Managing Complexity:Political and Managerial Challengesin United Nations Peace Operations

with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy

JULY 2009

I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E A C E I N S T I T U T E

Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith, eds.

Cover Photo: A view of Monrovia

from a helicopter of the United

Nations Mission in Liberia.

December 13, 2008. ©UN

Photo/Christopher Herwig

Conference Photos: 2008 ©Elliot

Moscowitz - Elliot’s Images

The views expressed in this paper

represent those of the authors and

rapporteurs and not necessarily

those of IPI. IPI welcomes considera-

tion of a wide range of perspectives

in the pursuit of a well-informed

debate on critical policies and issues

in international affairs.

IPI Publications

Adam Lupel, EditorEllie B. Hearne, Publications Officer

Suggested Citation:

Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith,

eds., “Managing Complexity: Political

and Managerial Challenges in United

Nations Peace Operations,” New

York: International Peace Institute,

July 2009.

© by International Peace Institute,

2009

All Rights Reserved

www.ipinst.org

ABOUT THE EDITORS

CATY CLEMENT is Faculty Member and Co-Director for the

New Issues in Security Course, Geneva Centre for Security

Policy.

ADAM C. SMITH is Senior Program Officer at the

International Peace Institute.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The International Peace Institute (IPI) owes a great debt of

gratitude to its many donors to the program Coping with

Crisis, Conflict, and Change. In particular, IPI is grateful to

the governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,

Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,

Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

CONTENTS

Meeting Note. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

MANAGING COMPLEXITY: POLITICAL ANDMANAGERIAL CHALLENGES IN UNITED NATIONSPEACE OPERATIONS

Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith,rapporteurs

Keynote Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

MANAGING COMPLEXITY

Alain Le Roy

Discussion Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

“MOVING THE RAVIOLI AROUND”: MANAGINGUN PEACE OPERATIONS IN A PERIOD OF CRISIS

Richard Gowan 19

PLANNING FOR SUCCESS

Cedric de Coning 24

LEADERSHIP ON THE LINE: MANAGING FIELDCOMPLEXITY

Pierre Schori 28

ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: MANAGINGKNOWLEDGE

Lise Morjé Howard 32

MANAGING TRANSITION: EXIT STRATEGIESAND PEACE CONSOLIDATION

Richard Caplan 36

Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

CONFERENCE AGENDA 40

CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS 44

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“Overstretched,” “underresourced,” and “over-matched” are terms commonly used to describe UNpeacekeeping. The first is a result of the vastnumber of conflicts the Security Council haschosen to address with peace operations. Thesecond is due to a lack of available specializedequipment, highly trained personnel, and funds—aconstraint compounded by global recession. Thefinal descriptor, “overmatched,” is, at least partly, aconsequence of the challenging, complex environ-ment in which the UN operates. The multiplicity ofactors involved, the unpredictability of the environ-ment, and the enormous obstacles to sustainablepeace all suggest a complexity through which theUN—a large bureaucracy dependent on the willand capacity of its member states—is oftenunprepared to navigate.

In recent years, efforts to integrate UN organiza-tions and activities in the field, streamline decisionmaking, improve communication, and strengthenplanning, monitoring, and evaluation processes,implicitly acknowledged the challenges specific tocomplex operating environments. Management, asa field of study and of practice, attempts to do thesame: limit unpredictability, anticipate crisis andresponse, improve efficiency, and measure andlearn from the results to improve effectiveness. Thisreport, and the seminar on which it is based,outlines the challenge of being “overmatched” bycomplexity, while offering suggestions forunderstanding and dealing with complex environ-ments.

Five key challenges, relating to planning, leader-ship, organizational complexity, interagencycooperation, and exit strategies, were identified:

The first and possibly most important element ofa peace operation resides in its planning. Soundplanning processes are critical in forecasting and

responding to the highly unpredictable nature ofpostconflict environments. Planning, due in largepart to the unique circumstances of each conflict,needs strong and sustained input from those in thefield with the best knowledge of the situation on theground. This field-based input must be sustainedthrough the life of a mission because of changingevents on the ground, suggesting the need for a full-time, devoted field-planning officer or unit withineach peacekeeping operation (PKO). Planningmust be coordinated on—at the very least—acursory level with the activities of the host govern-ment, bilateral donors, and nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs), and must address inputfrom ongoing monitoring and evaluation processes.

A second crucial aspect pertains to leadership,which, like planning, is key to the success ofcomplex endeavors. To choose the right leadershipfor its peace operations, UN headquarters mustinject more transparency into the SRSG (SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General) selectionprocess, as well as give the individual SRSGs moreroom to hand select a complementary senior staff.Most importantly, perhaps, the Special Repre-sentative of the Secretary-General and his or herdeputy bring coherence to the varied activities ofthe UN mission, agencies, funds, and programs. Heor she works to overcome the structural andresource challenges inherent in UN peaceoperations. To accomplish these goals, the SRSGmust be provided with better analytical andpolitical support from headquarters and be givenclearer authority on budgeting and questions ofconduct and discipline.

Third, flexibility and the capacity to adapt areessential to making missions effective. Managing acomplex environment requires the ability to learnand adapt to changing circumstances and thecapacity to institutionalize those lessons learned

1

MEETING NOTE

Managing Complexity:Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations

Peace OperationsCaty Clement and Adam C. Smith, rapporteurs

into policies, procedures, and guidelines.Unfortunately, peacekeeping is at a structuraldisadvantage when it comes to organizationallearning. Peace operations are temporary and adhoc by nature, contracts are often short term,training opportunities are limited, and,consequently, staff turnover is high. Exacerbatingthis is the constant state of crisis and response thattypifies a peace operation in the field, making itdifficult to prioritize systematic learning. Dedicatedbest-practice officers in every mission, increasedstaff retention through harmonized conditions ofservice, defined career paths, and regularizedtraining would all assist the organizational learningprocess.

Fourth, the UN does not operate alone in anyenvironment, and in many ways, success or failuredepends less on the UN than on the other organiza-tional entities working around it. Regional organi-zations now operate side-by-side with the UN insome missions, while host governments, bilateraldonors, NGOs, international financial institutions,and, often, spoilers together comprise the postcon-flict landscape. Success depends on the UN’s abilityto leverage its partnerships with other organiza-tions and groups, coordinate activities amongthem, bring spoilers into the political process, andenable and strengthen host governments. For thisto happen, a common strategic vision is required,developed in coordination with all keystakeholders. Some suggest that a broader compactinvolving the major players at the UN—the SecurityCouncil, the Fifth Committee, and the troop-contributing countries—as well as the internationalfinancial institutions and other major actors, suchas regional organizations, is needed to support anoperation from start to finish.

Finally, to manage a successful exit, the handoverof all activities to the host government must beanticipated from the first entry of the UN. Planningfor exit or transition starts at the very beginningand needs steadfast political support from theinternational parties and more analytical supportfrom the UN Secretariat.

INTRODUCTION

UN peacekeeping celebrated its sixtieth birthday in2008. By the end of that year, more than 91,000uniformed personnel were serving in sixteenpeacekeeping missions. That number increases toroughly 110,000 when local and internationalcivilian staff are included.1 This second surge of UNpeacekeeping since the end of the Cold War equatesto a more than six-fold increase from just a decadeago.

In addition to the number, the scope of peaceoperations has dramatically increased.Multidimensional peace operations can containmore than twenty occupational sections, fromadministration and aviation, to civil affairs andsecurity. Put simply, UN peace operations areperforming far more activities with many morepeople and machines, and much more money thanever before. As the scale and scope increase, so doesthe complexity of the terrain. Considering thatmost of these tasks are performed by multipleactors with varied goals in insecure environmentsand tenuous political contexts, the challenge seemseven more formidable. In a complex environmentpredictability is low, unintended consequences aremany, and effectively organizing and managingresources becomes both more daunting and moreessential.

The UN Secretariat and UN member states havedevoted substantial thought and effort to readyingUN peace operations for contemporary challenges.The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations(DPKO) and the Department of Field Support(DFS) have embarked on an agenda of reforminvolving several interrelated processes. Theguiding strategy of this agenda is based on “PeaceOperations 2010,” which aims to clarify the policiesand procedures needed to effectively support andfurther professionalize peacekeeping over the nextdecade.2 At the planning level, the IntegratedMissions Planning Process (IMPP) is an effort toprovide a much-needed integration framework forthe full UN presence in the field.3 Additionally,working in collaboration with the UN membership,

2 MEETING NOTE

1 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), “Monthly Summary of Military and Police Contribution to United Nations Operations,”December 2008, available at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/Yearly06.pdf .

2 See DPKO, “‘Peace Operations 2010’ Reform Strategy (Excerpts from the Report of the Secretary-General),” 2007, available atwww.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/po2010.pdf .

3 See United Nations, “Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP): Guidelines Endorsed by the UN Secretary-General,” June 13, 2006, available atwww.undg.org/docs/9907/IMPP-Revised-Guidelines-130606.pdf ; and United Nations, "IMPP Guidelines: Role of Headquarters: Integrated Planning for UN FieldPresences," May 2009.

DPKO worked “to codify the major lessons learnedfrom the past six decades of United Nationspeacekeeping experience” through the “UnitedNations Peacekeeping Operations Principles andGuidelines [Capstone Doctrine].”4

Such efforts are taking place, however, at a timewhen many believe that UN peacekeeping isalready in crisis.5 Three main challenges related tothe capacities of peacekeeping missions, theenvironments in which they operate, and thepolitical backing they receive, are repeatedly cited.First, limited financial and human resources areregularly overstretched, testing the managerial andorganizational capacity of the mission. Second,deployments are often mandated or planned forplaces where there is little or no peace to keep—anexistential test for peacekeeping. Third,peacekeeping efforts in postconflict societiesinvolve many different political actors with a widearray of political agendas. While the formerchallenge may admit to more straightforwardsolutions, the latter two suggest further managerialand political dilemmas. Personnel in the field notonly have to deal with “traditional spoilers,” but alsogovernmental and nongovernmental actors whocan exploit the managerial, legal, and politicalweaknesses of a mission to near paralysis. Such anenvironment requires factoring in higher levels ofrisk and uncertainty to planning and budgeting.Accordingly, these dilemmas require improvedmethods of engagement and communicationamong key stakeholders (i.e., the UN Secretariat,the troop-contributing countries, the UN SecurityCouncil, the General Assembly’s Fourth and FifthCommittees, regional organizations, relevantdonors, and regional powers).

In an era of limited resources, entrenchedpolitical divisions, and challenging operationalcontexts, robust and effective operations on theground seem more difficult than ever. Suchincreasing complexity calls for a deeperunderstanding of the specific managerial, organiza-tional, and political challenges of UN peacekeeping

operations, and the sharing of lessons learned fromoutside the UN context. UN peace operations needto develop models of organization, styles ofmanagement, skills, and procedures—in key areas,such as planning, decision making, andmonitoring—that will allow them to succeed in thehighly complex environments in which theyoperate.

It is in response to these trends that theInternational Peace Institute (IPI) and the GenevaCentre for Security Policy (GCSP) organized aseminar on the theme “Managing Complexity:Political and Managerial Challenges of UN PeaceOperations.” The seminar gathered scholars andpractitioners with extensive expertise in peaceoperations or knowledge of other complex contexts.It tackled two objectives: (1) gain a betterunderstanding of managerial and organizationalchallenges; and (2) devise concrete operationalrecommendations. Efforts to strengthen peaceoperations around the world are under way onmultiple fronts. This seminar aimed to facilitateexchange among the people guiding those effortsand to provide a service to the UN Secretariat andmembership by collecting ideas that might beuseful for further work in this field.

The seminar was held under the Chatham HouseRule. This meeting report represents the substanceof the discussions and does not necessarily reflectthe views of the IPI, GCSP, or individual partici-pants.

MANAGING UN PEACE OPERATIONS INA PERIOD OF CRISIS

Events on the eastern edge of the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo (DRC) in late 2008 and early2009 all too clearly demonstrated the limitations ofUN peacekeeping. If the protection of civilians isthe standard by which UN peacekeeping ismeasured in the public eye, then the UN—and theinternational community more broadly—still doesnot have the correct configuration of resources,structures, or will in place to predictably and

MANAGING COMPLEXITY 3

4 UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines [Capstone Doctrine]” (NewYork, January 2008).

5 See, for example, Richard Gowan, “The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 2006-08,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 4 (August 2008): 453-469; HarveyMorris, “Conflict Interventions Push Close to ‘the Outer Limit of Peacekeeping,’” Financial Times, July 24, 2008, p. 5; Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, andPhilipp Rotmann, “Rescuing the Blue Helmets,” International Herald Tribune, July 22, 2008; Harvey Morris, “UN Peacekeeping in Line of Fire,” Financial Times, May17, 2008, p. 5; Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), p. 2; Security CouncilReport, “Twenty Days in August: The Security Council Sets Massive New Challenges for UN Peacekeeping,” Special Research Report no. 5 (New York, September 8,2006), pp. 9-10.

consistently meet such a standard. The DRCsituation is not unique, however; stalemate persistsin Darfur, and postconflict peace is tenuous in WestAfrica and elusive in Somalia. The persistentchallenges force a reexamination of howpeacekeeping can be made more effective in thetwenty-first century— and, most likely, without thebenefit of additional resources. In the context of aglobal economic recession, observers and practi-tioners of peacekeeping wonder what political willand commensurate resources will remain forpeacekeeping in the near future.

If management improvements are urgentlyneeded, political challenges still abound in thecurrent global context. Within the UN setting,renewed tensions between member-state blocsfrom the East and the West have exacerbated thetraditional North-South divisions. Thesetensions—highlighted by debates over Georgia,Myanmar, Kosovo, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere—center on the rights and responsibilities of statesovereignty, the preemptive use of force, humani-tarian intervention, and, more generally, on thesecurity and development priorities within the UN.Debates over financing—whether funds should beput toward development or security use, forinstance—are particularly captive to the North-South divide. Not surprisingly, the debates have agreat deal of influence on the direction and conductof UN peacekeeping. Whether to authorize amission, which tasks to mandate, what size force toauthorize, where to generate troops and materiel,and how soon the UN should exit, are all questionswith answers tied largely to these broader politicaldebates. In an increasingly multipolar and interde-pendent world, the stakes for multilateral coopera-tion are indeed greater; however, such divergencesthreaten to derail reform and delay the criticalstrengthening of peace operations.

Amid calls for a new “Brahimi Report” on peaceoperations (or simply the full implementation ofthe original), those that see a crisis in peacekeepingcan be divided into three groups. First, the“Guardians” believe that the problem lies with theUN straying from its traditional core principles ofnonuse of force except in self-defense, consent ofthe host parties, and strict impartiality. Theybelieve that in the DRC, for instance, the UN’smilitary presence has sacrificed its impartiality

through its robust pursuit of spoilers and is nowincurring the costs of that aggressive stand.

A second set of observers, the “Heroes,” puts itsfaith in the ability of the Special Representative ofthe Secretary-General (SRSG) to mediateeffectively, to show leadership, and to deal preemp-tively with political stakeholders and potentialspoilers. This group believes that the UN leadershiphas not engaged constructively with the politicalprocess in the DRC, including dealing withRwandan leadership or rebel leaders.

Finally, the “Managers” feel that the mostpractical way to improve UN peacekeeping in theshort term is to shore up its managementstructures, processes, and policies to operate moreefficiently and effectively—especially during a timeof constrained resources.

Clearly, no single solution will right the listingship, but the debate over the purpose, and use of,peacekeeping will need to be settled eventually.However, the fact remains that political disagree-ments over direction are no excuse for poormanagement. And the reform of management isabout much more than “rearranging the deck chairson a sinking ship,” as some critics have called it.Management is not only about reshufflingstructures, units, and departments or rewritingdoctrines and practices, although those things areclearly needed at times. Management is about thefollowing:

• Setting common goals and shared values: manage-ment’s first job is to think through, set, andexemplify key objectives, values, and goals. In thecontext of peacekeeping this means improvingstrategic planning, coordination, and integration.

• Processes: management is deeply embedded inculture. In a multicultural environment likepeacekeeping missions, “how” goals are achieved isclearly essential.

• Human beings: management’s task is to makepeople capable of joint performance, to make theirstrengths visible and their weaknesses irrelevant.

• Enabling the enterprise and its members to growand adapt as needs and opportunities change: morecan be done to improve learning, training, andprofessional development in peacekeeping.

• Measuring performance and making decisionsbased on these measurements.

While effective management is not a panacea for

4 MEETING NOTE

all political challenges, it is possible to findexamples of creative management solutions totricky political problems. In Kosovo, as well as inDarfur, the UN has successfully adapted manage-ment mechanisms to achieve some modest goals. InKosovo, in the face of political resistance to a transi-tion to a European Union (EU) presence, the UNpresence was cleverly drawn down and the UNlogistics team was moved to the far suburbs of thecity. At present, the EU provides the bulk ofpeacekeeping there. In Darfur, the UN broughtmore flexible arrangements and transparency to theAfrican Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) inresponse to frustrations of donors and troopcontributors regarding the lack of fundingflexibility and transparency. The adaptation of UNmanagement structures prevented the missionfrom folding and allowed it to continue in itspresent form as UNAMID (the AfricanUnion/United Nations Hybrid Operation inDarfur).

