The Southern Journal of Phibsophy (1986) Vol. XXIV, No. 4

SOCRATES AND THE DUTY TO PHILOSOPHIZE Mark L. McPherran University of Maine at Farmington

The Socrates of the Apology claims to philosophize in accordance with a duty so overriding that he will accept even death, rather than cease from philosophizing (29cSd5; 30a-b). As he characterizes it, the source of this obligation appears straightforward: Socrates has been ordered to do philosophy by a god (23b, 29a3,30a, 37e-38a), and since one ought to obey the command of a god at all costs (it would be impious [and so unjust] to refuse),’ Socrates is obligated to philosophize regardless of any bodily danger (28d; cf. Rep.368b-c).

Socrates also believes that he ought to urge others to philosophize (29d-e, 30a-b, 38a; G.526e),2 and that “theunexamined life is not worth living,” (38a5-6). Thus, it would appear (at least) that Socrates believes that people other than himself are under some sort of an obligation to philosophize. However, the existence of a Socratic duty to urge others to do philosophy does not allow a direct inference to the claim that Socrates believed that all others-like himself-have a duty to do philosophy.3 After all, in his concern for everyone’s welfare (31a), the god may have ordered Socrates to go to great lengths to urge others to philosophize precisely because others do not actually have his sort of duty-or inclination-to engage in it (see n. 1).

For their own good people might require the special prodding to philosophize (in a limited and prudential fashion) which Socrates provides in obedience to the god: just as a parent might have a paternalistic duty of assistance to urge his children to do x, where they themselves do not possess the same duty to do x possessed by the parent.4 Hence, the ascription to Socrates of a belief in a general obligation to philosophize is in need ofjustification. It is also in need of clarification. We need to ask, for instance, about the nature, extent, and limits of such an obligation. Does the obligation to do philosophy require, for example, that a half-wit give up his menial occupation-

Mark McPherran is an assistantprofessor ofphilosophy at the University of Maine at Farmington. He has published papers on Socrates and Plat0 in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Phronesis, Journal of the History of Philosophy, andelsewhere, and has a paper forthcoming in Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie.

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adopting the poverty of a Socrates-in order to employ the elenchus in an ineffective and/ or counter-productive fashion? Or perhaps the sort of philosophizing Socrates urges on others differs in kind from the elenctically-based sort Socrates himself practices: a less intellectually demanding type of rational reflection perhaps.5

This paper is an attempt to respond to these needs and questions by first providing an interpretation that connects Socrates’ particular god- ordered mission to d o philosophy with the more general demands of piety as Socrates conceived them. On that basis I then argue for an account according t o which others besides Socrates possess a prima facie duty to d o philosophy founded on the obligation to d o that which is pious. In the second section I establish a second ‘secular’ Socratic imperative to philosophize. 1 contend that both imperatives are qualified by a distinction concerning the sort of philosophizing one might undertake, as well as by the individual talents and moral deficiencies present in those who must philosophize.

I Piety and the Duty to Philosophize

Socrates connects his own obligation to pursue a life of philosophy with the Delphic oracle. Chaerophon asked the oracle if anyone was wiser than Socrates, and the response was “no one is wiser” (21a5-7). Socrates thereupon set out to refute (elegxzn; 21cl) the apparent meaning of the oracle, and so began his mission to the Athenians. None the less, it would seem that Socrates had already for some time been pursuing a life of philosophy, believing it to be something beneficial that he ought to do, and so the command of the oracle is not what initiated his philosophical career.6 Rather, I will contend, it initiated his obligation to pursue it even at the cost of his life. Several scholars have noticed the glaring problem here, however. How is it that Socrates derived a command t o d o anything, let alone philosophy, from the claim that “no one is wiser”than he?’ Since the primary purpose of this paper is the investigation of the source and scope of the duty for those other than Socrates to pursue philosophy, I shall be brief in my answer to this question. Let me simply propose the following account, a portion of which has been argued for elsewhere, with the remainder resting on a plausible interpretation of the text.

On my view, Socrates was firmly committed to a number of beliefs concerning the nature of piety even prior to the pronouncement of the oracle.8 In support of this, I have argued elsewhere that the following claim can be ascribed t o Socrates:

P Piety is that part ofjustice which is a service (hyperetik2) of men to the gods, assisting the gods in their work (ergon), a work which produces some good result (on the analogy of a slave’s assisting his m a ~ t e r ) . ~

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Given that Socrates believed P, we may then view the origin of Socrates’obligation to do philosophy in this way: the claim of the god that no one is wiser than Socrates is initially a claim Socrates finds mysterious and paradoxical, for he is not conscious of being wise (Ap.2lb). None the less, the god’s claim cannot be false (21b5-7). But since anything a superior might say to an inferior under his command could conceal a demand for some sort of service on the inferior’s part, and since (according to P) piety requires that we serve the gods, Socrates conceives it to be part of his pious obligation-a religious duty-to discover the meaning of the god’s claim. Socrates then proceeds to elicit the true meaning of the oracular assertion by the constant elenctic interrogation of those whose claims to wisdom would falsify the oracle: namely, that he is the wisest in comparison to such Athenians by knowing “that he is in truth worth nothing with respect to wisdom”(23a-b).10 But the message of the oracle, that the Athenians are thus not only lacking in the knowledge ofvirtue but also inan awareness of their lack, places in turn a new demand on Socrates, derived (again) from P. Since it is probably at least an ergon of the gods to promote the establishment of goodness in the world, and since one ought to be pious, P demands that Socrates serve the gods by doing that which-in the present situation-best promotes the development of goodness (i.e., proper humility, virtue, and happiness) in his fellow Athenians: philosophy.II

In addition to the previous derivation of the Socratic duty to philosophize, there is an additional argument made plain in the text: Socrates claims that he continues to philosophize because he is being used by the god as a paradigm to deliver the message that

that one of you ... is wisest, who, like Socrates, has become cognizant that in truth he is worth nothing in respect of wisdom (23b).I*

Socrates’ argument at this point seems predicated on the view expressed, again, by P, that Socrates is obligated to serve the gods. Here the service seems two-fold: one service to the gods is to uphold the pious view that they never utter falsehoods (21 b5-7). Since the god has said of Socrates something that would be falsified by anyone’s turning out to have more wisdom than the minuscule portion Socrates possesses, whenever anyone claims to know something, it is then Socrates’duty to undermine their claim elenctically. Secondly, since it is the god’s wish to use Socrates as the paradigmatic vehicle for the delivery of his message by claiming that Socrates is the wisest of men, then it would seem that part of Socrates’ pious service is to aid him in this task. However, the message that we-like Socrates-are ignorant would be rejected by those who believe they have knowledge, if that message were directly asserted. Hence, the delivery must take the form of a demonstration; specifically, through a refutation of the relevant knowledge claim. Thus, when Socrates finds a person who claims to know, he “come[s] to

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the god’s aid” (23b): that is, he serves the god in accord with the demands of piety implicit in P by delivering the message of the god concerning our ignorance per demonstrandum.

