meagher paper

7/25/2019 Meagher Paper

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Anti-Corruption Agencies:

A Review of Experience

Final Paper

REVISED DRAFT

By

Patrick MeagherIRIS Center, University of Maryland

Submitted to the World BankPRM!C"

"ugust #, #$$#

"ckno%ledgements& 'his (a(er could not have been (roduced %ithout the guidance and su((ort ofRandi Ryterman and )im "nderson of the World Bank* the assistance of Sam+hana 'ha(a, ang Rong,"-i- "hmad, and Michael Radosh, all students at the University of Maryland* and the e.(ert in(ut of

Melissa 'homas, /iana Rutherford, and 0abriela Mossi of IRIS1 /eserving of s(ecial recognition are theauthors of the three original case studies that served as source material for (art 2 of the (a(er, namely3uigi Man-etti of Southern Methodist University, 'eresa Benedict of 'rans(arency International4Malaysia, and 5a+i Sembo+a and )ames 6a+una of the conomic and Social Research oundation,'an-ania1 "ny faults are the author7s o%n1


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Tale of Contents

1. Introduction________________________________________________________________1

Structure of t!e paper"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""#

2. Researching and Assessing Anti-Corruption Agencies_______________________________3

Defining an$ %easuring Success"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""&

Towar$s a 'or(ale Set of Perfor)ance In$icators""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""*

Explaining Success"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""#+

3. Previously Documented Cases_________________________________________________1

T!e Single-Agenc, Para$ig): ong .ong an$ Singapore""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""#&stablishment88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888889:Res(onsibilities and Po%ers888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888889;Safeguards and Relationshi(s88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888889

. !riginal Case "tudies________________________________________________________#

Estalis!)ent"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""&+"rgentina88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888882$Malaysia888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888882#'an-ania888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888882:

Responsiilities an$ Powers""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""&1"rgentina88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888882;Malaysia888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888882>> (ro(oses a some%hat more restrictive definition, describing theideal "C" as a body that& revie%s and verifies official asset!declarations* carries outinvestigations of (ossible corru(tion* and (ursues civil, administrative, and criminal sanctions inthe a((ro(riate forums1 'his definition D really a recommended model D identifies several of the

core features of "C"s that distinguish them from other institutions, but leaves out some of themAe1g1 information and outreach, analysis and technical assistance and at the same time is toos(ecific Ae1g1 including litigation and direct res(onsibility for asset declarations to accommodatethe range of agency forms no% in use1 5ence, %e (refer a some%hat looser definition1

'he history of "C"s a((ears not to be kno%n in much detail in the internationalcommunity of anti!corru(tion s(ecialists, (articularly those %orking in develo(ing and transitioncountries1 'his history is freHuently (resented as starting %ith the establishment of thecommission in Singa(ore in the 9>=$s, its restructuring in the early 9>:$s, or even the 5ong6ong bureau founded in the 9>@$s1 In fact, a Huite similar model began o(erations in e% ForkCity in the 9


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Deining and easuring "uccess

What are anti!corru(tion agencies e.(ected to do, and ho% does an observer kno% if suchan agency has been successfulG In general, "C"s are set u( as a (olitical res(onse to scandal,

and (rovide a mechanism for (olitical leaders to reassure voters and reformists that action isbeing taken to bring corru(tion under control1 'he e.tent to %hich the ob+ectives of a ne%agency reflect a desire for systemic change, as o((osed to a drive to score (olitical (oints, israrely clear D and is rarely intended to be clear1 'his (oses a dilemma for the observer indefining and measuring success1 What yardstick to useG 'he measurement of (olitical gain%ould be the easiest& ho% %ell does the reforming leader or (arty do in subseHuent electionsG5o%ever, in this (a(er %e are more interested in the reformist ob+ective, %hich is to constraincorru(tion1 Political gain might factor in, for e.am(le, %here (oor (erformance by an "C"coincides %ith significant gains to the founding (arty D thus hinting at an em(ty (olitical gesture1

If the agency7s ob+ective, then, is to reduce or constrain corru(tion, ho% is one to identify

and measure success in these termsG In the literature on "C"s, these issues are not oftenconfronted, and a((ear in most cases to be assumed a%ay1 6aufman A9>>


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6ox #: ,pot!eses on t!e I)pact of ACAs

9 'here is a series of institutional design factors (ro(osed in the literature on "C"s Asee belo%that describe necessary features of an effective anti!corru(tion agency1 "lthough these

conditions are consistently associated %ith success, they are not by themselves sufficient1 'heother necessary conditions for success of an "C" are e.ogenous, and include (ublic order,(olitical stability, the absence of macroeconomic crisis or cri((ling distortions, and some basicfeatures of the rule of la%1

# ven if all these sufficient conditions are met, the dimensions of corru(tion could stillover%helm an "C"1 Such agencies cannot cure thoroughly unsound governance environments1Rather, they can address corru(t areas Aeven dee(ly corru(t ones %ithin an environment that isother%ise sound in governance terms D i1e1 they can add value in anti!corru(tion terms to astructure of %orking institutions that have (roven unable to tackle some significant (ockets ofcorru(tion1 More s(ecifically, an "C" reHuires effective su((ort %ithin most, if not all, of the

follo%ing areas& the to( governing circle in the e.ecutive, the to( level of the +udiciary, thesu(reme audit agency, the legislature, the to( business figures and organi-ations, and the general(ublic1 In other %ords, there need to be some other effective institutions and net%orks that havenot themselves been seriously com(romised by corru(tion, or other%ise (ersuaded to look theother %ay1

= Conversely, "C"s lacking the features cited above could still succeed in the short!term, butare unlikely to outlive the current (olitical alignment or regime1 Such a success %ould have tobe based on mass (olitical su((ort for (olicies and measures against corru(tion Ae1g1 in the %akeof a scandal, or alternatively a strong anti!corru(tion (lank in the (latform of the ruling (arty orformation1 "bsent other conditions, anti!corru(tion initiatives %ill de(end on ad hoc bodies or

on (ersonalities Athe chief of state and a fe% allies, but %ill not result in sustained and successfulinstitutions1

2 " country7s Aor +urisdiction7s ability to create an effective "C" is a reflection of its ability toevolve effective institutions of governance Acourts, civil service, com(etitive (arty system, etc1more generally1 'he one is consistently associated %ith the other1 'his suggests that investingresources in an "C" %ithin a conte.t of high corru(tion %ill be both ho(eless, %asteful in termsof higher (riority needs going unmet, and indeed dangerous, since these are the situations %here"C"s are most likely to be (olitici-ed and (redatory1 Short!term success Aas in K= may befeasible, but this de(ends on the interests and alignment of (o%erful individuals rather than oninstitutional design D and a strong "C" may become abusive in the %ake of a (olitical shift19

We kno% %hat "C"s (ur(ort to achieve D but %hat do they actually doG "s in 5ong6ong and its many imitators, these agencies usually describe their anti!corru(tion (rograms interms of (revention and deterrence, often %ith some element of (ublic mobili-ation mi.ed in1Such a (rogram involves a certain defined menu of functions and tasks that most "C"s share1

9'he above (oints a((ly to emerging and established democracies, as %ell as to economically liberal but semi!authoritarian regimes1 In a fully authoritarian regime AStalinism, the 'aliban, an "C" can be effective as long asthe regime lasts, based on the (roven ruthlessness of the individual or coterie holding (o%er1

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5aving collected information on some thirty "C"s, %e are able to identify si. functions thatthey commonly (erform&

Receive and res(ond to com(laints

Intelligence, monitoring, and investigation

Prosecutions and administrative orders Preventive research, analysis, and technical assistance

thics (olicy guidance, com(liance revie%, and scrutiny of asset declarations

Public information, education, and outreach1

In e.amining agencies7 (erformance of these tasks, %e can certainly ask how welltheagency carries them out1 But this %ould not, by itself, enable us to determine the agencies7im(act on levels of corru(tion D %hich is %hat they are ostensibly designed to influence1 'hereare t%o main difficulties here1 ?ne (roblem is that, even if %e determine that an agency (erformsthe above categories of tasks e.tremely %ell, this does not tell us whether it has the rightmission1

'he (olitical science literature has traditionally been ske(tical about the value of anyrobust anti!corru(tion mission1 5untington A9>;


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(ayments often form some (art of the base of a graft (yramid that e.tends to the to( of theadministrative and (olitical systems1

"s distinct from anti!corru(tion measures generally, anti!corru(tion agenciesmight ormight not have a useful mission1 In one sense, they reflect the (revailing tackling!the!sym(tom

biasJ A6aufman #$$$ or thermodynamic la% that necessarily calls forth an anti!corru(tioninstitution %hen the stimulus of corru(tion is ackno%ledged1 'he consensus at least in theeconomics literature is that there are many more D and more im(ortant D causes of highcorru(tion levels than the lack of an "C" or some other kind of re(ressive mechanism1 ASee, e1g1Bardhan 9>>@, 6litgaard 9>


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efficiency of government e.(enditure and service (rovision, com(arisons over time in(rocurement and infrastructure costs, and even the incidence of civic initiatives againstcorru(tion Ae1g1 as re(orted in the (ress1 5o%ever, as 6aufmann A#$$$ and others (oint out,the (roblem of identifying a flo% of causality from anti!corru(tion agencies to these macro!leveloutcomes D including the need to account for the influence of structural reforms and other

im(ortant factors D is e.tremely daunting1 In other %ords, obtaining detailed information on thedesign and activities of "C"s, and the macro!level data on corru(tion!related (henomena, %ouldonly be the beginning of the inHuiry1 Much more %ould be needed1

(o/ards a 0ora)le "et o Perormance Indicators

or no%, su((ose that, instead of attem(ting to measure the systemic im(act of an "C"7sefforts, %e %ere to focus more narro%ly on %hat the agency does and ho% %ell it does it1 "s %ehave already hinted, this, too has its (roblems1 Com(aring the tasks actually allocated to anti!corru(tion agencies %ith the larger set of (ublic goods and services reHuired to combatcorru(tion Asee the chart above makes it clear that "C"s can only take on a limited set of them

