Sonderdrucke aus der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg

BERND MARTIN Agriculture and food supply in Japan during the Second World War Originalbeitrag erschienen in: Bernd Martin (Hrsg.): Agriculture and food supply in the Second World War. Ostfildern: Scripta Mercaturae Verl., 1985, S. 181 - 205

~~r icu l ture and ~ o o d suppIy in Japan during the Second World War * )

von Bernd Martin

Fot imperial Japan the Second World War began with the illfamed "China incident" in July 1937 and was ended by unconditional surrender o n Septem- ber 2nd, 1945. The development o f agriculture during these eight years can only be understood if one studies the natural geographical factors of this island country, its social structures, and not least the political and historical precon- ditions.

The forced opcning of Japan by the Americans in 1853 was followed b y the Meiji-Restoration (1868) with Its national remvery Programme. This 'revolu-

tion from above' was concentrated on modernizing industry as well as the struc- ture of the government and of the military. The backward-looking intentions underlying this transforrnation were dictated by a small reactionary elite stem-

rning from the ranks of the lowet samurai. This traditional military group fol- lowed dual and, in the last analysis, mutually exclusive airns. In order to equal the kh i t e ' powers, Japan was to d o p t superior western technologies. Yet a t

the same time the Japanese people were to remain isolated from the western world, culturally independent and subservient to the divine Emperor. In the end

Japan's vertically structured society was to be strengthened in o d e r t o preserve

the Imperial systern as well as the privileges of the ruling oligarchy. This out- ward modernization was determined by the idea of preserving the traditional social structure in o d e r to defend the country against the c h a l l e n ~ fro'm the . - - West. However, with rapid industrialization the gulf between the modern tatio- nale of technology and the static norms o f social behaviour in a hicrarchical society widened. Growing social tensions, resulting from t h t artificial and hasty

+) The present article is connected with two previous studies on social and economic conditions in Japan during the last war: Bernd Mutin. Japans Kriegswirtschaft 1941-1945. in: Friedlich Forstmeier und Hans-Erich Volkmann (Eds.), Kriepwirtschaft und Rüstung 1939-1945 (Wsseldorf, 1977), pp. 256-286 and Bemd Martin, Sozider Wandel in Japm und seine Folgen für die Nachkriegszeit, in: Wacraw h g u b o r s k i (Ed.). Zweiter Weltkrieg und Sozider Wandel. Achsenmächte und besetzte Länder (Göttinpn. 1981), pp. 364-384. Adequate references may be found in these articles, so footnotes to this essay are limited to details of exact figures. For western books On wartime Japan. too. See the bibliographicd survey by Bernd Martin, J a p n und der Ktieg in Ostmien. Kommentierender Bericht über das Schrifttum, in: Sondcrheft 8 der Historischen Zeitschrift, München 1980, pp. 79-220. For the problem of Japanese imperidism from 1868 until the period afrer the Second World War See Bernd Martin, The Politics of Expansion of the Japanese Empire: Neoim- perialkm or Pan-Asiatic Mission?, in: Wolfgang Mommsen und Jürgen Osrerhammel (Eds.), Imperialism and After (London, 1985). -. ,- . . . . .

Univei ntuu+ Bibliothek

rnodcrnization, could only be overcorne b y an increasing social imperialisrn, as

was the case aftcr China's defeat by rnodernizcd Japanese miiitary forces in 1895. By further expanding o n thc Asian mainland Japan succcssfully irnitated Western imperialism. There Japanese modern industries could obtain those raw rnaterials they lacked o n the horne islands and, a t the Same time, thcy could build up a tnatket for those pmducts which, due t o the litnited purchasing power o f a traditional village socicty, could no t be sold at hornc. The ptospect of Japan's manifest destiny as the Leader o f the Asian peoples appealed to both the urban rnasses disturbed b y thc technical Progress and t o the paupcrized farrners. After the world economic crisis, which hit the country severely in thc early

1930s 1) nationalist agitation could play o n the fcars and utopian dreains of the - . .

t o propagate ü prograinme o f 'national libcration'.

The village rnicrocosm o f a h i e r a r ~ h i c a l l ~ structurcd and vertically stratified society o f srnall groups served as the niodel for all ncw forrns o f sociaiisation 2) in governrnent circles, in the t o p ranks of thc arrny and in the big industrial firms. The peasantry was therefore regarded as the foundation of Japanese

society and was excluded frorn rnodernization. While patriotic propaganda pro- moted thc farrncrs to the rank o f defenders o f the fatherland and the productive

foundation o f the nation the agricultural population actually had t o endurt

hardships and poverty t o an incornparably ]arger dcgree than farmers in westcrn countries.

Japan's peasants had t o bear the burden o f industrialization. A high tax rate

on land, approximately 18 percent o f thc valuc o f the crop, brought in half of the nation's revenue until the First World War 3l.Afterwards newly introdu-

ccd purchase taxes and the traditional land tax, both to be paid by the lower

classes, togcther accourited for two thirds o f thc statc's revenut 4). With the cxccption o f a short p e r i d o f prosperity in the First World War 5 ) . Japanese

1) kriid Martin, Wirtschaftliche Konzentration und sozinle Konflikte in J a p n , in: Dietrnar Rotherniund (Ed.), Die Peripherie in der Weltwirtschaftskrisc: Afrika. Asien urid Lateiri- amerika 1929-1939 (Paderborn, 1983), pp. 197-224.

2) The Standard work on the structure of Japanese socicty, Chie Nakanc, Japanese Society (Berkeley, 1970); sec also two recent studies in German: Tatsuo Oguro,Die rätsel- hafte Natiun - Mentnlität und Denkweise der Japaner (Stuttgart. 1982) and Takeo Doi, Amae - Freiheit in Geborgenheit. Zur Struktur japanischer Psyche (FrankfurtlM, 1982).

3 ) Three percent of thc assessed value of the land. from 1876 two and a haif percent plus one percent of local tnxes, from 1876 altogcther 3.5 percent. Bruce F. Johnston, "Agticultural Productivity and Economic Development in Japan", in: Journal of Political Economy 1951, pp. 498-513; Takehzu Ogura (Ed.), Agricultural ikvelopment in Modern Japan (Tokyo, 1967), p. 23 and 43 ff.

4) For the tax reforrn of 1940 nnd wartime taxatioti sec Saburo Shiorni, Japan's h n c e and Taxation 1940-1956 (Ncw York, 1957).

5) Ogura, Agriculturnl Develupment, p. 27 ff.; Ann Wnswo, Japanese landlords. The Dccline of a Rural Elite (Berkeley, 1977). p. 87 f.

farm households, which rnade u p half the population, rernaincd on the lowest incorne level despitc the apparcnt wcalth o f thc capitalist classcs and the tradi- tional clitc. Modcrnizcd Imperial Japan stiick t o the rule o f the forrner Toku- gawa fcudal systeni o f squeezing peasants t o such an extent that "thcy could neither live nor die".

On the land, intensive cultivation was impedcd b y natural barriers as well as by thc preriiodern structure o f tenant rclations and property rights in agrarian society. The area o f land cultivated rernaincd the sarnc bctwcen the two great wars 6). Lack o f investnicnts and the low level o f mechanisation werc serious barricrs to an increüse ir i agricultural output . Thc production o f rice, thc basic food o f tlie Japanese, increascd b y only 24 pcrccnt bctween 1900 and the out-

break o f the Pacific War in 1941 7) . In lmpcrial Japan, bccausc o f structural deficits and traditional antirriodern attitudes the agrarian half o f the nation was unable t o fccd thc othcr half, not even at the lowest level o f consumption.

"Too rriany pcople on too little land" - this popular expression characteriscs

the agrarian situation in Japan and reflects t w o basic facts: only 16 <70 o f t h e to- tal area o f Japan is cultivable, and there were t o o rnany pcasant füniilies, about 5.5 rriillion farrn houscholds altogethcr 8) . Climatic conditions favour rice culti- vation, b u t are also suitable for other typcs o f grain and root crops. A ternpc-

rate clitnate in tlic north, o n Hokkaido, is conducive t o pasture, while thc sub- tropical zones o f South-Honshu, Kiushu and Shikoku perrnit the growing o f cit- rus fruits. Since in the mild clirnatic regions winter grain crops can be plantCd after the ricc harvcst, thc harvested area is a quarter to a third larger than the

arable land 9).

