mannheim - person_number_and_inclusivity_in_two_and.pdf
TRANSCRIPT
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
GENERAL LINGUISTICS
VOLUIVI
7
NUMBER 2
C A REITZEL COPENHAGEN 982
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PERSON NUMBER AND INCLUSIVITY
IN
TWO ANDEAN L A N G U A G E S 1 )
y
BRUCE MANNHEIM
[Received June 19821
1
The problem I wish to address here is first of all historiographic and that is the
ultima te textual provenience of the analy tic categories inclusive and exclusive as
applied to person systems. A distinction between inclusive
a sort of we including
the addressee, and
exclusive
a we excluding the addressee, is linguistically quite
com mo n, as Forchheimer s (1953) survey and William Jacobsen s areal study of
western North America (1980) demonstrate. It is of interest to the South
Americanist because, according to Mary H aas well known historiographic study
(1969), amplified by M arth a H ardman-de-B autista (1972), the terms first appeared
in colonial grammatical studies of both Aymara and Southern Peruvian Quechua.
But it is also of interest to the Indo-Europeanist because of the possibility that like
categories may be reconstructable f or Indo-E uropean (Kurylowicz, 1964: 149), and
consideration of the historiography of th e terms leads to greater analytic precision
with respect to their nature.
The inclusive and exclusive analytic labels are in fact older than has been
previously assumed, an d app ear in their present form fo r both languages in the late
sixteenth century. This raises a second problem: Can we tell whether the early
descriptions influenced o ne ano ther, and if s o, which language forced the analytic
I. Revised transcript of a talk at the Fifth International Workshop on Andean Linguistics Ithaca New
York July 29 1981. The material in this paper draws heavily on Mannheim forthcoming
a.
The
Quechua dat a is based in par t on field research carried out from 1976-1979 in the Department of Cuzco
Peru suppor ted by the Organization of American States The National Science Foundation and the
Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. I am indebted to Henning Andersen Ellen B.
Basso Wayles Browne Rosa Chillca Huallpa Wayne Harbert Martha J. Hardman-de-Bautista Diane
E. Hopkins Dell Hymes William Jacobsen Eloise Jelinek Peter Landerman Adrienne Lehrer Sally
McConnell-Ginet Aryon D. Rodrigues and Donald Sole for their advice and criticism. Thanks also to
Doris Sample for putting up with constant and innumerable revisions.
ACTA LINGUISTICA HAFN IENSIA 17.2 (1982) 139- 156
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140
BRUCE MANNHEIM
distinction? In order to answer that question we shall have to contrastively analyze
the manifestations of inclusivity and exclusivity in the two languages. I will
demonstrate that they are grammatically coded in different ways in the two
languages, a nd will draw conclusions from tha t fact as to the direction in which the
analysis was borrowed. This argument will direct my analysis to the final point,
which concerns the nature of person as a linguistic entity. W e are used to thinking
:
of person as a strictly indexial category that as it were picks out participants in the
speech event or alternately signals the lack thereof. That analysis of person is,
however, inadequate in that it makes wrong predictions about the combinability of
person and number and forces us to overlook substantive differences in the
gramm atical coding of person and its companion category, numb er, as indeed the
sixteenth century grammarians did. We must thus ascribe an intensional and
conc eptual na ture t o person alongside its extensiona l, indexical function.2)
2
T he inclusive/exclusive distinction was, to my knowledge, first observed by the
Dominican priest Domingo de Santo Tomas in his
1560
Quechua grammar. Santo
To ma s ma de repeated references to it in the early pages
fojas
8v., 9v.,
IOv.
15v.)
with the terms 'inc hy end o' an d 'excluyendo'. In 1583 the Tercer Concilio Limense
charged a committee of Jesuits with the translation of doctrine, catechism, and
sermons into Aymara an d Quechua, based on the manuscript materials then in use
by Jesuit missionaries (Bartra, 1967). The committee wrote an interesting set of
linguistic annotations to the translations, explaining several points of the
translation an d discussing the problem of dialect variation relative to the stand ard
adopted in the Doctrina Regarding the inclusive/exclusive distinction in the
Quechua first person they wrote that throughout the region,
... nclusion and exclusion are used in the first person plural b oth in prono uns and verbs.
