may 22, 2012 dear mr. huerta · 05/07/2012 · faa administrator may 22, 2012 page 2 of 12 4...

4 Barnstable Road, Hyannis, Massachusetts 02601

▫ 508-775-9767 ▫ Fax: 508-775-9725

www.saveoursound.org

a 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organization

May 22, 2012

Acting Administrator Michael Huerta

Federal Aviation Administration

800 Independence Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20591

Dear Mr. Huerta:

I am writing to you on behalf of the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound (Alliance) to express

my concerns based on information that I have obtained from the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests that we have

made with respect to the Cape Wind project. The FAA has consistently ignored the warnings of

the local aviation community, including airplane pilots, regional airports, and airline owners

that the proposed Cape Wind project would pose unacceptable risks to the safety of local pilots

and passengers. The documents make clear that FAA has made decisions based on political

factors rather than the recommendations of the pilots, who use this airspace every day,

thereby, failing to discharge FAA’s statutory safety-first mandate. In spite of the FAA

acknowledging both radar interference to Air Traffic Control and significant adverse impacts to

Visual Flight Rule (VFR) operations, the FAA still issued its third No Hazard Determination in

2010, shortly after the Department of Interior issued its approval for Cape Wind.

In its most recent 2010 Determinations of No Hazard, the FAA erroneously focused exclusively

on whether the turbines met the technical definition of obstruction (e.g. whether they

exceeded 500 feet) without considering separately whether they would interfere with air

navigation. This flaw formed one of the bases of lawsuits by both the Town of Barnstable,

which owns and operates one of the three local airports in the area, and the Alliance to Protect

Nantucket Sound, a non-profit environmental group dedicated to the long term protection of

Nantucket Sound. In a victory for public safety, on October 28, 2011, the US Court of Appeals

vacated the FAA Determinations of No Hazard (Town of Barnstable, Mass. v. FAA, 659 F.3d. 28

(D.C. Cir. 2011). As a result of this ruling, the Cape Wind project is currently under review once

again by your agency.

Because of the Federal Court order, the FAA must now again consider the very real aviation

safety risks posed by Cape Wind’s 25 square mile wind plant proposed for an area directly in

FAA Administrator May 22, 2012 of 12


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the middle of a highly trafficked, low altitude flight corridor in Nantucket Sound with three

airports in close proximity. This area hosts well established VFR routes between two of the

three busiest airports in the state with 400,000 flights per year over, in, and near the project

area, with two thirds of the air traffic concentrated in the few summer months. It is also an

area of rapidly changing unique weather conditions, forcing both IFR and VFR pilots to navigate

between frequent fog and low visibility low ceiling conditions.

As you know, the Cape Wind project has been the subject of intense publicity and has received

the ardent support of both the state and federal administrations to propel Cape Wind forward.

Our review of the internal FAA documents produced in response to our FOIA requests reveals

that FAA’s Obstruction Evaluation process has also been subject to pressure from these

external sources, resulting in FAA taking inappropriate shortcuts in its review. Accordingly, the

Alliance has grave concerns that the FAA will once again attempt to rubberstamp the Cape

Wind review in spite of the unacceptable risks to aviation safety.

Specifically, the FOIA responses reveal:

1. A clear pattern of political pressure on the FAA to rush the review process;

2. Admissions of safety impacts by FAA personnel evaluating the impact of Cape Wind’s

proposed 130 turbines;

3. Failure to use appropriate procedures to resolve ambiguity and contrary opinions

regarding the effectiveness of proposed technical measures to mitigate radar impacts;

4. Relaxation of mitigation requirements in order to protect the project proponent’s

economic interests rather than the safety of the aviation community and integrity of the

NAS; and

5. A possibility of threats to national security.

Pattern of political pressure and influence

FAA emails in response to the FOIA request clearly show political pressure and White House

and Department of Energy involvement. FAA personnel openly acknowledge the political

sensitivity of the project, pressure to rush the review to meet deadlines despite the clear risks,

and difficulty to deny the project given the political pressure to promote a green energy agenda.

A December 27, 2006 email from Cape TRACON, the radar air traffic control facility for

the Cape Cod and Islands airspace, outlining its concerns states, "I will tell you that this

will have an adverse impact on our operation..." The response to this email from FAA

ASW states, "Keep in mind that if an objection is issued, it will be based pretty much on



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your comments, so no smoke, please. Any ‘objection’ to a wind turbine project will be

scrutinized at the highest level (White House, DOE, etc.) so be thorough and exact."

