massive transient stability based cascading analysis and
TRANSCRIPT
MassiveTransientStabilityBasedCascadingAnalysisandOn-lineIdentificationofCriticalCascades
PaperNumber:16PESGM2419MariannaVaiman,V&[email protected]
2016IEEEPESGeneralMeeting,Boston,MACFWGPanelSession“CascadingOutages- Dynamics,
Protection,ValidationandData”July20,2016
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Contents:
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1. MassiveTransientStabilityBasedCascadingAnalysis
2. On-LineIdentificationofCriticalCascades
2015CWFGSurveyWhatwouldmakeyoumoresatisfied/Arethereanycomputationsassociatedwithcascadingoutagesyoufeelpresenttoolsfailtoaddress?• Dynamicsimulationofcascadingoutageswhichshouldincludeprotection
systemmodeling• Bettersolutionalgorithms/robusttools• Automated/optimizedmitigationmeasures• Identifyingandclassifyingwidespreadsystemarealimitationversuslocalarea
limitation• Identifyingandquantifyingtheriskofcomplicatedcascadesandlargeblackoutsin
awaythatallowstheseriskstobemonitoredandmitigated• Havingascreeningtool• Wideareavisualizationandanalysistoolsthatcanidentifystressindicatorsearly
andhelpoperatorstakeappropriateactions
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NERCStandardsRelatedtoCascading• PRC-002-2—DisturbanceMonitoringandReportingRequirements• TPL-001-4— TransmissionSystemPlanningPerformanceRequirements• CIP-014-2— PhysicalSecurity• CIP-002-5.1—CyberSecurity—BESCyberSystemCategorization• PRC-023-2—TransmissionRelayLoadability• PRC-024-1—GeneratorFrequencyandVoltageProtectiveRelaySettings• EOP-002-3.1—CapacityandEnergyEmergencies• EOP-003-2—LoadSheddingPlans• TOP-001-2— TransmissionOperations• TOP-004-2— TransmissionOperations• FAC-003-3—TransmissionVegetationManagement• FAC-011-2—SystemOperatingLimitsMethodologyfortheOperationsHorizon• IRO-008-1—ReliabilityCoordinatorOperationalAnalysesandReal-time
Assessments• IRO-010-1a—ReliabilityCoordinatorDataSpecificationandCollection
AnApproachtoTransientStabilityBasedCascadingAnalysis
• ImplementedinPotentialCascadingModes– TransientStability(PCM-TS)application:– Analyzescascadingoutagesfromtransientstabilityperspectivewhile
consideringprotectionsystem– UsedtoaddressNERCTPL-001-4standard
• Addressesthefollowingaspectsofassessmentofcascadingoutages:– Initiatingevents– three-phase&unbalancedfaults,anduser-defined
switchingsequences– Considersgeneratorout-of-stepconditions,overloads,transientvoltage
deviation– Incorporatesprotectionsystemmodeling
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ACascadingEventfromTransientStabilityPerspective
• Aneventisclassifiedasacascadingoutageifatleastoneoftheconditionsismet:– Sharpdropintransientvoltages
inalargepartofthenetwork– Sharpdropinfrequencyfollowed
bysystemseparation– Islandsareformedasaresultof
protectionoperation,withsignificantamountofload/generationwithintheisland
– Disconnectionoflargeamountofgeneration– Disconnectionoflargeamountofload
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Time-DomainSimulationduringCascadingAnalysis
• Eachcascadingeventissimulatedusingtimedomainsimulation:– Associatedtimeconstantsarespecifiedas
theuserinput
• Duringacascadingevent,elementsarebeingtripped.Trippedelementsmaybelines,transformers,loads,andgenerators
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CriticalCascadeCriteria• Time-domainsimulationrunsuntilatleast
oneoftheCriticalCascadecriteriaismet:– Islanding
TotalMWofloadinallcreatedislands,exceptthelargestislandexceedsapre-definedthreshold
– InterfacelimitviolationInterfaceMWflowduringcascadeexceedsinterfacelimit
– MWloadlossTotalMWlossofloadtrippedduringcascadeexceedsapre-definedthreshold
– MWgenerationlossTotalMWlossofgenerationexceedsapre-definedthreshold
– CascadepropagationCascadepropagatesbeyondtheuser-definedcontrolarea(s)
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GeneratorAngleDeviation• Checksthemaximumchangeintherotorangledeviation