Inclusion is when we include the person or perso ns with whom we speak in the ma tter, a s
(for example) if we were speaking to pagans we might say, 'We people are created fo r
heaven' as
(l a) aocan chic runacuna hana cpachapac camascam cachic.
Exclusion is when we exclude the person or persons with whom we speak from the
matter, as (for example) if we were speaking to pagans we might say, 'We Chistians
worship one god' as
2. It must be pointed ou t to anthropologically-oriented readers that I am using the terms 'intension' and
'extension' within the trad itio n of logical sema ntics and no t in the quite divergent sense in which
Lounsb ury (1969:29, footno te 11) reintroduc ed 'extension' into kinship sema ntics, following
Malinowski (I19291 1 2:138; 1935:14ff.; cf. H oca rt, 1937 for a critique of continuing relevance).
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PERSON, NUMBER AND INCLUSIVITY IN ANDEAN
141
(I b) Aocaycu chistianocuna huc Fapay Diosllactam muchaycu. )
The
1584
annotation to th e South ern Peruvian Q uechua translation th us labeled
the categories inclusion an d exclusion . Th e distinction being mad e here between
Christian s we exclusive an d hu ma ns as a whole we inclusive, priest speaking
recalls a similar example which Sa nto T om as (f.
8v.
used, in which Espa iloles we
exclusive ar e opp osed t o Y ndios we inclusive, priest speaking. Fo r all intents
an d purposes th e two categories, Espailoles and Cristianos were considered
equivalent, for evangelization was at that time culturally comprehensive, not only
religious (Duviols, 1971: 237f
. .4
T he curren tly used adjectiva l for m s inclusive an d exclusive were first used in
the annotations t o the corresponding Aym ara translation, probably in reference to
the Aymara of Juli:
Th e first person plural in demonstrative p rono uns, possessive pron oun s as well as verbs
which is used in this language for inclusion and exclusion is s follows:
(2a) hiussa, hiussan aca, hihuassana ca we inclusive
(2b) nana ca we exclusive
Our inclusive, ssa, as
(2c) apussa our lord
Our exclusive ha, adding genitive nanacana, as
(2d) nanacan a auquiha Pater noster
In verbs, what is in the conjugation serves as the first person plural inclusive. For the
exclusive the first person singular is used, adding the nominative nanaca, as
3. Aduiertase q(ue) toda esta doc trina se usa de inclusion o exclusion en las primeras personas plurales assi
de pro nabr es com o de verbos. Inclusion es qu an do incluymos en la materia a la persona, o personas, con
quien hablamos, co mo si habl ando con gentiles dixessemos, noso tros 10s hombres somos criados par a el
il
cielo, diremos, ilocanchic runacun a hanacpachapac camascam ck hi c. Exclusion es quan do excluymos
de la materia a la persona o person as con quien hablamos, com o si hab land o con 10s gentiles dixessemos
nosotros 10s christianos adoramos a vn Dios, diremos, ilocaycu christianocuna huc Fapay Diosllactam
muchay cu. (Tercer Concilio, 1584:75r.)
4 Co mpa re Co bo (1613:XIV,1:236): Las primeras p ersonas del plural de 10s verbos y el plural del
pro nom bre iloca, que significa yo y 10s prom omb res posesivos, tienen dos terminaciones, una inclusiva
y otr a exclusiva: L a terminaci6n inclusiva comprehende y significa a aque llos con quien se habla: co mo
si habland o con 10s cristianos dijksemos: Nosotros 10s cristianos conocemos a1 verdadero Dios. La
dicci6n con que esto se dice incluye a 10s que lo dicen y a aquellos con quien se habla. La exclusiva
significa n o mAs de 10s que habla n, excluye ndo a aquellos con q uien se habla; com o, si hab lando con 10s
gentiles dijksemos la misma oraci6n. la cual hariam os con diferentes p;labras que la primera vez, por que
alli era inclusiva y aq ui exclusiva; lo cual es particular desta lengua.
