SISA  Report  no.  3  -­‐  2013    

       

Madrassa  Education  in  Pakistan:  Controversies,  Challenges  and  Prospects  

             

Dr.  Syed  Manzar  Abbas  Zaidi  4  March  2013  

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 Madrassa  Education  in  Pakistan:  

Controversies,  Challenges  and  Prospects  

   

Dr.  Syed  Manzar  Abbas  Zaidi  

 

 

 

Centre  for  International  and  Strategic  Analysis  ©  SISA  2013    All  views  expressed  in  the  report  are  those  of  the  author  and  do  not  necessarily  represent  the  views  of  Centre  for  International  and  Strategic  Analysis.  The  text  may  not  be  printed  in  full  or  part  without  the  permission  of  the  author.      Queries  can  be  directed  to:  Centre  for  International  and  Strategic  Analysis  Phone:  (+47)  932  49  083  E-­‐mail:  info@strategiskanalyse.no  Internet:  www.strategiskanalyse.no  

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Content  

Introduction  ..........................................................................................................................................................  4 Classification  of  madrassas  .......................................................................................................................  5

The  purpose  of  the  study  ................................................................................................................................  7 The  current  debate  ............................................................................................................................................  8 Madrassa  controversies  .............................................................................................................................  8 Madrassa  challenges  ....................................................................................................................................  9

Causes  and  concerns  .......................................................................................................................................  10 The  role  of  madaaris  in  terrorism  ........................................................................................................  10 Madaaris  and  militancy  ............................................................................................................................  12 Madaaris  and  violent  sectarianism  ......................................................................................................  14 Radicalization  in  madrassas  ...................................................................................................................  15 Madaaris  and  politics  .................................................................................................................................  16

Reforming  madrassas:  success  and  failure  ...........................................................................................  17 Registered  and  ghost  madaaris  ..................................................................................................................  18 Madrassa  reforms  and  the  state  ...........................................................................................................  19 Foreign  students  at  the  madaaris  ....................................................................................................  21 Foreign  funding  .......................................................................................................................................  22

Current  debate  on  madaaris  reforms  ......................................................................................................  23 Potential  to  adapt  to  the  modern  world  .................................................................................................  24 A  deeper  look  at  the  madrassa  system  ...................................................................................................  25 Relationship  between  the  madrassa  and  society  ..........................................................................  25

Madrassa  curriculum:  a  case  of  misinterpretation?  ..........................................................................  26 The  madrassa  myth  .........................................................................................................................................  28 Conclusions  .........................................................................................................................................................  29 Policy  recommendations  ..............................................................................................................................  30

For  the  Government  of  Pakistan:  .....................................................................................................  30 For  the  madrassa  administrations  ..................................................................................................  32 For  civil  society  ........................................................................................................................................  32

Bibliography  and  sources  .............................................................................................................................  33 Notes  and  references  ......................................................................................................................................  34    

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Introduction  The importance of education in a society cannot be disowned. A well-established education system is an important constituent of a civilized nation and society. Its importance is well evident in developed countries as it plays a major role in personal and social development. As an alternate track to Western style of education, religious seminaries – madaaris1 and religious education have played a vital role in the history of Islam to fulfil the education needs of Is-lamic society. Despite the madaaris constituting an indigenous system of education in Paki-stan, the madrassa sector of the country has been at the center of debates on extremism and radicalization of society since Pakistan joined the US-led war on terror after 9/11. The madaaris are perceived as a crucial medium for promoting extreme religious, sectarian, social and political views which lead towards militancy. Meanwhile it has been highlighted time and again that there is a need to reform the madaaris to transform the radical ideologies with real Islamic moderate values, and provide an applied-education mode where madaaris students become useful members of the society.

