making the state pay: mobilizing public resources for victims of human rights violations (english)

8/9/2019 Making the State Pay: Mobilizing Public Resources for Victims of Human Rights Violations (English)

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By Camelia DoruEdited by Liam Mahony

A Tactical Notebook Published bythe New Tactics Project

of the Center for Victims of Torture

Making the State Pay:Mobilizing Public Resources for Victims of Human Rights Violations


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Published by

The Center for Victims of TortureNew Tactics in Human Rights Project717 East River RoadMinneapolis, MN 55455 USAwww.cvt.org, www.newtactics.org

Notebook Series EditorLiam Mahony

2003 Center for Victims of TortureThis publication may be freely reproduced in print and in electronic form as long as

this copyright notice appears on all copies.

Support for the Tactical Notebook Series

The Tactical Notebook series was produced with the support of the following fun-ders: the United States Institute of Peace, the National Philanthropic Trust, the Or-ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United States Departmentof State, the Sigrid Rausing Trust (formerly known as the Ruben and ElisabethRausing Trust), the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and a founda-tion and an individual donor who wish to remain anonymous.

Additionally, the King Baudouin Foundation provided grants to our partner theICAR in Romania to support the regional training workshop held there and theproduction of tactical notebooks by workshop participants.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the New Tactics in Human Rights Project

or its funders. The project does not advocate specific tactics or policies.


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Table of ContentsIntroduction.......................................................... 7The Problem and its History ................................ 7Our Tactic: Mobilizing Public Resources ............. 9

Building the Primary Alliance............................ 11Mobilizing Resources ......................................... 12Obtaining Appropriate Premises....................... 15Keeping Up With Increasing Caseloads, Costs.. 15Seeking Reparation for Victims......................... 19Discussion and Analysis...................................... 19Transplanting the Tactic .................................... 22Conclusion .......................................................... 24

The Center for Victims of TortureNew Tactics in Human Rights Project

717 East River RoadMinneapolis, MN 55455

[email protected]

Acknowledgements

For support during difficult work periods both before and after 1989, I am grateful to my family who backedme unconditionally all the way long (especially to my brother Octav) and my close friends, to my colleaguesfrom the hospitals I worked with (Eugen Subtirica, Mihaela Enachescu and many others), as well as to the pastand present teams at ICAR Foundations rehabilitation centers.

I also feel grateful for and indeed proud of the trust that several thousand former political prisoners and theirleadership especially their president senator Ticu Dumitrescu have placed in me and my colleagues.

A very special, warm and deep thought is reserved for the most patient, loyal and loving man in my life, myhusband Erik.


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April 2003

Dear Friend,

Welcome to the New Tactics in Human Rights Tactical Notebook Series! In each notebook a humanrights practitioner describes a tactical innovation that was successful in advancing human rights. Theauthors are part of the broad and diverse human rights movement, including educators, librarians,health care workers, law enforcement personnel, and womens rights advocates. They have devel-oped tactics that not only have contributed to human rights in their home countries. In addition,they have utilized tactics that when adapted can be applied in other countries and other situationsto address a variety of issues.

Each notebook contains detailed information on howthe author and his or her organizationachieved what they did. We want to inspire human rights practitioners to think tacticallyto reflecton the tactics they have chosen to implement their larger strategy and to broaden the realm of tac-

tics considered to effectively advance human rights.

In this notebook, we read about the efforts of the ICAR Foundation to mobilize public resources fora socially marginalized group victims of torture. The Foundation recognized that many citizenshad suffered torture during the communist regime, and created an organization to provide treat-ment and care to the thousands of torture survivors. While there was international support, theFoundation knew that provision of this care was actually the responsibility of the state itself. Thenotebook outlines ICARs effort to pressure the Romanian government to pay for rehabilitation oftorture survivors even though it was not willing to officially assume responsibility for past abuses. Ineffect, ICAR forced the state to begin to fulfill its moral and legal responsibilities as laid out in in-ternational and national laws. ICARs story provides ideas about how to pressure a state to carry outits obligations to a socially marginalized group and compel it to take a step toward justice.

The entire Tactical Notebook Series will be available online at www.newtactics.org. Additionalnotebooks will continue to be added over time. On our web site you will also find other tools, in-cluding a searchable database of tactics, a discussion forum for human rights practitioners, and in-formation about our workshops and symposium. To subscribe to the New Tactics e-newsletter,please send an e-mail to [email protected].

The New Tactics in Human Rights Project is an international initiative led by a diverse group of or-ganizations and practitioners from around the world. The project is coordinated by the Center forVictims of Torture (CVT) and grew out of our experience as a creator of new tactics and a treatmentcenter that also advocates for the protection of human rights from a unique positionone of heal-ing and reclaiming civic leadership.We hope that you will find these notebooks informational and thought provoking.

Sincerely,

Kate Kelsch

New Tactics Project Manager


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Mobilizing Public Resources for Victims of Human Rights Violations ____________5

Camelia Doru, M.D.

Camelia Doru, M.D., graduated from the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Bucharest and islicensed as a specialist in intensive care and anesthesiology. Camelia performed her clinical fellow-ship at Regional Hospital Sion (Switzerland). From 1979 to 1991, Camelia was a general practitioner,

an anesthesiology and intensive care specialist in Bucharest and in Sion, Switzerland. She has par-ticipated in international training seminars on the health professions and medical ethics as they re-late to human rights.

While serving at the hospital, Camelia experienced the most brutal effects of the communist re-gimes health policy, which required woman to bear five children. Many women, when facedwith the birth of a child they simply couldnt afford, chose the life-threatening option of an illegalabortion. The disastrous consequences left an entire generation of women victimized by this crimi-nal policy. Camelia did her best to help these women, trying to save their lives and diminish theirsuffering.

After the overthrow of the communist regime in 1989, Camelia began to work with victims of theold regime, helping obtain compensation for the survivors and their families and taking part in pro-

tests to stop former perpetrators from infiltrating the new government. She participated in themarathon demonstration at the University Square, and for more than six weeks assisted the hungerstrikers. She was then targeted by a group of governmental paramilitary supporters clearly angry ather opposition efforts, and had to flee her home, hide and ultimately leave the country.

After her return, she decided to dedicate her energies to those who had been in the forefront ofthe fight against communismthose who had survived torture as political prisoners. In 1992, shebecame the founder and medical director of the ICAR Foundation.

ICAR Foundation

The ICAR Foundation is a Romanian NGO, created in 1991 and legally registered in 1992. The first re-habilitation center opened in Bucharest in 1993, the second in Iasi in 1995 and the third in Craiova in1998.

