medical jurisprudence assignment 1
TRANSCRIPT
8/22/2019 MEDICAL jurisprudence Assignment 1
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Medical Jurisprudence
1.) Calimutan vs. People, GR 152133
2.) Taylaran vs. People GR L 49149 October 23, 1981
3.) People vs. Bausing GR 64965 July 18, 1991
Answer the questions in each case given.
1.) What is the medical testimony or the evidence?
2.) What is the problem requiring medical testimony?
3.) How does the Supreme Court appreciate the testimony? Calimutan vs. People GR 152133
FACTS:
Victim Cantre crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao.Victim Cantre
was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the culprit responsible for throwing stones
at the Cantre’s house on a previous night. Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him.
While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the back of victim Cantre.
Petitioner Calimutan then picked up a stone which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his
back. Victim Cantre complained of backache and also of stomachache, and was unable to eat. By nighttime,
victim Cantre was alternately feeling cold and then warm. He was sweating profusely and his entire body felt
numb. For the last time, he complained of backache and stomachache, and shortly thereafter, he died.
Victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation of blood in his
abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen. The laceration of the spleen can be caused by any blunt
instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned
to death by petitioner Calimutan.
Issues
Whether or not petitioner should be convicted of Homicide?
Held: It should be remembered that the meeting was a chance encounter. While a running grudge existed
between the victim Cantre and Bulalacao, there was none between the victim Cantre and petitioner
Calimutan. The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre
with the specific intent of killing. What is obvious was petitioners intention to protect his helper Bulalacao
who was, much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre. In the absence of such intent, petitioner
Calimutan is only guilty of Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Calimutan v. People G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006
Lesson: Proof beyond reasonable doubt, Defense of Stranger, Proximate Cause, intentional
felonies and culpable felonies
Laws Applicable: Art. 3, Art. 4, Par. 1
FACTS:
February 4, 1996 around 10 am: Cantre and witness Sañano, together with two other
companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar but as they were headed home, they
crossed paths with Calimutan and Michael Bulalacao.
Cantre, 26 years old and 5 ft. 9 inches, had a grudge against Bulalacao, a 15 year-old
boy of 5ft. for suspecting that he threw stones at the his house on a previous night so he
punched him
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Seeking to protect Bulalacao and to stop Cantre, Calimutan picked a stone, as big as a
man’s fist and hitting Cantre at the left side of his back not noticing that Bulalacao was
already able to runaway.
Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back and Calimutan desisted from any otheract of violence
Witness Sañano then brought Cantre home where he complained of backache and also
of stomach ache and was unable to eat
By night time, he felt cold then warm then he was sweating profusely and his entire
body felt numb
Having no vehicle, they could not bring him to a doctor so his mother just continue to
wipe him with a piece of cloth and brought him some food when he asked.
After eating a little, he vomited.
Shortly after complaining again of his backache and stomach ache, he died.
The Post-Mortem Examination Report and Certification of Death, issued and signed by
Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory
arrest due to suspected food poisoning
With the help of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, anautopsy was done by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez which showed that there was internal
hemorrhage and massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his
lacerated spleen caused by a blunt object like a stone.
RTC issued a warrant of arrest and during arraignment Calimutan pleaded not guilty to
the crime of homicide
RTC: Essentially adopting the prosecution’s account of the incident, held that Calimutan
was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide with a penalty of imprisonment from 8
years of Prision Mayor as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal asmaximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of P50,000 as
compensatory damages and the sum of P50,000 as moral damages
NOT defense of stranger , because after the boxing Bulalacao, he was able to run
thereby the unlawful aggression by Cantre ceased
The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left side
was a treacherous
criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been intended
CA: Affirmed RTC
Calimutan filed a petition for review on certiorari contending that the dissimilar findings
on the cause of death constituted reasonable doubt
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ISSUE: W/N he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide
HELD:
NO. MODIFIED Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and isaccordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to
a maximum period of two years and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is
further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the latter’s death and P50,000.00 as moral damages
Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind (NOT absolute certainty and the
exclusion of all possibility of error)
Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence, and although it does not
necessarily bind the courts, it is accorded great weight and probative value may
sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the Calimutan
and the lacerated spleen of the Cantre which resulted in the latter’s death
Proximate cause - cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and WITHOUT which the result would
NOT have occurred
Prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause of the death of the Cantre
was the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan.
Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed
suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy
performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the cause of
death, then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by the courts
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which
they are committed, in particular:
1.) intentional felonies - existence of malicious intent
- act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice)
2.) culpable felonies - absence of malicious intent
- act or omission of the offender is NOT malicious
- the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight
or lack of skil
Absence of intent, Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical conditionand other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
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ROLLIE CALIMUTAN vs PEOPLE, G.R. No. 152133
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner
Rollie Calimutan prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
23306, dated 29 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
46, of Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998, finding
petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Informatio filed with the RTC charged petitioner Calimutan with the crime of homicide,
allegedly committed as follows –
That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, Barangay Panique,
Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw a stone at PHILIP CANTRE, hitting him at
the back left portion of his body, resulting in laceration of spleen due to impact which caused
his death a day after.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.
Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December 1996, a warrant for the arrest of petitioner
Calimutan. On 09 January 1997, however, he was provisionally released after posting sufficient
bailbond. During the arraignment on 21 May 1997, petitioner Calimutan pleaded not guilty to
the crime of homicide charged against him.
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Ronaldo B.
Mendez, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); (2) Belen
B. Cantre, mother of the victim, Philip Cantre; and (3) Rene L. Sañano, companion of the victim
Cantre when the alleged crime took place. Their testimonies are collectively summarized below.
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness Sañano, together
with two other companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique,
Aroroy, Masbate. From the videoke bar, the victim Cantre and witness Sañano proceeded to go
home to their respective houses, but along the way, they crossed paths with petitioner
Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was harboring a grudge against
Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the culprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre’s
house on a previous night. Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him.