While these are modest successes, they show thatmanagement solutions can provide answers inpolitically complex environments. These aresometimes described as “second-best solutions.”With limited resources and rigid politicalconstraints, second-best solutions are often the bestthe UN and other intergovernmental organizationscan offer.

PLANNING FOR SUCCESS

Successful implementation of any task begins witha good plan. Peacekeeping is no different. Given themultiplicity of actors and tasks involved, planningfor and during a peace operation becomes at onceextremely important and extremely challenging.Not only does peacekeeping take place in a verycomplicated environment, it takes place in a highlycomplex environment. This difference is more thansemantic. A system that is complicated has manyintricate parts, but with some effort, can beunderstood, and its actions or reactions arepredictable. A complex environment, however, hasa nonlinear relationship between its parts andactors, and the actions of those actors are lesspredictable and often dependent on the actions ofothers.

All of the tasks of a peace operation are framedwithin a wider peacebuilding system and are

interrelated. For instance, effective disarmament,demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) not onlydepends on one part of the system carrying outeffective disarmament but on another carrying outeffective reintegration as well. How exactly one isdone greatly affects the success of the other. Theeffects of these activities, moreover, affect so manyother issues: the country’s stability, the calculationsof the political actors, the economy, etc. Similarly,the knock-on effects from anything as transforma-tive as security sector reform are many andsometimes unpredictable. This is true for nearlyevery aspect of a peace operation. Such interrela-tion and interdependency reduces predictability,and requires flexibility and adaptation on the partof those making plans. And because the widerpeacebuilding system involves not just the UN andits many agencies and programs, which channel lessthan half of the international community’sassistance, but many other non-UN actors as well,the planning process cannot simply focus on themission itself.

What does this complexity mean for UN peaceoperation planning in practice? First, planningmust take into account the unpredictability ofevents and be prepared to change course as a result.Both redundancy (i.e., having replacement parts ina system) and flexibility are important. Currently,staffing plans and, particularly, funding plans (i.e.,budgeting) leave very little room for eitherredundancy or flexibility. Second, unpredictabilityrequires adaptation. There is a tendency to focustoo much on planning and implementation, whilemaking little room for adaptation. Planning mustbe present through the life of a mission, adjusting to unforeseen reactions and consequences of themission’s work. The mission’s monitoring andevaluation should feed back into a planning loop,adjusting the planning based on the results ofinternal and external monitoring.

Third, planners must have deep knowledge of allthe actors and the general environment. Thepeacebuilding system within a postconflict countryis too particular, too large, and too complex forheadquarters-based staff to conduct all theplanning. Some planning functions, both at theoutset of a mission and throughout its life, must beconducted in the field. This suggests that everymultidimensional peace operation should have a

MANAGING COMPLEXITY 5

field-based planning officer. However, because ofthe intergovernmental buy-in required in multilat-eral operations, a certain level of planning mustreside at the headquarters level. This is necessary toengage the member states in order to create afeeling of ownership in the operation. Finally, asdiscussed above, planning should be based on apeacebuilding framework that includes the mainstakeholders, as well as the private sector and theNGO community.

Peace operations, however, are above all political.It is in large part the politics and the interchangebetween political actors that account for thedemanding complexity of the postconflict environ-ment. And it is the politics which typicallyconfound peace operations. The politicaldimensions of every conflict are different, and assuch, every peacebuilding framework or missionplan requires that more emphasis be placed onpolitical analysis prior to deployment. This requiresstrong representation from the political side on anyplanning team and it requires a betterunderstanding of how to work with member statesand regional organizations to strengthen the UN’soverall analytical support to peace operations. Onechallenge to this, however, is that political issuesare, by nature, sensitive. In any intergovernmentalforum, such as the UN, certain contingencies thatmight come up during a planning exercise (whichinvolve one or more member states or theirinterests) will be impossible to state in writing dueto their sensitivity. It is a challenge that may be bestworked around during the planning process in thefield.

The UN’s major effort to improve its planning forpeace operations, the Integrated Missions PlanningProcess (IMPP), took on some of these recommen-dations, notably the need for a comprehensive andintegrated analysis with views from the field.However, critics have noted the risk that thisplanning process, if followed to the letter, is so timeand resource intensive within the UN system that itleaves little room to engage with other actorsoutside the UN’s circle. The need for efficiencymust then be balanced against the need for coordi-nation. Not every actor should be included in everymeeting. Thus, rather than seen as one network,coordination should be understood as a web ofnetworks, with a core that is more denselyintegrated than the periphery.

On planning, the example of the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) could be illustrative.Unlike the UN, NATO requires consensus amongits members to take action, involving more engage-ment with member states. This in turn improvesownership and the political engagement of themember states with the missions themselves. Suchan arrangement commits the organization tostaying focused on the core political purpose of themissions—something that, arguably, is lost at timesat the UN. Within NATO, planning serves twomain functions: to empower the field throughproper commitment of higher-level resources andexpertise, and to synchronize activities andresources internally and externally. The planningfunctions of NATO are described as continuous,cyclical, and permanent. NATO planners prefer tokeep most planning functions at headquarters levelto reduce the footprint on the ground and to ensureownership by member states. There is, however, anacknowledgement of the need to defer to theunique insights of those on the ground.

However, NATO is equally challenged by existen-tial questions relating to its role within the largerinternational system. Like other regional organiza-tions, it reflects on its purpose and its role inpeacekeeping. Should NATO be a first responder ora responder of last resort? Should it focus onlonger-term postconflict recovery or short-termstabilization? Such questions involve the broaderglobal multilateral system for conflict management,and cannot be answered in isolation. Fora such asthe IPI-GCSP seminar on Managing Complexity,where multilateral organizations can exchange andshare lessons learned, could play an important rolein answering some of these questions.

LEADERSHIP ON THE LINE:MANAGING FIELD COMPLEXITY

The full complexity of the postconflictpeacebuilding environment is perhaps understoodbest by those who head peace operations. Typicallygiven the title of a Special Representative of theSecretary-General (SRSG), the senior UnitedNations official in a country is responsible forguiding the actions of the entire UN effort andcoordinating these with other international actors(member states and NGOs) and the many nationalactors. He or she is responsible for the safety andthe actions of the entire staff of a mission, national

6 MEETING NOTE

MANAGING COMPLEXITY 7

and international, civilian and military; account-able for the mission’s annual budget; and can becredited or blamed, even if unfairly, for themission’s success or failure. The SRSG or Head ofMission sets the strategic direction for the missionand often serves as chief political mediator andpublic face of the UN’s efforts. The combination ofthese challenging roles defines a position that isoften described as impossible.

Given the overwhelming importance and respon-sibility of the role of the SRSG, the selection,preparation, and support of the post are critical.Critics of the current selection process describe it astoo political, too opaque, and done without a largerstrategic vision of the roles and abilities required forthe particular post to be filled. The three main tasksof the SRSG, as mediator, coordinator, andmanager, require a unique combination of skillsthat are not often easily found. The Secretary-General could improve the selection process byrepeating in his reports to the Security Council theimportance of the right leadership team and thecriteria that need to be fulfilled. In identifying theprofile of the SRSG, it is necessary to determinewhat skill set among the three should receivepriority at the time. Once the selection of the rightSRSG is made, due consideration should be given tocreating a complementary senior managementteam. For instance, if the SRSG is selected formediation skills and experience, selecting a deputywith significant experience managing and coordi-nating within the UN system is critical. Finally,roles and responsibilities of each member of themission’s senior management team have to beclearly defined. These roles need not be identicalfor each mission, but should be adjusted to fit therelative skills and abilities of the particular team.

Even the most experienced diplomats, UNofficials, and political figures who become SRSGsare not quite prepared to handle the breadth of thechallenges they face upon arrival in a mission. TheSenior Leadership Induction Program (SLIP) is agood first step for those future mission leadersunfamiliar with the UN system and its intricacies.However, it is an introduction, rather than training;it is too short to be comprehensive, and only ahandful of civilian mission leaders have attended it.Much of the senior leadership requires a country-related induction, one specific to the circumstancesof the conflict, the actors and politics involved.

Management is a key function—and formidablechallenge—of the SRSG and his or her team. It takesa skilled and experienced chief to manage a staffthat can include thousands of civilians, police, andsoldiers—both national and international. AnSRSG who has to deal with labor grievances,security protocols, and discipline, but has neverreceived management training or has little experi-ence in such a setting, is set up to fail.

Several key issues and recommendations wereidentified. First, while in mission, SRSGs shouldreceive as much support as the UN system canmuster. Some have suggested the need for amentoring system for SRSGs. An SRSG mentorcould be a former SRSG, an academic, or a trainerto serve as a soundboard and a repository of advice.The SRSG could have complete control over how heor she chooses to use the mentor and the mentorwould have no role in evaluating the performanceof the SRSG.

Second, current and former SRSGs have voiced aconsistent complaint about the parameters of theirjob description. While all accountability for safety,finances, and success or failure resides with theSRSG, the authority to make some key decisions islacking. SRSGs have very little control over abudget that is set in advance, largely inflexible, andguarded over by the chief administrative officer.

Third, SRSGs feel particularly hamstrung bystringent personnel rules and procedures that donot allow them to handcraft a well-balanced andagreeable team. Once on the job, SRSGs are oftenfaced with sometimes suboptimal staff that havebeen recycled from one mission to the next andwhom he or she is unable to discipline. A staffmember caught stealing or otherwise misbehavingis not subject to immediate dismissal or suspensionwithout pay. Rather, the SRSG must start formalprocedures against the staff member that can takeup to two years to resolve. Often, the SRSG choosesto send the underperforming staff member toanother mission, only prolonging the problemwithin the larger UN presence in the field. This lackof discipline erodes the authority of the SRSG andthe morale of hardworking mission staff, andcreates a culture of impunity all too often seenwithin the UN system. There is thus a call to createmechanisms for the faster administration of justicewithin missions and to allocate more authority overbudgetary and personnel matters to the SRSG in

order to balance their authority and their account-ability. A commensurate increase in accountabilitymight involve subjecting the SRSG to 360-degreeevaluations by those with whom he or she worksmost closely (e.g., senior management team).

Third, the very high turnover—field-based UNemployees typically stay less than two years withinthe UN—and vacancy rates—some for criticalposts—were highlighted as important limitations tomission efficiency. At headquarters, analyticalcapacity is limited while bureaucratic frustrationsare common. Desks at DPKO and DPA are oftenunderstaffed and overburdened, resulting in slowor insufficient responses from New York. In thefield, current staff have no options for a career path,few incentives to train, or to even stay withinDPKO. Mission staff regularly leave DPKO to workfor agencies and programs that provide betterbenefits and compensation, and a more definedcareer path. Very few mission staff, even middlemanagement, have ever received training inmanagement. In fact, the human-resourcesparadigm must shift to view peace operations andcivilian professionals in the field as morepermanent fixtures of the UN. Field-staff compen-sation and benefits should be reevaluated with aneye toward longer-term retention. This includesincentives for training and for good performance.In so doing, the UN can both create the nextgeneration of trained-and-ready field staff, but alsomake life easier for current field leadership in theprocess.

ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING:MANAGING KNOWLEDGE

Recent scholarship on organizational learning inpostconflict environments supplements traditionaltheories regarding the success and failure of peaceoperations. Much of the literature to date suggeststhat the success or failure of international efforts ina postconflict setting is determined in large part bythe specifics of the environment within which amission operates. As such, in two separate cases ofpeacekeeping, differences such as the intensity ofthe conflict, how the conflict ended, the intentions

of the actors, the absence or presence of spoilers,etc., will likely result in two different outcomes.6 Asecond theory points to the will, interests, andengagement of the UN Security Council’s membersor other strong regional actors as the determiningfactors of success or failure. In essence, great (orregional) power politics can put sufficient pressureon the players and deliver the necessary resourcesto ensure peacekeeping success.7

Adding to these mainstream theories, newscholarship suggests that how a mission manages itslearning in the field can also affect its success. Inparticular, this approach claims that organizationallearning, specifically “first-level” learning, is anecessary, although not sufficient, component ofsuccessful mandate implementation.8 First-levellearning concerns lessons learned on the groundabout how best to implement a mandate, includinggathering and analyzing information, coordination,engagement with the surrounding environment,and exercising leadership. This type of learningmust take place in the field, not at headquarters, inpart through the mechanism of the Joint MissionAnalysis Cell (JMAC). First-level learning becomesorganizational learning when such lessons are thenincorporated into an organization’s doctrine,official practices, or strategy.

Acknowledgement of the importance of organi-zational learning in peacekeeping is not limited toacademia. The post-Brahimi Report period at theUN has seen the creation of a Best Practices Unit inDPKO, which has since expanded and been placedunder the umbrella of the Division for Policy,Evaluation, and Training. Indeed, many missionsnow include a best practices officer to help coordi-nate “first-level” learning, integrate such lessonsinto the policy-development process, and facilitateeasy access to guidance material. The best practicesoffices in a given mission attempt to connect the“first-level” learning that happens in the mission tothe “second-level” learning at headquarters.

Systematic learning, however, is still new topeacekeeping, and is often relegated to thebackground during the mission’s nonstop crisismanagement. A typical obstacle to the developmentof an organizational-learning culture is thetemporary nature of peacekeeping. Missions areestablished, and staff contracts typically awarded,

6 For a look at the relation of an operating environment to the success of the implementation of a peace agreement, see George Downs and Stephen John Stedman,“Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation,” in Ending Civil Wars: the Implementation of Peace Agreements, edited by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild,and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 43-70.

7 The effect of external actors on the success or failure of the implementation of peace agreements was first significantly addressed in Fen Osler Hampson, NurturingPeace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace [USIP], 1996).

8 See Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

8 MEETING NOTE

on a six-month-by-six-month basis, whichfrustrates the establishment of institutionalizedlearning processes. Harmonization of conditions ofservice between all UN entities, facilitation of staffmobility between field and headquarters, and thedevelopment of a professionalized cadre of civilianpeacekeepers would go a long way toward institu-tionalizing lessons learned and strengthening theorganizational learning processes.

Not surprisingly, organizational learning is also ahigh priority for similar institutions. The UnitedStates Army, for instance, focuses its efforts at theCenter for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) in FortLeavenworth, Kansas. The Army embeds a CALLunit with every deployed brigade to collect lessonsfrom the field. A process called the After ActionReview (AAR) is the primary vehicle by which theCALL formulates lessons learned. During thisprocess, a CALL staff member meets with a unit torevisit the critical points of an operation: whathappened, how the situation changed from whatwas originally planned, and what the results were.The AAR is also used as a training tool wherescenarios can be replayed after the fact. The resultsof the AAR meetings are not disseminated to thearmy as a whole, but rather collected and analyzedfor trends for study within the CALL.

CALL publishes “gap reports” from thesefindings, which are then distributed to the rest ofthe institution. It works to facilitate cross-organiza-tional dialogue by presenting the AAR process tothe armed forces of other states and other organiza-tions, such as the UN. The Center is also used as asource to help determine measures of success andperformance indicators. One important indicatorof performance identified by CALL is the army’sability to communicate with the local population,particularly in stabilization missions, such as inIraq and Afghanistan. Clearly, the same need foreffective communication with host nationals isapplicable to UN peace operations.

At the UN, there is said to be a bias among somemember states against increased funding fortraining, although training is one important way tomake sure lessons are not just learned, but appliedin the field. Training often focuses on “static”modules, such as gender mainstreaming, ratherthan skill-based training, such as political assess-ment. Increased and improved skill-based trainingwould help to strengthen knowledge managementcapacity in UN peace operations, and in the processhelp to further professionalize the field ofpeacekeeping.

MANAGING COMPLEX PARTNERSHIPS:DILEMMAS OF COOPERATION ANDINTEGRATION ON THE GROUND

The UN is not the sole player in the field of peaceoperations—nor was it ever meant to be. ChapterVIII of the UN Charter outlined a role for regionalorganizations in the settlement of internationaldisputes, and explicitly endorsed regional organiza-tions to take enforcement action if authorized bythe Security Council. Indeed, regional organiza-tions have become increasingly active in the field ofpeacekeeping. In recent times, and for variousreasons, the UN has engaged in partnerships (e.g.,in Darfur, Chad, Kosovo, Somalia) with diverseorganizations. Depending on the exigencies of thesituation, the partnerships take diverse forms,including sequential deployment, co-deployment,hybrid or integrated missions, compacts or coordi-nating structures. One size does not fit all; havingsome flexibility in forms of organization allows theUN and its partners to fit form to function. As ofyet, however, a comprehensive and clearunderstanding of the most appropriate forms ofcooperation for each situation has not beenrealized.

