC-09 0947TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER)
23-DEC-09 0947____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONCALLER DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION___________________________________________________________________________
END INCIDENT REPORT 926954
Page 2 of 2
12142010httpwwwnrcuscgmilreportsrwservletstandard_web+inc_seq=926954
-5-
Appendix B
PHMSA 7000-1 Form
NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047
US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration
ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID
PIPELINE SYSTEMS
Report Date No
(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS
Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov
PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report
1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________
d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code
IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001
2 Time and date of the accident
hr month day year
3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish
c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code
d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)
_________________________________
4 Telephone report
NRC Report Number month day year
5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses
Value of product lost $_______________
Value of operator property damage $_______________
Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________
Total Costs $_______________
6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)
a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________
b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions
CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil
c Estimated amount of commodity involved
Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is
less than one barrel)
Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________
CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)
Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage
Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other
PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE
(type or print) Preparers Name and Title
Area Code and Telephone Number
Preparers E-mail Address
Area Code and Facsimile Number
Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title
Date
Area Code and Telephone Number
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)
1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No
c Is pipeline interstate Yes No
Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)
d Area ___________________ Block ______________
State or Outer Continental Shelf
a Type of leak or rupture
Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)
Puncture diameter (inches) _________
Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation
Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________
Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________
bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control
Check Valve
2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________
3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________
Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld
Other (specify)
Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident
____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident
___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No
c Length of segment isolated _______ ft
d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______
PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT
1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in
2 Wall thickness in
3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year
1 Area of accident In open ditch
Under pavement Above ground
Underground Under water
Insideunder building Other ____________
2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES
1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No
Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people
Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official
b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe
If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min
2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No
2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection
Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test
Local operating personnel procedures or equipment
Remote operating personnel including controllers
Air patrol or ground surveillance
A third party Other (specify) _________________
3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____
PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance
a Pipe Coating Bare Coated
b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________
c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________
H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)
d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started
e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown
H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other
4 Lightning
5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other
6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other
7 High Winds
H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)
a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor
b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________
c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No
H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural
11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe
12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe
13 Vandalism
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES
Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other
Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other
Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5
a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect
b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No
d Date of test yr mo day
e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other
f Time held at test pressure hr
g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG
H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other
H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION
23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________
b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________
H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)
Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
-6-
Appendix C
Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp
Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be
released
- 1-shy
l
i
1 1 I
1 1 1 1 1
I 1
1
- shy - - 1
WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr
INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING
1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7
- - r
-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS
ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT
BO MAX 265 DIA
MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)
335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy
SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ
330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I
I I 25 (TYPPr
OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-
Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi
500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175
PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM
500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480
VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy
Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg
150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~
Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M
646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2
646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7
Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton
646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701
Welted 316 SST
Parts Po~imide ton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM
64 6VZEI 646VZEMI
Pressbull4 to 5000 psi
Vae 10 to 285 Hg
SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA
Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant
Steel Body
AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C
Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts
wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm
IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT
AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M
Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15
-5
15 12gt D
1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4
SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M
COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP
RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J
BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J
GREEN ----1)1
INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O
ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1
HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426
e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom
Appendix D
Accident Time Line
-7shy
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
-5-
Appendix B
PHMSA 7000-1 Form
NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047
US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration
ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID
PIPELINE SYSTEMS
Report Date No
(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS
Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov
PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report
1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________
d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code
IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001
2 Time and date of the accident
hr month day year
3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish
c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code
d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)
_________________________________
4 Telephone report
NRC Report Number month day year
5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses
Value of product lost $_______________
Value of operator property damage $_______________
Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________
Total Costs $_______________
6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)
a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________
b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions
CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil
c Estimated amount of commodity involved
Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is
less than one barrel)
Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________
CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)
Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage
Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other
PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE
(type or print) Preparers Name and Title
Area Code and Telephone Number
Preparers E-mail Address
Area Code and Facsimile Number
Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title
Date
Area Code and Telephone Number
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)
1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No
c Is pipeline interstate Yes No
Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)
d Area ___________________ Block ______________
State or Outer Continental Shelf
a Type of leak or rupture
Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)
Puncture diameter (inches) _________
Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation
Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________
Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________
bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control
Check Valve
2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________
3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________
Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld
Other (specify)
Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident
____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident
___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No
c Length of segment isolated _______ ft
d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______
PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT
1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in
2 Wall thickness in
3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year
1 Area of accident In open ditch
Under pavement Above ground
Underground Under water
Insideunder building Other ____________
2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES
1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No
Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people
Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official
b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe
If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min
2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No
2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection
Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test
Local operating personnel procedures or equipment
Remote operating personnel including controllers
Air patrol or ground surveillance
A third party Other (specify) _________________
3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____
PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance
a Pipe Coating Bare Coated
b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________
c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________
H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)
d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started
e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown
H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other
4 Lightning
5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other
6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other
7 High Winds
H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)
a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor
b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________
c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No
H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural
11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe
12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe
13 Vandalism
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES
Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other
Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other
Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5
a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect
b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No
d Date of test yr mo day
e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other
f Time held at test pressure hr
g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG
H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other
H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION
23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________
b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________
H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)
Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
-6-
Appendix C
Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp
Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be
released
- 1-shy
l
i
1 1 I
1 1 1 1 1
I 1
1
- shy - - 1
WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr
INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING
1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7
- - r
-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS
ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT
BO MAX 265 DIA
MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)
335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy
SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ
330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I
I I 25 (TYPPr
OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-
Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi
500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175
PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM
500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480
VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy
Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg
150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~
Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M
646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2
646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7
Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton
646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701
Welted 316 SST
Parts Po~imide ton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM
64 6VZEI 646VZEMI
Pressbull4 to 5000 psi
Vae 10 to 285 Hg
SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA
Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant
Steel Body
AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C
Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts
wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm
IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT
AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M
Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15
-5
15 12gt D
1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4
SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M
COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP
RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J
BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J
GREEN ----1)1
INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O
ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1
HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426
e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom
Appendix D
Accident Time Line
-7shy
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
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- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
NOTICE This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25000 for each violation Form Approved for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No 2137-0047
US Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration
ACCIDENT REPORT ndash HAZARDOUS LIQUID
PIPELINE SYSTEMS
Report Date No
(DOT Use Only) INSTRUCTIONS
Important Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples If you do not have a copy of the instructions you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at httpopsdotgov
PART A ndash GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report
1 a Operators OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ____________ 2 b If Operator does not own the pipeline enter Ownerrsquos OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) ___ c Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________
d Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________ e Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________ City County State and Zip Code
IMPORTANT IF THE SPILL IS SMALL THAT IS THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR sect19552(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER sect19550 AS REVISED IN CY 2001
2 Time and date of the accident
hr month day year
3 Location of accident (If offshore do not complete a through d See Part C1) a Latitude _____ Longitude __________ (if not available see instructions for how to provide specific location) b _________________________________________________ City and County or Parish
c _________________________________________________ State and Zip Code
d Mile postvalve station or survey station no (whichever gives more accurate location)
_________________________________
4 Telephone report
NRC Report Number month day year
5 Losses (Estimated) PublicCommunity Losses reimbursed by operator Publicprivate property damage $_______________ Cost of emergency response phase $_______________ Cost of environmental remediation $_______________ Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________ Operator Losses
Value of product lost $_______________
Value of operator property damage $_______________
Other Costs $_______________ (describe) _____________________________________
Total Costs $_______________
6 Commodity Spilled Yes No (If Yes complete Parts a through c where applicable)
a Name of commodity spilled ___________________________
b Classification of commodity spilled HVLs other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions
CO2 or other non-flammable non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions Gasoline diesel fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions Crude oil
c Estimated amount of commodity involved
Barrels Gallons (check only if spill is
less than one barrel)
Amounts Spilled ____________ Recovered ____________
CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)
Corrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage
Material andor Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other
PART B ndash PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE
(type or print) Preparers Name and Title
Area Code and Telephone Number
Preparers E-mail Address
Area Code and Facsimile Number
Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title
Date
Area Code and Telephone Number
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)
1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No
c Is pipeline interstate Yes No
Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)
d Area ___________________ Block ______________
State or Outer Continental Shelf
a Type of leak or rupture
Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)
Puncture diameter (inches) _________
Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation
Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________
Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________
bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control
Check Valve
2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________
3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________
Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld
Other (specify)
Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident
____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident
___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No
c Length of segment isolated _______ ft
d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______
PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT
1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in
2 Wall thickness in
3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year
1 Area of accident In open ditch
Under pavement Above ground
Underground Under water
Insideunder building Other ____________
2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES
1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No
Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people
Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official
b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe
If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min
2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No
2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection
Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test
Local operating personnel procedures or equipment
Remote operating personnel including controllers
Air patrol or ground surveillance
A third party Other (specify) _________________
3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____
PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance
a Pipe Coating Bare Coated
b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________
c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________
H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)
d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started
e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown
H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other
4 Lightning
5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other
6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other
7 High Winds
H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)
a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor
b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________
c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No
H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural
11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe
12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe
13 Vandalism
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES
Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other
Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other
Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5
a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect
b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No
d Date of test yr mo day
e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other
f Time held at test pressure hr
g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG
H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other
H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION
23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________
b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________
H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)
Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
-6-
Appendix C
Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp
Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be
released
- 1-shy
l
i
1 1 I
1 1 1 1 1
I 1
1
- shy - - 1
WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr
INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING
1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7
- - r
-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS
ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT
BO MAX 265 DIA
MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)
335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy
SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ
330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I
I I 25 (TYPPr
OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-
Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi
500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175
PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM
500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480
VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy
Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg
150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~
Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M
646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2
646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7
Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton
646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701
Welted 316 SST
Parts Po~imide ton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM
64 6VZEI 646VZEMI
Pressbull4 to 5000 psi
Vae 10 to 285 Hg
SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA
Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant
Steel Body
AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C
Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts
wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm
IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT
AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M
Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15
-5
15 12gt D
1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4
SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M
COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP
RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J
BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J
GREEN ----1)1
INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O
ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1
HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426
e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom
Appendix D
Accident Time Line
-7shy
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
PART C ndash ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)
1 Additional location information a Line segment name or ID _______________________ b Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No
c Is pipeline interstate Yes No
Offshore Yes No (complete d if offshore)
d Area ___________________ Block ______________
State or Outer Continental Shelf
a Type of leak or rupture
Leak Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec H5)
Puncture diameter (inches) _________
Rupture Circumferential ndash Separation
Longitudinal ndash TearCrack length (inches) __________
Propagation Length total both sides (feet) _________ NA Other _______________________________
bType of block valve used for isolation of immediate section Upstream Manual Automatic Remote Control Check Valve Downstream Manual Automatic Remote Control
Check Valve
2 Location of system involved (check all that apply) Operatorrsquos Property Pipeline Right of Way High Consequence Area (HCA) Describe HCA____________________________________
3 Part of system involved in accident Above Ground Storage Tank Cavern or other below ground storage facility Pumpmeter station terminaltank farm piping and equipment including sumps Other Specify _________________________________
Onshore pipeline including valve sites Offshore pipeline including platforms If failure occurred on Pipeline complete items a - g 4 Failure occurred on Body of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap Pump Sump Joint Component Valve Metering Facility Repair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting Girth Weld
Other (specify)
Year the component that failed was installed 5 Maximum operating pressure (MOP) a Estimated pressure at point and time of accident
____ PSIG b MOP at time of accident
___________PSIG c Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident Yes No
c Length of segment isolated _______ ft
d Distance between valves _______ ft e Is segment configured for internal inspection tools Yes No f Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure Yes No Donrsquot Know Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system g If Yes type of device run (check all that apply) High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run ______ UT tool Year run ______ Geometry tool Year run ______ Caliper tool Year run ______ Crack tool Year run ______ Hard Spot tool Year run ______ Other tool Year run ______
PART D ndash MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E ndash ENVIRONMENT
1 Nominal pipe size (NPS) in
2 Wall thickness in
3 Specification SMYS 4 Seam type 5 Valve type 6 Manufactured by in year
1 Area of accident In open ditch
Under pavement Above ground
Underground Under water
Insideunder building Other ____________
2 Depth of cover inches PART F ndash CONSEQUENCES
1 Consequences (check and complete all that apply) a Fatalities Injuries c Product ignited Yes No d Explosion Yes No
Number of operator employees _______ _______ e Evacuation (general public only) people
Contractor employees working for operator _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation General public _______ _______ Precautionary by company Totals _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official
b Was pipelinesegment shutdown due to leak Yes No f Elapsed time until area was made safe
If Yes how long ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes hr min
2 Environmental Impact a Wildlife Impact Fishaquatic Yes No e Water Contamination Yes No (If Yes provide the following) Birds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels Terrestrial Yes No OceanSeawater No Yes b Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes If Yes estimated number of cubic yards _________ Groundwater No Yes c Long term impact assessment performed Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes check below) d Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake If Yes check all that apply Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No
2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection
Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test
Local operating personnel procedures or equipment
Remote operating personnel including controllers
Air patrol or ground surveillance
A third party Other (specify) _________________
3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____
PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance
a Pipe Coating Bare Coated
b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________
c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________
H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)