While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the backs of victim Cantre and
witness Sañano. Petitioner Calimutan then picked up a stone, as big as a man’s fist, which he
threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back. When hit by the stone, victim
Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back. Witness Sañano put himself between thevictim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan, and attempted to pacify the two, even convincing
petitioner Calimutan to put down another stone he was already holding. He also urged victim
Cantre and petitioner Calimutan to just go home. Witness Sañano accompanied victim Cantre
to the latter’s house, and on the way, victim Cantre complained of the pain in the left side of his
back hit by the stone. They arrived at the Cantre’s house at around 12:00 noon, and witness
Sañano left victim Cantre to the care of the latter’s mother, Belen.
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Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident involving petitioner
Calimutan. He again complained of backache and also of stomachache, and was unable to eat.
By nighttime, victim Cantre was alternately feeling cold and then warm. He was sweating
profusely and his entire body felt numb. His family would have wanted to bring him to a doctor
but they had no vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following day, 05 February 1996, Belen was
wiping his son with a piece of cloth, when victim Cantre asked for some food. He was able toeat a little, but he also later vomited whatever he ate. For the last time, he complained of
backache and stomachache, and shortly thereafter, he died.
Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the Municipal
Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem Examination Repor and Certification of
Death, issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was
cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. The body of victim Cantre was
subsequently embalmed and buried on 13 February 1996.
Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre family, with the help of the Lingkod
Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, requested for an exhumation and
autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre by the NBI. The exhumation and autopsy of the body
of the victim Cantre was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez on 15 April 1996, after which, he
reported the following findings –
Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial autopsy; clad in white Barong Tagalog and blue
pants placed inside a wooden golden-brown coffin and buried in a concrete niche.
Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall, left side.
Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line.
Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].
Laceration, spleen.
Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed.
Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid and other partially digested food particles.
x x x x
CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN.
In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his exhumation and
autopsy report. He explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage and
there was massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen.
The laceration of the spleen can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr.
Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned to death by petitioner
Calimutan.
To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the sole testimony of theaccused, herein petitioner, Calimutan.
According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00 p.m. on 04 February 1996, he was walking
with his house helper, Michael Bulalacao, on their way to Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy,
Masbate, when they met with the victim Cantre and witness Sañano. The victim Cantre took
hold of Bulalacao and punched him several times. Petitioner Calimutan attempted to pacify the
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victim Cantre but the latter refused to calm down, pulling out from his waist an eight-inch
Batangas knife and uttering that he was looking for trouble, either "to kill or be killed." At this
point, petitioner Calimutan was about ten meters away from the victim Cantre and was too
frightened to move any closer for fear that the enraged man would turn on him; he still had a
family to take care of. When he saw that the victim Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao,
petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which he described as approximately one-inch indiameter, and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim Cantre on his right
buttock. Petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao then started to run away, and victim Cantre chased
after them, but witness Sañano was able to pacify the victim Cantre. Petitioner Calimutan
allegedly reported the incident to a kagawad of Barangay Panique and to the police authorities
and sought their help in settling the dispute between Bulalacao and the victim Cantre.
Bulalacao, meanwhile, refused to seek medical help despite the advice of petitioner Calimutan
and, instead, chose to go back to his hometown.
Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had happened to the victim Cantre after the
stoning incident on 04 February 1996. Some of his friends told him that they still saw the victim
Cantre drinking at a videoke bar on the night of 04 February 1996. As far as he knew, the victim
Cantre died the following day, on 05 February 1996, because of food poisoning. Petitioner
Calimutan maintained that he had no personal grudge against the victim Cantre previous to the
stoning incident.
On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision, essentially adopting the prosecution’s
account of the incident on 04 February 1996, and pronouncing that –
It cannot be legally contended that the throwing of the stone by the accused was in defense of
his companion, a stranger, because after the boxing Michael was able to run. While it appears
that the victim was the unlawful aggressor at the beginning, but the aggression already ceasedafter Michael was able to run and there was no more need for throwing a stone. The throwing
of the stone to the victim which was a retaliatory act can be considered unlawful, hence the
accused can be held criminally liable under paragraph 1 of Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left side was a
treacherous one and the accused committed a felony causing physical injuries to the victim. The
physical injury of hematoma as a result of the impact of the stone resulted in the laceration of
the spleen causing the death of the victim. The accused is criminally liable for all the direct and
natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been intended.
(Art. 4, Par. 1, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Narciso, CA-G.R. No. 03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964)
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one’s illegal acts
merely because one does not intend to produce such consequences (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil.
310).
The crime committed is Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused ROLLIE CALIMUTAN is GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised
Penal Code with no mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the IndeterminateSentence Law hereby imposes the penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision
Mayor as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos as compensatory damages and the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
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Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001, sustained the conviction of homicide rendered
by the RTC against petitioner Calimutan, ratiocinating thus –
The prosecution has sufficiently established that the serious internal injury sustained by the
victim was caused by the stone thrown at the victim by the accused which, the accused-appellant does not deny. It was likewise shown that the internal injury sustained by the victim
was the result of the impact of the stone that hit the victim. It resulted to a traumatic injury of
the abdomen causing the laceration of the victim’s spleen.
This is clearly shown by the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a Senior Medico
Legal Officer of the NBI after the exhumation of the victim’s cadaver…
The Court cannot give credence to the post mortem report prepared by Municipal Health
Officer Dr. Conchita Ulanday stating that the cause of the victim’s death was food poisoning. Dr.
Ulanday was not even presented to testify in court hence she was not even able to identify
and/or affirm the contents of her report. She was not made available for cross-examination on
the accuracy and correctness of her findings.
Dr. Conchita Ulanday’s post mortem report cannot prevail over the autopsy report (Exh. "C") of
the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who testified and was cross-examined by the defense.
Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that the victim indeed died of food poisoning, as
reported by Dr. Conchita Ulanday, why did they not present her as their witness to belie the
report of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.
The trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of Dr. Mendez is accorded the highest respectbecause it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of said witness.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate,
Branch 46, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide
is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15 January 2002, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner Calimutan for lack of merit since the issues raised therein
had already been passed and ruled upon in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001.
Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,
seeking (1) the reversal of the Decisions of the RTC, dated 19 November 1998, and of the Court
of Appeals, dated 29 August 2001, convicting him of the crime of homicide; and, (2)
consequently, his acquittal of the said crime based on reasonable doubt.
Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the two autopsy reports, with dissimilar
findings on the cause of death of the victim Cantre, constituted reasonable doubt as to the
liability of petitioner Calimutan for the said death, arguing that –
x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate was the first
physician of the government who conducted an examination on the cadaver of the victim PhilipCantre whose findings was that the cause of his death was due to food poisoning while the
second government physician NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ronaldo Mendez whose findings
was that the cause of the death was due to a traumatic injury of the abdomen caused by a
lacerated spleen and with these findings of two (2) government physicians whose findings are
at variance with each other materially, it is humbly contended that the same issue raised a
reasonable doubt on the culpability of the petitioner.
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As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of the evidence for the prosecution in the case at
bar, it suffices to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as to the petitioner’s guilt and therefore, he is
entitled to acquittal (People vs. Delmendo, G.R. No. 32146, November 23, 1981).
In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if his or her guilt is
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only amoral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it
does not demand absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error.
In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to hold
petitioner Calimutan liable for the death of the victim Cantre.
Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report and the personal testimony before the RTC
of prosecution witness, NBI Senior Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Mendez, are vital pieces of
evidence against petitioner Calimutan. Dr. Mendez determined that the victim Cantre died of
internal hemorrhage or bleeding due to the laceration of his spleen. In his testimony, Dr.
Mendez clearly and consistently explained that the spleen could be lacerated or ruptured when
the abdominal area was hit with a blunt object, such as the stone thrown by petitioner
Calimutan at the victim Cantre.
It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as an expert witness,
whose "competency and academic qualification and background" was admitted by the defense
itself. As a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed to possess sufficient
knowledge of pathology, surgery, gynecology, toxicology, and such other branches of medicine
germane to the issues involved in a case.
Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence , and although it does not necessarilybind the courts, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had properly accorded it great weight
and probative value. Having testified as to matters undeniably within his area of expertise, and
having performed a thorough autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre, his findings as to the
cause of death of the victim Cantre are more than just the mere speculations of an ordinary
person. They may sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by
the petitioner Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of the victim Cantre which, subsequently,
resulted in the latter’s death. With no apparent mistake or irregularity, whether in the manner
by which Dr. Mendez performed the autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre or in his findings,
then his report and testimony must be seriously considered by this Court.
Moreover, reference to other resource materials on abdominal injuries would also support the
conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan caused the death of
the victim Cantre.
One source explains the nature of abdominal injuries in the following manner –
The skin may remain unmarked inspite of extensive internal injuries with bleeding and
disruption of the internal organs. The areas most vulnerable are the point of attachment of
internal organs, especially at the source of its blood supply and at the point where blood
vessels change direction.
The area in the middle superior half of the abdomen, forming a triangle bounded by the ribs on
the two sides and a line drawn horizontally through the umbilicus forming its base is vulnerable
to trauma applied from any direction. In this triangle are found several blood vessels changing
direction, particularly the celiac trunk, its branches (the hepatic, splenic and gastric arteries) as
well as the accompanying veins. The loop of the duodenum, the ligament of Treitz and the
pancreas are in the retroperitoneal space, and the stomach and transverse colon are in the
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triangle, located in the peritoneal cavity. Compression or blow on the area may cause
detachment, laceration, stretch-stress, contusion of the organs (Legal Medicine 1980, Cyril H.
Wecht et., p. 41).
As to injuries to the spleen, in particular, the same source expounds that –
The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture resulting from the impact of a fall or blow from the
crushing and grinding effects of wheels of motor vehicles. Although the organ is protected at its
upper portion by the ribs and also by the air-containing visceral organs, yet on account of its
superficiality and fragility, it is usually affected by trauma. x x x.
Certainly, there are some terms in the above-quoted paragraphs difficult to comprehend for
people without medical backgrounds. Nevertheless, there are some points that can be plainly
derived therefrom: (1) Contrary to common perception, the abdominal area is more than just
the waist area. The entire abdominal area is divided into different triangles, and the spleen is
located in the upper triangle, bounded by the rib cage; (2) The spleen and all internal organs in
the same triangle are vulnerable to trauma from all directions. Therefore, the stone need not
hit the victim Cantre from the front. Even impact from a stone hitting the back of the victim
Cantre, in the area of the afore-mentioned triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3) Although
the spleen had already been ruptured or lacerated, there may not always be a perceptible
external injury to the victim. Injury to the spleen cannot, at all times, be attributed to an
obvious, external injury such as a cut or bruise. The laceration of the victim Cantre’s spleen can
be caused by a stone thrown hard enough, which qualifies as a nonpenetrating trauma –
Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or in combination with other viscera, is the most
frequently injured organ following blunt trauma to the abdomen or the lower thoracic cage.
Automobile accidents provide the predominating cause, while falls, sledding and bicycleinjuries, and blows incurred during contact sports are frequently implicated in children. x x x
The sheer impact of the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre
could rupture or lacerate the spleen – an organ described as vulnerable, superficial, and fragile
– even without causing any other external physical injury. Accordingly, the findings of Dr.
Mendez that the victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage from his lacerated spleen, and the
cause of the laceration of the spleen was the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back
of the victim Cantre, does not necessarily contradict his testimony before the RTC that none of
the external injuries of the victim Cantre were fatal.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was able to establish that the proximate
cause of the death of the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan.
Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."
The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely Sañano and Belen Cantre, had
adequately recounted the events that transpired on 04 February 1996 to 05 February 1996.
Between the two of them, the said witnesses accounted for the whereabouts, actions, and
physical condition of the victim Cantre during the said period. Before the encounter with
petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao, the victim Cantre seemed to be physically fine. However,after being hit at the back by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, the victim
Cantre had continuously complained of backache. Subsequently, his physical condition rapidly
deteriorated, until finally, he died. Other than being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was
no other instance when the victim Cantre may have been hit by another blunt instrument which
could have caused the laceration of his spleen.
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Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the victim Cantre died from a lacerated spleen, an
injury sustained after being hit by a stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Not even the
post-mortem report of Dr. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer who first examined the body
of the victim Cantre, can raise reasonable doubt as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre.