D and that other agencies often handle the same tasks any%ay1 'hus, an "C"7s value!addedsurely cannot be its set of res(onsibilities, (o%ers, and activities1 'hese e.ist in most societies,and the only Huestion is %hich agency has them1 Indeed, since other agencies e.ist to carry outfunctions that are sometimes housed in an "C", this also means that an "C"7s record of successD ho% %ell it carries out its tasks D does not! b" itself! measure net valueadded1 If the "C"didn7t e.ist, some other agency %ould likely be handling its (reventive, deterrent, and outreachfunctions1 /o "C"s do this better D so that they out(erform other arrangements in (roducingthese out(uts and outcomesG If so, ho% do they do it, and ho% do %e kno%G

'he underlying rationale for establishing an "C" in most cases seems to be that, unlikee.isting agencies of restraint, Ai it %ill not itself be tainted by corru(tion or (olitical intrusion*Aii it %ill resolve coordination (roblems among multi(le agencies through vertical integration*Aiii this integration, %ith some augmentation of (o%ers or im(roved criminal legislation, createsa (o%erful agency able to overcome obstacles that stymied earlier efforts* and Aiv the "C" issituated in such a %ay that it can centrali-e all necessary information and intelligence aboutcorru(tion and can assert leadershi( in the anti!corru(tion effort1 In other %ords, %hile settingu( an "C" may involve creating (o%ers and tasks that did not e.ist before, the agency7s maincontributions are synergy, coordination, and concentrated (o%er1 'his suggests that the maine.(ected outcome of an "C" should be an overall improvementin the (erformance of anti!corru(tion functions1

It is im(ortant to distinguish bet%een Aa the level of corru(tion in a given country ordistrict, and Ab ho% %ell certain core anti!corru(tion functions are (erformed1 In (rinci(le, thet%o are related, but the latter is essentially an output measure1 ?ne could link this, %ith only afe% realistic assum(tions, to measures of (ro.imate im(act or intermediate outcomes1 'hese areachievements that may de(end on an "C"7s success in (roducing its out(uts1 .am(les includethe number of successful (rosecutions, the number and Huality of institutional reforms designedto combat corru(tion, and the intensity of anti!corru(tion sentiment and activity across society1


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In this study, %e %ill use these kinds of (erformance measures to the e.tent available1'hese ty(es of measures had their genesis in attem(ts over the last several decades to assessagency and (ro+ect (erformance using 3ogframesJ and similar devices1 MeasurementtechniHues gained further (rominence and so(histication as a result of the e% PublicManagement movement1 'he latter arose %ith the %holesale restructuring of the (ublic sector in

e% Nealand in the 9>>$s, and related initiatives in Canada, the U161 and else%here1 Performance measurementsystems translate the ob+ectives of an organi-ation or (rogram into indicators against %hichachievement can be assessed1 'he areas covered by these measures usually include somecombination of (roductivity, effectiveness, Huality, and timeliness1 Use of these measures isthought to contribute to better decision!making, accountability, a stronger service orientation,and (ublic (artici(ation1 Public management e.(erts categori-e (erformance indicators asfollo%s Aational Center for Public Productivity 9>>@&

?ut(ut indicators A%orkload or units (roduced

?utcome indicators Aeffectiveness in meeting (ublic (ur(oses, meeting needs

fficiency and (roductivity indicators Acost!effectiveness, ratio of in(ut to out(ut,unit costs1#

What ty(es of (erformance measures %ould be a((ro(riate for anti!corru(tion agenciesGPresented in 'able 9 A'ables "nne. is a sam(ling of such indicators, from agencies %ithmissions similar to those of "C"s, such as the )ustice /e(artment A/?), Securities and.change Commission ASC, ederal 'rade Commission A'C, and nvironmental Protection"gency AP" in the U1S1 '%o anti!corru(tion agencies D the 5ong 6ong IC"C and the U1S1?ffice of 0overnment thics A?0 D have (erformance measures that merit scrutiny, and areincluded for (ur(oses of discussion1 It is useful to com(are a range of agencies %ith rolessimilar to "C"s, to get a sense of the varied %ays in %hich they attem(t to measure

(erformance1 or e.am(le, agencies %ith an identified client base, %hether %ithin governmentor outside, (lace greater em(hasis on efficiency indicators than do (urely regulatory andinvestigatory agencies1 early all of the agencies in 'able 9 use some form of out(ut indicator1Regarding outcome measures, the grou( is divided D some agencies em(hasi-e immediateoutcomes such as convictions, monetary recoveries and im(lementation of (roffered advice1?thers D (rominent among them regulatory enforcement agencies and audit bodies D focus moreon secondary effects such as savings to the treasury and to consumers1

)ust to clarify, %e do not (ro(ose a((lying these measures as such to the "C"s revie%edin this (a(er1 'he measures are agency!s(ecific1 'hey are fairly idiosyncratic (roducts based onthe mission, (olitical conte.t, ambitions, and resources of the agency in Huestion1 ?ne %ay to

use these measures is to ada(t them for (ur(oses of ongoing (erformance com(arisons amonganti!corru(tion agencies1 In 'able # A'ables "nne., %e ada(t and generali-e the indicators from'able 9, thereby creating a sam(ling of indicator ty(es relevant to anti!corru(tion agencies1 'helist is organi-ed not only by the ty(e of indicator, but also by function1 ?rgani-ing the measuresthis %ay enables us to com(are data for a %ide range of agencies, based on similar ob+ectives,functions, and activities1 5o%ever, com(aring such data should be done %ith caution, since the

#1B1 the categories also include In(ut indicators, and fficiency and Productivity indicators are (resentedse(arately, in the source material1

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underlying conte.ts, systems, definitions, and ob+ectives a((licable to "C"s vary considerably1Moreover, high scores on out(ut and efficiency measures are not al%ays meaningful, andoutcome measures in some cases (ick u( the effects of other influences D %ithout (roviding anymeaningful control1

We also do not mean do suggest that the (ro(osed measures, and the scorecards theygenerate, stand on their o%n1 "s %e7ve suggested, out(uts have a (lausible causal link tointermediate outcomes, and the latter bear a more com(le. theoretical relationshi( to overalldesired im(acts and outcomes in terms of corru(tion1 'hus, even the best measures no%available %ill not be informative %ithout more1 or one thing, the measurement data areincom(lete and inconsistent1 ot all of the basic out(uts are measured, and it is no easy task todetermine the consistency of, for e.am(le, (rosecutions %ith (rocedural (rotections and non!(artisanshi(1 Moreover, even com(lete measures on "C"s %ill eventually need to besu((lemented %ith intermediate outcome data for all agencies (roducing the same Aor similarout(uts, so that trends over time can be assessed1 Ideally, as (art of this, one should com(are the(eriod since the founding of the "C" to the (eriod before it came into being1 If all this

information e.isted for a sufficient sam(le of countries, thenit might make sense to linkintermediate to ultimate outcomes1 5o%ever, each of these undertakings is enormous, andbeyond the sco(e of this (a(er1

Rather, given these constraints, our choice has been to look at (erformance data in theconte.t of agency case!studies1 'hese include brief revie%s of documented cases as %ell asoriginal in!de(th case studies1 In other %ords, inter(reting the formal institutional descri(tionsand (erformance numbers reHuires a nuanced #ualitativesense of %hether the agency andactivities are %ell!targeted D hence %hether the outcomes are as beneficial as they could be1 Inthe current circumstances, only a fairly thickJ descri(tion of the agency and its conte.t %illenable us to gain such a Hualitative understanding1

,&plaining "uccess

5aving determined ho% %e might identify and measure success, %e are left %ith theHuestion of ho% to e.(lain it1 or this, %e turn to the literature on anti!corru(tion agencies1Sur(risingly, des(ite the burgeoning literature on corru(tion, very fe% contributions focus on"C"s, and no systematic study a((ears to have been made as yet1 'he (a(ers that do address"C"s are largely aimed at (ro(osing certain models and features1 In doing so, they (rovidesome intuitively (lausible suggestions about factors likely to yield success, including theagency7s o%n structures and (o%ers, as %ell as necessary com(lementary institutions1 Bo. #belo% (rovides a summary of likely success factors based on this literature and our o%ne.(erience1

?bservers associated %ith 'rans(arency International A'I and the World Bank have beenthe leading voices in this area, and their reform!oriented literature (ro(oses a series of dos anddon7tsJ for "C"s1 Po(e A9>>> suggests that the key elements making an "C" (otentiallyvaluable are its (revention activities and its role in monitoring the im(lementation ofgovernment7s overall anti!corru(tion (olicy1 In some cases, "C"s also have the features of anombudsman, but Po(e suggests that an ombudsman7s need for a coo(erative and trusting

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relationshi( %ith bureaucrats may be incom(atible %ith the investigative mission of an "C"1"lso, an "C" %ill need either a (olicy or a +urisdictional limit Ai1e1 non! or limited retroactivityconcerning (ast offenses1 In Po(e7s vie%, the addressing of (ast abuses needs to be ke(t %ithin(ragmatic limits, to avoid over%helming the "C" %ith case %ork and (olitical controversy1Since an anti!corru(tion agency is es(ecially vulnerable to misuse as a (olitical tool and indeed

as a vehicle for corru(tion, Po(e suggests that in general "C"s should be ke(t to the minimumsi-e D and consist essentially of small investigations and monitoring units1 "lso to reduce therisk of abuse, "C"s should be sub+ect to a combination of (ublic oversight, legal standards, and+udicial revie%1

Counterbalancing an anti!corru(tion body7s accountability is its inde(endence1 5ere,Po(e cites the follo%ing as im(ortant structural (rotections for an agency7s inde(endence& the(rovisions for a((ointment and removal of senior "C" officials, the (lacement of the "C" in a(osition %here it is not sub+ect to direct (olitical or ministerial dictates, and a direct role for(ublic stakeholders %ho (rovide a discrete (olitical base for the agency1 "lso im(ortant is somemeasure of fiscal inde(endence D either the ability to (ro(ose a budget directly to the legislature,

or a guarantee of budgetary stability1 While (lacement of the "C" in the office of the chief ofstate may bolster its strength ASinga(ore, in other instances A'an-ania this is likely tocom(romise its inde(endence1 Po(e also describes the affirmative (o%ers that an "C" needs inorder to be most effective1 'hese include& strong research and (revention ca(abilities* the rightto access %itnesses and documents* (o%er to free-e assets and sei-e travel documents* the abilityto (rotect informants* and authority to monitor assets, income and e.(enditures, and ta. returns1'he "C"7s (o%ers to monitor %ealth effectively are considerably enhanced %here the la%(rovides for an illicit enrichmentJ offense, %hich shifts the burden onto officials to sho% thatany unusual %ealth has a legitimate source1 Most obviously, an "C" needs strong (olitical and(ublic su((ort in order to be effective1