ICAR is the first and currently the only institution providing qualified assistance to torture survivors inRomaniapeople who fought in Romania for a democratic and open society during the political re-pression of 19451989and in the process experienced torture, violence or other inhuman treat-ment in the communist prisons. The foundations basic goals are to improve the health of these sur-vivors, help them become integrated into a normal social life and prevent future acts of torture.ICARs demonstration of respect for survivors also represents an important step toward healthy po-litical reconciliation, which the organization considers the least a society can do when its torturersoften go unpunished.

Since the beginning of its activity ICAR has been very active in the field of human rights and hastaken part in allimportant human rights-related demonstrations at the national and international

level.Contact InformationICAR Foundation70, Unirii Bd., Bl. J5, Sect. 374200 Bucharest, RomaniaTel/Fax: +40-1-321-22-21, +40-1-327-54-74


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Editors Preface

In this tactical notebook Camelia Doru, foun-der and director of the ICAR Foundation inRomania, describes how her organizationstenacious efforts convinced the Romanianstate to accept significant steps toward fulfill-ing its treaty obligations to former political

prisoners tortured under previous regimes.ICAR began this struggle at a time when, de-spite an apparent political transition, torturesurvivors were still ignored and treated withdisdain by both the state and much of thepopulation. Survivors thus lacked adequatemedical and psychological services.

Through nearly a decades work, ICAR suc-ceeded in creating a political climate for thestate to help fund torture treatment services.First local authorities provided physical prem-ises for torture treatment centers, then the

state gradually provided access to free medi-cines and partial insurance coverage for thespecialized care and services required by tor-ture survivors. It is a long and still unfinishedeffort, but ICARs success to date shows thepower of persistence and creativity, and theimportance of creating a political demandthat is both believable and trustworthy.

Many human rights organizations believethey can not accept money from the govern-ment particularly from those that were in-volved in human rights abuses. ICAR demon-

strates how through advocacy and lobbyingthey were able to gain public funding for tor-ture treatment services, and help the gov-ernment fulfill their treaty obligations, whileassuring that ICARs values, mission and inde-pendence were strengthened rather thancompromised.

This was much more than a struggle to pro-vide services to torture survivors, or a searchfor government funding. The states reluc-tance to support the needs of torture victimsbelies a much deeper problem of democracy,and illustrates that the post-communist politi-cal transition in Romania is still far from com-plete. Torturers have escaped with impunity,

and many now occupy influential positions insociety. The people they tortured, in contrast,face a society in which powerful forces wouldprefer to forget the past and its victims rather than use its lessons to build a deepercivil commitment to democracy and humanrights. ICARs tactic of mobilizing public re-sources to provide treatment to former politi-cal prisoners is thus part of a larger strategyto encourage a nation to take responsibilityfor its past in order to strengthen its future.That ICAR recognizes this long-term strategicgoal, even while immersed in the daily strug-

gle to find money for urgently needed medi-cines, gives its success even greater impor-tance.

This is a story of a grand tactic involvingmany years of work, multiple strategic objec-tives and smaller scale tactics, and numerousobstacles encountered along the way. It isessential that we absorb not only the tacticallessons Ms. Doru has to offer, but also thestory itself, which should both illustrate thenuances of this complex tactic and inspire usto replicate it.

Liam Mahony, notebook series editor


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Mobilizing Public Resources for Victims of Human Rights Violations ____________7

Introduction

In October 1991 the International Rehabilita-tion Council for Torture Victims (IRCT) invitedme to Budapest to take part in the first inter-

national symposium in Eastern Europe onDoctors, Ethics and Torture. During this sym-posium I met people from all over the world,people engaged in providing medical rehabili-tation to victims of torture under many differ-ent circumstances and often in politically ad-verse conditions. This experience, along withthe support I received from IRCT colleagues,encouraged me to create a non-governmentalorganization in Romania to address the terribleproblem of torture. I knew there would be po-litical resistance, but I also saw that I couldcount on professional international training,management and financial support.

The ICARFoundation wasregistered in April1992. Its namecommemorates theGreek mythologicalfigure Icarus, whoneeded help aftersuccessfully

escaping from long imprisonment and findingthat his wings did not survive the heat of thesun. Our logo contains the wings as a symbolic

representation of the Icarus. We began to

search for resources that would allow us toprovide services for the thousands of torturesurvivors in Romania.Throughout the subse-quent decade of work, we have found our in-ternational colleagues and donors to be crucial.

The treatment and care of torture survivors,however, should not depend on the interna-tional community. We believe that this work isthe moral and political responsibility of thestate itself. What I will describe in this note-book is our long-term strategy to pressure andpersuade Romanian local and central govern-ments to start accepting this responsibility.

We opened our first center in 1993 with onlythree doctors, two supporting staff, and abudget of $20,000 USD. We saw 85 clients, andour private and international supporters cov-ered all expenses. In 1994 and 1995 our at-tempts to mobilize public resources began tosucceed as we convinced local government offi-cials to provide premises for our operations; wenow estimate the value of this local govern-ment contribution at over $100,000 USD peryear. More recently we also obtained govern-ment support in prescribing free medicines forour clients a public contribution worth over$150,000 USD per year. By 2002, the ICARFoundation had grown to three centers with astaff of more than 50. We provide services for2,000 clients and receive annual internationalcontributions of $300,000 USD.

The Problem and Its History

The communist regime in Romania between1947 and 1989 is characterized by one of itsmost terrifying torturers, who stated that Itwas a party of assassins, like me: thieves, ban-dits, vagabonds, outlaws.1

This unpopular regime survived by repressionand intimidation, and through methods thatinflicted a deep fear of and mistrust in human-kind. People did not trust their children, rela-

1Damascus Road, Confession of a Former Torturer. DoinaJela.

tives or friends, and were suspicious of every-one. Before 1989, it was forbidden even to talkabout political prisoners, opponents, or dissi-dents.

This political suppression was at its worst from1947 to 1964 when communist rule was forcibly

established against the wish of the majority ofRomanians. After 1964 many political prisonerswere released and political suppression becameless visible, but it was no less effective, and dis-sidents were treated as common criminals. Toescape the gradual reforms introduced in theUSSR by Nikita Khrushchev and then by MikhailGorbachev, the communist elite in Romaniabegan to play the sovereignty card againstMoscow. While this earned some unjustified


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praise from the West, what it demonstratedwas a shift toward the Chinese and North Ko-rean models of totalitarianism complete withincreasing abuse of state power and glorifica-tion of the leadership.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dra-matic political changes in other countries be-hind the Iron Curtain, the call for change inRomania became irresistible. This led to publicuprisings in December 1989, first in Timisoaraand then in Bucharest, and to the subsequentfall of Nicolae Ceausescu. But while the dictatorwas gone, the power structure remained intact.The government installed after the revolutionin December 1989 consisted of a second line ofcommunists, intimately connected with theprevious regime. Their approach was to main-tain confusion about the past and distributethe responsibility for past atrocities on every-ones shoulders, implanting in the public mindthe convenient idea of widespread impunity.They wanted to make peace, to forget the past but also to retain their privileges.