The preceding interpretation of the oracle’s claim as a demand to do philosophy is given final confirmation for Socrates by “god’s com- mands given in oracles and dreams and in every other way that any divine allotment has ever impressed a duty upon man”(33c). Socrates must then ceaselessly philosophize, since the claim of pious service upon us is substantial: our aid to the gods, for instance, is more important than what the many think of us (21e).

One might suppose after all this that Socrates sees the practice of philosophy as a special, and not a general, obligation imposed in his particular case by an order of the god. But although he does, as I shall argue, see himself under orders which set him apart from the mass of men by the extent of his duty, he clearly views philosophy as a task everyone ought to undertake to some extent and in some form, for it improves us and makes life worth living (29e-30b, 36c, 38a, 39cd, 41e42a). Thus, I am not inclined to think that Socrates understands philosophy to satisfy the demands of piety only for himself.

Moreover, 1 think this for reasons other than those which are commonly derived from the Euthyphro’s discussion of piety to show that philosophy is an obligation of piety. Such arguments usually postulate as the sole ergon of the gods the attempt to instantiate goodness in the world, then hypothesize that philosophy is the service that helps to accomplish this task, and then conclude in uniformity to P that piety is nothing other than the practice of philosophy.13 I do think Socrates would agree that one primary ergon of the gods (i.e., perfectly moral gods) is to promote the establishment of goodness in the world and that philosophy is thus pious by its aid to this work. None the less, he would object to those arguments that presuppose it to be known that the establishment of goodness in the world is the sole or primary ergon of the gods.14 Thus, he would object to the claim that no non- philosophical activities (e.g., sacrifices) can be pious, since such a claim requires a clear understanding of the identity and scope of the god’s work. Again, Socrates would find it presumptuous to identify with certainty the precise nature of the gods’ergon.15 To do so would be to lay claim to a wisdom that is “more than human”(Ap.20e), whereas all we can reasonably hope for in this life is “human wisdom”(Ap.20d).16

Given the above, then, it seems to me that Socrates may well have held philosophical activity to be an important form of pious activity for reasons additional to those which involve an identification of the gods’ ergon. One reason of this sort might be that since the gods (for Socrates) are wholly good,l7 it is a compelling hypothesis that they desire our happiness.’* Since philosophical activity in both its constructive and destructive modes19 aims at the production of this, and since our service to the gods would seem to call for us to satisfy their desires, philosophical practice is thus pious.

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Additionally, we may only have pious characters by possessing a human understanding of piety; that is, a non-dogmatically held claim to a knowledge (or set of true beliefs) that we recognize to be fallible and that we would be willing to submit to the elenctic challenge. This understanding of piety involves the belief that P is true and incompleteable in this mortal life, a tentative claim as to why that is so, and elenctically-tested beliefs as to what actions ought to be adjudged pious.20 Now given that we understand P to be incompleteable in this mortal life, the practice that is necessary to know this is itself pious on derivative grounds. This practice is the elimination by means of philosophy in its destructive mode (elenctic testing of oneself and others) of the epistemological conceit most men have that they possess (or might come to possess) the complete and certain knowledge of divine things (i.e., the gods’ ergon) that would complete P. Effective philosophical activity substitutes for that conceit the recognition that an incomplete and uncertain understanding is the best we can humanly hope for (Ch. 166b-e).

Philosophical practice in its constructive mode is in turn the justification by elenctic means of those beliefs constitutive of human wisdom.2’ This activity is pious because it is productive of the happiness that the gods desire for us. Because it is presumably a matter of concern to the gods that we possess such happiness, the constructive aspect of pious philosophical practice requires that we only affirm with confidence those moral and religious beliefs that have been rigorously tested by means of the elenchus. These beliefs should in turn be held with a humility and caution that is conditioned by a willingness to their being re-tested by elenctic procedures.22 This is so, since as the Socratic practice of the destructive mode of the elenchus has repeatedly demonstrated (Ap.21b-23b), men are constantly in danger of con- fidently believing that they possess certain knowledge of both human and divine matters, and that they are thus in no need of improvement. Euthyphro is a prime case of this sort of blind arrogance. Such arrogance is impious because it represents and reinforces a lack of knowledge of piety (including, e.g., knowledge that P i s incompleteable by mortals) that consequently impedes men from serving the likely desire of the gods that we improve our souls.

I1 The Extent of the Duty to Philosophize

In the preceding arguments I have sought t o establish that as Socrates conceived of it, philosophical activity is a pious obligation for humanity, as well as for himself, insofar as it is a service that aids the gods in a t least some portion of their work. In addition to those religious considerations, the following argument (A) for a ‘secular’ obligation to d o philosophy can be constructed from explicitly Socratic principles:

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A ( I ) Anyone ought to do what is right and never what is wrong(e.g., Ap.29b; Cr.49b).

(2) To d o right consistently requires knowledge (or elenctically- tested beliefs) concerning what is right (A~ .29d-30a ) .~J

(3) Knowledge (or elenctically-tested beliefs) concerning what is right is obtainable primarily by means of the practice of philosophy (Ap.29d-30b; Cr.46c-48d; Ch. 157a-b; G.45’7~- 458b, 506c ff., 527b-e).24

(4) Therefore, anyone (prima facie) ought to practice philosophy.

This argument has logical force.25 There is also ample evidence that Socrates believed its conclusion as well its premises, and found that conclusion to be additionally warranted by ‘secular’considerations connected with our general well-being. For instance, Socrates claims that “the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being,” (Ap.38a5-6; my italics). The italicized phrase here stresses the fact that human beings can profit from engaging in moral inquiry in some way or other, if only by coming to see how deficient they are in respect of true wisdom.26 Apology 39d in turn asserts that those many Athenians deserving moral criticism will not escape such examination by putting Socrates to death:

this way of escape is neither possible nor creditable The best and easiest way is not to s top the mouths of others, but to make yourselves as good men as you can.

Again, at both 29e-30b and 36c we are told that Socrates urges everyone to care above all for the well-being of their souls. Given the implication here that one ought t o escape being a justifiable target for moral criticism by making one’s soul as good as possible, we are allowed to infer that the moral improvement philosophical activity makes possible renders that activity an obligation for all of us, who are morally imperfect. Again, in the Gorgius we find that Socrates exhorts “all other human beings” to perfect their souls by pursuing the truth by means of philosophy (507d-e, 526d-e, 527b-c), and that “if anyone proves evil in any way, he should be chastised” (527b): presumably by means of Socratic interrogation (at least), and by others besides Socrates who are qualified to d o so, should there prove to be any.*’

This last qualification raises an important question: thus far I have been operating on the unargued assumption that the philosophizing Socrates is urging on his fellow Athenians is t o be conducted after the Socratic model; i.e., through the relatively autonomous use of the elenchus. Is there anyjustification for this assumption, or does Socrates believe that our philosophical practice-as distinct from his-should consist primarily in submitting ourselves to Socrates (the sole master of the elenchus) for belief-testing, a testing requiring only the exercise of a

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less intellectually demanding sort of ‘rational reflection’ on our parts (see n. 5)? I think there is both conceptual and textual evidence against this latter possibility and in favor of my own presupposition, although there is not as much-nor is it as explicit-as 1 would like:

1. There is no clear textual evidence in favor of attributing a clear distinction between elenchus-wielding and ‘rational reflection’ to Socrates. Moreover, it seems that much serious rational reflection often involves an elenctic style of inference and the sort of one-step elenchoi produced by the use of counter-examples. 2. Socrates may be a genius of the first order, but he would be foolishly arrogant to think that he alone possesses the necessary intellectual requirements for utilizing elenctic procedures with at least some measure of success; e.g., some noted Sophists could successfully employ it. It would also be very odd indeed for someone with Plato’s dialectical skills to credit his teacher-in the very act of reconstructing that teachers’ many elenchoi-with the belief that no one else possesses the intelligence demanded for producing successful elenctic encounters.