Invoking Dr. Ulanday’s post-mortem report, the defense insisted on the possibility that the
victim Cantre died of food poisoning. The post-mortem report, though, cannot be given muchweight and probative value for the following reasons –
First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr. Ulanday in her post-mortem report, as well as in
the death certificate of the victim Cantre, reveals that although she suspected food poisoning
as the cause of death, she held back from making a categorical statement that it was so. In the
post-mortem report, she found that "x x x the provable (sic) cause of death was due to cardio-
respiratory arrest. Food poisoning must be confirm (sic) by laboratory e(x)am." In the death
certificate of the victim Cantre, she wrote that the immediate cause of death was "Cardio-
Respiratory Arrest" and the antecedent cause was "Food Poisoning Suspect." There was no
showing that further laboratory tests were indeed conducted to confirm Dr. Ulanday’s
suspicion that the victim Cantre suffered from food poisoning, and without such confirmation,
her suspicion as to the cause of death remains just that – a suspicion.
Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a sworn statement in which she had explained her
findings in the post-mortem report, to wit –
05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver?
A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by the NBI Medico-legal.
06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding your certification on the death of PHILIP B.CANTRE?
A: I stated in the certification and even in the Death Certificate about "Food Poisoning". What I
stated in the Death Certificate was that CANTRE was a SUSPECTED victim of food poisoning. I
didn’t state that he was a case of food poisoning. And in the Certification, I even recommended
that an examination be done to confirm that suspicion.
07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning?
A: As there were no external signs of fatal injuries except that of the contusion or abrasion,
measuring as that size of a 25 centavo coin, I based my suspicion from the history of the victim
and from the police investigation.
08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification that there was no internal hemorrhage in the
cadaver. Did you open the body of the cadaver?
A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct an exhaustive autopsy. I made an incision on
the abdomen and I explored the internal organs of the cadaver with my hand in search for any
clotting inside. But I found none. I did not open the body of the cadaver.
09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you have observed on the cadaver. Where was itlocated?
A: On the left portion of his back, sir.
10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit by a hard object on that part of his body, his
SPLEEN could be injured?
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A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong or forceful the impact was.
In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his testimony before the RTC how he conducted the
autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre, as follows –
Q What specific procedure did you do in connection with the exhumation of the body of thevictim in this case?
A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.
Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted?
A Yes, sir.
Q Aside from opening the head as well as the body of the victim Philip Cantre, what other
matters did you do in connection therewith?
A We examined the internal organs.
Q What in particular internal organs you have examined?
A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas plus the intestines.
x x x x
Q The cause of death as you have listed here in your findings is listed as traumatic injury of the
abdomen, will you kindly tell us Doctor what is the significance of this medical term traumaticinjury of the abdomen?
A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI don’t do what other doctors do as they make causes of
death as internal hemorrhage we particularly point to the injury of the body like this particular
case the injury was at the abdomen of the victim.
Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion of the abdomen of the victim this traumatic
injury is located?
A Along the midline but the damaged organ was at the left.
Q What particular organ are you referring to?
A The spleen, sir.
The difference in the extent of the examinations conducted by the two doctors of the body of
the victim Cantre provides an adequate explanation for their apparent inconsistent findings as
to the cause of death. Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her
unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive
autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the cause
of death of the victim Cantre, then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by
the courts.
Third, that the prosecution no longer presented Dr. Ulanday before the RTC despite being
included in its list of witnesses did not amount to a willful suppression of evidence that would
give rise to the presumption that her testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if
produced. As this Court already expounded in the case of People v. Jumamoy –
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The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses listed in the information did not
constitute, contrary to the contention of the accused, suppression of evidence. The prosecutor
has the exclusive prerogative to determine the witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If
the prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, the prosecutor need not
present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof
necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of theother witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature.
This Court has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses would not constitute
suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the prosecution's case. Besides, there is no
showing that the eyewitnesses who were not presented in court as witnesses were not
available to the accused. We reiterate the rule that the adverse presumption from a
suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful; (2) the
evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at
the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if
the accused believed that the failure to present the other witnesses was because their
testimonies would be unfavorable to the prosecution, he should have compelled their
appearance, by compulsory process, to testify as his own witnesses or even as hostile
witnesses.
It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer present Dr. Ulanday before the RTC,
perhaps believing that it had already presented sufficient evidence to merit the conviction of
petitioner Calimutan even without her testimony. There was nothing, however, preventing the
defense from calling on, or even compelling, with the appropriate court processes, Dr. Ulanday
to testify in court as its witness if it truly believed that her testimony would be adverse to the
case presented by the prosecution.
While this Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals andaffirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the victim Cantre was caused by
his lacerated spleen, an injury which resulted from being hit by the stone thrown at him by
petitioner Calimutan, this Court, nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC and the Court of
Appeals as to the determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner
should have been convicted for.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are
committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of
felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of
the offender –
In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the language of Art. 3,
the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act or
in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies,
the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to
another person is "unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without
malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner Calimutan
any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of suchintent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime
of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court
finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
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Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for the definition of reckless
imprudence –
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employmentor occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
There are several circumstances, discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, that demonstrate
petitioner Calimutan’s lack of intent to kill the victim Cantre, and conversely, that substantiate
the view of this Court that the death of victim Cantre was a result of petitioner Calimutan’s
reckless imprudence. The RTC and the Court of Appeals may have failed to appreciate, or had
completely overlooked, the significance of such circumstances.
It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim Cantre and witness Sañano, on the one
hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao, on the other, was a chance encounter
as the two parties were on their way to different destinations. The victim Cantre and witness
Sañano were on their way home from a drinking spree in Crossing Capsay, while petitioner
Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao were walking from the market to Crossing Capsay. While
the evidence on record suggests that a running grudge existed between the victim Cantre and
Bulalacao, it did not establish that there was likewise an existing animosity between the victim
Cantre and petitioner Calimutan.1avvphil.net
In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996 submitted by the prosecution and the
defense, it was the victim Cantre who was the initial aggressor. He suddenly punched Bulalacao,
the helper and companion of petitioner Calimutan, when they met on the road. The attack of the victim Cantre was swift and unprovoked, which spurred petitioner Calimutan into
responsive action. Given that this Court dismisses the claim of petitioner Calimutan that the
victim Cantre was holding a knife, it does take into account that the victim Cantre was
considerably older and bigger, at 26 years of age and with a height of five feet and nine inches,
compared to Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who was only 15 years old and stood at about five
feet. Even with his bare hands, the victim Cantre could have hurt Bulalacao. Petitioner
Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop the assault of the victim Cantre against
the latter when he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. The stone was readily
available as a weapon to petitioner Calimutan since the incident took place on a road. That he
threw the stone at the back of the victim Cantre does not automatically imply treachery on the
part of petitioner Calimutan as it is highly probable that in the midst of the fray, he threw the
stone rashly and impulsively, with no regard as to the position of the victim Cantre. When the
victim Cantre stopped his aggression after being hit by the stone thrown by petitioner
Calimutan, the latter also desisted from any other act of violence against the victim Cantre.
