meiji restoration in japan

Meiji Restoration in Japan

Introduction

In 1868, the long rule of the Tokugawa regime came to an end and

full sovereign powers were restored to the new Meiji Emperor.

Opposition to Tokugawa rule had been growing for a long time, but it

was not until the 19th century that several lines, ideological, of attack

on the Shogun were available. From these various lines of attack, the

Restoration leaders emphasized the theory that in ancient days, the

Emperor had enjoyed great power and prestige and that the Shogun

was a usurper who had taken all real authority away from the

Emperor. Such a line of attack on the Shogun became more and more

effective as Tokugawa power progressively declined.

The Theories accounting for the Downfall of the Shogunate

Among historians, there have been two main schools of opinion on

what really caused the downfall of the Shogunate.

The first school believed that the Tokugawa system of government

might have continued essentially unchanged had it not been for the

forcible opening of the closed door by the United States and other

countries. It had been customary for these historians to refer to the

primitive nature of Japan's economy before 1867 and to treat the

Tokugawa period as though it were an era of almost stagnation.

Therefore, the school of opinion argued that it was only the coming of

the foreigners that undermined the authority of the Tokugawa

government and so ruined it.


The second school of opinion, however, emphasized the undoubted

fact that the whole regime had been under indirect attack from many

directions inside Japan long before Perry arrived.

In the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, rapid economic growth had

produced an advanced economy capable of ready transformation into

an entirely new political and social order.

By the middle of the 19th century, the antiquated political system

and absurd political and social philosophy of the Tokugawa were

more than 200 years out of date. The simple concept of the division of

classes into rulers, warriors and commoners had little relation to Japan

of the 19th century with its teeming cities, rich merchants, restless

samurai and discontent peasantry.

Despite the division of the land into a large number of feudal fiefs,

the people had developed a strong sense of national consciousness.

The growth of nationalism and the development of a modern

commercial economy had made Japan ready for the more efficient

political forms of the modern nation.

The coming of the foreigners, symbolized by the Perry expedition,

merely provided the final impulse towards a collapse that was

unavoidable.

The theory that the main cause of the Shogunate's collapse was the

forced opening of Japan to foreigners cannot of course be accepted,

but the 2nd school of thought has perhaps inclined to go too far in


underestimating the impact of successful Western pressure on Japan

in the 1850's. It is hardly believable that the Shogunate would have

collapsed had it been able to resist the demands made by the United

States, Russia, Great Britain and other countries of the West. It must

be noted that so well had the early Tokugawa succeeded in creating a

system capable of preserving political stability that the machine was

still running relatively, smoothly. It was therefore necessary for an

external pressure to disrupt it. This pressure provided by the

foreigners was consequently fatal to the power of the Tokugawa

which had already been weakened by other forces.

Another point to notice is that the economic weakening of the

Tokugawa feudalism which has been serious by the early 18th century

and was actually not much worse by the middle of the 19th century.

Moreover, the Shogunate itself was on the whole better off than most

of the daimyo. It could debase the currency to its own advantage and

it controlled all the great cities and most of the economically

advanced parts of the country. It would be hard to argue that the

Shogunate fell from the economic difficulties, all the easier. The

downfall of the Tokugawa regime was thus the result of the

conjunction of 2 processes:

the internal decay of feudal society

pressure from the Western nations


It was only through the coincidence of these two forces of internal

decay and external pressure that contributed to the so-called Meiji

Restoration in 1868.

The Parties Overthrowing the Tokugawa

The overthrow of the Tokugawa was finally accomplished through the

union of anti-Tokugawa parties. These parties included:

The lower samurai and ronin, particularly the great western clans

of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa & Hizen which provided the armies and the

territorial base of operations;

The kuge, i.e. the court nobility and the Emperor who served as

the ideological justification for the overthrow of the usurping Shogun;

The merchants, especially of Osaka and Kyoto, who contributed

money to the revolution;

The peasants who not only served as soldiers but whose general

discontent weakened the Tokugawa domains.

The leadership of this alliance was in the hands of the lower samurai,

some of whom were administrators, some were intellectuals or

warriors and all of whom were concerned that the Tokugawa had to

go. However, these samurai and ronin could not have overthrown the

Tokugawa only by their strength and determination. Less dramatic

than the political and military achievement of the samurai but more

far-reaching in accomplishing both the overthrow of the Shogunate

and the stabilization of the new regime was the financial support of


the chonin, especially of Osaka where it is said 70% of Japan's wealth

was concentrated.

