maximus confessor and john scottus eriugena on place and time

8/19/2019 Maximus Confessor and John Scottus Eriugena on Place and Time

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MAXIMUS CONFESSOR AND JOHN SCOTTUSERIUGENA ON PLACE AND TIME

carlos steel

Maximus’ considerations on place in Ambigua ad Iohannem VI (X)

PG 91, 1180B-1181A offered Eriugena the ‘starting point’ for his ownviews on place. This contribution presents first a close reading ofMaximus’ argument and investigates in a second part how Eriugenatransformed Maximus’ views to develop his own doctrine. Maximus’argument is not primarily about place, but about the temporality ofthe universe. Whatever is in place, is limited and must have a begin-ning in time, as both time and place are inseparably connected. Eriu-gena learns from Maximus that place is the ‘natural definition of everycreature’, but takes ‘definition’ in the sense of ‘the essential or quid-ditative definition’. Eriugena also uses ‘place’ in a more common senseas the ‘tridimensional containment of a corporeal quantity’. How thetwo notions of place/space are related remains unclear. The inseparableconnection between time and place poses another difficulty. That thewhole creation is characterized by temporality is easy to admit, buthow could one understand that the whole creation is in place ? Whatabout incorporeal beings ? Maximus insists that time and place charac-terize the very being or ousia of created things ; it is what makes themfinite beings and distinct from the creator. For Eriugena the ousia never becomes itself subjected to spatio-temporal conditions ; only inits accidental appearance does it become spatial and temporal. Ulti-mately God and creation are the same reality, as will become evidentat the return of all things when the conditions of time and space willcease to exist.

In the first book of the Periphyseon Eriugena devotes a long dis-cussion to the ten categories and their possible application ina discourse on divine nature. It is in this context that we findan extensive investigation into the nature of place. At a crucialmoment in the discussion Eriugena paraphrases and quotes a longtext of Maximus Confessor, which, as he says, offers the ‘startingpoint for his argument’ :

Proceedings of the International Conference on Eriugenian Studies in honor of E. Jeau-neau , ed. by W. Otten, M. I. Allen, IPM, 68 (Turnhout, 2014), pp. 291-318.© DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.1.102065


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Take as starting point of this reasoning the following [text], whichwe have taken from the holy fathers, Gregory the theologian andthe excellent interpreter of his sermons, Maximus. 1

The long quotation comes from the Ambigua ad Iohannem VI (X),of which Eriugena made his own translation. 2 In this contributionI will not present a general presentation of Eriugena’s doctrine onplace, which has already been amply discussed by scholars, 3 butfirst (A) offer a close reading of Maximus’ argument and investi-gate in a second part (B) how Eriugena adopted and transformedMaximus’ views to develop in an original way his own doctrine

on place. This investigation will not only contribute to a betterassessment of Eriugena’s genius in dealing with his Greek sour-ces, but also touch upon the general subject of this volume, natureand creation. For place and time constitute the necessary condi-tions ( sine quibus non ) of the creation of the universe, as Eriugenafollowing Maximus repeatedly says. But before we engage in anyspeculations, let us have a close look at the text of Maximus quo-ted by Eriugena.

A. Maximus

If I may say in passing, the very fact that beings have theirbeing in a qualified sense and not absolutely ( τὸ πῶς εἶναι ἔχον, ἀλλ᾿οὐχ᾿ἁπλῶς) – which is the first form of circumscrip-tion ( περιγραφῆς) – is a powerful and important todemonstrate that beings have had a beginning in respect of beingand coming to be. Who could then ignore that, before conceiv-ing any kind of being – except the divine being and only this,which in a strict sense exists even beyond being itself –, one con-ceives ‘somewhere’ ( προεπινοεῖται τὸ ποῦ), together with which,always and in every respect, one necessarily conceives ‘at sometime’ ? For it is not possible to conceive ‘somewhere’ separate

1 Eriugena, Periphyseon 1.481B, CCCM 161 : 55 -56 ll. 1667-9 : Accipe igiturtale ratiocinationis huiusmodi exordium, quam a sanctis patribus, Gregoriouidelicet theologo sermonumque eius egregio expositore Maximo, sumpsimus.

2 Maximus Confessor, Ambigua ad Iohannem VI (X), CCSG 18 : 93-94

ll. 1421-1452 ; PG 91, 1180B-1181A.3 See Moran (1989) (1992), Courtine (1980) ; Bertin (1995). On Maximus’doctrine of place see Mueller-Jourdan (2005), on Maximus’ influence on Eriu-gena Kavanagh (2005).


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293maximus confessor and eriugena on place and time

from and deprived of ‘at some time’ (for they are that are together, as they are also without which). If, then, ‘somewhere’ cannot be separated fromand deprived of ‘at some time’, together with which it is naturallyconceived, and if all beings are shown to fall under the ‘some-where’ as they are all in place, --- for the totality of the universedoes not itself exist above the totality ( οὐ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ τὸ πᾶν τοῦ παντός) (for how absurd and impossible is it to proclaim thatthe totality itself exists above its own totality), but it has from itselfand in itself its circumscription – after the infinite power of the causeof all, which circumscribes everything – , namely the external limitof itself ; and this is precisely the place of the universe, as also cer-tain people define place, saying that place is ‘the outside circuit of theuniverse’, or ‘the outside position of the universe’, or ‘the limit of thecontainer in which what is contained is contained’ --- , it will also bedemonstrated that all things fall always under the ‘atsome time’, since all things that have being after God have thisbeing not absolutely, but in a qualified sense, and therefore theyare not without beginning. For everything that receives a quali-fication ( τὸν τοῦ πῶς λόγον) in whatever way, even if it is now,was not . Hence, when we say of the divine being thatit ‘is’, we do not say that it is after some manner, and thereforewe say in this case both that it ‘is’ and ‘was’ unqualifiedly and inan indeterminate manner and absolutely. For the divine cannotadmit any account or thought ; hence, even when we predicate ofit being, we do not say that it is. For being is derived from it butit is not itself being. For it is even beyond being itself, whether isit said or conceived qualifiedly or absolutely. If beings, then, havebeing after a certain manner, and not absolutely, it can be shownthat, just as they fall under the ‘somewhere’ becauseof the position and the limitation of their natural logoi , they alsoalways fall absolutely under the ‘at some time’ becauseof their beginning. 4

The text we are dealing with comes from a series of argumentsdemonstrating that the created world did not exist in all eternity,but had a beginning in time. Maximus argues that all created thingshave being not in an absolute sense, but in a qualified sense, ‘aftersome manner’, which gives them a limited, finite, or, as Maximus

4For the Greek text I use the edition of Carl Laga in preparation for theCCSG. For my translation of Maximus I made use of the translation of Louth

(1996), but modified it thoroughly. For translations of Periphyseon I-IV, I useSheldon-Williams’ translation with modifications.


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likes to say, circumscribed being. One of the first forms of cir-cumscription is precisely that all created beings do not just exist,but have their being somewhere, in some determined place. It isimpossible to think of some being without considering it as beingin some place. Whatever falls under the category ‘somewhere’, alsofalls under the category ‘at some time’, as there is nothing thatexists in place but does not exist in time. Hence, if all createdthings are somewhere, they must also be at some time and, there-fore, have a temporal mode of existence with a beginning in time.

The place of the universe

In a small digression in his argument (put in italics in my transla-tion) Maximus raises the question whether the totality of createdbeing can be said to be ‘in place’. The universe is not in a place ifwe understand by place something outside the universe in whichthe universe would be located. For how could there be somethingoutside the totality of all things ? This does not mean, however,that the created universe is an infinite place-less totality. It has,as Maximus says, besides the circumscription it receives from

being created by the infinite cause of all, also ‘from itself and initself its circumscription’, namely ‘the outside limit of itself’.

In order to explain in what sense the totality of all createdbeing could be in a place, Maximus introduces some definitionsof place, which one may find among ‘experts in these matters’,the philosophers. We have to read and interpret these definitionscarefully, as they are often misunderstood by commentators, andeven by Eriugena himself, but, in his case, the misunderstandingis philosophically fertile, as I hope to demonstrate. I therefore giveboth the Greek text and Eriugena’s translation.