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BRUCE MANNHEIM
(2e) nanacapampachatha we pardon them )
Th e final sixteenth century analytic attestation, the anonym ous Q uechua
rte
of
1586 treated the inclusive/exclusive distinction along the same lines as the Tercer
Concilio:
It should be noted that the pronoun Aoca has two different plurals ... Aocanchic and
Aocaycu that mean we ; Aocanchic means we including that person or people with
whom we speak, as in saying we people , we would say Aocanchic runacuna; Aocaycu
means we excluding that person or people with whom we speak, tlocaycu
Christianocuna we the Christians, excluding pagans in case we speak with them. This
same distinction is maintained in all first persons of all verbs, except the imperative
which has no exc l~s ive .~)
The analysis of the two first person forms as including and excluding the
addressee therefore dates to at least Santo T o m h Quechua Grammatica of 1560.
Th e earliest use of the now -current terminology inclusive an d exclusive appears
to be in the an notations to the Aym ara translation of the Tercer C oncilio s
Catecismo in 1584. Ludovico Bertonio, author of the most important
seventeenth-century Ay ma ra gram ma r (1603) and Diego de Gonzhlez Holguin, th e
Quec hua gra mm arian (1607), both served in the Jesuit mission in Ayma ra speaking
Juli, and were therefore necessarily familiar with the contents of the Tercer
Con cilio s Catecismo upo n w hich they drew a t least in so far a s its analysis of the
inclusive/exclusive distinction. And Bertonio and Gonzhlez Holguin were in turn
the sources of the later adoption of the terms into European grammatical
traditions.
3
Now, while it is clear that the analyses of the inclusive/exclusive distinction in
Aymara and in (Southern Peruvian) Quechua belonged to a single colonial
gramm atical tradition , it is equally clear that th e colonial gramm arian s dichotomy
5. La primera persona plural assi delos pronabres demonstratiuos, y possessiuos, como delos verbos (que
se vsa en esta lengua por inclusion y exclusion) se pone assi. Hiussa, hiussanaca, hihuassanaca, nos
inclusiue. Nanaca nos exclusiue. Noster a um, inclusiue, ssa, como apussa, nuestro senar. Noster
exclusiue ha, sobre el nombre poniendo este genetiuo nanacana, como nanacana auquiha padre nuestro.
En 10s verbos para la primera persona plural inclusiua sirue la misma que esta en la coniugacion. Para la
exclusiua sirue la primera persona singular, poniendo este nominatiuo nanaca, como nanaca
pampachatha, nosotros las perdonamos. (Tercer Concilio, 1584:78r.).
6.
...
acerca deste pronombre, Roca, es de aduertir q(ue) tiene dos plurales diferentes de 10s nombres que
haze Rocanchic, y Rocaycu, que significa nosotros, el Rocanchic significa nosotros, incluyedo a aq(ue)lla
persona o personas con quien hablamos, como para dezir, nosotros 10s hombres, diremos Rocilchic
runacuna, el Rocaycu, significa nosotros excluy5do aquella persona o personas con quien hablamos,
como Rocaycu Christianocuna, nosotros 10s Christianos, excluyendo a 10s gentiles si acaso se hable con
ellos. Esta misma diferencia tiene todos 10s verbos en todas las primeros personas del plural, except0 el
imperatiuo q(ue) no tiene exclusib. (Anonymous, 1586, cited from the 1614 re-edition, f.4v.)
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PERSON, NUMBER A ND INCLUSIVITY IN ANDEAN
143
did not play the same semantic role in the person systems of the two languages. In
other words, the colonial grammarians were not in fact describing the sam e object.
A comparison of the two systems would indicate how this is the case.
I
shall refer
here to modern data, since in this particular aspect both systems have been quite
stable for the last fo ur hund red years. ) Before proceeding fu rthe r, it shou ld be
pointed out that both languages are representatives of larger language families
-
.
Southern Peruvian Quechua of the peripheral branch of the Quechua family and
Aymara of the Jaqi family (Hardman-de-Bautista, 1978; Mannheim, forthcoming
b). N o genetic relationship between the two families has been established, a lthough
the particular memberlanguages with which
I
am concerned here have been in close,
long-term con tact (Hardman-de-Bau tista 19796; Man nheim, forthcoming
4.
3.1.