After the revolution in December 1989 theopen political suppression exercised by the Se-curitate the former secret political police came to an end, but no one was punished forparticipating in systematic human rights viola-tions under the communist regime. For a time,perpetrators kept a low profile, perhaps fear-ing legal action against them. But such fear has

proven unfounded: these people still occupymany important positions in the public sector,as well as in the new private business sector.Some even enjoy the immunity earned bymembers of parliament. Perpetrators of sys-temic violations of human rights have thusblended invisibly into society. They tend to livein better social and economic conditions thanthe majority of their victims. And they still con-trol many aspects of Romanian society.

The basic rights promised by the democratictransition were introduced to the public as if

they were privileges bestowed by the newpower, rather than rights earned by peoplethemselves. The partial restitution of land orother property was presented as a gift fromthe new power, not a right of the owners,while the minimal compensation to former po-litical prisoners was a sign of generosity, not

a necessary start in the much needed repara-tion process.

During this transition Romanian society becamepolarized into two groups:. A majority of peo-ple were cynical, indifferent, or naive support-

ers of the newly installed power, while a muchsmaller group opposed that power, recognizingthe old faces behind the new masks.

The Survivors

The former political prisoners ICAR hoped toserve were but a small number of the morethan three million Romanian citizens arrestedduring 43 years of communist repression.2 Anestimated 300,000 died in captivity.3 All werevictims of the Securitate, the secret police thatcontrolled every aspect of Romanian life onbehalf of the narrow political elite. Securitates

powers were unlimited. Members workedclosely with the judicial system especially withthe military courts since all actions were justi-fied on the basis of protecting national secu-rity.

These courts handed down harsh sentences foreven the smallest sign of opposition to the sys-tem. Sentences included long prison terms un-der inhumane conditions, years of slave labor,and loss of property the victims might own.Since many victims were young, their educationwas interrupted in most cases never to be re-

sumed. If they survived, they were effectivelydoomed after their release to live in very hum-ble conditions.

Having endured long periods in prisons or la-bor camps, survivors were often forced to relo-cate for an extended time to distant corners ofthe country. Survivors and their families wereconstantly harassed by security police, and re-quired to report to police stations at frequentintervals. When seeking employment or hous-ing they were frequently victims of extortion orblackmail, and their children were denied ac-

cess to higher education and occupational op-portunities. The situation improved after 1989,

2Golden Book of Romanian Resistance Against Commu-nism. Cicerone Ionitoiu, p 3-5.

3The Red Holocaust. Florin Matrescu, p 79-86.


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Mobilizing Public Resources for Victims of Human Rights Violations_____________9

but the regimes more outspoken critics werestill subjected to surveillance.

Because few marriages could survive this kindof forced separation and socio-economic seg-regation, the former political prisoners often

ended up living alone. They were outcastswithout family contacts or social networks. Anyinteractions between them or with other citi-zens were seen as new sabotage attempts,and were very risky.

After the 1989 revolution, these victims whohad survived prisons, camps, or deportation hoped to breathe freely in a democratic soci-ety. Instead they were again isolated, marginal-ized, and seen as unpleasant reminders of their

fellow citizens bad conscience. Society as awhole felt guilty for directly participating in orcooperating with political oppression, or forsilence in the face of gross human rights viola-tions committed in the name of the people.

Our clients enemies of the former politicalsystem had of course been systematicallyblacklisted, and their colleagues forced to pub-licly criticize them. People had thus beentaught that the political prisoners deservedtheir fate. At the same time, however, mostalso knew that injustices had been committed,and after the revolution did not mind thatsomething as uncontroversial as medical treat-ment was provided for victims in need.

Our Tactic:

Mobilizing Public Resources

Our long-term strategic goal was to convincethe state to take full responsibility for its ac-tions by acknowledging and treating formerpolitical prisoners justly and humanely. Theprocess of mobilizing public resources for thisgoal was a long one, with small and large suc-cesses along the way. As we tell this story, it

will become clear that we needed to pay con-stant and careful attention to two closely inter-twined strategic areas:

The building and strengthening of rela-tionships and/or alliances outside ICAR needed to help us pressure the gov-ernment to provide resources (see Box1).

The ICAR organization itself: its profes-sional conduct, its political and eco-nomic survival, and its relationship withits clients (see Box 2)

The interaction between these areas is crucial.We could not have built as strong an organiza-tion had we not succeeded in mobilizing exter-nal support. And we would not have gainedthis support had we not paid careful attentionto the organization and its clients. The clientconstituency, for instance, had political influ-ence of its own, which helped us achieve ourgoals. And our reputation for medical profes-

sionalism was crucial in building supportivelinks with the medical establishment and ingaining the trust of our clients.

The chart below shows the strategic links be-tween our objectives and the steps we took to

achieve them. As it shows, our practical needsand political goals coincided in this effort, withthe attainment of state support becoming a

Box 1:

Critical relationships and alliances

Survivors, first and foremost Local civil society organizations

Members of political parties and elected officials

International governmental organizations

International nongovernmental organizations

Re-emerging leaders of historic parties

Civil servants and officials at city, municipal andstate agencies

Health community in general, and specifically:

The General Medical Council

The Ministry of Health

Medical professionals willing to provide servicesto clients

External laboratories and specialty clinics toguarantee the provision of necessary services


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Box 2: Organizational factors

Maintaining an unassailable medical professionalism

Keeping a low profile, given the Romanian political context protecting ourselves fromsabotage, infiltration or harassment

Maintaining an open and transparent organization

Paying attention to internal organizational conflicts caused by secondary trauma

grand tactic that demanded a great deal ofour energy. The following pages describe howwe constructed the alliances needed to per-suade the government to accept some of its

obligations, a process that eventually involvedus in the proposal of new National Health In-surance Legislation.