Partnerships not only diverge in terms of theirstructure and form, but also with regard to theactors involved. The UN in particular has engagedthree different types of partners: international andregional institutions (e.g., the World Bank, NATO,the EU, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], the African Union[AU], the Association of Southeast Asian Nations[ASEAN], and subregional actors, such as theEconomic Community of West African States[ECOWAS]), national government authorities, andnonstate actors, such as NGOs. In some cases,cooperation between institutions has gone beyonda peace operation and has become more institu-tionalized. For instance, the UN and EU issue jointdeclarations, hold strategic meetings twice a year,and engage in a continuous stream of ad hoccontact. Partnership between the UN and AU hasbeen regularized through the AU-UN Ten-YearCapacity-Building Programme. The UNDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations mans anAfrican Union Peacekeeping Support Team inAddis Ababa, providing expertise and logisticalsupport to the development of the African Standby

MANAGING COMPLEXITY 9

Force. Of late, cooperation with regional organizations

has allowed the UN to operate in contexts in whichit would otherwise be denied access. Participationby the African Union in the Darfur mission(UNAMID) was pivotal in overcoming the govern-ment of Sudan’s reluctance to accept an interna-tional intervention. The AU’s participation is saidto be the “passport” by which the UN enters Sudan.This passport, however, does not come without itsown unique set of challenges. In addition to thepersistent difficulties involved with complicatedlines of command, control, and communicationthat arise from interorganizational cooperation,UNAMID suffers from the same pitfalls as manystandard UN interventions: it has receivedinadequate contributions of materiel (e.g., anabsence of attack and/or transport helicopters), andis based in a difficult environment with little peaceto keep and a large number of splintered rebelgroups.

Ideally, cooperation between internationalorganizations and other actors would be structuredto capitalize on each organization’s strengths.However, efficient and effective organizationbetween two large and complex entities is notwithout its difficulties. A first set of challengesentails the differing operating procedures employedby organizations and the existence of multiplechains of command. This confusion of thecommand chain leads to a diffusion of authorityand accountability, divide-and-conquer strategiesby spoilers, or to mission personnel working atcross- or overlapping-purposes.

A second hurdle concerns divergent mandates.With two organizations working side-by-side, ashared purpose and understanding is a criticalingredient of success. At times, however, the twoorganizations will have mandates that can be seenas conflicting, a situation most clearly illustratedwhen military and humanitarian actors operate intandem. Humanitarians have a strong incentive tomaintain their neutrality, which often requires adistancing from military partners. When there is animportant military component to the mission,other approaches tend to be seen through the prismof the success of the military operation.

A third difficulty is the capacity gap between

actors, notably when postconflict countries carrythe burden of coordinating the diverse and multipledonors. In general, due in part to the limitedcapacity of host governments, the UN transitionfrom serving as protector/provider to being anequal partner with national authorities is a difficultone to master. In such a situation, the UN must relyon the government to carry out certain responsibil-ities itself, sometimes forcing the mission to operateon a less efficient level in the short term.

The proliferation of such partnerships raises thequestion of a potential doctrinal shift within theUN system. The recently released United NationsPeacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelinesbriefly highlights the issue of planning andoperating peace operations with partners, but doesnot codify guidelines or principles for such activity.Developing doctrine or a common strategy on thisissue is a challenge in itself, due to the largenumbers of potential partners and the varioussituations in which they could be engaged. As astart, the UN DPKO could initiate an independentstudy of the comparative advantages inpeacekeeping of regional and subregional organiza-tions, as well as of lessons learned from the variousforms of institutional partnerships with the UN.

Partnerships do not mean all parties agree, butrather that the parties come to an agreement on acommon strategic vision. It is important that thevarious actors make clear their objectives anddevelop a shared framework in order to guaranteeengagement through a feeling of mutual ownership.Such partnerships have been developed betweenthe UN and EU in both Chad and Kosovo, betweenthe UN and AU in Darfur and between the UN, EU,and World Bank in Georgia.

MANAGING TRANSITION: EXIT STRATEGIES AND PEACE CONSOLIDATION

Although, as stated above, member states shouldsee peacekeeping as a core and permanent functionof the United Nations, each individual peaceoperation is temporary and will, at some point,come to an end. The conditions under which anoperation ends do not always conform to well-considered plans and optimal circumstances.Often, budgetary or political pressures voiced bymembers of the Security Council or pressures from

10 MEETING NOTE

within the host country can hasten peacebuildingplans and result in a premature departure. All toooften in places like Haiti, the Congo, and Angola,the UN has witnessed its peacekeeping effortsdissolve after its departure due to a suddenrecurrence of conflict.

Aside from the internal pressure within the hostcountry and budgetary pressure in the Council,there are operational constraints to a well-timed,purposeful withdrawal or transition. Theseconstraints include the absence of clear or agreed-upon criteria for achievement of success, and theabsence of a system-wide methodology to measureprogress or success. While little can be done toreduce the budgetary pressure on member states,there is much work to be done on these operationalconstraints.

What does a successful peace operation look like?What is the end-state the UN is trying to leavebehind? As simple as these questions may be, theyare very difficult to answer. One way to definesuccess is to predicate it on the fulfillment of themandate. Another, possibly minimalist, definitionwould be the cessation of all armed conflict, called“negative peace.” Such definitions, though, haveproved to be inadequate. First, lack of conflict doesnot necessarily mean sustainable peace. Negativepeace could be based on fear or the threateningpower of an unjust ruler. Second, peace can beextremely tenuous if the underlying factors, or rootcauses, of the original conflict have not beenaddressed. It is precisely the minimalist definitionof peace—and the political pressures thatpropagated it—which led to early withdrawals inprevious decades.

In recent years, scholars and practitioners haveembraced the more comprehensive approach topeace by trying to analyze and address the rootcauses of a conflict to bring about a so-called“positive peace.” This carries with it its owndifficulties—not least of which being a tendency toset the bar too high. Despite advances in conflictanalysis, there is still no consensus on how much ofa factor each particular element or “cause”contributes to a conflict. Given the numerousidentified causes of conflict, from poverty, tocultural or religious divides, to barriers to legaljustice, it is clearly difficult to know which cause isthe key to resolving a given conflict. And if that

cause is lack of economic development, forinstance, how much can the internationalcommunity do and when should those efforts end?

The lack of meaningful measures of effectivenesshampers exit planning. Missions need to establishbenchmarks that are measurable and meaningfulindicators of progress. These benchmarks shouldmeasure impact and outcomes, not just output. Forinstance, it is not enough to know how many judgeshave been trained, but rather it is important toknow what level of trust the population has in thejudicial system, and how much respect the judgeshave for human rights law. These are arguably moredifficult to measure, but would reveal a good dealmore about the state of a society.

Other than the sheer difficulty of quantifying thesometimes unquantifiable, developing apeacebuilding plan with benchmarks can be ahighly political act. The politics of benchmarkingcan conflict with the technical aspects ofbenchmarking. Indicators are necessarily contextspecific and the mission needs to developbenchmarks in close cooperation with the hostgovernment and local population—those whoinevitably know best what the most meaningfulindicators are. In Liberia, for instance, the JMACengaged in an open political dialogue with thegovernment to develop benchmarks to addresscorruption. However, the different players insideand outside the government have a stake in thevarious activities of the mission and in the length oftime the mission exists. While the Security Councilmay be pushing the mission to draw down, the hostgovernment might be delaying political progress toextend the life of the mission—and the aid moneythat follows. The mission is therefore vulnerable topolitical manipulation of its benchmarking process,possibly necessitating a process or evaluation of theprocess that is somewhat independent from themission. Further, the discord between the technicalbenchmarking and the politics can be reconciled ifthe politics are recognized and dealt with, ratherthan wishfully ignored.

A number of other challenges vex peacebuildingplanners. One is the multitude of actors involved inpeacebuilding work. Even if measurable andmeaningful indicators can be developed, the UN isonly one of many actors in a postconflict setting.Herding bilateral donors, international financial

MANAGING COMPLEXITY 11

institutions, and regional organizations to monitorall peacebuilding activity and assess progress is asignificant hurdle. Another challenge is successfullytransitioning from the role of provider andprotector to partner. The UN has a lot of experiencein the former roles, but the latter role is a challenge,especially when the UN and the host country donot agree on relative priorities or courses of action.Prolonging the roles of protector and provider canperpetuate the life of a peace operation indefinitely.Developing host governments’ capacities to transi-tion from being the focus of international efforts tobeing the driver of their own efforts is a process theUN has not yet perfected. This is aggravated by alack of host government capacity, which is oftenexacerbated by the UN’s tendency to skim off thetop of the national talent pool for its own staff.

Those who see the most difficult challenge asgetting all the actors on the same page propose theidea of a compact between all parties: the SecurityCouncil, the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee,the host government, the mission, and bilateraldonors. Agreement on a shared understanding ofthe desired end-state and the path to arrive at thatpoint, from entry through to exit, would solve theresource problems, the political discord, and the

lack of strategic focus. Lacking a compact, there is aneed for an SRSG experienced in mediation toramp up the political negotiations throughout amission’s life to achieve that shared vision beforetransition or exit. Finally, the resources to develop apeacebuilding plan with meaningful indicatorsneed to be present from the very start of a mission.Planners at the outset of a mission should alreadybe thinking about a plan to make the UN presenceunnecessary in the future. Dedicated resources fordeveloping this exit-strategy thinking need to beallocated throughout a mission’s life. Preventing therecurrence of conflict, one of the clear aims ofpeacebuilding, will require clear and expert strategyfrom the UN’s entry into a country until its eventualexit. Resources at UN headquarters, particularly inthe Department of Political Affairs and thePeacebuilding Support Office, are thus needed toimprove the ability of the UN as a whole to dostrategic analysis and planning around UN peaceoperations.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, peace operations no longer function as theyonce did. Once peacekeepers observed ceasefiresand maintained buffer zones; now they advise

12 MEETING NOTE

Participants at the conference, "Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations PeaceOperations," December 1, 2008 at IPI.

judges, protect civilians, disarm combatants, andtrain police officers. Once the neutrality ofpeacekeepers was unquestioned, but todaypeacekeepers are often under fire and in dangerfrom disaffected armed groups. The list of changesin peacekeeping is long and stark. As the tasks theUN has been asked to perform have become morenumerous and difficult, the UN’s ability to operatesuccessfully in such complexity has been severelychallenged.

The politics surrounding peacekeeping—from itsinception to its exit phase—have also become morecomplex. Tensions between the Security Counciland troop-contributing countries, between theCouncil, the Secretariat, and the General Assembly,between the North and the South, as well as Eastand West, persist. The UN’s inability to raise troopsfor the hardest missions calls into question itsrelevance as the principal arbiter for the mainte-nance of international peace and security.

Political challenges are, of course, no excuse forpoor management. In fact, in times of limitedresources and challenging operating environments,proper management is more important than ever.Yet, similar to the political challenges, the challenge

of complexity admits no easy solutions. Due to itsunpredictability, complexity cannot be solved, onlymanaged. Efforts to improve management areunderway in the Departments of PeacekeepingOperations and of Field Support. Such efforts,however, must be informed by the unique problemsposed by a complex environment.

Operating in a complex environment meansexpecting the unexpected, preparing forunintended consequences, and navigating onesystem that is complexly interrelated with othersystems. Plans must be made with the widerpeacebuilding system in mind, and no actor, norgroup of actors, can be considered in isolation.Although standardization of procedures andmechanisms is important in any large bureaucracy;in times of complexity, flexibility—in plans,budgets, and methods—is essential. There must beexperienced and able managers in the field who arewilling to adapt their styles, processes, and decisionmaking to the specific situation. Finally, those inthe field need certainty at home. When operating indifficult environments, support from headquarters,both analytically, politically, and operationally,must be predictable, robust, and unwavering.

MANAGING COMPLEXITY 13

14

Keynote Address: Managing Complexity

Alain Le Roy*

I am delighted to be with you today. I very much welcome IPI and GCSP’s initiative to bring together scholarsand practitioners with extensive expertise in peace operations. The question of how we manage the political andorganizational complexity of UN peacekeeping is timely. As you all are well aware, we continue to see anongoing surge in demand for UN peacekeeping, complex UN peacekeeping.

We manage eighteen operations deployed across twelve time zones in five continents, comprising 140,000authorized personnel, of which 110,000 are currently deployed, including 75,000 military, 11,500 police, and23,500 civilians. This compares to 30,000 deployed personnel just ten years ago. Two operations have beendeployed during 2008, to Darfur and Chad/Central African Republic, and these deployments are still ongoing.Eleven of these operations have been either deployed or strengthened in the past five years.

The paper prepared by Cedric de Coning for this seminar distinguishes complex systems from complicatedsystems, making the point that highly complicated systems, such as a NASA [National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration] space launch, may be difficult to manage, but each component of the system is inherentlypredictable and interacts with the others predictably. Complex systems, on the other hand, are made up ofcomponents that have dynamic and unpredictable relationships.

By this definition, peacekeeping operations are exceedingly complex. Peacekeeping operations must drawsupport from, and navigate between, numerous components, each one of them variable and potentiallyunpredictable. And, arguably, uncertainty and unpredictability are growing across many levels of thepeacekeeping system today.

• At the level of the Security Council, the political consensus which provides the “fuel” for an operation isoften strained. We have seen strong differences among Council members on the question of how to moveforward on a wide range of missions, from Darfur to Georgia, to Kosovo to Somalia.

• At the broader international level, there are open questions regarding how UN peacekeeping shouldevolve, how robust it should be, on burden sharing between troop contributors and the Security Council,and on the linkages with other multilateral peacekeeping options. Differing views on these questionsimpact how the Secretariat, and member states, respond to ongoing operations and the degree ofconsensus they enjoy in New York.

• At the regional and national levels, too, political support is often hard to come by and strong counter-vailing winds are working against many UN operations. We have seen the impact of diminished host-government support in Eritrea and at the outset of UNAMID [African Union/United Nations HybridOperation in Darfur] in Sudan. And in Afghanistan, the regional context for the peace process is increas-ingly complex and difficult.

• At the level of resources, the availability of troops and resources from member states is increasingly understrain. The lack of helicopters for Darfur is emblematic of the issue, but in fact, across peacekeeping as awhole, it is increasingly difficult to generate and sustain the resources needed.

• The mandated tasks of our missions are growing, and each task also depends on a complex political,economic, and security dynamic. For instance, elections in Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire are scheduled for nextyear, but the clock, and the support of political leaders, is running against them. This uncertainty impacts,in turn, on the rest of the mandates there. Security is an ever greater concern for staff vulnerable to themilitary and terrorist threat, even as they are asked to carry out more complex mandates that requireclose interaction with local populations, which, therefore, exposes them.

* Alain Le Roy is United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

• At the level of headquarters, we continueto work to build our managerial systemsand to integrate efforts across the UNsystem, yet the transaction costs to achievea “whole of UN” effect are still higher thanthey should be, given that we areaddressing one integrated problem.

• At the level of personnel, we are strugglingto build and maintain the staff resourcesthat we need. The average peacekeeperserves for less than two years, and theturnover and loss of institutionalknowledge brings its own uncertainty andcomplexity.

• Other organizations and agenciesdeployed alongside the UN peacekeepingoperation may play a critical part inbuilding and solidifying peace and each ofthem bring their own political andmanagerial complexity.

Serious disruptions at any one of these levels may threaten the success of a complex peacekeeping operation.Yet, we must remember that, even with all this inherent instability, UN peacekeeping operations often representthe most stable and robust institution in the postconflict environment. They are often the most critical propupon which weak governments lean as they build strength and legitimacy and make the transition from conflictto peace. Millions depend on UN peace operations as the main bulwark between state collapse and hopes forpeace.

How do we maximize the potential for their success? Clearly, we must strengthen the system wherever we dohave leverage, to make it more robust and able to stand the exogenous shocks that may lie in store.

First, we must apply the right tool for the job. Is there a peace to keep? UN peacekeeping operations are anexpression of the political will, emanating from the Security Council, of the international community to act. TheSecretariat must assess the situation as accurately as possible. And then, the Brahimi [Report’s] recommenda-tions continue to ring true: we must tell the Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear.

It is the basic lesson of the 1990s. Yet the political pressures on the Secretariat and the Council to act willcontinue to make this simple recommendation far from simple to carry out. With Somalia, the UN faces theissue today. There is a fragile peace process, yet no full peace agreement. Conflict continues, yet the AfricanUnion is deployed. The Ethiopian government has indicated that it may withdraw, building pressure for anincreased, international presence. The Secretary-General has advised that with no peace to keep, the situationcalls for a multinational force, yet so far none is forthcoming. The pressure to act is building. But ispeacekeeping the right tool? The dexterity of the manager cannot compensate for the choice of the wrong tool.