Because o f tlie lirnited cultivablc land arable land arriounted to 95 O/o o f thc total area. Cattle breeding and dairy farrning rernained insignificant 10). Evcn the cultivation o f fodder crops and of raw material crops for industrial purposcs did not exceed 17 % of the total yield 11). Above all Japanese agriculture sup-

plied food for thc agrarian population, t h c urban rnarkets being o f secondary irnportance. Intensive rice cultivation had priority. It accounted for 71 % of the production of the six rnajor staplcs and rnade u p only 4 9 1 o f the total harvc- sted area o f all food crops 12). A t thc beginning o f the Pacific War in 1941, a

6) Hruce F. Johnston, Japanese Food Management in World War TI (Stanford, 1953), P. 9.

7) Kbid p. 28. 8) Ibid p. 6. 9 ) lbid p. 10. 10) fiid p. 9 and Tahle Von p. 247. 11) Ibid p. 10. 12) Ibid p. 24.

division o f the cultivated area according t o crops shows the following percen- tages: rice 52 %, wheat 13,s ',T,, vegetables 9,2 %, naked-barley 7,7 %, badey 5,9 %, sweet potatoes 5 , l %, soyabeans 5,l %, potatoes 2,9 %, fruits 2,2 %, oats 2,2 % 13).

By intensifying the cultivation o f rice and by enlarging the area o f the paddy fields it would have been possible t o incrcase the production of Japan's rnost irnportant staple food. However, there were obstacles t o this scherne. Problems o f irrigation and o f field cleanng could not be solved uniier the prevailing tenancy System. Furthermore, intensifying cultivation required farrning in larger units o f landholding and sufficient usc of fertilizer, neither o f which could be achieved because o f existing property rights and because o f the decrease in the

production o f artifical fertilizer during the war.

Legal and Property Rights In 1872 the Meiji reforrns abolished feudal tenure and released the village

cornrnunities frorn the obligation o f paying taxes in kind t o the dairnyo-landlord.

F o r the first t ime Japanese farrners wcre free to move from the native villages and t o grow whatever they wanted in their fields. By these new laws land be- carne salable on the Open rnarket and thereby a n object o f capital investment. But the new owner-farmers had t o pay the sarne heavy taxes, now in cash rather

than in kind. This high rate o f land taxation ruined a lot of farrncrs and in thc later Meiji period feudal dependencies were renewed, now between tenants and

large estate owners. The middle t o large size land-owners, who had already been favoured in thc land review in 1873, succeeded in enlarging their ptoperty at t h e expense of the small ownerfarrners. Due t o lack o f capital rnany o f these srnallholdcrs had t o sell off their land and were forced t o work as tenant farrners.

This shift in ownership was completed about 1910. ßy then the original number o f 7 0 percent o f landowning peasants was reduced t o a share of 3 0 percent 14). This distribution o f landed property remained unchanged throughout thc Pa-

cific War until the forced land reforrn b y the Arnerican occupirrs took place in

1946. in 1941 the ownership o f agricultural property was divided as follows: Out o f

5.5 million peasant-households, 1.7 million (31,2 %) tilled their own soil, 1.2

million (20,7 %) were owners and tenants with a rnajor share in ownership,

1.1 rnillion (20 1) tenants and owners with a rnajor share in tenancy, and the

13) United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), Volume VIII, The Effects of Strategic ßombing on Japan's War Economy (Washington, 1946), Reprint Ncw York, 1976), Table C-198, p. 237. (Altogether 106.4 % plus 17 % of industrial crops = 123 %, i. C. the difference betwecn harvcstcd and cultivated arca.)

14) Waswo, op. cii., p. 12 ff.; E. Herbert Norman, Japan's Emergence AS A Modem State, in: John W . Dower (Ed.), Origins of the Modern Japanese Stak. Selected Writings of E. R. Norman (New York, 1975), pp. 243-273. Thomas R. H. kvens, Farm and Nation in Mo- dem Japan. Agrarim Nationalism, 1870-1940 (Princeton, 1974). p. 32 ff.

rest, 1.5 rriillion (27.7 %), were landless tenants 15). Of thc total acreage 46 % belonged to tenant farrners and 54 % was cultivatcd by owners 16). These pro- portions, of Course, varied considcrably according to repion and type of culti-

vation. Only 46 % of the ricelands, which were the most intensively cultivated regions with the highest yields, were farrned b y landowning farrners, while the less fertile soils in mountainous areas, which werc uscd for othcr crops, were cultivatcd by 62.7 ',?G owner farrncrs 17).

With a total area of 6 rnillion hectares of agricultural land, and about 5.5 rnillion farrn households the fictional average size was about 1.1 hectares (2.7 acrcs) per farriily. in reality, this average size was not achieved until the land reform after the war. In 1941 the real avcragc size of a field plot was 0.06 cho, i. e. approxirnately 6 AI or 720 Square yards 18). The Japanese farmer whether owner or tenant had to cultivate a scattcrcd arca split up in 1 0 o r 2 0 Geld Strips, according to thc size of his farrn. Thc total acreage of a farm whether owned by the proprietor, rcntcd, or in rnixed owncrship, was as follows in 1942: Table 1 19) :

Farm Households b y Area cultivated - (1 cho approximately 1 hectare) Up to 0,49 O/o cho 41 O/o o f all farm households = 2.450.000

0,99 % cho 31 % o f all farm households = 1.830.000 1 -49 ' X ) cho 16 O/n o f all farrn households = 920.000

1,99 O/u cho 6 % o f all farm households = 360.000 2,99 % cho 4 ',?G of all farrn houscholds = 210.000

4,99 % cho 1 % o f all farrn households = 740.000

Over 5.0 % cho 1 % o f all farrn houscholds = 490.000

Therefore 72 O/n o f all Japanesc farrn-households were cultivating an area less than 1 hectarc and even this was brokcn up into scattered fields.

On such srnall cultivable arcas mechanisation was impossible. Altogether only 3.000 rnechanizcd agricultural machines, aniong theni 99 tractors, were available

for use, depending on the petrol supply, during the war. In the intcrwar period the number of irrigation purnps had increased remarkably. But thcsc 300.000 purnps wcrc rnainly used to supply the larger farrns and hardly allcviated the lot

of the srnall Japanese peasants at all. Even draught anirnals for ploughing etc. wcre lacking; statistically spcaking, thcrc was 1 ox pcr 2 112 farm-households20).

15) Keginald Peter 1)orc. Land Reform in Japan (Oxford, 1959), p. 176. 16) Johnston,Japanesc Food Mumagement, p. 18; Ogura, op. cit.. p. 26. 17) Dorc, op. cit., p. 175. 18) lbid p. 26. 19) lbid p. 27; figures rcfer to the post-war census of August 1947, when the number

of farm households had increased to a total of 5.9 Million. 20) Johnston, Japanese Food Management, p. 10 f. and Table XIX on P. 259. Thc number

of tractors is to be foutid in Jcrome B. Cohen. Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis, 1949, Reprint New York, 19731, p. 364.

During t h e Second World War (1943. - 1945), Japancsc agriculture was still therefore in a pre-industrial state. Its production was bascd cntircly on man- power and labour. The pre-modern distribution of landownership whichprevent- cd any form o f modcrnisation was supplemented b y a 'fcudal' tenancy system. . . Thus the social o d e r o f thc village comrnunity and general agrarian poverty rctriained unchangcd until the final collapse of thc old order in 1945.

Tenancy arrangenicnts were made orally and not regulatcd by law 21). Up t o the war with China in 1937 all parliamcntary initiatives t o legalizc tenancy

agrccmcnts were either blockcd b y tlic uppcr house, the tnost loyal pillar of the imperial ordcr o r turned down in the asscmbly b y the powerfiil coalition o f large

estate owners and industrialists. Only 30 O/o o f the tenants had ariy legal agree- ment at all which gave them at least five years o f protcction against foreclosure.

The rents, writtcn o r oral, were fixed a t 60 O/o of the harvest and despite thc Meiji reforms were payable in kind, not in cash 22). The landlord payetl thc Iünd-

t a x t o the state and was o b l i g d t o providc investment capital for improvcmcnts such as irrigation purnps and -Systems. Howcvcr, the tenant had t o provide

labour and fertilizers, as wcll as maintain the farm buildings. The larger number o f lessors wcre small- and mediuni-sized farmers, who manag-

ed t o dcrive a regular source o f income froni the leased land in order to earn

some cxtra money. The averagc 4ze o f leased g o u n d was half a cho (about half a hectare). The numbcr of really large estate holders o t big landowncrs with 50 cho o r more in the land-rep;istcr numbered only 3.000 persons 23).

