matt matthews and kip lindberg “shot all to … · 56 north & south january 2004 • vol. 7...

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56 NORTH & SOUTH JANUARY 2004 • VOL. 7 • NUMBER 1 MATT MATTHEWS AND KIP LINDBERG Lone Jack battlefield and cemetery, 2003. Photograph by Alinda Miller “Thousands entered the war, got just a taste of it, and then stepped out again permanently.” —Mark Twain FOR SEVERAL DECADES THE SMALL COMMUNITY OF LONE JACK, MISSOURI, hosted an annual picnic commemorat- ing the turbulent Civil War battle fought there on August 16, 1862. Families drove wagons or rode horses for miles, arriv- ing early to spread their blankets in the best location, under the shade trees near the speakers’ platform. Following lunch a succession of speakers would address the crowd and recall, between pitches made by aspiring politicians, the dra- matic events of the Battle of Lone Jack. One year the keynote speaker was a local office seeker, “Colonel” Crisp, who was renowned for his vivid descriptions of the town’s historical event. The colo- nel awed the crowd with his recounting of the glorious charges, snapping ban- ners, and dashing uniforms. At his fever- ish climax, however, an aged veteran struggled to his feet and interrupted the mesmeric oration. “Colonel, that didn’t happen that way,” he announced. “I was there, and I know what took place. You’ve misrepresented the facts.” Without a moment’s hesitation Colonel Crisp de- clared, “God Damn an eyewitness any- way! He always spoils a good story!” 1 The history of the Battle of Lone Jack is a good story, and one that is now largely forgotten. Few outside of Jackson County have ever heard of the battle, except per- haps in a passing literary or film refer- ence. 2 While certainly not an engagement of national note, the Battle of Lone Jack was of great local importance; it was, by and large, a battle fought by the men of western Missouri—men who were friends and neighbors, boyhood chums, and blood relatives. And because both sides were the “home team,” playing un- der the evaluative gaze of loved ones, it became a personal and passionate fight, marked by extremes in both courage and casualties. By the summer of 1862 Missouri, while far from serene, was certainly more “Thousands entered the war, got just a taste of it, and then stepped out again permanently.” “Thousands entered the war, got just a taste of it, and then stepped out again permanently.” “SHOT ALL TO PIECES” The Battle of Lone Jack, Missouri, August 16, 1862 “SHOT ALL TO PIECES” “SHOT ALL TO PIECES”

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56 NORTH & SOUTH JANUARY 2004 • VOL. 7 • NUMBER 1

MATT MATTHEWS AND KIP LINDBERG

Lone Jack battlefield and cemetery, 2003. Photograph by Alinda Miller

“Thousands entered the war, got just a taste of it,and then stepped out again permanently.”

—Mark Twain

FOR SEVERAL DECADES THE SMALLCOMMUNITY OF LONE JACK, MISSOURI,hosted an annual picnic commemorat-ing the turbulent Civil War battle foughtthere on August 16, 1862. Families drovewagons or rode horses for miles, arriv-ing early to spread their blankets in thebest location, under the shade trees nearthe speakers’ platform. Following luncha succession of speakers would addressthe crowd and recall, between pitchesmade by aspiring politicians, the dra-matic events of the Battle of Lone Jack.

One year the keynote speaker was alocal office seeker, “Colonel” Crisp, whowas renowned for his vivid descriptions

of the town’s historical event. The colo-nel awed the crowd with his recountingof the glorious charges, snapping ban-ners, and dashing uniforms. At his fever-ish climax, however, an aged veteranstruggled to his feet and interrupted themesmeric oration. “Colonel, that didn’thappen that way,” he announced. “I wasthere, and I know what took place. You’vemisrepresented the facts.” Without amoment’s hesitation Colonel Crisp de-clared, “God Damn an eyewitness any-way! He always spoils a good story!”1

The history of the Battle of Lone Jackis a good story, and one that is now largelyforgotten. Few outside of Jackson County

have ever heard of the battle, except per-haps in a passing literary or film refer-ence.2 While certainly not an engagementof national note, the Battle of Lone Jackwas of great local importance; it was, byand large, a battle fought by the men ofwestern Missouri—men who werefriends and neighbors, boyhood chums,and blood relatives. And because bothsides were the “home team,” playing un-der the evaluative gaze of loved ones, itbecame a personal and passionate fight,marked by extremes in both courage andcasualties.

By the summer of 1862 Missouri,while far from serene, was certainly more

“Thousands entered the war, got just a taste of it,and then stepped out again permanently.”“Thousands entered the war, got just a taste of it,and then stepped out again permanently.”

“SHOT ALL TO PIECES”The Battle of Lone Jack, Missouri, August 16, 1862

“SHOT ALL TO PIECES”“SHOT ALL TO PIECES”

VOL. 7 • NUMBER 1 • JANUARY 2004 NORTH & SOUTH 57

peaceful than it had been the previoussummer. The first year of the war hadwitnessed several large battles and doz-ens of skirmishes. Tens of thousands ofFederal troops from Missouri, joined byothers from Kansas, Iowa, Wisconsin, Il-linois, and Indiana, traversed the state,engaging the pro-Southern MissouriState Guard, irregular partisans, andConfederate troops from Texas, Arkan-sas, Louisiana, and the Indian Territory.A series of Southern victories had wrestedmuch of the state from the Union, butlacking the logistical resources to retaintheir foothold the Confederate forceswithdrew. By the onset of winter, theMissouri State Guard was left as the soli-tary guardian of the trophies won dur-ing the previous summer. But it too waspoor in resources. Many of the guards-men left for their homes to harvest crops,planning to return to the ranks afterspring planting. Those who remained inthe army did so in winter camps acrosssouthwest Missouri. Cut off from thesesecessionist havens, potential recruits inthe northern part of the state awaited theopportunity to join their compatriots.

A turn in fortunes would alter theirplans. Union forces under Brigadier Gen-eral Samuel R. Curtis launched a cam-paign in January 1862, pushing the Mis-souri State Guard and its recentlyorganized counterpart, the MissouriConfederate Brigade, from the state. De-feated at the Battle of Pea Ridge, orElkhorn Tavern, in March, these rebelswere forced to continue the fight in Ar-kansas and Mississippi, dreaming of theday they could return to their belovedhome state.

Meanwhile, Federal authorities fur-thered their goal of securing Missouri forthe Union. In the absence of an organizedenemy, Federal troops could focus oneliminating the small but steadily grow-ing numbers of partisan guerilla bandsthat posed an increasing threat to Unionlines of supply and communication.While Federal authorities continued toraise volunteer regiments with which toprosecute the war farther south, theybadly needed a force that would consti-tute a deterrent to local insurrection.

The force they organized was namedthe Missouri State Militia, or MSM.Armed, equipped, and funded by the fed-eral government, this force was to be re-tained for service within the state, secur-ing strategic centers of population and

commerce, and patrolling vital avenuesof communication. Since each companyoperated in the locality in which it wasraised, the rank and file knew every coun-try lane, briar patch, and river bottom,and soon became effective in ferretingout enemy bands. In contrast to the nega-tive connotation implied by the title “mi-litia,” these forces were more effective insmall-scale, anti-guerilla operations thanmuch larger volunteer or regular armyunits.

In an effort to further augmentUnion forces in the state, the newly ap-pointed governor, H.R. Gamble, autho-rized the commander of the District ofMissouri, Brigadier General John M.Schofield, to issue General Order No. 19.Effective July 22, 1862, the order statedthat all able-bodied men were requiredto join the pro-Union Enrolled MissouriMilitia, or EMM, bringing with themtheir own horses and weapons. In addi-tion, all weapons and ammunition in ci-vilian hands were to be confiscated andused for the public defense. Further or-ders clarified the intent: in order to “putdown robbery, plunder, and guerilla war-fare, which it is plainly the duty and in-terest of every citizen to aid in doing,”Missouri men had to don Union blue orface stiff fines or incarceration. Exemp-tions were granted to those willing to“contribute money rather than personalservice,” as well as “all disloyal men andthose who have at any time sympathizedwith the rebellion.” Those men, while notrequired to serve in the Union militia, stillhad to register for service, giving theirnames and place of residence, and sur-

rendering their weapons. Not made spe-cific was the certainty that those who re-fused to join the militia for reasons ofself-proclaimed disloyalty would beclosely observed under what was essen-tially house arrest.3

Farther south, in and around VanBuren, Arkansas, a number of Missouricavalry regiments were attempting tocomplete their organization before beingaccepted for Confederate service. All wereunder strength and desperate for an in-fusion of recruits. The sheer distancefrom Missouri, and the inability of re-cruits to make the journey south with-out molestation by the Federal MSM,prompted Confederate authorities to ap-prove a raid into Missouri for the pur-pose of gathering recruits. Brigadier Gen-eral James S. Rains, senior officer of thegreatly diminished Missouri State Guard,assigned command of this expedition toColonel Jeremiah V. Cockrell. The colo-nel, more widely known as “Vard”Cockrell, was a Methodist minister fromWarrensburg, Missouri. He and hisbrother, Colonel Francis Marion Cockrell(quickly rising to fame in the Confeder-ate Missouri Brigade), were well knownamong the Southern families in JacksonCounty, and it was believed his presencewould influence others of similar beliefto enlist. Cockrell was to lead the force

Left: Colonel DeWitt Clinton Hunter.Bushwhacker Museum, Nevada, Missouri

Below: Colonel Jeremiah Vardeman“Vard” Cockrell. General Sweeny’s CivilWar Museum, Republic, Missouri

58 NORTH & SOUTH JANUARY 2004 • VOL. 7 • NUMBER 1

Left: Brigadier General John M. Schofield, commander of the District of Missouri.Right: Brigadier General James G. Blunt, Kansas departmental commander.

into west-central Missouri, an areaknown for its pro-Confederate views.Word of Order No. 19 had reached thewilds of Arkansas, and it was earnestlyhoped that thousands of Missourians,forced to choose between compulsoryUnion service and voluntary Confeder-ate service, would choose the latter andjoin Cockrell.