d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started
e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown
H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other
4 Lightning
5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other
6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other
7 High Winds
H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)
a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor
b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________
c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No
H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural
11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe
12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe
13 Vandalism
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES
Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other
Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other
Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5
a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect
b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No
d Date of test yr mo day
e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other
f Time held at test pressure hr
g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG
H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other
H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION
23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________
b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________
H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)
Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
-6-
Appendix C
Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp
Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be
released
- 1-shy
l
i
1 1 I
1 1 1 1 1
I 1
1
- shy - - 1
WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr
INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING
1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7
- - r
-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS
ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT
BO MAX 265 DIA
MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)
335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy
SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ
330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I
I I 25 (TYPPr
OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-
Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi
500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175
PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM
500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480
VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy
Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg
150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~
Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M
646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2
646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7
Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton
646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701
Welted 316 SST
Parts Po~imide ton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM
64 6VZEI 646VZEMI
Pressbull4 to 5000 psi
Vae 10 to 285 Hg
SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA
Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant
Steel Body
AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C
Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts
wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm
IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT
AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M
Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15
-5
15 12gt D
1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4
SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M
COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP
RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J
BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J
GREEN ----1)1
INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O
ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1
HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426
e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom
Appendix D
Accident Time Line
-7shy
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
PART G ndash LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION 1 Computer based leak detection capability in place Yes No
2 Was the release initially detected by (check one) CPMSCADA-based system with leak detection
Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test
Local operating personnel procedures or equipment
Remote operating personnel including controllers
Air patrol or ground surveillance
A third party Other (specify) _________________
3 Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____
PART H ndash APPARENT CAUSE Important There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate See the instructions for guidance
a Pipe Coating Bare Coated
b Visual Examination Localized Pitting General Corrosion Other ____________________
c Cause of Corrosion Galvanic Atmospheric Stray Current Microbiological Cathodic Protection Disrupted Stress Corrosion Cracking Selective Seam Corrosion Other ____________________
H1 ndash CORROSION 1 External Corrosion 2 Internal Corrosion (Complete items a ndash e where applicable)
d Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident No Yes Year Protection Started
e Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion No Yes =gt Estimated time prior to accident years months Unknown
H2 ndash NATURAL FORCES 3 Earth Movement =gt Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other
4 Lightning
5 Heavy RainsFloods =gt Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other
6 Temperature =gt Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other
7 High Winds
H3 ndash EXCAVATION DAMAGE 8 Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractorsNot Third Party) 9 Third Party (complete a-f)
a Excavator group General Public Government Excavator other than Operatorsubcontractor
b Type Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer PhoneCable Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor Nautical Operations Other ________
c Excavation was Open Trench Sub-strata (boring directional drilling etchellip) d Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes Date of last contact _________ e Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity Yes Date received mo day ______ yr No Notification received from One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner f Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation No Yes (If Yes check applicable items i - iv) i Temporary markings Flags Stakes Paint ii Permanent markings iii Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate iv Were marks made within required time Yes No
H4 ndash OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE 10 FireExplosion as primary cause of failure =gt FireExplosion cause Man made Natural
11 Car truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe
12 Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe
13 Vandalism
Form RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES
Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other
Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other
Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5
a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect
b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No
d Date of test yr mo day
e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other
f Time held at test pressure hr
g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG
H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other
H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION
23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________
b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________
H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)
Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
-6-
Appendix C
Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp
Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be
released
- 1-shy
l
i
1 1 I
1 1 1 1 1
I 1
1
- shy - - 1
WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr
INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING
1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7
- - r
-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS
ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT
BO MAX 265 DIA
MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)
335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy
SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ
330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I
I I 25 (TYPPr
OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-
Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi
500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175
PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM
500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480
VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy
Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg
150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~
Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M
646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2
646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7
Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton
646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701
Welted 316 SST
Parts Po~imide ton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM
64 6VZEI 646VZEMI
Pressbull4 to 5000 psi
Vae 10 to 285 Hg
SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA
Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant
Steel Body
AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C
Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts
wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm
IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT
AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M
Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15
-5
15 12gt D
1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4
SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M
COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP
RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J
BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J
GREEN ----1)1
INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O
ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1
HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426
e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom
Appendix D
Accident Time Line
-7shy
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
H5 ndash MATERIAL ANDOR WELD FAILURES
Material 14 Body of Pipe =gt Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other 15 Component =gt Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other 16 Joint =gt Gasket O-Ring Threads Other
