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Managing Levels of CSR Implementation within an MNC: competition and
receptivity
Anne Jacqueminet
Strategy and Business Policy
HEC Paris
1 rue de la Libération
78350 Jouy-en-Josas
Rodolphe Durand
Strategy and Business Policy
HEC Paris
1 rue de la Libération
78350 Jouy-en-Josas
May 8, 2013
Work in progress – Please do not cite without the authors’ permission
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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the antecedents of the implementation of corporate social
responsibility (CSR) practices in the subsidiaries of a multinational corporation (MNC). More
specifically, we study how an idiosyncratic characteristic of the subsidiaries, namely receptivity
to institutional demands influences their level of CSR practices implementation. We propose that
the mechanisms underlying receptivity to pressures from internal and external demands are
different. In the case of receptivity to external demands, the implementation is motivated by the
will to outperform market competitors. In the case of receptivity to internal demands, the
implementation is motivated by an internal search for resources, power and legitimacy.
Consequently, (1) the direct impact of receptivity to external demands is stronger for subsidiaries
less integrated in the MNC, while the direct impact of receptivity to internal demands is stronger
for subsidiaries more integrated in the MNC; and (2) the mediating impact of receptivity on the
relationship between isomorphic pressures from internal and external competitors and the level of
CSR practices implementation depends on the type of receptivity considered. More specifically,
we argue that there is a substitution effect of receptivity to internal demands and a cumulative
effect of receptivity to external demands. While receptivity to demands from external demands
reinforces isomorphism to both internal and external competitors, receptivity to the demands of
internal constituents reinforces isomorphism to internal competitors but hinders isomorphism to
external competitors. The data we collected on 101 worldwide subsidiaries of an MNC provide
strong support for these effects.
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Multinational Corporation (MNC), Neo-
institutional theory
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Managing Levels of CSR Implementation in an MNC: the Role of Receptivity
to Institutional Pressures
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a major topic for concrete actions in
many firms worldwide (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams and Ganapathi, 2007). Both academic research
and popular press point at the necessity for large firms to implement CSR practices. However,
they tend to overlook the intra-organizational heterogeneity that complicates implementation of
CSR practices in large firms and consider firms as monolithic decision-makers. This paper
investigates the consequences of this internal heterogeneity on practice implementation. More
precisely, it examines how, within a multinational corporation (MNC), the subsidiaries’
receptivity to pressures moderates the influence of internal and external institutional pressures on
their implementation level of CSR practices.
Neo-institutional theory scholars emphasize how the isomorphic pressures exerted on
firms determine their behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hoffman, 1999). Neo-institutionalists
thoroughly researched the conditions under which firms conform to the norms of their industry,
substantially, symbolically or by hybridizing (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Tolbert and Zucker,
1983; Sherer and Lee, 2002; Marquis, Glynn and Davis, 2007; Battilana and Dorado, 2010;
Philippe and Durand, 2011). But these arguments apply at the general level of the firm,
considered as a monolithic whole. As Kostova, Roth and Dacin explain (2008), the concepts at
the basis of neo-institutional theory “require serious theoretical reconsideration for the MNC”.
Indeed, the conformity of MNCs to institutional norms such as CSR is neither stable over time
nor homogeneous across their entities. MNCs span across different countries and different
industries, so they undergo numerous and conflicting demands. From one subsidiary to the next,
competitors and local players change. Recently, institutional scholars have identified the
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existence of conflicting demands in fragmented industries (Pache and Santos, 2010), or the
presence of conflicting logics in one given industry (Purdy and Gray, 2009). But little attention
was paid to the potential for firms to be part of several industries, because of the diversified
nature of their activities or of their geographical presence. As Gardberg and Fombrun point out in
their theoretical piece on corporate citizenship there is a need for MNCs to “balance the tension
between the legitimacy demands of the different institutional contexts in which they operate”
(2006). In addition, each subsidiary of a MNC is torn between pressures for consistency within
the MNC (the “mirror effect”) and institutional pressures of the differentiated local environments
(Doz & Prahalad, 1991; Rosenzweig & Sinh, 1991; Westney, 1993; Hillman & Wan, 2005;
Ferner et al, 2005).
Therefore, there is a need to investigate how the different types of pressures an MNC’s
subsidiaries undergo articulate and interplay to affect the level of practice implementation. In a
national context, Dobbin, Kim and Kalev (2011) show that pressures by internal advocates (e.g.
white women) and external pressures (by industry peers) act as alternatives rather than reinforce
each other in explaining the spotted adoption of diversity management programs in the US
corporations. Other studies have shown that firms’ receptivity reinforces the effect of institutional
pressures on CSR practices’ implementation (e.g. Delmas and Toffel, 2008, on ISO 14001 and
voluntary governmental environmental programs adoption). Here, we identify and describe two
types of isomorphic pressures: pressures from external competitors, who are the local market
competitors of the subsidiary, and pressures from internal competitors, who are other subsidiaries
in the same business unit as the subsidiary. In addition, we differentiate between two types of
demands the subsidiary has to address: the demands or expectation from external environmental
constituents (the State, the local authorities, NGOs, the media, clients and suppliers) and the
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demands from internal environmental constituents (the headquarters, the business unit). This
paper complements past research in two ways. First, it studies from within a large MNC (over
200, 000 employees worldwide and a presence in 70 countries) the relative influence of internal
and external isomorphic pressures on three CSR practice implementation. Second, it argues that
receptivity to internal and external demands is driven by two different mechanisms: search for
resources and power vs. competition for markets. As a consequence, the level of integration of
the subsidiary in the MNC is found to increase the impact of receptivity to internal demands and
decrease the impact of receptivity to external demands. Further, we argue that a subsidiary’s
attention is limited and that it prioritizes a type of constituents (internal or external) relative to the
other type. Therefore, subsidiaries that favor one or the other type of demands react differently to
the pressures from their environment. Subsidiaries that are more inward looking aim at
implementing the corporate policy in a compliant way, so that they are more sensitive to the
pressures from their internal competitors and less sensitive to the pressures from their external
competitors (substitutive effect). On the other hand, subsidiaries that are more outward looking
will try to imitate the best practices from both types of competitors, and be more sensitive to both
types of isomorphic pressures (cumulative effect). Thus, we explain not only variety of
implementation levels across subsidiaries but also why uniform programs launched by
headquarters are likely to fail if they ignore the dynamics of intra-organizational conformity. By
showing the variety of influences of institutional pressures and the subsidiary-level, mechanisms
that moderate and mediate them, this paper contributes to the study of strategic implementation in
MNCs and nurtures the dialogue between strategy research and neo-institutional literature.