In reply to these first points, it might be said that intellecfual skill-in our contemporary sense of, say, an ability in logic-is not what Socrates would appeal to in order t o justify a limitation on our use of the elenchus. Rather, it might be our comparative moral inferiority that would lead him t o exclude us from the use of the elenchus, which, as Socrates’own life illustrates, is a tool fraught with danger even for the wisest of Athenians. However plausible this line of thought might be, though, I d o not think it is a Socratic line, as the following textual considerations will now show.

3. At Gorgias 487e-488a (passim) Socrates says that we should all inquire how to live. So here and elsewhere 1 should think that Socrates would be guilty of misleading us if he firmly believes-but does not make clear to us (as he does not)-that we are not supposed to attempt the inquiry he urges on us in the same manner in which he inquires. 4. At Corgias 458a Socrates certainly imagines himself being elencti- cally examined by another. 5. At Apology 23c-d Socrates clearly states that the young who follow him imitate him by exarnining(elenctica1ly; exetadzein) others, and the implication is that they succeed in some measure to refute elenctically (cf. Rep.539 which suggests that Socrates’ pupils did manage to refute others). 6. As Vlastos has claimed, in “search nor phi1osophize”at Apology 29c the ‘nor’ is epexegetic, and at 41b ‘to philosophize’ is to examine (and ‘examine’ is a common reference to the elenchus).28 Thus, since we should all be contentiously eager to know the things the aforementioned search promises (G.505e), it seems to follow that we must all try to philosophize and so all try to wield the elenchus.

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7 . At Apology 31b2-5, Socrates claims that “I always d o your business [i.e.. what you should be doing] ...p ersuading youroften by means of the elenchus] to care for virtue,” (my italics and brackets). 8. At Apology 38a we find Socrates contrasting his god-ordered obligation to philosophize with another consideration in favor of a general obligation to philosophize:

For if I say that this [to cease to philosophize in Athens] is to disobey the god and that because of this i t is impossible to keep quiet, you will not be persuaded by me, oil the ground that I a m being ironic. And on the other hand, ... this even happens to be a very great goodfora human being[i.e., for lots of people]-to make speeches every day about virtue and all the other things about which you hear me conversing and examining both myself and others (my italics and brackets).

In other words, doing what Socrates does-exhorting and elenctically examining himself and others (‘making speeches’)-is a very great good (i.e., it should be preferred to many other sorts of activities) for a great number of people. Since we all ought to pursue the good, we all ought t o examine ourselves and others elenctically. 9. At Apology 39d it is forcast that people other than Socrates will soon refute his prosecutors (i.e., elenctically examine; elegchonres). 10. At Eurhydernus 282a Socrates declares that “every man shall in every way [i.e., including the use of the elenchus] try to become as wise as possible,” insofar as he desires happiness (my italics and brackets). 1 1 . At Charmides 166c-d (passim) Socrates claims that by wielding the elenchus he tests his own beliefs; thus, when he enjoins us to test ours, it is natural t o suppose that he is recommending that we perform a similar testing (of ourselves and others). 12. Socrates even advises the jurors who voted to condemn him to trouble his own sons “in the very same same way I pained you I[i.e., elenctically],”(4 le; my italics and brackets) should they prove uncaring of virtue, and that such a ‘troubling’would be just treatment (42a1).*9

Given all this, it looks as though Socrates believes that everyone ought to examine both themselves and others, and that they ought to d o so in the way in which Socrates ‘examines’; that is, everyone ought t o philosophize in the elenctic fashion, both through interior dialogue and through the examination of others.

So Socrates was committed to a general obligation to engage in elenctic philosophical investigation on both pious and secular grounds. But to what extent did he think that he and others ought to practice philosophy: what goods, in other words, ought to be sacrificed in preference to philosophical activity? Should one, for instance, pursue philosophy at great personal sacrifice even if one is an inept philosopher? If one does not pursue philosophy, does that render one impious by virtue of a violation of principle P? What if one is already willing to concede the principles that the elenchus leads to: is such a one still obligated to d o philosophy? Finally, if one has received no oracular

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‘command’ to d o philosophy, is one’s duty to pursue it of the same extent as Socrates’ reputed duty?

Surely Socrates would not advise literally every human being (and so, e.g., children and idiots) and regardless of probable outcomes to engage in philosophy in what I will term the active mode: the manner of philosophizing that Socrates most commonly exemplifies, where one submits others to elenctic interrogation (this, in contrast to the passive mode, where one engages in philosophy by serving as the interlocutor to an elenchus-wielder).30 More than anything else Socrates desires t o promote virtuous action and happiness,31 and if philosophizing- normally the means to those ends-were to undermine this somehow, then the obligation to engage in it would be to that degree vitiated. Socrates, for instance, does not advise everyone to despise financial gain or to ignore it completely in favor of elenctic dispute. Rather, he only advises people not to think more of financial gain than of well- being (Ap.36c, 29e-30a) and the knowledge that is needed for the virtuous use of such material goods (Ap.30b; Eud.282a). Socrates may hold that the wisdom secured by philosophy ensures our happiness (Eud.28 le-282d), but this does not entail that philosophical practice guarantees the acquisition of wisdom or that certain external goods are not necessary for the happiness of a t least some sorts of people. In the Crito (47d-e) and the Gorgias (505a), for example, Socrates argues in such a way as to suggest that the possession of a healthy body is a necessary condition for anyone’s leading a truly satisfactory life.32 Hence, at the point that one’s philosophical practice seriously threatened the loss of such a good without promising a net gain in good for oneself and others, one could justly neglect philosophy.

Next, Socrates insists (Ap.33a, 36c) that his own philosophical activity is to be construed as being in some sense a ‘private’mission, and that if some of Socrates’ students imitate him by elenctically examining others, they d o so of their own volition (automatoi; A p . 2 3 ~ 3 - 5 ) . ~ ~ 1 take this to mean that when Socrates admonishes others to d o philosophy (Ap.29d, 30a-b, 38a) he is not thereby setting himself as a standard for us whereby if we fail to pursue philosophy in the active mode regardless of other normally prudential factors (e.g., bodily danger) we are morally culpable.34 Given this and the above, then, I want tentatively a t least to credit Socrates with an instrumentalist qualification of both our pious and secular obligations to d o philosophy; that is:

IP Philosophy ought t o be practiced to the extent to which that practice may be supposed to result in moral improvement for everyone concerned.