The official record of the House of Mitsui says, "The loans required

for the military operations of the Imperial forces were largely

furnished by the House of Mitsui". The Meiji Restoration thus was the

outcome of this coalition of merchant class with the lower samurai.

The political settlement of the Meiji and especially the abolition of

feudalism in 1871 can only be understood by an examination of this

feudal-merchant alliance?

The Feudal Merchant Coalition

In studying Japanese social history, it becomes apparent that one must

dismiss all preconceptions based on a class-struggle interpretation as

sometimes applied to the French revolutions. In the case of political

struggle against the feudal aristocracy against the Church and the

Crown and eventually winning a clear-cut victory in France. In Japan,

however, the interests of the feudal ruling class and the big merchants

became so closely connected that whatever hurt one easily injured the

other. Should a daimyo refuse to pay his debts or threaten the

merchant in order to obtain their cancellation, he soon found that

whenever he applied elsewhere for loan, he met with a polite but firm

refusal. The big merchants depended on the interest of the loans to

daimyo and samurai for their livelihood. The samurai and the daimyo

who together with their followers were compelled by the sankin-kotai


system to spend 1/2 of their time in Edo, became the chief customers

of the chonin.

Quite logically then, the chonin felt that their own prosperity was

closely tied to that of the warrior and noble classes, their customers

and debtors. For this reason, the chonin never dreamed of attacking

feudalism as a system though they were prepared to finance a political

movement against the Shogunate in connection with rival feudal

elements. Takigawa Masajiro in his "Nihon Shakai Shi" or "A Social

History of Japan", therefore said, "The reason why this nascent class

of chonin did not even think of overthrowing the bushi class was the

latter were their customers and if they ruined their customers, if only

for a brief period, the shock to their own economic power would have

been disastrous. For this reason, the samurai were able to maintain

their position right to the Restoration, long after they had lost their

real power in the country." This aristocratic class therefore stood

shoulder to shoulder with the despised but economically powerful

merchant and usurer class. As the Tokugawa period advanced, these 2

groups drew closer together making possible the co-operation

between the big merchants of Osaka and the leading anti-Tokugawa

clans. Thus, the Meiji Revolution was not the story of a rising

business class which destroyed the structure of feudalism and

established its supremacy in a mercantile state. Still less was it a

democratic revolt transferring political power to representative of the

mass of the peasants and workers.


The Rise of Satsuma and Choshu

But what really sealed the fate of the Tokugawa was its failure to deal

effectively in 1866 with the military opposition from the Satsuma-

Choshu coalition. Satsuma and Choshu were outer clans of daimyos.

They were tozama. Satsuma was in the southern Kyushu and Choshu

was in the western end of Honshu. They were both traditional rivals

of the Tokugawa. By the middle of the 19th century owing to the

economic and social changes they were in a position to challenge the

authority of the Bakufu.

Both Satsuma and Choshu had a combination of advantages.

1. They were among the biggest domains that had any hope of

influencing national politics.

2. Satsuma was officially ranked 2nd among the hans in tax yield and

Choshu the 9th; and there were altogether 165 hans in Japan. In actual

tax income they were actually the 4th and 5th. The wealth of Satsuma

and Choshu in the mid-19th century was probably a factor leading to

their success, for without adequate financial resources they would

have had neither the strong morale nor the western arms which made

possible their triumph.

3. In both clans, the ratio of fighting men to fix income was much

higher than the national average, giving them greater military

manpower than their economic strength would suggest. Satsuma had

about 27,000 samurais. Choshu had about 11,000 samurais.


4. Another strength in the strength of Satsuma and Choshu was their

internal solidality and union. They were located far from the major

urban centres. Both (particularly Satsuma) were backward

economically and socially compared with some of the strongholds of

the Tokugawa. Hence the morale of their feudal warrior aristocracy

was less roded and they were able to take more effective action than

the hans located in economically more advanced area. Their very

backwardness contributed to their strength.

5. Satsuma was lucky to have to strong daimyo in Shimazu

Shigehide and later in his great grandson Nariskira, Satsuma also had

the advantages of trade and contact with the outside world through its

vessel domain, Ryukyu Islands, and had become a leading area in the

study of western science and technology. In Satsuma there were a

comparatively profitable mining industry, textile mills and trade

monopoly. The latter probed particularly successful with sugar

because Satsuma controlled the only parts of Japan where sugar can

grow well. Like most other hans it was burdened at the very

beginning of so-called "Tempo Reform". This effort enabled it in

clearing the han debt.