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THEORY BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
CSR practices integrate consideration for environmental and social impacts within the
many activities of a company -operations, research and development, procurement, marketing
and sales, human resources-, under various forms including partnerships and donations in money,
time or kind (Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007; Matten and Moon, 2008). McWilliams and
Siegel (2001) limit CSR to “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests
of the firm and that which is required by law.” Marquis et al. (2007) define the forms taken by
CSR actions: “cash contributions, investments in social initiatives or programs, employee
volunteer efforts, and in-kind donations of products or services”, with varying levels of monetary
and time commitment. Thus, CSR covers the collection of practices implemented by companies
to maximize their positive environmental and social impact, in line with or above the most
demanding legal environment they face across their facilities.
Multinational corporations’ subsidiaries are located in countries with varying legal
systems and normative expectations. Thus, for an MNC, CSR actions correspond not only to
voluntary practices but also to abiding by the most demanding legal environment it faces and
potentially expanding it to all its worldwide activities. At the global level, pressures increase on
MNCs as transnational organizations come into play (Bansal, 2005), such as the Global compact
and the ISO 26000. The Global compact is an international program promoted by the United
Nations and concerned about human rights, labor, environment and anti-corruption. And the ISO
26000 is an international standard structured around seven axes: governance, customer-related
questions, environment, social involvement, human rights, working conditions and relationships.
Therefore, MNCs must respond to rising demands regarding their “triple bottom line”: increasing
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economic, environmental and social benefits, while minimizing environmental and social impacts
(Aguilera, Rupp, Williams and Ganapathi, 2007).
CSR communication develops to address these mounting challenges (Philippe and
Durand, 2011). This prevalence of discourse and symbols, observable in the CSR context, does
not necessarily reflect the actual practices of the organization, so that it might leave room for
decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Indeed, the existence of a CSR governance structure or of
a CSR action plan does not guarantee the actual implementation of CSR practices across all a
firm’s subsidiary or the improvement of the corporate social performance. CSR practices and
discourses on CSR are “easily decoupled” structures (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999).
Noteworthily, the headquarters can also suffer from their subsidiaries’ communication tactics,
and may lack control on the actual implementation of CSR programs launched by the decision
center.
As a result, MNCs undergo what Kostova and colleagues called a “legitimacy spillover
effect” and “institutional duality” issue (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002).
Gaining and maintaining legitimacy in face of CSR demands is more difficult for MNCs than for
firms operating in a single country as complexity ensues from the variety of institutional
environments within which MNCs operate. In addition, the overall legitimacy of an MNC is
linked to the legitimacy of its sub-entities due to internal up- and down-ward spillovers (Kostova
& Zaheer, 1999). At the sub-entity level, an MNC’s subsidiary also faces an institutional duality,
i.e. institutional pressures from their host country as well as from their parent company (Kostova
and Roth, 2002; Hillman and Wan, 2005).
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Our first assumption relates to the various pressures exerted on a subsidiary on its level of
practice implementation. We distinguish between isomorphic pressures from external competitors
and isomorphic pressures from internal competitors.
First, the subsidiaries undergo institutional pressures from their local environment. These
pressures emanate first of all from the national government (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova,
T. & Roth, K. 2002; Björkman et al. 2007; Short & Toffel, 2010) and organizations can either
meet or exceed the legal requirements regarding CSR, but they cannot underperform (Gardber
and Fombrun, 2006). In addition, this legal CSR context is country specific. For instance, the
legal framework related to health and safety is very advanced in some countries (e.g.
approximately 500 laws in France and in the United States), but less developed in others (less
than 10 laws in many countries in Africa, South America, the Middle East and Asia). . The
subsidiaries also undergo pressures from their clients for whom CSR becomes a more and more
prevalent criterion to assess and compare offers (King, Lenox and Terlaak, 2005). These local
external pressures foster isomorphism between the members of the field (DiMaggio and Powell,
1986). Isomorphic pressures are stronger between actors that perceive themselves as similar
(Rosenzweig and Sinh, 1991); and a way to tackle uncertainty is to imitate what peers do (Rao et
al, 2001). Indeed, the subsidiaries will turn to their competitors to analyze and benchmark their
practices. This is all the truer that the CSR norm is very ambiguous, and identifying the adequate
level and type of practices is particularly difficult because there are no “specific substantive
requirements” (Edelman, 1992). They tend to focus on the practices and performance of their
local competitors because they face similar issues in terms of human resource management or
environmental impacts of their activities. Thus, competitive pressures can trigger practice
adoption (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Davis & Greve, 1997). These competitors undergo the same
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pressures and the level of CSR implementation by local competitors actually reflects the strength
of the local institutional pressures. As a result, the level of CSR implementation of a subsidiary
will be pulled by the level of CSR implementation and performance of its competitors.
Second, internally, within the MNC, as pointed by Kostova, Roth and Dacin (2008), the
“intra-organizational institutional field” is a major source of influences at the subunit level which
can be influenced by other subsidiaries of the MNC. Therefore, a competitive isomorphism is
again at play between the subsidiaries of the MNC. But, contrasting with the external competitive
isomorphism, the purpose of the subsidiary is not to satisfy external demand emanating from
clients, NGOs, the State of the public, but to improve internal visibility vis-à-vis the
headquarters. Internally, the subsidiaries do not compete for markets but for resources, be them
human, physical or financial. According to the intraorganizational ecological perspective,
organizational entities “compete for limited organizational resources so as to increase their
relative importance within the organization” (Burgelman, 1991).
In short, consistent with prior literature, we propose:
Baseline Proposition 1: The greater the isomorphic pressures exerted on a MNC’s
subsidiary by external and internal competitors, the higher its level of CSR practices
implementation.
The implementation of CSR practices also depends on the weight given to the demands of
external and internal constituents concerning CSR by the top management of the subsidiary.
Consistent with prior studies, we call this phenomenon receptivity (e.g. Delmas and Toffel,
2008). Given that capabilities and attention are limited, the receptivity to various constituents’
pressures varies according to the expected influence of the constituent (March and Simon, 1958;
March, 1994). It also depends on the internal representation of these constituents through
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functional departments (Delmas and Toffel, 2008) and of their demands among members (Pache
and Santos, 2010). For instance, an entity can tend to be rather customer oriented - i.e.
prioritizing a specific market actor- or to pay large attention to the expectations of rating agencies
-i.e. being more receptive to pressures from a non-market actor. The more subsidiaries are willing
to meet the expectations of the headquarters and of the business unit in terms of CSR, and the
more they are willing to attend to the demands of external stakeholders (the State, local
authorities, customers, NGOs, the media), the more they will implement CSR practices. In short,
consistent with prior literature, we propose:
Baseline proposition 2: The greater the subsidiary’s receptivity to the demands from
internal and external environmental constituents, the higher its level of CSR practices
implementation.