αὐτὸ τὸ πέρας ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἐξώτερον· ὅπερ καὶ τόπος ἐστὶ τοῦ παντός , καθὼς καὶ ὁρίζονταί τινες τὸν τόπον, λεγοντες· (1) τόπος ἐστὶν ἡ ἔξω τοῦ παντὸς περιφέρεια ἢ (2) ἡ ἔξω τοῦ παντὸς θέσις ἢ (3) τὸ πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος, ἐν ᾧ περιέχεται τὸ περιεχόμενον.

ipse finis ipsius exterior ; ipse etiam locus est uniuersitatis, sicutquidam diffiniunt locum dicentes : (1) Locus est ipse extra uni-uersitatem ambitus, (2) uel ipsa extra uniuersitatem positio, uel

(3) finis comprehendentis, in quo comprehenditur comprehensum.The third definition (‘the limit of the container in which what is con-tained is contained’) is clearly a reference to Aristotle’s celebrated


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conclusion at the end of the argument in Physics IV 212a19-20 :ὥστε τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρῶτον, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος. In the handbooks of philosophy that Maximus used onefinds the definition almost in the same formulation. Thus Nemesius,de nat. hom . 3, p. 41,22-42,1 τόπος γάρ ἐστι πέρας τοῦ περιέχον-τος, καθ’ ὃ περιέχει τὸ περιεχόμενον (adopted also by Johnthe Damascene, Exp . Fidei 13,2-3). We find the same definitionoften in the Alexandrian commentators, Ammonius, Simplicius,Philoponus. See, for instance, Simplicius, In DC, 258,3-4 ; 269,16-26 ;

In Cat . 185,4-6 ; 150,2-3 ; 337,12-13 ; In Phys . 571,17 ; 585,31-35.

Maximus changes the formulation slightly, writing ἐν ᾧ insteadof the standard formula καθ ’ὃ, maybe because he wants to putemphasis on the fact that the world is contained ‘in its place’.However, notwithstanding this clear reference to Aristotle, Maxi-mus’ understanding of place is different from what Aristotle ori-ginally meant with his definition, and is clearly influenced by theNeoplatonic understanding of place, of which we are well infor-med thanks to the celebrated Corrolarium de loco of Simplicius.Simplicius, though mostly an admirer of Aristotle, was upset by

Aristotle’s argument in Physics IV 5 that the universe, as a whole,does not exist ‘in place’. This seems to be an unavoidable conse-quence of Aristotle’s understanding of ‘being in place’ as ‘beingencompassed by a body external to it’ (212 a33-34). If there isnothing outside the universe, the universe as a whole cannot besaid to be in a place. Aristotle concludes :

The universe is not somewhere ( τὸ δὲ πᾶν οὔ που). For what issomewhere is itself something and yet another thing must existbeside it wherein it is and that contains it ; but beside the universeand the whole there is nothing outside the universe. (212b 14-17)

Aristotle’s thesis that the universe is not itself in a place, thoughit may be ‘accidentally’ in place, as all its component parts are inplace (212b11-13), had been criticized by the Neoplatonists sinceIamblichus. 5 To avoid the absurd consequence that the whole uni-verse is not itself in a place, the later Platonists modified the defini-

5That the category of place should not be limited to physical bodies occu-pying a certain place but could be applied to all levels of reality beyond the

first cause (in the sense of being encompassed by a higher principle) is a viewdefended by Iamblichus (see Simplicius, In Cat . 361,7-364,6).


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tion of place. If we consider place as the ‘limit of the containing’,this should not primarily be taken in the corporeal sense of onebody encompassing another, but as ‘the demarcation and measure orposition of all things’ in relation to one another and to the universe.

That Maximus understands place in this Platonic tradition isclear from his two first definitions, though exact parallels are moredifficult to recover in the tradition : (1) τόπος ἐστὶν ἡ ἔξω τοῦ παντὸς περιφέρεια ἢ (2) ἡ ἔξω τοῦ παντὸς θέσις. The Greek for-mulation is ambiguous. In fact, it is possible to interpret the gen-itive τοῦ παντὸς as related to the adverbial preposition ἔξω and

to translate ‘place is the circuit outside the universe or the posi-tion outside the universe’ or to consider the genitive τοῦ παντὸς as a subject genitive and to translate as I do ‘place is the outsidecircuit of the universe’, or ‘the outside position of the universe’.Eriugena opted for the first possibility, which seems the mostobvious and which he translated as ‘Locus est ipse extra uniuersi-tatem ambitus, uel ipsa extra uniuersitatem positio’. He is followedby his modern translators : ‘place is the boundary outside the uni-verse or its very position outside the universe’ (Sheldon-Williams) ;

‘the circuit outside the universe or the position outside the uni-verse’ (Uhlfelder) ; ‘une frontière extrinsèque à l’univers ou bienune position extrinsèque à l’univers’ (Bertin) ; ‘la circonferenzaestrema dell’universo, o quello che si colloca esternamente all’uni-verso’ (Moreschini). However, the whole context of the argumentmakes it clear that we cannot understand the definition in thissense. For just before the digression wherein the three definitionsare given Maximus had rejected the view that place would besomething outside the world as if it were an infinite space whereinthe world occupies only a limited place : ‘but the totality of theuniverse does not itself exist beyond the totality, but it has fromitself and in itself circumscription’. Maximus considers as place ofthe universe ‘the external limit of itself’ ( αὐτὸ τὸ πέρας ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἐξώτερον) and finds a confirmation of his view in the definitionsof place from the philosophical tradition. Therefore we shouldinterpret these definitions in that sense and translate ‘the outsidecircuit of the universe or the outside position of the universe.’ 6

6 Mueller-Jourdan (2005) rightly translates : “le lieu est la périphérieextérieure du tout, ou bien la position extérieure du tout” (p. 42).


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The view that there would be a space/place outside the worldis unanimously rejected by the Platonic philosophers followingAristotle’s authority : παρὰ δὲ τὸ πᾶν καὶ ὅλον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔξω τοῦ παντός (212b17-18). There is nothing outside the universe, noteven an empty infinite space (vacuum), and therefore it makes nosense to talk about a place outside the universe. We find the argu-ment often in Proclus, who even based an argument for the eter-nity of the world on it, for which he was subsequently criticizedby Philoponus (see In Tim . 2,60,20ff. ; Philoponus, De aet . mundi ,294,1ff). But not only pagan philosophers, also Christian authors

shared this view. Augustine found in the limitation of space to themass of the bodily world an argument to insist also on the limita-tion of the temporal duration of the world. One may recall Augus-tine’s notable question ‘What was God doing before he created theworld ?’ ‘And how much time has there been before he started cre-ating the world ?’ As Augustine explains, such questions are sense-less as they presuppose that there ever was a time preceding thecreation of the world, whereas in fact time was created togetherwith the world. In fact, as Augustine says, only the Epicureansaccepted that there was an infinite space wherein innumerablydifferent worlds existed, while all later authors rejected their viewas absurd. If, then, it is absurd to consider an infinite place out-side the universe – here all intelligent philosophers agree – it isalso absurd to talk about an infinite time. Here, alas, the philos-ophers do not agree, as Augustine protests.

But if they say that the thoughts of men are vain when theyimpute infinite space, since there is no space outside the world

(cum locus nullus sit praeter mundum ), we answer that it is by thesame token vain to conceive of the past times during which Godwas idle, since there is no time before the world. ( De civitate dei XI, 3)

We may now better understand what Maximus means when hesays that the place of the whole world is its outside or externallimit. Less clear is where he found definitions (1) and (2) in thetradition. For the first definition ( ἡ ἔξω τοῦ παντὸς περιφέρεια)there are antecedents if one replaces περιφέρεια (taken not just inthe sense of revolution but of the revolving vault of the heaven,its circumference) with περιφορά. As Aristotle says in his treatiseOn Heaven : ‘we apply the world ouranos to the substance of the


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outermost circumference ( ἐσχάτη περιφορά) of the world or to thenatural body which is at the outermost circumference of the world,but we can also apply the word ouranos to indicate the world as awhole, for the world is as a whole enclosed by the outermost cir-cumference ( De caelo I 9 278b11-14).