6. Choshu situated across the straits of Shimonoseki through which

all marine transport between Korea, China and Osaka had to pass was

able by means of trade and transport monopoly to accumulate

considerable wealth. The Choshu, led by young commanders of

exceptional ability, were armed and to some extent, clothed after the

European pattern. More revolutionary, however, was that these forces


were not confined to the members of the traditional warrior class but

accepted small townsmen and peasants as volunteers. The military

competence shown by the Choshu commanders was to secure for their

own clan after the collapse of the Shogunate a dominant role in the

organization of a Westernized imperial army. Indeed for more than 50

years until after the First World War, the highest appointments in the

Japanese army were held as a rule by members of the Choshu clan or

their followers. On the other hand, the Choshu "Tempo Reform" was

started in 1838 and succeeded in cutting down the han expenditure

and holding down the ever mounting han debt.

Thus, both Satsuma and Choshu were in good position to challenge

the Tokugawa supremacy. The main political development of the

1860's proved to be a series of competition for national leadership

between Choshu and Satsuma until finally in 1866, the two reached

an understanding and entered into a secrete alliance to overthrow the

Shogunate.

Rivalry between Satsuma and Choshu for National Leadership

The movement for "The Union of Court and Shogunate" (Kobu

Gattai)

In the year 1857 the emperor sent a secret message to Choshu and 13

other hans seeking support in his opposition to the Shogun's power.

Choshu


The Moderate Reform Party which was in power at the time

decided that Choshu should begin to take a part in national politics.

Their decision was motivated primarily by the long smouldering

resentment against the Tokugawa rule and by the memory of Choshu's

greatness before 1800.

These reformers proposed that Choshu should mediate in bringing

Edo and Kyoto together and this policy came to be known as "The

Union of Court and Shogunate".

They also suggested that the emperor should order the Shogun to

embark on the policy of "extension across the sea". Kyoto accepted

this proposal because it was the first open admission of its political

supremacy. The Shogun also accepted because he was delighted to

have full support from the imperial court for the foreign policy he had

been forced to accept. But in the end nothing came of the Choshu's

effort at mediation. The policy was undercut within Choshu itself both

by the opposition from the Extreme Pro-Imperial Party and by the

doubts of other influential reformers. Moreover, their failure was due

to the more daring bid for national leadership by Satsuma.

Satsuma

In 1862, Satsuma proposed itself as mediator between Kyoto and Edo.

To secure more Shogunate respect for the imperial court

To secure the release from confinement of Keiki (son of the Lord

Mito and defeated candidate for the Shogunship, was pro-emperor

and kept in confinement since 1859)


The appointment of Keiki as the Great Elder and guardian of the

new Shogun.

Satsuma won imperial support for this proposal and with the court's

censor it proceeded to suppress the Extreme Pro-Imperial Samurais

from Satsuma and other hans. Then Satsuma presented the demands

to Edo. Yielding to pressure, the Shogunate accepted the demands and

made Keiki the Great Elder and Guardian of the Shogun, with Lord of

Hizen (Matsudaira Keiki) had strong imperial leanings as a form

believer in national unity. Under his influence the whole Tokugawa

hostage system ("Sankin-kotai") was abandoned and the attendance of

the daimyos 100 days every 3 years. These startling measures made

obvious a change that had already occurred. The Shogunate no longer

could exercise effective control over the hans.

Pro-Imperial Movement

Choshu effort

The Choshu was not content to see national leadership fall into the

hands of its Satsuma rival. Out beaten by Satsuma in the movement

for A Union of Court and Shogunate ("Kobu Gattai"), Choshu

adopted a new approach which took an open Pro-imperial stand and

supported the sentiment of "Expel the Barbarians" that was obviously

favoured by the Court. This change of policy united the Extreme Pro-

Imperial Party with the reformers, the Extremists were now rising in

influence in the han government. Choshu also gained the support of a


few extremist court nobles and gradually won the control over the

imperial court. It was further strengthened by the official support of

Tosa (and of the major outer hans on the island of Shikoku).

So, in December 1862, the Choshu dominated Court got the

Shogunate to agree to the expulsion of the barbarians. The Shogun

was forced to set a date June 25, 1863 before which all foreigners

would be expelled, although he knew that it was impossible. So, by

this time the Choshu had placed the Shogunate in an impossible

position. The Shogunate was caught between the pressure from the

Kyoto Court and the superior military power of the West. It became

ineffective. It was unable to make any step of policy, as it merely

waited.