However, although the subsidiary’s response to the demands is positive in both cases, the
mechanisms leading to it differ for internal and external demands. In the case of internal
demands, it corresponds to the implementation of the corporate CSR policy. The subsidiaries are
internally competing for resources (Burgelman, 1991) and power derived from internal
legitimacy. The subsidiaries that are receptive to internal demands will implement the practices
because they wish to appear compliant in the eye of the headquarters. And in the case of external
demands, it rather consists in the proactive implementation of practices, no matter what the
internal expectations are, in an attempt to satisfy external demands and ultimately outperform
external competitors. As a result, the impact of the receptivity to external and internal demands
on the level of implementation of the CSR practices further depends on some subsidiary
characteristics. Indeed, implementing a corporate policy and proactively implementing practices
in response to outside demands are two very different mechanisms that vary from one subsidiary
to the next according to their characteristics.
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Notably, the subsidiaries that are more integrated into the MNC, as long-time members of
the MNC or as majority controlled by the MNC, more readily apply the internal policy. They
know how to interpret the recommendations, they have relationships with the managers in place,
they understand the purpose of the policy. In a nutshell, they have more experience in playing the
internal legitimacy and power game. But, given their attention capacity is limited (Occasio,
1997), these subsidiaries tend to be less proactive towards the demands of external actors because
they devote less time searching for answers to external demands relative to internal demands, and
they are less sensitive to their immediate external environment.
In turn, less integrated subsidiaries (recently acquired entities or minority participations)
do not have these strong connections with internal constituents and this understanding of the
internal policy, so that receptivity to internal demands does not as readily translate into the
concrete implementation of the policy. Since they are more outward looking, they have
connections with external constituents, they tend to understand their expectations better, and also
to balance internal and external compliance more. This leads them to really implement practices
in response to the demands of external constituents they are receptive to.
Hypothesis 1: The more integrated the MNC, the greater (respectively lower) the impact
of its receptivity to the demands of internal (respectively external) environmental
constituents on the subsidiary’s level of CSR practices implementation.
Isomorphic pressures and receptivity cannot be considered in isolation. Indeed,
isomorphic pressures apply to all subsidiaries with varying degrees depending on their own
receptivity to demands. Again, receptivity corresponds to the weight given by a subsidiary to the
pressures exerted by its various external constituents. Each subsidiary will grant diverse attention
to each pressure dimension, depending on its local context and on its industry specialization.
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Past studies have considered types of receptivity independently of each other. In
particular, Delmas and Toffel (2008) distinguish between receptivity to market and non-market
pressures. They find that receptivity to market pressure positively moderates the impact of market
pressures on ISO 14001 implementation. Receptivity to non-market pressure negatively
moderates the impact of non-market pressures on ISO 14001 implementation and positively
moderates the impact of non-market pressures on voluntary programs implementation (Delmas
and Toffel, 2008, page 1045). We suspect this is due to the fact that the two available practices
(ISO14001 and voluntary governmental programs) are rather alternatives than complements. The
facilities in their study can implement ISO 14001 when the market pressures for implementation
and the receptivity to these market pressures are high; or voluntary governmental programs when
the non-market pressures for implementation and the receptivity to these non-market pressures
are high.
Consistent with prior work, we argue that the relationship between internal and external
isomorphic pressures and practice implementation is partially mediated by the receptivity of the
subsidiary to the demands of internal and external constituents. Part of the impact of the
isomorphic pressure depends on the receptivity of the subsidiary to the demands of its
environmental constituents. Under stronger isomorphic pressures, the subsidiary implements
CSR practices because it pays attention to the demands of the corresponding environmental
constituents (Ocasio, 1997). However, the mechanisms underlying the influence of receptivity to
internal and external demands are not the same: competition for market in the case of external
demands, and search for internal power and resources in the case of internal demands. Thus, a
finer understanding of the mediating role of receptivity is necessary.
First, under stronger internal competitive pressures, the subsidiary will grant more
attention to the demands of internal actors (CSR direction in the headquarters, CSR
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correspondents in the business unit), and in turn be more inclined to implement the CSR
practices. Indeed, it will compete for the internal recognition of the quality and extent of their
implementation of the corporate policy.
However, receptivity to demands cannot only be considered in relation to its
corresponding institutional pressures, it also needs to be thought in relation to the other
isomorphic pressures. MNCs’ subsidiaries have limited and selective attention (Ocasio, 1997;
Ocasio and Joseph, 2005; Ocasio and Joseph, 2008) and the strength of pressures from external
competitors will shift focus away from the implementation of the corporate policy as the
demands of internal constituents will appear relatively less salient, imperative, and urgent. As a
result, when the pressures from external competitors are strong, the attention of the subsidiary is
diverted away from internal demands, so that the level of implementation is ultimately reduced.
This results in an overall negative mediation of the pressures from external constituents by
receptivity to demands of internal environmental constituents.
In sum, whereas past research has considered the receptivity to the constituents’ demands
only with respects to the corresponding isomorphic pressure, we hypothesize a substitution effect
among the mediating effects of receptivity to internal demands on the relationship between the
internal and external isomorphic pressures and practice implementation.
Hypothesis 2a: Receptivity to demands from internal environmental constituents
positively (respectively negatively) mediates the effect of isomorphic pressures from
internal (respectively external) competitors on a subsidiary’s level of CSR practices
implementation.
Some subsidiaries will be more receptive to the demands of external constituents (clients,
customers, local authorities, the State, the media, NGOS etc), because they are more outward
looking, they face more competition, they are sales rather than production units, etc. These
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subsidiaries need to satisfy the demands of very diverse external constituents, so that they search
for differentiation, innovation, and more absolute CSR performance. They then tend to imitate
more readily both internal and external competitors, looking for the best practices among their
internal and external peers. Unlike for internal receptivity, the mechanism at play is not internal
compliance driven only by internal isomorphism, but differentiation, innovation and
outperformance of both internal and external competitors. The mediation role played by
receptivity to external demands on the impact of the two types of isomorphic pressures is thus
cumulative instead of substitutive. In other words, receptivity to external demands positively
mediates the impact of the pressures from both internal and external competitors. Hence:
Hypothesis 2b: Receptivity to demands from external environmental constituents
positively mediates the effect of isomorphic pressures from internal and external
competitors on a subsidiary’s level of CSR practices implementation.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
METHODS
Data and Sample
Our field of inquiry is an MNC present in 70 countries worldwide and operating in gas
and electricity production and supply, as well as infrastructure development and energy and
environmental services. It defined and released ten group-wise quantitative and qualitative CSR
objectives in 2010. These objectives cover human resources (diversity, training and shareholding
by employees), safety and the environment (biodiversity and renewable energy). In order to test
our hypotheses, we focused on the objectives related to the proportion of female managers,
biodiversity and safety. Indeed, these topics are of particular interest because 1) they cover all
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facilities of the Group, 2) they can be easily translated into concrete actions in the operating units,
and 3) they are linked to three different domains: social, safety and environmental issues.
