Maintaining the Design Intent – Delivering Availability and Safety, and the Price of Failure

Jonathan Woodman

BMT Group Jwwoodman004@gmail.com

1. ABSTRACT

For submarine sustainment, understanding the design intent and the actual design on a day-to-day basis is essential to delivering availability and keeping the platforms safe. Understanding the design intent can be difficult and complex, it’s rarely captured in a single document and there are several factors that drive the actual platform requirements. Knowing the design intent at the start of life is a given, it is maintained throughout the sustainment phase by survey, maintenance and repair, but the actual material state of a platform can deteriorate throughout the length of a commission. Failure to deliver adequate sustainment functions will threaten availability, as recent examples from Australia and abroad can attest. Ultimately though, failure to manage a deteriorating material state will compromise the safety of the platform itself.

As Australia pursues the acquisition of a larger, more complex and more capable submarine fleet, the challenges and demands for skilled resources to manage the design intent will grow proportionally. This paper will investigate the nature of those challenges and the consequences of not getting it right. The submarine enterprise has a duty of care to deliver a safe platform, and at the same time achieve availability targets for operational tasking. This challenge can be met with the right people, the right processes, enabled by tools and knowledge. This paper will consider these impacts and the challenges faced by the team tasked with delivering our new submarines.

2. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ARDM - Age Related Degradation Mechanisms

ARM - Availability, Reliability and Maintainability

AWD - Air Warfare Destroyer CCSM - Collins Class Submarine CSMG - Canadian Submarine

Management Group DA - Design Authority DI - Design Intent DS - Design State EDWP - Extended Docking Work

Period FCD - Full Cycle Docking FMECA - Failure Modes, Effects and

Criticality Analysis FSM - Future Submarine

HSR - Hull Survey Requirements IP - Intellectual Property LORA - Level Of Repair Analysis MCD - Mid Cycle Docking OA - Operating Authority OEM - Original Equipment

Manufacturer RCM - Reliability Centred

Maintenance SMP - Self Maintenance Periods SQEP - Suitably Qualified and

Experienced Personnel SSMG - Submarine Support

Management Group SSR - System Survey Requirements UUC - Usage and Upkeep Cycle

3. INTRODUCTION

The maintenance of Design Intent (DI) for a submarine involves more than just the delivery of effective configuration control processes. It’s about attaining a deep understanding of the capability that the submarine can deliver, and applying this knowledge to assess the actual platform performance at any time. This is a core element of any sustainment program; only by understanding the relationship between the actual design and the DI on a day-to-day basis can informed decisions be made to ensure that submarine availability and safety are delivered.

Making the right decision also requires an effective sustainment enterprise with a performance driven culture and a focus on safety. The structure of this enterprise may be complex, combining elements of Navy, Defence and Industry. However, there is an overriding need for effective communication and management of design information and clear articulation of roles and responsibilities for managing the DI. This must be supported by suitable leadership, knowledge and experience to discharge these responsibilities effectively. In particular, the availability of submarine Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP) is a critical challenge to achieving success.

This paper will explore these issues in detail and consider the potential impacts for Australia’s Future Submarine Program. As Australia embarks on its biggest ever Defence procurement project, it follows that sustaining the Future Submarine (FSM) will be an equally unprecedented challenge. It can be assumed that, like the Collins Class Submarine (CCSM), Australia will seek to sustain a sovereign capability by making maximum possible use of in-country resources. It is therefore inevitable that larger submarines and a potentially larger fleet will increase the effort to manage the design and DI through life. The question must be asked; is Australia ready to meet this challenge for the FSM?

4. UNDERSTANDING THE DESIGN INTENT

4.1 WHAT IS THE DESIGN INTENT?

In its simplest terms, DI for a submarine is the definition of the intended performance and capability it can deliver. The DI evolves during the concept, design and build processes and represents the combination of user requirements, applicable standards, specifications, legislation and the need to achieve a balanced design. This differs from the actual performance that the submarine can deliver on any given day, its Design State (DS).

Understanding and achieving a common definition of the DI can be complex as it is unlikely to reside in a single location, but rather an interlinked set of documents, specifications, procedures and data. The following are some of the key artefacts contributing to the definition of the DI:

1. Documentation and drawings: design descriptions, parts lists, illustrated parts catalogues, installation, assembly and arrangement drawings, equipment data sheets, standards, calculations and similar. These data and references are typically contained within a Technical Data Pack, and are the fundamental basis for the capture of the design and its intended performance.