In the current version of its Sourceboo$, 'rans(arency International A#$$$ (uts for%ardsome criteria for assessing the Huality of an anti!corru(tion agency, as %ell as some factors thatcontribute to success and failure1 'he additional assessment criteria that 'I contributes are&

Is the agency head free of (olitical control in day!to!day o(erationsG

"re other staff free from (olitical interference and no goJ areasG

"re staff adeHuately trained and remuneratedG

Is the office of the chief of state effectively %ithin the "C"7s +urisdictionG

Is the agency accountable to all branches of government and the (ublicG

"re staff sub+ect to integrity revie%s and tests, and can doubtful members be removed

HuicklyG

Under the rubric of Why do anti!corru(tion agencies failGJ 'I sets out some further factorsaffecting success, including& %eak (olitical %ill,J fear of conseHuences, unrealistic e.(ectations,e.cessive reliance on enforcement Aignoring (revention, inadeHuate la%s, and loss of morale1

3angseth A#$$$ takes this discussion a bit further, (roviding some additional(rereHuisites for success and %arning of several dangers1 5e suggests an ideal "C" having acom(rehensive mandate, %hich includes investigations and (rosecutions, an educational and

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a%areness!raising function, a (reventive function, and a legislative role Asubmitting reform billsto (arliament1 Most Aif not all "C"s must also face u( to the need for selectivity ininvestigations1 3angseth underlines the im(ortance of clear standards in this area, and(articularly of e.(laining these credibly to the (ublic and to com(lainants in (articular13angseth additionally suggests that an effective "C" must be embedded in a coherent national

anti!corru(tion strategy, and that ne% agencies in (articular need to follo% a carefully definedfocus rather than take on all corru(tion!related matters1 urther, inde(endent "C"s have as(ecial res(onsibility for (recise and com(rehensive e.(enditure accountability1 While an "C"needs substantial resources, 3angseth %arns against donor overload,J suggesting aid agencies7strong interest in this area can saddle an "C" %ith more hel( than it use, and end u( causingdistortions1

Perha(s most hel(fully, 3angseth (ro(oses some ob+ective assessment measures, anddiscusses in more detail than others the dangers of failure1 5e suggests the follo%ing(erformance evaluation indicators& cases (rosecuted, convictions, case backlog, Huality of (ublicinterface, and surveys of (ublic kno%ledge and trust1 5e discusses the danger that an "C" may,

among other things&

add another layer of ineffective bureaucracy to the la% enforcement sector*

divert resources from e.isting organi-ations involved in anti!corru(tion %ork*

function as a shieldJ to satisfy donors and (ublic o(inion*

delay reform in other areas* and

function as a (olitical (olice1

/oig A9>>: also (ro(oses a number of guidelines for effective "C"s, %hileackno%ledging that such institutions have most freHuently been (ro(osed in develo(ingcountries as ad hocJ and cosmeticJ measures D %ith the result that they have usually been

denied the resources necessary to make them effective1 /oig7s res(onse to this is to suggest amodel combining the features of the 5ong 6ong Inde(endent Commission "gainst Corru(tionAIC"C %ith those of the U1S1 Ins(ector 0eneral AI0 system1 Such an agency should create anisland of com(etenceJ %ithin the (ublic sector by de(loying a cross!e.ecutiveJ cor(s dra%nfrom several key sectors1 5e suggests that "C"s are good at addressing certain (roblems Dethical (robity of officials, and government7s credibility and (ublic re(utation for integrity D butnot others1 Most im(ortantly, /oig7s model gives (rimacy to research and evaluations linked toa (roactive agenda of long!term reform and ca(acity!building, %hile (lacing lo%er (riority oninvestigation and (unishment1 'his is consistent %ith the subseHuent suggestion in /oig andRiley A9>>


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6ox /: Su))ar, of ACA Success Factors

9See: TI /+++ 3angset! /+++ Ca)erer #;;; Pope #;;; Doig #;;2>>a to classify anti!corru(tion strategies Dalthough there has been little attem(t to e.(lain it1 'he single!agency strategy does not move allanti!corru(tion functions into a single bureau D this %ould be im(ossible under almost anyconstitutional arrangement that even (ur(orts to be democratic1 Rather, the single!agencya((roach (laces a number of key ca(abilities, res(onsibilities, and resources under one roof D

thereby creating a (o%erful centrali-ed agency able to lead a s%ee(ing effort against corru(tion1'his still reHuires the "C"7s interaction %ith other entities having +urisdiction in this field Dnotably the courts, and in most cases, (rosecutors, as %ell as line ministries in areas likely to beaffected by corru(tion, e1g1 revenue and (ublic %orks1 By contrast, the multi(le!agencya((roach is less ambitious, creating one or more additional units or agencies %ith s(ecific anti!corru(tion res(onsibilities that either did not (reviously e.ist or %ere scattered amongde(artments1 'his strategy avoids setting u( a strong leadJ agency in the anti!corru(tion field,

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thus (osing a lo%er risk than the single!agency a((roach of u(setting the balance and se(arationof governmental (o%ers1

Establishment

Why set u( a single, free!standing agency to lead the anti!corru(tion effortG 'hee.(eriences of Singa(ore and 5ong 6ong offer essentially the same ans%er1 In both cases, acrisis of legitimacy seemed to (ose a threat to investor confidence and (olitical stability1 'heans%er %as something ne% and different, an agency untainted by association %ith corru(telements, and eHui((ed %ith enough (o%er to make dramatic head%ay against entrenchedcorru(tion1 Im(ortantly, this arrangement also hel(s centrali-e information and intelligence oncorru(tion, and can greatly reduce the coordination (roblems that often arise in multi!agencya((roaches1

Singa(ore %as the first to make this move1 CPIB %as founded in 9>:#, re(lacing the

"nti!Corru(tion Branch A"CB of the Criminal Investigation /e(artment D a small unit %ithinthe (olice force1 3eading u( to the reform, graft %as re(orted to be ram(ant in governmentde(artments, and a scandal in 9>:9 revealed %ides(read corru(tion in the (olice1 'he mainob+ective of the reform a((ears to have been to make the anti!corru(tion effort more effective byremoving the "CB7s functions from the (olice force D this arrangement had (revented it fromdealing strictly %ith elements of the (olice involved in corru(tion1 AOuah 9>>>a 'he corru(tion(roblem remained unresolved, ho%ever, and the government of 3ee 6%an Fe% in 9>;$ decidedto strengthen CPIB and enact a ne% Prevention of Corru(tion "ct1 "mong other things, the actstrengthened (enalties and called for the forfeiture of corru(t gains1 'he "ct also increasedCPIB7s (o%ers to include arrest and e.amination of any sus(ect7s bank accounts1 Since thattime, Singa(ore has ad+usted the "ct, and the (o%ers and resources of CPIB, as needed1 "mongthe changes %as an e.(ansion of criminal liability for corru(tion to include those %ho may notacce(t a bribe but intend to commit the offense, and those %ho acce(t a bribe but do not (rovidethe e.(ected favor in return1 "lso, by establishing its credibility as a serious anti!corru(tionforce, CPIB %as able to overcome (ublic ske(ticism and non!coo(eration1 AOuah 9>, 9>>:,9>>>a, %%%1gov1sg4(mo4c(ib4inde.1html

By the late 9>;$s, %hen 5ong 6ong %as looking for a %ay to gra((le %ith its corru(tion(roblems, it turned to Singa(ore as a successful model1 'he main concern in 5ong 6ong %asentrenched and systemati-ed (olice corru(tion, %hich facilitated drug trafficking, gambling, and(rostitution in return for huge rents, and also included bribery and e.tortion related to routine(olice functions such as traffic control1 'he system a((ears to have allo%ed for collection and(assing of (ercentages of graft u( the hierarchy to the Chief Su(erintendent1 'he immediatecrisis giving rise to IC"C7s founding %as a corru(tion scandal involving Peter 0odber, thenChief Su(erintendent, %ho esca(ed and later %as e.tradited for trial from the U61 A6litgaard9>


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initially by a distinguished former government official and senior com(any e.ecutive named)ack Cater D this last decision es(ecially signaling the government7s desire to rescue 5ong6ong7s re(utation and establish its credibility on the anti!corru(tion front1 A6litgaard 9>@$s1 'hey had sufficient autonomy from local (ublico(inion to institute a ra(id and dramatic change1 Since the 9>>@ handover, the e.ecutive re(ortsto mainland China, and it is feared that this is causing a (olicy shift in favor of more (olitici-edadministration and tolerance of corru(t business!government net%orks1 Second, Britain7sliberal!authoritarianJ a((roach, %hich (rovided considerable autonomy and credibility to therule of la%, hel(ed kee( IC"C from abusing its (o%er and enabled it to (ursue corru(tionsuccessfully1 3ast, local and international business elites have (layed a ma+or role1 'hey bothsu((orted IC"C in restoring some integrity to the (ublic administration, and a((arentlye.ercised (ressure to limit some of its inHuiries into high!level dealings affecting business

interests1 5o%ever, this did not (revent IC"C from (rosecuting (rominent business (eo(le1Indeed, once IC"C had met its ob+ective of su((ressing (olice and bureaucratic corru(tion, itbegan focusing more heavily on corru(tion in the (rivate sector Aas (rovided in the 9>@9Prevention of Bribery ?rdinance1

)esponsibilities and Powers

ach of these agencies has a broad mandate1 IC"C7s mission is summari-ed as follo%s&fighting corru(tion through effective la% enforcement, education, and (revention to hel( kee(5ong 6ong fair, +ust, stable, and (ros(erous1J Ahtt(&44%%%1icac1org1hk 'he three mainfunctions are handled by se(arate de(artments& ?(erations, Community Relations, andPrevention1