The second definition ( ἡ ἔξω τοῦ παντὸς θέσις) seems moreparticular to Maximus himself, though here again he stands in atradition. Maximus considers θέσις as one of the five fundamentalcategories of all created beings ( οὐσία, κίνησις, διαφορά, κράσις,θέσις).7 In attributing this important ontological role to θέσις

Maximus may have been influenced by Nemesius’ understandingof providence, to which he refers later in his argument (1188D).As Nemesius says, providence is according to the philosophers ‘thepermanency of all things and in particular of things subject togeneration and corruption and the position (θέσις) and order of allbeings in the same way’. 8 Just as within a living body all differentparts have been given their positions, which make the structuredorder of the organism possible, so the different parts also keeptheir position in the whole universe. In the Neoplatonic view place

is indeed given a fundamental role in the providential orderingof the world, as it assigns to all things their natural position, sothat the whole is constituted as a well-organized system. To bein place, then, is much more than being encompassed by anothercontaining body ; it means to occupy a determined position in re-lation to other bodies within the order of the world. As Simpliciusformulates it, following his master Damascius :

place taken unqualifiedly is the demarcation of the position of

bodies ( ἀφορισμὸς τῆς τῶν σωμάτων θέσεως), but to speak ofplace according to nature, it is the demarcation of the positionassigned to the parts of the bodies in relation to each other and tothe whole, and of the whole to the part. For, as the different partsof the earth and the heavens are differently disposed on accountof place, some as it happens in the north, others to the south, so

7 See Ambig . ad Iohannem VI (PG 91 : 1133A-1137C) and Steel (2012),247-254.

8Nemesius, De natura hominis , p.120,25-121,2 ed. Morani ; quoted byMaxi mus, Ambigua ad Ioh . VI (PG 91 : 1189 A-B) : Πρόνοια : ἡ γὰρ διαμονὴ

τῶν ἁπάντων καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ καὶ ἡ θέσις καὶ ἡ τάξις τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ φυλαττομένη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.


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also the whole heaven and the whole earth, are parts of the uni-verse and have their proper measure and arrangement of position(τῆς θέσεως εὐμετρίαν καὶ διακόσμησιν) because of place, oneretaining the outside of the whole, the other the middle. 9

If this is then the nature and function of place, it cannot simplybe ‘the limit of the container’, as Aristotle said. For, as Simpliciusobjects, how could such a limit ever be ‘the cause of order ordemarcation, being itself rather marked off by the things whichcome into and are contained by it’ ? 10 With this enlarged under-standing of place as ‘what assigns a well-ordered position to all

things’, one may also consider, Simplicius claims, the whole worldas being ‘in place’, meaning that it has been given by its creatora well-ordered positioning of all its parts, which always remainsthe same, whatever their movements may be and ‘the multitudeof varied succeeding positions in the universe which are like a sortof unfolding of it’. 11

Time and place : the conditions without which of the created world

As Maximus says in the text quoted above, it is not possible to

consider ‘somewhere’ without thinking of ‘at some time’, or theother way around. For time and place always coexist as they areboth together the conditions without which nothing can exist ( τῶν γάρ ἅμα ταῦτά ἐστιν, ἐπειδή καί τῶν οὐκ ἄνευ τυγχάνουσιν).That place and time are conditions sine quibus non of whateverexists except the creator, is taken as the premise for Maximus’next argument against the infinity of the world :

If no being is free of confine ( περιγραφῆς), all beings have alsotaken being ‘sometime’ and being ‘somewhere’ analogous to theirbeing. For without these absolutely nothing can exist ; no sub-stance, no quantity, no quality, no relation, no affection, no mo-tion, no disposition nor something else of the in whichthe experts in these matters enclose all things. 12

9 Simplicius, In Phys . 626, 19-27 ; translation J.O. Urmson, slightly modified.10 Simplicius, In Phys . 627,6-9.11 Simplicius, In Phys . 632,29-31.12 Ambigua ad Ioh . VI (PG 91 : 1181A-B) : Εἰ δὲ περιγραφῆς οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων

ἐλεύθερον, πάντα τὰ ὄντα δηλονότι ἀναλόγως ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τὸ πότε εἶναι καὶ ποῦ εἶναι εἴληφε· Τούτων γάρ ἄνευ τό παράπαν οὐδέν εἶναι δυνήσεται, οὐκ οὐσία, οὐ ποσότης , οὐ ποιότης , οὐ σχέσις , οὐ ποίησις, οὐ πάθος, οὐ κίνησις,οὐχ ἕξις, οὐχ ἕτερόν τι τῶν οἷς τό πᾶν περικλείουσιν οἱ περί ταῦτα δεινοί.


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The experts to whom Maximus is again referring here stand for thephilosophical tradition, in this case the discussion of the categorieswhich enclose whatever is. Among these categories two are singledout, time and place, because they are the conditions sine quibusnon , making it possible that the other modes of being are imple-mented. This is a surprising claim. Normally substance is singledout as the most fundamental category, while time and place arenever given a privileged status. In this argument, however, evensubstance is said to depend upon time and place. The terminol-ogy of τὰ ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ comes, as is well known, from Plato, who

distinguishes in the Phaedo what he calls the true or real causesfrom the necessary material conditions, which make it possible forthe true causes to exercise their activity. In the Timaeus Platoalso uses the term συναίτια for these necessary conditions. 13 Inthe later philosophical tradition the distinction between causesand auxiliary causes is often made. Interestingly, Chrysippus con-sidered time and place as necessary conditions making it possiblefor the true causes to exercise their causality. 14 This may have ledto the view that time and place are the ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ of all theother categories. In his treatise on the ten commandments Philoof Alexandria discusses the ten categories in this way :

Those who are versed in the doctrines of philosophy say thatthe categories which are said to exist in nature are only ten :substance, quality, quantity, relation, to act, to suffer, to have,to be situated and those without which ( τὰ ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ), timeand place. For there is nothing that does not share in them (…),as none of the previously mentioned categories can exist withoutthese two. 15

13 See Tim . 46c7, d1 ; cf. also Polit . 281c4-e9 ; 287b7-289c8.14 See SVF III 63 (p.16,7-8) ; II 346 (p.120,7-8). See also Philoponus, In

Meteor . 4,28 : τὰ συναίτια δέ, χρόνον καὶ τόπον καὶ κίνησιν. Sextus, Empiricus, Pyrrh hypoth . III 118 (p. 166 Mau) : ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν προειρημένων οὐκ ἄνευ τόπου ἢ χρόνου ἐπινοεῖται, μετιτέον ἐπὶ τὴν περὶ τούτων σκέψιν. ἐὰν γὰρ ταῦτα δείξῃ τις ἀνυπόστατα, ἀνυπόστατον ἔσται καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐκείνων ἕκαστον. Prolegomena in Platonem 16, p. 25, 16-17 ed. Westerink-Trouillard.

15 Philo, De decalogo 30-31 : τὰς γὰρ ἐν τῇ φύσει λεγομένας κατηγορίας

δέκα μόνας εἶναί φασιν οἱ ἐνδιατρίβοντες τοῖς τῆς φιλοσοφίας δόγμασι,οὐσίαν, ποιόν, ποσόν, πρός τι , ποιεῖν, πάσχειν , ἔχειν, κεῖσθαι, τὰ ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ, χρόνον καὶ τόπον. οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι τούτων ἀμέτοχον. See also De post.Cain 111.


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The similarity with Maximus’ text is so striking that one mustadmit that Maximus was influenced by his reading of Philo. InPhilo the argument is about the ten categories, and it is said thatwithout time and place the eight others (including substance !)cannot really exist. For whatever exists, is somewhere and at sometime. With Maximus, however, this doctrine acquires a metaphy-sical meaning : time and place are considered as the conditions ofthe existence of all creation, thereby differentiating it from itscreator. Creation never enjoys being absolutely, but always hasit in a certain respect, after a certain mode, as qualified being.