Once the Council has made its decision to deploy an operation, to use the tool, there must be enough politicaland material resources, enough muscle behind the tool, so to speak. I spoke earlier of the helicopter gap inDarfur. I think that experience underscores the wisdom of the Brahimi recommendation that the Councilshould not finalize a resolution mandating a mission until it is clear the resources can be found to implementit. This would certainly be worthwhile should peacekeeping be considered for Somalia, where the capabilitiesrequired would far outstrip what was called for in Darfur.

Of course, it takes both muscle and competence to properly wield any tool, and so one cannot point only tothe member states. The Secretariat must maximize its impact by improving its expertise, diversifying the modelswe apply, and becoming more nimble in interacting with peacekeeping partners in the security, humanitarian,

Alain Le Roy 15

Mr. Alain Le Roy, United Nations Under-Sercretary-General forPeacekeeping Operations, and H.E. Mr. Terje Rød-Larsen,

IPI President.

and economic development spheres. The ongoing effort to professionalize peacekeeping has certainly advanced DPKO [UN Department of

Peacekeeping Operations] and DFS [UN Department of Field Support] a significant distance, but there remainsa long way to go. Richard Gowan’s paper pointed to the “Heroes, Guardians, and Managers” typology as a wayof describing differing schools of thought on how peacekeeping operations should be guided. Of course, weneed a strong combination of each strain. We must find and retain the best individuals, ensure they have theright training and guidance on which to base their work, and that the organizational structures that supportthem are flexible and adapted to the field.

We are moving on all these fronts. We are working on widening the pool of candidates we draw on for leader-ship positions, to deepen our rosters, and to include more women. At the staff level, the human resource reformsthat are currently proposed by the Secretary-General are critical to ensuring we can attract and retain the beststaff and build up a core peacekeeping staff that can grow and develop.

At the level of training we continue to refine a global integrated training approach, which centralizes cross-cutting training requirements and supports decentralized training for specialized areas. We continue to developdoctrine and guidance under the overall umbrella of our so-called Capstone Doctrine, and we are workingintensively on key policy areas, such as protection of civilians. We are also developing senior leadership andsenior management training programs, an area which certainly deserves more attention.

We also need to recognize that collectively our expertise is not very deep in critical peacebuilding areas. TheUN does not retain in-house expertise on many aspects of statebuilding, yet we are mandated to assist inbuilding national institutions. Individual experts are often found in national government service, yet they maynot be ready to apply their skills in the postconflict environment. The finance expert from a national treasurysystem may not be accustomed to the lack of a banking system; the police trainer may not be prepared to dealwith a dysfunctional, politicized Ministry of Interior.

The Standing Police Capacity in DPKO offers an important model that may be worth emulating in somesectors. Individual experts are retained and revolved through various missions, assisting in planning, missionstart up, and implementation during critical periods. Such rosters, which can draw on expertise from the“North” and “South,” need to be further explored. Each peacekeeping operation may be “sui generis,” yet, thereare shared elements that are peculiar to the postconflict environment and we need to retain and build that typeof knowledge. We have deep knowledge among generalists, but we are relatively poor when it comes to specialistexpertise. We need to decide in which sectors we will develop deeper expertise and increase the specialization.This may also require that across the UN system we promise to do a bit less, but deliver more reliably in theareas we do engage in.

At the organizational level, we need to further improve how we integrate the international effort. We havemade some progress in integrated structures for missions, but we need to focus now on integrated approachesthat go beyond the mission. We are working on building better-integrated assessment and planning tools. I havealso been asked by the Secretary-General to chair an Integrated Steering Group to bring together relevant UNpartners at the ASG [Assistant Secretary-General] level to improve our integration across planning, support,mandate implementation, and accountability. The upcoming SG report on Peacebuilding will also provide anopportunity to tackle the issue of achieving an effective, integrated strategy to drive the internationalcommunity’s efforts as a whole. In most peacebuilding situations, only 20 percent of international assistance, orless, goes through the UN. The UN will need to offer a stronger model for wider international coherence if theoverall international impact is to be improved.

At the level of management systems, I think we must have a frank discussion with the member states. They,quite correctly, want accountability from managers. Yet they are also asking the UN to deploy missions rapidlyto extremely hostile, inhospitable, and distant locations. With operations worth over a billion dollars, the UN’smanagement committees focus budgetary deliberations at the level of each post. We need to find a balance, bywhich mission managers are empowered to implement with sufficient delegated authority, and their decisionsare subjected to fair audit later.

16 KEYNOTE ADDRESS

While we must continue to improve our management systems, it is worth remembering that, althoughmember states have been relatively generous in building up DPKO and DFS, the UN’s peacekeeping manage-ment structure is nevertheless very light. DFS and DPKO comprise some 1,000 staff, a fraction of what the EU[European Union] or NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] would employ to manage 140,000 personnelspread across the world. For each EU and NATO operation a dedicated operational command is establishedoutside the organization’s headquarters and distinct from the Force Commander in the mission area. For ouroperations, the strategic and operational level of management is, in effect, divided between headquarters andthe mission, without the intermediate command, and managers at both levels are pulled by competing respon-sibilities. At headquarters, managers cover multiple missions and must focus on the diplomatic and politicalinteraction with member states, and at mission level managers must deal with ever-pressing tactical demandswhile continuing to keep the strategic horizon in view.

At the level of the mission, we need to build leadership teams with a good combination of political leadership,technical expertise, and management acumen. We will never find all the characteristics required in one SRSG[Special Representative of the Secretary-General], rather he or she must lead a complementary team. UNmissions are complex, expensive organizations that are launched, peak, and disappear in extremely short ordercompared to comparable organizations. They have little time to develop effective organizational cultures, andtherefore leadership impact—positive and negative—is even greater than in long-standing institutions. This alsorequires stronger accountability.

Here I should mention the unfortunate, ongoing problem that continues to bedevil peacekeeping—sexualexploitation and abuse committed by UN peacekeepers, both uniformed and civilian. We have made someprogress in combating this issue. However, much more needs to be done. Member states must do their part tohold perpetrators to account, but also, on the part of the Secretary-General and DPKO, there is a determinationto increase managerial accountability and hold managers and officers accountable also, wherever this isjustified. There can be no other way to deal with this terrible problem, which harms individuals and communi-ties alike.

UN peacekeeping is today characterized by complexity. To support political transitions, humanitarianresponse, security sector reform, economic recovery, human rights reform, the build-up of rule of law institu-tions, we depend upon global partnerships across the UN system, with the World Bank, and bilateral partners.We are working with regional organizations and financial institutions to establish frameworks for predictablecooperation that encompass coordinated planning, as with EU-UN efforts in Chad, as well as effectivecommunication on our respective activities, as with NATO and the EU in Afghanistan. Our relationship withthe African Union is particularly intense, as we seek to support the AU in building its own capacities forpeacekeeping and to ensure that together we construct a mutually reinforcing network of capabilities.

Peacekeeping has moved from a relatively marginal instrument of international affairs to what it is today: acentral tool for the management of conflict. However, the fundamental challenges are well-known; financial andhuman resources to United Nations peacekeeping are severely overstretched, while blue berets are oftendeployed to places where there is little or no peace to keep. Our systems need to be strengthened and they mustcontinuously adapt. At the same time, we must recognize that peacekeeping will always be a high-risk business.Yet, when missions fail, one will inevitably find exogenous shocks play their part.

It seems clear to me, therefore, that we will need to collectively consider how to address more effectively thepolitical problems that lie at the root of the conflicts, and consider more deeply how we respond to the variousinterrelated aspects of conflict resolution; political, security, humanitarian, and early recovery. In particular, Ithink that the methodologies used by the UN are relatively weak when it comes to addressing the resourcequestions that drive conflict. In eastern DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo], for instance, thepeacekeeping and political tools that we can bring to bear focus on issues of military, political, and ethnicdivision closely, but do little to address the tensions over natural resources that underpin a good deal of theconflict there.

Clearly, UN peacekeeping has come a very long way thanks in good measure to the Brahimi reform process.Now, in many areas we are overstretched, as missions lack the resources—human, material, and political—to

Alain Le Roy 17

fully address all the expectations placed upon them. I think some of the key questions we must consider are thefollowing:

• In light of the changed political, economic, and security environment in which we find ourselves, do weneed to review our comparative advantages and consider the streamlining of mandates and tasks in orderto ensure better use of our limited global resources?

• What sorts of mandates are appropriate for UN peacekeeping? When is it the right tool, and what are theother tools that should be available to the international community for conflict resolution?

• What are the benchmarks against which we will measure the success of UN peacekeeping and how canthey help us to prepare for the transition to longer-term peacebuilding activities?

• How can we advance our thinking on the relative roles and interoperability of the UN and the AfricanUnion, European Union, and other regional and subregional peacekeeping actors?

• Do we need a new dialogue with member states on the question of whether the United Nations isproperly configured with the right systems and rules and regulations to grapple with the sheer logisticalchallenges of deploying at huge scale, rapidly into extremely distant and difficult terrain?

• How can the UN address the issue of the waning consent from host countries that we see in a number ofcases, and what does this mean for the standing of UN peacekeeping and its effectiveness?

• And what can we do together to ensure the strong, ongoing political and diplomatic support frommember states that UN operations need in order to succeed?

Thank you.

18 KEYNOTE ADDRESS

19

* Richard Gowan is Associate Director for Policy at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation.1 Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).2 Ibid., p. 8.3 Ibid., p. 9.4 UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines [Capstone Doctrine]” (New

York, January 2008), p. 31.

DISCUSSION PAPERS

“Moving the Ravioli Around”:Managing UN Peace Operations in a Period of Crisis

Richard Gowan*

INTRODUCTION: GUARDIANS, HEROES,AND MANAGERS

A recent history of the US Army identifies threerecurrent schools of thought about warfare:Guardians, Heroes, and Managers.1 TheGuardians—intellectual descendants of the Corpsof Engineers that fortified America’s eastern coastin the early 1800s—see war as a technical businessdriven by technology rather than human factors. Bycontrast, Heroes emphasize the importance ofmorale and courage on the battlefield. Thistradition can be traced to the Indian wars and hasmost recently reappeared in the “surge” in Iraq.

For Managers, “war is fundamentally an organi-zational (as opposed to engineering) problem—therational coordination of resources, both human andmateriel.”2 This school of thought often asserts itselfwhen frontline failures spark demands for armyreform:

Too often, this takes the form of what militarypersonnel cynically term “moving the ravioliaround”: drawing elaborate diagrams to rearrange(and “re-acronymize”) the chains of command, theforce structure, and the budget priorities, whileleaving the military institution and its fundamentalproblems virtually untouched. In the name ofreform and modernization, Managers are perpetu-ally engaged in the radical reorganization ofadministrative structures and tactical units,creating new concepts and buzzwords, andpromoting their new, transformed military organi-zation as superior to the one it replaced.3

This analysis of attitudes to war-fighting gives uspointers about how we should and should not thinkabout peacekeeping. Although the analogy should

not be stretched too far, the United Nations has itsown schools of Guardians, Heroes, and Managers.Here, the Guardians are not obsessed withperfecting military technology—in cases such asDarfur, the UN’s overriding challenge is often to gethold of any serviceable military technology at all.Instead, the UN’s Guardians are those thinkers andpolicymakers (both in the UN Secretariat andamong member states) who see themselves asprotecting and applying time-honored principles ofUN peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, and thenonuse of force.

The Capstone Doctrine promulgated this springby the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations(DPKO) reaffirms the utility of these concepts as “anavigation aid, or compass, for practitioners in thefield and at United Nations Headquarters.”4 Whilethis phrasing is meant to imply some flexibility in

Mr. Francesco Mancini, IPI, H.E. Dr. Fred Tanner,Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and Mr. Richard Gowan,

Center on International Cooperation.

how traditional principles are interpreted, there is anatural tension between the Guardians andpeacekeeping’s Heroes. The latter believe thatpersonalities play an all-important role in makingoperations succeed or fail, placing particularemphasis on the political role of the UN’s SpecialRepresentatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs).

The Heroic school of thought is (perhapsinevitably) strong in the UN Secretariat, especiallyamong the generation of officials formed in thefield over the last two decades. Its underlying credois sharply summarized in a recent essay by LakhdarBrahimi and Salman Ahmed, who argue that therange of operational tasks required of any medium-or large-scale peace operation makes it “easy to losesight of ” the fact that “skilled political processmanagement is critical to keeping the parties [to apeace agreement] engaged, and effective mediationis also needed to broker additional agreementsbetween the parties.”5

Brahimi and Ahmed fear that this art of political-process management is being lost. One reason isthat Special Representatives of the Secretary-General “cannot shirk their leadership responsibili-ties to ensure good order and discipline ofpersonnel, proper management of mission assetsand effective integration and unity of effort acrosscomponents.” But this “can come at the expense ofthe political role, and vice versa.”6

This political role is at risk because, while theUN’s Guardians and Heroes still have influence,Managers are now the dominant force in theorganization. The 2000 Brahimi Report onlypartially addressed undeniable managerial gapsthat haunted peacekeeping in the 1990s. The UNhas been on a sporadic and frequently quixoticquest for better management ever since.

This has taken the form of a series of reformefforts, large and small, that have rarely had theiranticipated effect. These include the developmentand frequent redefinition of the integrated-missionconcept; the introduction of Results-BasedBudgeting as a (less than satisfactory) managementtool; the Peacekeeping 2010 agenda to shake up

how different parts of DPKO work together; and,most recently and substantially, Secretary-GeneralBan Ki-moon’s decision to form a stand-aloneDepartment of Field Services (DFS) alongsideDPKO. In short, the UN has moved a truly vastamount of ravioli around for almost a decade.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN CRISIS

This is not to argue that individual initiatives havebeen unnecessary or misguided. DPKO and DFSare far better-staffed and more professional thanDPKO was ten years ago. But this progress ishampered by three main flaws. First, while theseelements of the UN may have improved, they stillsuffer from major gaps, especially in staffing.Missions such as that to South Sudan have notori-ously suffered vacancy rates of up to 35 percent.

Secondly, the process of constantly reshufflingelements of the UN system has resulted in a certainobsession with management reform for its ownsake. This is one part of what Manuel Fröhlich calls“reform as a modus operandi” at the UN: theprocess by which all Secretaries-General enteroffice as “reformers,” initiate changes that go awryor that lead to unintended consequences, and thenhave to launch corrective “reform of the reform.”7

The third flaw is that this cyclical process, takingon a life and logic of its own, has become increas-ingly detached from the strategic realitiessurrounding UN peacekeeping. This is not simplyto repeat Brahimi and Ahmed’s concern that SRSGsand their senior colleagues cannot fulfill theirpolitical tasks because of their managerial distrac-tions. As I have argued elsewhere, UN peace-keeping faces simultaneous systemic and paradig-matic crises—neither of which can be resolvedthrough management reform alone:8

• The systemic crisis: the UN’s ability to concentrateeffective military and civilian resources is increas-ingly constrained by a shortage of assets likehelicopters and police units—compounded by thedearth of experienced civilian mission managers atall grades. In the absence of resources, manage-ment reform can only achieve limited results—rather as restructuring the Ford Motor Company

20 DISCUSSION PAPERS

5 Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed, In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2008),p. 2.

6 Ibid., p. 4.7 Manuel Fröhlich, “The Ironies of UN Secretariat Reform,” Global Governance 13 (2007): 151-159. 8 Richard Gowan, “The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 2006-08,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 4 (2008): 453-469.

will only have limited results if it stops beingsupplied with tires and windshields.

• The paradigmatic crisis: the UN’s managementsystems are based on two political assumptions thatare incorrect in many environments. The first isthat host countries will be broadly supportive ofeffective and integrated missions on theirterritory—this is true of the Liberian government,but not of the Sudanese regime in Darfur. Thesecond assumption is that the Security Council andtroop-contributing countries can agree on strate-gies for the UN to implement. This has proveduntrue in Kosovo (where Russia and the West havesplit over the UN’s role) and Darfur (where Africantroop contributors, the US, and Europe disagreeover how to balance peacekeeping with theInternational Criminal Court’s [ICC] pursuit ofPresident Omar Bashir).

Where the UN lacks sufficient resources orinternational political backing, the question of whatconstitutes effective management takes on newdimensions. The pursuit of the UN’s standard goals(an integrated mission or even a full set ofmandated tasks) may be impossible or irrelevant.The real task may be to limit or reduce theweaknesses of a resource-poor mission bymanaging what little it has as efficiently aspossible—or to manage an operation in such a waythat somehow meets conflicting political impera-tives.

WHAT IS MANAGEMENT FOR?NAVIGATING DARFUR AND KOSOVO

An obvious example of managing a resource-poormission can be found in the case of Darfur. TheAfrican Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was asource of contention between the AU and Westerndonors, not only because of its vulnerability in aheinous environment, but also because of questionsfrom the donors over how efficiently their fundswere managed. Tensions also arose over limits onhow the funding instruments were used to supportAMIS: some were short term, some could not beused to fund military hardware or were too bureau-cratic.9

From an early stage, DPKO played a quiet role in

helping the African Union (AU) do the accounts.This role was formalized in the creation of theAfrican Union/United Nations Hybrid Operationin Darfur (UNAMID) to replace AMIS. While theSudanese government has exploited the UN’sshortage of assets by playing on the mandate’srequirement that the mission have “an Africancharacter,” UNAMID was designed to place missionmanagement firmly in the hands of the UN.