1 shall first discuss the Aym ara case, based o n da ta presented in a detailed
historical reconstruction and semantic analysis of Jaqi person carried out by
Hard ma n-de-B autista (1976, 1979a: 127f.). Ay mara has a system of fo ur person al
pronouns based on two hierarchical intersecting oppositions
-
inclusion of
addressee/exclusion of addressee, inclusion of speaker/exclusion of speaker
-
as in
figure 3:
Fig.
3:
AYMARA PRONOMINAL SYSTEM
ADDRESSEE
INC )/EXC -)
Aymara person suffixes (see figure 4) are semantically isomorphic with lexical
person. Mo reover, three of the fo ur suffixes are identical to the final syllable of the
pronouns.
SPEAKER
INC )/EXC -)
7. The modern Aymara material reflects La Paz usage. Point-by-point comparison of the Aymara person
-
system described by Bertonio in the early seventeenth century for Juli, Peru with modern dialectal
variants is carried out by Lucy Briggs in her doctoral dissertation, Dialectal Variation in the Aymara
Language
of
Bolivia and Peru
1976) in chapter 8 section 2.1; chapter
5,
section 2.3; and most
copiously in chapter 6, section 3. The modern Quechua variety is Cuzco, either daughter to or otherwise
extremely closely related to the varieties described in the colonial materials in question. Changes from
the colonial period to the modern in the Southern Peruvian Quechua person system are largely
phonological. These are detailed in Mannheim, forthcoming, c.
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144 BRUCE MA NNH EIM
Fig 4: AYMARA NOUN S UF F IXES FOR P ERS ON
Th e opposition of 'inclusion of the addressee/exclusion of the addressee' form s the
pivot of th e system fro m th e point of view of linguistic an d cultural pragmatics. It is
crucial to Aymara conversation to iteratively and redundantly specify the
relationship of the addressee to the narrated event (Hardman-de-Bautista,
1976:445, 446, 450; 1979~:27; Briggs, 197 659 4 ff).
Num ber is not an obligatory category of the prono un system nor of either of the
suffixal person systems. No Aymara person form'in itself implies number and any
may appear with or without a plural morpheme without the lack thereof implying
singu larity (Ha rdm an-de -Bau tista 1976:434; 1979a:124f.). Th e inclusive/exclusive
dichotom y in Aym ara involves opposition of what Hymes (1972:105) referred t o as
an inclusive pers on marking the inclusion of the addressee to a first person w hich
excludes the addressee. The opposition is thus functionally integrated into the
person system completely apart from number. So, although the inclusive form is
referentially plural in that its extension set necessarily includes more than one
individ ual, it is not gra mm atically (or intensionally) plural.*) A principled d i-
stinction between these aspects of the linguistic sign is often blurred in analyses of
the person/number complex
-
even by those who invoke it elsewhere - because
person is the linguistic category which comes closest t o being a pure indexical.9)And
it is precisely at this point that the Tercer Concilio grammarians missed target,
glossing first person plu ral as 'exclusive we' an d inclusive person either with o r
without the plural as 'inclusive we'.
S P EAKER
I N C ( + ) / E X C -)
-xa (1)
-ma (2)
-pa (3)
-sa (inc.)
8. For general discussion of systems in which an inclusive person is grammatically coordinate to the
traditional three persons, see Conklin o n H anun 60 (1962). Jacobsen (1980:208-210 and 221, fo otnote
18) cites typologically pa rallel data in Northern Paiu te and raises the issue of the disjunction between the
formal grammatical status of the inclusive singular and its reference to two individuals as Sapir had
noticed earlier for Southe rn Paiute (1930:176). Th e Aymara d ata raises the question more sharply
k
because number is not an obligatory grammatical category: the inclusive form is thus grammatically
ADDRESSEE
I N C + / E X C -)
indeterminate as to n umber.
9. For t wo recent exam ples see Silverstein (1976:117 and 119) in which a rule of person -numb er interac tion
is aosited bv which non-alural inclusive wrson is ruled out and Zwicky (1977:719) which makes a like
as m ption: T he Jaqi ( ~ ~ m a r a )xample shows this not to be the case. Roman Jakobson (1956:132)
mad e the same general point as here in criticism of Biihler.