Only God has absolute being and can even be said to exist beyondbeing as all beings (in a qualified sense) originate from him. Godis therefore above time and place, as Maximus explains :

God exists absolutely and without determination beyond allbeings, both what circumscribes and what is circumscribed, andthe nature of those [conditions] without which none of these couldbe, I mean, time and eternity 16 and place, by which the universe isenclosed, since He is completely unrelated to anything. 17

That whatever is created has its being in time is a not a contro-versial claim for Christian authors. But it seems difficult to admitthat whatever exists in time, must also be ‘somewhere’. Whatabout incorporeal beings, such as souls or angels who cannot be inplace ? Or should we take ‘place’ here in a broader sense indicatinglimitation, position within a whole ?

In other texts, in particular in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium ,Maximus seems to limit the necessity of place and time for exis-tence to the world of nature, which is subject to generation and

change. As he says in question 55 :

The law of nature encompasses both the genera and species fall-ing under nature ( ὑπὸ τὴν φύσιν) and what is considered aroundnature ( περὶ τὴν φύσιν), namely time and place. For one naturally

16 Αἰῶν is not the eternity of the divinity, but the shared eternity (oreviternity) of creation.

17Maximus, Ambigua ad Ioh . VI (PG 91 : 1153B) : ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἁπλῶς καὶ

ἀορίστως ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐστί, τὰ περιέχοντά τε καὶ περιεχόμενα καὶ τὴν ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ ταῦτα , χρόνου φημὶ καὶ αἰῶνος καὶ τόπου φύσιν, οἷς τὸ πᾶν περικλείεται, ὡς πᾶσι παντελῶς ἄσχετος ὤν.


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considers together with every generated being [the conditions]without which nothing [exists]. 18

Interestingly, the scholiast of the Quaestiones ad Thalassium , whomay have been a disciple of Maximus and the editor of his work,feels the need to explain in a note in what sense Maximus under-stands time and place as necessary conditions to exist ( τὰ ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ). As he says, upon their coming into being all beings havebeen assigned ‘a universal position and movement ( ἡ καθόλου τῶν ὄντων θέσις καὶ κίνησις). Nature exists in place ‘according to itsoutward position’ ( κατὰ τὴν ἔξωθεν θέσιν) and in time ‘because

it is moved towards its principle’. The scholiast insists, however,that nature is not in place and time ‘according to its existence(καθ’ ὑπόστασιν)’. For, as he argues, ‘nature is not composed outof time and place, but it has in them from outside the beginningof its being and its position ( θέσιν).19 This annotation is clearlyan attempt to limit Maximus’ provocative claim that all beingsare in time and place. According to the scholiast time and placeare only necessary conditions for the movement and positioning ofall things, not for their being. In the Ambigua passage, however,

Maximus clearly states that even the ousia of created beings isdependent upon place and time.

In the last question of Ad Thalassium (65) Maximus explainsmore clearly what he means by time and place as necessary condi-tions of all created beings. Place is the limited, determinate stand(στάσις περιγεγραμμένη) of beings in movement and change. Asall created beings are, in Maximus’ view, characterized by move-ment until they reach their ultimate end, only then will theystand in the creator from whom they originated. The world as

a whole is therefore a determinate or ‘limited place and stand’(τόπος πεπερασμένος καὶ στάσις). Time is the measurement andlimitation of movements ( περιγραφομένη κίνησις). When, at theend, all nature, having gone through place and time, is connected

18 Maximus, Quaest. ad Thal . q.55, 66-69 : (CCSG 7 : 485) : Περιέχει γὰρ ὁ νόμος τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν φύσιν ἀναγόμενα γένη καὶ εἴδη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν φύσιν θεωρούμενα, τὸν χρόνον φημὶ καὶ τὸν τόπον. Παντὸς γὰρ γενητοῦ τὰ ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ φυσικῶς συνεπιθεωρεῖται. (see also scholion 6 on

p. 517, 50-57) Q. ad Thal . q. 64, 356 -358 (CCSG 22 : 209) : τοὺς περὶ χρόνου καὶ φύσεως λόγους, ἤγουν τὴν μετὰ τῶν οὐκ ἄνευ περιληπτικὴν τῆς ὁρωμένης φύσεως γνῶσιν (see also scholion 13, on p. 243,37-38).

19 See also scholion 6 on p. 517, 50-57.


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with God according to grace, its motion, which is the cause of per-manent change, will come to an end by the presence of an unlim-ited standstill ( τῇ παρουσίᾳ τῆς ἀπεράντου στάσεως). Then theworld itself as a circumscribed and determinate place will come toan end and so will time as a circumscribed motion. There will beno need any more for time and place as conditions without whichnothing can exist, as all limitations will have been taken away.Nature will enter into a state of standing still without any motion.Yet this rest should not be seen as the contrary or end of motion –for that could only produce a determinate limited stasis –, but

will instead be a standing still without any limitation ( πέρας) ; forthere will be neither motion nor extension ( διάστασις). 20It is clear, then, that place and time are not just conditions for

the existence of the physical world – in this sense even Aristotlecould say that there is no movement without place and time –,but that they must be understood as the ontological conditionsfor whatever exists apart from the creator. This is exactly whatMaximus intends to say in the conclusion of the long text from

Ambigua quoted by Eriugena :

just as all beings fall under the ‘somewhere’ becauseof the position and the limitation due to their natural logoi , theyalso fall absolutely under the ‘at some time’ becauseof their beginning. 21

20 Quaest. ad Thal . 65,516-540 (CCSG 22 : 283 -285) : προδήλως ἄρα τῶν ὄντων ἡ φύσις (…) μετὰ τὴν φυσικὴν τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τῶν αἰώνων διάβασιν ἐν τῷ θεῷ ἔσται τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἑνί, μὴ δεχομένη πέρας ἐν ᾧ παντελῶς οὐκ ἔστι διάστασις. (…) ὁπηνίκα δὲ συναφθῇ τῷ λόγῳ κατὰ χάριν ἡ φύσις, οὐκ ἔσται τὰ ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ, τῆς τῶν φύσει κινουμένων ἀλλοιωτῆς ἀπογενομένης κινήσεως. Δεῖ γὰρ τὴν πεπερασμένην στάσιν, ἐν ᾖ γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν ἐξ ἀνά-γκης κατ ’ ἀλλοίωσιν τῶν κινουμένων ἡ κίνησις, δέξασθαι τέλος τῇ παρουσίᾳ τῆς ἀπεράντου στάσεως , ἐν ᾗ παύεσθαι πέφυκε τῶν κινουμένων ἡ κίνησις.(…) Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν κόσμος τόπος ἐστὶ πεπερασμένος καὶ στάσις περιγεγραμ -μένη, ὁ δὲ χρόνος περιγραφομένη καθέστηκε κίνησις ὅθεν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ καθέστηκεν ἡ κατὰ τὴν ζωὴν κίνησις. Ὁπηνίκα δὲ τὸν τόπον διελ-θοῦσα καὶ τὸν χρόνον κατ ’ ἐνέργειάν τε καὶ ἔννοιαν ἡ φύσις, ἤγουν τὰ ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ, τουτέστι τὴν πεπερασμένην στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν, ἀμέσως συναφθῇ τῇ προνοίᾳ, λόγον εὑρίσκει τὴν πρόνοιαν κατὰ φύσιν ἁπλοῦν καὶ στάσιμον καὶ

μηδε μίαν ἔχοντα πάντῃ περιγραφὴν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο παντελῶς οὔτε κίνησιν.21 Εἰ δὲ πῶς, ἀλλ᾿οὐχ᾿ἁπλῶς ἔχει τὰ ὄντα τὸ εἶναι, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τὸ ποῦ εἶναι διὰ τὴν θέσιν καὶ τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπ᾿αὐτοῖς κατὰ φύσιν λόγων, καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ πότε πάντως εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπιδείξεται.


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Every being has within the universe, in accordance with the ideallogoi which are constitutive of its nature, a determinate positionand a determinate time.