An on-line survey was conducted among the subsidiaries of the MNC in October 2012, in
order to capture the extent of implementation of practices related to these three topics, as well as
the receptivity to external pressures for implementation. The survey was validated thanks to 10
interviews with experts from the Group’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) department, and
pretested in two subsidiaries in June - July 2012. The main modifications that followed the
pretest were mostly clarifications and a slight reduction of the length of the questionnaire.
The entities were randomly selected according to a systematic cluster sampling among the
exhaustive list of subsidiaries. However, some randomly selected entities were replaced if they
did not exist anymore or did not have any employees (e.g. holding companies). The initial sample
thus obtained was composed of 104 subsidiaries. In each of the 104 subsidiaries, four to six
managers were asked to fill in the on-line questionnaire depending on their presence in the entity:
the general director, the finance director, the operating director, the human resource manager, the
communication director and the sales director. Overall, the on-line survey was sent to 475
respondents.
After several reminders, we received complete answers from 314 respondents, a 66%
response rate, in 101 subsidiaries located in 35 countries worldwide. The 101,000 employees of
these 101 subsidiaries represent 46% of the Group’s workforce.
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Measures
Dependent Variable: level of CSR practices implementation. The dependent variable,
level of CSR practices implementation, is captured through survey measures reflecting the extent
of implementation on the three selected CSR issues: the employment of female managers,
biodiversity and occupational health and safety. Eight or nine items were developed for each
domain in cooperation with experts in the MNC. The respondents thus had to answer 25
questions covering the three domains on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “0: not at all” to “7:
To a very great extent”. As a result, we obtained 7,850 observations at the respondent*practice
level (314 respondents * 25 questions on practices).
The eight items on safety were: “We have a safety management system”, “Our entity
designated a health and safety coordinator”, “We systematically use protecting equipment
(helmets, gloves, safety shoes, etc)”, “Our entity has a policy that sets our ambition in terms of
health and safety and define progress paths”, “There is a communication on health and safety
towards employees in our entity (written information, poster campaign, events, etc)”, “Some
training to work safety is compulsory for employees in our entity”, “Our entity has quantitative
objectives for health and safety” and “In our entity, there is a health and safety action plan that
sets improvement objectives regarding prevention and protection.”
The eight items on the employment of female managers were: “We implement practices
to favor gender equity in the recruitment of managers”, “We implement practices to favor gender
equity during annual performance interviews”, “The equal pay between men and women is
observed in our entity”, “Our entity has quantitative objectives regarding the recruitment and
employment of women among managers”, “In our entity, the work-life balance is favored
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(adapted working time, telecommuting, child day care)”, “Some awareness and communication
campaigns to prevent gender discrimination take place in our entity”, “We favor the access of our
female employees to trainings dedicated to leadership” and “There is an internal women network
in our entity”.
The nine items on the preservation of biodiversity were: “Our environmental management
system includes measures to preserve biodiversity”, “Biodiversity threats are analyzed when we
screen new investment opportunities”, “There is a communication on biodiversity towards
employees in our entity”, “We engage in projects to limit the impact of our activities on
biodiversity”, “We measure the impact of our activities on biodiversity”, “Our entity has
measurable objectives for biodiversity preservation”, “We collaborate with environmental
organizations on biodiversity preservation and restoration”, “Financial means are dedicated to the
management of our impact on biodiversity” and “We perform a regulatory watch on biodiversity
issues”.
Independent variables: Pressures from external competitors are captured by the weighted
average performance of competitors according to their size in the country (based on employees)
in the three domains: safety, gender diversity and biodiversity, obtained thanks to their ratings in
Asset4, the world’s largest Environmental, Social & Governance rating database. Asset4 provides
information about the name of the companies, their activity, their country, their headcounts and
of course a detailed grading. The grading used was the most recent one available to us: 2011.
First, the target group of competitors was identified by focusing on the companies that
were sorted as “utilities” in the database (either “gas”, “electricity”, “water” or “multiline”) or
that were sorted as “industrial services” and whose name or activity description alluded to waste,
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water, environment or energy. Then, only companies employing more than 1,000 people were
kept, a pool of 125 competitors worldwide. For these 125 competitors, we used Asset4 grading
for six items related to safety, seven items related to gender diversity and twelve items related to
environmental biodiversity.
The items capturing the safety performance of competitors in Asset4 were: “Does the
company have a policy to improve employee health & safety within the company and its supply
chain?”, “Does the company describe the implementation of its employee health & safety policy
through a public commitment from a senior management or board member or the establishment
of an employee health & safety team? AND Does the company describe the implementation of its
employee health & safety policy through the processes in place?”, “Does the company monitor or
measure its performance on employee health & safety?”, “Does the company set specific
objectives to be achieved on employee health & safety? AND Does the company comment on the
results of previously set objectives?”, “Does the company report on policies or programs on
HIV/AIDS for the workplace or beyond?”, and “Is the company under the spotlight of the media
because of a controversy linked to workforce health and safety?”
The seven items capturing the diversity performance of competitors in Asset4 were:
“Does the company have a work-life balance policy? AND Does the company have a diversity
and equal opportunity policy?”, “Does the company describe the implementation of its diversity
and opportunity policy?”, “Does the company monitor the diversity and equal opportunities in its
workforce?”, “Does the company set specific objectives to be achieved on diversity and equal
opportunity?”, “Does the company promote positive discrimination? OR Has the company won
any prize or award relating to diversity or opportunity?”, “Does the company claim to provide
generous vacations, career breaks or sabbaticals? OR Does the company claim to provide flexible
working hours or working hours that promote a work-life balance?”, and “Does the company
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claim to provide day care services for its employees? OR Does the company claim to provide
generous maternity leave benefits? OR Has the company won a family friendly prize like a
"Working Mother Award"?”.