'he offenses that IC"C investigates include those under the IC"C ?rdinance, thePrevention of Bribery ?rdinance, and the lections ACorru(t and Illegal Conduct ?rdinance, as%ell as blackmail committed by a civil servant through misuse of (ublic office and corru(tion inthe (rivate sector !! including bribery and %hite!collar crime1 'he IC"C ?rdinance reHuires theCommissioner to investigate anyJ sus(ected corru(tion1 'he agency7s (olicy has been to takethis literally, (ursuing allcorru(tion allegations %ithout a prioriselection criteria D although it is%ithin the sole discretion of the "ttorney 0eneral to decide %hich cases to (rosecute1 'his(recluded any discretion by IC"C to choose cases, and it %as deemed im(ortant to sho% the(ublic that all corru(tion is im(ortant1 "lso, an investigation could only be closed, unless it led to(rosecution, by a decision of IC"C7s ?(erations Revie% Committee Asee belo%1 5o%ever, onearea %as (artly closed off by la%& the (ast1 In res(onse to early (rotests about IC"C7so(erations, an amnesty for most (re!9>@@ offenses %as %ritten into the IC"C ?rdinance1AS(eville 9>>@

'he other t%o de(artments handle the remaining functions1 'he Prevention /e(artmentof IC"C has the res(onsibility and authority of e.amining (ractices and (rocedures ofgovernment entities %ith a vie% to identifying and reducing o((ortunities for corru(tion D and

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advising (rivate organi-ations on measures to (revent corru(tion1 It (rovides a re(ort to theclient organi-ation Abut does not submit bills to the legislature or (olicy (a(ers to the e.ecutive13ast, the Community Relations /e(artment carries out (ublic a%areness and education(rograms, handles com(laints and inHuiries about corru(tion, and maintains liaison %ith anti!corru(tion agencies in the mainland1 Ahtt(&44%%%1icac1org1hk

In carrying out its functions, IC"C en+oys truly com(rehensive (o%ers1 'heinvestigation or la% enforcement (o%ers of IC"C are the broadest D they include&

receiving and considering allegations of corru(tion*

arrest, detention, granting bail*

search and sei-ure, investigation and surveillance*

searching bank accounts and holding and e.amining business and (rivate documents*

reHuiring sus(ects to (rovide details of their assets, income, and e.(enditure*

detaining travel documents and free-ing assets in order to (revent flight or

laundering* and

(rotecting the confidentiality of an investigation1

IC"C Aas %ell as CPIB has authority both to res(ond to com(laints and to undertakeinvestigations on its o%n initiative1 Im(ortantly, IC"C does not have (o%er to (rosecute, buttransmits its investigative findings to the "ttorney 0eneral1

CPIB7s functions, although they influenced the IC"C model, are some%hat more limited1'hey are to receive and investigate com(laints alleging corru(t (ractice* investigate misconductby (ublic officers %ith an undertoneJ of corru(tion* and (revent corru(tion by e.amining the(ractices and (rocedures in the (ublic service for (ur(oses of minimi-ing o((ortunities1 'hefirst t%o functions reside in the Investigations Branch1 CPIB7s stated ob+ective here has al%aysbeen s%ift and sureJ action against corru(tion1 CPIB does not limit itself to corru(tion in the(ublic sector, but also targets (rivate sector corru(tion Aes(ecially (ayment of commissions andkickbacks, and is authori-ed to investigate an" other offensethat is disclosed in a corru(tioninvestigation1 CPIB seems to follo% the IC"C a((roach of follo%ing u( allcorru(tionallegations %ithout limit1 5o%ever, since CPIB cannot itself (rosecute, some cases get filteredout during investigation and after referral1 " /ata Management and Su((ort Branch handles the(reventive function, along %ith the related tasks of collecting information and screeningcandidates for official (ositions1 "n "dministration Branch (rovides general su((ort1

'he reform of CPIB and the Prevention of Corru(tion "ct in 9>;$ figured in acom(rehensive anti!corru(tion strategy that %as im(lemented in (hases1 'he first (hase focusedon a combination of deterrence and removal of o((ortunities1 'oughening the legal reHuirementsand the (enalties, as %ell as enforcement, met the first goal1 'aking (reventive action throughstudies and reform recommendations addressed the second (oint1 ?nly later, in the 9>;$1 AOuah 9>>:

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have been gaining strength since 9>>@1 Similarly, CPIB7s relationshi(s %ith key agencies aresaid to be highly coo(erative D and the results seem to bear this out1 'hese agencies include thePublic Service Commission, the "uditor 0eneral7s /e(artment, the Public "ccounts Committeeof Parliament, and the Ministry of inance1 A"h 3eak 9>>> In both cases, forceful (oliticalleadershi( D most obviously that of 3ee 6%an Fe% D established and institutionali-ed a (attern

of coo(eration across agencies in im(lementing the anti!corru(tion (rogram1

5o%ever, this is %here the similarity bet%een IC"C and CPIB ends1 Whereas CPIBo(erates as an arm of the Prime Minister7s ?ffice, %ith little outreach or accountability to the(ublic, IC"C has made (ublic trust and trans(arency (illars of its strategy1 urther, IC"C ismuch larger than CPIB1 "mong other things, the si-e difference a((ears to be driven by IC"C7sgreater need to inform and (ersuade its (artners in order to secure their coo(eration1 'hisa((arently is not a critical need for CPIB1

IC"C, unlike CPIB, has very strong accountability structures and mechanisms1 'hesechecks are arranged in such a %ay as to counterbalance the authority of the 0overnor1

"ccountability begins %ith strict res(onsibility of IC"C and senior officers to the 0overnor, andeHually strict res(onsibility of IC"C staff to the Commissioner1 'he la% reHuires IC"C to(re(are its accounts for the 0overnor, and for these to be revie%ed by the /irector of "udit1 'heIC"C budget comes from the general revenue, %hich means that the 3egislative Councilse(arately a((roves it D and can call the Commissioner in for hearings1 'he IC"CCommissioner (re(ares an annual re(ort for the 0overnor, %ho is reHuired by the ?rdinance tosubmit this to the legislature1 "lso, the division of investigative and (rosecutorial res(onsibilitybet%een IC"C and the )ustice ministry Aalso a feature of CPIB hel(s to (revent abuses1 Inaddition to these original features, some other safeguards have been (ut in (lace to avoid abusesof (o%er1 or e.am(le, a 9>>; amendment to the IC"C ?rdinance strengthened the citi-enoversight committees Asee belo% as %ell as the role of the +udiciary in authori-ing search%arrants D to bring IC"C into com(liance %ith 5ong 6ong7s 9>>9 Bill of Rights1 AS(eville9>>@, Camerer 9>>>

'he most innovative and %ell!kno%n accountability mechanisms are the citi-en oversightboards, kno%n as "dvisory Committees1 'hese are a((ointed by the 0overnor, but consist ofsome 2$ citi-ens, and are reHuired to be headed by (rivate citi-ens according to the amended?rdinance1 'here are four such committees& the "dvisory Committee on Corru(tion, %hichoversees general (olicy and direction of IC"C* and one committee dedicated to oversight of eachof IC"C7s de(artments !! the ?(erations Revie% Committee, Corru(tion Prevention "dvisoryCommittee, and Citi-ens "dvisory Committee on Community Relations1 'he ?(erations Revie%Committee is arguably the most strategic, since it oversees the largest and most (o%erfulde(artment1 In its terms of reference, the information it can demand from the /e(artment andits oversight (o%ers are clearly stated1 'he Committee does not have formal (o%ers to com(elthe (roduction of documents and information, but does have a straight line of res(onsibility tothe Commissioner and the 0overnor1 In addition, its re(orts shouldJ be (ublished, according tothe '?R D %hether they are or not, the 5ong 6ong (ress surely has means to e.tract informationand dra% conclusions about IC"C1 inally, there is also a se(arate and inde(endent IC"CCom(laints Committee, %hich revie%s all com(laints against the agency1 "n internalinvestigation and monitoring unit follo%s u( on com(laints1

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In the case of CPIB, the only formal (rotection for its inde(endence is the simultaneous(lacement of the bureau %ithin the Prime Minister7s ?ffice, and the vesting of a((ointment andremoval (o%er in the President1 'his is unlikely to be a strong safeguard in (ractice1 urther,CPIB7s budget is integrated into that of the Prime Minister7s ?ffice, hence the latter (resumably

determines %hat budget (ro(osal is submitted to (arliament D and influences the outcome of the(rocess1

Unlike IC"C, CPIB has no citi-en oversight boards nor any e.(licit (ublic outreach andeducation function1 It is not reHuired to (ublish or send to (arliament an annual re(ort, hence itso(erations are not kno%n in detail or, a((arently, covered in de(th by the (ress1 /es(ite its(ublici-ed commitment to e!government,J Singa(ore does not (ublish CPIB7s budget or(erformance record on the %eb1 "lso, CPIB7s (o%ers of arrest, search and sei-ure, revie% ofbank information, and others do not reHuire (rior +udicial authori-ation1 'his situation has ledsome to Huestion CPIB7s im(artiality, and has contributed to numerous instances of heavy!handedness1 ?n the other hand, the agency does seem to have a re(utation for (rofessionalism

and integrity, %hich suggests that it does o(erate broadly %ithin the bounds of %hat is (oliticallyand legally acce(table1 "s in 5ong 6ong, the rule of la% and a (olitically a%are citi-enry do setlimits1

)esources

"nother ma+or contrast bet%een IC"C and CPIB is their si-e and resource base1 IC"Cseems Huite large D huge in fact D for an agency of its ty(e, es(ecially in a relatively small+urisdiction such as 5ong 6ong, a city!state of about ; million (eo(le1 Its staffing has risen froma total of =;> at its founding in 9>@2 to 9,9@: in 9>>:, u( to the current figure of about 9,=$$1'he (resent total staff com(lement of IC"C is 9,=2#, %ith actual strength at 9,#>>1 'he numbersfor the de(artments are AIC"C #$$$&

?(erations& >@=4>2=

Prevention& :>4:Urban Services& :Public bodes& 99Private sector& =>@?ther& ;@

Soliciting4acce(ting bribe& :$?ffering bribe& @#?ffense connected %ith or facilitated by corru(tion& 9:@ Both the cross!country indicesand IC"C7s o%n (erformance data Aassuming these are (ro(erly vetted and verified as (art of there(orting (rocess seem to bear this out1

"t the same time, there are reasons for doubt about the %ider a((licability of the 5ong6ong IC"C model1 ?ne IC"C Commissioner cautioned that traumaticJ levels of corru(tion,substantial budget resources, the highest (ossible integrity, and high (olitical and (o(ular su((ortare all necessary conditions for making this kind of organi-ation %ork1 A6litgaard 9>@ underlines these conditions and says that IC"C itself %as not 5ong 6ong7s strategy1Rather, it ha((ened to be the right tool for 5ong 6ong to im(lement a broader strategy of la%enforcement, (revention, and (ublic su((ort1 /oig and Riley A9>>