B. Eriugena

Having explained Maximus’ views on place, let us now investi-gate how Eriugena interprets and develops them. The first inter-pretation of a text is its translation. Maximus is an incrediblydifficult author and the Ambigua in particular offer a challengeto any translator, as is evident from contemporary translations.Eriu gena’s translation of Maximus’ text on place is a superbexample of his philological genius. 22 In the Periphyseon Eriugenadoes not scrupulously quote his own translation, but sometimesintervenes in the translation to make its harsh Latin more fluent.Thus he replaces participle constructions with constructions witha personal verb, as in :

Ambig .1425-6 : praeter Deum solum et super ipsum esse propriesubsistentem

Periph .1670-1 : praeter deum, qui solus super ipsum esse propriesubsistit Ambig. 1434-5 : sed sub seipsa habens Periph .1682-3 : dum sub seipsa habeat

Or he may reorganize a sentence :

Ambig . 1432-3 : Hoc enim quantum et irrationabile et impossibileest statuere ipsam universitatem…

Periph .1680-1 : Hoc enim statuere irrationabile est et impossibile,

ipsam uidelicet universitatem….

The most interesting changes, however, are his replacement of thecategorical vocabulary of quando (ποτε) and ubi (που) by ‘tempus’and ‘locus’ :

22 One may criticize Eriugena’s translation of Ambigua VI, ll. 1448-1449 :Est enim super ipsum esse, super aliquo modo esse, et uniuersaliter superquod dicitur et intellig itur. A correct translation would be : Est enim super

ipsum esse, et (= τε add . ante corr. M ) super quod dicitur et intelligitur aliquomodo esse et [super quod dicitur et intelligitur] universaliter [esse]. In VI,line 1421 localiter for πως may be a free translation, as is also universa in VI,l. 1440 for τὰ ὄντα.


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Ambig . 1425-1430 : intelligitur ubi , cum quo …cointelligiturquando . Non enim possibile est intelligere dif-finitum ubi per privationem quando. 23

Periph . 1671-4 : intelligitur in loco . Cum quo ( loco uidelicet ) …cointelligitur tempus . Non enim possibile estlocum subtracto tempore intelligi.

Ambig . 1450-2 : quemadmodum sub ubi esse … et sub quando esse.

Periph .1704-5 : quemadmodum sub loco esse …et sub tempore esse.

This replacement may be questioned, as it is not evident thatthe categories ‘somewhere’ and ‘at some times’ mean the sameas ‘place’ and ‘time’, but we find it also in modern translations,because it makes the translation more fluent. 24

As his translation and his paraphrase of the text make clear,Eriugena understood Maximus’ argument very well. Nevertheless,as we shall see, in his own doctrine of place, although inspired byMaximus, he goes far beyond his Greek authority. I will explainthe difference between both views in five points.

1) Focus on place, not on time . As we have already seen, Maximus’argument is not primarily about place, but about the temporalityof the universe. The consideration of place offers an argument forthe demonstration that the world has a beginning in time. Eriu-gena takes Maximus’ argument out of its original context. Assaid, Eriugena starts his investigation into place with the ques-tion whether and how we can apply the different categories in adiscourse about divine nature. In contrast to Maximus, John isabove all interested in the discussion of place. He only deals withtime parenthetically, as he notices himself. ‘When arguing aboutplace we discussed some issues about time, insofar as the present

23 In l. 1429 ( Ambigua , ed. Jeauneau, CCSG 18 : 271) we find in manuscriptMazarine 561 (which is the main manuscript of Eriugena’s translation) for ubi and quando in the margin respectively locus and tempus . Eriugena probably

added these variant readings himself.24 Interestingly, Eriugena (or his disciple editor) started editing his owntranslation to make it more easily readable. Some readings ante correctionem in M are more literal (see Jeauneau’s introduction, CCSG : LX-LXI).


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discussion required’. 25 One will have to wait until Periphyseon Vfor a more thorough treatment of time.

2) What Eriugena mostly learns from Maximus is that place isthe ‘natural definition of every creature’. Summarizing his longdigression on Maximus the master concludes that place is nothingbut ‘the natural definition and mode and position of each creature,whether general or specific’ ( naturalem diffinitionem modumque

positionemque uniuscuiusque siue generalis siue specialis creaturae ).And his student confirms that now the intention of the whole

argument has become clear : the different terms used by Maximusto characterize place : finem, terminum, diffinitionem, circumscrip-tionem, all mean the same thing, namely, the ‘circuit of a finitenature’ ( ambitum scilicet finitae naturae ). 26 This is, however, muchmore than a summary of Maximus’ views. The use of the termdiffinitio prompted John to a lengthy development of great origi-nality that goes beyond what Maximus had in mind. The occasionfor this development is offered by the Latin term diffinitio, whichcannot only be used to indicate the ‘boundary’, ‘circumscription’,

or ‘limitation’ that are characteristic of finite beings, but also, andeven more so, entails the logical sense of definition, an explanationof the essential properties of things. When Maximus understandsplace ( locus ) as the definition of a thing, he means, Eriugena ex-plains, ‘the essential or quidditative definition’. In fact, there areas many sorts of places as there are types of beings that are defi-ned ( Periphyseon I.474D). The term ‘place’ is now understood inthe tradition of dialectic and rhetoric to indicate ‘topics, subjectmatter, heads under which, general notions’. 27 In Eriugena’s Plato-

nic understanding these general notions of what things are existin the human mind. If, then, places are definitions, and defini-tions exist in the human mind, we have to admit that place will‘necessarily be nowhere else but in the defining mind’ ( Periphyseon I.475B). Against the objection of the student that this understand-ing of place is far removed from what people usually understand

25 Periphyseon 1.504A, CCCM 161 : 85 ll. 2647-9 : nam disputantes de locoquaedam de tempore, quantum praesentis disputationis necessitas exigebatdiscussimus.

26 Periphyseon 1.483B-C, CCCM 161 : 58 ll. 1750-64.27 On the early medieval tradition of the topics, see Gersh (1997).


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as place (as habitationes , abodes inhabited by animals) the teacherargues that place cannot be a body ( Periphyseon I.475B-C). Thegeneral conclusion of the argument is obvious, and yet provoca-tive, going far beyond what Maximus originally meant :

Do you understand, then, that place is nothing but the act ofsomeone who understands and by virtue of his understandingcomprehends those things which he can comprehend. 28

The above quoted text is often used in arguments about the so-called ‘idealism’ of Eriugena. To ascertain that place has no otherreality than in the mind and ultimately in God himself soundsindeed like an anticipation of a Kantian transcendental understand-ing of place. I do not believe that such considerations are helpful.The most provocative formulations on place are found in book Iwhere Eriugena almost exclusively deals with place understood asthe essential definition of things. Definitions – this is evident –only exist in minds, not in bodies. If taken in this sense place isnothing but the act of understanding the essence of things. Eriu-gena uses, however, locus also in connection with spatium , by

which the quantity of bodies is extended : spatium quo corporumquantitas extenditur . 29 He speaks of spatia or intervalla locorum veltemporum . 30 Explaining the growth of animal bodies in book V hegives the following definition of time and place :

With time I now mean the interval needed for a body to reach itsperfect development in growth and with place I mean the seat ofthe singular bodily parts. 31

Such an understanding of place was rejected and almost ridiculed

by the master in book I : eos qui talia dicunt vera deridet ratio .32

28 Periphyseon 1.485D, CCCM 161 : 61 ll. 1857-9 : Videsne itaque non aliudesse locum nisi actionem intelligentis atque comprehendentis uirtute intelli-gentiae ea quae comprehendere potest.

29 Periphyseon 5.889D, CCCM 165 :43 l l. 1347-9.30 Periphyseon 3, CCCM 163 : 28 l. 749 ; 115 l. 3329 ; 130 l. 3763 ; 158 l.

4618 : Periphyseon 4, CCCM 64 : 82 l. 2407 ; 118 l. 3556.31

Periphyseon 5.950C, CCCM 65 : 126 ll. 4067-70 : tempora nunc dico spatiaquibus corpus humanum perfectum ad sui incrementum peruenit, loca uerosedes singulorum corporis membrorum.