The Shimonoseki Affair

It soon turned out that Choshu's anti-foreign feeling had gone too far.

The folly of such an unrealistic foreign policy was soon revealed.

Choshu seeing that the Shogunate had taken no action to expel the

barbarians attempted to act alone on the expulsion order. So, on the

appointed day, its forts along the Strait of Shimonoseki at the western

end of the Inland Sea fired on the American, French and Dutch ships.

In response the American and French warships destroyed the forts on

July 16-20 - known as the Shimonoseki Affair. Alarmingly, the

Shogunate ordered Choshu to stop its action. But instead, the

Shogun's envoy was captured and killed.


The Satsuma Coup d'etat (Restoration of Moderates)

Meanwhile, alarmed by this unrealistic foreign policy Satsuma had

taken more effective action in Kyoto aided by the domain issued in

Aizu (in northern Honshu). Satsuma organised a coup d'etat on

September 30, 1863 and troops were sent to the gate of the imperial

palace. The more moderate nobles were restored to control and the

court councils and imperial troops created under the Choshu

leadership were dissolved. The Choshu troops were forced to

withdraw from Kyoto to their own han.

Foreign attacks on Choshu and Satsuma

Choshu

At the end of May 1864, foreign ministers renewed their demands for

the opening of the Shimonoseki Straits, threatening to take action

themselves if Edo failed to do so. When Edo failed to give a reply, the

ministers organised a joint naval expedition against Choshu. In

September 1864, 17 foreign warships destroyed all the Choshu forts

on the Shimonoseki Straits and forced Choshu to agree to the opening

of the Straits. The Bakufu had to pay a war indemnity which was

abolished after the Bakufu agreed in June 1866 to a new commercial

treaty which reduced import duties to 5% and removed nearly all the

restrictions on foreign made.

Effects


Choshu realized that their "Expel the barbarians" policy was

impractical. From then on there was a change of policy putting greater

reliance on westernized military units and on individuals who knew

and understood the West. Two of their samurais Inoue Kaoru and Ito

Hirobumi who had just returned from Britain persuaded Choshu to

adopt western ways. In the rapid modernization of Japan which

started a few years later, Choshu became the patron and backbone of

the new Japanese Army first with the French and then with the

German army as its model. The consequent pro-Britain attitude of the

Japanese Navy and the pro-German attitude of the Japanese Army

were to exert a strong influence on Japanese policy from then

onwards until the Pearl Harbour Attack.

Satsuma

In Satsuma the feeling of expelling the barbarians was also strong and

would be illustrated by the Richardson Affair on September 14, 1862.

This incident involved 4 Englishmen who were riding in the city of

Yokohama and encountered the procession of Shimazu Hisamitsu.

Richardson was killed by an enraged samurai who felt that the

foreigner had not shown proper respect for their great lord. The

British reaction was quick and by threats of naval power Britain

forced the Shogunate to pay an indemnity of L100,000. She also

demanded an indemnity from Satsuma and punishment for the

murderer. On August 15, 1863, the Satsuma forts at Kagoshima fired

on the 7 British ships which gathered there to force their demands.


The British proceeded to destroy much of Kogoshima and to sink

most of the Japanese ships. Satsuma agreed to pay an indemnity of

$25,000 and this sum was to be borrowed from the Bakufu.

Effect

The incident naturally confirmed the Satsuma leaders' respect for

Western military power and also produced a deep interest on their part

in the British navy. The Lord of Satsuma was so impressed by this

display of naval force that, less than 3 years later, he invited the new

British Minister, and the Western naval ships for Satsuma. The

friendly relations thereby established between Britain and the House

of Satsuma played an important part, not only in the restoration of the

Emperor a few years later but also in the British Navy's being chosen

as the model on which the future Japanese Navy was founded and

built up. Meanwhile, the inability of the Shogunate to punish the

unruly clans or to obtain satisfaction from the foreign powers for the

attacks made on their nationals and their property had revealed the

growing powerlessness of the Shogunate. Many of the daimyo

considered that the treaties were not binding on them as they had not

been approved by the Emperor, who had in fact ordered the expulsion

of the foreigners. For the same reason, they were beginning to feel

themselves exempted from further loyalty to the Shogunate. The long

established authority of Edo was therefore rapidly being replaced by

the long-last authority of Kyoto. The movement to revive the

Emperor's supremacy gained strength very rapidly. Indeed, it was


evident that, if the anti-Tokugawa forced were to combine, there

would probably be civil war in which the Shogunate might well be

defeated.