2. Operating rules: the document set which describes how equipment, systems and the platform as a whole must be operated. These are set in accordance with system design requirements, adherence to which will ensure that the boat is operated within the bounds of its safety case. The rule set must be maintained and subject to strict configuration control.

3. Maintenance procedures and records: corrective and preventative maintenance actions for the submarine’s systems and equipment. Maintenance procedures must be defined along with required spares, tools and equipment. Maintenance records must also be kept and subject to configuration control.

4. Spares inventory: these spares must be correctly identified and codified so that they can be readily drawn down as required for corrective and preventative maintenance.

Configuration control for each of these elements is essential to maintain the integrity of the DI. This must be accurate and timely with changes applied simultaneously for linked DI artefacts. This will enable a single, consistent version of the DI to be applied across the sustainment enterprise at all times.

4.2 CAN THE DESIGN INTENT CHANGE?

The DI will typically be frozen at build and remain static for long periods through life. However, it is inevitable that there will be a need to change the design and the associated design artefacts through life to reflect the evolution of technical, safety or operational requirements. This can affect the DI and submarine capability as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 – Changes to a Design Affecting Capability and the DI

Based on Figure 1, the following three scenarios are considered:

1. A change to the design without impacting the DI:

A design change without affecting equipment form, fit or function: ‘original sin’, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) safety notices or obsolescence issues could arise which require like-for-like equipment changes, but with no impact on overall boat capability of the DI.

2. A change to the design which affects the DI:

Capability upgrade or update: The DI is found to be inadequate because of changes to the operational environment or technological advancements and capability change is implemented as a result;

Incident or material failure: if this brings the submarine safety case into question then changes to the design or operational procedures may result. The failure of a sea water cooling hose on HMAS Dechaineux in 2003 is an example of where an operational incident leads to a design change, in this case modifications to enable automated hull valve closure (Department of Defence, 2012). Design change could also be initiated if new facts or technological knowledge are discovered which invalidate existing safety arguments. The changes necessary to address these issues may affect the DI.

3. Operating outside the DI with no change to the design:

In extreme circumstances (i.e. military operations) the Operating Authority (OA) may request to operate beyond the DI or other imposed operational limits. This may provide a short term increase in capability. Operating beyond the DI could also occur inadvertently as the result of human error causing damage, reduction in capability and loss of confidence in safety functions.

The submarine enterprise has the responsibility to ensure that all changes to the DI through life are considered, reviewed and approved on a case-by-case basis in accordance with established, auditable processes. This will demonstrate correct decision making, provide a basis for maintaining the DI and the configuration of design artefacts, and deliver confidence in platform safety arguments.

5. DESIGN IMPACTS FOR AVAILABILITY AND SAFETY

5.1 THE PERFORMANCE ‘GAP’

In addition to the design changes which are deliberately applied through life, the use of the submarine will ultimately lead to deterioration of its DS and material state, and hence its performance with time. This is due to the high operational demands placed on submarines and the harsh environmental conditions in which they must act. Degradation may be gradual, the result of a range of Age Related Degradation Mechanisms (ARDMs), or it may arise suddenly from operational incidents or material failures.

In either case, there will be a lag between the DS and the DI that will tend to increase with time unless corrective actions are implemented. The designer will have included margins on equipments and systems so that some divergence of the DS from the DI can be tolerated. However, if the gap between the DS and the DI is allowed to grow in an uncontrolled manner

the availability and safety of the submarine will be compromised. This relationship is captured in Figure 2.

Figure 2 – Variation in Design Performance with Time

In Figure 2 the lag, or performance gap, between DS and DI can be characterised by the following:

1. The gap will increase (i.e. the performance of the submarine will decrease) over time due to operational usage of the submarine and the degradation effects which result. If degradation effects are left unchecked, the submarine is without maintenance for an extended time or a significant defect occurs, the availability limit may be breached. This is the point at which the submarine will require unplanned, corrective maintenance and a loss of submarine availability will result (defect rectification). Severe degradation may also compromise the safety of the submarine, represented by the safety limit, and result in loss of, or damage to, personnel, mission systems and the environment. The submarine OA and sustainment enterprise as a whole have a duty of care to ensure that this safety limit is never breached.