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Whatever success %hich Singa(ore may have achieved in the fight against corru(tion, it is notcertain that this is a role model to follo%1 "ny agency %hich earns the re(utation Aho%everunfounded and un(roven of using its formidable array of (o%ers against (olitical o((onents isnot %orthy of any further comment other than (ure disdain1

In short, both agencies have met their original anti!corru(tion ob+ectives1 'he divergent(aths that they follo%ed in this achievement have had im(ortant im(lications for their resourcereHuirements and for (ublic (erce(tions of their methods1 Clearly, 5ong 6ong7s em(hasis on(ublic outreach and education has its costs D including < regional offices, more than #$$ staff,and over U1S1 Q9; million in e.(enses1 'he need to elicit coo(eration also im(lies a largerinvestigative staff1 5o%ever, even this, together %ith 5ong 6ong7s larger (o(ulation and landmass cannot fully e.(lain %hy it has nearly #$ times as many investigators as CPIB does1 or its(art, CPIB7s budget and staff are only a fraction the si-e of IC"C7s D but this a((ears to have itso%n (rice in terms of (ublic su((ort and the agency7s accountability1 In the end, one can onlyassess the costs and benefits of IC"C and CPIB by com(aring them to the alternatives D bothvariants of the single!agency strategy and multi!agency a((roaches1 'o these %e no% turn1

4ariations on the "ingle-Agency odel

?ver the last t%o decades, a number of countries have follo%ed the single!agencya((roach1 In some cases, the 5ong 6ong IC"C model %as ado(ted in full, %hile in others, a(artial or hybrid a((roach ins(ired by IC"C and CPIB %as taken1 'his section revie%s thee.(eriences of several countries across the globe, em(hasi-ing variations in design and outcomesaround the 5ong 6ong and Singa(ore (recedents1 'he discussion here does not cover threeim(ortant e.am(les of this (henomenon, %hich are the sub+ect of more in!de(th case studies in(art 2 belo%1

"ll of the agencies revie%ed in this section took some ins(iration from the 5ong 6ong!

Singa(ore (aradigm, es(ecially IC"C, although they vary in the e.tent to %hich they ke(t thesame design s(ecifications1 'hree of these e.am(les are most clearly modeled on IC"C& theInde(endent Commission "gainst Corru(tion AIC"C of e% South Wales ASW in "ustralia,the /irectorate on Corru(tion and conomic Crime A/CC of Bots%ana, and the ?ffice of theIns(ector 0eneral of 0overnment AI00 of Uganda1 'he other agencies considered here ada(tedelements of the 5ong 6ong and Singa(ore strategies, follo%ing them less rigorously1 We %ill tryto shed light on some of the reasons for this1 'he latter grou( includes the 6orea Inde(endentCommission "gainst Corru(tion A6IC"C, the ational Counter Corru(tion CommissionACCC of 'hailand, the ?ffice of the ?mbudsman of the Phili((ines, and the Comision deControl Civico de la Corrupcion ACCCC of cuador1

Establishment! )esponsibilities and Powers

'he establishment of the various inde(endent agencies seems to follo% the (attern of5ong 6ong and Singa(ore1 'he SW IC"C in "ustralia %as established in 9>


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%as himself later investigated by IC"C, censured by the legislature, and in effect forced toresign1 AWilliams #$$$ Bots%ana sa% a similar eru(tion in the early 9>>$s, %hich threatened toharm its re(utation as an "frican model of good governance1 'he scandals revolved aroundillegal land sales and un(aid loans by senior officials from the ational /evelo(ment Bank1.tensive media coverage linked these cases %ith the cabinet and the President, and stirred

(ublic outrage1 Moreover, the Bots%ana Police orce lacked a fraud sHuad1 'hese factors led tothe enactment, in 9>>2, of the Corru(tion and conomic Crime "ct, establishing /CC as a(ermanent agency1 A'heobald and Williams #$$$

'he structure, functions, and (o%ers of these t%o agencies follo% the 5ong 6ong IC"Cblue(rint1 Both have se(arate units each charged %ith im(lementing (art of the same tri(artitestrategy consisting of investigations, (revention, and (ublic education1 'he Bots%ana /CC hasse(arate branches for (rosecutions and training, investigations, and intelligence, along %ith acombined (revention and education branch and a su((ort branch1 'he SW IC"C has unitscorres(onding to the three core functions, (lus a su((orting 3egal Unit1 Both have substantial(o%ers to carry out their res(onsibilities1 /CC7s (o%ers under its "ct are broader, including

search and sei-ure, arrest, and detention of travel documents D and all of these can be done%ithout a %arrant in a variety of circumstances1 /CC is also given authority to investigate%here it sus(ects someone of (ossession of une.(lained (ro(erty1J 'he SW IC"C a((ears tobe under more intense +udicial scrutiny1 or e.am(le, +udicial a((roval of search %arrants isgenerally reHuired A%ith e.ce(tions, and IC"C7s actions affecting anyone7s rights D including itsability to com(el coo(eration through contem(t charges D are e.(ressly under the +urisdiction ofthe Su(reme Court1 either agency has authority to (rosecute A/CC can do so but only %iththe "ttorney 0eneral7s consent, and they both a((ear to have am(le authority to (rotect theconfidentiality of investigations and %itnesses1

'he +urisdiction of the t%o agencies differs some%hat1 'he Bots%ana /CC seems tofollo% the 5ong 6ong model more closely, as the 9>>2 "ct brings (rivate sector activities %ithinthe sco(e of /CC7s investigation (o%ers1 'his includes not only bribery but various forms ofrevenue fraud, a form of %hite!collar crime that the 5ong 6ong IC"C does not have authorityover Aalthough CPIB could investigate this if it is connected to a corru(tion offense1 ven thisbroad mandate %as further e.(anded by the Proceeds of Serious Crime "ct, #$$$1 'his in effectmakes /CC the lead money!laundering investigator, by criminali-ing dealings in illegallyacHuired assets and reHuiring the central bank to refer sus(icious transactions to /CC forinvestigation1 By contrast, the SW IC"C limits itself to corru(tion offenses by (ublic officialsD although its sco(e %as e.(anded in 9>>2 to include conduct by Members of Parliament1

'he t%o agencies also differ on the matter of selectivity1 /CC has an e.(licit (olicy ofinter(reting its statutory mandate as reHuiring it to investigate ever"(ursuable re(ort D consistent%ith the 5ong 6ong a((roach1 A3angseth #$$$ By contrast, the SW IC"C retains theauthority to (rioriti-e com(laints D and to refuse any e.(lanations as to %hy a com(laint %as not(ursued, if IC"C deems this necessary for security and confidentiality (ur(oses1 It describes itsselection criteria for investigations as follo%s ASW IC"C #$$9& (1#=&

?nly matters %ith the (otential to e.(ose significant and4or systemic corru(tion or %hichother%ise involve matters of significant (ublic interest are selected for such investigation1

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IC"C has an "ssessment Panel that makes the initial determination as to %hether a com(laint is(ursuable, and then refers hard cases Ae1g1 (ursuable com(laints that %ould reHuire substantialresources to its ?(erations Management Committee for decision1 ASW IC"C #$$9

Similar agencies %ere also established Aor reformed in Uganda A9>>@follo%ing mass (rotests and the ouster of President Bucaram, in 'hailand A9>>> and 6oreaA#$$9 after the linkage bet%een corru(tion and the recent financial crisis %as recogni-ed1 'heseagencies have essentially been given the res(onsibilities and (o%ers of an IC"C!ty(e agency,%ith a fe% notable differences1 'he Ugandan I00 and the 'hai CCC additionally have thefunction of revie%ing official asset!declarations1 'he ?mbudsman in the Phili((ines has theIC"C anti!corru(tion res(onsibilities as %ell as the general function of a classical ombudsman toaddress in+ustice and maladministration1 Commentators have suggested that the (rosecutorialrole does not fit %ell %ith the ombudsman7s function as trusted mediator1 APo(e 9>>> Inaddition, the ?mbudsman makes binding determinations of la% in administrative cases Athe I00in Uganda has a similar ca(acity, and brings (rosecutions against senior officials in the s(ecial

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ASW IC"C "ct 9>>2 "ct sim(ly reHuires /CC only to re(ort its activitiesJ tothe President on an annual basis, although the re(orts also a((ear on the /CC %ebsite1 /CCdoes reach out to the (ublic through education (rograms and advertising, and also elicitscom(laints through its t%o field offices and its hotlines1

'he Bots%ana /CC7s relations %ith other agencies in this field have (roven to be a(roblem1 'his is es(ecially true of the "ttorney 0eneral7s office, but also of the courts D both area source of com(laints about backlogs and failures to bring cases to a conclusion1 "s of thebeginning of #$$9, /CC re(orted @$ cases a%aiting the "ttorney 0eneral7s advice or consent to(rosecute, and another :# cases (ending before the courts1 A/CC #$$# 'he 9>>2 "ct does notaddress intergovernmental duties of coo(eration D it sim(ly reHuires the "0 to consent to any(rosecution1 Whatever consensus Bots%ana may have reached concerning strategy has not beensufficient to overcome delays and ca(acity constraints at these t%o choke (oints1 /CC has no%res(onded by suggesting the strengthening of the "07s office, and by de(loying its staff to assistthe "ttorney 0eneral %ith (rosecutions1 A3angseth #$$$ Some of the (roblem in the courts maybe due to outdated (rocedural rules that make shortcuts such as (lea bargains difficult, and(revent /CC from legally using available electronic surveillance methods1 "lso, obtaininginformation from banks has been a (roblem for /CC1 'his is (erha(s e.(lained by inadeHuaterecord!kee(ing in the banks D although this is said to be im(roving1 A'heobald and Williams#$$$

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In the case of Uganda, the constitution Ach1 9= (rovides for the formal inde(endence ofthe I001 'he Ins(ector 0eneral and the /e(uty I0 are to be a((ointed by the President %ith thea((roval of Parliament to a four!year term Arene%able once, and can be removed only fors(ecified causes by consent of the President and a Parliamentary tribunal1 ?ne of these officersmust be Hualified to serve as a 5igh Court )udge1 'he constitution also (rovides that the I00