In the last week of July 1862 ColonelJohn T. Coffee and Lieutenant ColonelJohn C. Tracy, each with about three hun-dred men, rode from their camps at FrogBayou and headed north to Missouri.Both commands considered themselvesindependent from Cockrell, as Coffee stillrefused to join the Confederate serviceand Tracy remained convinced he wouldsoon receive some special dispensationfrom Richmond.

On August 1 Cockrell and his smallcommand moved out, accompanied byColonel Dewitt C. Hunter and his sevenhundred and fifty soldiers. The advanceguard of the expedition consisted ofroughly seventy troopers led by CaptainJoseph O. Shelby. With Cockrell in over-all command of the expedition, Lieuten-ant Colonel Sidney Jackman took chargeof his four hundred and fifty men.Jackman’s command was badly mountedand equipped, in part because of the abys-mal supply system of the Trans-Missis-sippi Confederacy. Many of these menlacked saddles and rode bareback, whilemost of their bridles were simply ropesor lengths of braided bark.

As the secessionists rode rapidlynorth, hundreds of men who had refusedto join the enrolled militia flocked to therebel banner. They “pranced [in] fromevery direction,” recalled Jackman. “Thewoods seemed alive with men, and allfleeing the wrath of what was known asthe Gamble order.” Many already hadfriends or family in rebel service, and didnot want to be forced into facing themacross a battlefield.4

On August 11, as these mountedforces moved north, the Union high com-mand was stunned by the fall of Indepen-dence, Missouri. A combined force ofConfederates under Colonels John T.Hughes, Upton Hays, and Gideon Th-ompson, supported by William Quantrilland his small guerilla band, had struckwithout warning, capturing the entireFederal garrison. Among the handful ofsecessionist casualties was ColonelHughes, killed at the head of his regiment.

a company of Union cavalry known asthe “Fremont Scouts,” leading themagainst local secessionist forces com-prised of the very men he suspected hadassassinated his brother. Foster quicklygained notoriety as a courageous warrior,an honor he shared with his youngerbrother Melville, who also served as acompany commander in the 7th MSMCavalry. In April 1862 the brothers werewounded in an engagement withQuantrill’s guerillas just outside Warrens-burg. Recovered from their wounds, theyresumed their vendetta.6

With Hughes dead, Upton Hays assumedcontrol of their combined commands.

Bewildered by the sudden influx ofConfederate recruiters into Missouri, andchagrined by the loss of Independence,Schofield ordered Brigadier GeneralJames Totten, the commander of theCentral Division of the District of Mis-souri, to start assembling a force to drivethe secessionists out of western Missouri.Wishing to give further support to Tot-ten, Schofield appealed to the Kansas de-partmental commander, Brigadier Gen-eral James G. Blunt, for additional troops.

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On August 12 Totten ordered onecompany of the 7th Missouri State Mili-tia (MSM) Cavalry to move from Syra-cuse to Sedalia. As Company H movedout, Major Emory S. Foster of the 7thMSM was ordered to Sedalia to take com-mand of the forces assembled there andmove quickly to Lexington, where he wasto take charge of an ad hoc force andmove south into Jackson County.5

Totten’s selection of Major Foster tocommand this northern pincer move-ment was almost certainly due to Foster’sreputation as one of the most aggressiveofficers in the Missouri Militia. Onlytwenty-three years old, the former news-paper editor from Warrensburg had al-ready garnered the respect of friend andfoe alike. Foster was a staunch Unionistfor whom the war had begun on a per-sonal note. At an election in Warrensburgearly in 1861, pro-secession opponentshad murdered his brother Marshall as hewas on his way to vote. With the comingof the war Foster raised and commanded

To add some firepower to the Fed-eral strike force Totten ordered a sectionof the 3rd Indiana Light Artillery, underthe command of Lieutenant James C.Devlin, to join Foster’s command.Devlin’s two guns were of a type knownas “James Guns,” being outdated M1841six-pounders altered for greater accuracyby rifling the bronze tubes to a patterndeveloped by inventor and former sena-tor Charles T. James.7 Late on the nightof August 12 the train carrying the Indi-ana section sped past the depot at Syra-cuse. A witness recalled that the cars“whirled by our depot with the speed oflighting, without making any stop, amidthe wild cheers of the men… half envel-oped in sparks of fire, [the train] seemedto be whirling to Hell.”8

The following day Totten orderednewly promoted Brigadier General FitzHenry Warren and his 1st Iowa Volun-teer Cavalry, supported by a section ofartillery, to move north from Clinton,Missouri, into Jackson County. There he

VOL. 7 • NUMBER 1 • JANUARY 2004 NORTH & SOUTH 59

small residences. The most impressivestructure was a large frame hotel knownas the Cave House. “The oddity of sucha hotel in such a place was ludicrous inthe extreme,” recalled one visitor, “for itcould easily have accommodated in onenight all the visitors it had any reason toexpect in a month.” About 1,300 peoplelived in the community, almost all com-mitted to the rebel cause. 13

After searching the area for muchneeded supplies the secessionist forcedeployed around the town. Hunter andJackman marched west, establishingtheir encampments about four milesfrom Lone Jack. Quantrill’s guerillas, ar-riving on the scene, bivouacked about amile farther west. Coffee, with Tracy’s in-dependent command, set up campabout a mile south of town. CaptainShelby and his command were notpresent, having forayed into LafayetteCounty the previous day. It was his de-sire to recruit enough men in his homecounty to raise an entire regiment.14

Meanwhile Foster’s column wasmaking good time as it pushed southinto Jackson County. Around noon themajor received intelligence fromfriendly residents that the rebel com-mander, John T. Coffee, was campednear Lone Jack with some 1,600 follow-ers. This news, combined with theknowledge that Hays and Quantrillwere also near Lone Jack, should havegiven the major pause. However, Fosterwas undeterred. Sending a message backto his commander in Lexington, Fosterpromised he would be in a grand fightby that evening.15

Cockrell never made it to his fam-ily home. Approaching Warrensburg heheard that Union forces were converg-ing on Jackson County. Reversingcourse, Cockrell returned to his com-mand, arriving at his camp about 9:00p.m. on August 15.

At approximately the same time,Foster’s command reached Lone Jack.Interrogating citizens, the Federal com-mander learned that Coffee and hisforce, now estimated at only eight hun-dred men, were camped just south oftown. Issuing orders to tighten girthsand ready weapons, Foster delivered onhis promise of an engagement beforeday’s end, leading his command into ac-tion at 11:00 p.m.

Just south of town Foster’s advanceran into rebel pickets. A scattering of

was to link up with Foster’s party mov-ing south from Lexington, smashing anyrebel forces in between.

At 11:00 a.m. on August 14, follow-ing a grueling forty-eight hour forcedmarch, Foster arrived in Lexington withDevlin’s section of Indiana artillery,Company H of the 7th MSM Cavalry, andtwo companies of the 8th MSM Cavalry.That same day Schofield wired Totten,telling him it was time to strike the Con-federate force reported near Lone Jack, asmall community in southeast JacksonCounty. Schofield was sure that this rebelforce, which he thought numbered nomore than a thousand men underHughes and Quantrill, would be easy preyfor the converging Federal forces. Tottenquickly issued orders to effect this edict.

At 1:00 a.m on the morning August15 Foster received Totten’s order to sallyforth from Lexington at daylight. He wasto move some thirty miles southwest toLone Jack, where he would rendezvouswith Warren’s command. Foster left Lex-ington at dawn with approximately eighthundred men. He had with him five com-panies of the 7th Missouri Volunteer Cav-alry, three companies of the 6th MSMCavalry, two companies of the 8th MSMCavalry, three companies of the SecondBattalion, Missouri State Cavalry, Com-pany H of the 7th MSM Cavalry, andDevlin’s two James guns. Melville Fosteraccompanied the force, undoubtedly aseager as his older brother to close withthe enemy.9

Unbeknown to Foster the campaignhad already suffered a serious setback.Warren, for reasons still unknown, haddisobeyed orders, moving his six hundredmen southwest from Clinton instead ofnorth toward Lone Jack. Receiving re-ports from alarmed Union citizens alonghis route, Warren telegraphed his supe-riors in Leavenworth, Kansas, that a largerebel force under Coffee, Jackman, andothers had passed through the area witha column of around 6,000 men, movingnorth. Totten was stunned by the newsof such a large Confederate force in Jack-son County. He immediately sent wordto Lexington to recall Foster, but the com-mand had already left Lexington, mov-ing south at a rapid pace. Couriers weredispatched, but Totten could not be as-sured Foster would receive the order intime.10

Unlike the slow moving and direc-tionally challenged Warren, the third col-

umn of Union soldiers left Fort Scott,Kansas, at 9:00 a.m. on August 15 des-tined for Jackson County. Brigadier Gen-eral James G. Blunt led his 2,500 menswiftly north, placing his infantry in wag-ons so that they could keep up with hiscavalry.11

* * *MEANWHILE, THE SECESSIONISTS HADNOT BEEN IDLE. Cockrell and Shelby hadstarted for Jackson County on theevening of August 14, Cockrell desiringto see his family, turning command overto Colonel Hunter and departing for hishome in Warrensburg. The next morn-ing Hunter marched the command far-ther north, halting at Lone Jack aboutmidday on August 15.12

The village of Lone Jack had beenfounded in the early 1830s, acquiring itsname from a giant blackjack oak tree thatwas visible for miles across the prairie.In 1843 a new addition, known as “NewTown,” was established to the south of theexisting settlement. By 1862 New Townconsisted of two stores, a blacksmithshop, a saloon, a post office, and a few

Fort Scott

Harrisonville

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musketry, quickly followed by volleys ofcarbines and blasts of cannon fire, illu-minated the night. Foster’s commandrapidly shattered the enemy line, captur-ing several Confederate outposts beforesweeping into the rebel encampments.Completely unprepared for the assault,Coffee’s and Tracy’s commands aban-doned their camps, fleeing in confusionand disappearing into the darkness.16

While the impetuous attack was suc-cessful it was by no means decisive, formost of the rebels escaped. Even worse,elements of the Union command lostcontact in the darkness and became dis-organized. During the skirmish some ofFoster’s cavalry mistook the Indiana artil-leryman for the enemy, firing into themand killing four men. Foster placed sec-tion commander Lieutenant Devlin un-der arrest, later claiming the Hoosier of-ficer was drunk. Whatever the reason,either mistaken identity or dereliction ofduty, this friendly fire maddened and dis-heartened the Indiana boys.17