2. The gap will decrease (i.e. the performance of the submarine will increase) when preventative and corrective maintenance actions are applied. These actions are enabled by sustainment functions. Failure to successfully deliver these functions can result in inefficient maintenance (maintenance overruns) which will reduce the availability of the submarine.

The 2003 failure of a sea water cooling hose on HMAS DECHAINEUX (Department of Defence, 2003) is an example of where the availability limit, but not the safety limit was breached. In this instance system redundancies, crew training and operational procedures prevented the worst case scenario. However, submarine availability was reduced by the subsequent recall

of the fleet, and operational restrictions were put in place until the cause of the incident could be resolved.

Between scheduled maintenance periods the DS and performance gap will be partially or wholly unknown. Maintenance periods provide critical opportunities at which survey and inspection activities, typically captured by Hull Survey Requirements (HSR) and System Survey Requirements (SSR), can be conducted to interrogate the DS. They also allow the maintenance regime to be adjusted, ensuring it remains appropriate to the systems installed and the age of the platform.

The timing of these periods is important: if they are too close together, platform availability may be reduced and at the demands on Production infrastructure and workforce may increase. If they are too far apart, the aggregation of defects and degradation of the DS may compromise safety limits. This availability-safety balance is the responsibility of the submarine enterprise to manage and it must take into account the maintenance requirements of the design in question. This presents a challenge for the sustainment of Australia’s FSM; can we manage this balance and understand the performance gap on a day-to-day basis?

5.2 MANAGING THE AVAILABILITY-SAFETY BALANCE; A QUESTION OF RISK

Fleet availability is a driving requirement for any Navy and the flexibility to deploy a submarine, or submarines, at any time on short notice is essential. But these demands will not always be easily met, and will challenge the submarine enterprise to make complex decisions: Can concessions be applied? Can maintenance actions be delayed? Should operational restrictions be removed? These actions increase the risk aggregated defects and concessions may breach the safety limit. Only confidence in the DI and relative DS will enable the submarine enterprise to tolerate these risks and make the right decisions. Figure 3 depicts the relationship between availability, safety and risk.

Figure 3 – Impacts of Increasing Availability in terms of Risk and Safety

Considering the extremes in Figure 3. On the far left, a risk adverse culture within the submarine enterprise could prevent boats heading to sea on the basis of low priority defects or issues. This culture would arise from limited confidence in safety functions; the result of a lack of experience across the enterprise or tools and processes that do not deliver the right information at the right time to enable effective decision making. In this scenario low fleet availability and inability to achieve operational tasking are likely to result. The evolution of Extended Docking Work Periods (EDWP) for Canada’s Victoria Class Submarine (Hughes, 2013) highlights the necessity of developing a skilled workforce equipped with appropriate processes and tools, to reverse a trend of poor fleet availability and provide confidence in platform performance.

On the far right of Figure 3, a failure to recognise the impacts of defects, deliver effective sustainment processes or operate boats safely could result in the worst case scenario; the loss of a submarine with all hands. The impacts of this can be gleaned from the early history of the naval submarine. Between 1917 and 1932, 16 from a fleet of 21 British K Class submarines were involved in major accidents resulting in the loss of eight boats and over 300 lives (Gray, 2003). While the pioneering nature of the design was certainly a factor, incidents of negligence, an unwillingness to change operational policies and lack of a proactive safety culture exacerbated the risks. The loss of a single submarine would be intolerable within the Australian context, and would certainly halt submarine operations on a long term basis.

Achieving high availability without compromising safety will depend on the degree to which risks are understood and tolerated. This requires confidence in the DS, the DI and the accuracy of design artefacts, in the processes which are being applied to perform repair, maintenance, update and upgrade actions, and in the tools which show that sustainment processes are functioning and effective. Provided that individual duty holders are skilled and experienced, this confidence will enable them to make the right decisions concerning platform safety. However, the wider sustainment enterprise must also empower these individuals to make the right decisions by providing supportive management frameworks, business processes and organisational culture. These enablers are discussed further in the following section.