In a report of June 2007, Secretary-General BanKi-moon and then AU Chairperson Alpha OumarKonaré submitted a report proposing that the AUappoint UNAMID’s commander—but that“operational directives will be implementedthrough an integrated headquarters structure,including a mission support division led by a UnitedNations director of administration” (emphasisadded).10 They added that “the overall managementof the operation will be based on United Nationsstandards, principles and established practices.” Inessence, UNAMID was constructed on a deal bywhich the AU commanded, but the UN managed.

Without such a deal, many donors might haverefused to keep funding the African peacekeepers.The UN’s management role has been to sustain aweak operation—but one that is arguably still muchbetter than having no mission at all. This is anunpleasant truth, but a potential model for the UN’srole in hybrid missions in Africa and beyond.

By contrast, Kosovo is a case where the UN’smanagement role has involved circumnavigatinginternational political splits. Since Kosovo’s unilat-eral declaration of independence in February 2008,the UN mission there (UN Interim AdministrationMission in Kosovo [UNMIK]) has been in anincreasingly absurd position: under SecurityCouncil Resolution 1244 of 1999, it is still theultimate source of authority in the province. Russiahas insisted this continue. But the Kosovars, EU,and US have wanted UNMIK to exit and bereplaced by a smaller European mission.

As Resolution 1244 is open-ended, and neitherRussia nor the West has risked reopening it in theSecurity Council, there has been no definitivepolitical direction on which way UNMIK reconcile

Richard Gowan 21

9 See Thierry Tardy, “The European Union in Africa: A Strategic Partner in Peace Operations,” (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2006), p. 8. 10 United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN

Doc. S/2007/307/Rev.1, June 5, 2007.

their competing demands. Officials speak of livingin “parallel universes” resulting from the need torespect 1244 while also adapting to local realities.But the UN has done a surprisingly adept job ofusing managerial arguments to address thesituation.

In the summer of 2008, Ban Ki-moon declaredthat in his capacity as the UN’s “ChiefAdministrative Officer,” he no longer believedUNMIK sustainable in its current form. Hisofficials, including a new SRSG apparently selectedfor the purpose, have set about cutting back themission’s civilian staff by four-fifths and contrivinglegal and political means to hand off policing andlegal duties to the EU—while leaving a residualUNMIK in place for formal reasons. This processhas often been ill-tempered, but the managerialmaneuver worked better than many analystsforesaw.

The maneuver could be described as “managingup”: identifying an operational position thatsomehow satisfies the competing politicaldesiderata of the Security Council. I have arguedelsewhere that the UN’s “overarching strategic taskis to build up a minimal consensus between the US,its allies, and its rivals about what UN peacekeepingis for in an age of tensions between them.”11 WhileBan’s sleight-of-hand in the Kosovo case may haveput Russia’s nose out of joint, it shows how suchminimalist deals may emerge.

There are obvious differences between the Darfurand Kosovo cases, both in the pressures the UN hasfaced and the partner organizations (the AU andEU) involved. But they share two characteristics.The prime goal in both has been mitigation: identi-fying managerial options that avert worst-casescenarios. This has meant viewing managerialdecisions in their immediate political context, notas a function of “reform of the reform.”

Although no one would argue that these aremodels for future operations, both challenge us tothink outside standard UN frameworks (integra-tion, etc.). With peacekeeping facing multiplecrises, the idea of management as mitigation maybe the best option the UN has.

RETHINKING MANAGEMENT:THE CONGO SHOCK

While the UN has tried to navigate difficult timesin Darfur and Kosovo, it has received a shock fromevents in the eastern Democratic Republic of theCongo (DRC).12 Laurent Nkunda’s rebels, oncemeant to integrate into the Congolese army underUN oversight, have seized territory, displacedhundreds of thousands, and encircled UN troops inGoma.

The immediate crisis there is not managerial: it ismilitary and humanitarian. But there is a saddisconnect between the energies that the UNmission (UN Organization Mission in theDemocratic Republic of Congo [MONUC]) has putinto coordinating its activities and its lack ofpolitical leverage over the rebels. Brahimi andAhmed’s warning of the dangers of losing control ofa political process ring true here: it is generallyagreed that MONUC has lost most of its politicalinfluence since 2006.

The fact that the UN’s largest military force cameclose to a major military defeat also highlights thescale of the systemic crisis for peacekeeping notedabove. It transpires that even a well-armed missionis not well-armed enough to take on an effectivemilitary threat such as that posed by Nkunda’sinfantry. The implications for the understrengthmission in Darfur and the proposed UN deploy-ment in Somalia are very grim.

The DRC is likely to focus international attentionon the broader crisis of peacekeeping, and stimulatequestions about the UN’s overall posture. Justifiabledoubts will be raised—or are already being raised—about the UN’s use of military assets, its relationswith European and African governments (whichhave been tested by the crisis), and its command-and-control structures. Management issues willfind their way onto the agenda.

Some responses by the UN’s differing schools ofthought are predictable. If the Heroes will arguethat the DRC shows the need for a politicallyempowered UN field presence, the Guardians willargue that MONUC strayed too far beyondtraditional UN principles.

22 DISCUSSION PAPERS

11 Richard Gowan, “No Bed of Roses for Le Roy,” Guardian Online, August 20, 2008.12 This discussion of events in the DRC reflects the situation in the final quarter of 2008. Events have moved on considerably since then, but the debate over the UN's

role continues.

What about the Managers? Prior to autumn 2008,critics of MONUC argued that its current woeswere rooted in the mission’s failure to adopt acoherent approach to disarming and reintegratingrebels in previous years.13 Advocates of this positionmay argue that MONUC shows the need for morecomprehensive, integrated strategies in the future.

All these arguments have merits—this paper isnot meant to adjudicate between them. But it hassought to show that the ensuing debates should notprivilege structural questions (such as integrationversus decentralization) over context (the uttermess in the DRC). That was the mistake made bythe Managers in the US military after Vietnam. “Wedid not manage the war in Vietnam efficiently oreffectively,” one wrote. “In the main, our organiza-tional problems stemmed from the omission ofbasic management theories and techniques.”14 Themyopia of this statement is striking. Vietnam wasperhaps the most self-consciously “managerial” war

ever. The American defeat was rooted not in poormanagement, but in an emphasis on managementthat obscured the war’s political realities.

Any response to the current set of peacekeepingcrises needs to incorporate a realistic appreciationof the likely challenges to any mission. What will bethe gap between mandate and resources? Whatexternal political factors may require managerialreadjustment? How robust will managementtechniques prove during periods of sustainedviolence, as in the eastern DRC? If the political andstrategic context looks unfavorable, what is theminimal level of success or sustainability the UNcan achieve? These are uncomfortable questions.But these are uncomfortable times forpeacekeeping. Rather than “moving the ravioliaround,” the UN must address the challenges aheadwithout indulging in the illusion that “reform as amodus operandi” is the best answer.

Richard Gowan 23

13 Rener Onana and Hannah Taylor, “MONUC and SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 4 (2008): 501-516.14 Linn, The Echo of Battle, p. 200.

There seems to be a growing acknowledgement ofthe complexity of peace operations, both in practiceand research. The emergency relief communitycoined the term “complex emergencies” in the early1990s.1 The peacekeeping community now widelyuses the concept “complex peace operations” todescribe the multidimensional and multifunctionalnature of contemporary peace operations. But whatdoes complexity refer to in the context of peaceoperations? The common-sense use of the conceptusually concerns two factors: the first is the sheernumber of international and local actors that needto be coordinated and consulted, and the second isthe wide range of activities undertaken by theseactors across the political, security, developmental,humanitarian, economic, governance, rule of law,and human rights dimensions.

It is thus surprising that the link between thecomplexity observed in the peace operationscontext and the science of Complexity has not beenpursued more vigorously. If the systems withinwhich peace operations function are complex, wemay be able to apply some of the insights gainedfrom Complexity to help us improve the sustain-ability, effectiveness, and impact of these operationsin the future.

Complexity originated in physics andcybernetics2 and then spread into the socialsciences, where it had a profound impact onsociology, psychology, and the managementsciences.3 Many of the core theories developed inthe physical sciences have proved relevant in the

social sciences.4 Although there has not been a lotof research done on the applicability of Complexityto international relations, conflict management,and peace operations,5 the multiagency, multidi-mensional peacekeeping environment make it alikely candidate for the application of Complexity.

It is probably obvious that Complexity does notlend itself to a neat and concise definition. In fact,one of the basic characteristics of somethingcomplex is that it cannot be reduced to a morecompact or concise form. One way to characterizecomplexity, therefore, is to distinguish betweenwhat is truly “complex” and what is merely “compli-cated.” If a system appears complex, but can beunderstood to the point where its behavior canbecome predictable, it is merely complicated. The

24 DISCUSSION PAPERS

Planning for SuccessCedric de Coning*

* Cedric De Coning is Research Fellow at African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Norwegian Institute for InternationalAffairs (NUPI).

1 A “complex emergency,” as defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), is “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total orconsiderable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate orcapacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.” IASC, “Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies,” IASC Reference Paper (New York,June 28, 2004).

2 See Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1948); Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory (New York: Braziller, 1968); H. Maturana andF. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living (New York: Springer, 1980); Gregoire Nicolis and Ilya Prigogine, Exploring Complexity (New York:Freeman and Co., 1989).

3 See R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic, 1984); Niklas Luhman, “The Autopoiesis of Social Systems,” in Essays on Self-Reference, edited byNiklas Luhman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); and R. Mayntz, “Chaos in Society: Reflections on the Impact of Chaos Theory on Sociology,” in TheImpact of Chaos on Science and Society, edited by C. Grebogi and J. A. Yorke (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1997).

4 See P. Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems (London: Routledge, 1998); Niklas Luhman, “The Concept of Society,” inContemporary Social Theory, edited by A. Eliot (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999); and Fritjof Capra, The Hidden Connections: Integrating the Biological, Cognitive, and SocialDimensions of Life into a Science of Sustainability (New York: Doubleday, 2002).

5 The work of Robert Jervis is one of the exceptions. See, for instance, R. Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1998).

Mr. Diego Ruiz Palmer, Operations Division, NATO,and Mr. Cedric de Coning, ACCORD and NUPI

International Space Station, for example, consists ofso many parts and requires so many differenttechnologies that no one person can understand itall. However, it is possible to fully explain itsworkings, even if this may require several experts indifferent disciplines and a truckload of manuals.That is why it is possible to plan and execute amission that involves departing from earth andarriving at a specific point in space, so that the crewof the International Space Station can be replacedand its stores replenished. These missions require ahighly complicated planning process, but it ispossible because enough of the causal factors arelinear and thus predictable.

Something that is complex, on the other hand,has a dynamic and nonlinear relationship among itsconstituent elements, i.e., they change over time,adapt to the environment, and do not follow aspecific cause-and-effect path. The complexityresults from the interaction between the elementsof the system, and is manifested at the level of thesystem itself.6 The human brain, language, andsocial systems are complex.7 Peacekeepingoperations and the conflict systems within whichthey operate are truly complex. It follows thatplanning something that is complex would requirean approach that is quite different.

PEACEKEEPING IS EMBEDDED IN ALARGER PEACEBUILDING SYSTEM

We cannot deal with the complexity ofpeacekeeping planning if we are going to isolate itfrom its role within the larger peacebuildingsystem. Peacebuilding systems consist of a largenumber of individual programs, undertaken bymultiple agencies. These agencies are independentwith each their own mandates, decision-makingstructures, and resources. At the same time, theyare interdependent in that no single program canachieve the overall goal of the peacebuildingsystem—consolidating the peace—on its own. Thisdoes not mean that every activity at the programlevel carries the peacebuilding label. It is when theyare considered together, however, in the context oftheir combined and cumulative effect over time,that their part in the larger peacebuilding system

emerges.8

Peacekeeping planning only makes sense when itis connected to a larger network of interrelatedprograms. The disarmament and demobilization(DD) that peacekeeping missions now typicallyundertake, for instance, rely on the assumption thatothers will provide a series of reintegration (R)programs. And the whole DDR process relies onthe assumption that there is a series of otherprograms in place that will create security, improveopportunities for education, create employment,and invest in sustainable livelihoods. Althougheach agency independently undertakes programsthat address one or more facets of the problem, acombined and cumulative effort is needed toachieve the overall peacebuilding objective. Inhighly dynamic environments, the systems that dowell have a certain degree of robustness, i.e., theyhave multiple ways of responding to changes in thesystem, and some degree of overlap and duplicationis thus actually healthy.

Peacekeeping planners thus have to recognizethat peace operations are embedded within a largerpeacebuilding system and depend on a UNintegrated and non-UN interconnected field-basedplanning process that is networked within thebroadest cooperative framework possible.

THE NEED FOR AN OVERALLSTRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

This implies that peacekeeping planners should, asa first priority, engage with partners in a processthat will generate the strategic vision, goals, andobjectives of the overall peacebuilding framework.The traditional approach to peacekeeping planningis that the process starts within the Department ofPeacekeeping Operations at UN headquarters andthen ripples out. This would be an appropriateapproach in a security-first and/or UN-centriccontext. However, given that the goal of securitycannot happen independently of other goals andthat the UN is only one of many important actors,the ripple effect often comes too late or has too littleimpact to influence the core assumptions in theoverall peacebuilding framework.

Cedric de Coning 25

6 Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism, p. 3.7 Ibid., p. x.8 C. H. de Coning, “Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions: A Norwegian Perspective,” (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of

International Affairs, December 2007), p. 14.

It is not necessary for all agents to be part of everycoordination process. A balance needs to be struckbetween being as comprehensive and inclusive aspossible and reaching agreement on the way ahead,to act and to deliver. These are not mutuallyexclusive objectives; both can be pursued, buttrade-offs and compromises will need to be made.Coordination in this context is thus aboutmanaging interdependencies. A web of networks isthe most appropriate structure, with the core beingmore densely connected than the periphery. Whilethe agreement of some partners is critical, it may beenough to simply consult others and move ahead.Competition among different policy options ishealthy as it ensures checks and balances are inplace and guards against group-think.

The terms “overall” and “comprehensive” in thiscontext do not just refer to a multidimensional(political, security, and developmental) approach,but also to a whole-of-actor approach that goesbeyond UN integration. There is a danger that theUN integrated peacekeeping planning process canbe so time- and resource-intensive that it leaveslittle room for the UN partners to engage with theother peacebuilding agents. The UN has the legiti-macy and credibility to be the catalyst for theoverall process, but then it must be committed to,and invest in, the overall peacebuilding framework.This does not, of course, negate the importance ofUN integration, but it alters the process flow byrecognizing the primary value of the overall systemeffect, articulated through some form of strategicframework, and the role of the peacekeepingmission within it.

TRACKING, MONITORING, ANDEVALUATION

Peacekeeping planning has, until recently,essentially represented a “shoot and forget” model.Once the plan has been approved at headquarters itis implemented in the field. Since, as pointed outabove, complex systems are nonlinear, dynamic,and, therefore, unpredictable, they require a highlyadaptive planning process, able to continuouslyadjust to changes in the environment. This impliesthat planning and implementation should not be

understood as separate functions, but rather as onecontinuous-feedback cycle informed by a trackingand monitoring process that is focused on a rangeof indicators to track changes at the systemic level.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

It is important to recognize, however, that nointervention in a complex system can have only oneeffect. Once again, complex systems are dynamicand respond to interventions in a nonlinearfashion. It may be possible to anticipate some of theways in which a complex system will respond to anintervention. However, the system will also respondin ways that cannot be anticipated.9 If we accept thatunintended consequences are a natural outcome ofthe dynamic nature of complex systems, then wealso have to recognize that they cannot be avoidedaltogether. Some unintended consequences shouldhave been foreseen or anticipated, especially if theyhave occurred under similar circumstances in thepast, while others may be totally unexpected.Unintended consequences are a predictable side-effect of peacekeeping operations, i.e., the likeli-hood that there will be unintended consequences ispredictable, but the specific unintendedconsequences are not always foreseeable. Thispossibility should therefore be factored into theplanning, coordination, and monitoring ofpeacebuilding frameworks.10

CONCLUSION

This discussion paper explores the utility ofapplying some of the insights gained from the studyof Complexity to help understand how to planpeacekeeping operations that are part of complexpeacebuilding systems in a highly dynamic andnonlinear environment. It was argued thatpeacekeeping planning cannot take place inisolation, but has to recognize that peace operationsare embedded in a larger peacebuilding framework.Peacekeeping operations are interdependent withother peacebuilding agents, hence unable to achievetheir objectives independently. Coordination in thiscontext is about managing mutual interdependen-cies.