This attribution is additionally warranted by the fact that both the pious and secular obligations established by P and A for engaging in elenctic activity were themselves established by appeals to instru- mentalist considerations. What renders philosophical activity pious is

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its performance with the intent to serve the gods by furthering man’s well-being.35 and what renders philosophical practice an obligatory practice without reference to the gods is that it-once again-aims a t that same end.

In the Apology (3 lc-32a. 36b-c) we find that Socrates himself limits the scope of his philosophical activity for consequentialistic reasons. There he justifies his failure to engage in public political activity-an activity that in his case would involve philosophical practice, and in an area that might reasonably be supposed to be ideal for his god-ordered work-on thegrounds that doing so would leave him prematurely dead, and so unable to accomplish the good that he might otherwise accomplish in a private practice. As he says a t 36c, he did not enter into matters where he stood to be of no benefir to anyone, either himself o r others. Indeed, it would seem that to engage in the elenchus without due regard for whether or not the consequences would be benefical would be to act intemperantly, but intemperance is not a good (Ch. 175e). Thus, the examination philosophy provides is not to be conducted without a n eye to consequences; rather, since such examination is worthwhile only insofar as it is productive of correct moral beliefs and happiness (or a t least useful perplexity),36 one ought to philosophize (or not) only when doing so maximizes these outcomes.

The Theaetetus, finally, contains what may be plausibly thought to be the record of a genuine Socratic practice that supports the view that Socrates did not understand the obligation to philosophize to be a perfect (unqualifiable) duty. In the course of comparing himself to a midwife ( 148e-15 Id), Socrates observes that a number of students have left him sooner than they should have, and that t o some of those- presumably because of their intemperant nature and “lack of under- standing”-he has refused further philosophical intercourse with himself (on the advice of the ‘divine voice’; 150d-151a). Here it looks as though such students ought not to philosophize, even with the assistance of the paradigm practioner of philosophy, because it has been estimated that there will be no profit in it for anyone (cf. 15lb).

Again, those whose minds are (in contrast to the previous pupils) unable to have even a few conceptions of their own have no need of Socrates, and so he finds them intellectual partners who will better profit them ( 1 5 1 b). But here, one of the alternative partners Socrates has in mind-Prodicus-will surely not engage the pupil in Socratic elenchus and self-discovery. Rather, the implication a t this point seems to be that, as Miles Burnyeat has so aptly put it, “an empty mind which has no conceptions of its own (cf. 148e) is fitted only to be sown with another’s seed.”37 But this is non-philosophical ‘instruction’ of the sort that Socrates explicitly disavows, and which is to be distinguished from philosophical examination. For instance, a t Apology 19d-20a, Socrates denies that he provided the sort of education men such as Prodicus offer, and that he has been no one’s teacher (Ap.33a-c; i.e., he has

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practiced elenctic philosophy with them, but he has not provided set doctrines). Thus, this makes it appear as though Socrates believed that some individuals are better off if they do not philosophize, and are thus-by virtue of the consequences-excused from the duty to d o so.

The attribution of this consequentialistic principle (1P) to the historical Socrates also has corroboration independent of the Platonic corpus. In Xenophon’s Memorabilia, for instance, Socrates praises men who possess enough self-knowledge to know that

by refraining from attempting what they d o not understand they make no mistake and avoid failure (4.2.25-26).’*

This would seem to apply equally to all activities, even to engaging actively in the elenctic search after self-knowledge. Again. Memorabilia 4.7.1 ff. claims that Socrates took pains to make his students “independent in doing the work that they werefitted for,” (my italics) and urged prudence in intellectual work; e.g., he limited the study of mathematics to what was useful (4.7.8).

Given all the above, I think we can confidently ascribe to Socrates the principle (IP) that although philosophical activity is, in the main, an obligation of piety and moral development, since such obligations are warranted by a system of ends, the obligation to philosophize may be instrumentally overridden. This principle, then, in conjunction with my previous observations concerning the nature of Socratic piety and its connection with philosophy, allows us to derive the following account of the differing obligations to do philosophy. These obligations will be borne by differing sorts of individuals on the basis of their moral need and philosophical talents, as those factors bear on their potential for producing eudaimoniu through philosophical activity. Unfortunately, my account must remain somewhat speculative in its details because of the lack of corroborating text and a clear Socratic specification of the nature of eudaimonia. 1 . Most individuals (of the age of reason), ranging from those possessing very limited intellectual gifts t o those who are masters of elenctic dispute-and regardless of moral development-will be obligated to pursue philosophy in the passive mode by serving as interlocutors in elenctic discussion whenever (within reason) so engaged by a n effective wielder of the elenchus. Indeed, it would seem obligatory to seek out an expert craftsman in moral training-or a t least an effective elenchus-wielder (e.g., Socrates)-if one stands to gain in well-being from such an encounter (Cr.47c-48a; La. 184e-l85e, 201a- b).39 Since ‘Socrates is the wisest’of the Athenians, and is yet ignorant of what virtue is (Ap.22c-d), this will mean that virtually all men are obligated to seek elenctic treatment (and take any resulting refutations to heart). Moreover, the experience of being so refuted by the elenchus is even of greater benefit t o oneself than actively refuting another (G.458a).

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The elenchus-wielder himself must, in addition, be honest in the sense that his intention must be to establish truth, belief-consistency, or moral improvement: there is no obligation to undergo the elenctic ex- amination of an ill-intentioned Sophist unless (oddly enough) there promises to be a net gain in virtue for all. Given IP, exceptions to the obligation to undergo elenctic examination will exist for those who are unable to profit from such examination because they lack sufficient intellectual powers (e.g., the power to recognize contradictions), and especially for those who, in addition to this, modestly admit their own lack of moral knowledge and none the less both concede Socratic principles of virtue and consistently act (fortuitously) in accord with those prin~iples.~O Socrates does not himself, for instance, relentlessly impose the elenchus on those who d o not make illegitimate inferences from particular knowledge claims to general knowledge claims concerning the moral virtues (the 'greatest things'; 4 . 2 2 ~ - e ) . Elenctic examination is generally reserved by Socrates (in his own case) for those who implicitly contradict the oracle by asserting confident knowledge claims (e.g., the craftsmen of Ap.22c-d), which, if true, would be constitutive of wisdom. Since he does not seem to demand of himself that he impose the elenchus on others of the above sort, then he would not seem to demand of us that we d o so (cf. Mern.4.2.25 ff.),4J or that such subjects themselves must undergo it.

Individuals of the above sort may a t least satisfy the demands of piety connected to P by performing self-effacing acts of piety such as those which constitute correct sacrifice.4* Aside from such rare exceptions, submilring t o effective elenchus-engaging in philosophy in the passive mode-is pious in accord with P and is a n obligation for virtually everyone because doing so will lead to moral improvement in those who require it (virtually everyone). As for those rare individuals who d o not require improvement or who a t least concede Socratic principles of virtue and their own ignorance-should there even be any-doing philosophy passively serves as a check on the development of unjustifiable confidence in one's epistemic state and on the reliability of previously accepted beliefs.