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146 BRUCE MAN NHEIM
COMPLEMENT SUBJECT
.DDRESSEE SPEAKER
INC/EXC INC/EXC
ADDRESS-
EE
1- +3 ) 2-3) 3-3) inc.+3)
INC/EXC
SPEAKER
INC/EXC
-ta -tathird person )
I
-tan
SPEAKER I
-2) 3-2)
INC/EXC * *
second person) -sma -tam a)
ADDRESS-
EE
2+1)
3-r l )
INC/EXC
*
first person) -ista -itu
ADDRESS-
EE 2-inc.) 3-inc.)
INC/EXC
* *
incl. person) -istu
Fig.
5: AYMARA VERB SUFFIXES FOR PERSON
unmarked tense)
Of the remaining ten cells, one is unfilled, second person subject
-
inclusive
person com plement. It exists in a sister language to Aymara, Jaqa ru Hard ma n-
de-Bautista, 1966:56-58), though there it is defective in remote tenses
Hardman-de-Bautista, 1966:57f., 68). In the remaining Jaqi language, Kawki,
second person subject - inclusive complement is syncretic with second person
subject
first
person complement Ha rdma n-de-B autista, 1976:438). Returning to
Aym ara now , H ardman-de-Bautista notes that the second person subject
-
inclusive
.
person complement form expected for Aymara via prospective reconstruction
shows up with a second person subject
-
first person complement denotatum and
posits a shift. The gap, far from arbitrary, appears in the most highly marked
-
position in the person system. Finally, it must be pointed out that the first and
second person subject
-
third person complement forms both
fa
in figure 5) are
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PERSON, NUMBER AND INCLUSIVITY IN ANDEAN
147
distinct over most of the Aymara-speaking area (first person ta and second -fa
and are morphophonemically distinct in the La Paz variety reflected in the diagram
as well (Briggs, 1976:390f.; Hardman-de-Bautista, 1976:445).
3 2 1
Lexical person in the Cuzco dialect of Southern Peruvian Quechua is
partially constructed on the basis of possessor suffixes and so will be taken up
last. ) The nominal (possessor) paradigm, represented in figure 6, is a garden
variety three-person system in which the semantically unmarked third person also
restrictedly serves a definiteness function. Three plural forms immediately follow
person in the noun: -kuna pluralizes the lexical stem; -ku identical to the first
syllable of the substantival plural and mutually exclusive with it, marks the
exclusion of the addressee from the person/number complex. Adjoined to the first
person -y and the third person -n, -ku forms a first plural exclusive (-yku) and third
plural (-nku), respectively. The -chis plural, on the other hand, marks the inclusion
of the addressee in the person/number complex. It pluralizes the second person and
together with the third person -n the form unmarked for person forms an
inclusive for which there are two pragmatically governed interpretations, first
person inclusive plural and second person polite. The inclusive interpretation, the
11. For alternative accounts of Cuzco Quechua person morphology and semantics see CusihuamPn
(1976:109f.,
123ff., 161ff.). Lefebvre and Dubuisson (1977 and n.d.), Sole (ms.), and SolP and
Cusihuamhn (1967). Of the analyses the latter two differ most radically from that presented here. Soh' s
thoroughgoing effort to segment recurrent partials resulted in identification of the
n
which initiates
many verbal person morphs as 'potential aspect' (ms.5.34.1). It is not clear whether such a radical
decomposition of forms allows one to either more elegantly identify position-classes of contrastive
morphs or predict their use in actual speech. I therefore hesitate to accept it. Moreover, it is not clear
that this rather idiosyncratic use of the term 'aspect' has anything whatsoever t o do with use of that
term in grammar or in ordinary speech.
During disussion of this paper at the Fifth International Workshop on Andean Linguistics, Sola
claimed intellectual paternity for the segmentation of the
nchis
form presented here. The claim
cannot be sustained, however. That particular segmentation was already proposed in Santo TomPs'
grammar of 1560 (flOv., for instance) and GonzPlez Holguin's grammar of 1608 (1842 reprint:41).