Even when the 46.000 households which in the census o f 1930 had claimcd t o live off ground rents 24) are includcd the Japanese landed gentry was a very small group, lcss than 1 percent o f thc agrarian population. Howevcr, the poli- tical influence behind the policy of p r e s c ~ n g the traditional village order as

the nucleus o f Japanese society lay with thc big estate owners. Thcy formcd one of the rnost influcntial pressure groups in thc Lower House and always rnanaged

to get elected in Open votcs with the help o f bribcs and otlier tnanipulations. As rnernbers o f the ruling class thcsc few thousand landlords flatly refused to inaugurate social rcforrns in the countryside 25). ~ i i e r e f o r e it is this group which must bc held mainly responsible for the militant agrarian socialism advocated in thc 1930s b y the rniddle tanking ürmy officers, who themselves werc of petty rural origin. The agricultural lob by in parliament, together with its complcmen- tary partncr t h e industrialists, (in 1930 approximatcly 32 percent o f all M P S ) ~ ~ ) ,

21) Dore, op. cit., p. 28 f. 21) Dore, op. cit., p. 35; Johnston, Food Manu~ement, p. 18. 22) Dore, op. cit., p. 28 f. 23) Dore, op. cit., p. 29. 24) Dore, op. cit., p. 21. 25) Waswo, op. cit.. p. 121 f.; Havens. Farm und Nation. p. 114 f. 26) Arthur E. Tiedctnan, Big Business und Politics in Prewar Japan. in: Jarnes W. Morley

seconded the efforts t o continuc thc established social order which had worked so well in both agriculture ;ind industry. As in the Gcrman Keich, so in Japan, the tacit agrcerncnt betweeri the big industrialists and the big estatc holders had incrcased social tensions which finally Icd t o thc abolition o f the parliamentary systerri in Loth countries. T h i ~ process o f deniocratic crosion startcd in Japan in 1932 when parliamcntary governrnent was übolished and cnded u p in a national chauvinistic war o f aggression against China in 1937.

Labour Murket und Agricultural l-lf-oduction

Mobilisation o f manpower for the arrried forces, for the arrnament industry and last but not least for agriculturül production was much slower ;tnd less

cfficicnt in Japan than in othcr belligerent countries. The Japanese armarnent industry whcn conipared with its Arncrican countcrpart looked likc an industrial

dwarf, its output did not evcn rcach 1 0 percent of the Arrierican one 27). Like

the bückward agrarian sector rriodern industries, too , were no t prcparcd for the total organisation of all rcsources requiretl for modern warfare ;tnd thus could only be mobilized on ü vcry rnodcst scale. The existing economic potential was

ncither sufficient for cquipping arrried forccs which would be compürüble in sizc witli those in westcrn countries, nor was agricultural production sufficicnt to supply such ü giant arrny. When in June 1945 Japan had t o defend the homc islands and wanted t o mobilize thc nation for total warfare this could only be donc o n pre-modern Patterns. T h c naining o f a homcguard army with bamboo- spears instead of rifles can be regardcd as a symbol o f the complcte collapse o f tlie rriodern econornic systern. The daily cxodus o f Iiundreds o f thousands of townspeoplc in search of food rnust bc counted as a further proof that rnost o f

t h c urban population lived below the rriinirnuni for existencc during thc last

ycar o f t h e war. t3y fighting the western nations Japan took u p a burden t o o heavy for a country which had undergone only a partial and very superficial modcrnisation. Imperial Japan, therefore, was bankrupt, cven bcfore the country

had t o endure the devastating cffccts o f modern warfare. In view of the I h i t e d industriül and agrarian resources Japanese rnilitary lea-

ders, like their Gertrian countcrparts, Iiad t o rely on the strategy of Blitzkrieg. Japan achieved even greater successcs in thc initial stagc o f the Pacific War than her Gerrnan ülly had achieved in Europe. But the unexpectcd Allied countcr- offensive found Japan's cconomy rnore helpless than that of the German Reich.

The military situation did not cause greütcr shifts eit her o n the labour-market o r in industrial and agticultural production. Only b y concentrating available resources o n special branches o f the armament industry like the shipyards, could

remarküble rcsults bc achieved o u t o f which thc postwar econornic iniraclc ernerg- ed. Rut in general bo th the productivity o f labour and ou tpu t levels decreased

(Ed.), Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan (Pnnccton. 1971). pp. 267-319, hcre p. 281. 27) USSBS Vlll p. 2.

in industry as weil as in agriculture b y the cnd o f 1942, after only onc year o f war against thc Allicd powers.

At the last ccnsus taken before the Pacific War on 1 October 1940 the total horneland population and Japanese soldiers serving abroad togcthcr numbercd 73.1 million 28). Imperial Japan was the only belligerent country

where rnarriage- and birth rates rernained constant thmughout the war. Thus

t h e population had increased b y 3.9 rnillion when thc ncxt ccnsus was taken on 22 February 1944 29). Tt was due t o this phcnomcnon and not the result o f

draft labour that the total number of employed persons, i n c l u d i q rnilitaty pcrsonncl rosc frorn 34.2 t o 37.4 rniUion during these four war ycars 30). In

October 1940 13.8 rnillion werc ernployed in apicul ture, i. e. 42.6 O/u o f thc

econornically active Four years later it was half a rnillion lcss, but

the share was still 42.2 % 31). But dunng the war years fernale labour and old peoplc gained a dominant position in agriculture. Table 2 32):

Distribution o f the Agtarian Labour Force 1 October 1940 6.6 niio niale (47.8 % o f all pcrsons eniployed

in agriculture, 33.5 % o f the eco- nornically active male

7.2 mio fcmalc (52.2 O/n resp. 56.5 %) 22 February 1944 5.7 mio rnalc (41.6 % resp. 30.3 %)

7.7 rnio fernalc (58.4 O/n resp. 59 %) Thus, a t the beginning o f 1944 less than one in three male workers had retain-

e d their eniployment in the agricultural sector, while about t w o thirds o f thc total fcrnale labour force now wotked in agiculture. The burden o f Japancse peasant paddyfield work was born b y rnarricd wornen with children t o bruig up

and grandmothets t o help with the work. The shift in the proportion o f rnen t o women working in agriculture is diie

t o the movernent o f t n d e labour, and also in part o f younger wornen, from the

land t o better paid and easier jobs in industry, and also t o men being recruited for the armed forces. ßetween 1937 and 1944 about t w o rnillion workcrs left t h e land t o live in the cities, about one third o f them young unmarricd wo- nien 33). This niigration of labour from the land t o urban arcas rcachcd its pcak

in 1942, the first year o f the war. The arnazing victories, heralding a new cra

28) Johnston, Food Supply, Table I1 on p. 245. 29) Cohen, op. cit., p. 288; Thomas R. H. Havens. Valley of Darkness. The Japanese

People und World War Two (New York. 1978). p. 134 f. For marriagc and fcrtility ratcs See lrenc B. Tacubcr, 7he IJopu&tion uf Japan (Princcton, 1958).