As Coffee’s and Tracy’s men van-ished into the dark of night, the echo ofUnion artillery continued to reverberatefor miles, alerting the individual seces-sionist commands that an event of greatimportance had occurred. The fact thata Union force was in the area and confi-dently operating at night was unsettling,and their supporting artillery suggestedit was a sizable force and not just a scout-ing party. Soon after the skirmish endedColonel Hays, with his four hundredmen, rode into Vard Cockrell’s camp. In-cluded in Hays’ command was a companycommanded by Captain Caleb Winfrey,a physician whose home and office werein Lone Jack. Having served as a surgeonwith the Missouri State Guard the previ-ous year, Winfrey had exchanged hismedical kit for a sword and recruited hisown cavalry company. Joining Hays onlydays before, Winfrey’s company had anintimate knowledge of Lone Jack and avested interest in its security.18

Colonel Cockrell ordered his meninto battle formation and waited for Cof-fee and Tracy to join him. As the troopsrested on their arms Cockrell learned thata Union force of unknown strength hadattacked Coffee and Tracy, and returnedto Lone Jack for the night. Uncertain asto what action would be prudent,Cockrell consulted Jackman, who urgedan attack on the town in the morning,fearing that the Union force, whatever its

strength, would hamper a withdrawalsouth. Cockrell agreed.19

Soon Tracy and his commandstraggled into Cockrell’s camp, havinglost their pursuers before circling west.Tracy had no knowledge of Coffee’s con-dition or location, only that the two com-mands had become separated in theirflight south from Lone Jack.

Civilians from New Town informedCockrell that the Union force numberedabout one thousand men, and with theaddition of Tracy’s command Cockrellbelieved he held a numerical advantageand planned his attack accordingly. TheConfederate forces would positionthemselves for a dawn assault on thetown. Hays would prepare a mounted di-version from the north while Hunter,Jackman, and Tracy moved dismountedthrough a weed-choked field west oftown. Once the Unionists were focusedon Hays’ feint, the dismounted menwould emerge from their cover and as-sault the town from the west.

Jackman led their commands to a pointa half-mile from Lone Jack, where themen dismounted. About half the Confed-erate force, approximately 1,500 men, wasunarmed, having enlisted with the expec-tation of being issued weapons. Thesemen were to wait near the ammunitionwagon, which had been brought up to apoint northwest of town. Meanwhile,Cockrell’s force closed on the Union po-sition. Hunter, with perhaps one hundredfifty men, joined Jackman’s command offive hundred soldiers, and together withTracy’s three hundred fifty recruitsmoved through the fallow field of weedswest of town. They halted at a point esti-mated to be a mere hundred yards fromthe enemy position, secure in the knowl-edge that Hays, with his force of fourhundred men, was preparing to attackfrom the north.20

Following their disorganized assaulton the Confederate camps, Foster and hismen had returned to Lone Jack. TheFederals were completely exhausted by the

The success of the flank attack de-pended greatly on surprise, as the rebelslacked the resources for a sustained fight.Despite the fact that his men had an av-erage of only six cartridges apiece,Cockrell thought that sufficient as the“enemy would run after a shot or two.”Not wanting to delay the attack by dis-tributing a greater supply of ammuni-tion, and unwilling to await Coffee’s un-certain return, the entire Confederatecommand was ordered into position.

Hays rode away with his columnwhile Cockrell, Hunter, Tracy, and

events of the past few days. Most of themen picketed their horses close to themain street, tying their reins to an Osageorange, or bois d’ arc, hedge running par-allel to and about fifty yards from theeastern edge of the street. When prop-erly trimmed such a hedge presented atough and nearly impenetrable mass ofthorns, each several inches in length.These hedges had become popular in theprevious decades as an effective barrierto errant livestock, protecting croplandmore efficiently than either split rail orstone fencing. The hedgerow ran north

Left: Colonel Upton Hays. Jackson County (Missouri) Historical Society.Right: Major Emory S. Foster, commander of Union forces at Lone Jack. Lone Jack Museum.

VOL. 7 • NUMBER 1 • JANUARY 2004 NORTH & SOUTH 61

and south along almost the entire east-ern length of the street, turning east atits northern and southern ends to sur-round a field of tall corn. As the com-mand collapsed into sleep up and downthe street, Foster established his head-quarters in the Cave Hotel. The two can-nons of the Indiana battery were parkednear the blacksmith shop.

As soon as the Union cavalrymen re-turned to town it became clear to the resi-dents that the Federals intended to stay.Fearing the secessionists would give battlein the morning, most of the inhabitantstook what valuables they could easily re-move and fled under cover of night. Bymorning only a few diehard families re-mained. Mrs. Bart Cave, whose husbandwas proprietor of the Cave Hotel, re-

mained with her three small children andher mother-in-law. She soon saw theirhome turned into a field hospital, as Fos-ter ordered the Confederates woundedin the skirmish to be treated there, anddelegated Assistant Surgeon William H.Cundiff from the Second Battalion Mis-souri State Militia Cavalry to that duty.In the early morning hours Foster in-formed his commanders that at daybreakthe command would mount and ridewest, ready to give battle to whatever en-emy they could find. At no point duringthe night did a messenger arrive fromLexington with word of Totten’s order towithdraw, and Foster remained blind tothe fact that a Confederate force morethan three times the size of his own waswithin striking distance.

As daylight approached Hunter,Jackman, and Tracy waited patiently forHays’ flank attack to begin—the signalto launch their own assault. The easternhorizon began to brighten, and still therewas no sign of an attack nor further wordfrom Hays. Then to Jackman’s great as-tonishment Hays appeared out of thedarkness, riding slowly down the rebelline. Jackman called out, “Colonel Hays,in the name of God, what are you doinghere?” Hays responded that his attackwould soon begin and, after surveyingthe line, turned and slowly rode away.Jackman believed the only explanationfor Hays’ delay and personal reconnoi-ter was that the colonel was distrustfulof his fellow commanders’ experienceand intent.21

As Hays’ men made their final prepa-rations for the attack a ripple of gunfirebroke the early morning calm. Unionpickets had discovered Hays’ advance andloosed a few panicky shots. The dis-charges alerted Foster to a possible threatbut did not seem to unduly alarm themen themselves. A Union picket, recall-ing the three or four shots fired north oftown, believed that a few of his waywardcomrades were simply “aiming to getsome chickens for breakfast.” Whetheralerted by this gunfire, or simply follow-ing his decision to pursue the rebels atfirst light, Major Foster ordered his mento rise and prepare for battle.22

As the minutes ticked by, and thefirst rays of sunlight began to emerge inthe east with no further sign of Hays’ at-tack, Jackman’s men grew more anxious.Circulating among his men, Jackmanheard a number of voices mutter fearfullythat something was wrong; it was not safeto remain in their exposed position anylonger. While the tall weeds gave themconcealment, they would provide no pro-tection once the Federals spotted theirposition, for minie balls would cutthrough the grass as easily as the blade ofa scythe. Private C.B. Lotspeich of Jack-man’s command remembered lyingprone in the field and listening to theUnion forces as they began stirring. “Welay there and could hear them give everycommand,” he said, “hear them puttingon accouterments, loading their guns[and] forming lines of battle.” Listeningto his opposite number issuing com-mands, Hunter chaffed at the delay, badlywanting Jackman to order an attack re-gardless of Hays’ failure to appear. “We

A rare photograph of Missouri Confederates. Left to right: Thomas H. Brown, William A. Brown,and Abe Brown, all of whom served at Lone Jack with Colonel Upton Hays. The Lone Jack Museum.

62 NORTH & SOUTH JANUARY 2004 • VOL. 7 • NUMBER 1

pared for action, but lacking any coverthey were dangerously exposed to hos-tile fire. Most would still be in the streetwhen the attack began.25

The two rifled James guns were soonunlimbered to the right-front of theblacksmith shop, the new location ofFoster’s headquarters, and the Unioncommander ordered that the cannon bepositioned to command the street fromend to end. With Lieutenant Devlin stillunder arrest, command of the artillerysection went to Sergeant James M. Scottand Sergeant J.C. Updegraff. CaptainMilton H. Brawner, commanding Com-pany A, 7th Missouri Volunteers, was as-signed the responsibility of supportingthe guns.

Foster evacuated his combatantsfrom the Cave Hotel, leaving behind Sur-geon Cundiff and his three Confederatewards. Mrs. Cave, with her children andmother-in-law, again chose to stay, per-haps believing they were as safe in theirown home as anywhere else in town. Be-fore departing, Major Foster ordered thehotel marked with a yellow flag to denoteits occupation as a hospital.26

The sun was now up and, eventhough there was no sign of Hays,Jackman issued the order to attack. Yell-ing as they struggled through the tallweeds and hemp, the three Confederatecommands charged toward the enemy.Pausing only to take aim, the rebelspoured a galling fire upon the Federalsin the street. “Our line of battle wasscarcely formed when they came upon us,yelling like savages,” reported Captain

William Plumb, commanding CompanyB, 6th MSM, “and sending their balls intoour ranks thick as hail.” A soldier in the8th MSM recalled that the attack was soswift his unit was forced to fight dis-mounted “for they had not time tomount.” For most of the Federals this wasjust as well, as it would have been ex-tremely difficult to reload their muzzle-loading rifles on horseback.