Notwithstanding their notoriety in the West, madaaris in Pakistan are considered as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that provide free education, boarding, and lodging to their students, and help to ‘educate’ the poverty struck in society. The institutions follow a structured curriculum of Islamic subjects designed to prepare its graduates for positions as Islamic clergy. Therefore, religious education is reckoned as a part of the education system in the country. There are three parallel streams in education – public schools, private schools, and Islamic religious schools, and ‘madrassas’ or ‘madaaris’ (both plurals are lexically used) which exist in Pakistan. Being Muslims, many in Pakistan want Islamic education, and not an unsubstantial number of parents seek both religious and secular components in education. Hence public and private schools both embrace Islamic studies as a subject beside other sub-jects in the curriculum, while madaaris offer purely religious education for the students who have ambitions to specialize in religious education. In these circumstances, even if madaaris are criticized by a segment of society, many amongst the masses continue to support them.

The madrassa institution came into the limelight in the aftermath of 9/11. Thousands of news-paper articles, research papers and essays published across the world have discussed the role of the institution in promoting violence and militancy. International Crisis Group (ICG) re-ports, “Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military” July 2002 and “The State of Sectari-anism in Pakistan” April 2005, explain the role of madrassas in Afghan war during Zia re-gime and their role in promoting sectarian violence in the country. Amir Rana’s book “Gate-way to Terrorism” 2003, maps out a list of the madaaris that have links with jihadi and sec-tarian organization in Pakistan. “Pakistani Madrassas – A Balanced View” by Dr Saleem H Ali (published in 2005) states that there were 363 madrassas in tehsil Ahmadpur in South Punjab and a majority of them were involved in sectarian violence. Whereas some other re-

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ports focused on the role the madrassa plays in threatening international security, the 9/11 Commission report released in 2004 said some of Pakistan's religious schools or madrassas served as “incubators for violent extremism” in the world. The thesis “Pakistan, Madrassas, and Militancy” by Daniel L. Billquist and Jason M. Colbert, December 2006, argues that the best path for combating religious militancy in madrassas is by helping to create better alterna-tives to madrassa education, including state run and private schools, and not by targeting madrassas directly. However, many revisionists’ researches have demonstrated that in fact madaaris are not to be condemned as dens for suicide bombers, as they do not necessary hail from the madrassas but mainstream institutions. Peter Bergen & Swati Pandey, “The Madras-sa Scapegoat”, 2006, examined 79 terrorists responsible for five of the worst anti-Western terrorist attacks, and found that only in rare cases were madrassa graduates involved. Some experts have also challenged assumptions of these schools as major militant hubs. In “The Madrassa Challenge”, 2008, Christine C. Fair explores the significance of the madrassa and its role in Pakistan’s educational system. Numerous Pakistani writers have also discussed the madrassa education and system in Pakistan. Muhammad Qasim Zaman’s book “Religious Education and the Rhetoric of Reform: The Madrassa in British India and Pakistan,” Compar-ative Studies in Society and History, April 1999, and the book “Deeni Madaris-Tabdeeli Kay Rujhanat” By Khalid Rahman, a comprehensive piece of work in Urdu on the trends of changes taking place in Religious Education Institutions (REIs) of Pakistan, are highly rele-vant researches for all those who want to understand the system, educational process and the influence of these institutions in Pakistan's society.

The review of existing literature on the subject usually portrays a rather slanted picture inas-much the arguments in favor of madrassa or against it put forward one-sided narratives. On the other hand the balanced views towards the madrassa institution have ignored some as-pects, and failed to draw an appropriate conclusion. Therefore, the question arises that if the madrassas are not involved in acts of militancy then why is the issue of madrassa reforms so important in Pakistan, and if the madrassas are involved in militancy and terrorism then why is the Pakistani government reluctant to take action against them? The gaps of communication and lack of knowledge are obstacles to understanding this dilemma of comprehension. This report not only analyses the key issues of the madrassa system in the present time, but also explores ways to bridge gaps between religious and mainstream education in the country, be-sides recommendations to settle some of the controversies with regard to madrassa system.