30) Cohen, op. cit.. p. 288, Johnston. Food Supply, Table I on p. 244. 31 ) Cohcn, op. cit., p. 290 and p. 292. 32) Ibid. 33) Johnston, Food Supply, p. 95.

o f prosperity, causcd the trünsfer o f p r o f c ~ s i o n a l l ~ qualified staff from the

Japancsc cities t o the 'newly conqucrcd tcrritorics, where they took over the local adrninistration and ecoriorri y. The resultant gaps in J apanese Iioinc indu-

stries were filled by younger labourcrs frorn agricultural areas. Until the end of I944 recruitrnent in to thc arrncd forces hardly üffected the

labour mürket a t all, certainly not thc agricultural sector. A t the outbrcak o f thc war with China in 1937, thc Japancsc arrncd forces numbered 634.000. They increased t o 2.4 miilion men before the üttack o n Pearl Harbour. At the time o f thc census in Febmary 1944 they had reached a strength o f 3.7 triillion rnen which was about 10 % o f thc total male population 34). Cornpared with

these figures, in Germany 28 % o f the rnale population had becn called to t h e colours by March 1943 35). With a sitiiilar population strength the Japanese armed forces drafted only half the number o f rccruits called u p for military service in Gerniany. Japanese cornbat losses were only lcss than half a rnillion altogether 361, just about onc fifth of the German losses 37). While German mili- tary authorities tended t o r e ~ r u i t soldicrs frorn the peasant farrriing class ünd often spared skilled workers in Japan it was the othcr way round; although the peasant class rnadc up half the population, it only provided 23 '%of all recruits between the ycars 1937 - 1945. For service in thc rncchanized forces and in the navy the Japanese prcfcrrcd young workers froni industry, w h o provided 4 3 % o f all drafted men. The rcrnaining 34 o f the r e a u i t s wcrc called u p from com- merce, transport and civil adrninistration 38). In Japan i t was uncomrnon to

defer skilled labour or administrative specialists from military service, since bearing arms for the country had the highest ideological priority. However, the

low quota o f agricultural workers can only be explained by their lack o f technical ability. Above all for ideological reasons - the peasantry was regardcd

34) Figures are based on Tacubcr, op. cit., p. 333; they are higher in Cohcn. op. cit., p. 288 and lower in USSBS, V111 p. 167.

35) The strength of the Cern~an armed forces reached its peak in 1943 wich 9.480 Million mcn scrving (Ploetx, Ccschichte der Weltkriege, ed. by ~ndreas Hillgruber and Jost Dülffer, Freiburg, 1982, p. 114).

36) It is impossible to givc an exact figure for combat losses since dl the records were bumt by the responsiblc rninistries just before unconditional surrender took placc. Only thc number of civilian losses has bccn worked outexactly; 299 485 (Cohen, op. cit. , p. 408). Estiniatcs made by American officcrs after interrogations of high-ranking Japanese rnilitary personcl give the figure of 459 000 combat losses, official Japancse postwar statistics however claimed a total of about 2.1 rniiiion dead. Three quarters of the deaths in the arincd forces wcre due to factors othcr than battle, such as disease, rnalnutrition and star- vation (Taeuber. op. cif . , p. 334 f.).

37) Gcrman combat losses until 31 January 1945 (wheri the sbtistics end) rar1 at 1.8 rniilion soldicrs. Combat losses in thc last rrionths of the war aiid the nurnber of soldiers missing in action or dying in captivity account for a further 2.2 million. Total losses of the Cerman arrned forces, thereforc, were about 4 miilion.

38) Cohen, np. cit.. p. 294 f.

as the basis of society - the farrners were not to bleed to death like the industrial classcs. After final victory the size of the industrial sector would anyhow be

reduced and, as in Gemany, the Japanese nation would return to an agricultu- ral Pattern of socicty. In addition the quota of recruits from the peasant class

classified as fit for rnilitary service was lower than that of urban groups, owing

t o the formers' poor standard of health. Thus, labour shortage in agriculture, which is often rnade responsible for the

fall in production, did not in fact exist. Even the drafting of 4.5 rnillion rnen

during the last 1 112 ycars of the war 391, which was more than the number of called-up persons during the previous seven years, had but Iittle effcct on agri- culture. From mid-1944 until surrender the nurnber of townspcople returning

to live on the land in order t o escape from the heavily bombcd cities vastly outnumbered the called-up sons of ~easan t s 40).

Furtherrnore, at the end of 1944 owing to the heavy bombing of citics, the evacuation of industrial plants to the countryside began. Thus seasonal workers for harvesting could easily be supplied, since Japanese factories no longer ran at

full capacity. In addition to this out of the total nurnber of 3 million students and school pupils drafted for public service in 1945, rnore than 1 million were ernployed in food supply 41 ).

In the last years of the war farming became attractive. Therefore the total

number of fatms rose by 5.3 % during the war 42). Jn 1950 there were still 16.1 million persons working in agriculture 43), far rnore people, in total and as

a percentage, than were ernployed in farrning either at the beginning or the cnd

of the war. In agriculture there was no need for foreign workers to be recruited frorn the conquercd Asiatic tcrritones or prisoner of war Camps. Even in indu-

stry only 667.684 Korean workers and about 31.000 Chinese had contracts and rnore than half of thcrn were forccd to d o slave-work in the dangcrous coal

rnines of Hokkaido 441. There was a rnore than sufficient labour force available

in Japan. The problern was how to employ it in the most efficient way in a rctro-

grade industrial production structure, as well as in an equally inefficient agri- culture. The per capita productivity of Japanes industrial workers was much

lower than in Gcrmany or thc United States of America, where factories were

bctter equipped with modern rnachinery. In terrns of agricultural output the comparison with Western countries was even more detrimental to Japan.

39) Taeuber, op. cit., p. 333. 40) Approximately 10 Million pcopie left the cities in thc find stage of the war (Havens,

Volley of Darkness, p. 154 ff.). 41) USSBS V111 p. 105. 42) Ogura, op. cit.. p. 62. 43) Taeuber, op. cit., p. 87. 44) USSBS VIII P. 103 and Cohen. op. cit., p. 325.

Table 3 51): Yield. per Hectare i n Metric Tons

Ycür Kicc Whcat Hark y

1939 3.6 2.2 2.3 1941 2.9 1.7 2.0 1942 3.5 1 .G 1.8 1943 3.4 1.3 1.5 1944 3.3 1.6 1.8

Total Production in Millions o f Me tric Tons

1939 11.5 1.7 0.8 1941 9.2 1.5 0.7 1942 11.1 1.4 0.7 1943 10.5 1.1 0.6 1944 9 -0 1.4 0.8 1945 6.6 0.9 0.5

i n 1945, the year o f thc final militüry and cconorriic collapsc, the situation was aggrüvüted b y an unusually hard winter; the harvest turned o u t t o b e tlie worst since 1909. U p t o the winter of 1944145 the delivery quotas for rice set by the p v c r n m e n t b y and large had bccn fulfilled.

Altogrther the percentage of the rice harvest sold t o governmcnt agcncies rose frorri 52.5 '% in 1944 to 63.7 % in thc last ycar o f the war 52) . Wich X

of 74 million in 1941, the statistical avcrage per day was 336 grarn- mcs o f rice Per capita; b y 1945 with a population o f 77 rnillion tlie ration was

only 234 grammes per head pcr day. As the peasants wcrc allowed to keep 450 grammes per cupita 53) for their fütnilies the domcstic production o f ricc to-

würds the cnd o f the war was totally insufficient t o guarantcc an adcquate ra-

tion for thc urban rriasses and the expanding arrried forces. In order t o sustain the supply of basic staple foods in the years o f normal

harvcsts bcfore the war up t o 20 % o f the rice consuriied in Japan had hücl to

be irnported. Sugar was 95 % dependent o n iniports, soyabcüns 50 O/o 54). Thc requued comrnoditics wcrc niostly iniported from thc Japanese colonics, For-

niosü (sugar), Korea (ricc), and frorri the puppet-statc Manchukuo (soyübeans) and, o f Course, extorted froni the native population at further cost t o their low standard o f living. Recause o f bad harvests in-Korea from 1940 onwürds

Japan started t o import rice from South-East Asia. About two ycars lüter tlie Japanese, üs the occupying power, were üble to exploit and plunder the ricc

51) USSBS V111, Appendix Tahle C-199, p. 238 and Cohrn. up. cii., p. 368. 52) Johnston, Japanese Fuod Management, p. 21 0. 53) Ibid p. 192. 54) Ibid p. 45 f.; Cohen, op. cit.. p. 368.

stocks of this region and to ship luge quantities to their homeland. By 1943, about three quarters of the rice irnports originatcd frorn South-East-Asia. But the following year, whcn Anierican subrriarines took cornrnand of the seas, the import figure went down drarnatically to a niere 9.4 % 55). The redirection of rice irnports to Korea and Forrnosa in 1943 could not balance the drop in total rice irnports, which dccreased frorn 2.6 rnillion tons in 1942 to 1.2 rnillion tons in 1944 56).

As the American navy controlled the coastal waters of Japan, only 268.000 tons of rice from Formosa and Korea 57) reached the starving home islands b y

sca from November 1944 to September 1945, although food imports had abso- lute priority. The collapse of the inland supply system of the cities WS not averted by this meagre supply.