The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few minutes. It was a very
brief scuffle, in which the parties involved would hardly have the time to ponder upon the most
appropriate course of action to take. With this in mind, this Court cannot concur in the
declaration made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the
victim Cantre as a retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift and spontaneous reaction to an
unexpected and unprovoked attack by the victim Cantre on Bulalacao. That Bulalacao wasalready able to run away from the victim Cantre may have escaped the notice of the petitioner
Calimutan who, under the pressure of the circumstances, was forced to act as quickly as
possible.
The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim
Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre. What
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is obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutan’s intention to drive away the attacker who
was, at that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier
described, much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre.
Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful objective when he threw the stone
at the victim Cantre, his act was committed with inexcusable lack of precaution. He failed toconsider that a stone the size of a man’s fist could inflict substantial injury on someone. He also
miscalculated his own strength, perhaps unaware, or even completely disbelieving, that he
could throw a stone with such force as to seriously injure, or worse, kill someone, at a quite
lengthy distance of ten meters.
Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre was
the proximate cause of the latter’s death, despite being done with reckless imprudence rather
than with malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan remains civilly liable for such death. This Court,
therefore, retains the reward made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the heirs of the
victim Cantre of the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and another
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29
August 2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November
1998, is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to
a maximum period of two years and one day of prision correccional . Petitioner Calimutan is
further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the latter’s death and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
TAYLARAN vs DE CASTRO, G.R. No. L-49149
Charged with murder ill the Court of First Instance of Bohol, appellant was convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P
12,000 and to pay costs. Appealing to this Court, appellant insists on his defense of accidental,
not deliberate killing.
We quote hereunder from the appealed decision the versions of both the prosecution and thedefense, as set forth therein:
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
At about 10:00 P.M. of November 5, 1976 accused called at the house of
deceased Ofremia Atup y Sarabosing located in barrio Binliw, Ubay, Bohol for the
purpose of submitting himself to the latter for treatment of his snake-bite
located at this left foot. His announced purpose being good, the deceased
opened the door for him. Once inside, the deceased took her medicine
paraphernalia (she being a local quack doctor) and started treating the accused.
Then all of a sudden the accused drew his small bolo (Exhibit A) and stabbed the
deceased several times causing her to fall on the floor dead. After killing the
deceased, accused proceeded to the house of the son of the deceased for the
purpose of killing him and his wife but accused did not accomplish his purpose
because the deceased's son refused to left him enter his house. After that the
accused surrendered himself with his bolo to policeman Demetrio Basilad who
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was then on guard at the municipal hall of Ubay. When asked why he killed the
deceased who was also his grandmother-in-law, accused answered, 'because she
promised to kill me with a 'barang', hence killed her first. (Testimonies of
Salvador Atup, policeman Demetrio Basilad and Juanita Busalla)
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
At about 9:00 P.M. on November 5, 1976 accused went to tend to his carabao.
On the way, he was bitten by a snake at the smallest toe of his left foot. Hence,
he proceeded to the house of his grandmother-in-law, Ofremia Sarabosing which
was located in barrio Binliw Ubay, Bohol for treatment of snake-bite. Ofremia
Sarabosing was a quack doctor known to cure snake-bites. He arrived at
deceased's house at about 10:00 P.M. The deceased opened the door to let him
enter. Once inside he and the deceased stood on the floor facing each other.
Then the deceased instructed accused to open his snake-bite with a bolo (Exhibit
A) so that the venom can be drained out. While he was opening his snake-bite
with a bolo, he accidentally put out the light of the kerosene lamp which was
placed on the floor, This prompted the deceased to re-light said lamp. She
banded her body down with her two hands extended towards the floor to light
said lamp. At the very time that deceased was bending her body downward,
accused lifted his right hand which was holding the bolo upward, so that the
point of the bolo accidentally hit deceased's right chest penetrating the nipple
and resulting in her death. Upon realizing that the deceased was fatally
wounded, accused asked for her forgiveness and after that he ran away.
(Testimonies of accused himself and Elpidio Mendez).1
As the trial court prefaced its decision, which version is correct?
That the deceased died from wounds inflicted by the appellant is not disputed. As gleaned from
the opposing versions set forth above, the conflict is in how the wounds were inflicted —
whether with deliberate intent, or purely by accident.
It is extremely difficult to accept the accident version of appellant which he purveyed without
corroboration. More than one wound was found sustained by the deceased, on different parts
of the body. One single stroke could not have inflicted all of them. The first wound could
possibly have been accidentally inflicted, but the other, wounds could not have been similarly
inflicted if, as just pointed out, they did not result from the first blow. Their locations preclude
that a single blow produced all the wounds. This fact robs the accident theory of appellant of
any plausibility.
The explanation of appellant as to how the wounds other than that located on the right chest
was inflicted simply cannot inspire belief. In trying to succor the old woman when she fell upon
being hit accidentally with the point of the bolo, as appellant alleged, he could not have kept on
holding the bolo. He would have dropped it instantly, as instinct would have made him do so.
The infliction of more wounds after the first was therefore deliberate and not by mere accident.
It is, likewise, hard to believe that a mere accidental hitting with the point of the small bolo, and
therefore not with so much force, would inflict a wound that is so fatal as that sustained on the
chest.
That the wounding was with intent to kill is reflected by appellant's statement that he killed the
old woman because she had allegedly promised to kill him by "barang" or by witchcraft, which
he gave upon surrendering to Pat. Demetrio Basilad at the Municipal Building. It was just
natural for appellant to explain to the police why he was surrendering. For Pat. Basilad to testify
on what appellant said on this score is thus perfectly proper, and full credence must be
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accorded to him, being obviously an impartial witness. It is not a matter of whether the
statement is a part of the res gestae to be admissible.