The attackers hastened to close withthe enemy, for most were armed withdouble barreled shotguns, effective onlyat short range. The rebels emerged fromthe weeds, only to come up against a railfence running north to south some fiftyyards from the Union position. As theConfederates struggled to clear the ob-stacle a massive volley erupted from theUnion line. The Federal cavalrymen hadopened fire on their exposed foe, andwere quickly joined by the Indiana artil-lery discharging blasts of canister.Jackman saw a man on the left ofHunter’s line go down; rushing to his as-sistance Jackman saw there was little hecould do, and after pleading desperately

waited until they had donned the blue,seized their guns, [and] provided them-selves with plenty of ammunition,” helater complained. “[They] formed intoline and counted off, as if on parade, andwere thus ready and waiting for a foe tofight.” As the Federals continued theirpreparation Hunter pleaded withJackman to launch the attack immedi-ately. Jackman declined to attack beforeHays, a decision seconded by Tracy, andthe entire command continued to hugthe ground and wait in baited silence.23

The Federal pickets fell back into thetown, heralding the Confederate threatto the north. Although Foster laterclaimed he had forty minutes to preparefor the Confederate assault, other eyewit-ness testimonies differ, suggesting theFederal commander barely had time toorganize his command. Nonetheless,compared to their opponents, Foster’smen were well trained and disciplined,as well as slightly better armed, and theywent to their work with alacrity. Rush-ing into position along the street northof the blacksmith shop were CompaniesA, C, E, F, and I of the 7th Missouri Vol-unteer Cavalry. Many men in this unitwere equipped with Hall’s breech-load-ing carbines, giving them a slight edge inrate of fire over their muzzle-loading foes.With the exception of the 7th MissouriVolunteers, however, Foster’s force wasarmed almost exclusively with M1854Austrian “Lorenz” rifles, M1841 “Missis-sippi” rifles, and a handful of M1853 Brit-ish “Enfield”-pattern rifles.24

In the center, forming in and aroundthe blacksmith shop, were Companies A,C, and F of Nugent’s Second BattalionMSM Cavalry, supported by Company H,7th MSM Cavalry—the only companypresent from Foster’s personal command.On the far left of the Federal line Com-panies A, B, and E of the 6th MSM Cav-alry speedily assembled in the road, whileCompanies F and H of the 8th MSM Cav-alry formed to their right.

A small force from the 7th Volun-teers, probably no more than a company,occupied some houses on the northernedge of town, rapidly turning the dwell-ings into fortified fighting positions.Whether through lack of time or neglect,or the desire to keep their means of arapid withdrawal close at hand, thecommand’s mounts were left where theyhad been picketed the night before. Tiedto the hedgerow, the horses were pre-

Lieutenant Colonel Sidney Drake Jackman.U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle

Barracks, Pennsylvania.Dr. (Captain) Caleb Winfrey. General Sweeny’s

Civil War Museum, Republic, Missouri.

VOL. 7 • NUMBER 1 • JANUARY 2004 NORTH & SOUTH 63

Left: Private John Berry, Company H, 8th Missouri Militia Cavalry. Berry suffereda broken right shoulder at Lone Jack, probably in one of the deadly assaults on the guns.

Luretta Williams Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks.Right: Henry D. Moore, captain of Company H, 8th MSM Cavalry. At Lone Jack he was shot

twice in the left thigh and once in the right ear. Courtesy Jerry Moore.

for water for several minutes the mandied. Under this “rain of lead” PrivateJoseph Burcham, recruited into Hunter’scommand just six days before, observeda number of men running away. Othersbecame “less anxious to press to thefront” and flung themselves behind whatcover could be found.27

Returning to the battle line, Jackmanwitnessed Captain Levin Lewis fall froma wound to the head. Regaining his com-posure, Lewis, a Methodist minister incivilian life, explored the injury. The bul-let was evidently almost spent when itstruck the captain, for despite the flowof blood Lewis could feel the ball hadsimply embedded itself in his skull. Amidthe din of battle he removed the offend-ing bullet himself, only to be struck againin the hand. Jackman observed the injuryand the self-surgery that followed, andlater joked with Captain Lewis that he“had hoped to convert [Lewis] toCampbellism, but since Yankee bulletscould not penetrate his head, there wasno use in trying….”28

While Hunter’s and Jackman’s mensought protection behind the fence,Tracy’s command negotiated the obstacleand rushed boldly toward the barricadedhouses to their front. They did so, how-ever, without their commander, who

turned to make his way to the rear as theassault on the Federal position began.One of his men recalled, “All of the sud-den Tracy retreated to the rear, makingas many gyrations as a burning worm,saying he was shot.”29

As the assault progressed, the battlewas joined by Hays’ tardy command,which moved to attack from the north-west. For some unexplained reason Haystoo dismounted his force, contrary toCockrell’s orders. In the forefront of thisassault were Captain Winfrey and hismen. Incensed that the Federals had oc-cupied his house and office, Winfreylaunched an immediate charge upon hisown residence. His company was re-pulsed in a brutal hand-to-hand encoun-ter. Undeterred he reformed and attackedagain, driving the Union men out of hishome and into the street beyond. Tracy’smen linked up with Hays’ command andengulfed the buildings in a deadly close-range crossfire.

Heavily outnumbered and takinghorrendous casualties, the Federal rightcollapsed. Abandoning the barricadeddwellings they quickly retreated south-east toward the blacksmith shop, fol-lowed closely by the triumphant Confed-erates. With their flank now turned, theadvanced companies of the 7th Missouri

Volunteers retired from their positionalong the north end of the street, fallingback to the line formed by the Indianabattery and their own Company A.30

From the blacksmith shop MajorFoster watched as a mass of Southernersran across the northern end of the street.Recalling the desperate situation, Fosternoted, “A considerable body of men onfoot, and armed with shotguns, runningand firing as they ran, sought to pass onthe north of our position to our rear.” Tocounter this threat Foster ordered Cap-tain William Long and a portion of hisSecond Battalion MSM Cavalry to moveback behind the hedgerow to his right,and take up a defensive position.

From his supporting position nearthe guns, Captain Brawner witnessed thecannons turn toward the swarm of ad-vancing Confederates. Although underconsiderable fire themselves, the artil-lerymen “opened upon them with ter-rible effect, scattering them in confu-sion.” Recoiling under the bombardmentthe rebels took cover next to the Osageorange hedgerow. Under a withering firefrom Brawner and the two rifled can-nons to their south, the Confederateswere now fired upon by Long’s cleverlyconcealed force.

The devastating crossfire was toomuch for many of the Confederates, whoabandoned their position and took coverin the tall hemp. Others stuck fast to thehedgerow and continued the fight. JohnS. Kritzer of Hays’ command recollectedthat each time they fired their shotgunsand old brindle-stock squirrel rifles,“There was sure to be meat in the pot, inother words, a dead Yankee near the can-non.”31

Meanwhile, the attack on the Fed-eral left had stalled. Hunter’s men huggedthe fence, while the troopers of the 6thMSM fired back from an even more ex-posed position in the street. Soon, how-ever, realizing they could not sustain suchan exposed position, Captain Plumb andthe three companies of the 6th MSMmoved north up the street, seeking theprotection of the dwellings on the eastside of the road.

Plumb’s detachment moved north tofind shelter and Hunter formed his meninto column, intending to attack eastacross the street. But as he prepared tolaunch the assault, he learned that mostof his soldiers had already exhausted theirmeager supply of ammunition. To make

64 NORTH & SOUTH JANUARY 2004 • VOL. 7 • NUMBER 1

matters worse, he received word that aUnion cavalry force was moving throughthe cornfield on his right flank and rea-soned that, “unless immediate steps weretaken, they would capture our horses andammunition, and also be able to chargeme in the right rear.”32

The flaws in the independent natureof the rebel command and the resultingpoor communication were quickly be-coming apparent. Unbeknown to Hun-ter the horsemen moving on his rightwere not Union cavalry but fellow Con-federates. Although it will probably al-ways remain an enigma, it is highly prob-

able that this force was part of Coffee’smissing command, or possibly amounted force led by Captain DavidShanks of Hays’ command. Far fromthreatening Hunter’s position this force,numbering perhaps two hundred men,was attempting to turn the Union leftflank. Plumb’s Union detachment, catch-ing a glimpse of the horsemen as theyemerged from the cornfield, opened fireas it crossed to the east side of the street.Plumb later claimed he “repulsed a largeforce of cavalry, which charged furiouslyupon our left, aiming to rout us at thefirst dash.”33

Plumb’s fusillade may well have dis-comforted the mounted rebels, but agreater shock was quickly to follow. Fos-ter had once again dispatched a smallforce behind cover of the hedgerow, thistime under the command of CaptainElias Slocum of Company H, 7th MSMCavalry. Pulling two companies from thecenter, Slocum worked his way southalong the prickly barrier to a point per-haps a hundred feet south of the Unionleft, where the hedge, turning sharply, raninto the cornfield.

As the rebel horsemen chargedthrough the tall corn south of the hedge,

BRAWNERPLUMB

LONG

BRAWNERPLUMB

FOSTER

8MSMF

7MVCA

CPT LONGCPT SLOCUM

TRACY

HAYS

JACKMANHUNTER

UNKNOWN

StreetStreet

Corn Corn

Tall weedsTall weeds

CornCorn

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Map 2 Lone Jack 5am to 7am Aug 16, 1862

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Two James rifled cannons (Union)

Old frontier-style weather boarded single story house

Outbuildings (i.e., cow sheds, etc.)

Blacksmith shop (Foster’s headquarters); large building, single story

Blackjack oak tree; very tall, visible for miles

Cave Hotel; two story building, frontier-style and weather boarded

Log cabin

Public square

Stables

Dr. Caleb Winfrey’s house and store

Osage orange hedgerow

Openings in hedgerow

Rail fence

Cornfields

Area of tall weeds

Building used as field hospital

To Ammo Wagon

Long’s Counterattack

VOL. 7 • NUMBER 1 • JANUARY 2004 NORTH & SOUTH 65

hoping to outflank the Union position,they smashed headlong into the formi-dable hedgerow. Describing the resultingcarnage, Foster wrote:

Furious cries and fearful maledic-tions, mingled with the sharprattle of Slocum’s rifles, told ofconfusion on the one side anddeadly determination on the otherof that green wall. Here was oneof the deadliest spots on thebloody field of Lone Jack. But thekilling here was all done bySlocum, for so great was the con-fusion among the guerrillas—those behind crowding forwardupon those checked by thehedge—that not a hundred shots,all told, were fired by them. Find-ing this route impracticable theyreturned to the main body of Con-federates massed on our front.34

Hunter, not sure who was on hisright and with his men almost out ofammunition, marched his commandsouthwest in a maneuver designed to pro-tect his flank. Then, changing his mind,he resolved to replenish his ammunitionand headed northwest, the last knowndirection of the ammunition wagon. Bydoing so Hunter abandoned the field

completely, leaving an irate Jackmanwith his right flank completely exposed.