26 DISCUSSION PAPERS

9 Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism, p. 3.10 Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), The Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations (Tokyo: United Nations University Press,

2007).

Cedric de Coning 27

Peacekeeping planning needs to recognize its rolewithin the larger peacebuilding system, and thismeans that its first priority should be to contributeto, encourage, and perhaps even facilitate a widerstrategic peacebuilding framework process. In adynamic environment the planning process needsto be highly adaptive and this argues for integratinga tracking-and-monitoring process into an ongoing

field-based planning process that will shift theplanning emphasis from headquarters to the field.Finally, the planning process needs to anticipateunintended consequences in this kind of environ-ment, and thus take steps to anticipate and monitorthe effects its interventions are having, and adjustaccordingly.

28

Being an SRSG has been the most demanding andexciting, revolting and rewarding experience of myprofessional life. Demanding for me as a newcomerto a large field mission under considerable internaland external pressure, exciting with the dailyadrenaline shots which both energized me andsometimes kept me sleepless, revolting in seeingthe gap between the misery and powerlessness ofthe poverty-stricken majority and the glaringriches and arrogance of the ruling classes, andfinally rewarding for having had the opportunity towork with committed and dedicated colleaguesand, by common efforts, seeing misery reduced,international solidarity mobilized and hope againglimmer in the eyes of people.1

When UN Secretary-General (SG) Kofi Annanasked me to be his Special Representative (SRSG) inCôte d'Ivoire, he argued that the situation called fora person who had executive and legislative experi-ence in government and parliament, insider experi-ence dealing with the European Union (EU) andthe United Nations (UN), one who came from acountry with no colonial past and a tradition ofsupporting the liberation struggle in Africa, whospoke French and personally knew key Africanleaders.2

It turned out that the SG was right. Without themultifaceted mixture of politics and diplomacy, andexperience in international organizations, I wouldhave been at a loss in Côte d'Ivoire, where I servedfrom April 1, 2005, to February 15, 2007. Thisspeaks to the critical need for, and the challenge ofselecting, SRSGs with the rare combination of skillsand experience needed to lead a UN peaceoperation.

Despite this, it took me six months to somewhatget my bearings of the mission’s nature and scope,as well as of the Ivoirian land and its people. It feltas if the SRSG was to be an omnipotent renaissanceperson, a master of all arts. At the same time, whilethe SRSG ultimately has macro-responsibility forthe success or failure of the mission, the SRSG

cannot engage in its micromanagement.It is not easy for a new SRSG to take over an

ongoing mission, which has developed its own life,trends, dynamics, and human relationships. TheSRSG inherits a certain mission “culture,” as well asits established and resilient structures. And,consequently, when change is needed, it takes a lotof time to implement it. It is important for the newSRSG to set the proper tone for his or her staff. Thelack of any sense of urgency, crisis awareness, teamspirit, or team work on the part of some staffmembers makes it difficult to meet defined goalsand objectives, or agree on deadlines andbenchmarks in supporting the implementation ofthe roadmap for peace.

Strong leadership of a UN peace operation doesnot only start with the SRSG, but requires a reliableand capable senior management team. In this I wasfortunate and greatly helped by colleagues,especially as I was not greeted by any handover noteor given my predecessor’s end-of-assignmentreport, if it existed. Through all this I was fortunateto have Alan Doss, who had previous experience inthe mission and in the region, at my side in the firstyear of service.

* Pierre Schori is Executive Director of Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE).1 Pierre Schori, End-of-Assignment Report presented to UN Department of Peacekeeping, New York, February 2007. 2 This discussion paper is drawn in large part from Pierre Schori’s End-of-Assignment Report, presented to UN headquarters in New York, February 2007.

Leadership on the Line: Managing Field ComplexityPierre Schori*

H.E. Mr. Pierre Schori, FRIDE, and Dr. Martin Barber,University of Edinburgh

Pierre Schori 29

LEADERSHIP AS GOOD GOVERNANCE3

Organizations with strong, centralized power areoften weak on transparency, and thus run the riskof being weak on developing fair staff policy andpromoting a positive team spirit. I saw it in my ownmission, and I tried to combat those leadershipexcesses by being flexible, egalitarian, transparent,and in a constant listening mode, while leading byexample.

A good team leader should be able to inspire andencourage others, not only give orders, pull rankwith those around and below him or her, andengage in turf wars with other senior staff. Thiswould also lead to a greater loyalty among the stafftoward the mission, which, in turn, might reducethe misconduct and discipline cases.

Good governance, which we preach to others,must also begin “at home,” in our own mission.Implicitly, good governance dissociates itself fromall forms of nepotism and hierarchical rigidity,which I would call “commando practices andstructures.” There are ways of dealing with theseproblems. Building on and highlighting “bestpractices” is one way but not the only one. Studyingand learning from “bad practices” is, in fact, a veryuseful and educational way of improving standards.

Given these realities, mandatory 360-degreeevaluation processes should be introduced in allmissions to focus in a first phase on senior leader-ship, from section and unit chiefs and up. Ingeneral, I found it most helpful and healthy for themission to be the object of regular external scrutiny.“Barril”-style missions and other assessmentmissions, such as groups of experts, audits, andDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)visits, have proved to be useful instruments formonitoring the implementation of the mission’smandate and for measuring the constraints, gaps,and additional resource requirements. Thoseassessment missions provide an opportunity to geta fresh and independent look at the missionsthemselves, and give headquarters more insight andknowledge. Those evaluation missions shouldinvolve other departments in addition to DPKOand the Department of Field Support (DFS), suchas the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) andthe Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

Affairs (OCHA).

OVERCOMING RESOURCE LIMITATIONS

The human, material/logistical, and financialresources at the disposal of the mission typicallyprove inadequate to address the serious andincreasing challenges confronting the mission,especially during security-related disturbances. Forexample, in January 2006, the UN offices in Abidjanand all UN agencies in the western part of thecountry were under attack by violent mobsorganized by local militia leaders and linked to thegovernment party, which opposed the latestSecurity Council resolutions. During that difficultweek we found out, much to our regret, that themission was not properly prepared for handlingriots by civilians. The tear gas was neither sufficientnor modern enough to deter or stop the constantattacks by mobs throwing stones and Molotovcocktails. Nor did we have sufficient formed policeunits (FPUs) at our disposal. It must be underlinedthat the mission and the SG himself repeatedlyasked for reinforcements of troops and relevantmaterial to the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire(ONUCI) but each time found the Security Councildivided on the matter.

SRSG AS COORDINATOR

The multiplicity of external actors with sometimesdiverging and competing political agendas,including noticeable disagreements among keyactors within the Security Council, make it difficultto promote a strong and coordinated internationalresponse to emerging risks and challenges. In thefield, coordination with UN agencies is clearlyimportant. It serves to show the local populationand government the unity of purpose and action ofthe UN family. Good practices evolving fromcoordination include the timely dissemination ofthe conclusions of senior management team (SMT)meetings; the broadcast of security advisories onanticipated disturbances and related precautionarymeasures; and the sharing with the heads of UNagencies sensitive political issues to enlighten themabout the complexity of the crisis and the optionsfor addressing the related challenges. However, thecoordination exercise is made difficult by thetendency of some UN agencies to protect their turf

3 Based on a response to a DPKO questionnaire on “Senior Leadership Appointment Policy,” December 16, 2005.

30 DISCUSSION PAPERS

vis-à-vis the mission’s perceived interference intheir areas of responsibility. My view is to advocateas much mission integration as possible whenpossible; promote synergy from diversity.

The Deputy SRSG (DSRSG) plays an essentialrole in the mission. At the same time, I wonderwhether the quintuple-hatting of the DSRSG isreally a good idea. He or she is at the same timeDSRSG, Resident Coordinator (RC), HumanitarianCoordinator (HC), UNDP Resident Representative(RR), and alternate Designated Official (DO). As Isee it, this structural contradiction and schizo-phrenic duties rendered my deputy’s situationextremely difficult, not to say impossible.

It is also necessary to realize that the UN is notthe only actor with a stake in resolving conflict.Regional and subregional organizations, such as theAfrican Union (AU) and the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS) areincreasingly taking responsibility during crises onthe African continent. This shared responsibilitycan result in occasional turf battles among regionalleaders in the pursuit of competing agendas orpreoccupations. During my tenure in 2005 and2006, the AU and ECOWAS dedicated foursummits exclusively to the situation in Côted'Ivoire, as well as two others where Côte d'Ivoirewas on the agenda. Given their limited resources,ways and means should be found to offer regionaland subregional organizations the possibility ofsending staff to spend time at DPKO, the EU, orother similar bodies to improve their skills. Eachmission should identify focal points at the relevantregional or subregional organization to liaise withthe relevant technical units in the mission to facili-tate monitoring and follow-up on actions requiredin implementing decisions made by those organiza-tions and the UN.

Finally, the UN mission should explore thepossibility of initiating the establishment of amechanism for coordinating donor support to thepeace process. In order to promote transparencyand accountability, the mission should alsoencourage the International Monetary Fund, theWorld Bank, and the European Union to monitorand audit public expenditures, especially in thenatural-resource sectors.

SENIOR-MANAGEMENT-RELATEDPERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVEISSUES

Things may have changed since 2007. However, it ismy impression that every SRSG would admit thatone of the major lasting challenges of managing amission is related to personnel andfinancial/budgetary arrangements. PersonnelManagement and Support Services (PMSS) is afriend indeed, but it is sometimes a slow friend.Rules and budgets are imposed by others, not leastby the General Assembly and the AdvisoryCommittee on Administrative and BudgetaryQuestions (ACABQ), but within given frameworks,there should be room for more flexibility andcreativity. This is also the case for the UN Office ofHuman Resources Management. Missions shouldbe allowed to set up their own shortlists drawnfrom Galaxy (the UN e-staffing system) based onpersonal experiences of colleagues’ qualities. Theother friend, Financial Management SupportServices (FMSS), sometimes intervenes andprohibits measures that are recommended by otherbranches of DPKO. A case in point was myambition to strengthen regional offices byrelocating a political affairs officer from Abidjan toBouaké. This was deemed “not allowed” by FMSSwhile the rest of the system is crying out fordecentralization and reinforcements in the field.

In general, the headquarters-based personnelmanagement systems are inadequate to fulfill theneeds of field managers. I have personally seen twocases related to key senior posts, where the differ-ence in the candidates selected was extremely widein both quality and performance. They should noteven be in the same league. This raises the questionof how shortlists are being composed. It is alsoimportant to try to maintain gender balance in therecruitment campaign. A major hindrance toattracting qualified female candidates is the classifi-cation of some missions as non-family-dutystations.

GENDER MAINSTREAMING

On a final note, gender mainstreaming, I believe, isan important facet of leadership in UNpeacekeeping operations. It is a must, not only forpolicy reasons but also for successful and sustain-

Pierre Schori 31

able outcomes. The message from headquarters isgenuine and strong, but it is encountering seriousobstacles in the field. The gap between policy anddirectives from New York and actual implementa-tion in the missions is much larger than I could everhave imagined. Repeated reminders of SecurityCouncil Resolution 1325 are to no avail if thereceiver of the message is not prepared for it or,even, unable to understand it.

I believe the UN has to attack this dilemma at itsroots, in the troop-contributing countries (TCCs)themselves. Based on my contact with manyofficers from the TCCs, I strongly recommend thatsuch predeployment training should be assistedfrom headquarters. In this regard, a special taskforce should be set up, led by a committed personwith experience of a peacekeeping mission, prefer-ably a former SRSG.

I also recommend that a gender mainstreamingcourse should be mandatory for all SRSGs beforeleaving for the mission station. Without propergender mainstreaming awareness, senior leaderscannot be the role models they need to be in

relation to national and other institutions, whereoften gender is substantially downplayed.

CONCLUSION

Heading a UN peace operation is a trulychallenging yet rewarding experience. The variousroadblocks explained above attest to theoverwhelming difficulty of the position. The manyroles of the SRSG force him or her to be a master ofall trades and responsible not only for the lives ofthose serving under him or her, but also for thefragile peace process he or she is mandated by theUN Security Council to support. Success as a leaderin this challenging environment requirestransparency, accountability, equanimity, andpatience—not only with the situation on theground, but also with UN headquarters in NewYork. For the UN to succeed in improving theeffectiveness of its field missions, it should continueto learn the lessons of previous missions, selectexperienced and knowledgeable SRSGs, and finally,give them the authority and space to do the jobs forwhich they were selected.

Since the end of the Cold War, of the eleven mostcomplex, multidimensional peacekeeping missionsin civil wars, the UN has been successful atimplementing its mandates in seven cases—Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Cambodia(mixed), Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, and SierraLeone.1 The number of successful cases issurprising given the extensive media and academicattention to failure. While positive peace—i.e.,peace beyond fulfillment of the multidimensionalmandates—has not necessarily been established inall cases, the majority of the basic tasks that the UNset out to do was accomplished. What are thesources of success in UN peacekeeping in civilwars?

In the academic literature, the two most commonarguments about the causes of success and failureare that situational factors (e.g., the number ofbattle deaths, the length of the war, the type ofterrain, the existence of a mutually hurtingstalemate, etc.), or the will of the Security Councildetermine the outcomes of peacekeepingoperations.2 In contrast, this paper argues thatorganizational learning within the UN Secretariat’speacekeeping operations is equally, if not more,important and is a necessary factor for achievingsuccess.

Organizational learning in UN peacekeepingmissions occurs on two levels: first, within thepeacekeeping mission while it is in progress, andsecond, at headquarters, between missions. First-level learning is defined here as the increasingability to engage in multidimensional peacekeeping.This definition has its roots in both the cognitiveand the efficiency schools of the study of organiza-tional change, and rejects arguments that equate

learning with increasing complexity of thought.First-level learning refers to learning on theground, while a peacekeeping mission is inoperation. In the field during a peacekeepingmission, members of the organization learninnumerable daily lessons.3 When aggregated, theselessons can amount to members of the Secretariatlearning how to implement the mandate. Thislearning is then considered to be organizationallearning when new ideas are manifested as changesin organizational procedures, routines, strategies,structures, and goals.

This view of organizational learning, in contrastto the efficiency literature, focuses on the process oflearning, or increasing ability; learning is notdetermined by the final outcome of thepeacekeeping operation. The outcome of anoperation—be it success or failure—is consideredto be separate from the independent variable oforganizational learning.4

32 DISCUSSION PAPERS

* Lise Morjé Howard is Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University1 This discussion paper is based on findings from Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2008).2 Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Langley, “The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 4, no.4 (1993);

I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); “An Agenda for Peace, PreventiveDiplomacy and Peace-keeping,” Report of the Secretary-General (17 June 1992, UN Doc. A/47/277- S/24111); and David Malone, The UN Security Council: Fromthe Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004).

3 George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock make the apt distinction between “learning that” and “learning how.” See Breslauer and Tetlock, Learning in US and SovietForeign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), p. 6. For example, one can learn “that” a stove is hot, but “how” to cook.

4 To further explain with a cooking metaphor: when one is learning how to cook, there are certain indicators of increasing cooking ability that do not depend uponthe final outcome. Even after learning how to cook, not every dish may turn out to be fabulous, possibly due to factors beyond the cook’s control.

Mr. David Futch, US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned,and Dr. Lise Morjé Howard, Georgetown University.

Organizational Learning: Managing KnowledgeLise Morjé Howard*

FIRST-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONALLEARNING

There are four basic indicators of first-level organi-zational learning. These consist of the organiza-tion’s ability to (1) gather and analyze information;(2) coordinate among the different divisions of thepeacekeeping mission; (3) engage the organizationwith its post-civil-war environment; and (4)exercise leadership in such a way that the organiza-tion commands authority from all actors, evenduring crises.5 Table 1 presents a summary of thepreconditions indicating possible learning, as wellas indicators of learning, or its opposite, organiza-tional dysfunction. The preconditions representstructures that must be in place before the organi-zation can engage in the learning process. Learningis possible if the preconditions are present, but thepresence of these conditions does not ensure thatlearning will occur.

Of the four indicators, probably the most crucialconcerns organizational engagement with the

environment. A wide distribution of UN staff in thefield, among the local population, is a preconditionfor learning. Learning itself is indicated by twoprimary factors: the profile of the organization, andthe operation’s ability to disseminate information.The profile of the organization in the host countrycan range from “colonial” to “integrative.” Acolonial profile is one where staff stay oncompounds, do not interact with locals, are heavilyarmed, and senior UN representatives are ofteninvolved in the daily decision making of the UNoperation.