Classification  of  madrassas    In Pakistan, the madaaris are based on sect, and every sect has its own madrassa network that is controlled by a board or Wafaq. Every board has its own system of education and they hold annual exams and distribute certificates among students. There are five madrassa boards or

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wafaqs in Pakistan, and they are also members of Ittehad Tanzeemat Madaaris Deenia (ITMD), an umbrella organization of madaaris, which was established in 2003. They are;

1. Wafaq ul-Madaaris al-Arabia (Deobandi) 2. Tanzeem ul-Madaaris (Barelvi) 3. Wafaq ul-Madaaris al-Salafia.(Ahl-e-Hadith) 4. Wafaq ul-Madaaris al-Shia (Shia) 5. Rabita ul-Madaaris al-Islamia (Jama’at-e-Islami)

Among the five above-mentioned boards, four of them are classified on the basis of sects; Deobandi, Barelvi, Shia or Ahl-e-Hadith, and a fifth board that is affiliated to Jama’at-e-Islami does not adhere to any specific sect. There are two primary sects in Pakistan, the Sun-nis and Shias. The Shias makes up about 15% of the Pakistani Muslims. The Pakistani Sunnis are followers of the Hanafi school of thought. Among the Sunnis, the majority are Barelvi, a generally moderate group who seek to be inclusive of local rituals and customs. The Deoban-di school of thought (originating in the Indian town of Deoband, near Delhi), seek to purify Islam by rejecting “un-Islamic” accretions to the faith from culture and custom. The Ahl-e-Hadith (followers of the way of the Prophet) have a similar emphasis on “purifying” the faith, but they do not follow any fiqh (religious jurisprudence), as opposed to the Hanafi fiqh. The details of the abovementioned boards with particular reference to their sect are as follows:

Wafaq  ul-­‐Madaaris  al-­‐Arabia  (Deobandi)  Although within the Sunni sect, Barelvis are greater in number, Deobandis have more reli-gious seminaries in Pakistan because they are more organized in the realm of religious activ-ism.2 The registered number of Deobandi madaaris is about 16,800 affiliated with Wafaq ul- Madaaris al-Arabia. Hifz3, tajweed4 and dars-e-nizami5 madaaris are also included in the total number. Jamia Ashrafia Lahore and Dar ul-Uloom Korangi Karachi are distinguished within Deobandi madrassas because they are operating independently, and their degrees and certifi-cates were approved by the government during the Zia ul-Haq regime. However, their stu-dents also appear in the exam board of Wafaq ul-Madaaris al-Arabia.

Tanzeem  ul-­‐Madaaris  (Barelvis)  The total number of registered madrassas affiliated with Tanzeem ul-Madaaris is about 8,000, which is less than half of the total number of Deobandi madaaris. The Barelvi sect follows the creed of Sufism that prevailed in the sub-continent. Within the network of Barelvi madrassas, Dar ul-Uloom Muhammadia Ghosia Bhera, district Sargodha, Punjab which has more than four hundred branches, and Minhaj ul-Quran, which has schools and colleges equipped with modern education, make a distinction as they are not affiliated with Tanzeem ul-Madaaris and have separate education and examination systems.

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Wafaq  ul-­‐Madaaris  al-­‐Salafia.  (Ahl-­‐e-­‐Hadith)  The other Sunni group is the Ahl-e-Hadith, a small minority, which holds 1,400 registered madaaris affiliated with Wafaq ul-Madaaris al-Salafia in Pakistan. The Pakistanis often refer to this group as the Wahhabis and/or Salafis, as their teachings are close to that of Abdul Wahhab. They completely reject all schools of thoughts including the Hanafi. The madaaris of the controversial Jama’at ud-Dawa6 are also registered in Wafaq ul-Madaaris al-Salafia. Jamia Salafia Faisalabad, founded by Hakeem Abdur Raheem Ashraf is the only madrassa within the Salafi school of thought which is independent with regards to examinations, and distributes degrees with the approval of the government.

Wafaq  ul-­‐Madaaris  al-­‐Shia  (Shia)  Although Shias are in minority in Pakistan, they have a considerable number of Madaaris; about 413 madaaris are registered under Wafaq ul-Madaaris al-Shia. There is no distinct sem-inary in the Shia sect of Pakistan that has authority to issue a degree or hold examinations independently.