The Satsuma - Choshu Alliance (March 1866)

Satsuma and Choshu at the beginning were unfriendly. But their

difference had gradually disappeared after 1861 because Satsuma had

lost confidence in the Shogunate and doubted the real motive of the

Shogunate. They came to decide that Choshu was a better ally than

the Shogunate. Reconciliation between the two was brought about the

pro-imperial ronin from Tosa. On March 7, 1866, a secret alliance

was drawn up in Kyoto. This alliance meant the end of the Tokugawa

Shogunate.

Death of the Shogun and the Emperor

1866 - The Shogun Iemochi died and Tokugawa Keiki was his

successor. He prepared to further progress of the nation by opening

the country more fully to foreign intercourse.

1867 - Emperor Komei died and was succeeded by one who was not

so hindered by the traditions and hostility of the past, he was

Mutsuhito who took up his title as Meiji.

The Civil War


It became the customs in the 20th century for foreigners as well as

Japanese to look back at the Meiji Restoration of 1867-68 as smooth,

aimest, bloodless transfer of power. But in reality, there was civil war

for several months. The Shogun, Keiki, voluntarily surrendered his

administrative powers to the youthful Emperor, Meiji, in November

1867. So ended the 2-1/2 centuries of Tokugawa rule, and on

December 9, 1867, the Imperial Restoration was formally proclaimed.

The ending of the Shogunate and the Restoration of the Emperor,

however, was actually the beginning of a further struggle before peace

was finally restored. Following the formal proclamation of the

Restoration, the formation of a new government was announced on

January 3, 1868. To the indignation of the ex-Shogun's supporters, not

only was Keiki excluded from its membership, his lands were ordered

to be confiscated. Keiki himself was prepared to accept this treatment

in silence but his adherents were not. He was persuaded to take up

arms and on January 27, 1868 met with overwhelming defeat at the

Battle of Fushimi. Following the defeat of his army, Keiki took ship

to Edo and ordered the city to be surrendered to the Imperial troops.

Elsewhere certain clans loyal to the Tokugawa fought on firmly. The

last area of resistance was at Hokkaido where an admiral of the

Shogun's navy held out for some months in 1869. Thus ended the

supremacy of the House of Tokugawa which provided Japan with 15

Shoguns.

The Changing Attitude towards Foreigners


The forces that overthrew the Shogunate had long been associated

with the slogan "Expel the Barbarians" and it might have been

expected that with their victory, anti-foreign sentiment would become

more serious and widespread. There were, of course, still a few

isolated instances of anti-foreign agitation before Japan finally settled

down to the task of modernization, but prompt and drastic punishment

was given by the new government to those guilty of attacks on

foreigners. It was no part of the policy of the new men who ruled

Japan to antagonize, much less drive away, the barbarians. They

realized that to achieve a position of power in the world, their country

would have to be modernized. With all speed, it would have to catch

up with the technologically advanced nations of the West.

However, modernization could never be accomplished without

Western help and advice. A number of foreign technicians had

already been employed both by the Shogunate and by certain feudal

lords before 1868. But after that year, there were many more of them -

British, American, French, German and Dutch - engaged by the

Japanese government as pilots, railways and marine engineers,

financial and legal advisers, agricultural experts, university and school

teachers, military and naval instructors and at the same time, Japanese

were sent abroad to learn from the West. But among the Japanese,

there has never been the scornful indifference that has often

characterized the Chinese attitude towards foreigners. The Japanese

have never been too proud to learn. It appeared therefore strange


reversal of the whole situation for the anti-foreign monarchical party

and, in effect, became pro-foreign almost overnight. In April 1869 the

Emperor and his court left Kyoto to take up residence in Edo which

was renamed Tokyo or Eastern Capital, had remained the imperial

and administration centre of Japan ever since.

Conclusion

The steps leading to the Meiji Restoration had been complex and

largely haphazard rather than simple, straight-forward and planned.

Conflicting interests had been drawn together in the final stages, but

there had been more disunity than unity among those who eventually

restored the throne to its legitimate position. In these respects, as well

as in the national aspects, the movement had a striking resemblance to

the Unification of Italy though the parallel cannot go too far. The

forces that were to win the national revolution came from the imperial

ideology that justified the revolution, the "Expel the Barbarians" spirit

that gave it power and the ambition of young samurai of relatively

humble birth that gave it daring drive. From then onwards, military

power rather than traditional authority, public opinion or political skill

was to be deciding future in Japanese politics.

meiji restoration in japan

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