(Exhibit 1)

A January 14, 2009, internal FAA email acknowledges, "The Cape Wind project in

Nantucket Sound is highly political..." (Exhibit2)

A January 20, 2009, internal FAA email states, "The cases are in a Rush Status, therefore

generally we try to turn around in a week from the date it is entered into work status.

However, we realize there are a lot of cases and the amount of work involved in this

particular study and the political sensitivity, we want to ensure we provide a response

that captures all anticipated adverse impact as a result of these proposals." (Exhibit 2a)

A January 30, 2009, internal FAA email states, "How are you doing on the cape wind

cases, could you let me know when you expect to be completed as OES is inquiring due

to the political sensitivity to them and our response." (Exhibit 3)

A February 6, 2009, FAA email states, "We are getting considerable pressure to get the

Cape Wind cases out on circ. I can’t do that without AF's response. It's reached critical

mass… I know you're very busy and this is not your only project, but this is very high

profile." (Exhibit 4)

Another February 6, 2009, email states, "We have heard on the media that the sponsor

is looking to move forward with construction in the next couple of weeks, given the level

and cost of the modifications involved to mitigate radar performance impacts, this could

very well be a show stopper for the proponent and we have to do everything in our

power to be prepared as this is highly political. Our response will be scrutinized by

those advocating this renewable energy resource and we must be accurate, clear and

concise with what we are providing back as to our response." (Exhibit 4a)

A June 2, 2009, email states, "This is a working group and all will be required to

participate and provide input as this is extremely political and likely to result in further

discussion and probable public inquiries." (Exhibit 5)

An April 1, 2010, states, "Could you provide some information regarding the political

implications associated with the Cape Wind project?" (Exhibit 6)

An April 13, 2010, action item states, "Request that Sheri provide political issues or

insight for Valerie and Rich" (Exhibit 7)

A May 3, 2010, PowerPoint presentation to Eastern Service Area Directors includes a

slide titled “Political Implications” which states, "The Secretary of the Interior has

approved this project. The Administration is under pressure to promote green energy

production. It would be very difficult politically to refuse approval of this project."

(Exhibit 8)



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On May 7, 2010, an email response was sent within the FAA stating, "Who is willing to

go tell the White House that we are halting wind development because there might be

wake turbulence or microclimate effects?" (Exhibit 9)

An August 7, 2010, email states, "I think this project is going to move quickly as the

funding is coming from Cape Wind and they want to get on with installation of their

wind farm. The FAA has said that the work at Falmouth radar must be accomplished

prior to the wind turbines. All of this is being moved by politics as well." (Exhibit 10)

Admissions of safety impacts

Numerous FOIA responses express safety concerns by Cape TRACON as well as FAA personnel

involved in the review of Cape Wind. Cape TRACON’s concerns are documented over several

years, beginning in 2006 and continuing through 2010.

A December 29, 2006, email from Cape TRACON to FAA personnel outlines detailed

concerns regarding Cape Wind including impacts on low altitude flights, variation in

traffic, IFR and VFR impacts, and congestion. (Exhibit 11)

A May 4, 2009, email again from Cape TRACON to FAA includes a detailed list of impacts

at FMH and Cape TRACON including approaches, search and rescue, loss of targets, and

clutter. (Exhibit 12)

A July 17, 2009, draft memo of Cape Wind proposal options states that ASR 8 "clutter is

a major distraction to ATC. ATC flight following for non-transponder equipped aircraft

would be compromised over WT. Approximately 12% of traffic do not have

transponders." (Exhibit 13)

On February 24, 2010, When asked by FAA personnel, “When your office reviewed the

playback demo from the test that was conducted to simulate the wind turbines, what

was AT's opinion as to whether the wind turbines were going to be an issue? AT

responded on March 2, 2010, "While not the official AT response, I offer the following:

Based on what we observed in the playback test, the radar reflections of the simulated

wind turbines would exceed an acceptable level and will be an issue." (Exhibit 14)

A February 10, 2011, mitigation strategy memo regarding the FMH Reimbursable

agreement acknowledges that, "Establishment of a wind turbine project that consist of

many individual wind turbines that are closely spaced presents performance issues for

FAA radar… The effects will exist as unwanted clutter…unwanted moving targets...”

(Exhibit 15)

An October 31, 2011, email states, "I don’t think air traffic could keep a low flying

search-only VFR from running into a wind turbine." (Exhibit 16)



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Ambiguity and contrary opinions regarding the effectiveness of proposed mitigation

Numerous emails and briefing papers released range from stating that the mitigation options

may not be effective to stating that the expected loss of detection would be moderate in the

ASR 11 replacement option and severe in the TDX 2000 option. Emails also discuss that

necessary equipment may not be available to implement the proposed mitigation measures.