Rabita ul-Madaaris al-Islamia (Jama’at-e-Islami)

The Jama’at-e-Islami, founded by the prominent Islamic thinker Ab’ul ala Mawdudi, is a re-vivalist and religio-political movement that considers itself as the “vanguard” of the Islamic revolution in Pakistan. It has an independent orientation, with no affiliation to any sect. There are about 1,000 registered madaaris affiliated with Jama’at-e-Islami’s madrassa network Rab-ita ul Madaaris.

The  purpose  of  the  study  Literature reviews reveal that most of the authors have focused on one or two particular issues relating to madrassas. Though there are some works which explain the system of madaaris in detail, they do not discuss prevailing problems and challenges faced by them. Efforts are un-derway on national and international levels to address the issues of madrassas, but the prob-lem still persists. Analysis based on essentialist assumptions and hypothesis, outdated knowledge, and misconceptions have further complicated the subject. In Pakistan, the madaaris are considered as an important source of knowledge where more than two million students are getting education. It is the responsibility of the state and society to understand the system of madrassa education, and to make efforts for its improvement keeping in mind the need of the hour.

Importantly, madaaris are being discussed internationally in line of their role with regard to sectarian violence and militancy and the worsened security landscape of the country. In such circumstances, the government and madrassa administration need to jointly take steps in order

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to improve their status and credibility within the international community, by actively ad-dressing challenges faced by the madrassas.

Negotiations between the government and the madrassa boards have been in progress for many years, but desired result have not been achieved so far. The main question, the role of madaaris in terrorism and militancy, remains unanswered in the context of Pakistan. What is the role of madrassas in volatile situations of the country? What are the developments in the dialogue process between the government and the madrassas on the issue of reforms and chal-lenges, and what are the major obstacles in this regard? How is the government treating madrassas with regard to reform, and what is their response? What is the reaction of madaaris in the background of leveled allegations against them? So far research have not been able to address the abovementioned questions; nevertheless, there is dire need of such a study that will analyze these issues related to madrassas, and prepare practical recommendations that lead towards solutions.

This research will examine the status of religious education and its importance with reference to madrassas in Pakistan. The study is aimed at the current debate to analyze causes, concerns, and challenges faced by the madrassas. Progress in madrassa reforms will also be discussed in the paper and hurdles to this elaborated upon. Based on interviews with madrassa and gov-ernment authorities, recommendations will be presented at the end. This study will not only serve to help out the government policy institutes and security establishment, but will also add information on the subject in academic discourse and serve as inputs for international policy-makers.

The  current  debate  Madaaris are being discussed and criticized widely as they are facing many challenges. There are three types of opinion dominant in the current debate on madaaris. Firstly there are sup-porters or blind followers of madaaris; secondly, there are elements which are anti-madaaris, and lastly, there are neutral observers. The entire debate is revolving around madrassas con-troversies and challenges. Initially, controversies and challenges faced by madaaris will be narrated, and then the related issues will be analyzed.

 Madrassa  controversies  • Following the incidents of 9/11, madaaris have been discussed as being breeding grounds

for extremism and militancy, and they are often said to be linked with terrorism directly or indirectly, whereas the administration of seminaries vehemently denies this. The percep-tion exists that terrorists in disguise take refuge in madaaris due to their sympathizers. If law enforcement agencies launch raid on madaaris, it is considered a violation against

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their independence. In such circumstances, how should this issue be tackled by the madaaris and the law enforcement agencies?

• In Pakistan, madaaris are established on the basis of sect, and they educate according to their belief systems. Therefore, the establishment of sectarian organizations and involve-ment or participation of madrassa students in sectarian violence is a major apprehension.

• Madaaris have played important role in jihad, and its education is obligatory in madaaris. The issue arises that without permission of the government, is participation of seminary students in jihad is permitted or not? Amidst such a situation, establishment of jihadi out-fits and their networks in madaaris is alarming for law and order of the country.

• Establishing offices of religio-political parties in madaaris is also a major concern by var-ious sectors. The role of madaaris in politics is also criticized.

• Meanwhile, it is perceived that madrassas have their own semblance of government in their areas and no one is allowed to intervene, thus, people raise questions about the writ of the state.