Identical formal segmentation in explicit, neo-bloomfieldian frameworks were arrived at by
Masako Yokoyama (195159) and William Wonderly (1952:370 and 374), although both treated
ti
before
chis
as a conditioned alternant of the first person morpheme. Neither was acknowledged by
Sol& More surprisingly, Yokoyama's morphological sketch, quite elegant though limited by
paucity of source material, is not cited in either of the descriptive works by SolP covering much the
same ground.
Solh likewise criticized the use of the term 'inclusive' here as an external imvosition and
suggested it be replaced by 'deferential' (cf. Solh, ms. 6. 31. 22; Sola and CusihamPn.
1967:5.1222). It is clearly not invariantly 'deferential' in the ordinary sense of the term, that IS,
'yielding with courtesy', since it is quite felicitously used under the opposite circumstances, for
example, a lord ordering a group of
peones
using the imperative and
chis.
Sol& therefore
redefines 'deferential' thus: 'This plural morpheme occurs under the following semantic
conditions: (a) either the actor or the receiver of the action is second person
...
(b) 2nd person
(and the speaker) are members of a group referred to elliptically as actors or receivers of the
action.... He goes on to say that, 'the semantic condition is also satisfied in commands
addressed to more than one person ... (Sol&, 6.31.22). These conditions are exactly those
summed up by the feature
inclusion of addressee
used in the text of this article. They are,
moreover, precisely the conditions mentioned by Southern Peruvian Quechua grammarians
since the sixteenth century in their definitions of 'inclusive', which incidentally appears to have
been coined for Quechua (Haas, 1969, and conclusions of this article) and hence could hardly
be considered an 'external imposition'. Since there appear to be no empirical consequences to
using the 'deferential' label (with the SolP definition not the ordinary one) as opposed to the
commonly recognized and understood term 'inclusive', I suggest that the point is moot.
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PERSON, NUMBER AND INCLUSIVITY IN ANDEAN
149
statement and treats the person system as absolutely regular within each major
syntactic class from the formal point of view. Such combination of third-person
with inclusive plural is typologically uncommon, but certainly not unknown. A
comparable construction combining inclusive number forms with the third person is
found in Huave, a language isolate in Mexico (Stairs and Hollenbach, 1969:49ff;
Matthews, 1972: 106f.).
The cost of this analysis is that the semantics of person are rendered more
abstract. The resultant gap between what is actually said and what the person
expressions denote must be bridged pragmatically. As I suggested above, the first
person plural interpretation of the sequence involves inference of speaker inclusion
from explicit addressee inclusion plus plurality. The advantage of a more abstract
semantics for the chis expression is that a quite natural pragmatic account of the
second person polite interpretation now becomes feasible. There are several
possible pragmatic scenarios: First, the plural component is read as an
amplification of the social persona of the (asserted) addressee. Second, given that
the usual inference from the inclusive plural form is inclusion of both addressee and
speaker, it among the personhumber forms and because of the 0 person does
not unequivocally individuate the addressee (cf. Brown and Levinson, 1978:203ff.).
In fact, the response to an intended second person polite use of the inclusive plural
in a situation in which its appropriateness has not yet been established is for the
addressee to ask, Who, me? Third, again assuming the first person inclusive
interpretation as given, use of the inclusive plural as second person subsumes the
speaker in an addressee-centered speech event. (Lefebvre, 1975, extensively
discusses the second person polite use of the inclusive plural.)
The interaction of the two plurals of person with the lexical plural is of some
interest here because of divergences between colonial and modern grammatical
descriptions and because of recent disagreement over the semantics of person in
modern Cuzco Quechua which rests precisely on that point. Santo Tomis' 1560
grammar reported that only -chis and
ku
were mutually exclusive and that the
lexical plural
kuna
could occur with either
1
lr, for example). GonzAlez Holguin
agreed in his early seventeenth century grammar (1852 [16081:47). It appears that in
the modern language the lexical plural kuna may only co-occur with the inclusive
plural -chis and is prohibited from co-occurring with
ku.
Does this reflect a change
in the language in which the interaction of number in the person system and the
lexical plural has become less regular? think not.
Over the past few years have worked fairly extensively with Quechua text from
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and have not been able to find a
single textual attestation of the putative
ku kuna
sequence. I suspect therefore that
the examples which appear in the grammars of that period are analogical
reformulations on the part of the grammarians, and that in fact the colonial and the
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150 BRUCE MANNHEIM
modern languages do not differ in this respect.