6. THE SUSTAINMENT ENTERPRISE

6.1 FUNCTIONS AND ROLES

As described, there are many challenges to maintaining the design and DI through life. Neither are static, and the management of both is complex. A submarine sustainment enterprise is required which can meet these challenges, achieving a deep and accurate knowledge of the DI and applying this knowledge to ensure that submarines are available and safe. The shape of the sustainment enterprise itself may be complex requiring collaboration from Defence, Navy and industry across multiple departments and segments, and separated geographically as they are in Australia. However, there are a number of simple, common sustainment functions which must be delivered to maintain the DI. These are presented in Figure 4.

Figure 4 – Key Submarine Sustainment Functions

Engineering is broadly responsible for the sustainment of the DI and associated technical data including documents, drawings and databases, which allow the DS to be determined at any time. Engineering roles and responsibilities are multifaceted; data logging and reporting are fundamental activities which allow more complex analyses such as Availability, Reliability and Maintainability (ARM), Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM), Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) or Level of Repair Analysis (LORA) to be undertaken. Overall, Engineering has the responsibility to deliver the body of technical evidence necessary to enable sound safety based decisions to be made, and in turn support the role of the Design Authority (DA).

Production is responsible for delivering a platform in the physical condition necessary for safe operation, and to meet availability and capability targets. Production activities can be considered in three main categorises:

1. Repair: Unplanned corrective maintenance actions to rectify defects and improve the DS to the point where it is safe and capable for operation. This may be performed by ship’s staff while a boat is on operations or during Self Maintenance Periods (SMP). Typically repairs will also be carried out by the Production workforce across other maintenance periods;

2. Maintenance: Planned preventative maintenance actions conducted during each maintenance period with the aim of addressing defects, correcting material state and improving the overall performance of the submarine;

3. Capability Update/Upgrade: Actions to alter or improve the performance of the submarine which ultimately affect the DI. Due to the time required to implement these actions they are typically performed during major maintenance or overhaul periods such as Mid Cycle Dockings (MCD) or Full Cycle Dockings (FCD).

For each activity, it is essential that the associated design artefacts are updated accurately and in a timely manner. For example, concession and defect records must be managed, parts and materials drawn from the supply chain must be recorded, and any amendments to Engineering Change packages arising during installation must be fed back through the DA for approval.

Supply is responsible for sourcing, procuring, storing and delivering materials and spares for the ongoing sustainment of the submarine fleet. It is essential that sustainment activities are coordinated so that the right parts are delivered on time, otherwise there is a risk of maintenance overruns leading to loss of submarine availability. Obsolescence issues must also be properly identified and managed so that a lack of parts or materials does not compromise the DI.

Planning is required to ensure effective communication and coordination between Engineering, Production and Supply and to interface between these functions and the DA. Ultimately, Planning must be carried out against the Usage and Upkeep Cycle (UUC) for the fleet to ensure that availability targets are achieved.

The Design Authority (DA) has the responsibility to ensure that the submarine design is fit-for-purpose through life such that availability, capability and safety requirements are met. The DA is also responsible for making design decisions which affect the DS and DI. It is vital that there is a planned and coordinated relationship between the DA and Engineering, which flows down to Production and Supply functions, as these provide the interfaces through which the design can be influenced.

The submarine Operating Authority (OA) is the body responsible for the safety of the submarine fleet while on operations. The OA must also ensure that each submarine is operated in accordance with its operational rules so that the submarine safety case is adhered to. The OA will invariably be prioritised towards the successful completion of operational tasking, and this may create a positive tension with the DA who will tend to be focused on maintenance period activities which affect the submarine design. This tension must be managed by the submarine enterprise to ensure that an appropriate balance of submarine availability and capability results, without compromises to safety.

6.2 ENTERPRISE ENABLERS

In practice the structure of the sustainment enterprise will be complex; separated organisationally, geographically and by the many different roles and responsibilities required. Successful maintenance of the DI within this structure requires several key enablers to bridge these gaps.

Communication and Flow of Information: Achieving the deep knowledge of the design and the DI is essential, but this knowledge is only useful if it can be effectively communicated across the depth and breadth of the sustainment enterprise. A set of tools and processes is required to manage thousands of design artefacts through life, ensuring that updates and changes to these are applied in an accurate, timely and consistent manner and that the right information reaches the right people at the right time. The Coles review (Coles, Greenfield, & Fisher, 2012) has shown that a failure to achieve this will hinder the ability to make informed, consistent decisions, a factor which has contributed to the poor availability of the CCSM fleet.