Given these and other risks, several FAA employees recommend following the Safety Risk

Management (SRM) process for Cape Wind and describe how it was applied in the wind

turbines proposed in Anchorage, Alaska. However, it appears that it was not followed and only

the OES process was used.

On February 10, 2009, a note added to recommendations states, "Performance of the

TDX-2000 over a wind farm is unknown at this time." (Exhibit 17)

July 22, 2009, draft memo on negotiation talking points with Cape Wind acknowledges

that radar tests before construction would not be conclusive. (Exhibit 18)

A July 31, 2009, email states that the interface requirement for the TDX-2000 to an ARTS

IIE generally would require an "AIU, manufactured by Sensis Corporation. …Only five

AIU units were manufactured by Sensis, however there are no known AIU units

currently available in FAA inventory and the manufacturer has since stopped

production of the AIU” (Exhibit 19)

A November 20, 2009, draft of FAA responses to public comments states, "Investigation

has revealed a reasonable possibility that detection for an ASR 8/TDX 2000

combination may be low above the entire wind farm. It is for this reason that the FAA

is investigating replacing the ASR-8 with an ASR-11." (Exhibit 20)

A January 20, 2010, email regarding the ASR test, "There is some uncertainty regarding

the results of the test and now they are looking for a site where they can validate the

test." (Exhibit 21)

A January 29, 2010, email states, "In our constant endeavor to determine the impacts to

the ASR-8 with Wind Turbines. I have tried another test target injection to the ASR-8 in

Savannah, GA. Unfortunately I have a difference in the data of the two facilities."

(Exhibit 22)

A March 22, 2010, email states, "Who in the agency makes the decision? We gave our

recommendations. Who is the decision maker that puts the agency at risk if the TDX-

2000 doesn't work? If it doesn’t work and no provision is made for the ASR 11 then the

agency is on the hook to pay for the whole thing.” (Exhibit 23)

A March 30, 2010, email states, "As you can see, I have received contradictory advice

over whether the digitizer will or won't help." (Exhibit 24)



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An April 1, 2010, briefing paper on negotiation talking points concerning Cape Wind

effects on FAA radar includes a table which summarizes the expected loss of detection

as “severe” for the TDX 2000 option and “moderate” for the option to replace the ASR 8

with an ASR 11. (Exhibit 25)

An April 2, 2010, email states, “I understand that you are running a SMS panel for the

Wind Turbine installation off of Anchorage. I would like to discuss with you a little bit if

you have time the SMS process for this case. The reason I am asking is that we have a

similar situation out in New England with a proposal by Cape Wind to put 130 wind

turbines off the coast of Cape Cod, MA.”…”Obviously there is risk associated with this

wind turbine installation and concern over who should be making and signing off on the

decisions in this case. I was a little reluctant at first with the SMS process but the more I

think about it the more it makes sense. Someone other than the Tech Ops local folks

should be accepting the risk and those that are impacted by those risks should also be

weighing in on the decision. In addition, it’s a good idea to look at all possible risks

associated with his proposal.” (Exhibit 26)

Another April 2, 2010, email describes the use of SMS in Anchorage and states, “The

SMS manual specifically calls out for preliminary safety analysis. I suggest that you use

that process for as long as it takes to design for minimum risk as stated in the safety

order of precedence. Gather any NAS system impacts information and the chain

reaction of events that occur from any impact and its influence on the operational

environment to assist in the development of the FAA’s plan to maintain safety or change

proposal.” (Exhibit 26a)

An April 5, 2010, FAA email recommends applying the SRM process to Cape Wind. It

states, “After further discussion with Neal and Peter, and knowing that this could delay

the determination even longer, in my personal opinion, I think that the SRM process is

needed. There are risks associated with issuing a determination on this OE (Obstruction

Evaluation) case. We certainly and to ensure that the appropriate people, at the

appropriate level of the organization have signed off on the risks associated with the

installation of these turbines.” The response states, “Thanks. I had spoken with my

Quality Control Group here and they also advised that we will need an SRMD for this.”