Weld 17 Butt =gt Pipe Fabrication Other 18 Fillet =gt Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other 19 Pipe Seam =gt LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld HF ERW SAW Spiral Other
Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5
a Type of failure Construction Defect =gt Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures Material Defect
b Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site Yes No c Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred Yes complete d-g No
d Date of test yr mo day
e Test medium Water Inert Gas Other
f Time held at test pressure hr
g Estimated test pressure at point of accident PSIG
H6 ndash EQUIPMENT 20 Malfunction of ControlRelief Equipment =gt Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other 21 Threads Stripped Broken Pipe Coupling =gt Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other 22 Seal Failure =gt Gasket O-Ring SealPump Packing Other
H7 ndash INCORRECT OPERATION
23 Incorrect Operation a Type Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other _______________________________________
b Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test drug test alcohol test _________
H8 ndash OTHER 24 Miscellaneous describe 25 Unknown Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete) PART I ndash NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)
Form RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4 OPS Data Facsimile
-6-
Appendix C
Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp
Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be
released
- 1-shy
l
i
1 1 I
1 1 1 1 1
I 1
1
- shy - - 1
WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr
INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING
1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7
- - r
-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS
ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT
BO MAX 265 DIA
MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)
335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy
SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ
330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I
I I 25 (TYPPr
OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-
Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi
500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175
PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM
500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480
VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy
Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg
150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~
Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M
646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2
646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7
Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton
646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701
Welted 316 SST
Parts Po~imide ton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM
64 6VZEI 646VZEMI
Pressbull4 to 5000 psi
Vae 10 to 285 Hg
SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA
Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant
Steel Body
AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C
Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts
wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm
IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT
AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M
Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15
-5
15 12gt D
1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4
SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M
COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP
RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J
BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J
GREEN ----1)1
INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O
ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1
HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426
e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom
Appendix D
Accident Time Line
-7shy
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
-6-
Appendix C
Port Bolivar Galveston station PampID amp
Product Specification for the Pressure Switch that failed allowing crude oil to be
released
- 1-shy
l
i
1 1 I
1 1 1 1 1
I 1
1
- shy - - 1
WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr
INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING
1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7
- - r
-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS
ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT
BO MAX 265 DIA
MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)
335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy
SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ
330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I
I I 25 (TYPPr
OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-
Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi
500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175
PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM
500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480
VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy
Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg
150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~
Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M
646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2
646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7
Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton
646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701
Welted 316 SST
Parts Po~imide ton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM
64 6VZEI 646VZEMI
Pressbull4 to 5000 psi
Vae 10 to 285 Hg
SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA
Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant
Steel Body
AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C
Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts
wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm
IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT
AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M
Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15
-5
15 12gt D
1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4
SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M
COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP
RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J
BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J
GREEN ----1)1
INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O
ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1
HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426
e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom
Appendix D
Accident Time Line
-7shy
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
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- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
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- SYSPRT2 m
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- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
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- LRTYPE2 m
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- SEGCONFY l
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- INLINE3 m
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- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
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- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
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- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
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- SOILY l
- SOILN m
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- IMPACTN l
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- OCEANY m
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- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
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- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
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- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
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- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
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- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
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- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
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- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
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- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
- 1-shy
l
i
1 1 I
1 1 1 1 1
I 1
1
- shy - - 1
WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr
INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING
1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7
- - r
-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS
ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT
BO MAX 265 DIA
MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)
335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy
SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ
330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I
I I 25 (TYPPr
OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-
Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi
500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175
PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM
500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480
VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy
Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg
150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~
Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M
646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2
646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7
Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton
646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701
Welted 316 SST
Parts Po~imide ton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM
64 6VZEI 646VZEMI
Pressbull4 to 5000 psi
Vae 10 to 285 Hg
SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA
Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant
Steel Body
AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C
Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts
wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm
IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT
AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M
Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15
-5
15 12gt D
1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4
SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M
COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP
RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J
BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J
GREEN ----1)1
INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O
ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1
HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426
e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom
Appendix D
Accident Time Line
-7shy
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
WI()E flANGE PRE$UREEXTERNAl ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUMSSTPORr
INsrJUIJlDON DRAWING
1~1t] 1 L _ _bull bull B7
- - r
-4250shy646GZE I 212 18 FREE LEADS
ELECTRICAL r---- ----r---- CONNECTION I I I 112-14 NPT
BO MAX 265 DIA
MTGHOLES 646GZEl (2 PLACES)
335 ADJ SCREW ~~r-~MAX I I RANGE SCALE 1- ~ =r2BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 225 shy
SQMAX 12-14 NPT SHIPPING Wf APPIlOX 56 OZ
330 11587 GRAMSIbull _ -- MAX ----t--I __ I 1P I
I I 25 (TYPPr
OP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA PRESSURE SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEELbull PRESSURE PORT ampMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Adiuloble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx Sy (Tet) On Incr On Deer Dead-
Press Pre Pre Pre bond pi p1 pi p1 pi
500 750 12-16 4-152 8 3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5 3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12 3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28 3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65 3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175
PRESSURE SWITCHES 12N STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646GZE-7011 bull PRESSURE PORT amp DIAPHRAGM
500 750 14-16 4-15 1 3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7 3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14 3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34 3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO 3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200 SOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280 5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480
VACUUM SWITCHES 12 STAINLESS STEEL
MODEL 646VZE bull PRESSURE PORT amp POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM
Max Proof Admiddotuloble Se-Polnt Ranoe Approx Sybull (Tet) On Incr On Deer Deadshy
Press Pre Vacuum Vacuum bond psi pi In Hg In Hg In Hg
150 250 35-285 10- 260 i~
Welted 316 SST Po~imideParts Iton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std OPOT M
646(1101 646GZEMI 646GZE2 646GZEM2
646GZEII 646GZEMll 646GZE3 646GZEM3 646GZE5 646GZEM5 646GZE7 646GZEM7
Wettoo 316 SST Parts Viton
646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011 646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011 646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011 646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011 646GZES-70 I I 646GZEM5-7011 646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011 646GZE9- 70 11 646GZEM9-7011 646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701
Welted 316 SST
Parts Po~imide ton
MODEL MODEL SPDT-Std DPDTM
64 6VZEI 646VZEMI
Pressbull4 to 5000 psi
Vae 10 to 285 Hg
SERIES 646GZE 646GZE-70 11 646VZE Standard Features bull UL I CSA
Explosion Proof Div 1 2 bull NEMA 479 13 bull Fire Resistant
Steel Body
AMBIENT TEMP RANGE -30middot to 160 F -34 to 71 C
Options Code F Ethylene Propylene O-ring Y EECS Certified to EXsIIT5 700B Gold Contacts 7030 Gold Contacts
wjSST Diaphragm 7044 Monel Pori and Diaphragm 7045 Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm 7065 TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm
IUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS RATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT
AMPERES VOLTS SPOT DPDT M
Rebull Rebull 125 AC - 50(60 Hz 15 5 250 AC - SO60 Hz 15
-5
15 12gt D
1480 AC - 50(60 Hz 5 4
SCHMATIC AND WIRING CO SPDT-Slondard DPDT M
COLOR OF lfAJS COlOI OF lfAJSPP
RED NIC RED NICI IIROWN C UOWN ClJ BLUE NO =-t BLUE N101 -e--J
BlACl( NIC2GREEN ----jl~ YELLOW C2 PURPLE N02J
GREEN ----1)1
INC10SURCIIIIPlCATlONS Div 1 explolion-proof and hermetically ooled elrlcal a mbly Part No 17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option) liled by both Underiteril Loborotorle tnc (File No E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle (File No 22921) for hardou tocatlon cia 1 Group A II C and D Cia 2 Group E F and O
ModeI646GZEMl hOI an approlmale dead band of 9 p1
HOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number add desired options listing letter codes first followed by numbers Custom Control Sensors Incmiddot 21111 Plummer Street Chatsworth CA 91311middot Tel (818)341middot4610middot Fax (818)709-0426
e-mail switchnelccsdualsnapcommiddot htlpllwwwccsdualsnapcom
Appendix D
Accident Time Line
-7shy
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
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- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
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- DRLRMFY
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- DRCALY
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- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
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- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
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- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
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- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
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- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
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- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
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- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
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- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
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- NOTIFY m
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- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
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- COMPONENT5 m
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- FILLET2 m
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- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
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- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
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- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
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- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
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- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
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- MALFUNC8 m
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- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
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- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
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- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
Appendix D
Accident Time Line
-7shy
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
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- FAIL_OCO
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- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
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- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
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- NPS 24
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- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
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- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
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- EVAC
- STHH 14
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- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
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- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
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- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
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- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
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- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
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- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
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- NOTIFY m
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- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
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- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
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- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
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- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
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- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
Timeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on December 232009 - NRC926954
December 232009 0702 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar containment alarm from the Bolivar Station 0748 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from Lynette with Galveston Co sheriffs department reporting a broken oil pipeline at Port Bolivar 0749 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley (EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co sheriffs department 0755 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco to see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr 0800 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to head to Bolivar he can make it quicker than Bruce 0805 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at Bolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron 0807 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded) 0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett (EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula 0810AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and requested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and called Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS 0811 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell control to get her to go to max rate on Seajack 0820 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO) 0821 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING CHOPS oil to Sunoco 0823 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station 0828 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak and said they would make all agency notifications 0839 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co on site command center (Herbert Franklin Incident Commander) and it was verified the oil spray had stopped 0900 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public as a result of the crude oil release Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists arrived at the Bolivar Station They closed inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve located on top of the 24 inch-line that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch PSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment 0908 AM CST (and again at 0914 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil amp Gas Div Region 3 regarding accident 0918 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by EPA representative - Mark Hays 0923 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region regarding accident