Clear Lines of Responsibility: As a result of the need to coordinate design activities between Navy, Defence and Industry elements, the roles and responsibilities for each must be clearly articulated. There must be clarity as to who holds the deep understanding of the DI, who has the authority to make and approve design changes, and who can accept that these changes have been implemented correctly. Without this there may be duplications in effort, or worse, gaps which compromise submarine availability and safety.

Effective Leadership and Management: In any complex, detailed technical project, such as the maintenance of DI, there is an inherent risk of underestimating the level of effort required to achieve set outcomes, and exceeding time and cost budgets. Effective leadership and management, complemented by proper planning, are required to handle these risks and ensure that amongst the sustainment enterprise there is a performance driven culture focused on delivering submarine availability (a key tenet of the Coles Review) while maintaining safety. Strong leadership and management will enable cohesion and coordination of enterprise functions and ensure that where challenges arise they can be dealt with efficiently. This also provides individual duty holders the confidence, authority and autonomy to make the right decisions concerning the design.

Suitably Qualified and Experienced People: The success of the sustainment enterprise is underpinned by the ‘people’ element of the program; the SQEP who must successfully discharge their roles and responsibilities, many of which will be unique to the submarine industry. However, there is a global challenge in establishing workforce strategies which can deliver the right number of people with the right mix of skills to support the sustainment enterprise. In Australia this challenge has been captured by the Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan (Defence Materiel Organisation, 2013), the RAND 2011 report into Australia’s submarine design capabilities (RAND National Security Research Division, 2011) and the Skills Australia Defence Industry Workforce Strategy (Skills Australia, 2012). Fundamentally, the requirement for SQEP must be clearly articulated so that a suitable training and development pipeline can be developed, focused on a sustainable workforce which can maintain the DI over a typical 30 year submarine life-of-type.

7. CASE STUDIES

Maintaining the DI is a challenge for any sustainment organisation. In preparing for Australia’s FSM the challenges faced by other programs must be considered to ensure that similar emergent issues are managed effectively in future.

7.1 THE AIR WARFARE DESTROYER PROGRAM

The events of late 2014 concerning Australia’s Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) program highlight the importance of having the information necessary to establish the DI and understanding the DI as a basis for verifying design artefacts.

For any design, the detail design package and in particular the production drawings for arrangement and assembly, provide the basis by which DI is translated to a physical design. The audit of the AWD program (Australian National Audit Office, 2014) highlighted the difficulties of the Australian based design team in interpreting the Navantia supplied platform drawings; a fundamental inability to understand Navantia’s DI, confounded by a lack of access to supporting design artefacts and models. The announcement in late 2014 (Minister for

Defence, 2014) for an ‘increased’ Navantia role in the AWD project, comprising of a team of 11 experts (The Australian, 2014), represents an essential injection of designer expertise to improve the understanding of the DI.

These problems highlight the inherent difficulty in tailoring a design to meet Australian requirements. A successful transition to Australian ownership requires an increased level of effort to establish the DI and understand it at a technical, engineering level. While the arrangements for build and delivery of Australia’s future submarine capability may vary from the AWD Alliance model, similar risks exist for the future submarine program, regardless of whether handover of design information occurs pre or post build. If an untested offshore build and design modification program is adopted (RAND Corporation, 2015), this transition may pose new and unknown challenges for the management of DI information.

7.2 THE VICTORIA CLASS SUBMARINE

The Victoria Class has suffered a number of issues including operational incidents, significant defects, maintenance overruns, equipment obsolescence and intellectual property disputes. While there are multiple, complex causes for these issues, they are representative of the effects that can arise deep in service if confidence in the DI and control of the DS performance gap are lost.

A key to overcoming obsolescence issues is an effective design change process enabled by an in-depth understanding of the DI. A report into the Victoria class submarine program (Bush, 2005) suggests that, at least until 2005, efforts to re-establish the DI were being overtaken by the rate at which equipment was becoming obsolescent. The conversion of HMCS Victoria to fire Mk. 48 torpedoes over a 12-year period (Byers & Webb, 2013) also highlights the difficulties faced by the program in delivering capability upgrade functions. While these processes have been hampered by a range of complex and interlinked issues, they highlight how ‘chasing’ the DI through life can limit delivery of effective sustainment functions.