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Mobilizing Public Resources for Victims of Human Rights Violations___________ 11

Prerequisites:a) trust between ICAR and the survivors, b) uncompromising medical profes-sionalism; c) organizational survival;

ICAR - Mobilizing State Resources: Strategy Chart

Strategic sub-objectives:

Obtain publicly-owned premises for treatment centers Secure the ability to prescribe free medicines for clients State support for full rehab and specialized services (future)

Tactics applied to obtain premises: Persuaded personal contacts to use their influence Mobilized political allies in the government and legisla-ture Used recommendation of high-level political ally (fromclient group) Nurtured allies in municipal government making them

visit a functioning center in Copenhagen Direct negotiation with City Hall Persuaded international allies to influence municipalnegotiation Applied Architectural creativity

New strategic sub-objective: Change NationalHealth Insurance Legislation to allow ICAR toprovide for the medical needs of its clients.

Tactics used: Gain support through personal contacts Gain support through political party andclient group allies

Goal: Confront impunity and the past; Get the State to fulfill International commitments bytaking moral and legal responsibility for torture victims.Immediate practical goal: To provide the necessary professional services for survivors

Grand Tactic: Mobilize State resources for treatment of victims of torture, as a matter ofprinciple, and as a matter of practical necessity.


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Building the Primary Alliance:

ICAR and the Survivors

One of our first and most important tasks wasto gain the trust of the former prisoners them-selves. They were disillusioned, isolated and

understandably suspicious of everyone. Earningthis trust not only allowed us to provide medi-cal support, but gave us, in the former prison-ers themselves, an important political ally.

Our strategy in working with the survivors wasto contribute to thereconciliation process on arather small scale, working tobuild a solid bridge linking ourprofessional and social net-works to the former politicalprisoners, their families and

their friends. This was ourcontribution to the larger goalof persuading the nation totake responsibility for its pastin order to build a betterfuture. Our intervention wasbased on the professionalmedical knowledge and support we could of-fer. 4

Based on the experience of rehabilitation cen-ters in Western Europe and North America, weplanned a center that would provide similar

services to torture victims within the indige-nous population in Romania. In an attempt tolearn which kinds of services were most neededamong our clients, we decided to begin withpart-time health professionals from variousprofessions and specialties.

4 Ideally such a program should reach out to all torturevictims among former political prisoners, but in practice weneeded to limit ourselves to the provision of outpatientservices in one location. It was natural to start in Bucharest,

which had the largest concentration of former politicalprisoners. We decided to first offer services only to primaryvictims of torture, although international experience hadproven the need for services among secondary victims (i.e.immediate relatives) as well. The Ministry of the Interiorhad issued identifying certificates to victims of politicalpersecution and punishment; this documentation, togetherwith membership in the Romanian Association of FormerPolitical Prisoners, made it easier for us to identify personseligible for admission to our program.

In view of the shortcomings of the Romanianpublic health system, the ICAR Foundationcommitted itself to providing appropriate,qualified and free medical assistance for former

political prisoners. To earn their confidence weneeded to provide torture victims with consis-tently humane and professional treatment, andshow that we understood the complexity oftheir needs, with medical, psychological, andsocietal efforts all required to overcome thedamage inflicted by the past. Any variation in

the quality of this care wouldhave compromised the trust weworked so diligently to earn.

In the city of Iasi, in December1995, at the the openingceremony of our second medicalrehabilitation center, weexperienced a special momentdemonstrating that trust. Severalhundred representatives of thelocal branches of the RomanianAssociation of Former PoliticalPrisoners (AFDPR), from cities

and villages across the country, were gatheredfor their annual meeting. For the first time theyhad invited outside guests to join them, and wewere there representing the ICAR Foundationand the International Rehabilitation Council forTorture Victims. In a very emotional moment

one participant expressed his feelings in brokenGerman, his only means of international com-munication: This is the first international rec-ognition of the holocaust which the Romanianpopulation has lived through under more than40 years of communist terror.

It is a sentiment that the president of theAFDPR, Ticu Dumitrescu, senator 1990-2000,has often echoed in public statements: Theinternational support for the medical rehabili-tation centers of the ICAR Foundation has beenthe only visible but all the more welcome -

sign of international recognition of the suffer-ings of the hundreds of thousands of victims ofthe Stalinist regime in Romania between 1947and 1989.


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Mobilizing Resources:

Initial Allies and Barriers

Having secured our relationship with the survi-

vors, we began the ambitious task of mobiliz-ing all of the Romanian national resources thatcould help us provide services to this targetgroup. There was a national debt to be paid tothe survivors. We kept a constant pressure onstate and municipal authorities, especiallythose in a position to secure clinic sites suchactivities and those responsible for allocatingfunds for public health services.

The problems we faced were both political andpractical. On the political side, we needed tocircumvent the resistance or even outright

sabotage of our efforts from former oppres-sors. We needed bridges of communication tothose in power who might choose to help us.And we needed allies. On the practical side, weneeded physical premises, professional experts

and a considerable amount of money.

We were not alone in our struggle. Our imme-diate allies were a number of small civil society

organizations created right after the revolu-tion, foremost among them Alian a Civic .There was also the Association 21 December,the Group for Social Dialogue, and the Societyfor an Independent Television. Together theyformed a network promoting various democ-ratic developments, including our initiative. Wealso had press support from Rom nia Liberand other independent media, such as Revista22 and Radio Contact.

We had additional allies in the so-called histori-cal (pre-communist) political parties, the PNT(National Peasants Party) and the PNL (NationalLiberal Party), which re-emerged after the revo-lution. In the first elections after the revolu-tion, in May 1990, these parties gained admin-istrative power in all major cities. Their moralsupport did not immediately produce visible


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results, but it may to some extent have pro-tected our initiative from direct interference byunsympathetic national powers. We also ob-tained the backing of the most prestigiousamong the re-emerged leaders of the historicalparties, Corneliu Coposu, who gave us his writ-ten recommendation. Once we started opera-tion at our first center in Bucharest, severalother leading personalities from these partiesbecame clients and close friends of the initia-tive.

The former political prisoners themselves weresome of our most important allies. Immediatelyafter the revolution 65,000 of the estimated100,000 survivors of political persecutionformed the AFDPR, and elected Ticu Dumi-trescu as its president. A few months later hewas also elected to the Senate of the Romanianparliament on the ticket of one of the revivedhistorical parties.

During the months following its creation theAFDPR obtained concessions from the newpowers, including official papers documentingtheir detention and political persecution, ex-emption from payment of income taxes, a fewfree railway passages per year, and on paper the right to free medical care and medicine.5The strength of the AFDPR helped break downsome of the political barriers we too were fac-ing. Individually, the survivors were weak socialplayers, but in force they exerted a certain po-

litical influence, and gained discrete supportfrom the opposition parties. ICAR benefitedfrom this acceptance and from the protectionafforded by our strong relations to the interna-tional governmental as well as non-governmental organizations.