32 Periphyseon 1.475C, CCCM 61 :49 ll . 1431-3.


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Even more disturbing is the following definition of place in rela-tion to quantity and dimensionality :

Quantity is nothing but a certain dimension of parts, which areseparated either in thought alone or by natural difference, and arational progression of what is extended by natural spaces, I meanlength and breadth and height, into certain l imits ; and place isnothing but the confine and the containment ( ambitus et conclusio )of what is limited by a certain term. 33

The use of the term ambitus and conclusio reminds us of Maxi-mus’ doctrine of place, which was discussed in Periphyseon I. Now,

however, no connection is made with the dialectical meaning of‘place’ as ‘essential definition’. On the contrary, place is hereunderstood in a physical sense, as the containment of the threedimensions of a certain corporeal quantity. The extension of spaceand the intervals of time are required as conditions of the move-ment and development of the natural world. Eriugena was himselfaware that he used the term locus in different senses, as he expli-citly formulates in Book V : ‘by place I now mean not the defini-tion of things, which remains in the mind, but the space whereinthe quantity of bodies is extended’. 34 It remains difficult, however,to explain what exactly the relation is between the spaces/placesoccupied by the physical bodies and place understood as the natu-ral essential definition of things.

3) As we have seen, Maximus considers time and place as the con-ditions sine quibus non (τὰ ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ) for the existence of thecreated world. Eriugena was so taken by this view that he oftenreferred to it using even the Greek phrase. Already in his transla-tion of the Quaestiones ad Thalassium he feels the need to add hisown scholion to help his readers how to understand this phrase :

33 Periphyseon 1.478B, CCCM 61 : 51 ll. 1532-8 : nil aliud est quantitasnisi partium quae seu sola ratione seu naturali differentia separantur certadimensio eorumque quae naturalibus spatiis extenduntur, longitudine dico,latitudine et altitudine, ad certos terminos rationabilis progressio ; locus uero

nil aliud est nisi rerum quae certo fine terminantur ambitus atque conclusio.34 Periphyseon 5.889D, CCCM 65 : 43 ll. 1347-8 : Locum nunc dico nonrerum diffinitionem, quae semper manet in animo, sed spatium quo corporumquantitas extenditur.


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One should supply after ‘the things (namely places and times)without which’ ( que sine quibus ) : nothing in this life is generatedor exists or lives or is in movement ; therefore they are called bythe Greeks ΤΑ ΩΝ ΑΝΕΥ, that is, the [conditions] without which,that is, places and times. 35

Eriugena returns to this issue several times in the Periphyseon .Thus, when introducing the discussion of the categories of placeand time, he notices :

Place and time are counted among all the things that have beencreated. For in these two the whole of the world that now exists

consists and without these it cannot exist, and therefore they arecalled by the Greeks ΩΝ ΑΝΕΥ ΤΟ ΠΑΝ, that is without whichthe universe cannot exist. 36

And he concludes :

For no creature can be without its own definite and unchangeableplace and its own definite intervals and limits of time, whetherit be corporeal or incorporeal ; and that is why, as we have oftensaid, these two, namely place and time, are called by the philos-ophers ΩΝ ΑΝΕΥ, that is, ‘without which’ ; for without these nocreature which has its beginning by generation and subsists aftersome manner can exist. 37

Following Maximus Eriugena insists that place and time mustbe understood ‘before’ we can understand a finite being : videsnelocum tempusque ante omnia quae sunt intelligi ? (1.1706-7). How-

35 Quaest . ad Thal . q.65, scholion 33 (CCSG 22 : 320 ll. 168-171) : Que, id estloca et tempora, sine quibus subaudis : nil in hac uita uel nascitur uel est uel

uiuit uel mouetur, que propterea a Grecis uocantur ΤΑ ΩΝ ΑΝΕΥ, que quibussine, idest loca et tempora. Also in the translation of Ambigua VI we find himin the margin explaining ‘sine quibus’ : id est locus et tempus (CCSG 18 : 271).

36 Periphyseon 1.468C-D, CCCM 161 : 39 ll. 1131-5 : Locus siquidem et tem-pus inter omnia quae creata sunt computantur. In his nanque duobus totusmundus qui nunc est consistit et sine quibus esse non potest, ideoque a grae-cis dicuntur ΩΝ ΑΝΕΥ ΤΟ ΠΑΝ (id est quibus sine uniuersitas esse nonualet). (translation Sh.-W., slightly modified).

37 Periphyseon 1.489A, CCCM 161 : 65 ll. 1993-7 : Non enim ulla creaturacerto suo loco atque immutabili certisque temporum spatiis finibusque, siue

corporea sit siue incorporea, potest carere. Ideoque, ut saepe diximus, duohaec, locus profecto et tempus, a philosophis ΩΝ ΑΝΕΥ appellantur (hoc estquibus sine) ; nam sine his nulla creatura generatione inchoans et aliquo modosubsistens potest consistere.


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ever, this priority of place and time should not be taken in a tem-poral sense, as if place and time existed before the creation ofthe universe of which they are the conditions. They are createdby God together with the world of which they are the conditions.What Eriugena says in the Homily on the Prologue to St. John abouttime, that it has not been made before but together with the world(tempus non ante factum, non praelatum, sed concreatum )38 , can alsobe said of place. Time and place precede the world only logically(sola ratione ) – as a container ‘precedes’ what is contained by it –not temporally : non spatiis temporum, sed sola ratione conditionis

praecesserint .39

In Book V Eriugena devotes a special question to examining

the relation between time and place and the universe. 40 As hesays, there are ‘among catholic authorities’ two opinions on thisissue. Some say that time and place are not a part of the uni-verse but external to it ( non intra partes mundi, sed extra ipsiusuniversitatem ). They argue that time and place cannot themselvesbelong to the created world, as it is contained and circumscribedby them. Besides, time and place are incorporeal beings ; they

should not be counted together with corporeal things. Otherscomprehend time and place within the universe. They say thattime and space have been created together with all the rest thatis contained in the universe. For if time and space were beforethe world, which has a temporal beginning, they would certainlybe eternal. And if they were eternal, they would be no differentfrom God himself or subsist as primordial causes in him. Eriu-gena rejects this view as stultissimum referring to Augustine whosaid that nothing would be more stupid than to believe that therewas a place before the creation of the heaven and a time beforethe creation ( loca supra caelum and tempora ante mundum ). There-fore, Eriugena concludes with Augustine that time and place orig-inated together with the universe ( simul cum mundo orta et coorta ) ;they neither precede it nor will continue to exist after its return

38 Vox spiritualis VII, 28-29 (SC 151 : 237).39 Periphyseon 1.482B, CCCM 61 : 57 ll . 1718-9.40 See Periphyseon 5.888B-889B, CCCM 65 : 41-42 ll. 1266-96 and, on this

same text, the excellent note 99 by Bertin (1995), 227-229.


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to the creator at the end of times. 41 From the development of theargument it is clear that Eriugena here follows the second view,which is explicitly attributed to Augustine. As to the first posi-tion, which he rejects, it seems to be Maximus’ view. Eriugenaeven uses the phrase extra universitatem from his translation ofMaximus (which as I have attempted to show is incorrect). Doesthis mean that Eriugena here makes a retractatio of his previousposition in Book I, in which he certainly followed Maximus ? Onemay explain the apparent conflict between Eriugena’s views inBook I and in Book V by pointing to the two senses of place he

distinguishes, the ‘definition of things’ and the spatiality that isthe condition of the extension of corporeal masses. 42 Only whenplace is understood in the latter sense, does it belong to the cor-poreal world and will disappear with it. When it is taken as thedefinition of all things, however, it is not included in the worldbut precedes it, coming forth from the mind of the creator, andeternally remains in the divine mind. Eriugena has no problemsin accepting that the ‘rational principles of place and time’ are inthe mind of the creator, and he attributes this view even to the

second opinion forwarded by Augustine. 43 It is interesting to seethat already in the first book, when he is defending with Maximusthe priority of time and place over the universe, he appeals to theauthority of Augustine and thus sees no conflict between his twoauthorities. Eriugena refers to the conclusion of De musica , whereAugustine proposes the ultimate explanation of the harmonicorder of the universe.