• Computesthedifferencebetweenmaximumandminimumgeneratorrotorangles,anddeterminesthemaximumdifference:– Computedduringuser-definedtimeinterval– Unitswithsmallerrealpoweroutputmaybeexcludedfrommonitoring
• Doneforinformationalpurposesonly;thisisnotincludedinCriticalCascadecriteria
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CheckingSteady-StateStability• Aftertime-domaincomputationiscompleted,allelementstrippedasaresultofacascadingchain,aretrippedusingsteady-state(e.g.,loadflow)computation
• Powerflowsolutionisobtained
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CriticalTrippingCriteriaandDelays• Trippingoccursduringacascadingevent
ifatleastoneofthetrippingcriteriaismet:– Linetrippingthreshold– Transformertrippingthreshold– Loadtrippingthreshold– Generatortrippingthresholds
• ElementTrippingandDelays:– TrippingoccursonlyifacriterioncontinuestobemetduringRelayDelay
timeinterval– Inthiscase,theelementwillbetrippedafterRelayDelaytimeinterval
elapsed
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ModelingRelayOperation• Fourtypesofrelaysconsideredduring
theanalysis:– Distancerelays– Overcurrentrelays– Undervoltage relays– Underfequencyrelay
• Itisassumedthattheaboverelaysareinstalledonalllines,transformers,loads,andgenerators
• Relayoperationismodeledusingtheuser-defineddelays
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TypesofCascadingOutcomes• Basedondeterminationandcomparisonofdampingparameters
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Outcome OutcomeType1 Decreasingamplitudeoscillations2 Increasingamplitudeoscillations3 Oscillationswithdecreasing frequency4 Oscillationswithincreasing frequency5 Monotonouslyincreasing frequency6 Monotonouslydecreasing frequency
On-LineCascadingAnalysis• Steady-stateanalysisoffastdevelopingcascadingeventswhen
Operatorhasnotimetoreact• Usesnode-breakermodelofthesystem:
– SCADA-basedState-EstimatorcasesorPMU-basedLinearStateEstimatorCases
• InitiatingEventsarecomplexcontingencies(N-2,stuckbreaker)beyondN-1whichareaddressedinregulardispatch
• ClassifieseveryInitiatingEventasCritical,NearcriticalorAcceptable:– Basedonoperationalreliabilitycriteriaappliedtoconsequencesofpotential
cascade
• ImplementedinROSE/PCMtool
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IdentificationofaCriticalCascade• Purpose:classificationofCascadeasCriticalistheidentificationof
IROLviolationbasedonmeasurableconsequences• ExistenceofaCriticalCascadelongerthan30minutesmeansIROL
violationreportableevent• ConceptofCriticalCascadeisaconsistent,quantifiableand
auditableprocessofIROLviolationanalysis• ConceptofCriticalCascadeisapracticalinstrumenttosatisfy
genericNERCrequirementsofIROLcompliance
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Source:ISONEandV&REnergy
AttributesofaCriticalCascade• CriticalCascadesatisfiesatleastoneofthefollowingcriteria:
– Systemwidevoltagecollapseoccursuponapplyinginitiatingcontingencyorastheresultofcascadingtripping
– IslandingofthesystemandtotalMWofloadinseparatedislandsisgreaterthanpre-definedthreshold
– ActualinterfaceMWflowduringcascadeexceeds“stability”interfacelimitbypre-defined%level
– TotalMWlossofloadexceedspre-definedthreshold– TotalMWlossofgenerationexceedspre-definedthreshold– CascadepropagatesbeyondBalancingAreafootprint
• EachcriterionforaCriticalCascadeisconfigurable:– Enable/Disable– Thresholdvalue
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MetricsofLocalityofVoltageCollapse• Non-convergenceofpowerflowisreportedas“voltageinstability”.
– Majority(>90%)of“voltageinstability”haslocalimpactandaffectsquitelimitedMWofloads
– Typicalpowerflowsolutioncannotdistinguish“local”from“widespread”voltageinstability
• “Locality”ofvoltagecollapseismeasuredbytheminimalMWofloadsheddingnecessarytopreventvoltagecollapse
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Source:SlavaMaslennikov,EugeneLitvinov,ISONE