On the other hand, those who lack a n epistemic humility pro- portionate to the actual state of their knowledge (e.g., Euthyphro), and who stand in the greatest need of moral development, would be those most obligated to serve as interlocutors to effective elenchus-wielders. After all, if all evil is the result of ignorance, the greater one's ignorance the more likely it is that one will be (and do) e ~ i 1 . ~ 3

As for third parties to a n elenctic discussion, it would seem as though they are free to listen in or not, depending solely on interest (Ap.33a). The actual practice of philosophy (active or passive) involves for Socrates a degree of intellectual engagement that does not seem ordinarily possible for third parties: they are not, for instance, required to state honestly what they believe.44 None the less, it seems clear that

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Socrates believes that everyone ought to be interested in the subject he examines people on-moral improvement-and our texts show some support for the view that bystanders to an elenctic discussion are obligated to listen in, since they will be helped merely by paying attention to such discussions. For instance, Socrates claims that “you burors] will even be helped by listening [to Socrates’ apologia],” (Ap.30~4; my brackets), and in the Gorgias he is willing to give a speech on virtue rather than abandon the audience (505e-509e).45 2. The obligation to engage actively in elenchus-wielding would seem to be in direct proportion to the likelihood of moral development for interlocutor, audience, and elenchus-wielder, which must in turn be calculated on the basis of a number of interrelated factors, primarily: (a) the intellectual ability of the elenchus-wielder in question to employ the elenchus effectively (i.e., demonstrate the inconsistency of inconsistent moral beliefs and the logical failure of false knowledge claims), and (b) the moral status of the elenchus-wielder. This first factor (a) is relevant since false moral beliefs will only be encouraged in everyone by failures of the elenchus to reveal the falsity of such beliefs ( P h . 1 15e; G.458a). T o instill false beliefs is t o harm others, and this must never be done (Cr.47e-48a, 49b-c). Hence, a person who is unable to wield the elenchus effectively is excused, say, from attempting the public examination of a clever Sophist advocating immorality; indeed, he or she positively ought to avoid doing so. However, when the danger is less grave, it would seem permissible-though not obligatory-for those less skilled in the elenchus to employ it.4h On the other hand, one skilled in the elenchus ought t o examine himself and others as much as is consistent with an overall increase in moral virtue, even if death is a risk (Ap.28b). Because of the stiff intellectual requirements involved in the successful employment of the elenchus and the standard distribution of such skills across human communities, those obliged to wield it will be of fewer numbers, it would seem, than those obligated to suffer it.4’

Another important factor bearing on our obligation to philosophize actively is (b) the moral status of the elenchus-wielder. A Sophist of the immoralist variety, for instance, ought not to wield the elenchus in an attempt to convince others of what is patently an immoralist thesis (e.g., that it is morally acceptable to d o what is unjust), for this poses the real danger of moral harm to others. In a case like this, in fact, Socrates would probably deny that such an attempt would be an instance of philosophical practice as he understands it, since this would not be a search for either truth or moral virtue. On the other hand, a virtuous man with elenctic skill ought t o examine himself and others in preference to all other (external) goods.

Two objections founded on passages from the Republic might to adduced here against my view that not everyone is required to philosophize actively:

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a. At 368b-c Socrates suggests that he-and seemingly anyone else-- must undertake to defend justice ‘‘so long as one has breath and can utter his voice,” and that to fail to d o so would be to act impiously. b. At 335e Socrates invites Polemarchus to take up arms as his partner in a battle against the view that wise men might say what is false (e.g., that the just man harms his enemies), even though Polemarchus is clearly not his intellectual ~ e e r . ~ g

In respect of (a), I want immediately to agree that Socrates is asserting what he takes to be a general obligation of piety: to rationally “defend justice so long a s one has breath ... whenjustice is reviled .... The best thing ... is toa id her as best 1 [and anyone else] can,”(my italicsand brackets). Here I would also claim in agreement that many of us-and not just Socrates-must d o ou r philosophical best when the virtues and various moral truths are actively attacked, and that against such a n attack every man must come to the defense in some fashion. However, that need not mean that we must every one of us actively seek out those who are attacking justice in order to engage them in elenctic comhat: against immoral Sophists who possess great eristic skill, for instance, we may need to call out for our intellectual Heracles (cf. Ph.89b-c) (or simply shun them and/ or greet them with laughter and abuse). So we are obligated to defend justice as best we can, and for some of us, the best thing is to be quiet, allow the experts to get on with their work without our interference, and d o that work of our own which will best aid the cause of justice.

Although in (b) it is true that Polemarchus is taken on as a partner and that he is no great philosophical talent, it clearly does not follow from that that everyone must always actively philosophize. My view also does not demand that philosophical talents less distinguished than Socrates must always and only philosophize passively. After all, if Polemarchus actively philosophizes in this situation, he has Socrates on hand should some dangerously false view remain resistant to his amateur elenchus. Again, on my thesis, everyone is obligated to pursue philosophy, but it must be remembered that this obligation is qualified by considerations having to d o with what it is that justifies doing philosophy in the first place: the progress of human happiness and virtue. For many people-but not for Socrates, his peers, and his true pupils-this will place significant limits on their obligation to philosophize: not so many, however, as completely to absolve the sort of people that flee from Socratic examination from the moral condemnation of having failed in their duty.

In light of the preceding discussion, I want now to reconsider the case of Socrates. On my account of philosophical obligation, any individual possessed of inordinate intellectual abilities and moral integrity will be inordinately obligated to philosophize actively; and were he to in fact realize the degree of moral deficiency alleged to be present in the Athenianpolis-as Socrates has been made to realize by the oracle--he

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would be morally negligent not to practice the elenchus assiduously, ‘stationing himself‘to his task (Ap.28d) even at the risk of death. Such an individual would pursue philosophy for prudential reasons of self- improvement and to ensure right action (A), but also because piety (P) demands it, since it is a likely desire of the gods that aN men should possess eudairnonia.49 This obligation, then, is independent of the method of discovery of a present moral lack in oneself and others: it may be by oracle, or by insight, o r by refutation.

On this account, Socrates must be seen as someone with an inordinate degree of self-confidence and relative certainty concerning his own intellectual talents and moral worth. For given Socrates’ endorsement of IP, his interpretation of the oracle’s pronouncement as a command to d o philosophy ceaselessly and regardless of material and bodily consequences must result from a judgment that he, Socrates, is uniquely qualified as the person who best stands to net the greatest gain in good for himself and others currently residing in Athe11s.5~ In fact, and in confirmation of my thesis that the duty to d o philosophy is consequentially varient, this is just how Socrates is portrayed (Ap.30~- 32a, 36b-e). He is said to be a rare gift of the gods (Ap.30a, 30d-e), a great benefactor of the city (Ap.36d); Socrates alone, of all the Athenians, practices true statesmanship (G.521d).