Shortly after Hunter’s departureJackman ordered his own men to retire,partly because of the exposed flank butalso because they too were out of am-munition. Marching west, Jackman’s sol-diers rejoined Hunter and together theymoved north toward the ordnancewagon. A lull descended on the south-ern portion of the field.35

In stark contrast, the fighting to thenorth grew in intensity. The roar ofmusketry and cannon fire rose to a cre-scendo, and pausing only long enoughto regroup, Tracy’s and Hays’ commandsrenewed their assault. The Confederates,led by Hays himself, stormed from thewest side of the street. With theirtrapped comrades from the hedgerowjoining them, the Confederates aimedtheir attack squarely at the two guns ofthe Indiana battery. Desperate for cover,many of the Union men brought uptheir mounts to use as a living breast-work. Seeing this, Hays ordered his mento direct their fire at the animals.Brawner’s company alone lost twenty-six of them in rapid succession. Formany years residents and veterans wouldrecall the piteous screams and groans of

these dying horses as they collapsed inheaps.36

The Hoosier cannoneers workedthe two guns at a feverish pace, discharg-ing blasts of canister as quickly as the cyl-inders could be rammed home. Witheach discharge dozens of iron ballsbelched from the guns, and billowingclouds of white smoke, combining withthe smoke from hundreds of small arms,choked the air and obscured friend andfoe alike.

Just moments after Hays orderedthe charge the surging rebel tide sweptover the artillery pieces. A brief butbloody close-quarter engagement en-sued. One young Confederate jumpedup on a captured gun, yelling “Hurrahfor Jeff Davis!” before falling dead,riddled with bullets. The surviving can-noneers abandoned their guns and ranto the rear, passing the blacksmith shopand squeezing through the break in thehedge beyond, with Brawner’s support-ing cavalry joining the rout. Directly ontheir heels came the screaming rebels,many following the Union men throughthe opening in the hedgerow. As the rebelforce poured around the hedge CaptainLong and his detachment fled south intothe cornfield. Word that the guns had

HUNTER & JACKMAN HUNTER & JACKMAN TRACY

HAYS

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7 7

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Confederate unit

Union company

Confederate attack

Union attack

Confederate march route

Union movement

Confederate retreat

Union retreat

Secondary Confederate attack

Union counterattack

StreetStreet

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orth

Map 3 Lone Jack 7am to 10:30am Aug 16, 1862

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Federal withdrawal1030 a.m.

Hotel on fire, 9 a.m.

By 9 a.m. Foster rolled thetwo guns into the street

66 NORTH & SOUTH JANUARY 2004 • VOL. 7 • NUMBER 1

been captured spread quickly along theUnion line, disheartening the defend-ers.37

Toward the left-center of the street,Company F of the 8th MSM Cavalry wasordered to mount up and ride north to-ward the captured James guns, but as theyneared them the order was counter-manded. Instead the company was di-rected to find a way to enter the corn-field east of the hedgerow and drive theenemy out. The company of Federalsproceeded south, finding another breakin the hedgerow. “We went out sometwenty or thirty rows [into the cornfield,]turned north, then wheeled into line andmade a charge,” stated Corporal WilliamL. Roney. “The enemy was packed inthere as thick as they could lie on theground. They rose up and gave [us] afrightful volley, and wounded quite afew.” Forced back by a hail of gunfire,Company F retreated to its original po-sition and dismounted.

As Captains Brawner and Long triedto rally their shaken men, Major Fostertook steps to remedy the situation. Withno enemy on his left flank he orderedCaptain Plumb to move with two com-panies toward the center to help recap-ture the guns. Taking his own CompanyB, and Company A of the 6th MSM Cav-alry, Plumb united with some rallied sol-diers and rushed toward the capturedguns.38

Amid the dust, smoke, and mangledheaps of dead and dying men and horses,the Unionists struck back. Fighting hand-to-hand the blueclad troopers recapturedtheir cannon and quickly got them backinto action. The shattered Confederateswere once again driven back across thestreet, while an equal number took ref-uge on the east and west side of thehedgerow. Among the bodies littering thestreet was that of Plumb, stopped by arifle ball that shattered his right shoul-der.

Meanwhile Jackman, arriving at theammunition wagon, was astonished tofind hundreds of men simply millingaround. Jackman witnessed Cockrell“urging them, with all his power that wasin him, to return to the battle, but withlittle effect.” While most of Hunter’s andJackman’s men hurriedly filled theirpockets and cartridge pouches with am-munition, the remainder seemed uncon-cerned about future operations. PerhapsFoster’s spirited defense was judged too

great to overcome, or this style of fight-ing deemed too reckless for new recruits,but many in the Confederate force re-fused to return to the fight. The presenceof so many reluctant warriors had a det-rimental impact on those preparing toreturn to battle. These men toldJackman, “Why [should] a few of us goback to be killed, when the whole com-mand is here and refuses to go back?”Nevertheless, gathering up all who wouldfollow, Jackman and Hunter marcheddirectly back toward New Town.39

On his way to the firing line Jackmanspotted Colonel Tracy being carried fromthe field by two men. Jackman, alarmed,inquired about his fellow commander’sinjury. Tracy told him he had beenwounded by an exploding shell while at-

tacking the Federal guns. The rain of ironfragments had, in Tracy’s words, “cut meon the top of the head and some cut mylegs terribly in front and one piece struckme in the fundament, and now the bloodis running down my legs.” After a quickexamination, Jackman could find notrace of the wounds, and in fact couldfind nothing physically wrong with Tracy.“[I] was thoroughly convinced,” statedJackman, “that [Tracy] was mistaken asto what was running down his legs.”40

Now resembling more an armedmob than a military unit, Jackman’s andHunter’s ad hoc command returned tothe fight on the western edge of town. Asthe Confederates climbed the fence andmoved toward the cover of a few scatteredoutbuildings they were once again met

COLE YOUNGERFirst Lieutenant Thomas Coleman

“Cole” Younger served under ColonelUpton Hays at Lone Jack. After the warCole Younger, along with Frank and JesseJames, gained national notoriety as bankand train robbers. On September 7, 1876,the James-Younger gang attempted to roba bank in Northfield, Minnesota, butwere met by a hail of gunfire. Cole andhis brothers, Jim and Bob, were seriouslywounded and later captured and con-victed. Sentenced to life in prison, Colewas helped in his parole efforts by formerLone Jack veteran Major Emory Foster.Surprisingly, the Federal commanderwrote to Judge George M. Bennett ofMinneapolis in the late 1890s in an ef-fort to help secure Cole’s freedom.Foster’s letter contains an interesting ac-count of the battle and sheds light onconditions in Missouri immediately af-ter the war:

During the progress of the fightmy attention was called to a youngConfederate riding in front of theConfederate line, distributing am-munition to the men from whatseemed to be a ‘split basket.’ He rodealong under a most galling fire fromour side the entire length of the Con-federate line, and when he had at lastdisappeared, our boys recognized hisgallantry in ringing cheers. I was toldby some of our men from the west-ern border of the state that they rec-ognized the daring young rider asCole Younger. About 9:30 a.m. I was

shot down. The wounded of bothforces were gathered up and wereplaced in houses. My brother and I,both supposed to be mortallywounded, were in the same bed.About an hour after the Confeder-ates left the field, the ranking officerwho took command when I becameunconscious, gathered his men to-gether and returned to Lexington.

Soon after [their departure] theConfederates returned. The first manwho entered my room was a guerrilla[Quantrill’s band arrived after thefight], followed by a dozen or moremen who seemed to obey him. Hewas personally known to me and hadbeen my enemy from before the war.He said he and his men had just shota lieutenant of a Cass county com-pany whom they found wounded,and that he would shoot me and mybrother. While he was standing overus, threatening us with his drawn pis-tol, the young man I had seen dis-tributing ammunition along in frontof the Confederate line rushed intothe room from the west door andseizing the fellow, thrust him out ofthe room. Several Confederates fol-lowed the young Confederate intothe room, and I heard them call himCole Younger. He (Younger) sent forCol. Cockrell (in command of theConfederate forces) and stated thecase to him. He also called the youngman Cole Younger and directed himto guard the house, which he did.

VOL. 7 • NUMBER 1 • JANUARY 2004 NORTH & SOUTH 67

by a withering fusillade from the Federalspositioned across the street. The attack-ing force quickly took cover and returnedfire. Aiming at shadowy figures made in-distinct by clouds of billowing smoke,some of the shots fired by Hunter’s andJackman’s men missed their mark. Fly-ing wide, these bullets smacked into Hays’and Tracy’s position behind the hedgerowin the rear of the Federals. One of the meninjured by this friendly fire was PrivateHenry C. Luttrell. Severely wounded, hewas dragged away to the rebel field hos-pital, established in a mill just north ofNew Town.41

Working his way among the proneforms behind the hedge, Colonel Haystried to rally his dazed command. Des-perate to instill an aggressive fighting

spirit, he shouted above the roar of battlethat he would show his men something.With a pistol in each hand Hays gave theorder to “Charge, double quick!” at theUnion men in the cornfield. The South-erners rose as one, with even the unarmedmen ready to launch themselves at theirfoes.

From his position in the cornfieldCaptain Long witnessed Hays’ prepara-tions and launched a hasty counterattack.With their backs against the hedge bar-rier the Confederates found themselvesfaced with the threat of the chargingFederals while still taking fire from theirown men across the street. Hays reluc-tantly ordered a swift retreat, and whilemost of the rebels managed to escapethrough the opening in the hedgerow,

some found this avenue blocked by theonrushing cavalrymen.42

Major Harvey Vivian and three of hissubordinates were captured by Long’sonrushing troopers. The officer watchedas the dismounted Union men shot histhree comrades. As they turned on themajor a Union officer intervened, insist-ing Vivian be taken prisoner. Whilemarching their captive toward the black-smith shop a volley erupted from theConfederates across the street, sendingthe Union guards diving to the ground.Instead of taking cover Vivian ran, suf-fering a bullet through the arm in theprocess. Desperation forced him to clawhis way to safety through the thorny bar-rier. “Upon landing on the other side Iwas somewhat of a tattered mess,” re-ported Vivian, “[as] the majority of myclothes had hung in the hedge.” With hisbody torn and bleeding he stumbled to-ward a riderless horse, swung himself intothe saddle, and made good his escape.43

As the fighting continued to rage, astream of wounded Federals found theirway to the Cave Hotel; with the yellowhospital flag clearly visible it appeared asafe sanctuary from the maelstrom en-gulfing the street. Inside Mrs. Cave andher family, along with Dr. Cundiff andhis assistants, gave what aid they couldto the wounded and dying.