The twelve items capturing the environmental biodiversity performance of competitors in
Asset4 were: “Does the company have a policy for reducing environmental emissions or its
impacts on biodiversity? AND Does the company have a policy for maintaining an
environmental management system?”, “Does the company report on initiatives to protect, restore
or reduce its impact on native ecosystems and species, biodiversity, protected and sensitive
areas?”, “Does the company report on partnerships or initiatives with specialized NGOs, industry
organizations, governmental or supra-governmental organizations that focus on improving
environmental issues?”, “Does the company report or provide information on company-generated
initiatives to restore the environment?”, “Does the company report on initiatives to reduce the
environmental impact of transportation of its products or its staff?”, “Is the company directly or
indirectly (through a supplier) under the spotlight of the media because of a controversy linked to
the spill of chemicals, oils and fuels, gases (flaring) or controversy relating to the overall impacts
of the company on the environment?”, “Does the company report on initiatives to reduce, avoid
or minimize the effects of spills or other polluting events (crisis management system)?”, “Does
the company have a policy for reducing the use of natural resources? AND Does the company
have a policy to lessen the environmental impact of its supply chain?”, “Does the company
describe the implementation of its resource efficiency policy through a public commitment from
a senior management or board member? AND Does the company describe the implementation of
its resource efficiency policy through the processes in place?”, “Does the company have
environmentally friendly or green sites or offices?”, “Does the company report on initiatives to
reuse or recycle water? OR Does the company report on initiatives to reduce the amount of water
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used?”, and “Does the company report on initiatives to reduce the environmental impact on land
owned, leased or managed for production activities or extractive use?”.
The items clearly appeared to have two modes: a low and a high score. Therefore, we
replaced them by binary scores: 0 for a low score and 1 for a high score. Then, a unique measure
of the local market pressure per topic per country was obtained, by calculating an average score
of the competitors on each of the three topics in each of the 35 countries covered by our sample1.
More precisely, we allocated the employees of the 125 competitors in the 35 countries in which
our MNC operates. When there were less than 10,000 employees and the competitor was mostly
based in a large country, the headcounts were all allocated to this country. Otherwise (either more
than 10,000 employees or based in a small country), we checked the company website for the
allocations of employees per country. Eventually, pressures from competitors is a weighted
average grade that was calculated for our MNC’s competitors in each country by summing the
scores of all local individual competitors across the items per issue (safety, gender, and
environment) weighted by their local headcount relative to all the competitors’ headcounts in this
country.
Our MNC has 6 operating “branches”, all related to the core businesses of the Group
(Environmental Services, Gas, Energy, etc). The generation of the pressure from internal
competitors variable relies on our survey’s items related to the average extent of practice
implementation by the other MNC’s entities from within the same branch excluding the focal
entity.
Our unit of analysis is the respondent*practice; therefore, for each pressure (external and
internal competitor), we retain the values that correspond to the entity, competitors, and peers
1 Missing data for Oman and Pakistan (for Oman & Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates’ score was used and for
Pakistan, the Indian score was used).
21
from the country where the respondent’s entity is located and for the corresponding practice
(safety, gender or environment).
The receptivity to demands from external constituents and the receptivity to demands from
internal constituents were captured thanks to survey items. For external constituents, the three
questions asked were “Regarding its health and safety results/the percentage of female managers/
its performances as regards the preservation of biodiversity, to what extent is your entity
supportive of the demands of these external actors?” Respondents had to give an answer on a 7-
point Likert scale and the proposed items retained here were “Local authorities”, “The media”,
“NGOs”, “Clients”, “Suppliers”, “Local communities and neighbors” and “Shareholders”.. The
scores on these seven items were averaged. For peer pressures, the three questions asked were
“Regarding its health and safety results/the percentage of female managers/ its performances as
regards the preservation of biodiversity, to what extent is your entity supportive of the demands
of these internal actors?” Respondents had to give an answer on a 7-point Likert scale and the
proposed item retained here were “Group Sustainable Development Direction” and “Branch
Sustainable Development or Environmental Correspondent”. The scores on these two items were
averaged.
The level of integration is proxied by two measures: ownership represents the control of
the Group over the entity. It takes the value of 1 when the percentage of ownership of the MNC
over the focal entity is less than 50% (minority), 2 when it’s between 50% and 99% (majority)
and 3 when it’s over 99% (full control). Time corresponds to the time the company has been part
of the Group up until 2012. It takes the value of 1 for less than 10 years, 2 for less than 20 years,
and 3 otherwise.
22
Controls: The national legal context was proxied via data on national legislation relative
to the three CSR issues at stake. For safety, we used the number of laws related to health and
safety in the country in 2012, provided by the International Labor Organization. For gender
diversity, we used the number of laws related to non-discrimination in the country in 2012,
provided by the International Labor Organization. For biodiversity, we are aware of no database
listing the laws related to biodiversity worldwide, and even at the national level, most countries
do not communicate this information. Therefore, we used the national percentages of terrestrial
and marine area that was protected in 2010, provided by the Worldbank. Indeed, the protection is
defined and declared by the government of each country, and can thus be considered to reflect the
importance granted to biodiversity by each country’s government. Given that the ranges of our
variable differed greatly across topics, we normalized the variable per topic.
The entity’s autonomy was captured through a question in the survey addressed to the
managers, adapted from Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s work (2008). The question was: “In the
following propositions, please select the answers that best describe the decision-making process
in your subsidiary”, on five items: “To discontinue a major existing product/service or
product/service line”, “To invest in major plant or equipment to expand production capacity”,
“To formulate and approve your entity's annual budgets”, “To increase (beyond budget)
expenditures for research and development”, “To subcontract out large portions of the
production”. The respondents gave their answer among 6 potential answers: “the entity's opinion
is not asked; decision is explained to the entity by the Branch”, “proposal by the Branch, but the
entity's opinion carries little weight”, “proposal by the Branch, and the entity's opinion carries a
lot of weight”, “proposal by the entity, decision made by the Branch”, “decision made by the
entity without much consultation with the Branch”, and “Non applicable”. Since the various
23
items are reflective measures of the autonomy of the entity, we calculated a Cronbach alpha for
the five items. The alpha coefficient is of 0.74, which means the internal consistency of the scale
is good. Therefore, to generate a single variable per respondent, we averaged the scores on the
five items. In our models, the few “non applicable” responses were replaced by the average
response among all respondents who answered one of the five first items.
Other firm controls concern the size of the entity, i.e. its number of employees as of
30.09.12. We logged this variable since there was some disparity among the entities’ size
(between 20 and 15,350 headcounts).
We included respondents’ controls. Tenure and time spent in the company were captured
through two survey items asking for how many years the respondent had been respectively in her
current position and working for the MNC. Respondent in charge reflects the fact that the
respondent is in a way responsible for the implementation of the practices within the subsidiary.