In contrast, an integrative organization engagesactively with the local population, at lower, middle,and elite levels of society.6 A learning organizationwill tend toward the integrative end of thecontinuum, whereas a dysfunctional organizationoften maintains a colonial profile. Anotherimportant aspect of organizational engagementwith the environment involves the UN’s ability tocommunicate its intentions to the local population,

Lise Morjé Howard 33

5 Inspiration for this descriptive model comes from Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990). This section alsobuilds on the work of many scholars, including Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press, 1963); Graham T. Allison, The Essence ofDecision (Boston: Little Brown, 1972); Chris Argyris and Donald Schon, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,1996); Herbert Simon, Reason in Human Affairs (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983); Lloyd S. Etheredge, Can Government Learn? American ForeignPolicy and Central American Revolution (New York: Pergamon, 1985); James G. March, Decisions and Organization (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988); Jack Levy,“Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 279-312; Frans Leeuw, Ray C. Rist, and Richard C.Sonnichsen, eds., Can Governments Learn? Comparative Perspectives on Evaluation and Organizational Learning (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994); andAndrew Bennett, Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Interventionism, 1973-1996 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).

6 J. P. Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), p. 39.

Table 1: Indicators of First-Level Organizational Learning

Information CoordinationOrganizational

Engagement withEnvironment

Leadership

PreconditionsIndicatingPossible Learning

Indicators ofLearning

Mechanisms in placeto gather technicalinformation from awide variety ofsources

Peacekeepingoperation takescharge of interna-tional-organizationcoordination

Low level of head-quarters engagementwith daily decisionmaking; wide distri-bution of staff in field

Mission leadership isappointed early in thenegotiation processand is familiar withthe conflict

Problem definitions/political judgmentsbased on technicalinformation andderived from the field

Task prioritization isincrementally reeval-uated and realigned

Organizational profiletends toward integra-tion with environ-ment; organization isable to communicateintentions to localpopulation

Mandate isinterpreted as a“baseline;” leader ofUN operations is ableto alter incrementallythe goals of warringelites; leader learnshow to manage crises

7 Martti Ahtisaari, as quoted in Heribert Weiland and Matthew Braham, eds., The Namibian Peace Process: Implications and Lessons for the Future (Freiburg: ArnoldBergsträsser Institut, 1994), p. 67, note 18.

8 See Christopher Wren, “Outjo Journal: UN Namibia Team Makes Some Unlikely Friends,” New York Times, January 19, 1990, p. 4-A.9 United Nations, “UNTAG Namibia: Description and Analysis of the Functional Performance of the Mission,” unpublished report, May 1990, pp. 36-37, paragraphs

75-77.10 Personal interview with President Martti Ahtisaari, Kulturanta, Finland, July 10-12, 1998

which indicates learning. The absence of an activeUN information campaign indicates dysfunction.

In the cases of successful mandate implementa-tion, the military and civilian components had theability to gather technical information, analyze andevaluate combatants’ motives, coordinate thedifferent international operations in the field,manage crises, alter the goals of the warring parties,and change the UN operations on the ground inlight of new understandings of problems. At times,even when the Security Council expressed lowlevels of interest, and parties to the civil war werereneging on promises, the UN was able to learn onthe first level, and the operations were successful atmandate implementation.

For example, the United Nations TransitionAssistance Group (UNTAG) mission in Namibia,with recent Nobel Peace laureate Martti Ahtisaari asSpecial Representative of the Secretary-General(SRSG), was successful in large part because offirst-level organizational learning. While at theoutset of the operation, forces sympathetic to SouthAfrica and South West Africa People's Organization(SWAPO) began fighting, the leadership ofUNTAG was able to dispel this and other crisesthrough diplomatic efforts and by establishingmoral authority rather than enforcement powers.The leadership of UNTAG sought to changeNamibian society by helping to create “a newatmosphere and climate of reconciliation,” and tointeract directly with the Namibian people, notsimply with political elites.7

The UNTAG mission had a clear and centralizedchain of command. It was also spread widethroughout the vast country, in order to engage theorganization directly with its environment. Staffmembers would attend church services on a regularbasis, and meet often with community leaders,student groups, political groups, traditional groups,veterinarians’ associations, and farmers’ unions.8

Many of these meetings would last up to four ormore hours. The reach of the organization allowedit to learn about the needs and worries of ordinaryNamibians, while teaching them about the coming

elections, political parties, and democraticgovernance.

In the “eyes, ears, and voice” of UNTAG, as thedistrict and regional centers have been called, staffmembers knew well the overall mission objectiveand the time frame. But other than these restric-tions,

staff were provided with broad guidelines, ratherthan detailed recipes, on how to execute theirfunctions. This required that district staff initiateand adopt a modus operandi which took intoaccount the diversity of their respective areas. Dailyreports were fed to the capital, Windhoek, whichnot only permitted the flow of information, butalso allowed for adjustments in both policy andworking methods. Staff were in constant contactwith the local population and thus had instantfeedback on their own performance permittingadjustment as necessary.9

The combination of well-structured, widelydisbursed offices, with flexible mandates providedan efficient and legitimating framework forinformation gathering and political coordination.

Ahtisaari maintains that a major reason why hewas able to establish a trusting and smoothrelationship between UNTAG and Namibians wasthat he had a trusting and solid relationship withhis staff.10 The Special Representative was also giventhe power to answer only to the Secretary-General,thus he alone was in political charge of all aspects ofUNTAG. Aside from the decision to appoint aDeputy Special Representative, changes in theoperation and the specifics of how to implementvarious tasks were generally the domain of UNTAGin the field, not Secretariat headquarters or theSecurity Council. Alterations in operations, such assuggestions for new methods and targets for theinformation program, were initiated from theSpecial Representative’s office, based onrecommendations he had received through thenumerous channels of information available to him.In other words, the UNTAG central offices weremanaged, and derived their success, primarily fromthe field, rather than from UN headquarters. First-level organizational learning was a crucial

34 DISCUSSION PAPERS

component of the success of UNTAG.

SECOND-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONALLEARNING

In contrast to first-level learning, or “learning whiledoing,” second-level learning is much broader, andentails learning at the strategic level, at UNheadquarters. It often involves postmission evalua-tion and organizational change at headquarters inresponse to evaluation. Second-level organizationallearning can be defined as change in the organiza-tion’s overall means, structures, and goals, inresponse to new understandings of problems andtheir causes. An important indicator of second-level learning, which also provides a link betweenthe first and second levels, is improvement in thepreconditions for first-level learning (see Table 1for details).

Second-level organizational dysfunction isindicated when components of the organization areunable to adequately define problems, implementstrategies, or realize goals. An intermediate stage ofless severe organizational learning, which could becalled “incremental adaptation,” is characterized byprograms being transferred from one mission tothe next, regardless of the new context, and newprograms or bureaucratic structures being addedwithout adequate streamlining or reevaluation ofmeans-ends relationships.11

There are some signs of second-level learning inthe UN in the acknowledgement and institutional-ization of two related principles: first, that the UNshould not try to keep the peace where there is nopeace to be kept, and second, that the UN does nothold the legitimacy or the means to engageeffectively in peace enforcement (and that activepeace enforcement should be the domain of singlestates, regional organizations, or coalitions of thewilling). While both of these principles are beingchallenged rhetorically under the increasing weightof the “responsibility to protect” doctrine and thecurrent real-life challenges in the DRC and Darfur,the Brahimi Report has given support to members

of the UN Secretariat to “say no” to some of therecent impossible missions (such as that in Iraq).

CONCLUSION

The Brahimi Report, issued in 2000, represents themost comprehensive review of UN peacekeeping todate. While many important ideas were advanced,the institutionalization of the ideas that are relatedto the greater resourcing of DPKO and augmenta-tion and alteration of its structure at headquartershave not necessarily improved the efficiency oreffectiveness of UN peacekeeping overall. Thereport makes many very important suggestions,especially with respect to decreasing the amount oftime it takes to deploy peacekeepers and consis-tency in troop training. But the unspoken, centralidea behind the report is that increases in the sizeand configuration of the Department ofPeacekeeping Operations will solve the problems ofcomplex UN peacekeeping. In light of this centralrecommendation, the size of the DPKO hasincreased in size more than two-fold since 2000.The central problem with this solution is that,based on the findings from successful cases of UNpeacekeeping, the organizational change that isneeded is not at UN headquarters, but in the field.

Future organizational changes at the center oughtto be focused not on getting the bureaucratic sizeand coordination structures right in New York, butrather on enabling field operations to do what theyneed to fulfill the mandate. Having more people toanswer to at a politically charged UN headquartersdoes not seem likely to help missions learn on theground. In order to engage in more first-levellearning, which is the primary source of success inUN peacekeeping, there needs to be greaterlearning on the second level, at UN headquarters,with an overall goal not of increasing organizationalsize and political strength in New York, but rathertoward streamlining operations at the center anddelegating responsibility and decision-makingauthority to the field.

Lise Morjé Howard 35

11 On “incremental adaptation,” see Haas, When Knowledge Is Power. On the sources of organizational dysfunction, see Giulio Gallarotti, “The Limits of InternationalOrganization: Systematic Failure in the Management of International Relations,” International Organization 45, no. 2 (1991): 183-220; and Michael Barnett andMartha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organization,” International Organization 54, no. 1 (1999): 699-732.

All United Nations peace operations, complex orotherwise, are created with the termination of theoperation in mind.1 No peace operation is intendedto endure indefinitely, even if a number ofoperations, in actual practice, have been of longduration. Termination need not and does notnecessarily entail the end of all UN and other third-party involvement in a conflict situation. However,when a UN peace operation is established, it isassumed to be a temporary measure that willendure until, in the best case, a lasting solution tothe conflict can be found that will allow the UN towithdraw without jeopardizing the peace or, in theworst case, circumstances on the ground deterio-rate and a continued UN presence is no longerthought to be able to contribute to maintaining thepeace. UN peace operations may also end throughthe transfer of responsibility for the operation toanother organization.

If all UN peace operations are expected to end,the conditions under which they are brought to aclose do not always conform to well-consideredplans (assuming such plans exist in the first place).Budgetary pressures from the assessed contribu-tors, for instance, can result in the “premature”termination of an operation. Similarly, politicalpressures for closure from the Security Council canundermine peacebuilding plans, while pressures fortransition from within the host country can alsodistort strategic plans. It can be very difficult for theUN Secretariat to manage budgetary and politicalpressures originating from member states orconflict territories. However, there are otherconstraints on the design and implementation ofeffective exit or transition strategies. Theseconstraints are no less serious than budgetary andpolitical ones, but, because they are largely of anoperational nature, they are, in principle, more

susceptible to positive intervention by theSecretariat. This paper will concentrate on two ofthe more significant of these constraints.

The first of these constraints is the absence ofclear or agreed-upon criteria for the achievementof success in the stabilization of a country.2 A soundexit strategy depends on clarity and consensus withregard to peacebuilding success. If it is not clear orif there is not agreement as to what constitutespeacebuilding success, then it will be difficult todetermine what measures are required to achievesuccess or when and if success has been achieved.The problem, in part, is that there are no hardmeasures or indicators of a self-sustaining peace—in contrast, say, to the indicators of a prosperouseconomy or a healthy population. The ultimate testof a self-sustaining peace necessarily comes afterthe fact—that is, only when the internationalcommunity has drawn down significantly or exited.One measure of sustainability, therefore, is thesurvival of a peace following the first election after

36

* This paper draws on the author’s contribution to the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), “Measuring Peace Consolidation and Supporting Transition,”Briefing Paper (New York, March 2008).

** Richard Caplan is Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford and Director of the Centre for InternationalStudies.

1 For purposes of this study, UN peace operations encompass a UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) peacekeeping mission and the UN CountryTeam.

2 Charles T. Call, “Knowing Peace When You See It: Setting Standards for Peacebuilding Success,” Civil Wars 10, no. 2 (2008): 173-194.

Managing Transition:Exit Strategies and Peace Consolidation*

Richard Caplan**

Dr. Richard Caplan, University of Oxford, andH.E. Dr. Fred Tanner, Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

peacekeeping forces have departed.3 Yet, while thismay be a reliable measure and useful for analyticalpurposes, it is not a practical one for transitionalplanning purposes.

Different standards may be employed to evaluatethe success of efforts while peacebuilding is underway. One approach is to predicate success onmandate fulfillment: if the mission completes theessential tasks of its mandate then the mission isdeemed to be a success. The problem with thisapproach, to analogize from medicine, is that anoperation may be a success and, yet, the patientdies: in other words, a peacebuilding mandate maybe fulfilled without a sustainable peace having beenestablished. Mandate fulfillment is never a statedmeasure of peacebuilding success but the standardoften informs the thinking of practitioners in thefield.

Another standard of success is the absence ofmajor armed violence between states or of internalwar within a state—what is known as a “negativepeace.” The problem with this approach is that theachievement of a negative peace is generallythought by itself to be insufficient for two relatedreasons. One is that it may not be an adequate basisfor a stable peace. If, for instance, a negative peacein a country or territory is achieved through theexclusion or repression of its citizens, it will be anunjust peace and therefore it may be an unstableone.4 The other reason is that a negative peace doesnot address the root causes of a conflict—such aspoverty, inequality, unsustainable development,and unaccountable governance—the persistence ofwhich, it is widely believed, can result in conflictrecurrence. In addition to any empirical evidencethat may underpin these claims, there are strongnormative imperatives at work in favor of a morerobust concept of peace: autocratic rule, forinstance, may be found to be effective inmaintaining peace, but would be anathema to the

United Nations and other third parties.5

Within the UN system there is broad acceptanceof the view that a sustainable peace is a comprehen-sive peace that entails not only the provision ofbasic security but also the (re)establishment offunctioning political institutions and processes andthe achievement of at least a minimum level ofeconomic and social development.6 This isessentially a “root causes” approach topeacebuilding. The difficulties associated with thisapproach are two-fold. First, despite significantadvances in conflict analysis, we still do notunderstand well enough the contribution thatvarious political, social, and economic factors maketo the maintenance or degradation of peace. It isalso questionable whether and how far we cangeneralize on the basis of the knowledge that wehave. As Charles Call observes, “many postconflictcountries (e.g., Guatemala) have failed to addressthe root causes of war, but have not experienced areversion nor is there one on the horizon.”7 Second,difficulties arise in efforts to specify the content andthe limits of such broad goals as the eradication ofpoverty for the purposes of designing a peaceconsolidation strategy and, by extension, an exitstrategy. As one contributor to a recent UNPeacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) studyobserved, “UNDG/UNCT [United NationsDevelopment/United Nations Country Teams]struggle to determine, and agree on, what thecritical peace-building fault lines are, notably interms of the causal links between poverty-relatedissues and threats to peace. Does every poverty-related problem constitute a threat to peace or anobstacle to peace consolidation?”8

Even where there may be clarity and agreementin principle on what the critical peacebuilding faultlines are, tensions may arise with regard to theoperationalization of strategy. For instance, theSecurity Council may have views about the timing

Richard Caplan 37

3 B. Blechman et al., “Effective Transitions from Peace Operations to Sustainable Peace,” (Washington, DC: DFI International, 1997).4 M. W. Doyle and N. Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 73.5 And, yet, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and M. Söderbom observe, “Severe autocracy appears to be highly successful in maintaining the post-conflict peace… If the

polity is highly autocratic, the risk [of reversion to conflict] is only 24.6 percent; whereas if it is not highly autocratic the risk more than doubles to 62 percent.” Theauthors conclude that liberal democratic development may be intrinsically desirable, but it should not be viewed as a mechanism for increasing the durability of apostconflict peace. See Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom, “Post-Conflict Risks,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 4 (2008): 470.

6 United Nations, “No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” UN Doc.S/2001/394, April 20, 2001, §20. See also World Bank/UN Development Programme Initiative on State-building in Crisis and Post-conflict Contexts, “The Role ofState-building in Post-Conflict Transitions—Country Focus (Concept Note),” September 18, 2007.

7 Call, “Knowing Peace When You See It,” p. 183.8 PBSO, “Measuring Peace Consolidation and Supporting Transition,” p. 9.

of the drawdown of peacekeeping forces that are atvariance with the views of the Secretary-General orDPKO, which in turn may be at odds with thethinking of the host country. Or the Secretary-General and his or her Special Representative maynot always be in agreement with regard toimplementing particular aspects of a strategy. And,of course, there is an inherent tension between theUN as driver of reform and the UN as partner in itsrelations with host countries. Sometimes thesetensions are not significant; at other times they maybe obstacles to coordinated and coherent action.

A second and related constraint on the designand implementation of effective exit or transitionstrategies is the absence of a system-wide countrymonitoring methodology to inform planning orthe inappropriate use of benchmarking to chartprogress toward a sustainable peace within acountry. The lack of a common approach tocountry monitoring means that different UNagencies sometimes operate on different assump-tions about the country situation (including threatanalysis, national capacity, and the likelyconsequences of particular international initiatives)at any given moment. The inappropriate use ofbenchmarking occurs when operational perform-ance and other such outputs are the objects ofevaluation rather than outcomes that are moreindicative of the degree of peace consolidationachieved.

A sound transitional strategy needs clearoperational measures of effectiveness that can helpUN peace operation leadership and their nationalcounterparts to determine when the supportoffered by the UN system should be altered orreduced. (Of course, a good transitional strategyfirst needs a good entrance strategy: if the strategicgoals of an integrated peace operation are unreal-istic or poorly defined, then sound transitionalplanning will be much harder to execute.)