The fact that we were tolerated at the begin-ning was also due, however, to the very lowpublic profile we maintained in the early years a policy that received criticism from somemembers of the European Union, who wantedpublicity around the activities they supported.

Because we considered the initiatives survivaland the protection of services for our clientsmore important than donor satisfaction, we didnot change our policy.

5 Law 118/1990

We also had to protect the initiative againstinfiltration by the former Securitate. At onepoint we noticed that a new colleague was dis-cretely checking client files. When we askedhim for documentation of his background andwork history, he left and never returned. Afterthis, the security police did not bother us. Noneof our confidential information has ever beenrevealed publicly, and we have never been tar-geted for the sorts of scandalous attacks or in-ternal sabotage that had made Securitate sonotorious. We are of course as vulnerable toinfiltration as any organization, and have madesure to maintain a very clean and transparentoperation.

Finally, we had to protect our initiative frompolitical in-fights within the AFDPR. This wasaccomplished by insisting on the professionalcharacter of the initiative and the need for itscomplete independence from the AFDPR.

On the practical side, we had to be able to pro-vide free medicine and medical care to our cli-ents, not just for the direct medical conse-quences of torture and ill treatment, but for allother kinds of medical problems our clients suf-fered. Considering the relatively advanced ageof these survivors, this was a particularly largetask. The provision of medical care demands acostly investment in initial infrastructure, andsignificant daily costs for trained personnel,medicines and much more. We initially ob-

tained international funding for our activities.But not only did we believe that the state wasethically obligated to fund these activities, wealso faced a very practical reality: the relativeshortage of international funding.

Targets for Pressure and Eventual Col-

laboration

In order to achieve our long-term goal, weneeded to build and maintain collaborativerelationships with many people and organiza-tions, starting with responsible political figures

at the city halls. The fact that the historical par-ties conquered most city halls in the May 1990municipal elections greatly helped our initia-tive.

Even with this political support it was some-times difficult, however, to find civil servants inthe central administration who were suffi-


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ciently motivated to help us and our clients.Our initial approaches to the National HealthAuthorities were unsuccessful, and improvedgradually only over time and with politicalchanges. The local health authorities weremore accessible, and personal relationships atall levels proved useful.

We developed good relationships with key per-sons close to the General Medical Council,6which helped us attract a number of qualifiedhealth professionals to our clinic as center staffor external consultants. It must be understoodthat those joining this initiative in its earlyphase, even in a strictly professional medicalcapacity, bore the risk of being considered po-litically suspicious, which could be unhelpfulto career prospects in the public health services.

The key international non-governmental or-ganization working in support of medical re-habilitation services for torture victims, theIRCT in Copenhagen, also helped us maintainand expand our support network. With theiradvice we managed to obtain financial assis-tance first from the European Union and laterfrom the United Nations. This also involved theopen support of the Danish Embassy in Roma-nia, a level of diplomatic support that gave ussome protection against harassment from thosewho might prefer to see our efforts frustrated.IRCT also channeled private donations to theICAR Foundation, which eventually allowed us

to turn the premises made available by themunicipalities in Iasi, Bucharest and Craiovainto up-to-date clinical facilities.

6 The General Medical Council is the professional associa-tion to which all doctors in Romania belong, and whichissues licenses for both private and public practice.

"Founder of ICAR welcomed at theDanish Embassy"


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presented this document, and the mayor im-mediately instructed the city administration tomake a new effort to find larger premises forthe center. We were finally offered a larger

space in an unfinished building on the mainUnirii Boulevard. With the generosity of ourinternational private donors (particularly theParker Family of the Oak Foundation) and thevision of our able architect we were able tobring all our activities (except our dental cabi-net) under the same roof, and took residencein 1999. The city gave us a temporary contractat a nominal rent and indicated that this con-tract would be renewed as needed.

Craiova

Finally, in 1998, we were able to establish our

third, but smaller center in Craiova, in thesouthwestern part of the country. This requiredlengthy negotiations with the city hall. Wefound it helpful to have representatives from

the IRCT in Copenhagen accompany us in someof these meetings, as their presence lent a levelof support and pressure to our case. The citygovernment eventually decided to support our

effort by making premises available. After re-pair and adaptation these became a good set-ting for clinical activities.

Between these three municipalities more than1000 sq. m. was put at our disposal at a nomi-nal rent. The market value for such centrallyplaced office space in these cities easily exceeds

$100,000 USD per year, one-third of the annualoperating costs of the three centers.

Keeping Up With

Caseload and Costs

Our continuing challenge was now to providefree medical care and medicine to a constantlyincreasing number of clients. News of the cen-ters existence spread rapidly among formerpolitical prisoners, and our appointment bookswere always full.

We had hoped to obtain practical assistancefrom the public health services, especially diag-nostic and therapeutic services we could not

provide. When we approached the ministry ofhealth soon after our official registration in thespring of 1992, however, we received a com-pletely negative response.

We therefore began to build a network ofsympathetic colleagues willing to provide theirprofessional services at an affordable price. Wealso made contracts with external laboratoriesand specialty clinics, including geriatric hospi-tals, to guarantee our clients free access to suchservices. As a consequence, the cost of medicalservices and especially of medicine was rapidlyincreasing with the increase in the number of

Evolution of total surface (sq.m)

100 100118

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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Evolution of total cost of premises

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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

US$


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clients, and soon created serious budgetaryproblems for ICAR.

After the revolution, recognized former politi-cal prisoners became entitled by law to freemedical care from the public health system. But

the capacity of the Romanian health care sys-tem was quite limited and access to care con-tinued to be dependent on the patients abilityto pay health care providers under the table.Since our clients had no money for such pay-ments, they simply did not receive the servicesthey needed irrespective of the law.

ICARs commitment to securing appropriateand qualified medical assistance at no cost toour clients was thus possible only throughgrants from our international donors. The staffwas paid a decent salary to attract qualifiedprofessionals, but they were told never to askfor or accept supplementary payments fromour clients.

Although the law also gave former politicalprisoners the right to free medicine, they werein fact not able to obtain it. Private pharmaciesrefused to provide medication free of charge,as they knew that high inflation and delays incompensation from the ministry of healthmeant they were unlikely to recover the fullcost. To save face, the health system authorizeda few doctors to prescribe from state pharma-cies a few medications free of charge. Not sur-

prisingly, this system was immediately floodedby clients and blocked.