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
0938 AM CST - NRC contacted reference number 926954 at 0938 am
1005 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up released crude oil Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from spray 1030 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil and following meeting initiate response at 1230 PM CST The clean-up response efforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25 2009 when the spill response and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished 11 00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett regarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation 0200 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate investigation 11 00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the Public
December 24 2009 0500 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that the Bolivar Station is being re-activated and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is reshystarting
December 25 2009 1200 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished
Other Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response center which covers TRRC TGLO and TCEQ Incident number is 20094041 John Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning NRC 926954Talked to Kevin Lee
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
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00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
Appendix E
Metallurgical Evaluation Report
-8shy
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
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00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
13800 Westfair East Drive Houston Texas 77041-1101 Phone (281) 955-2900 Fax (281) 955-2638
Website wwwstresscom
an employee-owned company HOUSTON bull CINCINNATI bull NEW ORLEANS bull BATON ROUGE
SENIOR PRINCIPALS President Joe A Fowler PhD P E
Senior Vice President W Thomas Asbill PE
Vice PresldenlS Ronald O Young PhD PE Clinton A Haynes Jack E Miller PE J Randy Long PE Charles A Miller PE
PRINCIPALS James W Alben PE Christopher Alexander Ph O Ck1udo Allavillo Corp LIII Mnrk A Bennen PE Kenneth K Shalla PhD Richard S Boswell PE ABllk 8oubenider PhD P E Helen Cllan CPA John F Chappell PE Kimberly O Flesner PE S Allen FOl( PE Greg Gillie PE David L Garrell PhD Andreas T Kalsounas P E
Tell)l M Lechinger Christopher Malice PhD PE Harbindsr Pardal Ph D Thomas L Power PhD PE George R Ross PhD PE Ram6n I San Pedro PE
Teri Shackelford Mellhew J Stahl D Eng PE David A Tekamp PE Kurt DVandervort PhD PE
Kenneth A Waeber PE Raben E Wink Bobby W Wright PE Jay Z Yuan PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATESI STAFF CONSULTANTS GlennA Aucoin Pmiddot Richard C Blel PI J Kirk Brownlee PE Michael J EffenbOl ger PE Michael W Guillol PhD bull PE DaVid P Huey PE Daniel KrZYWicki PE CSP Kennelh R Riggs PhD PE
SENIOR ASSOCIATES Paul Angher P E Roger D Cordes PhD P E Donnie W Curinglon Nrlpendu DUlla Ph D PE Steven A Garcia Mark E Hamilton Breit A Hormberg Wllram A Milcr PE John M Moore Ronald A Morrison PE DaVid F Renzi Blian S Royer PE Mohmod Samman Ph D PE Danicl A Pitts PE
Leo Vega
STAFF CONSULTANTS Ray A Ayers PhD PE
Mark Banel PE Clinton H (Clint) Brill PE Charles Buscemi Paul Oowdican PE Joe W Frey P E SCOII Harding PhD PE SIeve Haysen PhD PE Joe Kintz P E Sleven Kinyon PhD Paul J Kovach PE Aon Scrrvner Jackie E Smilh P E
ASSOCIATES Juhan Bedoya Lyle E Breau x PF James Brewer PF Napoleon F Douglas Jr Kenny T Farrow Ph D Kar en Lucio Olhp A famar PhD Scot T McNeill PhO Salhish Remamoorlhy Chad Seercy PhD Awn Sreeranganalhan Lance Staudacher Kevin Wang PhD PE
February 2 2010
Mr Joe Sobilo PN 1251102 Enterprise Products Company 1100 Louisiana PO Box 4735 Houston TX 77002
Re Failure of Cap Screws in Switch
Subject Results of Metallurgical Evaluation
Introduction
Enterprise Products Company (EPCO) recently experienced a failure in an electrical switch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Four small cap screws holding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service exposing the internals of the switch
Following the failure EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and test samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the observed failure The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston Texas where the SES evaluation was performed
Discussion
A view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A) A closer view of the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2 The end of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2 and is marked by the arrow in the photograph
Closer views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4 The outer ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident
The screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw 1 by SES Screw 2 was at the upper right screw 3 was at the lower right and screw 4 was at the lower left in the photograph
Screw 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface while the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be essentially identical The ends of screws 1 and 3 were thus removed from the body of the switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces In view of their similarity to screw 3 screws 2 and 4 were not examined in detail
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded were examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SESs scanning electron microscope (SEM) An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical elements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the SEM
The measured compositions of the screws 1 and 3 are presented in Scans I and II in Appendix B The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel containing approximately 13 chromium
The composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in Scan III The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type 316 austenitic stainless steel
Also presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on the as-received fracture surface of screw 1 As shown in scan IV the foreign substance appeared to consist primarily of zinc carbon and oxygen It thus appeared that the foreign substance may have consisted of zinc carbonate
On the other hand it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of iron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product Corrosion of the underlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on the screw surface
Cross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations The structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6 The structures appeared to consist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical
The cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness measurements The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness across their cross sections The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 408 to Rockwell C 444 The average hardness of screw 1 was Rockwell C 430 and the average hardness of screw 3 was Rockwell C 427
The fracture surfaces of screws 1 and 3 were also examined using the SEM Prior to this examination the foreign material on screw 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive commercially available cleaning solution The as-received fracture surface on screw 3 was clean and required no cleaning
The fracture surfaces on screws 1 and 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8 respectively As can be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical The fracture surfaces both had the rock candy texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior austenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure
Stress Engineering Services Inc 2 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
The similarity of the clean fractures on screws 2 3 and 4 plus the similarity of the fracture surface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws apparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking The lack of any significant corrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of the zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little if any direct role in the fracture of screw 1
Conclusions
Based upon the results of our testing and analysis we have developed the following observations andor conclusions
1 SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces on the screws confirmed that the fractures had occurred by way of hydrogen assisted cracking
2 The high hardness (Rockwell C 43) of the attachment screws probably played a significant role in the cracking process
3 The zinc rich deposits found on screw 1 apparently did not produce significant weight loss corrosion of the screw
4 On the other hand the presence of solutions contalOlng zinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by promoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant Type 316 stainless steel housing in which they were mounted
Thank you for allowing us to have been of assistance to you in performing this evaluation If you have any questions concerning the test results or opinions presented in this report please feel free to contact us at your earliest convenience
K~PE Staff Metallurgist Stress Engineering Services Inc
Stress Engineering Services Inc 3 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
Mr Joe Sobio Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Appendix A
Photographs
Stress Engineering Services Inc 4 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 1 The failed switch supplied for this investigation The failure occurred at the right end of the switch as shown in this photograph
Photo 2 A closer view of the failure location One of the failed screws is just visible in this view and is marked with the arrow
Stress Engineering Services Inc 5 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Photo 3 A view of the outer ends of all the failed screws
Photo 4 A closer view of the fracture faces on the screws Screw 1 is the upper left screw 2 is at the upper right screw 3 is at the lower right and screw 4 is at the lower left in the photograph