Repair and overhaul of the Victoria class has also suffered from a lack of platform technical data; the result of IP issues with UK based entities (Byers & Webb, 2013). Australia has had its own share of IP related problems with the CCSM, the resolution of which has not been straightforward. Avoiding these issues for the FSM program and our ability to sustain the submarines in-country will require the maximum possible design disclosure from the chosen design partner and a deep knowledge of the interfaces to any systems which are outside the IP boundary.

8. DESIGN INTENT AND THE AUSTRALIAN SCENARIO

Australia is currently advancing through an acquisition program which, by the end of 2015, should see a preferred design partner announced and details for the design, build and sustainment phases confirmed. While specific sustainment arrangements are currently unknown, the DMO highlight that, as an outcome of the 2009 white paper, the FSM will be maintained and sustained in Australia (Defence Materiel Organisation, 2012). On the assumption therefore that maximum possible use of in-country resources will be made, the acquisition of a larger, more complex and more capable submarine will pose new challenges for the maintenance of the DI. To enable proper planning and ensure we learn from past lessons, our ability to meet these challenges must be assessed.

8.1 A SINGLETON CLASS

As Derek Woolner observes (Woolner, 2001), despite many project successes the early sustainment of the CCSM was tumultuous. Defect repair actions caused delays to the build of HMAS RANKIN, and the McIntosh/Prescott review recommended that all sustainment activities be conducted in Western Australia. It is accepted that the sustainment enterprise was unprepared for the scope of the challenges it faced at the time and a statement from the ANAO 2008/09 audit stands out: ‘At the outset of this audit, Defence advised the ANAO that the Collins class was introduced into service without a validated strategy for through life support and without a good understanding of the real cost for support of the complex

submarine platform’ (Australian National Audit Office, 2009). The study also highlights that ad-hoc sustainment functions were delivered until 2003, and while the exact implications of this are unclear, a lack of clarity over the roles and responsibilities for maintaining the design and DI would have ensued. Many of these difficulties are attributed to Australia’s unfamiliar role as a parent navy with a unique design of its own to maintain. While many lessons have been learnt from the sustainment of CCSM over the past 20 years, we are again seeking to acquire a singleton submarine class, bespoke to our requirements, posing many of the same challenges anew.

Invariably, the submarine we acquire will be the product of an untested design partnership in matters of such classified, sensitive and complex nature. The submarine design will be unfamiliar as a result; designed around methodologies and doctrines we have not been exposed to, with systems and equipment that we have not previously supported, and supply chain elements we have not previously dealt with. Along with the requirements we will seek to impose, the resultant design will be only a distant relation to the baseline from which it has evolved and bear potentially limited commonality with the CCSM. This will challenge development of the deep understanding of the DI required for sustainment, which, as the CCSM has shown will be critical in the period during and immediately following the introduction of the FSM class.

8.2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

As described, sustainment of the FSM in-country revolves around the ability to achieve design disclosure, or at the very least to understand the interfaces which will enable us to deliver effective design upkeep, update and upgrade actions through life. However, experiences with the CCSM and Victoria class show that obtaining IP and design understanding is not simply achieved, nor is it ever likely to be considering the associated commercial and technical sensitivities. Further complicating the matter is the untested nature of the design partnership that will emerge with France, Germany or Japan, and the extent to which they will be willing to share their IP. This is directly linked to their involvement in the sustainment program, where greater involvement decreases the likelihood that Australian partners will be privy to design IP.

And if we are to obtain the level of disclosure we desire, we must be clear on who within the submarine enterprise will be responsible for understanding this information, and developing the deep knowledge that will be embedded as the cornerstone of the sustainment program. This will likely require a core element of the enterprise to be implanted within the design partners’ organisation during design and build phases so that a successful transfer of the requisite design knowledge can occur.

8.3 FLEET SIZE AND DISPLACEMENT

While there is uncertainty over the number of submarines Australia will seek to procure, designs of approximately 4000 tonnes are ‘about the size we might be interested in’ (Senate Economics References Committe, November 2014). Even for six submarines of this size it can be assumed that, compared to the CCSM, the number of maintenance significant items will increase and new systems and technologies will be incorporated to provide the capabilities we need. This will affect the amount and type of work required to maintain the DI, and additional technical skills, specialisations and knowledge will be required.