%ill o(erate inde(endently and be res(onsible only to Parliament D and that it makes semi!annualre(orts to Parliament1 Until the 9>>: constitution (rovided for the I007s res(onsibility toParliament, it %as res(onsible and re(orted confidentially to the President1 ASedigh andRu-indana 9>>> 'he constitution also (rovides for I007s budgetary and (ersonnel autonomyAsee belo%1 In terms of structural relationshi(s, the I00 is surely hel(ed by the fact that it ischarged %ith enforcing the 3eadershi( Code of Conduct across government, and the Ins(ector7srole as chair of the ational Coordinating Committee overseeing the government7s anti!corru(tion action (lan1 ASedigh and Ru-indana 9>>> 'here %as also a ne% Minister for thicsand Integrity (osition created in 9>>< to direct government (olicy on anti!corru(tion, but this isessentially a minister %ithout a ministry, and may have been a badly (lanned res(onse toelection!year anti!corru(tion rhetoric1 AWatt et al #$$$

'he Phili((ines ?mbudsman, along %ith the to( de(uties, is a((ointed by the Presidentfrom among a grou( A%ith s(ecified minimum Hualifications nominated by the )udicial and BarCouncil1 'he ?mbudsman has a non!rene%able term of seven years, along %ith a se(aratebudget line and guarantees against salary and budget cuts1 She4he re(orts annually to thePresident and to Congress, and the office7s determinations, both legal and administrative, aresub+ect to +udicial revie%1 While it does not have formali-ed outreach (rograms, the?mbudsman is intensively covered by the (ress and by non!government %atchdogs1 "lso, the?mbudsman is one of many organi-ations in the Phili((ines %ith an anti!corru(tion mandate Dincluding the s(ecial anti!graft court mentioned above, the Commission on "udit, the "ttorney0eneral, and the Presidential Commission "gainst 0raft and Corru(tion APC"0C D %hich donot a((ear to coordinate %ell1

cuador7s CCCC2is headed by a grou( of seven commissioners, chosen by the Presidentfrom the various colegiosre(resenting the s(ectrum of civil society, from universities to(rofessionals, the media, business, labor, indigenous (eo(le, %omen, and human rights grou(s1 It%as founded under a (residential decree, then entrenched in the 9>>< constitution as aninde(endent organ1 Its civic constituency in (rinci(le gives the CCCC a strong (o%er baseinde(endent of government1 "lso, CCCC submits regular re(orts to the legislature1 5o%ever,%ithin government, CCCC7s relationshi(s vary, from its effective coordination %ith theCom(troller and the Procurement de(artment, to its continuous conflicts %ith the "ttorney0eneral over (rosecutions1 CCCC has been severely critici-ed in official circles recently for itsinvestigations into bank fraud D its +urisdiction here is based on its mandate to address corru(tionand fraud that im(act state financial interests, including shareholdings in banks1

'hailand7s CCC also has a commission structure, %ith the nine commissioners beingchosen by the Senate from a list of 9< nominated by to( +udges, academics, and (oliticians1 'hecommissioners elect their o%n Chair1 'he Senate monitors and receives re(orts from the CCC,

2Information on this agency comes from tele(hone and e!mail corres(ondence, the CCCC A#$$$ re(ort, as %ell asthe agency %ebsite&%%%1comisionanticorru(cion1com

#


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and the latter cannot (rosecute or im(ose administrative sanctions on its o%n D although it doesassist the "ttorney 0eneral and the Senate in (erforming these functions1A%%%1nccc1thaigov1net

'he 6orean 6IC"C is directly under the control of the President1 evertheless, it is

es(ecially ham(ered in (ursuing cases, since it must hand over any matter it deems %orthy of aformal investigation to the com(etent agency such as a (rosecutor or the audit agency1 'his(revents it even from Huestioning the accused1 "((arently, the 6IC"C statute %as %ritten this%ay as a result of (ressure by the Ministry of )ustice and other de(artments concerned about thene% agency7s (o%ers1:

)esources

unding and staff are decisive in determining an agency7s ability to (erform1 'he SWIC"C clearly has the advantage in this area1 It em(loyed a staff of 9## in #$$9, including := inthe Investigations /ivision and #; in the Corru(tion Prevention, ducation and Research

/ivision1 'he Commissioner has substantial latitude in hiring staff, and a((ointments aree.em(t from both civil service and industrial relations em(loyment regulations1 Remuneration(ackages a((ear to be on a (ar %ith other government agencies, %ith the Commissioner earningsome U1S1 Q9>2,#:$1 'raining is also given some (riority D IC"C hasrecently decided to focus more on I' and investigative training1

SW IC"C7s net e.(enses %ere U1S1 Q


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In the case of the Ugandan I00, the constitution A"rt1 ##> calls for an inde(endentbudget a((ro(riated by Parliament, and controlled by the Ins(ectorate,J and reHuires governmentto facilitate the I007s access to sufficient Hualified staff to (erform its functions effectively1 'heI007s budgetary (rovision for F #$$#!= %as re(orted in the (ress to be U1S1 Q=1=; million,although this fell short of %hat %as reHuested1 In (articular, the ?ffice of the I00 has

com(lained about the lo% salaries (aid to front!line investigators, %hich amount to little morethan U1S1 Q9$$ (er month1; 'he Ins(ector 0eneral has a staff of some 92:, of %hom @= aretechnical or (rofessional staff s(read across si. units, the ma+ority in inance and "dministrationA=>, ?(erations A#9 and 3egal "ffairs A9>1 A%%%1igg1go1ug

In com(arison, the ad+usted #$$9 budget for the Phili((ines ?mbudsman %as U1S1 Qmillion in total, %ith the o(erating budget com(rising U1S1 Q@1= million of that Afigures from thePhili((ines Budget Management /e(artment1 'he cuadorian CCCC has a #$$# budget of U1S1Q=1; million, and it also receives funds from donor agencies for s(ecial (ro+ects1 It has a staff of2# in the Ouito headHuarters, and 9# in its 0uayaHuil branch office1 'hailand7s CCC em(loyedsome =@$ officials in #$$9 Aslated to increase to :=@ in #$$#, along %ith :: tem(orary

em(loyees !! distributed across four divisions and 99 bureaus1

Performance Monitoring

'he SW IC"C is reHuired by la% to re(ort to the SW (arliament on the fulfillment ofits mandate, including the numbers of investigations, their outcomes, etc1 More s(ecific(erformance indicators a((arently have been develo(ed in coo(eration %ith the )ointParliamentary Committee, the ?ffice of the "uditor 0eneral, and the ?mbudsman1 or #$$$!9,IC"C re(orted receiving 9:$> com(laints %ith a total of #$:< allegations1 "mong theseallegations, the follo%ing categories of offenses figured (rominently& misuse of (ublic resourcesA9@1: of allegations, favoritism A9=, and forgery4fabrication of information A9$1=1ailure to re(ort conflicts of interest accounted for @1@ of allegations and bribery :1>1 Interms of sectoral area, 9#11; (ublic services, and


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92: talks or (resentations to the (ublic on corru(tion1

/CC also listed a number of analytical re(orts on government structures, but did not givefigures for the e.tent to %hich any of these %ere im(lemented1

Perha(s most striking in the com(arison bet%een the SW IC"C and the Bots%ana/CC is the follo%ing grou( of facts1 /uring an overla((ing 9#!month (eriod, the t%o agenciesem(loyed almost the same number of staff and received almost the same number of com(laints1Fet /CC7s budget %as some #$!#: of IC"C7s, and /CC (ursued a far larger number ofinvestigations and (rosecutions1 'his seems to have overburdened a staff that is (robably notnearly as %ell!eHui((ed, and evidently not nearly as %ell!trained, as their "ustraliancounter(arts1

What %ere the resultsG 'he ans%er to this is not entirely clear, but there are someindications that IC"C has much more credibility than /CC %ith both the (ublic and thegovernment1 IC"C launched far fe%er investigations and (roceedings by design D it intended to

focus its resources strategically1 'he record suggests several carefully!considered (ublichearings, analytical re(orts, and recommendations D %ith a high (ercentage of u(take bygovernment clients1 'hese activities a((ear even more focused if one recalls IC"C7s morelimited +urisdiction, %hich does not include the economic crimes that /CC deals %ith1 WhileIC"C did not estimate amounts of money saved as a result of its investigations and reformrecommendations, its selection (rocedures suggest the (otential for high benefit4cost1 /CC, bycontrast, did not re(ort the outcomes of its studies, and the (altry record of monetary a%ardsAordered but not necessarily collected s(eaks for itself1

'he other "C"s vary in their efforts to re(ort results1 Uganda7s I00 re(orts toParliament every si. months, although these re(orts are not made (ublic1 or the (eriod )uly

9>>@ to "(ril 9>> referred to other government de(artments1 Regarding asset declarationsunder the 3eadershi( Code of Conduct, a high rate of non!return has been re(orted1 AWatt et al#$$$ I00 investigations are re(orted to have resulted in the dismissal of several officials, theremoval from office of some (olitical leaders, and the initiative in the mid!9>>$s to eliminatemost ghostJ %orkers from the (ublic (ayroll1 ASedigh and Ru-indana 9>>> 5o%ever, theassessment of the I007s overall im(act on corru(tion in Uganda is much more sobering AWatt etal #$$$& (12;&

L'There has been little success in terms of reduced levels of corru(tion and im(roved servicedelivery1 In fact, there is little evidence that any reduction in the level of corru(tion has beenachieved at all1

'he Phili((ines ?mbudsman re(orts com(rehensive figures for its activities1 'he "nnualRe(ort for #$$$ A?ffice of the ?mbudsman #$$9 includes the follo%ing&

>,@=> ne% cases received

9#,9 cases filed for (rosecution %ith the courts Aan increase of 9$ from the (rior year

=9


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:92 cases in %hich (enalties %ere im(osed on government officials or em(loyees Au(

:> from 9>>>

9$,:>< and ovember 9>>>, of %hich it com(leted its investigation of some =##1 ?f the lattergrou(, @> %ere referred for legal or administrative action1 ACCCC #$$$ By the end of its firstHuarter of o(eration, the 6IC"C in 6orea had received some


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off and (ut under the authority of a Serious rauds ?ffice or other unit dealing %ith revenuefraud or %hite!collar crime1 "lso, Singa(ore7s CPIB has authority to investigate any crime thatcomes to light in its corru(tion investigations D a (o%er that most such agencies do not have1'he issue here is one of synergy or economy D i1e1 %hat activities are most efficiently andeffectively dealt %ith togetherG In relatively small +urisdictions such as 5ong 6ong, Singa(ore,

and Bots%ana, the natural tendency %ould be to grou( several kinds of offenses together underone investigating body1 'he risk, of course, is that this augmented (o%er might be misused1