It takes the value of 1 when the respondent is either human resources manager, or COO or CEO
and 0 when the respondent is either CFO or communication or sales manager.
Eventually, Biodiversity practices and Safety practices are two binary variables taking the
value of one when the topic is respectively biodiversity and safety, or zero otherwise. We
introduced these controls given that we expected the practices to display different levels of
implementation across the three topics (biodiversity, safety and employment of female
managers).
Model
We tested our hypotheses using nested linear regression models with maximum likelihood
estimates, clustered by practice and entity. The correlation matrix presented in Table 1 below
suggests there is no multicollinearity issue in the data. Indeed, the correlation between the main
24
regressors and the moderating variables is between 0 and 0.35 in absolute value. Rather
unsurprisingly, the only correlations above 0.50 are the correlation between the two types of
receptivity and between the pressures from internal competitors and safety practices2.
Regarding the mediation analysis, we chose to calculate the indirect effect by multiplying
the regression coefficients, running Sobel-Goodman tests (Sobel, 1982) instead of using the four-
step approach of Baron and Kenny (1986) that has been criticized for reporting insignificant
results in the first steps when mediations actually existed (e.g. MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz,
2007).
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here
RESULTS
The regression results are presented in Table 2. Model 1 is the reference model and
includes all control variables. It suggests that the national legal context triggers practice adoption
to a large extent, with a significant impact and a coefficient of 2,655. In addition, the safety
practices tend to be more implemented than other types of pressures. This is not surprising since
safety is known to be the more mature among the three topics. In fact, the mean of the dependent
variable is of 6,48 for safety practices (standard deviation of 0,98), 3,93 for biodiversity practices
(standard deviation of 2,00) and 4,03 for practices in favor of the employment of female
managers (standard deviation of 2,04). In addition, the impact of autonomy is negative and
significant, confirming that there is an influence of the headquarters on the level of
2 The rationale is the same as the one behind the impact of safety practices on the implementation level of CSR practices: safety practices are implemented to a greater extent than other practices by all subsidiaries. Given the way the pressures from internal competitors were proxied, they should be higher when the variable safety takes the value of 1, and lower when the variable safety takes the value of 0.
25
implementation of CSR practices in the subsidiaries: the more autonomous the entities, the lower
their implementation level of CSR practices. The negative and significant impact of respondent
in charge suggests that the managers who are responsible for the implementation of CSR
practices tend to report lower implementation levels than other respondents. This is probably
linked to the fact that these respondents have a better knowledge of the practices in their
subsidiary than other respondents who, in doubt, tend to report implementation levels slightly
above reality. The impact of size is also positive and significant, suggesting that larger
subsidiaries tend to implement the CSR practices more extensively. At the respondent level,
tenure and time spent in the Group also tend to slightly increase the reported level of CSR
practices implementation.
In Model 2, we added the pressures, level of integration and time since entry. The impact
of pressures from internal and external competitors is positive and significant, confirming our
baseline proposition 1. Note that in Model 2, the direct effects of integration and time since entry
are negative and significant. The impact of the national legal environment is no longer significant
in this model. This is consistent with our argument, since this impact is absorbed by the
isomorphic pressures exerted by external competitors.
In Models 3, we added the receptivity to internal and external demands to the previous
model. The positive and significant coefficients associated with these variables confirm our
baseline proposition 2. In addition, we can notice that the impacts of the isomorphic pressures
change when we add these variables, already pointing to a mediation effect. Adding the mediator
into the model to check for mediation has been done in previous works (e.g. Leiponen and Helfat,
2011). However, here, since the coefficients of isomorphic pressures remain significant, further
investigation is needed to demonstrate that a partial mediation exists. This is done below, after
the analysis of models 6 and 7 thanks to the Sobel-Goodman Mediation tests.
26
In Models 4 and 5, we test hypotheses 1 stating that the level of integration of the
subsidiary in the MNC reinforces the impact of receptivity to internal demands, but reduce the
impact of receptivity to external demands on the level of practice implementation, using our two
variables: ownership and time. In Model 4, the first interaction coefficient presenting the
moderating effect of level of integration (time) on the effect of receptivity to internal demands is
positive and significant, while the second interaction coefficient presenting the moderating effect
of level of integration (time) on the effect of receptivity to external demands is negative and
significant, confirming Hypothesis 1. A similar analysis of model 5, presenting the moderating
effects of the level of integration (ownership) allows us to again confirm Hypothesis 1. Indeed,
the interaction coefficient reflecting the moderating effect on receptivity to internal demands is
also positive and significant, while the interaction coefficient reflecting the moderating effect on
receptivity to external demands is again negative and significant.
These first results corroborate our argument that the mechanisms underlying receptivity to
internal and external demands are different. We can now check whether this really leads to
different mediation effects on the relationship between isomorphic pressures and CSR practices
implementation.
In Model 6, we included the pressures from internal and external competitors plus the
receptivity to internal demands. The objective was to disentangle the potential mediating effects
of receptivity to internal and external demands. Compared to model 2, introducing receptivity to
internal demands as a separate variable increases the coefficient of pressures from external
competitors and reduces the coefficient of pressures from internal variables. This suggests that
receptivity to internal demands negatively mediates the impact of pressures from external
competitor and positively mediates the impact of pressures from internal variables.
27
In Model 7, we included the pressures from internal and external competitors plus the
receptivity to external demands. Compared to model 2, introducing receptivity to external
demands as a separate variable reduces the coefficients of pressures from external competitors
and pressures from internal variables. This suggests that receptivity to internal demands
positively mediates the impact of both types of pressures.
To further check the fit of the partial mediation models, we ran Sobel-Goodman
mediation tests presented in tables 3 to 6 below3.
For pressures from internal competitors, the indirect effect through receptivity to internal
demands is significant and represents 19% of the total effect and the indirect effect through
receptivity to external demands is significant and represents 11% of the total effect. For pressures
from external competitors, the indirect effect through receptivity to internal demands is
significant and represents -27% of the total effect and the indirect effect through receptivity to
external demands represents 5% of the total effect but it is not significant. We can note that the
indirect effects through receptivity to internal demands are larger than the indirect effects through
receptivity to external demands. This is consistent with our argument that the effects of
receptivity to internal demands are substitutive, while that the effects of receptivity to external
demands are cumulative. Indeed, the effect of receptivity to internal demands is focused on one
type of pressure, excluding the other one, while the effect of receptivity to external demands is
split between the two types of pressures. More concretely, subsidiaries that are more receptive to
3 We also simultaneously computed the indirect effects and obtained their standard error thanks to a seemingly
unrelated regression. The percentage mediated by each mediator slightly decreased, but the signs, ordering and significance of the effects were very similar.