An increase in the number of submarines will certainly impact the maintenance of the design and DI, and this can be considered in terms of a theoretical UUC. The current CCSM UUC, based on a ‘10+2’ cycle with (ten years in-service followed by a two year Full Cycle Docking), involves no more than two submarines in extended maintenance at any time (one in FCD and one in MCD) so that international benchmark availability can be achieved. If the same availability target is set for a hypothetical FSM fleet of between eight and 12 submarines, this would result in between two and four submarines in extended maintenance at all times as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5 – Boats in Maintenance for a Theoretical 10+2 UUC and an FSM Fleet of Increasing Size

An increase in the size of the fleet could also lead to compression of the ‘drumbeat’ between successive deep maintenance periods for the fleet. This will place pressure on the timely delivery of upkeep, update and upgrade functions. In Figure 6, a representative 12 year segment from the theoretical UUC is shown which demonstrates this effect.

Figure 6 – Compression of a Theoretical 10+2 UUC over a 12 Year Period for an FSM Fleet of Increasing Size

In practice, the actual UUC will vary considerably from Figure 6 as influenced by the actual maintenance requirements for the platform, the availability of the infrastructure and resources to deliver maintenance functions, and the rate at which successive boats are introduced to service. However, an increase in boat displacement and fleet size will present unprecedented challenges for the sustainment of submarines in Australia and require the growth of the sustainment enterprise as a result.

8.4 MAINTAINING TWO DESIGNS IN PARALLEL

In order to avoid a capability gap as the CCSM reaches its end of service life, there will be a period of overlap with the introduction of the FSM fleet. This will effectively result in two designs to maintain, each with their own DI. The French, German and Japanese FSM design options under consideration may have little commonality with the CCSM, providing limited opportunities for synergy during the parallel maintenance of both classes. The sustainment methodologies and frameworks for each class will vary significantly, particularly their associated document sets and supply chains. This will create a peak demand for the submarine enterprise at a critical time when new sustainment arrangements are being implemented, and typical teething problems are resolved.

8.5 SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE SUSTAINMENT ENTERPRISE

The Coles review (Coles, Greenfield, & Fisher, 2012) has shown how communication, clear lines of responsibility and strong leadership are critical for the delivery of effective submarine

sustainment. These recommendations have been embodied by the current sustainment enterprise to improve the availability of the CCSM. However, the shape of the enterprise will change over the 13 years until the anticipated introduction of the FSM first of class (Senate Economics References Committe, November 2014). The enterprise change is already in progress, as evidenced by the planned restructure of DMO and their call for a workforce strategy (Department of Defence, 2015) and the Navy blueprint for restructure of the Naval Engineering function in response to Rizzo review (Department of Defence, 2013). The interfaces between Defence and Industry are also subject to change, influenced by Defence’s ongoing challenge to develop and retain submarine technical SQEP, and the incremental transfer of this knowledge to industry. In the UK and Canada, this has led to the establishment of the Submarine Support Management Group (SSMG) and Canadian Submarine Management Group (CSMG) respectively (Morris, 2012). Australia’s unique geography has also challenged the ability to collocate and coordinate the sustainment enterprise, a challenge which will grow with an increased fleet size and the possibility of a fleet base on the east coast of Australia as outlined in the Defence Force Posture Review (Department of Defence, 2012).

8.6 SUITABLY QUALIFIED AND EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL

A critical challenge will be meeting the demand for SQEP necessary to support the submarine enterprise. A number of studies have been conducted over the last five years (RAND National Security Research Division, 2011), (Skills Australia, 2012), (Defence Materiel Organisation, 2013) investigating the current state and future demands for the submarine workforce in Australia. However, these have focused on design and build, and carry the assumption that these activities will develop the workforce necessary to fill sustainment roles. The extent to which the submarines are built in Australia will challenge this assumption and influence the ability to successfully execute the transfer of design knowledge into the enterprise.

In any case, a sustainment workforce is required which in itself is sustainable over the life of the FSM class, and addresses the challenges associated with development of, in the interests of a sovereign capability, a primarily Australian workforce. The first step in this process will be to effectively quantify the requirements for this workforce in terms of the required skills, experience and overall numbers; an area that has not been addressed by the reviews completed to date. Workforce demands must also be considered against other competing sustainment programs and the planned procurement of up to 50 new navy platforms over the next two decades (RAND Corporation, 2015).