Even before the war Japan had provcd unable to supply itself with basic foodstuffs and during the war the goal of self-sufficiency was never reached

dcspitc govcrnrncnt encouragement o f agriculture. The supply gap h x l to be filled with irnports froni the colonies and after 1941 with rcquisitions frorn the conqucred territories. Anierican cornrnand of the seas, and the insufficiency o f

Japanese merchant shipping together prevented an adequate supply frorn reach-

ing the Japanese frorn 1943 onwards. The catastrophic food supply situation in 1944 was not only due to war ernergencies but also to struc- tural weaknesses and incfficiencics in Japanese doniestic production, both of which wcrc thc rcsults of a pre-modern agrarian ideology stubbornly upheld b y the rulinR oligarchy.

Supply uf the 130pulation - - -

Dorncstic agricultural output and the import of foodstuffs together sufficed to rnaintain a minimal Standard of living in pre-war times. The average per cupita food supply bctwccn 1911 and 1931 was about 2.200 calories per day 58). This figure is a little bclow the average numbcr of calories required for light work (2.300 calories). Heavy work likc t i lhg thc soil rcquircs 4.000 calories; in a

rcsting positioti the notrnal metabolic rate for an adult Person is about 1.600 - 1.700 calories.

The low food consurription in Japan, whcrc thc diet consisted 6 0 '8, of ricc 59). irriplies that a considerablc pcrccntage of tlic population was aLeady living be- low the minimurn subsistence level before the war in the Pacific beRan. Under- - nourishrnerit and rnalnutrition wcre widespread among the poorest classes in the cities and, o f Course, aniong thc pauperized srnall farrners and tcnants. Be-

55) USSBS VIII, p. 195. 56) Cohcn, op. ci t . , p. 369 5 7 ) lbid. 58) Johnston, Japanese Food Management, p. 7 2 . 59) Ibid P. 24.

causc o f hcavy taxation or high rents a lot of small farmcrs would pawn their

crop in advance and would then havc nothing t o live On. To eat p a s s and root vcgetables was quite cornmon in pre-war Japancse villages 60). The tnisery on the land reached its during the 1929 - 1931 world economic crisis, when only every third farm household recorded a small ~ r o f i t and when the averagc annual deb t per household was 77 yen 61). This caused the peasant families t o sell their daughtcrs cithcr t o industry on a contract basis o r t o thc brothels o f the tnilitary o r the red light districts o f the towns. Tt h ~ q been calculated that at the beginning of thc ninctcen-thirtics practically one in tcn of the young women was working in such plrices o f entcrtainment. Prostitution in prc-war Japan had bccome a new form of feudal tenure among the starving classes of srnall peasants 62). Infant mortality was high and tubcrculosis as a result of mal- nutrition, far more widespread than in Westcrn countrics 63). Thus in thc casc of a protracted war the food supply o f thc population would becomc a priority factor, if not a decisive one, for the outcome o f the war.

Contrary t o the situation in Germany Japanese authonrics had not concerned . .

themselves with the organisation o f food stocks 64), although industrial raw materials had been stock-piled before the war bcgan . The cabinet planning- board, a kind o f suprerne coordination agcncy for rcarmamcnt, did not consi-

der the basic needs of the lnstcad thcy had confidence in the loyalty

and selfdenial of the Japanese population whose deep devotion towards the god- like Emperor would certainly sec them throuRh the darkest hours. After the

"National General Mobilisation Law" of 1 April 1938 651, complete control of thc country's economy was transferred t o the governtiient in ordcr to increasc - armament production for a Iong war in China and t o provide for a probablc conflict with the Westcrn powers. However, the speeding u p of armament pm- duction, forced mergers o f industrial firrris, and high inflation rates negatively affected the supply o f civilian consumer goods. Uctail prices began t o rise, real income stagnated 66), and many goods entirely disappearcd from the shel-

ves o f the Stores. Speaking in Rcneral terms Japan's overstrained industry was ruined, as had bcen the c a x with agriculture after the First World War, beforc American embargo measures entirely cu t o f f the supply o f urgently needed raw materials in mid-1941.

60) FOT the everyday life of farmets and agrarian poverty see Misiko Hane, Pemmts, Rebe& and Outcasts, 7'he ünderside of Modem Japan (New York, 1982), esp. pp. 102 ff.

61) Havens, Valley of Darkness, p. 136 f f . 62) Hane, op. cit., pp. 206-225 (Stuvation and prostitution). 63) Johnston, Japanese Food Mmiagement, p: 91. p: 163. 64) USSBS VIII, Appendix Table C-202, p. 238. The food stock of rice in 1941 (1.1

Million tons) was only 10 percent of the annuai dornestic harvest. 65) Cohen, op. ci t . , p. 11. 66) USSBS VIII, Appendix Tables on pp. 226-228.

Kationing startcd as early üs 1940. Sugar, flour, charcoal and matches were supplied only in fixed quotas; wool and co t ton textiles were replaced by sub- stitute fibres 67). Thc govcrnrncnt started to control staple food comrnoditics in 1939 when the "Rice Distribution Control Law" was passed and the state- owned "Japancse Rice Corporütion" was sct up 68). Rice was rationed in the country's six triajor citics froni April 1941 onward 69). Whcn the war b m k e o u t in Europe wholes;~le prices for consurner goods, especially for staplc foods, rose alaririingly, so that the Japanese government ordcrcd a general price s top for rice on 19 Septeiribcr 1939 70). But neither the state distribution systcm for ricc no t price control functioncd pmperly. Big-business and the traditional agrarian lobby, both of which thc govcrnmcnt entirely depended o n , wcrc too

intetested in rriaking a o u t o f the war t o bc conccrned with the well-

bcing o f thc inajority o f the population.

Thc "Japanese Rice Corporation" founded as a monopoly organisation f o t

buying and selling could d o nothing b u t control the distribution of rice irnports. ~ f f i c i a l l y , ricc-cxchan~es wete closed down and individual transactions made illegal, biit those prcviously engaged in the rice business now worked in the semi- public organisation and found it easy t o continue their business as usual. Thc

corriplicated system of governmcnt purchasing agencies and a similar state-con- trolled rctail system never succeeded in c o n t r o l l i n ~ the small rice dcalers and thetefore was already proving itself ineffcctivc during the first nionths o f thc war. Finally, on the 1 July 1942 thc "Central Foodstuffs Management Corpora-

tion" was founded and placed under thc dircct contml o f the Ministry of Agri- cultute and Forestry. With the help o f this organisation the state was üble t o

control the buyinR and selling of staple food cornrnodities and successfully dis- placcd o f the deülers and their profits 71).

As early as October 1940 farmers were obliged by law t o sell all o f their rice crop t o statc controlled agnc ies 72) cxccpt the ainount needcd for thcir own consuniption. Betwccn 1939 to 1942, a morc sophisticated system of quotas

for dclivcry and distribution t o thc cities was worked o u t and finally centrali- zed under statc control 73). Ftoni thcn onwards. the Ministry o f Agriculture and Forestry laid down approximate yuotüs o f staple food required frorn thc

Prcfcctures. Afterwards thc administration of thc Prefectures decidcd o n thc final quotas, which were thcn subdivided at the regional lcvcl of the village corn-

67) Cohen, op. cit., p. 362. (Petrol had been rationed since March 1938, Havens, Valley of Uarkness, p. 16.)