For the number of places and times, as St. Augustine says in chap-

ter six of De musica

, precedes all things that are in them : for themode, that is, measure, of all things that are created, naturallyprecedes in reason ( ratione ) their creation ; and this mode and mea-sure of each is called place, and so is it. Similarly, the beginning

41 See Augustine, De civ. Dei XI, 5. Eriugena refers to this authority alsoin Periphyseon 2.558BC (CCCM 162 : 44 ll . 1036-1038) and in his homily Voxspiritualis VII.

42

See Bertin (1995), 227-229.43 Periphyseon 5.888B, CCCM 165 : 41 l l. 1280-2 : rationes siquidem loco-rum et temporum, priusquam in mundo crearentur, in verbo dei, in quo factasunt omnia, praecesserunt.


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and the start of birth is conceived prior to everything which isborn and has a beginning. 44

The order of this universe as a spatial corporeal reality dependsupon the locales numeros (1) expressed in it. But that spatial nume-ric order is again dependent upon the harmonic order of the ‘tem-poral numbers’ (2) governing the movements of planets and stars.Superior to it is the order of life, whose movement is not itselfordered by temporal measures, but produces by its psychic move-ment the numbers (3) governing the temporal intervals. Finallythere are the intelligible numbers in the divine mind (4). Eriu-

gena learns from this Augustinian speculation that the numbersor measures or rational principles of place and of time precedeby reason the spatial and temporal universe that is measured bythem. This means in his view that at the end space and time willreturn to their eternal causes. 45 In that way Augustine is madeconcordant with Maximus’ view. 46

Time and place are thus conditions of the created universe asit now exists. These conditions will disappear after the return ofthe universe to its creator at the end of time, or rather return totheir primordial causes. There will be no more time and no moreplace, as there was no time and place before the creation of theworld. The Greek phrase τὰ ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ may therefore not betaken in an absolute sense as if these were the necessary condi-tions for whatever comes to exist. They are only conditions forthe existence of the world as long as it exists as a finite, createdworld and will also disappear together with the world to whichthey belong. The teacher thus warns his disciple not to take thephrase sine quibus non in a strict sense as referring to absoluteconditions of existence.

Regarding the fact that the Greeks call these two parts of theworld, I mean place and time, ΩΝ ΑΝΕΥ (that is, [the parts] with-

44 See Periphyseon 1.482B-C, CCCM 161 : 56-57 ll. 1707-15.45 See Periphyseon 5.970D, CCCM 165 : 155 ll. 5026 -9 : Nam et ipsa loca et

tempora cum omnibus, quae in eis adhuc in hac vita ordinantur et mouenturet circumscribuntur, in suas aeternas rationes redire necesse est.

46I do not agree with Marenbon (1981), p. 86, n. 82 that “John’s referenceto the primordial causes of space and time is a measure of his desperation

in trying to reconcile the irreconcilably different concepts of space and timefurnished by Maximus and Augustine.”


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out which the other parts cannot exist), I would definitely affirmthat this phrase only holds for them as long as that whole [sc. theworld] of which they are parts remains. When the world, however,passes by, together with it also the meaning of this phrase willbecome empty. 47

If time and place are, however, the conditions sine quibus non of the finite world, distinguishing it from its creator, Eriugena’sclaim ( non temere dixerim ) that both will eventually disappear,becomes a controversial one, since it seems to remove the distinc-tion between the creator and the creature. When all things will

return to their eternal reasons, ‘they will lack every local andtemporal limit’.

For being infinite they will to infinity adhere in the Cause of allthings, which lacks all definition because it is infinite. 48

As we will see, Augustine would never have subscribed to thisconclusion. Space may indeed disappear, but time will not.

4) According to Maximus there is no time without place, no place

without time. Both conditions are inseparably connected as theconditions sine quibus non of the created universe. That the wholecreation is characterized by temporality is easy to admit, but howcould one understand that the whole creation is in place ? Bodiescertainly are both in time and situated in place, but what aboutsouls, angels and other incorporeal beings ? They are in time butnot in place. Eriugena raises this question explicitly in the fifthbook in connection with the question we discussed in the previ-ous section. ‘Is everything that moves temporally necessarily also

moved in place ?’ 49

47 Periphyseon , 5.889D-890A, CCCM 165 : 43-44 ll. 1349 -54 : Nam quodgraeci duas illas mundi partes, locum dico et tempus, ΩΝ ΑΝΕΥ (hoc est sinequibus caeterae partes esse non possunt) appellant, tamdiu illud uocabulumnon temere dixerim in eis praeualere, quamdiu totum illud cuius partes suntpermanserit. Eo uero transeunte, simul et illius uocabuli uirtus euacuabitur.

48 Periphyseon 1.483A, CCCM 65 : 57 ll. 1737-9 : Causae enim omnium

rerum, quae omni caret circumscriptione quoniam infinita est, infiniti ininfinitum adhaerebunt.49 Periphyseon 5.888D, CCCM 65 : 42 ll. 1296-7 : utrum omne quod mouetur

temporaliter necesse sit etiam localiter moueri ?


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On this issue Eriugena finds the authorities in the catholic tra-dition again in disagreement. That God is himself beyond timeand place is agreed by all, and neither is there any discussion oncorporeal beings which are and move both in time and place. Butit is questionable how to understand the motion of spiritual beingslike angels or souls. Some hold that they occur only in time with-out place, others insist that time and place are inseparably con-nected and that whatever moves in time is also situated in place,and vice versa. The second position is clearly that of Maximus, aswe have seen. The first is held by Augustine. According to Augus-

tine whatever is in place must be also moving in time, but not theother way around. What is in time, is not necessarily in place, asis proven by the example of the angels. Eriugena refers to a pas-sage of De Genesi ad litteram VIII, XX, 39 : creator spiritus movetsine tempore et loco ; creatus spiritus per tempus sine loco ; cor-

pus per tempus et locum . 50 We have thus the following gradation :1. God is above time and place ; 2. the souls are in time but notin place ; 3. bodies are in time and place. The angels, which arepurely spiritual beings, stand between God and souls. They share

in God’s eternity, Augustine says, when they are contemplatingsine loco et tempore ; but when they fulfil their tasks in the prov-idential administration, they may themselves be moved in timeand could even move bodies in time and space without, however,losing their contemplative attitude. 51 That the measures of timeprecede in the ontological order the measures of place is also whatwe learned from the conclusion of De musica . 52 The positions ofMaximus and Augustine seem difficult to reconcile and surpris-ingly Eriugena himself does not opt for one of the two : ‘but whatof the two views should be held as most appropriate, it is not up

50 This authority is also quoted in Periphyseon 1.504C, CCCM 161 : 87ll. 2681-4 ; 5.1000D, CCCM 65 : 196 ll. 6370-5 and in De praedestinatione VIII.148-50, CCCM 50 : 53.

51 Augustine’s solution clearly stands in the Plotinian tradition, which hemay have known through Porphyry. See the notes on this of P. Agaësse andA. Solignac in their French translation of De Genesi ad litteram (Oeuvres de

saint Augustin 49, 1970, p. 514-516).52 The question whether quando takes precedence over ubi or vice versawas discussed by the ancient commentators on the categories : see Simplicius,

In Cat . 340,27-342,20.


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to us to adjudicate.’ 53 He leaves the question open ; after delibera-tion everybody can decide what position seems to be more reason-able. Later, however, in Book V he returns to the same questionreferring again to the authority of Augustine in the De Genesi adlitteram.

The context is now given by an interpretation of the biblicalnarrative of the last judgment when Christ will come down onthe clouds of heaven (see Matth. 24 : 30). 54 In Eriugena’s views theclouds stand here for the celestial substances, namely the angels.But can the angels be said to move in place, coming down from

heaven ? Eriugena’s view is different from Augustine’s as discussedabove : Eriugena claims that the angels only have a spiritualmovement ‘without any temporal or local motion’. Some people,he says, might object that this denial of temporal movement inangels goes against Augustine’s view who argued that only Godis sine loco et tempore , whereas the created spiritual beings are intime but not in place. He agrees, but he defends his position ‘byfollowing the authority of the Greeks, which ascertains withouta doubt that whatever is moved in place is also moved in time.