9. CONCLUSION

The CCSM program has demonstrated the inherent challenges in sustaining a submarine through life. Significant efforts are required to achieve a deep understanding of the DI and the DS, and to manage the gap between the two which inevitably evolves on a day-to-day basis. A failure to deliver these efforts and control the gap will ultimately compromise the delivery of platform availability and safety.

A sustainment enterprise is required which can manage the scale and scope of these challenges and deliver an availability driven, safety focused culture. This can only be achieved if effective tools and processes, clear lines of responsibility, and strong leadership and management are in place. Delivering safety is also reliant on the availability of submarine

SQEP who can make the right decisions affecting the design, and who are empowered by the enterprise to do so.

In Australia, the FSM project to date has been understandably prioritised around the design and build of a submarine to meet our requirements. But this is only the first step in what will be Australia’s most substantial defence sustainment program to date. It is inevitable that the acquisition of larger, more complex and more capable submarines will demand the growth and evolution of the submarine enterprise; new infrastructure, larger workforce and improved processes. We must question our preparation to meet these challenges and to control the DS-DI gap in the future.

Clearly there is a need to avoid a scenario of ad-hoc and unprepared sustainment that was applied early in the life of the CCSM. But we must also build on the recent positive changes to the enterprise which have led to the improved availability of the CCSM fleet. None of the challenges in maintaining DI are particularly new, only increased in scale by the size of the FSM program. Fortunately, there is still time to plan and ensure that our acquisition efforts are not squandered, and we deliver an available and safe FSM fleet.

10. REFERENCES

1. Australian National Audit Office. (2009). Audit Report No. 23 2008-09, Management of the Collins-class Operations Sustainment. Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia.

2. Australian National Audit Office. (2014). Audit Report No.22 2013–14, Air Warfare Destroyer Program. Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia.

3. Bush, R. E. (2005). The Victoria-class Submarine Program. Canadian Naval Review, Volume 1, Number 2.

4. Byers, M., & Webb, S. (2013). That Sinking Feeling; Canada’s Submarine Program Springs a Leak. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.

5. Coles, J., Greenfield, P., & Fisher, A. (2012). Study Into the Business of Sustaining Australia's Strategic Collins Class Submarine Capability. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

6. Defence Materiel Organisation. (2012). Future Submarine Program. Retrieved June 2015, from http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/AboutDMO/OurStructure/GMSubmarines/FutureSubmarineProgram/Default.aspx

7. Defence Materiel Organisation. (2013). Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan; A Plan for the Naval Shipbuilding Industry. Canberra: Defence Materiel Organisation.

8. Department of Defence. (2003, February 17). Media Room: Media Releases, HMAS Dechaineux Incident. Retrieved April 2015, from Australian Government Department of Defence: http://www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl.cfm?CurrentId=2348

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11. Department of Defence. (2013). Naval Engineering Future State Blueprint. Canberra, ACT: Department of Defence.

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13. Gray, E. (2003). Disasters of the Deep, A Comprehensive Survey of Submarine Accidents and Disasters (3rd Edition ed.). Leo Cooper.

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20. Skills Australia. (2012). Defence Industry Workforce Strategy, Discussion Paper. Canberrra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia.

21. The Australian. (2014, December 9). Rescue plan for AWD project. The Australian. 22. Woolner, D. (2001, September). Lessons of the Collins Submarine Program for

Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement. Retrieved 06 2015, from: http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp0102/02RP03

11. AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Jonathan Woodman is a Senior Mechanical Engineer with over six years’ experience in submarine engineering and sustainment projects across three continents. Between May 2010 and October 2011, Jonathan undertook a placement at BMT Fleet Technology Limited in Ottawa, Canada where he acted in the role of mechanical/project engineer on sustainment tasks for the Victoria Class submarine. On return to BMT Design & Technology in Melbourne, Jonathan led the development and delivery of BMT’s Submarine Design and Engineering course, and in 2014 was a member of the Phase 4 review team for 'The Study Into the Business of Sustaining Australia’s Strategic Collins Class Submarine Capability' (the Coles Review). In July 2014, Jonathan commenced a placement at BMT Defence Services Limited in Bath, UK, working as a Senior Engineer on submarine sustainment tasks for UK and international programs. 2014 also saw Jonathan complete the Submarine Design Course at University College London.