Second, it has recently been alleged that while the lexical plural
kuna
may
co-occur with the nchis sequence (zero person, inclusive plural) it may not co-occur
with the nkichis (second person, inclusive plural) sequence (Dubuisson and
Lefebvre, 1979:4ff.). This in turn motivated a claim that nchis is morphologically
unsegmentable and hence a four-person analysis of Southern Peruvian Quechua as
isomorphic to the Aymara system discussed earlier. But this is simply not the case.
Pluralization of a lexical stem marked with a second person, inclusive plural
number is in fact grammatical. Thus, wawaykichiskuna your (plural) children ,
despite the claims of Dubuisson and Lefebvre, is perfectly well-formed and
interpretable. There is therfore no distributional reason to analyze
chis
differently
in the sequences nchis (zero person, inclusive plural) and nkichis (second person,
inclusive plural).
3 2 2 The pattern of the subject verbal paradigm is identical to that of the nominal
(see figure 7). The close formal relationship between the two paradigms, preserved
in all of the Quechuan languages, leads to the assumption of a common pattern
prior to the break-up of Proto-Quechua. Well understood reanalysis of verbal
person of the sort studied by Watkins (e.g., 1962:90ff.) and others whereby the
semantically zero third person was interpreted repeatedly as a zero form and spread
through the paradigm, subject to government by tense and mood, appears to have
been at work here as hope to show in future work.
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152 BRUCE MANNHEIM
inclusive plural position V is pluralized; in
-wa-nki-ku,
second person subject,
first person obje ct, exclusive plural position I is pluralized; and
-wa-n-ku,
third
person su bject, first person objec t, exclusive plural is amb iguo us between a reading
in which I is pluralized and one in which V is pluralized.
Th e inclusive/exclusive dichotomy is less well-installed (in William Jacobsen s
perspicacious term) in lexical person. The same three-person pattern is evidenced
here. Second and third person are pluralized as any substantive, with -kuna:
qan-kuna
and
pay-kuna,
respectively. But the inclusive/exclusive split is retained by
adjoin ing th e respective first person nominal suffix to the first person lexical stem:
nuqa-n-chis first person plural inclusive ; nuqa-y-ku first person plural exclusive .
The
nuqanchis
form unequivocally designates the first person plural inclusive .
It can no t be used with a second p erson polite reading as can the +chis sequence.
This fact supplies a n ad ditiona l argum ent fo r the analysis of t he semantics of +chis
presented above. Were we to treat the second person polite usage of -nchis as a
pragm atic disp lacemen t of a fo rm w hich is semantically first person, we would need
to explain why
nuqanchis,
with an explicit first person, can never be interpreted as
second person polite. This fact follows automatically from the account here in
which -nchis is a vague zero person-inclusive plural pragm atically filled in as first
person inclusive plural or as a second person polite.
4.
In my discussion of early use of the categories inclusive an d exclusive
concluded that the analytic distinction between inclusive and exclusive in person
systems appears to date to sixteenth century missionary grammars and religious
translations in two Andean languages, Aymara and (Southern Peruvian)
Quechua.l3) It is evident that missionary priests working with both languages drew
o n a comm on tradition in their linguistic work a nd o n a comm on terminology, on e
which was developed in response to Andean experiences and was not merely a
slavish imitation of Nebrija or other continental grammarians (cf. Rowe,
1974:365). Yet the common terminology developed in an American context could
just as surely lead them to misidentify grammatical categories in
one
language on
the basis of another. And the inclusive/exclusive distinction is a case in point.
While both Q uech ua and Aym ara encode inclusiveness in their grammatical
systems, the contrastive analyses in section 3 show that it is quite differently
installed in each: Aymara encodes the inclusive/exclusive dichotomy in its
person
system; Quechua in its number system. Extending Hymes terminological
suggestion, Aymara has an inclusive
person ,
but Quechua an inclusive
13. Aryon D. Rodrigues pointed out to me that an analytical distinction between inclusive and exclusive
appears in sixteenth century Brazil in the Tupian grammar of Anchieta, published in 1595. Dr.