Therefore, whatever is without local motion must also be withouttemporal motion. For both time and place will either be togetheror be taken away together, as they are inseparable’. Although atfirst Eriugena had left the issue open, he now clearly takes posi-tion for Maximus contrary to Augustine. 55

5) According to Maximus time and place characterize the verybeing or ousia of created things ; it is what makes them finitebeings and distinct from the creator. At first Eriugena just seems

to adopt this view, when he says that ‘every ousia created fromnothing is local and temporal ; local because it exists after somemanner as it cannot be infinite, temporal because it begins to bewhat it was not before.’ 56 However, the way he explains this the-

53 Periphyseon 5.889A-B, CCCM 65 : 42-43 ll. 1215-24.54 Periphyseon 5.1000C-1001B, CCCM 65 : 196-97 l l. 6351-81.55 At Periphyseon 5.6375-81 Jeauneau does not identify Eriugena’s Greek

authority as Maximus, Ambig . VI. 1180B-C (CCSG 18 : ll. 1426 -31).56 Periphyseon 1.487A, CCCM 61 : 63 ll. 1913-6 : omnis enim ΟΥCΙΑ de nihilocreata localis temporalisque est, localis quidem quia aliquo modo est quo-niam infinita non est, temporalis uero quoniam inchoat esse quod non erat.


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sis is far different from what Maximus intended to say. In fact,accordi ng to Eriugena the ousia never becomes itself subjected tospatio-temporal conditions ; only in its accidental appearance doesit become spatial and temporal. As Eriugena repeatedly says, whatthe ousia of a thing is remains unknown for human beings, whoonly have access to it through sense perception. What Dionysiussaid about the divine essence itself, that we only can know that it exists, not what it is, must be said of every ousia. We can onlyaffirm that the ousia exists but, not knowing what it is in itself,we can attempt to indicate what it is starting from its accidental

properties, such as quantity, quality, and primarily from its beinglocated in place and time. Place and time offer indeed the condi-tions for the appearance of the other accidental forms attached tothe ousia .

Therefore ousia is in no way defined as to what it is, but it isdefined that it is ; for from place and from time and from the otheraccidents, which are understood to be either within it or outsideit, is given not what it is but only that it is. 57

In fact, as Eriugena learns from Gregory of Nyssa, the sensiblebodies are not themselves substances, but made up from an aggre-gation of properties, which are in themselves incorporeal and intel-ligible, such as quantity and quality and time and place. In thatsense the ousia of things (with its triadic structure of essence, powerand act) never enters as such the spatio-temporal condition, butremains eternally established in God himself. This means that –contrary to what Maximus said – the ousia is as such never tem-poral and local ; it remains as ousia a primordial cause created by

God but also identical with God in his Word : created and creative.Summarizing the Aristotelian doctrine after the long and

detailed discussion of each of the ten categories, the discipleclearly distinguishes ousia or substance from the nine accidentalgenera. The ousiai do not require anything in order to exist ; onthe contrary, they have been established by the Creator as the‘immutable foundations’ of all things. In their trinitarian struc-

57 Periphyseon 1.497A, CCCM 61 : 63 ll. 1917-20 : ΟΥCΙΑ itaque nullo mododiffinitur quid est, sed diffinitur quia est. Ex loco nanque, ut diximus, et

tempore accidentibusque aliis, quae siue in ipsa seu extra intelliguntur esse,tantummodo datur non quid sit sed quia est.


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ture they even resemble the divinity. Therefore, the substancesdo not themselves fall under the spatial-temporal conditions whichthe Greeks call τὰ ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ.

For the fact that place and time are called by the Greeks ὧν ἄνευ,that is, without which the other things cannot exist, should notbe understood as meaning that the above mentioned substan-tial trinity [sc. essence, power, act] is to be counted among thethings which cannot subsist without place and time ; for it doesnot require the aid of place and time to subsist since it exists byitself by the excellence of its own creation before and above placeand time. 58

A daring conclusion, which goes far beyond what Maximus said.The ousia of all things never becomes itself temporalized and loca-lised and thus never becomes itself ‘finite’. 59 The spatio-temporalconditions only concern the accidental appearances of the substan-ces on the level of what is created. Here again we have to admitthat for Eriugena God and creation are ultimately the same real-ity. This will be definitely so at the return of all things whenthere will be not more appearances in time and space.

bibliography of secondary literatur

Bertin (1995), Francis Bertin, (transl .), Jean Scot Erigène. De la divisionde la nature. Periphyseon. Livre I-II, Paris.

Courtine (1980) = J.-F. Courtine, ‘La dimension spatio-temporelle dansla problématique catégoriale du De divisione naturae de JeanScot Erigène’, in Les Etudes philosophiques 3, 343-367.

Cristiani (1973) = Marta Cristiani, ‘Lo spazio e il tempo nell’operadell’Eriugena’, in Studi Medievali , 3a Serie XIV, I, (1973) : 39-136.

Cristiani (1973) = Marta Cristiani, ‘Le problème du lieu et du tempsdans le livre 1er du Periphyseon ,’ in John O’Meara and LudwigBieler (eds.), The Mind of Eriugena , Dublin, 41-48.

58 Periphyseon 1.507D-508A, CCCM 61 : 91 l l. 2819-2820 : Nam quod agraecis locus et tempus appellantur ΩΝ ΑΝΕΥ (hoc est sine quibus caeteraesse non possunt) non ita intelligendum est ut inter ea quae sine loco et tem-pore non ualent subsistere substantialis illa trinitas praedicta rerum compu-

tetur. Ea nanque loci temporisque auxilio ut subsistat non eget, dum per seipsam ante supraque tempus et locum conditionis suae dignitatis existat.59 Unless one takes ousia as identical with the divine logoi according to which

all things have been created : this is Eriugena’s interpretation of Maximus.


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Gersh (1997) = Stephen Gersh, ‘Dialectical and Rhetorical Space. TheBoethian Theory of the Topics and its Influence during theEarly Middle Ages,’ in Jan Aertsen and Andreas Speer (eds.)

Raum und Raumvorstellungen im Mittelalter ( Miscellanea Mediae-valia 25), Berlin-New York, 391-401.

Kavanagh (2005) = Catherine Kavanagh, ‘The Influence of Maximusthe Confessor on Eriugena’s Treatment of Aristotle’s Categories,’in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 79, 567-596.

Louth (1996) = Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor, London-NewYork .

Marenbon (1981) = John Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin to theSchool of Auxerre. Logic, Theology and Philosophy in the Early

Middle Ages, Cambridge.

Moran (1989) = Dermot Moran, The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriu-gena. A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages , Cambridge.

Moran (1992) = Dermot Moran, ‘Time, Space and Matter in John Scot-tus Eriugena : An Examination of Eriugena’s Account of thePhysical World,’ in Fran O’Rourke (ed.), At The Heart of the Real.

Essays in Honour of Archbishop Desmond Connell , Dublin, 67– 96.

Moreschini (2003) = Claudio Moreschini (transl.), Massimo il Confes-sore. Ambigua. Problemi metafisici e teologici su testi di Gregorio diNazianze e Dionigi Areopagita , Milano.

Mueller-Jourdan (2005) = Pascal Mueller-Jourdan, Typologie spatio-temporelle de l’Ecclesia byzantine : La mystagogie de Maxime le Con-fesseur dans la culture philosophique de l’Antiquité Tardive , Leiden2005.

Sorabji (1988) = Richard Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion. Theories in Antiquity and their Sequel , Cornell University Press.

Steel (2012) = Carlos Steel, ‘Maximus Confessor on theory and praxis.A commentary on Ambigua ad Johannem VI (10) 1-19’. InThomas Bénatouïl and Mauro Bonazzi (eds.), Theoria, Praxisand the Contemplative Life after Plato and Aristotle , Leiden.

Uhlfelder-Potter (1976) = Periphyseon. On the Division of Nature , trans-lated by Myra L. Uhlfelder with summaries by Jean A.Potter,Indianapolis.

maximus confessor and john scottus eriugena on place and time

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