(Exhibit 27)

An April 15, 2010, email recommends completing an SRMDM and states, “It is my

personal opinion that even an SRMDM may not be necessary however, considering the

visibility this project has received, the SRMDM would document our reasons for

considering the Cape Winds project safe and compliant with our SMS. Modification to

the ASR-8, TDX-2000 (or both) is a separate issue warranting its own SRM.” (Exhibit 28)



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An April 22, 2010, white paper recaps an April 1 teleconference, which included the

Terminal Planning office. The white paper states, “They raised concerns over the need

to complete a Safety Risk Management (SRM) study and requested more time for that

determination to be made. There is question about whether the OES process makes up

for an SRM study, and thus, an SRM study would not be needed.” (Exhibit 29)

An April 22, 2010, memo summarizing an FAA teleconference discussion: "we are

receiving many conflicting opinions in the service Center - We hear that digitizers will

adequately address the issue. However, we hear that they won't. We hear that the OE

evaluation addresses all safety issues. However, we also hear that it doesn’t address the

clutter on the radar scope..." (Exhibit 30)

An April 28, 2010, email which states, “You people need to listen to what I and others

are and have said. That is, we will optimize the FMH ASR-8 to provide improvement to

the extent possible. We do not expect that this will be good enough to resolve the wind

turbine issues and recommend the implementation of a TDX 2000 to digitize and

provide post processing to further resolve the issue. You people cannot take the

collective word of three engineers (myself, Peter and Ernie) that the TDX 2000 will take

care of the situation. I hear the bean counters in P&R say that we must "get this right"

but nothing is a guarantee. So, if that’s the real case, then tell OE/AAA that the wind

farm is the worst thing to happen to the FAA's radar program since SBS." (Exhibit 31)

In response to the April 28, 2010, email, on May 3, 2010, the following email was sent: "I

understand your frustration. Just wanted to give you a little feedback from today’s

telecon. Tech Ops, up to Gene's level has not changed our position or

recommendations. The decision on if AT can live with the mitigations offered is not ours

to make….Maybe now that Gene has said what we’ve been saying for over a year now

someone will listen and the OES determination can move forward." (Exhibit 31a) Note

that on March 20, 2010, Cape TRACON did weigh in stating “Based on what we observed

in the playback test, the radar reflections of the simulated wind turbines would exceed

an acceptable level and will be an issue." (Exhibit 32)

An August 7, 2010, email states, "I explained that a TDX 2000 may not be available from

the FAA and that Sensis has moved on to the next generation. In any case, I do not have

the details on availability or what Sensis could provide. Just thought I’d let you know

about this.” (Exhibit 35)

Mitigation requirements favor Cape Wind economics over aviation safety

After acknowledging aviation safety impacts and expressing uncertainty regarding the

proposed mitigation options, the FAA appears to make mitigation recommendations to



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accommodate Cape Wind’s profitability regardless of probable public safety risks. Two

months prior to the May 2010 DNH, the acting head of the Obstruction Evaluation group

stated, “Shutting them down midstream will create an undue burden on the developer and

could possibly bankrupt them." FOIA information released from the FAA clearly shows that

the FAA chose to recommend lesser cost, but less effective solutions, in order to protect the

financial viability of the developer rather than public aviation safety. Statements

throughout documents released in the FOIA process, as well as in the February 2009 Notice

of Presumed Hazard, would have required Cape Wind to cease operations if the TDX 2000

mitigation option is not sufficiently effective until an ASR 11 replaces the ASR 8 and is fully

operational. Yet, in the 2010 Determination of Hazard, this requirement is dropped. The

ensuing mitigation only requires Cape Wind to put $15 million into an escrow fund to cover

the potential cost of an ASR 11 with no requirement to cease operations, potentially putting

millions of pilots and passengers at risk for nearly a four-year period, the FAA’s estimate for

the length of time needed to implement an ASR-11.

While numerous documents discuss the ASR 11 replacement as the preferred option by FAA

personnel, the TDX 2000 option is adopted as first priority. In fact, implementation appears

to already be underway despite the fact that the FAA 2010 determination has been vacated

by the Federal Court order, in an apparent prejudgment of the outcome of the current

evaluation process.

Finally, in a July 2009 memo, FAA personnel dismiss the option of restricting the airspace to

transponder only aircraft as a mitigation option. Yet, it is a distinct possibility that the FAA

would, in fact, take this step based on the uncertainty in the effectiveness of the mitigation

options and real world examples such as Travis AFB, where an airspace restriction has been

adopted; and, in fact, the 2010 Determinations expressly contemplate the possibility of

restricting the airspace if the technical mitigation recommendations are not effective

without any indication of how the 2009 concerns were resolved.