Appellant of course denies having made the admission, but in the light of the other evidence of
the prosecution, his denial is not convincing. As demonstrated earlier, his accident theory of the
killing merits not much credibility from the mere fact that more than one wound was inflictedwhich could not have resulted from just one blow. Repeated blows easily negates any claim of
wounding by mere accident.
The fact that he was not allowed to enter the house of Juanita Busalla, daughter of the
deceased, when he went there directly from the old woman's house, would show that he
appeared, by his behavior or words, that he was dangerously in an angry mood, which is
indicative of being a deliberate killer rather than a sorrowful and harmless penitent for a killing
he has committed only by accident. As Juanita also testified, when appellant was already in jail,
he told her that he killed her mother because of witchcraft, corroborating Pat. Basilad's
testimony. It would, therefore, be of no avail for appellant to contend that the court a quo
erred in admitting appellant's statement he made upon surrendering that he killed the
deceased because the latter intended to kill him by witchcraft as part of the res gestae. The
testimony of both Pat. Basilad and Juanita Busalla on the inculpatory statement of appellant is
legally admissible not because the statement is part of the res gestae, but for said witnesses
having heard appellant made the statement on their own perception.
It is hard to see why the aforementioned witnesses testified on the admission of appellant the
way they did unless they were prompted only by the truth. If appellant had surrendered with
an admission of killing the old woman by accident, as he must have tried to impress upon the
authorities if such was the truth, Pat. Basilad had no reason to give the killing the graver
character than what it really was. As far as he is concerned, he had no more problem relative tothe solution of the crime, which is the usual cause for police twisting the truth or other form of
excesses when conducting investigations the desire to solve a crime by all means.
That Dr. Silverio Gaviola who issued the post-mortem examination report failed to testify
thereon because he died before he could be called to the stand, so unduly stressed to show the
quality of his report as hearsay, does not affect the sufficiency of the evidence against appellant
to entitle him to the acceptance of his claim of accident to exempt him from criminal liability.
As already shown, such evidence is more than adequate to make the mind rest at ease on
appellant's guilt as charged. The autopsy report, if not admitted as such, is part of the
testimony of Pat. Sarabosing. He testified on the number and location of the wounds, and his
testimony, being that of a peace officer with basic knowledge in medico-legal medicine, having
taken a course therein (p. 26, tsn, May 21, 1978) may well serve the purpose of the autopsy
report, if the report is not itself admissible as independent evidence, as appellant would insist.
Appellant has also invoked the provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution in trying to
block the admission of his declaration to Pat. Basilad that he killed Ofremia Atup because of her
alleged vow to kill him by witchcraft, contending that the safeguards therefor have not been
made available to him. The cited provision reads:
Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the rightto remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against himself. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
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The applicability of the foregoing provision does not seem to contemplate cases like the print
where no written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal
custodial investigation. What was testified to is only what appellant told the police why he is
surrendering to them. It is but natural for one who surrenders to the police to give reason or
explanation for his act of surrendering. It can hardly be said that under such circumstance, the
surrendered is already "under investigation within the meaning of the constitutional provision.As the Solicitor General correctly observes on the circumstances of this case: "If however, he
voluntarily admits the killing and it was precisely because he surrendered to admit the killing,
the constitutional safeguards to be informed of his rights to silence and to counsel may not be
invoked."
In any case, as previously pointed out, another witness, Juanita Busalla, who is not a policeman
also testified to appellant telling her when he was already in jail, that he killed Ofremia Atup
because of her promise to kill him by means of witchcraft, the same declaration he supposedly
made to Pat. Basilad, upon surrendering after the killing. The constitutional safeguard invoked
can have no application to Juanita's testimony on what appellant told her not in the course of a
police investigation.
At any rate, even without the admission, the accident version of appellant is inherently
incredible. As already stated, that he was not allowed by Ofremia's daughter and husband to
enter their house when he went there direct from the old woman's house is a strong proof that
he did not exhibit the harmless mood of a repentant killer as he should visibly appear to them if
the killing was only accidental. On the contrary, he must have appeared so angry, displaying
unmistakable intent to kill then after killing their mother, as the daughter Juanita Busalla, so
testified. (pp. 30-39, tsn, Feb. 1, 1978).
Verily, the issue is one of credibility. The lower court gave more of it to the testimony of theprosecution witnesses. We find no reason to disturb the lower court's appreciation of the
relative credibility of the opposing witnesses.2
Moreover, appellant having admitted the killing,
the burden of proving the exempting circumstance he has invoked in his defense calls for clear
and convincing evidence, as is required of similar defenses as that of self-defense.3
This, he
failed dismally to fulfill.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs BAUSING, G.R. No. L-64965
BIDIN, J.:p
This is an appeal from the decision * of the Regional Trial Court of Dapa, Surigao Del Norte,
Branch XXXI, convicting appellants of the crime of murder, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
JOVEN BAUSING and MANUEL LOROSO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER qualified with treachery. There being no aggravating
circumstance and mitigating circumstance, the Court hereby sentences JOVEN
BAUSING and MANUEL LOROSO, to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
to indemnify the heirs of the late ALEXANDER MANTILLA, jointly and severally,
the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00); without subsidiary
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imprisonment in case of insolvency; with the accessory penalties imposed by law
and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 66)
The facts, as summarized by the trial court, are as follows:
. . . last August 3, 1978, approximately 9:15 o'clock in the evening, the victim,Alexander Mantilla, as incumbent Barangay Councilman and a Ronda Member of
Barangay Consuelo, General Luna, Surigao Del Norte, while performing his
official duties, was at the billiard hall of accused Manuel Loroso, together with
the following persons, namely: Ruirino Crisologo, Domingo Teraytay, Estanislao
Sunico, Aureliano Pacanor, Segundiano Pacanor, Edisimo Minglana, Barangay
Captain Rufo Bunga, Pepito Tokong, Juanito Tokong, Manuel Loroso, Joven
Bausing and Valentin Bausing.