68) Johnstori, Japanese Food Management. P. 187. 69) Cohen, op. cit. , p. 375. 70) Johnston, Japanese 1:ood Management, p. 171. 71) lbid p. 181. 72) Ibid p. 191 and p. 200. 73) Ibid p. 19l:"Food Managfment Law" February 21, 1942.

munities (buraku). At the village level the "Agricultural Association" then de-

cided how t o allocate thc delivery quotas for each individual fartning household. These local societies had been founded by the state t o effect a partial rnodcrni-

zation o f Japanese agrjculture, and during the wartirne years becarne the organis-

ing committees for harvesting, con trol of manpower and allocation o f machi- nery and draught anirnals. However, the purch;ise o f the harvests was left to the "Agricultural Cooperative Society", which was a privately owned producers'

cornpany o f the viilagc cornmunity. It ensured that delivery quotas and any

excess amounts were purchascd by the branches o f the "Central Foodstuffs

Management Corporation". Farmers were free t o join these two administrative

bodies, which, however, caused a lot o f confusion and had bad effects on the

agricultural output. In March 1943, thcrefore, both organisations were atnalga-

mated into one, known as the s t a t c~on t ro l l ed " ~ ~ r i c u l t u r ü l Cooperativc Asso- ciation 74)". When the Ministry o f Agriculture and Porestry took coniniand of

the civilian industrial sector in November 1943 for the first time in the war an effectivc central authority now bccanie rcsponsiblc for thc supply of food as

wcll as o f other civilian commoditics. But these belated efforts to h p r o v c the adrninistration could not stop the increasing difficulties o f supply whicl~, in the

second year o f the war against the west, were felt everywhere. Just as delivering the quotas was a collectivc effort o f the village corntriunity

and thereforc in accordance wit h thc traditional Japanese social structure, so was the distribution o f food rations. This proccdure was not bascd on the indi- vidual bu t rather on family needs, Families wcre orKanised into neighbourhood cornrnunities 75). As a wartime measure, the Ministry o f lnterior ordered these traditionally structured communities t o be re-erected in September 1940 in the cities below thc level o f the modern administrative network. About tcn to

twenty households formed a neighbourhood association, a kind o f large family

group, and 20 to 30 o f these units madc up thc superior comrnunity council. Both organisations elccted representatives who had t o bc confirmed in office

by the Ministry o f Interior. The neighbourhood associations were held respon-

sible for all wartirne social security matters, such as fireservicc, crime preven- tion, political education and information, all matters which the Japanese per-

manent civil Service h d provcd unable t o deal with.

When in February 1942 rationing o f staple foods and o f private comrnoditcs

was introduced throughout thc country 761, this was carried out in the cities

on the basis of the neighbourhood associations, while in the countryside the traditional village community (baruku) becatne responsible for the distribution

of goods. This revival o f traditional collective norms of behaviour ~ t r e n ~ t h e n e d

74) Ibid p. 180 f. 75) Havens, Vallty of Darkness. p. 37 ff. and 76 ff. See the contribution by Erich Pauer

in this volume pp. 219-241. 76) See note 73.

the coinmunity spirit aniongst the population and tied die individual bo th in his poiitical thought and Standards o f personal conduct t o the group. Thus in- dividual profitccring as well as the abusc o f food ration cards werc prevented.

Two or three tirnes a rnonth staple food was distributcd t o the neighbourhood association whose warden passed it on t o the individual househoids and saw

t o it that tempotary hardships wcre dealt with b y extra rations. This flexiblc systern psychologicaiiy fulfdled the Japanese citizens' dcsire for collective har-

mony, while o n thc cconomic side the parasitic srnall dcalers were swept away. This cottibination o f group fccling wi th self-responsibility in ncighbourhood

areas lightened all kinds of wartirnc burdens and enorrnously hclped people

t o bear the hardships o f rncagre rations. The normal ration for a male adult (age tange 1 1 t o 60 years) doing p n e r a l work was 330 gr o f ricc pcr day, which liad a caloric value of 1158. This sliare increased t o 5 7 0 gr (2001 calories) pcr

day for people engaged in heavy work. Women however, doing the sarne hard work, only receivcd 420 gr (1474 calories) a day 77). These rationing quotas for thc civilian were, a t least o n Paper, maintained throughout thc Pacific War. Aftcr 1944, however, rations could only be kept u p by providing

substitiites for rice and by thc surrinier of 1945 the system collapsed altogether. Members o f the armed forces were better off: soldiers received 600 gr of ricc and 187 gr of whcat flour claily, more than twicc thc civilian ration, searnen got

a bit less, 5 4 0 gr rice and 1 8 7 gr wheat-flour daily 78). The discrirnination against the working woman and the preferenccs given t o soldiers, even t o thosc on gar- rison duties in the horneland, rnirrors the traditional classification of the social Strata. Japanese wornen were rcgardcd as cheap and temporary labour while

the soldiers were the pillar o f the imperial Systcm. Bccausc the rneagre rations fo t industrial workers further decreased the already

low productivity, from 1 9 4 3 onwards extra rations wcrc delivered to plants where the rnanagernent looked after the distribution. Thus the highest ration

for heavy workers rose t o 730 gr, and f o r wotnen doing the sarne work 560 gr

o f rice per day 79). Since the Japanesc navy had requisitioned nearly all thc rnotor-driven fishing boats the supply «f marine products, which made u p 7 5 O/o o f the total protein, went down t o half o f thc pre-war aniount $ 0 ) . Many fac- tories thercfore bypasscd thc insufficient rationing systern and strirted buying

their supplics dircct frorn the or alternatively resortcd t o the black market. It was no t until May 1945, with full niobilisation o f the horne countries for the final strugglc that the injustices in the rationing scherne were ironed ou t 8'). The military ration had bccn rcduced cven bcfore, despite an increase

77) Cohen, op. cit., p. 375; Johnston, Japanese Food Management. P. 201. 78) Cohen, op. cit., p. 380. 79) Johnston, Japanese Food Management, p. 203. 80) Ibid p. 84 and 127 ff. 81) Cohen, op. cit., p. 376.

in the nurnber o f rncn under arms. A fair ration systcrn was then introduced, irrespective of profession o r sex, but only on papcr. The drastic reduction o f

domestic food production as well as thc cessation of overseas imports as a result o f action by the US-navy rcduced per capita supplics t o a level far below the niinirnurn sustenance level. The supply of food and consumer goods was so ciisastrous fo r thc b y February 1945 that Prince Konoye, the formet Prime Minister w h o had instigated the war against China, submitted a peace niemorandurn t o the throne, in order t o warn His Majesty of the danger o f a

cornrnunist revolution if the situation did not improve 82). Bccausc real wages of the workcrs rosc more rapidly during thc Pacific War

t h m prices 83) and becausc consumer goods became scarce, there was an cxcess

o f purchasing powcr that could be absorbed only by the black tnarket. Of all the major powcrs in thc war Japan's rationing systcm was the most ineffcctive and h e r black niarkct thc rnost flourishing; thanks to thc latter the population was a t least able t o survive. Table 4 84) :

Developrnent of Prices on the Black Market

Official Pricc Black Market Prices Dec 1 9 4 3 Nov 1944 J uly 1945

Rice 1 Sho (1 112 kg) 0,5 Yen 3.0 Yen 22,O Yen 35,O Ycn Soyabcans 1 Sho 0,4 Ycn 3,O Yen 7,O Yen 12,O Ycn

Sweet Potatoes 1 Kan (3,75 kg) 0,4 Yen 4,O Yen 8,O Yen 9,O Yen

Reer (Rottie) 0,9 Yen 2,O Yen 9,5 Yen 15,O Yen Sugar 1 Kan 2,2 Yen 50,O Yen 220,O Yen 520,O Yen Box of Matches 0,4 Yen 1,O Ycn 30,O Yen 80,O Yen

The Jzp;rnese market for consumcr goods collapsed in 1944 and thc supply of food, which h d been rnorc o r less adequate until the end o f 1943, collapsed completely a t the beginning of 1945. Cotnpared with the other belligcrent nations

the Japanese population had t o suffer thc greatest reduction in privatc consurnp- tion and had t o endure the worst shortages in food supply. The decline was more than 30 '% frorn 1940 to 1944 in Japan, in G r m a n y it was only 24 a/o. whereas in the USA consumption increascd b y 1 6 O/u within the saiiie period 85).

82) Karl H. Peter (Ed.), Hriefe zur Weltgeschichte (Stuttgart. 1961). pp. 469.474 (Icttcr from Konoye to the Emperor. February 14.1945.).

83) The Index of workers' real wages (July 1937 = 100) was at an average level of about 200 in 1943 with miners even higher, the average retail price level was abuut 168. (USSBS VIII, p. 106 and p. 224.).

84) Cohen, op. cit. , p. 363; slightly different figures: USSRS VIII, p. 225. 85) Cohen, op. ci t . . p. 354 and p. 416.