A February 12, 2009, email clearly states, "Either mitigation option would be required to

be funded through a reimbursable agreement with the proponent, implemented and

operational prior to construction associated with the Cape Wind project. If option 1 is

chosen and performance is not acceptable to AT, the proponent agrees to immediately

cease operation and mitigate the impact by funding and exercising Option 2. " (Exhibit

34)

The February 13, 2009, Notice of Presumed Hazard further states, “The mitigation

resolution would need to be implemented and operational prior to construction of the



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Cape Wind project. The proponent would need to agree to immobilize all wind

turbines, and as part of the reimbursable agreement, to fund the replacement of the

ASR-8 with an ASR-11 system if the external digitizer is installed and it is found that its

performance is not acceptable to Air Traffic Control.” (Exhibit 35)

A July 17, 2009, draft memo of Cape Wind proposal options includes prioritization of

mitigation options starting with ASR 11, then with TDX 2000. A flight restriction

boundary is dismissed as "general mitigations not candidates for consideration" and

"restriction of airspace not supported by user communities." Discussion of TDX 2000

option states, "loss of some detection is a trade-off for significant reduction in clutter."

(Exhibit 13a)

A July 22, 2009, draft memo on negotiation talking points with Cape Wind proposes the

ASR 11 as the best mitigation option. It also clearly requires shutdown of Cape Wind

turbines if Cape Wind chooses the TDX 2000 option and it doesn’t work. The memo

states, "This would necessitate all outstanding Cape Wind turbines construction

activities to cease and existing wind turbine operations be shut down and blades

locked in place until the proponent can procure, install and commission an ASR-11 into

the NAS." The memo also states, "The proponent may still have to default to option 1

after executing part or all of option 2, if option 2 does not successfully mitigate the

effects. This would translate to loss of revenue because the wind turbines would have

to be shut down and the project would need to be put on hold until successful

mitigation measures are in place." (Exhibit 36)

An October 1, 2009, FAA email states, "A cease construction and immobilization of

wind turbine blades clause will be included in any negotiation. This clause would

become effective in the case where mitigation measures are not effective." (Exhibit 47)

An October 22, 2009, email states, "Note that these conditions do not guarantee final

acceptance of the wind farm by the FAA. If the wind farm is installed and there is an

unacceptable impact to NAS operations, then the FAA will require that the wind farm

cease operations until the impact can be remedied, at no cost to the FAA." (Exhibit 38)

A February 1, 2010, email recommends the ASR 11 over the TX 2000 option. It states,

"Because of the much greater resolution and post processing capabilities provided by

the ASR 11, I believe this solution would produce the best results with regard to

preservation of true search target detection and false search target elimination."

(Exhibit 39)

A March 22, 2010, email states, "I think the agency needs to make a decision. Is it the

TDX-2000 or the ASR-11? If it’s the TDX-2000, then that's what it is. If it is the ASR-11,

then there will have to be a cost shared agreement with the FAA sharing the expense. It

gets problematic to say let's try one thing and if that does not work, we'll stop



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everything and revert to plan B. Once development starts on a wind construction site,

you can't shut them down when all their resources are allocated for the project and

equipment. Shutting them down midstream will create an undue burden on the

developer and could possibly bankrupt them." (Exhibit 40)

Another March 22, 2010, email states, "That’s a good question. OE does not make the

decision, I would think it would be up to the technical office that evaluated the radar,

My point here is you can’t say well go with one thing, but if we figure out later it is not

going to work, we'll shut you down while we work on something else. Whatever course

of action the agency wants to follow should be worked out in the negotiation

proceedings with the Cape Wind folks. They may be agreeable to an ASR-11 cost

sharing agreement if the TDX-2000 doesn’t work in a specified time frame, but will not

agree to shutting down construction." (Exhibit 41)

An April 1, 2010, briefing paper on negotiation talking points concerning Cape Wind

effects on FAA radar: "If the TDX-2000 option is selected and does not provide sufficient

primary detection above the turbines, an ASR-11 replacement would be required for the

FMR ASR-8. In this situation, the FAA will reserve the authority to execute in part, or in

whole, until an ASR-11 can be installed and commissioned to replace the FMH ASR-8,

the following options: 1. Issue a Determination of Hazard for all wind turbines in the