Madrassa  challenges    • Registration of madaaris is a major problem which is debated across the board. The exact

figure of madaaris is not clearly identified. Only those madaaris which are registered with one of the five abovementioned wafaqs or boards can be numbered. It is believed that a large number of madaaris are operating without any formal affiliation and registration.

• Madrassa curriculum is under heated debate inside the madaris and beyond. According to one school of thought, madrassa curriculum does not address the modern requirement of the present era. Many observers believe that some subjects being taught in madaaris fos-ters provocation, leading students to extremism and militancy.

• Since the Musharraf era (1999-2008), the issue of madaaris reforms has been negotiated between the government and the administrations of wafaqs or boards. It is not clear what development has been made so far. What are the demands of the madaaris and which of them have been accepted by the government? What is the stance of the government in this regard?

• Fund raising is also a major issue. Some analysts believe that madaaris take funds from foreign countries to promote their agendas. It is considered that madaaris are being used as platforms for exerting influence of their favored sect/-s by foreign countries.

• Education of foreign students is an important topic of debate between the government and the madaaris. Modalities of education of foreign students in Pakistani madaaris are yet to be resolved.

• Madaaris are major societal institutions. They have ardent followers, and thus they can play vital roles for reforms of society, but they do not pay much attention to the society besides influencing religion. It remains to be seen how madaaris can play a positive role for promoting peace and harmony in the society.      

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Causes  and  concerns    Academia, media and concerned institutions have discussed in detail their apprehensions re-garding madaaris that surfaced after 9/11. They tried to explore causes that show madaaris have links with terrorism and militancy, sometimes with minimalist essentialist reductionism. There are also some more nuanced studies; in this study, efforts will make to explore causes and concerns in the Pakistani context.

The  role  of  madaaris  in  terrorism  Two aspects of terrorism, transnational and homegrown terrorism, are vital to discuss regard-ing the role of madaaris in the existing debate. According to Western experts, transnational Islamic terrorism, also known as ‘Global Jihad’, is defined as attacks against the United States at home and its installations abroad, as well as its allies in order to take revenge. On the con-trary, one school of thought in Pakistan considers U.S. attacks on Muslim states as transna-tional terrorism. Clearly, there are widely differing viewpoints vying at crossroads. On the other hand Pakistani policymakers believe that few elements of madaaris are involved in transnational terrorism. However, it is difficult to prove that madaaris are involved in transna-tional terrorism due to insufficient data. No evidence has been uncovered to link any of the 9/11 attackers or the 7/7 London subway bombers to madrassas, or even any formal Islamic education. A study by Marc Sageman, “Understanding Terror Networks, Princeton University Press, 2004” revealed that less than 9 per cent of the known al-Qaeda terrorists attended a madrassa. It may be noted here that most al-Qaeda cadres involved in global jihad have re-ceived advanced secular education from local institutions and sometimes from the West. Looking into the educational background of jihadists, Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey in the study “The Madrassa Scapegoat”, 2006, argue that there was a much stronger correlation between exposure to higher secular education, especially in non-Muslim countries, and in-volvement in global jihadist activities, rather than madrassa education. The study also reveals that there is little evidence to connect madrassas to transnational terrorism, and that they are not a direct threat to the United States.

On part of transnational terrorism, there have also been concerns that students of madrassas in Pakistan are taking part in jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Actual data or facts are yet to be explored. Nonetheless, Pakistani madrassas do have ties to domestic and regional violence, particularly the Sunni-Shia sectarian violence and homegrown terrorism orchestrated by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its affiliated local groups. Security officials claim that a majority of non-registered madrassas in the tribal areas, and a few from the settled areas provide facilities for recruitment of terrorists. Many Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith jihadi outfits sent their madrassa students in Afghanistan and Kashmir to take part in jihad. After imposi-tion of bans during Musharraf’s era, a number of splinter groups emerged from the main-stream; those are now involved in homegrown terrorism within Pakistan. Investigation reports

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revealed that after the Lal Mosque operation in 2007, for instance, students of Jamia Fareedia and Lal Masjid established the ‘Ghazi Force’ to prepare suicide bombers to take revenge on the government by launching attacks in Islamabad. The force took youngsters from Islamabad to the tribal areas to train them as suicide bombers. Another group, Esmatullah Moavia, a splinter group of Jaish-e-Muhammad, a Kashmir focused Jihadi group, is affiliated with TTP and also recruits from madrassas.