Insert Tables 3 to 6 about here
28
internal demands imitate internal competitors to a greater extent than subsidiaries that are more
receptive to external demands imitate either internal or external competitors.
Overall, hypotheses 2a and 2b are supported by our data analysis, although Hypothesis 2a
more strongly.
In summary, our analysis confirms that the impact of receptivity demands on CSR
practices implementation is not uniform across subsidiaries and demand types: the impact of
receptivity to internal demands is higher for subsidiaries that have been part of the MNC for
longer and whose integration level is higher, while the impact of receptivity to external demands
is higher for subsidiaries that joined the MNC more recently and whose integration level is lower
(Hypothesis 1). In addition, receptivity to internal demands positively mediates the impact of
pressures from internal competitors and negatively mediates the impact of pressures from
external competitors (Hypothesis 2a), while receptivity to external demands positively mediates
both effects (Hypothesis 2b), although to a lesser extent.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Before commenting on our findings, we acknowledge that this work is based on the study
of a single case, a multidivisional organization with multiple industrial and regional presences.
Therefore, the generalization should be performed with caution, in particular when talking about
global firms, in which the industry x country vector is likely to be different. Another limitation
lies in the fact that the dependent variable and the moderators are both collected through a single
survey. However, the independent variables are collected separately, so that we avoid a too
severe common method bias. Further empirical refinements will alleviate this concern as well. As
of now, our preliminary results shed light on the great contrasts that exist across an MNC’s
subsidiaries. Departing from the assumption that MNC firms are monolithic wholes, this paper
29
advocates for a nuanced analysis of the aggregated CSR performance of MNCs and points to the
need to consider the idiosyncratic characteristics of their subsidiaries. By moving the level of
analysis from the organization to the subsidiaries, it answers a request from both neo-institutional
and international strategic scholars to look at intra-organizational drivers of performance and
conformity.
It further develops the neo-institutional arguments at the subsidiary level within an MNC.
Following prior works by international strategy scholars (e.g. Kostova and Roth, 2002, Delmas &
Toffel, 2008), we confirm that internal, as well as external competitors influence an entity’s
tendency to adopt certain practices. In particular, based on the magnitude of the coefficients from
our regressions, we find that the influence of internal competitors is more important than the
influence of external competitors. In addition, we find that the mechanisms underlying receptivity
to internal and external demands are different, so that the effects of the two types of receptivity
on practice implementation will be diversely affected by some characteristics of the subsidiaries
such as their level of integration or the amount of time they have been part of the Group.
By measuring the impact of the organizational context on practice implementation once
controlled for the structural organizational characteristics, these results also confirm that the
selective focus of attention by decision-makers, because it results in varying degrees of
receptivity to environmental demands, constrains organizational action. Although isomorphic
pressuresfrom internal and external competitors are cumulatively reinforced by receptivity to the
demands from external constituents, isomorphism to internal competitors is substituted for
isomorphism to external competitors under the role of receptivity to demands from internal
constituents. We show that the influence of an institutional pressure does not only depend on its
absolute strength, or even on the receptivity level of the organization to the corresponding
30
demands, but also on the level receptivity to other demands. Receptivity to certain demands
cannot be considered in isolation from receptivity to other demands.
Eventually, our work advances research on sustainability by looking at the antecedents of
CSR implementation at an intra-organizational level. Thus, following Margolis and Walsh’s
prescription (2003), we depart from the numerous studies on CSR that focus on the link between
corporate social performance and corporate financial performance at a firm level. From a
practical point of view, we show that the overall receptivity of the subsidiaries of an MNC to
pressures for CSR practices implementation is limited, which suggests that their implementation
of CSR practices is constrained by idiosyncratic organizational characteristics and environmental
determinants. Since subsidiaries differ in their prioritization of institutional actors and demands,
they respond with varying implementation and conformity levels. With our model and results, it
is therefore possible to anticipate which entities will respond and how, and to adjust management
to entities’ specificities for an improved level of implementation of CSR practices.
31
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35
FIGURE 1
Summary of the Research Hypotheses
36
TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations
Mea
n
Std
. D
ev.
Min
Max
Pre
ssure
s fr
om
ex
tern
al
com
pet
ito
rs
Pre
ssure
s fr
om
inte
rnal
com
pet
ito
rs
Rec
epti
vit
y t
o e
xte
rnal
dem
and
s
Rec
epti
vit
y t
o i
nte
rnal
dem
and
s
Tim
e si
nce
en
try
Lev
el o
f in
teg
rati
on
Bio
div
ersi
ty p
ract
ices
Saf
ety
pra
ctic
es
Nat
ion
al l
egal
co
nte
xt
Siz
e (l
og
ged
)
Au
tono
my
Res
pon
den
t in
ch
arg
e
Ten
ure
Tim
e sp
ent
in t
he
com
pan
y
Pressures from external
competitors 0.7478967 0.1729894 0 1 1
Pressures from internal competitors 0.5088233 0.3055959 0 1 0.1470 1
Receptivity to external demands 3.77904 1.706541 1 7
-
0.0269 0.3007 1
Receptivity to internal demands 3.976569 1.696665 1 7 0.0719 0.3569 0.6827 1
Level of integration (time) 1.802548 0.7524495 1 3 0.0861 -
0.1165 -
0.1066 -
0.1314 1