The scholarly and policy literature suggest thatthe following seven general principles shouldinform transitional planning and efforts to measure

progress toward peace consolidation:9

1. The objectives (intended outcomes) of a peaceoperation need to be reevaluated in view of theconditions that characterize the postconflictenvironment once stabilization has been achieved.Do these objectives still support the broad strategicgoals of the mission? Have new or unanticipatedthreats or impediments to a stable peace emerged(e.g., external security challenges, new populationdisplacements) that require the articulation of newor altered objectives? Has available implementingcapacity—internationally and nationally—changedand what implications does this have for meetingthe objectives? Are the (new) objectives clearlyunderstood and accepted by all internationalimplementing agents and national counterparts?

2. Core tasks need to be specified that will enable thepeace operation to meet its objectives, and just asobjectives will need to be reevaluated as conditionson the ground improve, so will the core tasks associ-ated with them. It is also important to gaugewhether the theoretical assumptions underpinningthese tasks are sound. For instance, is a weaponsbuy-back program actually reducing the supply ofweapons in a country or merely creating a newregional market for the sale of arms?

3. Benchmarks need to be measurable usingmeaningful indicators. Indicators should focus onmeasuring outcomes and impact, not just output. If,for instance, one of the benchmarks is the establish-ment and development of a professional, impartial,and independent judiciary, then appropriatemeasures of progress would be whether there isevidence of ethnic or other bias on the part ofjudges in the performance of their duties, how muchtrust the court system enjoys among the generalpublic and endangered population groups in partic-ular, and whether judges are respectful of interna-tional human rights norms. Measuring how manyjudges are trained, by contrast, while important, isnot a meaningful indicator of the level ofcompetence that the judiciary has attained.

4. Benchmarks and indicators to measure a country’sprogress need to be consistent across the interna-tional system. If donor states, the UN, and othermultilateral agencies each employ differentbenchmarks and indicators, it will be difficult to

38 DISCUSSION PAPERS

9 These principles are derived from a wide body of literature, including Craig Cohen, “Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction,” Stabilization andReconstruction Series no. 1 (Washington, DC: USIP, March 2006); Kenneth Menkhaus, “Impact Assessment in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Challenges and FutureDirections,” (Geneva: Interpeace, July 2004), available atwww.interpeace.org/pdfs/Publications_(Pdf)/Current_Reports/Challenges_in_peacebuilding_impact_assessment.pdf ; Tanya Spencer, “A Synthesis of Evaluations ofPeacebuilding Activities Undertaken by Humanitarian Agencies and Conflict Resolution Organizations,” (London: Active Learning Network on Accountability andPerformance in Humanitarian Assistance, November 1998); and UNDG/World Bank, “Joint Guidance Note on Integrated Recovery Planning Using Post ConflictNeeds Assessments and Transitional Results Frameworks,” (New York, September 2007).

arrive at a common assessment of progress towardpeace consolidation and to adjust course accord-ingly. This is a difficult principle to observe in somecases however, as donor governments are account-able to their legislatures, and watchdog agencies maywish to employ their own criteria to assess theeffective use of tax revenue.

5. Host-country buy-in for and participation inbenchmarking are essential. Host-country counter-parts need to participate in the design of transitionalplans and the establishment of the benchmarks andindicators related to implementing those plans. Asrecovery proceeds, effective implementation ofpeacebuilding plans will depend increasingly on thewillingness and capacity of host-country stake-holders to come together, own the process, andeventually drive it forward.

6. Effective evaluation requires adequate resourcesfrom the start of an operation. Evaluation processesin support of transitional planning need to be builtinto a postconflict peacebuilding strategy from theinitial phase of an operation.

7. The tendency to politicize metrics design andreporting must be avoided. There is a temptation toproclaim “success” in the face of pressures andcriticisms from donor governments and others, evenwhen the evidence does not support such a claim.Similarly there is a temptation to obscure inconven-ient truths. Reporting and evaluation need to beprotected against politicization. For this reason itmay be advisable to employ an independent body,outside the UN, to evaluate operations or particularareas of operations.

CONCLUSION

This paper has concentrated on two constraints onthe effective management of transition in peaceoperations: the absence of agreed standards ofpeacebuilding success and the absence of soundmonitoring of progress toward success. The twoconstraints are closely related: without clarity aboutthe particular standards of success that apeacebuilding operation seeks to achieve, it is notpossible to evaluate progress meaningfully towardthose ends. There are other constraints ondesigning and implementing effective exit strate-gies, including limited planning capacity withinand between some UN agencies to supportsequencing and transition; the lack of adequatestructures to share information and plan jointly(notwithstanding the strides that have been madein the integration of various parts of the UN systemin the planning and delivery of field operationsthrough the Integrated Mission Planning Process[IMPP]); and a lack of broad knowledge within theUN system concerning the actual experience oftransition and exit, which means that practice(good and bad) is not always broadly shared, or, if itis shared, it is not often translated into policy,guidance, or tools for integrated peace operations.The two constraints discussed in this paper,however, arguably constitute the two primarychallenges to designing sound transition and exitstrategies.

Richard Caplan 39

ANNEX

Conference Agenda

Monday, December 1, 2008

09:00 Breakfast

09:30 – 09:45 Welcome and Introduction

H.E. Mr. Terje Rød-Larsen, President, IPIH.E. Dr. Fred Tanner, Director, GCSP

09:45 – 11:00 Panel 1: Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges ofUN Peace Operations

This panel will help frame the discussion of subsequent panels, providing the strategic,political, and managerial context in which peace operations are taking place. Panelists willbriefly define the key political and managerial dilemmas in today’s peace operations as theysee them.

ChairH.E. Dr. Fred Tanner

PresenterMr. Richard Gowan, Associate Director for Policy, Center on International Cooperation,New York University

DiscussantsH.E. Mr. Leslie Kojo Christian, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Ghana to the United Nations Mr. Francesco Mancini, Deputy Director of Studies, International Peace Institute

11:00 Coffee Break and Group Photo

11:15-12:00 Keynote Address

H.E. Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations,United Nations

12:00-13:30 Panel 2: Planning for Success: Off to a Good Start

The importance of planning for and in a mission cannot be overstated. While efforts havebeen made to improve planning, in particular to make planning processes more integrated,UN planners still struggle to align resources and actors with mandates. What are the keychallenges to strategic planning? What are the roadblocks toward integrated planning? Whatcan be done to remove these roadblocks? How can both guidance and implementation beimproved?

40

ChairH.E. Ms. Susana Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General, Department of Field Support, United Nations

PresenterMr. Cedric de Coning, Research Fellow, ACCORD and NUPI

DiscussantsMs. Margaret Carey, Director, Africa I Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations,United Nations Mr. Diego Ruiz Palmer, Head of the Planning Section, Operations Division, NATO International Staff

13:30 Lunch

14:30-16:00 Panel 3: Leadership on the Line: Managing Field Complexity

The success of a mission often depends not only on consistent and unambiguous leadershipfrom the headquarters and top field management, but also on determined and skilledguidance from middle management in the field. How important is leadership in complexoperations? What are the key skills needed to manage complexity? How can the UN developappropriate leadership? What are the key impediments to be overcome in the exercise ofleadership in a mission?

ChairMr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant-Secretary-General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations,United Nations

PresenterH.E. Mr. Pierre Schori, Executive Director, FRIDE

DiscussantsDr. Martin Barber, Honorary Fellow, University of EdinburghMr. Haile Menkerios, Assistant Secretary-General, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations

16:00 Coffee Break

16:15-17:45 Panel 4: Organizational Learning: Managing Knowledge

Learning is a key notion in shaping the work of organizations and individuals. In peaceoperations learning happens at many levels: across missions at headquarters level, withinmissions in the field, and at an individual level. The challenge is to transform thewidespread knowledge at all levels into organizational change and improvement. How hasthe UN gone about trying to promote organizational learning? Where has it succeeded orfailed? What works and what does not? How can the UN improve its organizationallearning so that new ideas and best practices can manifest as change in organizationalprocedures, routines, strategies, structures, and goals?

CONFERENCE AGENDA 41

ChairMs. Angela Kane, Under-Secretary-General, Department of Management, United Nations

PresenterDr. Lise Morjé Howard, Assistant Professor, Georgetown University

DiscussantsMs. Izumi Nakamitsu, Director of the Policy, Evaluation, and Training Division,Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United NationsMr. David Futch, Senior Military Analyst, Center for Army Lessons Learned, US Army Combined Arms Center

19:00 Cocktail Reception

Tuesday, December 2, 2008

08:30-09:00 Breakfast

09:00-10:30 Panel 5: Managing Transition: Exit Strategies and Peace Consolidation

Major challenges exist in planning the termination of a complex operation or its transition(e.g., scaling down a multidimensional peacekeeping mission to become a peacebuildingmission). Clearly, a good exit strategy depends on good entrance and intermediate strategies.At the same time, in UN peacekeeping a poorly conceived exit strategy can jeopardize thefragile achievements of a peace operation. What are the key political and organizationalchallenges of creating an exit strategy? When and under what conditions can exits besuccessfully achieved? What are the benchmarks? How should the exit strategy be prepared?How can the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding be best managed?

ChairMr. Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General, Rule of Law and Security Institutions,Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

PresenterDr. Richard Caplan, Professor of International Relations, University of Oxford

DiscussantsMs. Sofia Carrondo, Policy Adviser for Post-Crisis Transitions, United NationsDevelopment Operations Coordination Office, United Nations Development GroupMs. Jane Holl Lute, Assistant Secretary-General, Peacebuilding Support Office, United Nations

10:30-11:00 Coffee Break

11:00-12:30 Panel 6: Managing Complex Partnerships: Dilemmas of Cooperation and Integrationon the Ground

The UN is not the sole player in the field of peace operations. The African Union, ECOWAS,the European Union, and NATO all have deployed missions with military components. The

42 CONFERENCE AGENDA

OAS and OSCE have established civilian missions, and joint operations are increasinglycommon. What are the most serious dilemmas facing the UN in managing complex partner-ships on the ground? What are the most successful models—sequentially deployed, co-deployed, “hybrid” operations—as we look to the future? Under what conditions do thevarious models work best? What can be done to ensure that institutional partnershipsfunction as effectively as possible?

ChairLt. General Chikadibia Obiakor, Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations,United Nations

PresenterDr. Michael Lipson, Visiting Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New YorkUniversity

DiscussantsH.E. Mr. Rodolphe Adada, Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur H.E. Mr. Pedro Serrano, Head of the Liaison Office of the General Secretariat of theCouncil of the European Union

12:30-13:15 Wrap-up Session: Conclusions and Next Steps

ChairH.E. Mr. Peter Maurer, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations Dr. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Vice President of Programs, EastWest Institute, New YorkDr. Edward C. Luck, Senior Vice President and Director of Studies, International PeaceInstitute

CONFERENCE AGENDA 43

H.E. Mr. Rodolphe AdadaJoint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur,African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operationin Darfur (UNAMID)

Dr. Martin BarberHonorary Fellow, University of Edinburgh

Dr. Richard CaplanProfessor of International Relations,Department of Politics and InternationalRelations, University of Oxford

Ms. Margaret CareyDirector, Africa I Division, Department ofPeacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations

Ms. Sofia CarrondoPolicy Adviser for Post-Crisis Transitions, UN Development Operations Coordination Office(UNDOCO), UN Development Group (UNDG)

Mr. Xavier ChatelFirst Secretary, Permanent Mission of France tothe United Nations

H.E. Mr. Leslie Kojo ChristianPermanent Representative, Permanent Mission ofGhana to the United Nations

Dr. Caty ClementFaculty Member and Co-Director for the NewIssues in Security Course (NISC) Geneva Centrefor Security Policy (GCSP)

Mr. James CockayneSenior Associate, International Peace Institute(IPI)

Mr. Cedric de ConingResearch Fellow, The African Centre for theConstructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)and The Norwegian Institute of InternationalAffairs (NUPI)

Mr. Stephen Del Rosso, Jr.Chair, International Peace and Security, CarnegieCorporation of New York

Mr. Ettore Di BenedettoTeam Leader, Leadership and Management Team,Integrated Training Service (ITS), DPKO,United Nations

Mr. Emmanuel DelormeIntern, Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations

Col. Hammad Ahmed DogarMilitary Adviser, Permanent Mission of Pakistanto the United Nations

Ms. Elena DonovaAttaché, Permanent Mission of the RussianFederation to the United Nations

Mrs. Souad El AlaouiCounsellor, Permanent Mission of Morocco to theUnited Nations

Dr. Efrat ElronSenior Fellow, IPI

Ms. Sally Fegan-WylesDirector, UNDG

Mr. David FutchSenior Military Analyst, Center for Army LessonsLearned, US Army Combined Arms Center

Mr. Richard GowanResearch Associate and Associate Director forPolicy, Center on International Cooperation(CIC), New York University

Ms. Alison GurinProgram Assistant, IPI

Mr. David HaeriSpecial Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General,DPKO, United Nations

44

Conference Participants

Dr. Abdel-Kader HairecheTeam Leader, DPKO-AU Peacekeeping SupportTeam (DPKO-AUPST)

Mr. Adrian HillsSpecial Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General,Department of Field Support (DFS), United Nations

Ambassador John L. HirschSenior Adviser, IPI

Dr. Lise Morjé HowardAssistant Professor, Department of Government,Georgetown University

Ms. Adriana JacintoPolicy and Training Officer, Integrated TrainingService, DPKO, United Nations

Mr. Julian JunkResearch Fellow, Department of Politics andManagement, University of Konstanz, Germany

Ms. Angela KaneUnder-Secretary-General, Department ofManagement, United Nations

Mr. Paul KeatingActing Deputy Chief, Peacekeeping Best PracticesSection, DPKO, United Nations

Ms. Elizabeth KissamAssociate Political Affairs Officer, DPKO,United Nations

Mr. Benno LaggnerMinister, Head of UN Coordination Unit,Directorate of Political Affairs, Political AffairsDivision III, UN and Other InternationalOrganizations, Federal Department of ForeignAffairs, Switzerland

Mr. Sébastian LapierrePolitical Affairs Officer, Peacekeeping BestPractices Section, DPKO, United Nations

Mr. Alain Le RoyUnder-Secretary-General, DPKO, United Nations

Dr. Michael LipsonVisiting Scholar, CIC, New York University

Dr. Edward C. LuckSenior Vice President and Director of Studies, IPI

Ms. Jane Holl LuteAssistant Secretary-General, PeacebuildingSupport Office (PBSO), United Nations

Ms. Susana MalcorraUnder-Secretary-General, DFS, United Nations

Mr. Francesco ManciniDeputy Director of Studies, IPI

H.E. Mr. Peter MaurerPermanent Representative, Permanent Mission ofSwitzerland to the United Nations

Ms. Ariel MorvanChief, Senior Leadership Appointments Section,Office of the Under-Secretary-General, DFS, United Nations

Mr. Edmond MuletAssistant-Secretary-General, DPKO,United Nations

Ms. Izumi NakamitsuDirector, Policy, Evaluation, and TrainingDivision, DPKO, United Nations

Dr. Alexandra NovosseloffPolicy Adviser on UN Issues, Directorate forStrategic Affairs, French Ministry of Defense

Lt. General Chikadibia ObiakorMilitary Adviser, DPKO, United Nations

Mr. Richard PonzioSenior Policy Analyst, PBSO, United Nations

H.E. Mr. Terje Rød-LarsenPresident, IPI

Mr. Diego Ruiz PalmerHead of the Planning Section, OperationsDivision, North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO)

CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS 45

46 CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Dirk SalomonsDirector of the Program for Humanitarian Affairs,School of International and Public Affairs,Columbia University

H.E. Mr. Pierre SchoriExecutive Director, Fundación para las RelacionesInternacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE)

H.E. Mr. Pedro SerranoHead of the Liaison Office of the GeneralSecretariat of the Council of the European Union

Dr. Waheguru Pal Singh SidhuVice President of Programs, EastWest Institute,New York

Mr. Carl SkauSecond Secretary, Permanent Mission of Swedento the United Nations

Ms. Jenna SlotinSenior Program Officer, IPI

Mr. Adam C. SmithSenior Program Officer, IPI

Ms. Rana TahaSpecial Assistant to the Joint AU-UN SpecialRepresentative for Darfur, African Union/UNAMID

H.E. Dr. Fred TannerDirector, GCSP

Mr. Dmitry TitovAssistant-Secretary-General for Rule of Law andSecurity Institutions, DPKO, United Nations

Ms. Pim ValdreSpecial Assistant to the President, IPI

Col. Willem Van DullemenChief Current Military Operations Service, Officeof Military Affairs, DPKO, United Nations

Ms. Sofia WartmannPolitical Affairs Officer, Office of Operations,DPKO, United Nations

Ms. Vanessa WyethSenior Program Officer, IPI

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