Manchuria and North-China, whereas at home a prospcring agriculture would . -

guarantee a decent living for thc rcrnaining fartners. In reality, however, the reforms initiated by the state destroycd the patriar-

chical order in the countryside and pavcd the way for the developrncnt o f a modern industrial society, But as a consequence o f wartimeindoctrination tra- ditional norms o f social behaviour prevailcd in post-war Japan. On 1 April 1938 the Japanese parliament, b y voting for the Mobilisation Laws handed over all

legislative rights t o the govcrnment. From then on parliarnent could no longcr

block reforms which thc statc rcgarded as essential for thc Progress o f the war cconomy. As the cost o f artificial fertilizers made for thc highest percentagc (45,7 '%) o f thc farrners' budget 87), thc govcrnrnent ordcred che dissolution o f t h e relevant cartel and in 1938 fixed prices 88)which remained constant through-

o u t the war. Howcver, as arniaments had the first priority and nitrogenl production wasrequired for explosives, the proportion allocated t o

the manufacture of fertilizcrs h d t o be reduced steadily frorn 1937 onward. Thus in 1944 only one-sixth o f thc prcivar ou tpu t o f artificial fertilizcr was avaiiable t o agriculture 89). The first protcctive law for agriculture could not bc effectivc bccause military dernands had absolute priority ovcr civilian needs.

Howcver, reforms in t h e health service proved very cffcctive and helped in opening the way t o a modern welfare statc. Thc Ministry of Welfare, founded i n 1938 90), immediately inaugurated a " ~ e a l t h lnsurancc Law" that was pri- marily concerncd with thc sanitary and health conditions o f the agrarian popu- lation. With the foundation o f local health insurance offices in towns and villa- ges, the erection o f public hcalth ccntres and not lcast a more extensive training

Programme for doctors, health conditions improved reinarkably during the war. In 1939 sailors and white-collar workcrs wcre includcd in the systetn; the rest o f

the popuiation had t o enter the compulsory health insurancc scrvicc 3 years later in 1942. In the last year o f the war 41 million Japancsc wcrc insurcd against illness and accident and registered a t altogether 10.500 local Hcalth-

Insurance offices 91). The old patriarchal obligation of big-landowncrs and big- industrialists t o care for thcir ernployees had t o give way t o a rnodern systeni

of employer and ernployec bo th cqually protected b y social security. The foundations of all the ;igricultural reforms were laid in 1938 with the

"Agricultural Land Adjustrncnt Act". The main aim o f the law was t o provide

a lcgal status for tcnancy. Frorn thcn On the tenant'farnier, even if he h d n o written contract, had a right t o keep tlie leased land. He could only be expelled by the landowner if the latter claimed that he intended t o cultivate thc land

87) Johnston, Japanese Food Management, p. 1 5 . 88) Ogura, op. cit.. p. 226 ff. 89) Cohen, op. cit. , 366; USSHS Vll l p. 146. 90) Havens. Valley ofDarkness, p. 47 ( 1 . July 1938). 91) Ibid.

himsclf. Cornpulsory arbitration o f tcnancy disputcs diminishcd the nurnbcr o f conflicts, which reached their pe& with 6.800 court cases in 1936, t o half that fgure 92). During the Pacific War these cases dwindled t o an insignificant num- ber 93). Furtherrnore, this Agricultural Act ensured that local villagc organisa- tions took care o f land left b y the tenants who were called up for rnilitary ser- vice o r migrated t o the industrial centres, rather than allowing the landlords t o have jurisdiction over this land. In ordcr t o stabilize t h e economic situation in the countryside a new structural plan for land ownership was set up. With the help o f a governrrient fund o f 1 million yen tenants could now purchase land frotri the owner in instalments spread over 25 years. Thc pknned changc in ownership o f 410.000 hectares of land marked thc bcginnings o f a radical shift

iti agrarian property rights. When war broke out in Europe 1939 world agricultural prices soared m d

prices in Japan followed suit, with the result that thc govcrnrncnt irnposcd a price-stop on rice 94) which rcduccd thc profit-margins o f the landlords still further. In ßecembcr 1939 thc "Farm Kcnt Control ordinance 95)" froze land

rents at the level of Scptcrnbcr 1939 and left it t o the lncal authorities to fix ncw maxirnum limits for rents. It now became a rule t o lower the rent t o 40 % o f the Iiarvest value, rather than t o 60 % as had bcforc becn customary. When land pnces for rice pacldyfielcls still went u p and reached a pcak in 1941 thc

government intervened and Set fmed price ratcs 96). At the samc time an ordi- nance forbade the use of cultivatcd land for othcr purposes than tiliing 97)

in order to prevent speculative transactions with the scarce land urgently needed for the supply of the population.

The start o f thc war with the USA in 1941 necessitated further government intervention. T o limit the rnigration o f farmers t o industry and t o forestall the danger o f land being wastcd, the "Agricultural Production Control 0rdinance98)" o f 21 Decernber 1941 laid down that 40 % o f the total population should re-

main in the countrysidc. Only with the permission o f the local "Agricultural Association" was it a t all possible for those peasant farmers who cultivatcd

less than 0,3 hcctares t o leave the vi l lav corntnunity. The aim o f this rcgula- tion was also t o protect the owner farmers and ,to liberate seasonal land-workers for industrial work. Even so, n o matter how many regulations and decrees were issucd, migration to the towns continued.

92) Johnston, Japanese Food Management. p. 12 1 . 93) Ibid p. 121; Dore, op . dt., p. 72: Saburo Ienaga. Japan's Lact War. World WarIIand

the Japmiese, 1931-1945 (Oxford. 1978). p. 209. 94) See above footnote 70. 95) Oguri, op . cit., p. 139. 96) Dore, op . cit., p. 112. 97) Johnston, Japanese Food Management, p. 120. 98) Ibid P. 95 f.

From 1938 onwards, the government's agrarian policy foiiowed the guideline that it should Support a rniddleclass of peasant-farmers at the expense of the landlords or estate owners. This trend was accclcrated when the system of dual- pricing for rice was established in 1941. Thc actual cultivator of thc land was to be stimulated to higher production by the payment of statc-prcmiums, while at the samc time the big-landowncrs wcre t o be encouraged to hand over their land to thc tcnant farmers. Table 6 99): Farm Prices o f Kice (Yen per koku)

Tenant-farmer's Bonus on Rice paid in Rent to

Landlord the Landlord Owner-Cultivator

1941 44 Yen + 5 Yen 49 Yen total 1942 44 Ycn + 5Yen 49 Yen 1943 47 Yen + 15.50 Yen 62,50 Yen 1944 47 Yen + 15,50 Yen 62,50 Yen 1945 (Planned) 55 Yen + 37,50 Yen 92,50 Ycn 1945 (Actual) 55 Yen + 245,OO Yen 300,OO Yen

Thc systcm of state subsidies for cultivator-producers was further irnpmved in 1944, t o aUow a special bonus of 55 yen per koku t o bc paid for thc last 10 % of the dclivcry quotas and for excess production an additional premium of 175 yen per koku. In 1944 whcn the estate owner had to seii his rice to the state for 47 yen per koku the tenant received a prernium o f 15,50 yen per koku while the cultivator was allowed the sum of the prices paid to thc two formcr groups, namcly 62,50 yen. With thc additional prcmiums thc cultivator could rcccivc as much as 162,50 yen per koku 100).

The dual-price system used by the governtiient in buying rice led to a tirastic rcduction in rcnts and rcduced the incomc of the big landowncrs. As thc rents had bcen frozen and the tenant cultivators carncd cxtra moncy, the farmers prc- fcrrcd to pay thcir rents in cash rather than in kind. Mcasured by the accruing to thc tcnants landowncrs' incomc steadiiy dcclincd during thc war. Thc cffcctivc lcvcl of rcnt sank drastically from 45 O/o in 1941 to 38 O/o in 3943 and in 1945 cvcntuaiiy camc down t o 9 % of the total harvcst 101). For the first time in modern history the real income of Japanese farmers improved. The ave- rage incomc of a farm of 1,2 hcctarcs rose from 233 yen in 1937 (p. a.), by 430 % to 1001 yen surpiiis in 1944 lo2).

99) Dore, op. cit . , p. 114; slightly different figures: Cohcn, op. cit.. p. 383. 100) Ibid p. 383 f. 101) Ogura, op. cit., p. 101. 102) Ibid p. 58.

ßecaiise rcal wages of itidustrial workers did no t increase on the sartie scalc

and bccause the price indcx remained lower than thc wage index, for t h e Erst tirrie sincc the etiforccd industrialisation o f the Meiji era the Japancsc peasant

w u l d make a dccent living. In the final ycars o f the war the farnier actually

had a better incomc than ever bcfore and agriculture, üs in formcr days, bccamc thc basis o f thc national economy.