Furthermore, Socrates portrays his own obligation to pursue philosophy actively as being of far greater extent than that which is borne by others: he has neglected his affairs, both public and private, and his family (Ap.23b, 31b), he has done it without the rewards of enjoyment, money (Ap.23c, 31b-c), and leisure (Ap.23b), and it has been a seemingly inhuman and unreasonable (Ap.3 1 b 1-2,3 I b7) vocation in just that way: an obligation over and above the obligations of others that would be wrong to ignore or moderate (Ap.29d, 37e). He alone, finally, seems to be the one Athenian with the task to urge others to philosophize, and to do so even at the risk of death. Whether or not we agree with the self-assessment on which he based this account of the extent of his own duty-and his ultimately optimistic judgment about the philosophical potential of his fellow men-it proves difficult not to wish that he was right.5‘

NOTES

’ On my view, Socrates is a theist whose theism is integral to his philosophical presuppositions. Evidence for this thesis-and for the presupposition here that Socrates believes that all impious acts are unjust-is provided in my paper “Socratic Piety in the Eufhyphro,”(hereafter, “Socratic Piety”), Journalofhe History ofphilosophy 3 ( 1985): 283-309. Socrates’gods are our intellectual and moral superiors, and it is wrong not to obey the commands of such superiors (see, e.g., Ap.29b6-7; Ch.176b-c; Lo.184e8-9).

Throughout this paper I use the terms ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’, but in a relatively non-technical fashion, since there is no trace of Kantian duties in the thought of Socrates. So I want to make clear that when 1 attribute to Socrates the belief in a ‘general duty’or ‘obligation’ to do philosophy. 1 mean only to claim that Socrates believed that most

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people of the age of reason ought to--prima facie-do philosophy, that doing philosophy will benefit them and ought generally to be preferred over all other activities, and that philosophizing is virtuous; but that on certain occasions one ought to refrain from philosophizing. Here. then. one might speak of different sorts of duties to philosophize. where the difference between any two sorts would lie in the degree to which one ought to prefer other activities to the practice of philosophy.

2 Here the justification could be equally straightforward: one ought to obey the commands of a god at all costs. and so because Socrates has beencommanded bya god to urge others to philosophize (Ap.33c), Socrates ought to urge others to philosophize. ’ That is. i t is not at all obvious in the Apology that the god has commanded

everyone-or even most people-to philosophize. In fact, 4 . 3 I b uses just this sort of analogy: Socratesgoes to individualsas a father or

older brother might, persuading them to care for virtue (1.e.. to care for the improvement of their souls, and thus to d o philosophy).

1 am grateful to Gregory Vlastos for bringing this possibility to my attention. 6 See Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, “The Origin of Socrates’ Mission,”

Journal of fhe History of Ideas 4 (1983): 657-666 (hereafter “Socrates’ Mission”), and Richard Kraut, Socrates a n d rhe State (Princeton. 1984): 271, 11.43. ’ For a history of the varied interpretations of this problem, see Brickhouse and Smith,

“Socrates’ Mission,” pp.657-8, nn. 1-4. 8 The following derivation of Socrates’ obligation to philosophize from the oracular

pronouncement is--for the most part-an elaboration of the derivation proposed by Brickhouse and Smith in “Socrates’ Mission”p.664. In brief, they argue that Socrates has a sense of obligation to the god which derives from antecedently held beliefs about the requirements of piety which are not based on a direct command of the oracle:

There is good reason to suppose that Socrates is presented as believing, even beiore ChaerophonS startling news. that piety requires one to serve the gods by promoting what is good. But his astonishment at the oracle and his subsequent understanding of its real meaning show that he had not fully realized the full extent to which his fellow Athenians pursued and possessed only apparent goods. The god’s message, therefore, is that the Athenians lack the supreme benefit, virtue, a deficiency of which they are arrogantly ignorant. As the god’s servant, Socrates must free them from the pretense of real wisdom that is the cause of their deficiency and urge them to acquire virtue. This, he says, he has done, for he has tirelesslycarried out his pious duty toconvey the god’s message toall who will listen.

“Socratic Piety,” pp.283-292. Because, as 1 will argue. Socrates’ firm conviction that he ought to d o philosophy (Ap.29b) is founded on this principle, I would contend that Socrates would claim to know P (although it would be a ‘fallible’claim to knowledge: Vlastos”know1edge; e’; see n.14). For evidence of a Socratic commitment to the master- slave/ superior-inferior metaphor. see. e.g., Ph.62d-63d; Ion 53e: Parm.l34d-e; .4lc. Major 122a; and Xenophon’s Memorabilia 1.4.9-12.

10 See Kraut. op. cit., p.271. 1 1 Philosophical practice in this sense includes persuading people(often by means of the

elenchus) to care for truth. virtue, and the perfection of their souls (Ap.29e. 3Oa, 3 Ib), to care less for material things than for virtue (Ap.29e-30b). and to free them by means of the elenchus from the pretense of wisdom (Ap.23b. 23e, 28a, 38a). See also, e.g., Ch.l57a, 166a. Here I subscribe to the view that the elenchus is Socrates’only method for searching for moral truth; see Gregory Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” The Philosophical Quarterly I38 ( 1985): p. 18; and “The Socratic Elenchus,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy I (1983): n.47; Kraut, op. cit., p.27 I , 11.43. In opposition to this, see T. Irwin, Plato’s Moral Tbeory(Oxford, 1977). pp.37.39. Although divine dispensation may yield moral beliefs that will withstand the test of the elenchus (Meno 99b5-d5), divine inspiration is not a methodical source of reliable moral belief or knowledge; see“Socratic

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Piety,” p.3034; Kraut, op. cir., pp.291-3; and Brickhouse and Smith, “The Paradox of Socratic Ignorance in Plato’s Apology,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 2 (1984): 125-131; and “‘The Divine Sign Did Not Oppose Me’: A Problem in Plato’s Apology,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1986):511-526.

Note that I have said that philosophy-as-elenctic-examination is the best method forthe attainment of virtue and happiness‘in the present situation’; i.e., the present state of moral ignorance in Athens. I have thus left open the possibility that another form of philosophizing might replace the use of the elenchus should its propaedeutic function result in a general advance toward the knowledge of virtue.

1 2 T. and G. West’s translation, Four Texison Socrares(Cornell, 1984), hereand below. 13 E.g., W.A. Heidel, “On Plato’s Eurhyphro,” TAPA 3 I (1900): 174, who discovers a

definition of piety in the Euthyphro according to which it is“the intelligent and conscious endeavor to further the realization of the Good in human society, as under God,”(i.e., it is philosophy).

14 Here and below 1 am relying on Vlastos’distinction between knowledge claims which are recognized to be fallible but which are none the less to be relied upon for having survived elenctic testing (‘knowledge/e’), as opposed to claims to certain knowledge (‘knowledge/c’), “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” pp. 17-19, See also Irwin, op. cir. p.40, “Socratic Piety,” pp.15-21; and Brickhouse and Smith, “The Paradox of Socratic Ignorance in Plato’s Apology.”