Given these funding difficulties, and the in-creasing number of clients to whom free medi-cation was provided, ICAR began to face seri-ous budgetary problems. We intended, how-ever, to make certain our clients could obtainthe medication to which they were legally enti-tled. We first invoked another law provisionthat allowed patients to choose their physi-cians. The ministry of health initially rejectedour requests to allow ICARs physicians to pre-

scribe free medicines for our patients. But afterpersistent efforts they were obliged to makesome concessions.

In the first round we obtained permission forthe physicians at the ICAR Foundation to pre-scribe partially subsidized medicine within alimited per-person and per-prescription

budget. This lowered our medicine costs perclient, but with an ever-increasing client load,and because we still had to cover the differ-ence, medication costs continued to exceed ourbudget.

In 1997 we managed to convince a sympatheticcity hospital director to help. He obtained per-mission to cover within his budget the cost ofmedicines prescribed by our physicians, as ifthey were on the hospital staff. This solved theproblem in Bucharest, but not in Iasi or Craiova.

Through these steps, we have largely suc-ceeded in protecting the right to prescribe freemedicine to our clients. The value of this publiccontribution to our work from the NationalHealth Insurance exceeds $150,000 USD peryear, one-half of the annual operating costs ofthe three centers.(graphic no.2)

Evolution of ICAR and state contributions to the cost of medecine

68614

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95006500 1400019000 13500 14000

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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

State contribution (USD)

ICAR contribution (USD)

Adjusting to National Health

Insurance Legislation

To optimize the benefits that could be derivedfrom the public system, we needed to con-stantly adapt to changes in legislation or ad-ministrative rules. This sometimes required usto significantly reorient our tactic, and evenour organizational structure.

In 1998, a new National Health Insurance Sys-tem was voted into law by the Romanian par-liament, and all previous arrangements had tobe reconsidered. Until now, ICAR had offeredits clients both general and specialized medicalcare free of charge. Doctors who worked inconsultation rooms at the center were paidmonthly salaries, and were always able to pre-


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Seeking Reparation for

Victims of Human Rights

Violations

According to the UN Convention against tor-

ture, which has been ratified by Romania, thestate parties have an obligation to provide vic-tims of torture not only with compensation,but also with as full rehabilitation as possible.Given that our clients are victims of deliberatestate human rights violations, we hope to con-vince the Romanian state that it should even-tually take over the full cost of specialized carefor these victims all over the country.

The torture survivor is a complex patient whoneeds comprehensive treatment for the physi-cal, psychological and social consequences of

torture, and requires spiritual, legal and finan-cial assistance as well. The treatment of tortureis a new chapter in medical education. In the 20years since the first torture treatment centerwas opened in Denmark, rehabilitation centersaround the world have accumulated a vast

amount of experience. Twenty years, however,is apparently not long enough to change thedominant attitudes of the broader medical pro-fession, often still unaware of the complexneeds of these special clients. The multidiscipli-nary team working in a rehabilitation centertries to meet as many of the survivors needs aspossible, something that cannot be done in anordinary medical unit. We are aware that thisvery complex combination of services is notlikely to be supported completely by the publichealth system, but we want to obtain from thestate the maximum support guaranteed by law,and work to amend the law when necessary.

The non-medical aspects of reparation to vic-tims of human rights violations like legal re-dress, restitution and compensation, as well asmoral reparation should also become part ofRomanian judicial and political tradition. Fi-nally, there is an obligation for Romania to ef-fectively pursue in court all perpetrators ofgross human rights violations. Pursuing theseproblems will be a natural extension of thestrategies and tactics we have used thus far.

Discussion and Analysis

Factors Working in Our Favor

Our success was affected by the character ofthe prisoners as a group and by specific quali-ties of ICAR as well:

The immediate creation of a nationalassociation of former political prisoners,the AFDPR. Their elected spokesmenwere able to act effectively on theirbehalf using the window of opportu-nity created by the relatively fluid po-litical situation in the winter of 1989-90.

AFDPRs unconditional backing of ourefforts provided both inspiration andsupport with some behind-the-scenespressure at the political level. And indi-vidual sympathizers within the systemwere helpful in a number of situations.

ICARs ability to operate in completeopenness in spite of the lack of realpublic sympathy for its target group.

ICARs ability, after some initial set-backs, to establish and maintain directcontact with relevant levels of govern-ment and agencies as well as with pro-fessional groups and individuals.

ICARs international support fromDenmark, the European Union and theUnited Nations, as well as from theUnited Kingdom and later the UnitedStates. We are particularly grateful forthe very generous grants from theParker family in Switzerland, and ingratitude for their constant supportnamed our center in Bucharest CASAPARKER.

Skills and abilities of the ICAR staff, andtheir connections to the health system.Our medical staff was allowed to pro-vide, free of charge, the diagnostic ex-aminations and medical treatment they


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felt were appropriate. This helped ourclients trust our commitment to providethem with optimal care, which in turnrestored some of the confidence inpeople that they had lost during theiryears of political persecution.

There were broader contextual factorsworking in our favor as well:

There was a general political wish, evenamong former communists, to help fa-cilitate Romanias integration intoWestern Europe by meeting Europeanstandards, including those related tohuman rights. During meetings withRomanian officials we constantly usedexamples of how, in other democraticcountries, rehabilitation centers func-tion in relation to the national healthsystem and other local and national au-

thorities. Romanian legislation is multifaceted,

and open for interpretation. Its imple-mentation tends not to be coordinatedbetween sectors or administrative lev-els. This lack of coherence was some-times to our advantage, as somethingnot acceptable to one institution mightbe acceptable to another. Though therewas no great political commitment toreparation for the sufferings of formerpolitical prisoners, there was also reluc-tance to openly criticize what we were

doing as long as we kept a low pro-file.

The law concerning the rights of formerpolitical prisoners ( Law 118/1990) gaveus legal grounds for our effort.

Although the Securitate people werestill very much in control behind thescenes, they kept a low profile and didnot try to sabotage our activities.

In 1996, the presidential election re-sulted in the first non-communist presi-dent, Emil Constantinescu, and there

was a change of government. This gaveus an opportunity to have more access,and to raise our profile. The former po-litical prisoners were publicly recog-nized as deserving of public gratitudeand assistance for their fight againstrepression. (Even so, the center/rightgovernments during this presidencywere unable to make any serious effortto improve the situation of the former

political prisoners. Nor were they ableto move ahead with any trials of theformer torturers of our clients.)