Security experts say some madrassas are providing sanctuaries to militants, especially those seminaries who have links with banned militant organizations. Terrorism suspects have re-portedly taken refuge in mosques and madrassas before conducting attacks. On information given by agencies, the government has launched several crackdowns on some madrassas in different areas of the country to arrest terrorists hiding there in the guise of being students. In one such raid in July 2009, a terrorist was killed while two others were arrested, along with a truck load of lethal weapons from religious school, Jamia Usmania in Dera Ghazi Khan, run by Riaz Kamboh. He was using the Madrassa as a cover for organizing a terrorist cell. Securi-ty officials confirmed that some of the arrested terrorists declared their affiliation with madaaris.

In response to allegations that madaaris are involved in terrorism, all wafaqs are in agreement on the stance that propaganda against them is based on political reasons, and no madrassa is involved in terrorism. Qari Hanif Jallandhary, in an interview, supported the argument by saying that when the Soviet Union had occupied Afghanistan, the rest of the world including the U.S. and the Arab World fought against it. At that time, many people who were students of madaaris had participated in the war against the Soviet Union. After that, according to Jallandhary, the Western world realized that if these people could destroy the Soviet Union, they were a potent potential future threat. For protection of their own states, Western coun-tries started a propaganda campaign against Islam and madaaris to weaken their power.7 As regards to direct involvement of madaris in terrorism, Dr Raghib Naeemi remarked that if any institution was involved, the government should have made it public.8

The wafaqs view police and law enforcement raids on madaris as a violation of their inde-pendence. Therefore, all the wafaqs agree that in such circumstances, if any madrassa is in-volved in terrorism, the government should inform the wafaq to whom the madrassa is affili-ated with. The wafaqs vow to disown such an institution by cancelling its registration. How-ever, they differ on responses to the situation when law enforcement agencies take action on the information of suspects hiding in the seminary. Wafaq ul-Madaris Al-Arabia is of the view that nobody can identify terrorists. If a person visits any madrassa and stays there as a guest of a student or a colleague, it is difficult for the administration to identify his intention. According to interviewees, even a host may not know the true intention of his guest. Thus, the

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concerned madrassa is not responsible for such actions, and this should be considered that person’s personal and individual action. Wafaq ul-Madaris Al-Arabia is of the view that the government has the authority to take action if it has concrete evidence about involvement of the madrassa. They state that they are not sympathizers of any madrassa that is involved in nefarious activities, but they suggest courses of action when breaching privacy of a madrassa. First the government should contact the organizer/-s of the madrassa, and inform them about the suspects, sending a small rapid response force rather than a full out assault force. Use of excessive force damages the credibility of the madrassa and reportedly creates chaos in the society.9 Tanzeem ul-madaaris has a different opinion, saying that the security agencies should be completely authorized to arrest any suspects hiding in madaaris. According to them, such steps secure the credibility of madaris, and detractors of police raids on madaris must have skeletons in their closet.10

This debate reflects that the administrations of madaaris do not rule out the presence of mili-tants, but disagree on the approaches that the government may take against terrorist suspects seeking refuge in a madrassa.

Madaaris  and  militancy    Following 9/11, there has been a debate to differentiate jihad, terrorism, violence and militan-cy, which attracts a lot of attention particularly in conservative Muslim circles in Pakistan. Many in these circles argue that if earlier, the struggle of seminary students in Afghanistan and Kashmir was deemed as jihad, why are these terms now being defined according to ‘vest-ed interests’. It is not the purpose of this report to go into details of the semantic debate that still rages on, but to stress upon the fact that the perception as above is a common theme amongst madrassa students and administration, as well as many common people in Pakistan. From the vantage point of history, madrassas’ involvement in propagating militancy is diver-sified. It seems that madrassas have a strong tendency to focus on local and regional issues, while playing a vital role in the Afghanistan war and Kashmir conflict. Initially, madrassas got involved in militancy during the Soviet-Afghan war, when some (but by no means all) madrassas were used to educate and recruit the mujahideen to fight the Soviets. At that time, new madrassas sprouted, funded and supported by Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Central Intelli-gence Agency, where students were encouraged to join the Afghan resistance.