15 “Socratic Piety,” pp.298-309. As Nicholas Smith has pointed out to me in correspondence, there is another objection to the claim that piety in nothing other than the practice of philosophy: if there is unity of the virtues, it would then turn out that each of the virtues is nothing other than philosophy as well, which is plainly false. Although philosophy always makes some contribution to every virtue, surely courage on the battlefield and moderation in dining are notjust philosophy.

I h “Socratic Piety,” pp.297-298.

I n For the sake of brevity I must bypass the many interesting discussions of Socratic eudaimonism and simply assume that for Socrates a thing is good only insofar as it is conducive to happiness; hence, that only happiness is intrinsically good. How we are to define happiness ( i t . , whether or not Socrates equated it with pleasure) I leave open, but assume that we are not to define it in terms of virtue or virtuous activity; thus, virtue will be an instrumental good only because it contributes to what is intrinsically good: happiness.

19 Here 1 am presupposing there are such modes: the destructive mode of philosophical activity is the elenctic revelation of belief-inconsistency, and thus, lack of knowledge (Ap.2 lc3-22ax29e3-30a2). More controversially, the positive mode is the revelation that some belief may be relied upon since it has withstood the test of the elenchus ( Cr.48b3-e2; G.508e6-509a4). See Irwin, op. cit. pp.6,3740,and Vlastos,“The Socratic Elenchus,”and “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge.”

2o “Socratic Piety,” p.307. Cf. Kraut, op. cit., pp.291-309. I agree with Kraut that Socrates presupposes the existence of natural limits-especially as regards piety-that prevent human beings from havingany realistic hopes of attaining full moral development and certain knowledge (‘divine wisdom’) in this life.

See, e.g., Ap.21 b; Phd.62d-63c; Eu.6a-d, 13c-d.

2 1 E.g., that it is better to suffer wrong than to do it. See n.19. 22 Socrates even subjects the pronouncement of the oracle that no one is wiser than he to

23 See also Irwin, op. cit., pp.90-94. 24 Ibid. Here I say ‘primarily’ because of Socrates’ reliance on non-rational sources of

truth; e.g., Ap.33~4-7. 25. Especially if we supply the premise that we ought to d o those things that provide the

necessary conditions for our doing what is right, and the provision that such things may be done only if their performance is consistent with the principles of virtue.

26 And so here we see a prudential reason for doing philosophy independent of its desirable results in action. I am in agreement with Irwin, op. cir., p.91, that Socrates values

the test of the elenchus. See Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” p.20.

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philosophy solely for its results (pace Kraut. up. rig., p.271. n.43). The elenchus, for Socrates. is a means to a good end (G.472~-d. 500c; knowlodge and recognition of ignorance), but nothingchosenforthe sake ofafinalgood isagood initself(L~~s.2l!,c-d. 220a - b ).

? Given Ap.30e, 3 la , and G.521d. i t seems unlikely that Socrates (or Plato) would grant that there are any elenchus-wielders in Athens as qualified as Socrates, but that need not completely absolve others from the duty to philosophize actively.

Since’no one does wrong knowingly’, (Pr.352b-c; Meno 78a). the chastisement spoken of here should at least include philosophical interrogation (and perhaps other standard forms of punishment as well), given what Socrates says at Ap.25e-26c.

2 X ”The Socratic Elenchus,” pp.3 1-32. 29 In their reply to Vlastos, “Vlastos on the Elenchus,” Oxford Studies in Ancient

Philosophy 2 (1984): 185-195. T. Brickhousc and N . Smith have argued on the basis of several of the passages I have cited above that “though Socrates may be safelyassumed to be its [the elenchus’] greatest master, any adequate account of the elenchus must permit its being sensibly commended to any of us inclined sincerely to employ it,”(p.195).

3O I think this is true despite the fact that Socrates generally welcomes all comers to elenctic discussion: anyone he meetsat any given time(Ap.29d). as well as young and old, citizen or foreigner (Ap.30a). See Vlastos, “The Socratic Elenchus,” pp.34-35.

Although at Apologj 23c there is no suggestion that the wealthy young men who imitate Socrates should moderate their use of the elenchus. I would argue that this is because Socrates foresees no real harm in the case of fheir activity. Plato seems to have disagreed with Socrates over this assessment (see n.47). and many have found Socrates’ defense against the charge that he is not responsible for the corruption of those who have listened to him (Ap.23c-26b. 32a-34b) unpersuasive.

31 See Irwin, op. c i f .% p.91. J z Ibid., p.93. In a paper delivered to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy. New

York, December, 1984, “Socrates the Epicurean’?’’ Irwin has argued for an adaptive account of Socratic wisdom. On this view, wisdom secures happiness irrespective of prevailing external conditions. Given the passages I have cited which conflict with this (noted by Irwin). I am disinclined to accept his view. Rather. 1 am more persuaded by Vlastos in his “Happiness and Virtue in Socrates’ Moral Theory.” Proceedings oJ“ fhe Cambridge PhilologicalSociefy 2 10 ( 1984): 18 1-2 13, that for Socrates there are a class of “subordinate constituents of the good: nonmoral goods .... we shall be happier with than without them,” (p.201). I t is quite conceivable that for some individuals the continued practice of philosophy might present the possibility of a loss of such goods with no countervailing possibility of a gain in wisdom: here the greater happiness is secured by refraining from philosophizing.

A much stronger argument for my view that goods necessary for our greater happiness could be undermined by our philosophizing is provided by T. Brickhouse and N . Smith in “Socrates on Goods, Virtue. and Happiness.” forthcoming in Oxford Studies In Ancienr Philosophy. There they argue for a Socratic distinction between virtue, considered as a condition of the soul, and virtuous activity. On that basis they then attempt to show that Socrates believed in the necessity of the former for happiness, but the sufficiency of only the latter. Accordingly. since a severly damaged body may prevent one from performing the virtuous actions necessary for “living well,”a person may be harmed bodily to such a degree that he is better off dead rather than alive (regardless of his philosophical propensities and powers). Given this, I would argue, it is then easy to imagine situations in which the threat of this sort of harm (without the promise of a countervailing production of goodness elsewhere) will qualify a person’s obligation to philosophize.

J 1 This term may well imply the unbidden doing of an act. Socrates is supposed to serve as a paradigm of some sort (Ap.23aSb4). but not as a

standard of minimum philosophical obligation. Rather, Socrates servesas an example of the relative value of human wisdom in comparison with the wisdom of the god.

34 It is true that Apology 38a isa blanket exhortation to philosophize. There it looks as though Socrates is saying that everyone should spend at least a good part of their day

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doing what he does in the agora. None the less, Socrates nowhere explicitly demands of others the same selfless devotion to philosophy that he demands of himself, and even then, he moderates his own mission with an eye to long-term consequences (Ap.31c-32a, 36b-c).