Rodrigues observes that A nchieta s grammar was actually comp osed ap proxim ately three decades
earlier, making it roughly contem poraneo us to Do mingo d e Santo TomBs grammar. This fact places
the ultimate Peruvian precedence of the analytic distinction in some d oubt, and certainly requires and
merits further research.
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PERSON, NU MBER AN D INCLUSIVITY IN ANDEAN
53
numb er'.14) (The lexical pronom inal first person inclusive referred t o in
3.2.2
is a
complex expression which presupposes the substantival person-number system.)lS)
The passage which I cited from the annotation to the Aymara translation of the
Do ctrina of th e Tercer Concilio of
1583
in which num ber
is
inappropriatel brought
in, suggests that the Aymara analysis was calqued on sixteenth century works on
Qu echu a, in which the con flation of 'inclusion'/'exclusion' an d 'plural' was
entirely appropriate.I6)
Th e lesson of their misconstrual of the categorial seman tics of the Aym ara person
system is still current. The illusion that person functions in natural language as a
mere index of particip ants in the speech event and lacks any concep tual properties
in relation to the gram ma tical system is a pervasive on e and is difficult to overcome .
But if we stubbo rnly cling to th at illusion, we misinterpret the nature of th e Aym ara
non-plural inclusive person as a 'dual ' category which has n o status in the Ayma ra
gramm atical system, an d maintain t ha t the Ay ma ra language is somehow bizarre in
treating as singular a form which indexes two speech-act participants, or falsely
predict tha t such states-of-affairs are impossible. 17
Likewise, the viewpoint that person functions purely indexically makes the
Cuzco-Quechua second person polite use of the (zero person-) inclusive plural
-nchis an arbitrary attachm ent of the use to the form and makes the otherwise quite
transparent verbal and nominal person-number systems appear morphologically
irregular and opaque. In an analysis in which more abstract conceptual properties
are assigned to both person and number, the first person inclusive plural and
second-person polite strategies fall-out quite naturally as alternate pragmatic
inferences. A co herent accou nt of these facts requires us to ascribe a conceptual an d
intensional nature t o person, alongside its extensional indexical function .'@
14. G ilij (1965[17821) used the expression 'inclusive num ber' in speak ing of Ch iqu ito (20512461). but it is
clear from the context that he intended it to refer to the phenomenon of distinguishing inclusive and
exclusive as a whole. (Other mentions include Tamanaca (15811811) and Quechua, the latter after
Ga spar Xuarez (198I2361); cf. Haas 1969).
IS. The analysis presented here, of course, crucially presupposes that grammatical morphology (entirely
suffixal) is a conceptual prime, alongside the word, in Southern Peruvian Quechua gram mar. Although
it is not possible to elicit free citation forms of grammatical formatives, the entire synchronic and
diachronic set of the language toward transpar ent agglutination seems to bear ou t this assumption.
16. It must be stressed here that-I am referring to the southernmost members of the Quechua family. (On
classification o f the Q uechua languages, see Mannheim, forthcoming, b . The Central branch and some
of the Northern languages have a Jaqi-like four person system with a morphologically unsegmentable
cognate to Cuzco
-nchis
as the inclusive person. The present inclusive number system may well have
been an innovation in the non-central languages despite Forchheimer's claim (1953:98) that inclusive
forms always develop from the narrowing of one of two competing plural forms. Curiously, these
include the very Quechua varieties which most show the areal influence of the Jaqi languages
(Mannheim, forthcoming,
d .
17. Cf. Matthews, 1972:105, 117. See also footnote 9.
18.
1
am unc omm itted a s to the precise relationship between the gram matical categories (concepts) assigned
to person and the intension assigned to account for its (indexical) extensions. I suggest that in the
person system the intension in the formal, carnapian sense in which it is determinate of a set of
extensions is quite closely tied t o its conceptual specification. See Partee (1979) and Dow ty (1979, Ch .
8) for theoretical discussions of th e problems raised by the relationship between concept and intension,
but notice that the problem of underdetermination of semantic concepts exists also in the analysis of
any other representational system (e.g., phonology, syntax, social structure).
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BRUCE MANNHEIM
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