(he Alternative' ultiple-Agency Approaches

'he single!agency strategy e.em(lified by 5ong 6ong and Singa(ore came aboutthrough a combination of circumstances, including entrenched corru(tion and an outbreak ofscandal* failures in the traditional institutions D es(ecially the (olice force D leading to a loss ofconfidence* and dramatic action by semi!authoritarian leadershi( backed by a consensus Aeven ifbelated and some%hat reluctant of key elite grou(s D in a culturally cohesive city!state conte.t1'his constellation of factors does not freHuently recur1

ot sur(risingly, most countries continue to follo% the alternative a((roach of combiningtraditional state institutions %ith one or more s(eciali-ed anti!corru(tion units or agencies1 Inthese situations, there may be a ma+or scandal or at least a %ide (erce(tion that e.istingstructures have (roven inadeHuate to (revent or re(ress costly ethical la(ses1 5o%ever, the de(thof the crisis and the strength of leadershi( are insufficient to su((ort a more robust centrali-ationof anti!corru(tion functions1 In other %ords, traditional +udicial and administrative agenciesretain their core ca(abilities and legitimacy %hile additional structures are (ut in (lace to addressga(s, %eaknesses, and ne%ly!emerged o((ortunities for corru(tion1 urther, the government in(o%er is unlikely to command sufficient su((ort for more dramatic ste(s D es(ecially thedraconian measures ado(ted in 5ong 6ong and Singa(ore1 'his may be due to elite o((osition,civic concerns about the erosion of liberties, or a combination1

In this section, %e revie% a (rominent sam(le of these multi!agency a((roaches1 ?urcases come mainly from the United States, India, and the uro(ean Union1

-he ./S

" %atershed date for the develo(ment of anti!corru(tion agencies in the U1S1 %as 9>@


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0eneral, an e.ecutive a((ointee, is reHuired to address criminal allegations against other highe.ecutive officers1 When there are credible allegations of illegalities by certain high officials ofthe federal government, the la% reHuired the "ttorney 0eneral to conduct a (reliminaryinvestigation to determine %hether the charges %arranted further investigation or (rosecution1'he "0 then had to make a re(ort +ustifying a finding one %ay or the other1 If the charges %ere

%orth (ursuing, then a S(ecial Counsel %ould need to be a((ointed1 Regarding both the(reliminary investigation re(ort and the a((ointment of a S(ecial Counsel, the "ttorney 0eneral%as ans%erable to a (anel of a((eals!level +udges a((ointed by the Chief )ustice of the Su(remeCourt D and it %as this (anel that defined the Counsel7s +urisdiction1 In the last decade, it hasbecome clear that this arrangement guarantees the S(ecial Counsel7s inde(endence, but does notim(ose sufficient accountability D a (roblem that early critics antici(ated1 or does it add valueto e.isting systems, according to many critics1 A5arriger #$$$

'he S(ecial Counsel %as the best!kno%n of the (ost!Watergate innovations in the U1S1,but %as in fact only one of several institutions %ith anti!corru(tion res(onsibilities1 "t thefederal level, these include the Public Corru(tion unit of the BI Ainvestigations, the Public

Integrity Section of the /e(artment of )ustice A(rosecutions, the 0eneral "ccounting ?fficeAtechnical studies and reform (ro(osals, the Ins(ectors 0eneral, the ?ffice of 0overnmentthics, Congressional committees, and others1 'here is no centrali-ed anti!corru(tion agency orstrategy1 "t the state and local levels, there have been some agencies that fit the single!agencymold more closely, notably e% Fork City7s /e(artment of Investigations, %hich had bothinvestigative and (reventive functions1 'he /?I has been critici-ed for taking too strict ana((roach to (ublic integrity, es(ecially since the (reventive functions %ere handed to anotheragency, %ith the result that it instills fear and (assivity in city officials D thus reducing the Hualityof governance1 A"nechiarico and )acobs 9>>; "lso, many states have ?mbudsman offices,%hich are not "C"s, but do handle com(laints and conduct outreach to citi-ens on goodgovernment issues1

Probably the closest a((ro.imation to an "C" at the U1S1 federal level is the ?ffice of0overnment thics1 5o%ever, ?0 has a very s(ecific and limited mission of serving as ane.ecutive branch ethics %atchdog1 'his, for e.am(le, is one of several functions (erformed bysuch agencies as Uganda7s I00 and the Phili((ines ?mbudsman1 ?0 is relatively small for aU1S1 government agency, %ith some @2 em(loyees and an F #$$= budget of U1S1 Q99 milliondistributed among five de(artments1 It has a se(arate line in the federal budget and a /irectora((ointed by the President to a five!year term D i1e1 the term overla(s Presidential and legislativeterms, %hich enhances the /irector7s autonomy1 In other structural res(ects, ?0 is like otherfederal agencies1 Its (erformance criteria are summari-ed in 'able 9 in the "nne.1 AUS?0#$$$

0iven its limited mandate, ?0 functions as a central coordinating body similar to an"C" D it aims to (revent and resolve conflicts of interest, foster high ethical standards, andstrengthen (ublic confidence in the integrity of government1 ?0 does this by develo(ing ethicsrules and regulations, (roviding guidance and inter(retation, evaluating the effectiveness of rulesand agency!based ethics (rograms, and conducting outreach and education for e.ecutive officialsand staff1 Its most (rominent (ublic role is that of receiving and revie%ing the financialdisclosure statements of White 5ouse em(loyees and Presidential a((ointees %ho are confirmed

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by the U1S1 Senate1 In this role, it enters agreements %ith these a((ointees to use blind trusts andother instruments to ensure that direct conflicts of interest are avoided D and monitors thesearrangements1 A%%%1usoge1gov 'he ?07s functions are carried out by other structures %ithinthe legislative and +udicial branches1 ?ne notable e.am(le of such a legislative institution is theParliamentary Commissioner for Standards in the U61

'ndia0

"s mentioned above, the function of ethics %atchdog is often (erformed by agencies thatalso have a number of other (o%ers and res(onsibilities1 5ere, a notable e.am(le %ould beIndia7s Central Eigilance Commission1 'his %as set u( as an advisory body in 9>;2, in theaftermath of the Santhanam Committee7s re(ort on (ublic sector corru(tion1 ?riginally re(ortingto the Ministry of 5ome "ffairs, it %as later made an inde(endent statutory body re(orting toParliament1 In the ethics area, CEC %orks %ith all elements of government on their (rograms ofvigilanceJ against corru(tion, (roviding guidance and monitoring im(lementation1 3ike theU1S1 ?0, the CEC has corres(onding units %ithin each ministry and (ublic body that are

res(onsible for vigilance (rograms1 In addition, CEC scrutini-es transactions by (ublic officialsthat may be im(ro(er, receives and addresses com(laints of corru(tion and abuse of (o%er in theadministration, refers inHuiries to the Central Bureau of Investigation ACBI, and monitors CBI7sinvestigations and (rosecutions of offenses under the Prevention of Corru(tion "ct1 "s fore.ternal scrutiny of the CEC, its "nnual Re(ort to the President and Parliament offers oneavenue for oversight, and it issues freHuent (ress releases1

'he CEC7s sister agency, the CBI, is the central government7s investigating arm,focusing on corru(tion and economic crimes, in addition to ordinary criminal offenses under its+urisdiction1 It came into being in 9>;=, about the same time as CEC, taking over from a s(ecialbureau that had until then been (art of the (olice force1 'he CBI continues to be manned by(olicemen em(loyed by the government A%ho may freely be transfer in and out1 It also lackscredibility %ith the (ublic1 ot a single CBI case involving a minister had lead to a convictionfrom 9>:@!9>>@ Abut see belo%1> 'he lack of credibility is e.em(lified in the lo% number ofcorru(tion re(orts CBI receives1

India, being a federation, also has bodies at the state level %ith functions similar to theCEC D many go by the name of1o$ A"u$taD and it is the state level that a((roves any CBIinvestigation into state matters1 India also has the usual array of audit, (rosecuting, andins(ection agencies1 rom this mi.ture, e.(erience seems to sho% that CEC is gainingcredibility as it gains (o%er, a fe% of the state!level bodies have (roven Huite ade(t at addressingcorru(tion, and the remainder D notably including CBI D may have re(utations for(rofessionalism but are ham(ered by (olitical intrusion1 AMauritius ational "ssembly #$$9,Ouah 9>>>a, arasimhan 9>>@, htt(&44cvc1nic1in1

Ma+or changes have been made in the res(ective roles of CEC and CBI since the mid9>>$s1 /uring a raid in 9>>:, the CBI found records of massive amounts of black market money(aid to 99: high level (oliticians over a decade Athe )ain 5a%ala scandal1 'hough it ended many

arasimhan, (1 #:>>@ Su(reme Court ruling suggestthat (arliament is hesistant to grant the (o%ers necessary to curb corru(tion1 In March of #$$$,the CEC advocated investigations of (oliticians for income ta. violations1 In res(onse, thes(okesman for the ruling (arty suggested that such actions could +eo(ardi-e legislation to

confirm the Supreme Court order turning the CVC into a statutory body.12

More recently, in the Bofors case Ainvolving a S%edish arms com(any and the Indian/efense Ministry, the defendants filed a motion for the case to be dro((ed because the CBI

began investigation and issued a charge sheet %ithout formally consulting the CEC1 'hedefendants argue that in reality, corru(tion cases in the CBI arent closely monitored by the CEC1'he CEC takes more of a advisory role Anot a case by case role1 'he defendants claim this isunconstitutional because of the Eineet v1 India ruling in 9>>@ in %hich the court mandatedchanges in the functioning of the CEC and CBI1 'his is interesting because the la% fulfillingthat mandate doesnt e.ist Aas a resolution at least1 While the Court ruling didnt convince(arliament, it is being used as (recedent Arule of la% and the court (lans to further clarify CBIroles %hen ruling in Bofors1

'he general (ublic vie%s the internal control systems for corru(tion in India Athe CEC,CBI and CE?s %ith a sense of futility1 Most obviously, the CBI is not (olitically free to