Factors Complicating Our Efforts

Romanian society after 1989 was only a super-

ficially reformed communist society. After 50years of passive and responsibility-avoiding be-havior, there was considerable resistance tochange, and the Romanian population did notwelcome independent initiatives or actions.The majority of people retained paternalist at-titudes, and distrust was rampant, not onlyamong the former prisoners, but in society as awhole. The relationship between the govern-ment and civil society was particularly polar-ized. Former prisoners received no sympathyfrom either the general population or the po-litical hierarchy.

Impunity

Romanian society has shown little interest inbringing former perpetrators to justice or pro-viding reparations to victims, and extreme de-lays in the judiciary system have frustratedanyone trying to achieve justice for past crimes.Ten years after the massacre in Timioara, forinstance, the two generals responsible for giv-ing the order to use live ammunition on an un-armed civilian demonstration were finally sen-tenced to prison terms. Right after their sen-

tencing, however, they were somehow able or enabled to leave the country unpunished.

Senator Ticu Dumitrescu, the president of theAFDPR, fought a ten-year battle in the parlia-ment to open the extensive personal files ofthe former Securitate. But the majority of par-liament members used every trick and everyexcuse for delay to frustrate his initiative,which finally ended in a much-diluted versionallowing candidates who stand for election toparliament to be screened for possible connec-tions with the Securitate. In the end, not sur-prisingly, many Securitate files were missing.Because the committee charged with examin-ing the files had to fight with the authoritiesholding them for every scrap of paper, it wasunable to produce a report until after the elec-tions.

In November 2000, the former communists re-gained the presidency as well as a working ma-

jority in parliament. Fortunately they have


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changed their style somewhat, in part due totheir desire to secure entry into North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) and the EuroepanUnion.

The struggle against impunity is a new element

of our work, one we undertake as part of acomprehensive response to the needs of ourclients. A full psychosocial rehabilitation cannotbe separated from the question of justice. Thiswork requires us to carefully prepare our strat-egy and tactics, to understand the ways inwhich the system resists any pressure for re-form, and to invest time, money and determi-nation in our efforts to break the system.8

We are currently preparing a project with anexperienced organization in this field, RedressTrust, based in London. This shared projectseeks to contribute to the development of hu-man rights standards and the rule of law inRomania through enforcement of appropriatereparation to victims of torture includingcruel, inhuman or degrading treatment andpunishment and by ensuring that perpetra-tors of such human rights violations arebrought to justice.

Organizational Factors

Overcoming Our Own Fears

Each of us involved in this initiative was awarethat the activity represented a challenge to the

new powers, and might damage our profes-sional careers. But most of us also had a per-sonal motivation to help our clients, havingseen some form of political repression amongour families or friends. Each of us, then, de-cided to take the risk of joining the staff, andno one left because of pressure to do so. Wedeveloped strong relationships with our clients,and each of us has felt that helping these vic-tims was the most emotionally fulfilling profes-sional activity we could engage in.

8 In fact in March, 2003 ICAR Foundation opened a trialagainst the Romanian state asking them to recognise theexistence of the Communist Holocaust in Romania and topresent public excuses to the victims and their families .It isalso asked to be recognised that the Securitate was apolitical secret service and had a terrorist character.

Unity and Momentum

ICAR management kept staff updated at regu-lar meetings, and involved everyone in findingsolutions to problems. Even when we weretemporarily unable to offer staff their full sala-ries, almost everyone was willing to accept a

temporary pay cut.

In working with torture survivors it is not un-common for some of the burden of the trau-matic experiences to be transferred from thevictim to the care provider, sometimes leadingto provider burnout. This in turn may lead toconflicts among the staff members over appar-ently unrelated issues, or to a splitting of thestaff into warring factions. ICAR Foundationhas experienced these situations, but they wererecognized and dealt with efficiently and didnot lead to the breakdown of the initiative.

We knew we had to seek out different kinds ofsolutions for the work to survive, and this de-manded a great deal of adaptability from thestaff. The arrangements that helped us securefree medicines, for instance, were sometimesquite complicated. Sometimes the heavy bur-den of medication costs led to discussionsabout whether a client should receive a par-ticularly expensive or long-term therapy. In al-most every case we decided to go ahead andoffer the best available treatment, irrespectiveof the cost.

Challenging and Sanctioning Officials

Our financial manager was not afraid to chal-lenge government officials. In one situation theministry of finance refused to refund the VAT,which we were not supposed to pay as a hu-manitarian organization. ICAR had fulfilled allthe legal conditions and still the payment hadbeen delayed for more than a year. After wethreatened to take the ministry to courts, wefinally received payment. In another case, a lo-cal administration was charging the ICARFoundation unjustified taxes, and we tookthem to court. This created some respect forthe foundation, and such actions did not haveto be repeated.

Results/Outcomes

We ultimately succeeded in mobilizing substan-tial contributions from public resources, which


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has allowed us to provide continued qualitymedical care and rehabilitation to a substantialnumber of former political prisoners in threeRomanian cities. The centers have also providedsocial rehabilitation to their clients by showingthem the respect they deserve and overcomingtheir isolation. As one client expressed it duringa visit of European Union evaluators to thecenter in Iasi, I often come here even when Iam not in immediate need of medical services

just because this is the only place in this citywhere I feel genuinely welcome.

In financial terms the activity still dependsheavily on international donors especially the

European Union and the United Nations Volun-tary Fund for Victims of Torture. But the com-bined estimated value of the premises thatRomanian city authorities have put at our dis-posal and the contribution from the RomanianNational Health Insurance System to covermedication costs now total $250,000 USD peryear 45 percent of the total estimated cost ofoperating the three centers in Bucharest, Iasiand Craiova.

Looking back at ten years of activity, we canfairly claim that our success was far beyond ourexpectation.

Transplanting the TacticIt is our hope that this experience will be in-structive for any group trying to convince thestate to take responsibility for providing a le-gally mandated service to a specific group ofpeople. Although our experience is in the con-text of medical services there may be manyother areas where such pressure on and col-laboration with the state could have positiveresults such as legal services or education.

Most specialized services for disadvantagedgroups have probably needed this kind of tacti-

cal approach. The pioneers of such serviceshave had first to mobilize public sympathy for agroup not previously recognized as being inneed of special attention, a group often theobject of public rejection and even insultsuchas leprosy patients, the mentally handicapped,the mentally ill and most recently patients withHIV/AIDS. Once public sympathy has been cre-ated, these groups benefit from public healthprograms and socio-medical care financedmainly by public funds.