35. “Socratic Piety,” pp.304-9, esp. p.307. 36 Irwin, Plat0 S Moral Theory, p.9 I . See also G. Anastaplo, Human Being and Citizen

(Chicago, 1975). pp. 18-20. whoargues that the Socraticexamination of oneSlife requires the examination of the lives of others, since all men share in the one life of the community: an understanding of one’s life requires a n understanding of its setting. Examining others also seems a prerequisite of examining oneself because of its therapeutic efficacy against the natural tendency toward self-deception.

3’ M. Burnyeat, ”Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration,” BICS 24 (1977), p.9. Naturally, 1 want to concede that the late date of the composition of the Rzeaetetus significantly undermines its value as a source of reliable information on the views of the Socrates of the early dialogues.

38 Translation by E.C. Marchant, Loeb Edition (London, 1979). here and below. 39 As Socrates has it, there is no worse evil for a man than a false opinion on the subject

of the proper care for the soul (fh. I15e; G.458a): even the perplexity brought on by the elenchus or a Socratic confession of ignorance is thus a n important gain (Ap.23a-b). Hence, we should seek out the ‘charmer’ who will help us attain either truth or perplexity (Ch.175d-176c). See Kraut, op. cit., p.235 ff.

Should such consistent action even be possible; see premise (2) of argument A. 1 am imagining here that this possibility would not require the doing of philosophy ineven the passive mode.

41 Given Socrates’ exceptionless claim that the unexamined life is not worth living (Ap.38a), 1 will have to say that Socrates would find the present class of individualsa very small one at best. This Socratic principle admits of exceptions because, as Irwin notes, op. cit., p.91, “self-examination [for Socrates] is worth while [solely] because of the importance of correct beliefs about morals,”and “when [moral] knowledge is found, the elenchos should no longer be an essential method of moral instruction.”(p.97). In these cases I am discussing, there is no concern that the elenchus is to be valued apart from its results because “the right way of holding beliefs is good in itself apart from its results,” (p.97) since people who are intellectually deficient cannot “rationally and autonomously” employ the elenchus in a defense of their views.

42 “Socratic Piety,” pp.305-6. For examples of Socratic religious sacrifice we have only one dubious instance in the Platonic corpus(fh. I18a). None the less, thereare numerous instances in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (1.1.2, 1.1.19, 1.3.64, 4.3.16-17, 4.6.4-6) which testify to Socrates’orthodoxy. Although Xenophon may well haveexaggerated the extent of that orthodoxy, he seems to confirm a degree of traditional practice independently testified to in Plato (e.g.. Eud.302~. Phdr.229e, Ph.1 17c).

In accord with my interpretation of piety(P). secularlyjust acts will bealso be piousacts if performed with the intent to please and serve the gods.

Euthyphro serves as a paradigm case here: the gap between his arrogant claims of knowledge and the actual state of his knowledge was so wide that he was prepared to prosecute his own father on the basis of those false claims (Eu.3e-5a).

44 See, e.g., GSOOb, Rep.346a. and fr .33 Ic. Cf. Vlastos, “The Socratic Elenchus,”

4 5 Of course, Socrates may well be thinking here that he is a uniquely qualified individual. and that we need not pay attention to just any elenchus-wielders that happen to be in town: he may think that he is the only competent elenchus-monger around. This possibility raises a problem that crucially affects our duty to undergo the elenchus: is our obligation to undergoelencticexaminationan obligation to undergo( 1 ) only theelenchus given by Socrates, (2) only good elenchus, or (3)any elenchus whatsoever? If my account has beenat all close to the truth, then Socrates will reject the idea ( I ) that we are under no obligation to philosophize once he isdead,as well as (3). since we ought topositivelyavoid some elenctic encounters (where false beliefs will be encouraged by an incompetent or ill-intentioned elenchus-wielder). So although it is then clear that ou r obligation is to seek

pp.35-38.

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out ( 2 ) only good elenchus, ou r problem will then be to identify the good elenchus we ought to seek. But if 1 am in great moral ignorance. how shall I recognize good elerichus and good elenchus-wielders and so differentiate the philosophers from the sophists and fools? (Socrates may have had a greater faith in the power of divine guidance than we dreamed.) But perhaps Socrates would have simply advised the pursuit of all elenctic encounters that appear to pose no significant danger, trusting in what few true beliefs even a Thrasymachus will possess and in the power of the soul to profit more from the possession of true beliefs and their testing than it suffersfrom the possession of thost: that are false.

4h For instance, i t is apparently permissible for the jurors who found Socrates guilty to 'trouble' his sons with elenctic examination (Ap.4le).

4' Despite this limitation on the number of people obligated to actively philosophize, one still gets the overall impression from the early dialogues that Socrates generally sees little need to restrict access to the philosophical enterprise, especially in the passive mode. He appears to think that philosophizing in even a limited fashion is a good for virtually all people. Clearly. Plato came to restrict philosophy to the well-qualified few because he perceived some danger in this attitude, thinking-it seems-that Socrates was overly generous in his estimation of the power of rational persuasion and the intellectual and moral potential of ordinary men (see. e.g., Rep.494a. 519d. 537e-539e [esp. 538d-el). For an excellent discussion of the very different attitude the mature Plato exhibits toward unrestricted access to (and so a general obligation in respect of) philosophizing and the elenchus (e.g., in the Republic), see M. Nussbaum, "Aristophanes and Socrates on Learning Practical Wisdom," Arisrophanes: Essays in Interprefarion, J. Henderson (ed.), Yale Classical Studies, vol. XXVI: 43-97 (esp. pp.81-88).

4" I owe this pair of objections to N . Smith. 49 On this view of piety. then, i t is the desire of the gods for our well-being that is the

source of our altruistic pursuit of philosophy in the active mode: it is for this reason above all that we should try to refute others (for prudentially. we might only seek to be refuted ourselves; G.458a). None the less, refuting others in fulfillment of our pious service will benefit us as well, for the gods are not indifferent to the welfare of good men (Ap.41~-d; Eu. I5a; Mem. I .4.5-19). See "Socratic Piety." pp.300-308, for evidence that Socrates would attribute a desire for our happiness to the gods.

5o On my account, Socrates' refusal to propose exile as a punishment (Ap.37c.38a) results from a judgment that since he must philosophize no matter where he goes, death, or pointless wandering at best, will be his fate (Ap.37d-e). Additionally, his death may further his divine work. Thus. he should not propose exile. Other alternative punishments which would diminish his capacity for the virtuous activity of philosophizing would for that reason make his life not worth living, and are thus to be rejected (see Brickhouse'sand Smith's "Socrates on Goods, Virtue, and Happiness," op. cir.).

51 I am grateful to Gregory Vlastos, Thomas Brickhouse, Mark Strasser,and especially Nicholas Smith, for their comments on the ancestor of this paper. Any errors or implausible claims are entirely my own. I would also like to thank Yukio Kachi for sending me a copy of his unpublished manuscript "Socrates on the Divine Command to Philosophize," which I found helpful in formulating the Introduction and Part 1 of this paper.

An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Annual Workshop in Greek Philosophy of the Joint Program in Classics and Philosophy. the University of Texas at Austin, 1985. 1 would like to thank my commentator, Owen Goldin, for his helpful remarks on that occasion.

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