Cape Wind project. 2. Immediately prevent additional wind turbines from being

erected in some, or all area of the opposed wind farm. 3. Demand that the blades of

some, or all, of the existing wind turbines be locked in place until the proponent can

procure, install, and commission an ASR-11 into the NAS. The time frame to accomplish

this would vary depending on the procurement option pursued, however, at a minimum,

it would take 3-4 years from the date the Cape Wind project is stopped." (Exhibit 25a)


slide titled “Worst Case Scenario” that states: "The FAA will not be able to see primary

targets in the vicinity of the wind farm and may have to issue a NOTAM advising pilots

that it cannot provide advisories in the area of the wind mills. Primary IFR aircraft may

be required to navigate on the victor airways that go around the wind farm. Airspace

design might require slight modifications." A “Technical Recommendations” slide states

"As a final resort, revise the Cape TRACON airspace and procedures to restrict air traffic

in the wind turbine area to only aircraft with beacon transponders." (Exhibit 8a)

A January 27, 2011, email in reference to the 2/13/2009 NPH requiring shutdown states,

" If such language is in the reimbursable agreement - or would be in a reimbursable

agreement if one is signed by the FAA and Cape Wind - then that would take care of the

argument that once the turbines are installed, it would be too late, if the ASR-11 (as well

as the TDX-2000) do not work." The 130 Determination does not state that this type of



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language would need to be in the reimbursable agreement. "FAA folks: Can we assume

that the language would be included in a written statement so that (1) construction of

the turbines could not begin before the TDX-2000 was installed and operational and (2)

if, after construction, the TDX-2000 does not suffice, that Cape Wind would

immobilize all turbines and fund the replacement of the ASR-8 with an ASR-11?"

(Exhibit 42)

A May 3, 2011, email states, "If further study finds that the construction of the Cape

Wind project would produce a substantial adverse effect on aviation due to radar

interference/degradation, funding through a reimbursable agreement with the

proponent would be required for either mitigation option (external digitizer or

replacement ASR 11). The mitigation resolution would need to be implemented and

operational prior to construction of the Cape Wind project. The proponent would need

to agree to immobilize all wind turbines and, as part of the reimbursable agreement, to

fund the replacement of the ASR-8 with and ASR-11 system if the external digitizer is

installed and it is found that its performance is not acceptable to Air Traffic Control."

(Exhibit 43)

On July 20, 2011, an email exchange gives approval to install the TDX-2000 at FMH.

This project is ranked as highest priority for the Terminal Infrastructure Board for

FY2011. One of the emails states, “We planned to use ASR-8 SLEP funds to implement

the solution, subject to review and approval by Finance. The Terminal Directors

concurred with our proposed solution and funding approach" (Exhibit 44)

Possibility of threats to national security

Several emails shortly before the FAA issued a DNH express concern that the Cape Wind

turbines may pose threats to national security. It is unclear whether the proper agencies

addressed this issue especially given the scenario that aircraft operating without a transponder

could remain unseen.

An April 1, 2010, emails questions, "Has anyone checked to see if we have any national

security issues if we filter primary data out around the windmills that are in the middle

of the bay along the coast?" (Exhibit 45)

April 5, 2010, email states “Tech Ops would not coordinate security issues under the

Obstruction Evaluation either. Based on our study it is possible that a plane without a

transponder could essentially not be picked up over the wind farm." (Exhibit 46)


slide titled “National Security Issues” which states, "The masking of primary RADAR data

along the coast may have national security implications." (Exhibit 8b)



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Conclusion

The FOIA documents obtained clearly show that the FAA’s own experts, including ATC, have

determined that the Cape Wind’s 44 story, 25 square mile wind plant would have an adverse

effect on the 400,000 annual flights a year that traverse this airspace, and that the effectiveness

of the proposed mitigation options are uncertain at best. It is also clear that the wind plant will

endanger not only the well-established low altitude VFR routes, but the multi-class commercial

flights operating in this already compressed airspace, with the very strong possibility that ATC’s

ability to manage the NAS in this area will be put at risk.

The FAA’s own internal emails and memos, combined with years of testimony previously

provided by some of the world’s leading radar experts in conjunction with objections by the

regional airport managers, ATC managers, AOPA and airline operators, as well as a Court order

vacating the most recent FAA DNH, indicate a pattern of the FAA succumbing to political

pressure with suboptimal decisions leading to serious public safety risks. The FAA needs to

uphold its responsibility to protect the local aviation community and must render an

unconditional “Determination of Hazard” for the 130 turbines proposed for Nantucket Sound.

Sincerely,

Audra Parker

President and CEO

Cc: Sheri Edgett-Baron, Manager, FAA Obstruction Evaluation Group

may 22, 2012 dear mr. huerta · 05/07/2012 · faa administrator may 22, 2012 page 2 of 12 4...

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