Stress Engineering Services Inc 6 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
500 11m
Photo 5 A view of the microstructure in screw 1
500 flm
Photo 6 A view of the microstructure in screw 3 The structures in both screws are essentially identical and appear typical of a quenched and tempered high alloy steel
Stress Engineering Services Inc 7 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
SEM MAG 100 kx Det SE Detector 50 iJrn Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 7 The fracture surface on screw 1 following ultrasonic cleaning The fracture face appears typical of hydrogen stress cracking
SEM MAG 100 kx bull Date(mdy) 0108110 arowe Stress Engineering Services Inc
Photo 8 The fraclure surface found on screw 3 The structure is essentially identical to that shown in Photograph 7
Stress Engineering Services Inc 8 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 22010
Appendix B
SEM-EDS Test Results
Stress Engineering Services Inc 9 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN I c1ecradllgenesislgenmapsspc OSmiddotjan-2lHl155414 Bolt 1 Base metal LSecs 4]19
Fe
Ke llt
75
Fe Cr
Fe rli Mo Mill
Si Cr I~ i rH
100 200 300 4()l 5001 600 7 00 8 00 Energy- keV
900
D
Elemellf Wt ---shy -
At ---
SiK 0036 0070 MoL 0058 0034 CrK 1312 1395 MnK 0044 0044 FeK 8444 8357 NiK 0106 0100
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 10 PN 1251102
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
142
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN II
o
Pl12511)O JOBS12511o0 J OBS11251102i SEM-EDSiJi)ata and spectra~Base M e1aJspc OS-Jan-2010 Bolt 3 Bas e Metal LSecs 99
237 Fe
13
KC
95 n
CrFe
Fe
Si
100 4)O sno middot6lO 100 8 00 9t) 0 Energy- keV
-shy - - -
Element WI At SiK 0047 0092 CrK 1336 1414 MnK 0038 0038 FeK 8579 8456
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 11 PN 1251102
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
------- -
00
Mr Joe Sobilo En te rprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN III c (edax321genesis1genmapsspc OS--Jan-201O 172350 Switch cap oase metal LSegtcs 122
Fe
172
129
IC n Cr
n
Fe
43 Ni Mn Fe
~Ji
Cr
100
Element Wt At SiK 0105 0207 MoL 0269 0155 CrK 1744 1860 MnK 0146 0147 FeK 6743 6693 NiK 0993 0938
Matrix Correction ZAF
Stress Engineering Services Inc 12 PN 1251102
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
Mr Joe Sobilo Enterprise Products Company February 2 2010
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS) January 8 2010
SCAN IV cedax32ig enes i s lgen mapss pc 08-Jan2Ult1 ) 155922 Bolt 1 Fracture surface uncleaned avg comp LSecs 99
154shy
Zn
123shy
o
93 shy
Kent
62 -
Zn
31 shy Fe C
s Si Mn
AI Ca Cr Fe Ca Cr ZI11jfn4 ~Mg II pound
00 100 200 300 4 )olt suosno 700 8CO 900 1Q00 H ) 0
Energy- keV
I Elemet -
CK OK
MgK ALK SiK SK CaK CrK MnK FeK ZnK
Matrix
~Vt shy
1819 2540 0042 0030 0035 0076 0060 0138 0016 0741 4503 Correction
~
3756 3937 0043 0027 0031 0059 0037 0066 0007 0329 1708 ZAP
Stress Engineering Services Inc 13 PN 1251102
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
-9-
Appendix F
Post-Accident Photos
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
-10-
Figure 1 ndash Photographs taken on December 23 2009 showing aerial view and ground view of Enterprise Bolivar Station facility following release of crude oil Highway 87 is shown in the aerial view and it was the road closed as a result of the release
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
-11-
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
- IDATE_YY 2009
- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
- TELDT_MM 12
- TELDT_DD 23
- TELDT_YY 2009
- TELRN 926954
- PPPRP 2500
- EMRPRP 118433
- ENVPRP 60981
- OPCPRP 0
- PRODPRP 780
- OPPRP 0
- OOPPRP 0
- PRPTY 182694
- OPCPRPO
- OOPPRPO
- COMM CRUDE OIL
- LOSS 120
- RECOV 110
- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
- A3D1 m
- A3D2 m
- SPILLEDY l
- SPILLEDN m
- SPUNIT1 l
- SPUNIT2 m
- GEN_CAUSE1 m
- GEN_CAUSE2 m
- GEN_CAUSE3 m
- GEN_CAUSE4 m
- GEN_CAUSE5 m
- GEN_CAUSE6 m
- GEN_CAUSE7 m
- GEN_CAUSE8 m
- PHONE 9858041376
- PFAX
- BTPRINT
- CLASS1 m
- CLASS2 m
- CLASS3 m
- CLASS4 l
- LINE_SEG CAMERON HIGHWAY
- OFFAREA
- BNUMB
- OFFST
- OCS
- OPPROP 8
- PIPEROW 8
- HCA 8
- HCADESC OTHER POPULATED AREA (OPA)
- SYSPRTO
- FAIL_OCO
- PRTYR 2008
- INC_PRS 693
- MOP 1250
- PUNC_DIAM
- RUPLN
- PROPLN
- LRTYPEO
- UBLKVM
- UBLKVC
- UBLKVA
- UBLKVR 8
- DBLKVM
- DBLKVC
- DBLKVA
- DBLKVR 8
- SEGISO 1
- VLVDIST 5
- DRHRMF 8
- DRLRMF
- DRUT
- DRGEO 8
- DRCAL
- DRCRK
- DRHARD
- DROTH
- DRHRMFY 2009
- DRLRMFY
- DRUTY
- DRGEOY 2009
- DRCALY
- DRCRKY
- DRHARDY
- DROTHY
- NPS 24
- WALLTHK 32
- SPEC API 5L
- SMYS 65000
- SEAM ERW
- VALVE BALL VALVE
- MANU GROVE
- MANYR 2004
- LOCLKO
- DEPTH_COV 0
- EFAT 0
- NFAT 0
- GPFAT 0
- FATAL 0
- EINJ 0
- NINJ 0
- GPINJ 0
- INJURE 0
- SHUTDAY 0
- SHUTHR 15
- SHUTMIN 0
- EVACNO
- EVAC
- STHH 14
- STMN 30
- SOIL_YRD 140
- AMT_IN_WATER
- RSURFACE
- RGROUND
- RSOIL 8
- RVEG
- RWILD
- OFFSHOREY m
- OFFSHOREN l
- INTERY l
- INTERN m
- IFEDY m
- IFEDN l
- SYSPRT1 m
- SYSPRT2 m
- SYSPRT3 m
- SYSPRT4 m
- SYSPRT5 l
- SYSPRT6 m
- LRTYPE1 l
- LRTYPE2 m
- LRTYPE3 m
- LRTYPE4 m
- LEAK1 m
- LEAK3 m
- LEAK2 l
- RUPTURE1 m
- RUPTURE2 m
- SEGCONFN m
- SEGCONFY l
- INLINE1 l
- INLINE2 m
- INLINE3 m
- INLINE4 m
- FAIL_OC1 m
- FAIL_OC2 m
- FAIL_OC3 m
- FAIL_OC4 m
- FAIL_OC5 m
- FAIL_OC6 m
- FAIL_OC7 l
- FAIL_OC8 m
- FAIL_OC9 m
- FAIL_OC10 m
- FAIL_OC11 m
- FAIL_OC12 m
- FAIL_OC13 m
- FAIL_OC14 m
- OPRSN l
- OPRSY m
- LOCLK1 m
- LOCLK2 m
- LOCLK3 l
- LOCLK4 m
- LOCLK5 m
- LOCLK6 m
- LOCLK7 m
- IGNITEY m
- IGNITEN l
- EXPLOY m
- EXPLON l
- EVAC_REASON1 m
- EVAC_REASON2 m
- SHUTDOWNY l
- SHUTDOWNN m
- FISHY m
- FISHN l
- BIRDSY m
- BIRDSN l
- TERRESTRIALY m
- TERRESTRIALN l
- SOILY l
- SOILN m
- REMEDIALY l
- REMEDIALN m
- IMPACTY m
- IMPACTN l
- OCEANN m
- OCEANY m
- SURFACEN m
- SURFACEY m
- GROUNDWN m
- GROUNDWY m
- DRINKN m
- DRINKY m
- DRINKSRC1 m
- DRINKSRC2 m
- WATERY m
- WATERN l
- DETECTEDO
- DURLEAK_DAY
- DURLEAK_HR 2
- COMP_BASEDY l
- COMP_BASEDN m
- DETECTED1 m
- DETECTED2 m
- DETECTED3 m
- DETECTED4 m
- DETECTED5 m
- DETECTED6 l
- DETECTED7 m
- PIPE_COAT1 m
- PIPE_COAT2 m
- VIS_EXAM1 m
- VIS_EXAM2 m
- VIS_EXAM3 m
- COR_CAUSE1 m
- COR_CAUSE3 m
- COR_CAUSE5 m
- COR_CAUSE6 m
- COR_CAUSE7 m
- COR_CAUSE8 m
- PROTN m
- PROTY m
- PREV_DAMN m
- PREV_DAMY m
- COR_CAUSE4 m
- COR_CAUSE2 m
- VIS_EXAMO
- COR_CAUSEO
- CPYR
- PREV_DAM_YR
- PREV_DAM_MO
- PREV_DAM_UK
- EARTH_MOVE1 m
- EARTH_MOVE2 m
- EARTH_MOVE3 m
- EARTH_MOVE4 m
- FLOODS1 m
- FLOODS2 m
- FLOODS3 m
- FLOODS4 m
- TEMPER1 m
- TEMPER2 m
- TEMPER3 m
- TEMPER4 m
- FLOODS5 m
- EARTH_MOVEO
- FLOODSO
- TEMPERO
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_GRP3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE1 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE2 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE3 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE4 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE6 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE5 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE7 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE8 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE9 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE10 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE11 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPE12 m
- THIRD_PARTY_TYPEO
- EXCAV_TYPE1 m
- EXCAV_TYPE2 m
- EXCAV_ONY m
- EXCAV_ONN m
- EXCAV_LAST_CONTACT
- NOTIF_DATE_MM
- NOTIF_DATE_DD
- NOTIF_DATE_YY
- NOTIFY m
- NOTIFN m
- NOTIF_RCVD1 m
- NOTIF_RCVD2 m
- NOTIF_RCVD3 m
- NOTIF_RCVD4 m
- MARKEDN m
- MARKEDY m
- TEMP_MARK1 m
- TEMP_MARK2 m
- TEMP_MARK3 m
- PERM_MARK m
- ACC_MARK1 m
- ACC_MARK2 m
- MKD_IN_TIMEY m
- MKD_IN_TIMEN m
- FIRE_EXPLO1 m
- FIRE_EXPLO2 m
- CAUSE1 m
- CAUSE2 m
- CAUSE3 m
- CAUSE4 m
- CAUSE5 m
- CAUSE6 m
- CAUSE7 m
- CAUSE8 m
- CAUSE9 m
- CAUSE10 m
- CAUSE11 m
- CAUSE12 m
- CAUSE13 m
- PIPE_BODY1 m
- PIPE_BODY2 m
- PIPE_BODY3 m
- PIPE_BODY4 m
- PIPE_BODY5 m
- COMPONENT1 m
- COMPONENT2 l
- COMPONENT3 m
- COMPONENT4 m
- COMPONENT5 m
- JOINT1 m
- JOINT2 m
- JOINT3 m
- JOINT4 m
- BUTT1 m
- BUTT2 m
- BUTT3 m
- FILLET1 m
- FILLET2 m
- FILLET3 m
- FILLET4 m
- FILLET5 m
- PIPE_SEAM1 m
- PIPE_SEAM2 m
- PIPE_SEAM3 m
- PIPE_SEAM4 m
- PIPE_SEAM5 m
- PIPE_SEAM6 m
- PIPE_SEAM7 m
- PIPE_SEAM8 m
- PIPE_BODYO
- COMPONENTO
- JOINTO
- BUTTO
- FILLETO
- PIPE_SEAMO
- FAIL_TYPE1 m
- FAIL_TYPE2 l
- CONS_DEF1 m
- CONS_DEF2 m
- CONS_DEF3 m
- PIPE_DAMAGEY m
- PIPE_DAMAGEN l
- PRS_TESTY l
- PRS_TESTN m
- TEST_YR 2004
- TEST_MO 5
- TEST_DAY 29
- TEST_MED1 l
- TEST_MED2 m
- TEST_MED3 m
- TEST_MEDO
- TEST_TP 4
- TEST_PRS 1595
- MALFUNC1 m
- MALFUNC2 m
- MALFUNC3 m
- MALFUNC4 m
- MALFUNC5 m
- MALFUNC6 m
- MALFUNC7 m
- MALFUNC8 m
- THREADS1 m
- THREADS2 m
- THREADS3 m
- THREADS4 m
- SEAL1 m
- SEAL2 m
- SEAL3 m
- SEAL4 m
- MALFUNCO
- THREADSO
- SEALO
- IO_TYPE1 m
- IO_TYPE2 m
- IO_TYPE3 m
- IO_TYPE4 m
- IO_TYPEO
- IO_DRUG
- IO_ALCO
- MISC
- UNKNOWN1 m
- UNKNOWN2 m
- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m
-12-
Figure 2 ndash Photographs showing station piping where the failed pressure switch was located The pressure had been removed prior to these photographs and it is shown in the Metallurgical Report in Appendix E
- DOE jan 042010
- RPTID 20090351 -- 12246
- ORIGINAL
- SUPPLEMENT 8
- FINAL 8
- OPERATOR_ID 31618
- OWNER_OPERATOR_ID
- NAME ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC
- STREET 1100 LOUISIANA STREET
- STREET2 HOUSTON HARRIS TX 77002
- IHOUR 800
- IDATE_MM 12
- IDATE_DD 23
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- LATITUDE 29418782
- LONGITUDE 94704811
- ACADDRESS1 PORT BOLIVAR GALVESTON
- ACADDRESS2 TX 77650
- POSTSURV
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- PNAME NATHAN L GRAY JR
- PEMAIL NGRAYEPRODCOM
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- NARRATIVE A PRESSURE SWITCH ON THE BOLIVAR VALVE STATION FAILED 1313STRESS ENGINEERING REPORT SUGGESTS THAT FRACTURED SURFACES ON THE SCREWS CONFIRMED THAT THE FRACTURES HAD OCCURRED BY WAY OF HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING THE HIGH HARDNESS OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS PROBABLY PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE CRACKING PROCESS ZINC RICH DEPOSITS FOUND ON SCREW 1 APPARENTLY DID NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT LOSS CORROSION OF THE SCREW THE PRESENCE OF SOLUTIONS CONTAINING ZINC SALTS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OBSERVED CRACKING OF THE SCREWS INDIRECTLY BY PROMOTING GALVANIC COUPLING BETWEEN THE SCREWS AND THE MORE CORROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL HOUSING 1313REPLACED FAILED SWITCH AND PUT PIPELINE BACK IN-SERVICE 131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313131313
- CAUSE14 m
- CAUSE15 l
- CAUSE16 m
- CAUSE17 m
- CAUSE18 m
- CAUSE19 m
- CAUSE20 m
- CAUSE21 m
- CAUSE22 m
- CAUSE23 m
- CAUSE24 m
- CAUSE25 m