(roduce the results that are needed1 'he Su(reme Court ruling in Eineet arain v1 Union ofIndia called for a (anel of e.(ert la%yers to assign blame in each acHuittal in court1 'he criminalconviction rate in India is a mere ;19= 'his oversight may act as a disincentive for (rosecutingcases1 "s a CBI officer (uts it,

9$/as, (1 9;=199CEC 9>>> Re(ort, (19$29#Raj, Ranjit Dev. Budget fails to tackle huge black economy. Asia Times. March 7, 20009=Eittal, (1 #:

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Most criminal cases in India any%ay end in acHuittal1 1 1 1 because of legal lacunae, lack of%itnesses1 1 1 'he CBI already filters out a high (ercentage of cases to kee( a high success rate1'he court order %ill sim(ly %ork as a disincentive against (ursuing difficult cases %ith a lo%

chance of conviction192

Fet, a string of high!level convictions in #$$$ might have made an im(act on the average Indian1In ?ctober, P1E1 arsimha Rao became the first Indian (rime minister to be convicted on chargesof corru(tion1 )ayaram )ayalalitha, a national (arty head, %as sentenced to five years forillegally (urchasing state o%ned land19: arlier that year, the CEC made headlines by (ublishingthe names of over 9$$ (ublic servants %ho %ere under investigation for corru(tion1 'hough itreceived some bad (ress for being sensational, in a+industan -imes(oll, >= of the (eo(lesurveyed a((roved of the site19;

In terms of (erformance against their anti!corru(tion mandate, many argue that the CECand (artner agencies have not done enough to raise the stakes for corru(tion1 'he CBI e.amined;:#$ com(laints in 9>>#1 'hey only investigated ##> of those com(laints1 Com(ared to theIC"C of 5ong 6ong, these numbers are distressing1 'he IC"C e.amined ==9# cases in 9>>21India is a much larger country %ith a civil service (o(ulation of around #$ million1 urthermore,it is ranked the ;>= established theService Central de Prevention de la Corruption1 'his is an advisory body %hose (riorityfunction is to centrali-e all information needed to detect and (revent a %ide range of corru(t actsD including misa((ro(riation, influence (eddling, and self!dealing1 'he SCPC also (rovidesassistance to the +udiciary on corru(tion cases and advises central and local government bodieson (revention and reform1 'he SCPC commissioners are led by a senior +udicial official of therank of Princi(al State Prosecutor, and include re(resentatives of relevant agencies such as audit,ta.ation and customs, (olice, com(etition, and consumer affairs1 'he SCPC re(orts annually tothe Prime Minister and the Minister of )ustice1 A/ebord 9>>


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%ere struck do%n as unconstitutional because the agency7s actions are not sub+ect to +udicialrevie%1 While it has its o%n (rofessional ethic, SCPC is not structurally inde(endent1 Placingre(resentatives of the main relevant agencies of government on the Commission a((earsdesigned to foster coordination and information e.change in this area, and also to make it moreof an interministerial body than a com(onent of the )ustice Ministry1 'he a((roach here is to

im(rove information and foster coo(eration, rather than to remove to a central agency (o%erse.ercised by the (olice, )ustice Ministry, Conseil d2Etat, ?mbudsman AMediateur, and others1'he rationale for this is to make it (ossible for agencies %ith dis(arate missions to create aunified (icture of com(le. corru(tion schemes and net%orks, %hich are made u( of %hat %ouldother%ise a((ear to be unconnected elements1 A/ebord 9>>>>

Most other countries also avoid the single!agency a((roach1 "n ?C/ survey found that9= of the 9: surveyed countries had Jbodies %ith (o%er to investigate corru(tion,J but only five

had s(eciali-ed bodies to (rosecute corru(tion1J A?C/ 9>>@ "s noted above, theinvestigative (o%ers of the rench SCPC %ere struck do%n due to constitutional concerns aboutlack of +udicial oversight1 Similarly, Britain7s 3a% Commission found that it could not confers(ecial anti!corru(tion investigatory (o%ers on the (olice, lest it violate the uro(eanConvention on 5uman Rights1 Where the U6 has (laced e.traordinary (o%ers is in the Seriousraud ?ffice, %hich focuses on com(le. fraud %hich in some cases entails (ublic sectorcorru(tion1 'he S? is o(erationally inde(endent, although it is res(onsible to the "ttorney0eneral1 It has the kinds of authority that "C"s have, but in the conte.t of com(le. frauds D andit can receive referrals from the (olice1 AMauritius ational "ssembly #$$$,%%%1sfo1gov1uk

By com(arison, the S?7s counter(art in 0hana has a %ider remit that makes it moreakin to an "C" D it deals %ith cases involving serious financial or economic harm to the state,%hich clearly includes many forms of (ublic sector corru(tion1 A"sibuo #$$9 'he 0hanaianS? thus follo%s the 5ong 6ong, Singa(ore, and Bots%ana a((roaches of addressing (ublic and(rivate sector frauds through the same agency1 'his clearly has a certain logic, given the (ublic!(rivate ne.us that gives rise to corru(tion1 5o%ever, most countries, like the U161, do notem(o%er a s(ecial agency to handle both areas, but rely on coo(eration and informatione.change across agencies1

'he 3atin "merican countries also fit the ?C/ (attern1 " fe%, such as "rgentina,cuador, and Chile, have follo%ed the single!agency a((roach discussed above1 Most othersa((ear sim(ly to su((lement their traditional institutions %ith s(ecial anti!corru(tion units(laced in the Public Prosecutor and Su(reme "udit agencies Ae1g1 l Salvador, 0uatemala, or%ith (olicy!level coordinating bodies Ae1g1 Me.ico, icaragua, Panama1A%%%1res(ondanet1com4english4anti8corru(tion4re(orts4com(endio8111

Conclusion

?ne should avoid e.aggerating the distinction bet%een single! and multi(le!agencya((roaches in the anti!corru(tion field1 Where to (ut the dividing line is not al%ays obvious D at

=


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least one observer AOuah 9>>>a has a((roached this differently from ourselves1 Clearly, morethan one (art of government has some concern and res(onsibility for dealing %ith corru(tion inall the countries %e have encountered1 'he difference lies in the e.tent to %hich (o%ers aretaken from other la% enforcement agencies D or ne% and e.traordinary (o%ers are created D andhoused in a single (o%erful agency designed to lead the anti!corru(tion effort1 "s suggested

(reviously, most countries, es(ecially ?C/ members, a((ear to have a (olitical or legal bar tothe establishment of such a (o%erful agency1 It is also likely Abut not necessarily the case thatthose countries do not have an urgent need for an "C", since they have the means to creates(ecial units %ithin other agencies, to strengthen their la%s, and to achieve the necessarycoordination and centrali-ation of information1

In the search for a useful counterfactual,J these multi!agency e.am(les (oint to the mosteasily accessible com(arison1 What if 5ong 6ong or Singa(ore had taken this a((roachGConversely, %hat if the U1S1, Britain, or rance had used the single!agency strategyG Can %ecom(are the t%o basic ty(es of systems Aand the variants of each %ith res(ect to their success incarrying out the core functions Alisted in (art # above for %hich "C"s have been designedG

urther, does success in this area translate into effective restraint of corru(tion D %hether interms of cross!country corru(tion data, or in terms of (redictive modelsG We %ill return to theseissues later in the (a(er1 or no%, this discussion should (rovide a useful conce(tual frame%orkfor the three in!de(th case studies (resented in the ne.t (art1

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&5 8riginal Case Stu$ies

'he e.isting record suggests that the single!agency a((roach ins(ired by 5ong 6ong andSinga(ore has (roduced some successes, but also a host of disa((ointments, %hen ado(ted invaried conte.ts across the globe1 We understand some of the reasons for this, since a fe% cases

such as 5ong 6ong and e% South Wales are e.ce(tionally %ell!documented1 or the rest,information tends to be s(otty1 "s %e7ve suggested, understanding ho% "C"s (erform reHuiressome in!de(th investigation1 We need to kno% more about their inner %orkings, the allocation ofresources, their location and relationshi(s %ithin the overall system, the Huantity and Huality oftheir out(ut D and the (olitics surrounding them1 'o address these needs, %e have commissioneda series of detailed case studies1 'o these %e no% turn1

In this (art, %e (resent a set of cases in more de(th than those in the (revious section1'his (resentation includes original material develo(ed by researchers focused on three countries&"rgentina, Malaysia, and 'an-ania1 ?ur revie% of the cases is largely dra%n from originalstudies commissioned by IRIS and %ritten by Professor 3uigi Man-etti of Southern Methodist

University A"rgentina, 'eresa Benedict of 'rans(arency International Malaysia AMalaysia, and5a+i Sembo+a and )ames 6a+una of the conomic and Social Research oundation A'an-ania1More detailed data from these cases a((ear in the "nne.es1 'he choice of countries %as guidedby a number of factors including the relative scarcity of (ublished studies on these cases, thedesire to have a mi.ture of geogra(hic and (olitical conte.ts re(resented, a (ractical decision tofocus scarce resources on studies of agencies having fairly broad (o%ers, and the availability ofresearchers and data in these countries1 We begin %ith an overvie% of the agencies, then (rovidea summary discussion of these agencies7 salient as(ects, including, as above, their mandate,authority, resources, structural (rotections, and agency (erformance monitoring1

,sta)lishment

"s in the cases covered (reviously, the anti!corru(tion agencies in these three countrieshave been sha(ed by (olitical res(onses to crises of governance1 "s e.(ected, the strength of thechallenge (osed by these crises, hence the firmness of the ruling (arty7s gri( on (o%er, (lays ama+or role in determining ho% (o%erful is the agency that emerges1 conomic conditions, andtherefore resources available, are also crucial1 In these conditions, (olicymakers take strategicdecisions about the ty(e of agency, the la%s it enforces, and in general the location of variousanti!corru(tion functions across government1

Argentina

'he Oficina Anti Corrupcionor "nti!Corru(tion ?ffice A"C? of "rgentina %as createdthrough 3a% #:1#== of 9>>>9>1 Its (redecessor %as the Oficina de EticaPublicaA?P1 'he ?P had come into e.istence in early 9>>@, but became functional only thefollo%ing ovember1 President Carlos Menem issued a ne% decree A294>> on )anuary #@, 9>>>further s(ecifying its functions1 In other %ords, the ?P came into effect only during the lastt%o years of the Menem administration A9>!9>>>1 'he ?P %as (atterned after the U1S1?ffice of 0overnment thics

meagher paper

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