Between 7:00 and 9:00 a.m., as theopposing lines consolidated their posi-tions, the battle evolved into a shootingmatch across the sixty-foot-wide street,Hay’s and Tracy’s men holding the westside of the street, the Union men the east.To the right-front of the blacksmith shop,the two rifled cannons continued to blastaway at any viable target, albeit at a slowerrate owing to the number of casualtiesamong the crews. Although the Confed-erates faced a serious disadvantage, hav-ing to fire directly into the rising sun, theynevertheless were now well within shot-gun range of the enemy. With both friendand foe firmly entrenched, Foster likenedthe struggle to “two wrestling athletes[holding] each other in a horrible em-brace.”

As bullets and buckshot filled the airthe Union casualties began to mount.One of Captain Long’s cavalrymen wasstruck in the face by a shotgun blast, thebuckshot tearing away his lower jaw.Dazed, the critically injured soldierstumbled against another comrade, whohad been wounded when a rifle ball broke

My brother had with him about$300, and I had about $700. Thismoney and our revolvers were, withthe knowledge and approval of ColeYounger, placed in safe hands, and…delivered to my mother in Warrens-burg, MO.

Cole Younger was then certainlya high type of manhood, and everyinch a soldier, who risked his ownlife to protect that of wounded anddisabled enemies. I believe he still re-tains those qualities and would provehimself as good a citizen as we haveamong us if set free, and would fightfor the Stars and Stripes as fearlesslyas he did for the Southern flag.

I have never seen him since thebattle of Lone Jack. I know much ofthe conditions and circumstancesunder which the Youngers wereplaced after the war, and knowingthis, I have great sympathy for them.Many men, now prominent anduseful citizens of Missouri, were, likethe Youngers, unable to return totheir homes until some fortunateaccident through [threw] them withmen they had known before the war,who had influence enough to makeeasy their return to peace and use-fulness. If this had occurred to theYoungers, they would have had goodhomes in Missouri.

Source: The Story of Cole Younger—ByHimself (1903).

Thomas Coleman (“Cole”) Younger.Historical Society of Missouri

68 NORTH & SOUTH JANUARY 2004 • VOL. 7 • NUMBER 1

both of his arms. Neither man wanted toleave the fight, so they determined towork in tandem. Unable to load his rifleon his own, the jawless man would holdthe cartridge while his comrade torethrough the paper with his teeth, expos-ing the powder and ball. Onlookerswatched in amazement as the two con-tinued to blast away at the enemy despitetheir horrible wounds. Nearby, Fosterwatched a round tear through the skullof one of Captain Plumb’s men. Althoughmortally wounded the soldier continuedto fumble through the motion of reload-ing his rifle; he died an hour later withthe weapon still locked in his hands. Pri-vate George T. Delozier of Company F,8th MSM, was wounded in succession bya bullet through the right shoulder, onethrough the right side of his neck, andfinally a blast in the face from a shotgun.At his post beside the blacksmith shopPrivate William Hopper, of the SecondBattalion MSM, was hit in the hand andknuckles by two spent rounds. As he bentto recover his fallen rifle a third bulletricocheted off the building and struckhim in the back of the head, driving himface forward into the dirt street.44

Confederate casualties mountedtoo. As cannon and small arms fire sweptthe avenue the rebels managed to worktheir way through the buildings and lotsto the back of the Cave Hotel. Takingdevastating fire from the buildings eastof the street, Jackman’s men broke intosmall squads, each desperately trying tofind cover. The colonel and five otherstook refuge behind a small cabin in backof the Cave Hotel. In seconds, however,a bullet slammed into the temple of aman beside Jackman. A moment later around ripped through the head of a firstsergeant, who fell beside the other vic-tim, whereupon a third bullet shatteredthe skull of Captain Abner Bryant. Cer-tain that the next shot would add an-other body to the rapidly growing pile,Jackman recommended to his survivingcomrades that they change position. Thewords had hardly left his mouth, how-ever, before a fourth shot struck home.Jackman and the remaining man quicklymoved to a new location.

Convinced that the deadly sniper firewas coming from within the Cave Hotel,the Confederates began firing into thetwo-story structure. While this smallarms fire easily penetrated the thin boardwalls it seemed to have little effect, as the

rebels continued to lose men to the con-cealed Federals.

Frustrated, Lieutenant James C.Martin suggested to Jackman that thesnipers could be flushed out if the struc-ture was set ablaze. Jackman approved theplan and ordered his remaining soldiersto prepare to shoot any Federals whoemerged from the hotel. Martin, assistedby Private Lafayette Logan, sprinted to theback of the structure, picking up bits ofpaper and other combustibles along theway. Within minutes the two men hadcrammed the kindling into the weather-board, setting fire to the hotel.45

Busily moving from patient to pa-tient, Dr. Cundiff watched in horror asflames began to consume the back wallof his hospital. Rushing outside, the sur-geon pleaded for assistance. From acrossthe street a small force of Union men re-sponded, hastily flanking the hotel andholding the rebels at bay until Cundiffcould remove his patients. As thewounded were carried across the avenueMrs. Cave and her family exited the build-ing, running as fast as they could througha hail of gunfire and making their wayover the fence to take cover in the tallweeds. Before long, however, Mrs. Cave,while attempting to comfort one of heroffspring, was shot in the chest and mor-tally wounded. She died five weeks laterin the presence of her traumatized chil-dren.46

Within minutes the entire hotel wasengulfed in flames. Miraculously, Cundiffhad managed to get almost all of thewounded out of the building. One man,a Confederate badly wounded in the skir-mish the previous night, was not movedin time and was burned alive in theflames.

From the limited vantage points of-fered by the blacksmith shop, Foster con-tinued to scan the horizon for any signof reinforcements. At 9:15 a.m. he ob-served a force of some two hundred menabout a mile south of town. Believingthem to be Federals, Foster’s soldiers letout a loud cheer. However, after observ-ing the fight for a short while, themounted men turned and rode fromview; to this day their identity is un-known.

The battle continued to rage, and theUnion men around the blacksmith shopbegan to take accurate fire from a smallhouse to their north. In an effort to dis-lodge the sharpshooters Foster ordered

his two James rifles pushed forward intothe street. As Captain Brawner and hiscompany deployed to protect the remain-ing cannoneers, the Union gunners tooksight down the length of their tubes andbegan to fire salvo after salvo into thehouse to the north.47

With projectiles pummeling theirresidence, Mrs. William Phillips, her twochildren, and a sixteen-year-old niecetook shelter in a bedroom, crowding intothe meager protection of an empty ward-robe. Soon one of the Federal shots rippedthrough the house, smashing the bedsteadand showering the wardrobe with debris;the family lost no time in fleeing.48

Shortly after 10:00 a.m. Foster no-ticed that the Confederate fire was slack-

DEATH OFCAPTAIN LONG

Among the civilians who voluntar-ily fought alongside Confederate troopsin the battle was a group of brothers fromPleasant Hill, Missouri, a community ap-proximately a dozen miles southeast ofLone Jack. James Henley, with ten otherboys, raced to the scene of the fight, anx-ious to get a shot at the Yankees. Abrother, Andrew Henley, was also in-volved in the fight as a recent recruit ofVard Cockrell.

Following the battle James Henleywas surveying the carnage when he heardhis name being called by a wounded Fed-eral officer. The man was unrecognizable,with black smears of gunpowder anddried blood obscuring his face, but Jamesknew the voice belonged to Captain Wil-liam Long. Prior to the battle Long hadbeen commander of the Federal garrisonat Pleasant Hill, which was located at theold fairgrounds opposite the Henley fam-ily home. Long had befriended the fam-ily, despite their secessionist leanings.

The brothers decided to take thewounded officer into their own care.When Long said he was too badly hurtto make the trip on horseback, JosephHenley, the boys’ father, rode home andreturned with a wagon.

While all of his three wounds wereserious, the shot that had shattered Cap-tain Long’s leg was most dangerous, andseveral days after the battle his leg wasamputated. By that time Andrew Henley,also wounded in the leg at Lone Jack, hadreturned home. Long, hearing that the

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ening. Convinced that the enemy wasrunning low on ammunition, Foster sur-veyed the area. To his great surprise hewitnessed a man on horseback distrib-uting cartridges among the rebel soldiersdeployed along the west side of the street.As the Union soldiers fired away the mancontinued to dispense the greatly neededammunition, apparently unconcerned bythe Federal bullets hissing around him.With his supply finally exhausted theman rode calmly away, amid the cheersof impressed Federals.

Within a few moments the center ofthe street was once again engulfed in gun-fire. As one wing of the Confederate armypoured deadly shotgun blasts into theFederal position, some of Hunter’s and

Jackman’s soldiers moved stealthily uponthe guns of the Indiana battery. Onceagain the section of James rifles andBrawner’s supporting cavalry came un-der a blistering fire.

Enraged by what he perceived as theneedless slaughter of his men, Lieuten-ant Devlin broke from arrest and ran tohis section, ordering his men to fall backto the safety of the buildings. As the crewsbegan to break, Sergeant Scott, “withblackened face and flaming eyes, andfighting like the devil incarnate,” coun-termanded Devlin’s order. The artillery-men, trying to decide whose order to fol-low, hesitated. At that moment Devlinwas struck down, two bullets tearingthrough his lower abdomen and testicles.