In the case of former political prisoners in a ba-

sically unreformed society, an appeal for publicsympathy was not really possible. Too manyindividuals in the public system had direct orindirect responsibility for the sufferings ofthese prisoners and wanted to forget the past.Even those who had simply witnessed this hu-man rights disaster found it easier to assumethat these people had somehow brought theirsuffering onto themselves, or that their storieswere exaggerated. We thus had to rely on indi-

viduals whose families had personal experience

with the problem.

In other situations both avenues might be pos-sible: a campaign could create public sympathyand broad-based political support while alsomobilizing individual allies inside the systemthrough informal channels and direct personalcontact.

Our experiences reinforced time and again thatfor the success of this tactic we had to a) takeadvantage of every conceivable opportunity forexternal support and governmental influence,

and b) pay close attention to our internal or-ganizational situation and relationship withclients. We had to continually research, evalu-ate, adjust and adapt, depending on how situa-tions were supporting or hindering our pro-gress in mobilizing public resources for Roma-nias survivors of torture.

When transplanting this tactic into new con-texts, it is essential to pay close attention tothese areas on an ongoing basis. Take time toresearch public resources that may already beavailable or could be expanded, and to develop

new resources. Evaluate the supports already inplace and available. This will provide a goodstarting point from which to build relationshipsand alliances, and will also show you what sys-tems, agencies and legal or legislative supportsyou may need to gain access to in order tomove forward. Adjust and adapt each area tokeep pace with the new relationships, alliancesand support you create in the process of build-


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ing and strengthening the public resources foryour issue or constituency.

We cannot emphasize enough the importanceof keeping a watchful eye on your own organ-izational conduct in all arenas. As organizations

can all too easily take on the symptoms andconflicts of the people they serve. Particularlywhen they are working with vulnerable andvictimized populations, it is especially impor-tant to keep the pulse of the dynamics withinthe organization itself. These dynamics cangreatly hinder progress if not attended to withcare. In addition, the mobilization of publicresources is in part a question of political credi-bility and reputation and your organizationspolitical reputation will greatly benefit frommaintaining an impeccable professional repu-tation.

The following questions can help you reflect onyour potential use of this tactic.

Key questions to consider before trying to im-plement this kind of campaign

Are members of your target groupautomatically or legally eligible for thepublic (health) services you are seekingto provide for them?

Do the available public (health) servicesmeet the standard of quality your tar-

get group requires, or do you need toestablish your own service organizationto guarantee this quality? If they areadequate, your task is to have your tar-get group accepted and treated by thenational system. If services are unac-ceptable or non-existent, as was thecase for torture survivors in Romania,the task might involve establishing anew institution to fill the gap, thenconvincing the state to support this in-stitutions work.

What are the financial and human de-

mands you will face? Can the targetgroup pay for such services, or will youneed to find funding? Will you be ableto do this? Can you provide adequateservices? Can you promise consistencyand dedication in order to earn thetrust and loyalty of the target group?Can you find enough private and inter-

national support to sustain your effortswhile you try to persuade the state tofulfill its responsibilities? Where wouldyou need to begin building the finan-cial and human support systems for thework you plan?

What will be the states response toyour demands? Will there be inertia, in-competence, or outright resistance?Can you analyze the nuances behindthese responses in order to overcomeeach one?

Do you have allies inside the state sys-tem, in the ministries or administrativeunits that are responsible for the ser-vices you hope to mobilize? Do youhave avenues and contacts for improv-ing and expanding such alliances?

Do you have allies within the political

system? If you need to put pressure ona given administrative unit, can you doso?

Will your effort require a legislativestrategy? Will changes in law make itmore feasible to obtain state supportfor services? Do you have the contactsand allies to develop and promote thenecessary legislation?

If you think the answers to these questions aresufficiently positive, and you intend to imple-ment such a tactic, consider how it would fitinto your overall strategy. You may want toconsider some of the steps taken to implementthis tactic:

Build trust and solidarity with the tar-get group. Based on your own skills andexpertise and the target groups needs,set goals regarding the services you in-tend to provide.

Start working for the priority needs ofyour clients even on a volunteer basis ifnecessary.

Begin looking for allies within the ad-ministration and the political bodies ofthe state.

Study the legal opportunities andspeculate on any lack of coherence orspecificity within the law. Identify in-ternational human rights and humani-tarian law that supports your claim.


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Find the legal framework that will al-low you to bring together the differentrights of the group under a coherentformula that allows you to satisfy theneeds you have identified. Find somesmart lawyers sympathetic to yourcause. Using existing legislation or leg-islation under preparation makes it eas-ier for sympathetic administrators atvarious levels to provide for the specialneeds of a specific target group than ifthey have to push through specific leg-islation for one group.

Study the political system to identifythe most effective place to focus yourattention, pressure or search for allies.

Never forget that your target group it-self will have its own political powerand connections. It may be useful tothink of analogous groups that may al-ready receive the kind of attention youwant to secure for your target group.

If your strategy involves a public cam-paign to gain sympathy and support foryour clients, you will want to ally your-self with sympathetic journalists. Evenin a low-profile struggle such as ICARs,media allies can be important whenyou need certain kinds of pressure, orwhen you need to protect yourselfagainst attempts to delegitimize yourefforts.

Conclusion

Fortunately, in all societies at all times thereare courageous, desperate or even crazypeople who are willing to speak out. There isno completely silent civil society. But there isalso no recipe for how to make people breakthe silence or decide to act. You should notgive up on a tactic before exhausting all possi-ble ways to adapt and implement it. We, for

instance, realized that we needed to directlyapproach the responsible agencies and use thebest possible legal arguments. We had to beatthem with their own methods.

It was extremely draining to have to inventnew solutions to constantly changing situations and then to convince an unenthusiastic publicsystem to support the implementation of suchsolutions. Sometimes the speed of the political

changes made it impossible for us to makeplans at all. I was, in fact, a little afraid of whatwe were doing at times because the lack of anexplicit legal framework required us to use somany imaginative interpretations to reach ourgoals. I believe that our tactic succeeded be-cause of the lack of precedent, our element ofsurprise and the transparency of our organiza-tion in our determined but always correct rela-tions with the public authorities.

If I had to do everything over there is not muchI would change. I dont think we missed anyopportunity to mobilize private or public re-sources in order to help the former politicalprisoners, though it took both time and pa-tience to transform our expectations into real-ity.


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Notes


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For a full list of publications available in the Tactical Notebook Series,

go to www.newtactics.org.Online you will also find a searchable database of tactics andforums for discussion with other human rights practitioners.

The Center for Victims of Torture

New Tactics in Human Rights Project

717 East River Road

Minneapolis, MN 55455

[email protected]

making the state pay: mobilizing public resources for victims of human rights violations (english)

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