The agrarian reforrn o f thc American occupiers aitcr 1945 had thus becn well

prcpared by Japancse wartirne rcgulations altering tlie traditional social ordcr in

thc villages. The American reform 103) took u p the basic idcas o f the reforrn programrrie o f 1938 but its itriplementation was more drastic than the former

cautious elitc had proposed. Alrnost 7 0 % o f the total arable area was affected and 30 Y, o f thc total population was directly invulvcd in the changeover. The rnaximum sizr of landownership was lirnited t o 2 hectüres (3 hectares o f pasture-

land in Hokkaido); rented Iünd was limited t o 112 hectarc only. On thc complc- tion o f the reforms in 1950 the distribution o f owncrship had radically changed: Table 7 104):

Farm Household by Ownership Status in 1950 61,8 % o f land areü, i. e. 3,8 mio households, owners and cultivators 25,8 O/u o f land area, i. e. 1 ,6 mio households, owners and tenants with

a major share in ownership 6,7 Yo o f land area, i. e. 41 1.000 households, tenants and owners with

a rnajor share in tenancy 5,O '70 o f land arca, i. e . 312.000 households, tenants only Insteüd o f rc-agriculturalizing thc nation, as the traditional elite had intended,

the Arricrican reforrri produccd an economically and politically stable peasant- farmcr class; it dcstroyed the premodern feudal elitc of big landlords but i t also released labour for industry. Retwccn thc wars Japan had never bcen ablc t o supply herself with food and had reached the state o f physical exhaustion

arid collapse at thc cnd o f the Pacific War. Rut in thc post-war era the country became self-sufficient in staple foods and started t o export rice.

Conclusion A refotin o f agriculture in Japan was an essential prerequisite for all further

rcforms. The final liberation o f thc Japancse peasant from feudal obligations whicli had already begun during thc last years o f the war, sounded the death- knell of the village community as the nucleus o f the lmperial System. The in-

efficiency o f Japanese agriculture and the disastrous food situation in thc cities a t the end o f the war were both inevitable results of an outdated ownership

structiire and a setni-feudal tenancy System. Reforms initiated by the Japanese

103) Dore, op. cit. , p. 174. 104) Ibid p. 176.

themselves during the wat showed thc right way, whicli the Anicricans later followcd. Hut under thc old ordcr all teforms temaincd stiick in ideological premiscs, which were intended to stabilize thc ethnic entity of the Japanese and to re-agriculturalize socicty. Japan failcd in thc war prirriarily because of

an unfortunate experiment, attempting to combinc thc standards of Western industtialisation and urban life with village conimunity life bascd on a backward-

looking ideology. Pattcrns of a ~ i l l a~ea r i en ta t ed society still prevail in the Ja- pan of today, but the political and structural framework, as in Germany, has

becn decisively transformed. By destroying the big estates the formcr powcrful agrarian elite of the landed gentty was ruined. Their backward-looking idcology, once the cotner-stone of the Iniperial System, crumbled and with it went the old o d e r .

Zusammenfassung * ) Die Entwicklung der japanischen Landwirtschaft im Zweiten Wcltkricg ist von

den natürlichen Kahmenbedingungen dieses ~nselstaatcs und dcn historischen Voraussetzungen, einer vorrnodernen , hai bfeudalen Gesellschaftsordnung dcs damaligen Kaiserlichen Japari, nicht zu trennen. Von der gcsamtcn Landfläche sind nur etwa 16 Prozent, das entspricht 5,9 Miiiiorien Hektar, für landwirt- schaftliche Produktion nutzbar. Die wichtigste Kultur stellte zu öcginn dcs P u i - fischen Krieges der Keisanbau dar, der 52,5 Prozent dcs nutzbaren Landes bean- spruchte. Etwa 5,5 Millionen Bauernhaushältc, von dcncn lediglich ein knappes Drittel Eigncr des von ihnen bebauten Bodens waren, hatten im Durchschnitt etwas mehr als einen Hektar zur Verfügung, der jedoch in der k R e l in zahlrcichc kleine Feldstreifen aufgeteilt wat. Die Hälfte des Bodens wurde von Pächtcrn oder Halbpächtern bearbeitet, die als Pachtleistung bis zu 60 %der Erntcerträgc abliefern mußtcn. Eine klcinc Anzahl von 3.500 Croßgrundbcsitzern, dic übcr

50 Hektar und meht besaßen, beherrschte den Agrarsektor und sperrte sich als - einflußreichste Gruppe, zusamrnen mit den Vertretern der Industrie, im Untet- haus bis 1937 vehement g e g n alle Reformen.

Die Zahl der in der 1,andwirtschaft beschäftigten Arbeitskräfte betrug während

des Krieges etwa konstant 42 Prozent (ca. 13,5 Millionen) aller Erwerbstätigen, da der Bevölketungsüberschuß von vier Millionen Menschen von dcr Rüstungs- industrie und den erst irr1 letzten Kriegsjahr kräftig expandierenden Streitkräften absorbiert wurde. Eine Verschiebung ergab sich lediglich inncrhalb dcr landar- beitenden Bevölkerung durch dic Abwandcrung junger Männer in die Industrie, so daß Landarbeit währcnd des Kricgcs vornehmlich von Fraucn und ältcren Personen ausgeübt wurdc. Dic Arbeitskräfte in dcr Landwirtschaft reichten daher im Grunde aus, so daß keine asiatischcn Gastarbeiter oder Kriegsgefangene auf dem Lande eingesetzt wurden. Auch blieb die Iändlichc Bevölkerung von den

* ) Die deutsche Fassung des gcsamten Aufsatzes, indcs ohric Fußnoten, erschieti iri "Stu- dia Historiae Oeconorniac" 17 (1983). S. 129-151.

Kriegseinwirkungen weitgehend verschont. Dennoch sank die Produktion zwi- schen 1939 und 1944 bei den Grundnahrungniitteln um mehr als 10 Prozent ab, Der Rückgang der Anbaufläclie und Mangel an Kunstdünger sowie landwirt- schaftlicheni Gerat waren dafür hauptverantwortlicli. Da zudem in Friedens- zeiten etwa 15 - 20 O/o des Nahrungsmittelbedürfs irnpottiert wurden, entstand während des Krieges, als diese Importe wegfielen, cin akutes L)efizit in dcr Ver- sorgung der Bevölkerung.

Dic staatliche Administration zeigtc sich außcrstandc, dcn Mangel zu vcrwal- ten, so daß die bereits 1939 begonnenen Rationierungen ab 1942 auf der Grund- lage von Nachbarschaftsverbänden, etwa 10 bis 20 Familien, erfoigten. Die Rasis-

Ration betrug 330 gr Reis pro Person und Tag, doch das ungerechte System be- vorzugte Soldaten, die das Doppelte erhielten, und diskriminierte die Frauen. Die Minimalvcrsorgung konnte bis etwa Ende 1943 aufrechterhalten werden, ab 1944 brach jedoch der Markt für Vcrbrauchsgüter zusammen. Von allen

kriegführenden Großmächten mußten die Japaner ihren Konsum am drastisch- sten einschränken und vermochten nur dank des prosperierendsten Schwarz-

marktes überhaupt zu überleben. Sta~tl iche Reformmaßnahrnen karncn zu spät und crfolgten überdics unter den

ideologischen Prämissen, das Dorf als Urzelle der japanischen Gesellschaftsord- nung zu erhalten und etwa 40 T, dcr Uevölkerung auf dem Lande zu belassen. Lediglich die schlcichende ökononiische und politische Entmachtung der Groß- grundbesitzcr durch ein vom Staat ab 1943 verfügtes doppeltes Preissystem fIir

Reis, bei den1 der Eignkultivator einen beträchtlichen Bonus erhiclt, bereitete die von dcr amcrikanischen Besatzungsmacht ab 1946 radikal vollzogene Agrar-

rcform vor. Die strukturelle Incffizicnz der japanischen Landwirtschaft während dcs Krieges war durch die traditionelle, vormodcrne Sozialordnung bedingt. Erst der Zusammenbruch des Kaiserlichen Japans beseitigte die alte Ordnung und als deren wcsentlichen Bestandteil den Großgrundbesitz, so da13 der Durch-

bruch zum modernen Industriestaat mit cincr, nach den ~ e f o r m e n , prosperie- renden ~andwittschaft crfolgcn konnte.