As their officer crumpled to the ground,and with a surging mass of yelping rebelsbearing down on their position, most ofthe Hoosiers abandoned their artillerypieces.49

Emboldened by the sudden cessa-tion of artillery fire the Confederatesstormed into the street. About one hun-dred and fifty Southerners descendedswiftly on Brawner and the few remain-ing men of the artillery crew. A savagehand-to-hand contest followed, therebels capturing the guns and forcing theFederals to flee. As the Confederateswheeled the pieces around, and at-tempted to get them into action, Brawnercalled for reinforcements. In another madsortie, Brawner once again secured theguns, driving the Southerners back to thewest side of the road. In seconds, how-ever, the Confederates again charged,driving Brawner and his exhausted war-riors back to the blacksmith shop.

The bloody contest was by no meansover. Again Union soldiers stormed outof the blacksmith shop and surroundingstructures, with Captain Brawner lead-ing them forward, back toward the guns.Amid the heaps of dead and dying menand horses, the close-quarter strugglecontinued, revolvers, clubbed muskets,and fists all being freely used. Brawner’sforce once again secured the guns as theConfederates retired. Knowing their po-sition was untenable the Union men be-gan to wheel the guns by hand back to-ward the blacksmith shop. Before theycould get far, however, another Confed-erate charge, the largest of the day, sweptforward. In the face-to-face bloodbaththat followed, a wounded Brawner andhis survivors were sent reeling. As Fosterwatched from the blacksmith shop, thevictorious rebels began to pull the cap-tured guns through the maze of prostratebodies back to their side of the street.

Meanwhile, Major Foster called onCaptain Long for immediate support.Long, who had been fighting Hunter’sand Jackman’s men south of the black-smith shop, responded quickly, and de-spite his wounds personally led sixty mento the blacksmith shop. Foster remem-bered, “[Long’s] coat had been thrownaside and his shirt, open at the collar, ex-posed his breast bathed in blood andpowder stained. He had a strange lightin his eye, and his parted lips showed histeeth set sharply together.” Through theroar of small arms fire Foster called out

Captain William A. Long (left), commander of Company A, Second Battalion Missouri State MilitiaCavalry, and unknown comrade. Courtesy Margaret McClellan.

oldest son was recuperating in the nextroom, asked if it was possible to see him.When Andrew hobbled into the roomand over to the bed Long took his friend’shand and shook it heartily.

Captain William Long died soon after,still in the care of the Henley family, andwas buried in the Pleasant Hill cemetery.

Source: Pleasant Hill Times,August 25, 1911

70 NORTH & SOUTH JANUARY 2004 • VOL. 7 • NUMBER 1

The Friends of Historic Lone Jack, whosupport the Lone Jack Battlefield, Soldier’sCemetery & Museum in a variety of ways—including conducting all tours and provid-ing publicity for the museum—are activelytrying purchase and preserve the remainingportion of the battlefield.

To learn how to make a donation to theLone Jack preservation project or to become

a member of the Friends of Historic LoneJack, visit their website: http://www.friendsofhistoriclonejack.org or write to:Friends of Historic Lone Jack, P.O. Box 34,Lone Jack, MO 64070.

Other questions can be directed toAlinda M. Miller, president of the Friendsof Historic Lone Jack, at:[email protected]

Photograph of the subdivision located on the eastern portion of the Lone Jack battlefield.Photograph by Alinda Miller.

to Long, asking if he would help recap-ture the cannons. Long replied in the af-firmative, saying, “I would go with youto hell!” With only an empty pistol in hishand, Long and his sixty men followedMajor Foster and small force into thefirestorm beyond.

Foster’s forlorn hope emerged fromthe blacksmith shop and leapt upon theenemy. Surprised by the savage on-slaught, the stunned Southern men againabandoned their prizes and staggeredback to the east side of the street. Thesurviving Union force began wheelingthe cannons back to the blacksmith shop,past the ever-growing piles of dead. Ashe strained to move one gun Major Fos-ter was struck by a bullet to the back, andhe fell into the dirt street.

Once the guns were back on theUnion side of the street, Melville Fostertraversed the road again, under an intensestorm of gunfire, to return to his brother’sside. As the young captain reached hisbrother and bent down he too was struck.A bullet ripped through his right breast,emerging near his right shoulder blade.Losing blood quickly, the mortallywounded officer managed to retrieve hisbrother and struggle back to the black-smith shop, being hit again in the pro-cess. The final charge had been success-ful; the artillery would remain in Unionhands for the duration of the battle. Ithad been a costly victory. Forty-eight ofLong’s sixty men were killed or woundedwithin a few moments. Among the rowsof dead and dying men littering the streetwas Captain Long himself, having fallenat the head of his command. As MajorFoster lay in a half conscious state on thefloor of the shop the battle continued torage outside. The few remaining cannon-eers, assisted by volunteer cavalrymen,once again manned their guns andopened on the Confederates.50

About 10:30 a.m. the firing againseemed to taper off, then cease. Fromtheir position the Federals caughtglimpses of Confederate troops in smallgroups of twos and threes breaking fromcover and leaving the field. Elated, a spon-taneous cheer went up from the Unionlines—the rebels had begun withdraw-ing to the north. To the Unionists itseemed that their sacrifice and strugglehad been rewarded with victory.

The celebration was short lived,however. The Confederate retreat haltedas the heretofore absent command of

Colonel Coffee, over eight hundredstrong, emerged from the woods northof town and deployed for battle. The ap-pearance of this force, fresh and appar-ently ready to redeem their reputation,electrified their exhausted compatriots.“[These reinforcements] arrived just inthe nick of time, when victory was poisedover the field, uncertain where to perch,”reported Hunter.51

section were dead, their crumpled corpsesstill harnessed to the limbers. Unable todrag the cannon by hand to Lexington,some of Foster’s exhausted survivorsrolled the guns south down the street, pastthe hedgerow, and into the cornfield be-yond.53 Here the artillery pieces werespiked, the tubes dismounted from thecarriages, and the carriages given a super-ficial camouflage of corn stalks.54

With Major Foster grievouslywounded, Captain Brawner took com-mand of the remaining Union forces. Itdid not take him long to evaluate thecombat effectiveness of his dwindlingcommand. His men were exhausted, hav-ing traveled over a hundred miles in theprevious days and fought the skirmishthe night before, and having been heavilyengaged since daybreak. In addition, theywere nearly out of ammunition. With re-inforcements nowhere in sight, CaptainBrawner reluctantly but prudently gavethe order to abandon Lone Jack and re-treat to Lexington.52

This would not be easy, as scores ofhorses had been killed and wounded. Allof the horses belonging to the artillery

Mounting his command, with someno doubt riding double, Brawner led hismen out of the village they had foughtso hard to defend. Nearly every officer inhis command had been killed orwounded, including Brawner himself.Unable to take their wounded with them,the Federals gathered them into a smallstore building near the smoldering ruinsof the Cave Hotel, where they were leftto the mercy of the rebels. Among thesebleeding men were the two Foster broth-ers and Captain Long. The Federal deadwere left where they fell, as there was nottime enough for their burial. The cavalrycolumn wound north from Lone Jack un-molested, reaching the Federal garrisonat Lexington at 7 p.m.

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Captain Brawner expressed confi-dently to his superior that his men hadwon the battle. The price for this “vic-tory,” however, had been high; of theeight hundred men who left Lexingtonthe day before fewer than half returned.Brawner reported forty-three men killed,154 wounded, and seventy-five missing,for a total of 272. This does not fully ex-plain the return of less than four hun-dred of the command. Perhaps the restwere slightly wounded, either taking ref-uge in sympathetic homes along theroute of retreat or returning to their ownhomes to recuperate; or perhaps theywere troopers who straggled or wereforced to march on foot, arriving in Lex-ington later. In any case, Foster’s com-mand suffered a casualty rate of at leastthirty-four percent, and perhaps morethan fifty percent.55

Bolstered by Coffee’s arrival thecombined rebel command once againentered Lone Jack, only to find its bul-let-riddled buildings deserted. As therebel surgeons began ministering to theUnion wounded the soldiers began tocomb the battlefield for much-neededordnance and supplies. The retreatingFederals had left behind hundreds ofrifles, pistols, and carbines. Scatteredthrough the buildings and yards weresets of leather accouterments, canteens,blankets, and pieces of clothing. In ad-dition, scores of saddles and bridles wereremoved from the dead cavalry horsesfor further use. Hunter found the twoartillery pieces where they had been left,guarded only by a small boy and twohorses. The guns were jubilantly claimedas trophies of war.56

The blistering August sun made itimperative that the bodies of the dead beburied quickly. Two parallel trencheswere dug under the shade of the largeblackjack tree, with the bodies of the deadlaid inside, segregated into friend and foe.Colonel Hunter walked along thetrenches, surveying the bodies as theyawaited a covering of earth. Inquiring ofthe officer in charge of the burial detail,Hunter learned that 119 Federals andforty-seven rebels had been brought therefor burial. Undoubtedly more Confeder-ates had been killed, as several sources lista nearly equal number of dead for eachside. Most likely many of the Southerndead were identified and their bodies re-trieved by friends and family for privateburial. Whatever the number of Confed-

erate casualties they were certainly severe,as Colonel Tracy reported after the fightthat the Southern command was “shot allto pieces, crippled, and bleeding.”

Important, too, was the disposal ofthe dead cavalry and artillery horses. Onelocal farmer, Tom Roupe, was ordered todrag some seventy-five to one hundreddead or dying horses off the main streetand deposit their carcasses outside oftown, an effort that took all day.57

As the secessionists completed po-licing up the battlefield their command-ers took stock of the situation. Opera-tionally their campaign had been asuccess. Men had been recruited in ad-equate numbers, enough to field severalfull regiments. Even better, the Federalloss in arms and equipage significantlybenefited the Confederate command.

However, the rebels knew their po-sition was untenable, so preparationswere made to begin their movementsouth. They too would leave the seriouslywounded behind. Those who could notjourney to their own homes to recuper-ate would be left with local citizens orawait the return of the Federal army.

By mid-morning of August 17 theremaining rebels were warned of thepresence of another Federal force. Gen-eral Warren entered Lone Jack that morn-ing, and General Blunt arrived from FortScott the next day, his 2,500 men makingthe trip with remarkable speed. Discov-ering the fate of Foster’s command, andascertaining the Confederate route of re-treat, Blunt set off in pursuit. The Unionpursuit was dogged, but the Confeder-ates made good their escape, soon reach-ing the relative safety of north-central Ar-kansas.