There were two (2) billiard tables and on them the following persons were
playing: Domingo Teraytay, Barangay Captain Rufo Bunga, Juanito Tokong and
Estanislao Sunico.
The billiard game was first interrupted when Domingo Teraytay and Manuel
Loroso were grappling for the knife which was protruding at the back pocket of
the former, the knife was ultimately taken with the assistance of Estanislao
Sunico and Aureliano Pacanor. Manuel Loroso, as owner of the billiard hall,
confiscated the knife in order to prevent any trouble therein.
Thereafter, Valentin Bausing, sometimes called "Rodolfo", clattered the billiard
balls which caused Alexander Mantilla to admonish him to stop his act as he was
not concerned with the game.
Without any word, accused Manuel Loroso who came from the back of Mantilla,
held the hands of the latter while being raised when all of a sudden, Joven
Bausing appeared in the scene, with unsheathed sharp pointed bolo (Exh. "A")
which was hidden inside the umbrella (Exh. "B") thrust many times said bolo
upon Mantilla. Mantilla was released only by Loroso, after the victim was
staggering unconsciously who later fell dead outside the billiard hall. ( Rollo, pp.
29-31)
Appellants Bausing and Loroso were then charged with murder with assault upon an agent of
person in authority. Both pleaded not guilty to the charge and after trial, the trial court
rendered the judgment which appellants now seek to be reversed.
During the trial, the prosecution established the guilt of appellants through the testimonies of
Crisologo, Tokong, Teraytay and Minglana, among others, who were all present at the billiard
hall when the incident happened.
Crisologo testified that in the billiard hall, he saw Manuel Loroso and Domingo Teraytay
grappling with each other for possession of a knife. The others present in the hall tried to pacify
the two and the knife was taken by Estanislao Sunico. He also testified that he saw Valentin
Bausing making trouble inside the billiard hall and was advised by the deceased AlexanderMantilla to stop as he had nothing to do with the game. At this point, Manuel Loroso
approached the deceased from behind and took hold of the latter's hands, whereupon Joven
Bausing ran towards them repeatedly thrusting a sharp pointed bolo at the victim (Alexander
Mantilla) who kicked his assailant in a futile attempt to defend himself. The victim was hit
below his left breast and right breast. Weakened and already down, appellant Joven Bausing
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again stabbed the helpless victim on the mouth after which appellants Bausing and Loroso
walked away (TSN, March 8, 1979, pp. 3-11; Original Records, pp. 172-180).
The above testimony of Crisologo was corroborated in all material points by the testimonies of
(1) Pepito Tokong who was inside the billiard hall because of rain (TSN, April 25, 1979, pp. 3-12;
Original Records, pp. 218-227); (2) Domingo Teraytay who was also playing billiards (TSN, June28, 1979, pp. 3-16; Original Records, pp. 250-263); and (3) Edisimo Minglana who was also in
the hall watching the billiard game (TSN, November 13, 1979, pp. 14-17; Original Records, pp.
232-245).
All of the above witnesses gave exactly the same version of the gruesome and merciless killing
of Alexander Mantilla to the effect that the deceased was only trying to stop Valentin Bausing
from making trouble when Manuel Loroso approached the deceased from behind, held both of
the latter's hands, while the accused Joven Bausing, father of Valentin, suddenly attacked
Mantilla and stabbed the latter several times. As the victim staggered towards the door, he fell
flat on his face. Not satisfied with the injuries already inflicted by him, accused Bausing held the
head of the fallen victim and stabbed the latter on the armpit, hacked him at the left arm
biceps, forearm and mouth.
In this appeal, appellants raise the following errors:
1. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT MANUEL
LOROSO HELD ALEXANDER MANTILLA FROM THE BACK WHILE THE LATTER WAS
BEING STABBED SEVERAL TIMES BY APPELLANT JOVEN BAUSING, THAT
APPELLANT MANUEL LOROSO AND JOVEN BAUSING CONSPIRED IN KILLING
ALEXANDER MANTILLA AND THAT APPELLANT MANUEL LOROSO'S DEFENSE IS
ALIBI, THUS, ERRED IN CONVICTING MANUEL LOROSO OF MURDER;
2. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EDERESA TOKONG'S
TESTIMONY HAS BEEN UNREBUTTED AND THEREFORE FATAL TO THE DEFENSE;
3. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT BELIEVING APPELLANT JOVEN
BAUSING'S DEFENSE THAT HE WAS ACTING IN DEFENSE OF HIS SON, RODULFO
BAUSING, AND IN HOLDING THAT HIS DEFENSE LACKS THE QUANTUM OF PROOF
REQUIRED BY LAW;
4. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED
WAS QUALIFIED WITH TREACHERY;
5. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANT JOVEN BAUSING HAS TO BE
CONVICTED, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF MURDER AND
NOT ONLY OF HOMICIDE AND IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IN HIS FAVOR. (Appellant's Brief,
pp. 1-2; Rollo, p. 85 c-d)
Appellants' assignment of errors being interrelated, the same shall be addressed jointly.
Joven Bausing admitted the killing of the deceased but invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative in a bid to escape criminal liability. After a careful examination of the
verdict rendered by the trial court, We find no compelling reason to reverse the judgment of
conviction.
In order that the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative may be properly invoked, the
following requisites must concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the
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means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person
attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein (Art. 11, par. 1 & 2, Revised
Penal Code).
The first requisite is indispensable. There can be no self-defense unless it is proven that there
had been unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed by the assailant. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or repel (People vs. Malazzab, 160
SCRA 123 [1988]; Ortega v. Sandiganbayan [1990]). In addition, for unlawful aggression to be
appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof,
and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude (People v. Pasco, Jr., supra; People vs.
Rey, 172 SCRA 149 [1989] and the accused must present Proof of positively strong act of real
aggression (Pacificar v. Court of Appeals 125 SCRA 716 [1983]; People v. Aquiatan, 123 SCRA
501 [1983]; People v. Aquino, 124 SCRA 835 [1983]). Unlawful aggression must be such as to
put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself or of a relative
sought to be defended and not an imagined threat.
In the case at bar, appellant Bausing's claim of unlawful aggression committed by the deceased
has not been sufficiently established to warrant the appreciation of defense of a relative as a
justifying circumstance. All four prosecution witnesses who were eyewitnesses to the killing of
Mantilla testified categorically that no unlawful aggression was committed by the deceased.