Level of integration (ownership) 2.289809 0.7668508 1 3 0.0607
-
0.1212
-
0.1094
-
0.1188 0.1378 1
Biodiversity practices 0.36 0.4800306 0 1 -
0.0146 -
0.5000 -
0.0398 0.0511 -
0.0000 -
0.0000 1
Safety practices 0.32 0.4665059 0 1 0.1687 0.9214 0.2691 0.3474 0.0000
-
0.0000
-
0.5145 1
National legal context 0.4352102 0.2780456 0 1 0.1028 0.1913 0.0177 0.0960 0.1350 0.0506 -
0.1122 0.2214 1
Size (logged) 5.729462 1.549967 2.995732 9.638871 0.0471
-
0.0945
-
0.0942
-
0.0759 0.4076 0.0738 0.0000
-
0.0000 0.0931 1
Autonomy 3.928201 0.4573802 2 5 0.1255 -
0.0499 -
0.1194 -
0.0719 0.0177 0.2293 0.0000 -
0.0000 0.0211 0.0998 1
Respondent in charge 0.8089172 0.3931792 0 1
-
0.0179
-
0.0155
-
0.1035
-
0.0710 0.0555 0.0252 0.0000 0.0000
-
0.0562 0.0930 0.0518 1
Tenure 4.420382 3.747216 0 30 0.0148 -
0.0385 -
0.0054 -
0.0086 0.1469 0.1460 0.0000 -
0.0000 0.0502 0.0759 0.0424 0.0329 1
Time spent in the company 11.25159 8.29125 0 38 0.1096
-
0.0417
-
0.0739
-
0.0448 0.2459 0.1443 0.0000
-
0.0000 0.1718 0.1938 0.1309 0.0089 0.1985 1
37
TABLE 2
Models of CSR Practices Implementation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Pressures from
external competitors
0.504*** 0.587*** 0.531*** 0.563*** 0.667*** 0.441*** (0.141) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.134) (0.134)
Pressures from internal
competitors
2.137*** 1.721*** 1.684*** 1.687*** 1.719*** 1.902*** (0.228) (0.214) (0.214) (0.215) (0.217) (0.216)
Receptivity to external
demands
0.138*** 0.232*** 0.235*** 0.270*** (0.014) (0.035) (0.048) (0.011)
Receptivity to internal
demands
0.198*** 0.012 0.067 0.279*** (0.013) (0.035) (0.046) (0.011)
Level of integration
(time)
-0.199*** -0.148*** -0.339*** -0.151*** -0.171*** -0.138*** (0.037) (0.034) (0.069) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Receptivity to internal
demands*time
0.102***
(0.018)
Receptivity to external
demands*time
-0.050***
(0.018)
Level of integration
(ownership)
-0.142*** -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.153** -0.118*** -0.103***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.066) (0.031) (0.031)
Receptivity to internal
demands*ownership
0.055***
(0.018)
Receptivity to external
demands*ownership
-0.039**
(0.019)
Biodiversity practice -0.057 -0.087 -0.339 -0.339 -0.345 -0.228 -0.384 (0.239) (0.239) (0.240) (0.240) (0.240) (0.240) (0.240)
Safety practice 0.866*** 1.148*** 0.886*** 0.919*** 0.908*** 1.029*** 0.802***
(0.278) (0.281) (0.277) (0.277) (0.278) (0.278) (0.278)
National legal context 2.655*** -0.120 -0.121 -0.144* -0.123 -0.076 -0.182**
(0.218) (0.091) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
Size (logged) 0.041** 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.071*** 0.074***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Autonomy -0.215*** -0.224*** -0.169*** -0.178*** -0.164*** -0.171*** -0.191***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Respondent in charge -0.196*** -0.192*** -0.086** -0.073* -0.079** -0.086** -0.132***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Tenure 0.011** 0.014*** 0.011** 0.009* 0.011** 0.010** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Time spent in the
Group
0.006*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 3.804*** 4.171*** 2.702*** 3.113*** 2.796*** 2.873*** 3.106***
(0.268) (0.290) (0.285) (0.307) (0.312) (0.286) (0.286)
Wald Chi2 210.69 428.48 1266.87 1304.58 1275.74 1156.07 1029.97
Observations 7,850 7,850 7,850 7,850 7,850 7,850 7,850
Number of groups 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
38
TABLE 3
Sobel-Goodman Mediation tests - Mediation of the pressures from internal competitors
by receptivity to internal demands
Coef Std Err Z P>Z
Sobel 0.40829413 0.05308378 7.692 1.443e-14
Goodman-1 (Aroian) 0.40829413 0.05311981 7.686 1.510e-14
Goodman-2 0.40829413 0.05304773 7.697 1.399e-14
Coef Coef Std Err Z P>Z
a coefficient 1.35117 0.167756 8.05439 8.9e-16
b coefficient 0.302178 0.01166 25.9163 0
Indirect effect 0.408294 0.053084 7.6915 1.4e-14
Direct effect 1.72749 0.173884 9.93473 0
Total effect 2.13579 0.180425 11.8375 0
Proportion of total effect mediated 0.19116817
Ratio ofindirect to direct effect 0.23635095
Ratio of total to direct effect 1.236351
TABLE 4
Sobel-Goodman Mediation tests - Mediation of the pressures from external competitors
by receptivity to internal demands
Coef Std Err Z P>Z
Sobel -0.18800665 0.03491603 -5.385 7.263e-08
Goodman-1 (Aroian) -0.18800665 0.03493854 -5.381 7.405e-08
Goodman-2 -0.18800665 0.03489351 -5.388 7.124e-08
Coef Coef Std Err Z P>Z
a coefficient -0.590586 0.107527 -5.49244 4.0e-08
b coefficient 0.318339 0.011661 27.2984 0
Indirect effect -0.188007 0.034916 -5.38454 7.3e-08
Direct effect 0.872792 0.111226 7.84701 4.2e-15
Total effect 0.684786 0.116163 5.89502 3.7e-09
Proportion of total effect
mediated -0.27454813
Ratio ofindirect to direct effect -0.21540821
Ratio of total to direct effect 0.78459179
39
TABLE 5
Sobel-Goodman Mediation tests - Mediation of the pressures from internal competitors
by receptivity to external demands
Coef Std Err Z P>Z
Sobel 0.23456606 0.05006897 4.685 2.802e-06
Goodman-1 (Aroian) 0.23456606 0.05010735 4.681 2.851e-06
Goodman-2 0.23456606 0.05003055 4.688 2.753e-06
Coef Coef Std Err Z P>Z
a coefficient 0.750165 0.157308 4.76877 1.9e-06
b coefficient 0.312686 0.012465 25.0846 0
Indirect effect 0.234566 0.050069 4.68486 2.8e-06
Direct effect 1.90122 0.173854 10.9357 0
Total effect 2.13579 0.180425 11.8375 0
Proportion of total effect mediated 0.10982662
Ratio ofindirect to direct effect 0.12337666
Ratio of total to direct effect 1.1233767
TABLE 6
Sobel-Goodman Mediation tests - Mediation of the pressures from external competitors
by receptivity to external demands
Coef Std Err Z P>Z
Sobel 0.03179261 0.03218303 0.9879 0.32321702
Goodman-1 (Aroian) 0.03179261 0.03220772 0.9871 0.3235881
Goodman-2 0.03179261 0.03215832 0.9886 0.32284536
Coef Coef Std Err Z P>Z
a coefficient 0.099601 0.100748 0.98861 0.322854
b coefficient 0.3192 0.012515 25.5048 0
Indirect effect 0.031793 0.032183 0.987869 0.323217
Direct effect 0.652993 0.111637 5.84924 4.9e-09
Total effect 0.684786 0.116163 5.89502 3.7e-09
Proportion of total effect mediated 0.04642709
Ratio ofindirect to direct effect 0.0486875
Ratio of total to direct effect 1.0486875