* * *MANY OF THE MAJOR PARTICIPANTS, in-cluding Foster, Hunter, and Jackman,contributed their memories of the battleto a series of newspaper articles publishedin the 1880s. Understandably, the ac-counts were in many respects contradic-tory. Moreover, many of the writers, es-pecially the ex-Confederates, descendedto character assassination. Prompted bythis public squabbling Henry Luttrell,having survived his wound and serveduntil the end of the war, wrote:

Let the honors fall on those whodeserve them. But after the sadstory is all and truly told it re-veals the sorry spectacle of con-

tention for the honor of superi-ority in command among the of-ficers, where unity should haveexisted. Even at this late day wesee that the venom has not allbeen exhausted. No wonder theConfederacy collapsed.58 ■

KIP LINDBERG is archivist of theWeapons of Mass Destruction Collec-tion, U.S. Army Chemical School, Ft.Leonard Wood, Missouri, and the formersite superintendent of the Mine CreekBattlefield State Historic Site.

MATT MATTHEWS is an opposingforces specialist with the Battle Com-mand Training Program at Fort Leaven-worth, Kansas. He is also the formermayor of Ottawa, Kansas.

The authors are currently complet-ing a book on the Baxter Springs, Kan-sas, massacre.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: The authorswould like to thank Alinda Miller, presi-dent of the Friends of Historic Lone Jack,and LTC Frank Gammon for their helpin researching this article.

NOTES1. A teenage Harry S Truman, future U.S.

president, was among those in the audi-ence when veteran and Truman familyfriend Abe Koger corrected Colonel Crisp.This is his recollection of that event. MerleMiller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biographyof Harry S. Truman (Berkley, CA, 1974), p.68; David McCulloch, Truman (New York,1992), p. 63.

2. “Rooster” Cogburn, the fiction charactercreated by author Charles Portis for hisbook True Grit, and portrayed by JohnWayne in the 1969 motion picture of thesame name, claimed he lost his eye as aConfederate participant at the Battle ofLone Jack.

3. Organization and Status of Missouri Troops(Union and Confederate) in Service Dur-ing the Civil War (GPO, Washington, D.C.,1902), pp. 48-54.

4. Richard L. Norton, ed., “Behind EnemyLines”: The Memoirs and Writings of Briga-dier General Sidney Drake Jackman(Springfield, MO, 1997), pp. 72-73, 81.

5. United States War Department, The Warof the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Offi-cial Records of the Union and ConfederateArmies, 128 Vols. (Washington, D. C. 1880-1901), Series I, Volume 13, p. 238 (hereaf-ter cited as O.R.; all citations of O.R. referto Series 1 unless indicated otherwise).

6. George S. Grover, “Major Emory S. Fos-ter,” Missouri Historical Review, Vol. XIV,Nos. 3-4 (April-July, 1920), pp. 425-32.;Liberty Weekly Tribune, April 4, 1862.

72 NORTH & SOUTH JANUARY 2004 • VOL. 7 • NUMBER 1

7. Ordnance Reports, Box 767-768, RG: 94,Stack: 8WC, Row 13, Compartment 16,Shelf B, National Archives, Washington,D.C. Frank J. Gammon of Huntersville,North Carolina, conducted this research,which clearly shows that the two gunsused by Union forces at Lone Jack werebronze M1841 6-pounders with 3.67-inchbores, rifled to the James system. In addi-tion, newspaper articles and veteran ac-counts make numerous mentions of“rifled bronze cannon” and specify Jamesshells.

8. S.K. Hall, Letter to Harris, 12 September1862, from the collection and courtesyGeneral Sweeny’s Museum of Civil WarHistory, Republic, Missouri.

9. O.R., Vol. 13, pp.238, 569, 575.10. O.R., Vol.13, pp. 569, 575.11. O.R., Vol. 13, p. 571.12. Norton, ed., Behind Enemy Lines, 82-84.13. Kit Dalton, Under The Black Flag (Mem-

phis, 1912), p.76; Romulus L. Travis, TheStory of Lone Jack (n.p. 1907).

14. Norton, ed., Behind Enemy Lines, 84.15. O.R., Vol.13, p. 239.16. O.R., Vol.13, pp. 237, 239.17. S.K. Hall, Letter to Harris; O.R., Vol. 13,

p. 239.18. Norton, ed., Behind Enemy Lines, 85; W.L.

Webb, Battles and Biographies of Missou-rians: or the Civil War Period of Our State(Kansas City, 1900), pp.153, 159.

19. Norton, ed., Behind Enemy Lines, 86.20. Ibid., 89-90.21. Ibid., 92.22. Corporal William L. Roney, hand-written

memoirs, scrapbook, compiled by theIndependence, Missouri, chapter, UnitedDaughters of the Confederacy, tran-scribed by The Blue and Gray Chronicle,Independence, Vol. 6, Number 3, Febru-ary, 2003.

23. Norton, ed., Behind Enemy Lines, p. 92;C. B. Lotspeich, Manuscript, Mid-Conti-nent Library, Independence, Missouri;Missouri Republican, September 12, 1885.

24. Ordnance Returns for 7th Missouri Vol-unteer Cavalry, Second Battalion Mis-souri State Militia Cavalry, 7th MissouriState Militia Cavalry, 6th Missouri StateMilitia Cavalry, 8th Missouri State Mili-tia Cavalry, National Archives, Microfilm,Command and General Staff College,Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

25. Missouri Republican, August 1, 1885;Norton, ed., Behind Enemy Lines, 93.

26. Missouri Republican, September 26, 1885.27. O.R., Vol. 13, p.237; Roney memoir;

Lotspeich manuscript; Norton, ed., Be-hind Enemy Lines, 92-93; Leslie Anders,“Fighting the Ghost at Lone Jack,” Mis-souri Historical Review, Volume LXXIX,Number 3 (April, 1985), p. 342.

28. Norton, ed., Behind Enemy Lines, 93.Campbellism was founded by Thomas

Campbell and his son AlexanderCampbell, in the early 19th century. Theorder was known by many names suchas, the Restoration Movement, Disciplesof Christ, and The Christian Church.Many in the church believed that it wasa return to the pure New Testament andteachings.

29. Lebanon Rustic Leader, May 12, 1881.30. Webb, pp. 159, 328-30.31. O.R., Vol. 13, pp. 237, 239; Missouri Re-

publican, August 1, 1885; ConfederateVeteran, April 1916, p. 63.

32. Missouri Republican, September 12,1885.

33. Janet B. Hewett, ed., Supplement to theOfficial Records of the Union and Con-federate Armies, Addendum [Reports],Vol. 13, Serial No. 19 (Wilmington,1996), p. 46.

34. Missouri Republican, August 1, 1885. Fos-ter wrongly believed this to be Quantrill’scommand.

35. Missouri Republican, September 12,1885.

36. W.L. Webb, Battles and Biographies ofMissourians: or the Civil War Period ofOur State (Kansas City, 1900), p.157.

37. Webb, 158.38. O.R., Vol. 13, p. 237; Roney Memoirs;

Supplement to the O.R., Vol.13, Serial No.19, p. 46.

39. Supplement to the O.R., Vol. 13, Serial No.19, p. 46; Norton, ed., Behind EnemyLines, 96.

40. Norton, ed., Behind Enemy Lines, 97. Aprevious example of Tracy’s behaviorcomes from Dr. John W. Armstrong, whofought at Lone Jack. Armstrong claimedthat Tracy ran away from a fight in “Hog-eye,” Missouri, early in the campaign.Lebanon Rustic Leader, May 12, 1881. Itshould be noted, however, that Tracy hadby all accounts performed honorably atthe Battle of Wilson’s Creek, where hewas wounded in action. Henry C. Lut-trell, a Lone Jack veteran, made the fol-lowing statement after reading Jackman’saccount of Lone Jack: “Tracy certainlydid not show any sign of cowardice whileleading his regiment to the charge onthat fated morning; he faced ‘the music’like a little man to my certain knowledgeup to the time of his wound. What hedid afterwards, I, of course don’t know,but I don’t believe he acted the pusillani-mous cur that Jackman describes.” Mis-souri Republican, October 3, 1885.

41. Ibid.42. Webb, 157. Letter from Major Vivian,

Jackson County Historical Society Ar-chives.

43. Article on file at the archives of the Jack-son County Historical Society.

44. Missouri Republican, August 1, 1885;Pension application of William Hooper,

National Archives and Records Admin-istration

45. Norton, ed., Behind Enemy Lines, 99-100;Missouri Republican, September 12,1885.

46. Missouri Republican, September 26,1885; Webb, 159. Jesse M. Cave, “Memo-ries of the Battle of Lone Jack,” Indepen-dence Examiner, August 14, 1937.

47. Missouri Republican, August 1, 1885.48. W.Z. Hickman, History of Jackson

County (Topeka, KS, 1920), p. 283.49. Missouri Republican, August 1, 1885.50. Ibid., Roney Memoirs.51. Missouri Republican, August 1, 1885;

September 12, 1885.52. O.R., Vol.13, pp. 237-38.53. Roney memoirs.54. “Spiked” means the cannon were dam-

aged, probably by driving a rat-tailed fileinto the vent hole to prevent the inser-tion of a friction primer or other igni-tion device. By removing the trunnioncaps and lifting the carriage trail a can-non tube could easily be dismounted.Weighing around eight hundred pounds,it would take several men to remount thetube on the carriage. According to Cap-tain Brawner’s after-action report, “wespiked one of [the guns] and otherwisevery much injured the other, while theammunition belonging to them wasmostly destroyed before we left.”

55. Report of Colonel Dan Huston, Septem-ber 23, 1862, from the collection andcourtesy General Sweeny’s Museum ofCivil War History, Republic, Missouri.

56. Missouri Republican, September 12,1885.

57. Norton, ed., Behind Enemy Lines, 110;Ernest N. Roupe, “Boyhood Memoriesof the Civil War,” from the JacksonCounty Historical Society Archives.

58. Missouri Republican, October 3, 1885.

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