The victim merely admonished Valentin Bausing, son of appellant Joven, to stop meddling with
the game going on. Appellant's claim of defense of his son cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of the eyewitnesses pointing beyond reasonable doubt that he (appellant) was the
aggressor who treacherously assaulted the deceased.
More importantly, appellant Bausing already admitted the killing of Mantilla. Having made the
admission, it is thus incumbent upon the accused to prove the justifying circumstance to thesatisfaction of the court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability. In such instances, the
accused must proffer strong, clear and convincing evidence of self-defense and depend not on
the infirmity of the prosecution, for even if the latter was weak, the plea of self-defense cannot
prosper especially so where the accused himself has admitted the killing, as in the case at bar
(People v. Bayocot, 174 SCRA 285 [1989]; People v. Masangkay, 157 SCRA 320 [1988]; People v.
Abagon, 161 SCRA 255 [1988]; People v. Tesorero, 71 SCRA 579 [1976]; People v. Llamera, 51
SCRA 48 [1973]; People v. Bauden, 77 Phil. 105 [1946]; People v. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772 [1946]).
Appellant Loroso next contends that the trial court erred in holding that Ederesa Tokong's
testimony has been unrebutted and therefore fatal to the defense. Loroso argues that he has in
fact testified as a sur-rebuttal witness and rebutted the testimony of Tokong point by point.
The argument is devoid of merit and need not be discussed at length. What the trial court
meant when it said that the testimony of Tokong was unrebutted is the fact that appellant
Lorozo failed to rebut the testimony of Tokong that after the killing of Mantilla, said appellant
slept in their (spouses Tokong's) house with bloodstains on his shirt and pair of trousers and
that the blanket and beddings used by him were also stained by blood. The trial court's
pronouncement did not mean that no sur-rebuttal witness was ever presented by the defense.
The nature, character, location and number of the wounds suffered by the deceased belie any
supposition that the deceased was the unlawful aggressor (People v. Marciales, 166 SCRA 436[1988]). As reflected in the autopsy report and the testimony of Dr. Prospero Tayco, the
deceased suffered seventeen (17) incised wounds, including the "through and through" incised
wound of the heart, 21 inches long with entrance at the apex of the heart which is the primary
cause of death and massive blood loss secondary thereto, aside from the numerous abrasions
and avulsions (Autopsy Report, Exh. 15, Original Records). In contrast, both Valentin and Joven
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Bausing suffered no injury. The infliction of the 17 wounds on the deceased could only lead to
the conclusion that Mantilla was the victim of aggression and not the unlawful aggressor.
On the other hand, appellant Loroso faults the trial court for classifying his denial of
participation in the killing of the deceased as one of alibi. Appellant claims that he was busy
pumping air into his petromax lamp lighting the billiard hall at the time the incident occurredand ran away as soon as he saw blood after the second thrust by appellant Bausing. Appellant's
defense would therefore appear as a simple denial of his participation in the commission of the
offense.
Appellant's unsubstantiated disclaimer of participation cannot be given any credence. Self-
serving as it is, his denial of participation in the commission of the crime cannot prevail over the
forthright and positive testimonies by the prosecution witnesses as they uniformly pointed to
him as having held both hands of Mantilla from behind and raised them upwards while Joven
Bausing suddenly appeared on one side of Mantilla, unsheathed the bolo inside the umbrella he
(Bausing) was carrying and stabbed the victim continuously. Loroso released his hold of
Mantilla only when the latter was already on the verge of death as a result of the stab wounds
inflicted by appellant Bausing. The weak denials of appellant cannot prevail over the clear and
positive testimonies of the eyewitnesses regarding his participation in the killing of the
deceased. (People v. Bocatcat, Sr., 188 SCRA 175 [1990]; People v. Delavin, 148 SCRA 25 [1987];
People v. Alcid, 135 SCRA 280 [1985]; People v. Tuscano, 137 SCRA 203 [1985]) for it is a settled
rule that greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime
(People vs. de Mesa, 188 SCRA 48 [1990]; citing People v. Canada, 144 SCRA 121 [1986]; People
vs. Mostoles, Jr., 124 SCRA 906 [1983]).
That the killing of Alexander Mantilla is murder qualified by treachery is borne out by therecords. The victim was not only unarmed but was also deprived of every means to defend
himself from the treacherous attack. Loroso held both hands of the deceased victim while
Joven Bausing suddenly appeared and started stabbing the victim. In People v. Mahusay (138
SCRA 452 [1985]), this Court ruled that there is treachery where the victim was held tightly by
one of the accused before his co-accused stabbed him, as in the case at bar. The appellants
executed the crime in a manner that tended directly and specially to ensure its execution
without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the deceased might have made (Art.
14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code; People v. Pacabes, 137 SCRA 158 [1985]).
The presence of conspiracy was inferred from the concerted acts of both the accused. They
both approached the victim almost simultaneously. As one held the victim's hands tightly from
behind and raised them upward, the other delivered the fatal stabs which caused Mantilla's
death. The manner by which Loroso held the victim's hands from behind which clearly
prevented the latter from defending himself and without which act the crime would not have
been accomplished, makes appellant Loroso a conspirator and a principal by indispensable
cooperation (People v. Martinez, 127 SCRA 260 [1985]). Where the accused by their acts aimed
at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another part so as to
complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts were concerted
and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments, the lower court was justified in concluding that the defendants
were engaged in conspiracy wherein the act of one is the act of all (People v. Manlolo, 169SCRA 394 [1989]). Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by the acts of the accused
themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interests (People v. Monadi, 97 Phil. 575 [1955]).
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender invoked by Joven Bausing deserves scant
consideration. While appellant Bausing claims to have voluntarily surrendered to Pat. Arturo
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Esparrago of Surigao del Norte Police Station on the night of the incident, records of the case
show that appellants were in fact arrested on August 28, 1978 as per return made by Station
Commander Saturnino Plaza of General Luna, Surigao del Norte Police Force (Original Records,
p. 7). The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated considering
that the return of the warrant of arrest showed that appellant was in fact arrested.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification as to the
indemnification which is hereby increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.