Secondly, since the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s, many of their regime leaders and officials graduated from Pakistani madaaris. One of the most famous relationships was between the Taliban and the Haqqania Madrassa located in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), in the town of Akora Khattak, because Mullah Omar and his colleagues were reported to have attended classes there. Similarly, madrassas were established in refugee camps to impart reli-gious education to the Afghans as well as training for jihad. Subsequently, different jihadi

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organizations were used to wage jihad against Indian forces in Kashmir – a bone of conten-tion between India and Pakistan since independence. The role of madrassas in the breeding of jihadi outfits has ever since been hotly debated. According to a research, about 200 Deobandi, 77 Ahl-e-Hadith, and 23 Barelvi madrassas were affiliated with jihadi organizations or sup-porting jihadi outfits in Pakistan. Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), one of the largest and most active jihadist group involved in Jammu and Kashmir, was established in 1993 as the military arm of the prominent Markaz-ud-Daawa-Wal-Irshad, a madrassa located in Muridkee, Punjab.11 An-other report stated that about 18 per cent of the madaris were affiliated with sectarian or jihadi outfits such as Sipah-e-Sahaba, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.12

Some experts have also challenged the role of madaaris in militancy. Christine Fair writes in her book “The Madrassah Challenge”, that the madrassa market share has remained stable or even declined somewhat since 1991. She cites studies which disagree about direct ties be-tween madrassas and militancy. However, she admits even if few militants come from madrassas, they are still a matter of concern, as they possibly produce students who are more likely than students in mainstream schools to support militancy. A Brookings Institution re-port says that while religious schools are often cited as a cause of extremism, they “appear not to be a major risk factor”. The report mentions that fewer than 10 per cent of Pakistani stu-dents attend madrassas.13 These given arguments explain that madrassas feature prominently in the discourse on Islamic extremism and militancy. Although, madaaris reject links with militancy, whereas on the issue of jihad, they do recognize that some madrassas have affilia-tions with jihadi outfits and groups. With regard to the education of jihad, the madaaris unan-imously agree that the education of jihad is obligatory in Islam and they will continue it. They argue that western powers want to eliminate education about jihad because they feel threatened by Muslims and jihad. However, they are generally not in favor of practically sending madrassa students for jihad. Maulana Yaseen Zafar, from Wafaq ul-madaaris al-Salafia says, “Madaaris should not be tool of any political party or jihadi organization. Self decision to wage jihad is not an appropriate option; it can take the country to civil war.”14 Maulana Raghib Naeemi, vice president Tanzeem ul-Madaaris, says, “If madaaris’ students have to wage jihad, there should be no need of half million soldiers in the army. Now such madaaris, those (which) were trained for jihad, are in power and have severe anti-government stances.”

Maulana Abdul Malik, President Rabita ul-Madaaris, says, “There is neither (any) jihadi out-fit in any madaaris nor do its students participate in jihad. It is a game of the government and the establishment to wage proxy jihad against India. On failure of the plan, the government is taking action against its own trained people and seminaries.”15 Qari Hanif Jallandhary from Wafaq ul-Madaaris Al-Arabia states, “It should be the responsibility of the Council of Islamic Ideology to deal with the issue of jihad and participation of students in it. The council should

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focus whether permission of the government is necessary for jihad or not. Is the government fulfilling [its] requirements or not? In my opinion, madaaris should focus on education and students should not take part in any kind of militant activities. However, after attainment of degrees, they are free to do whatever they want to do”.16 According to Shia scholars, jihad is an obligation if decreed by an Imam or for the defense of the country; otherwise, it is consid-ered (unlawful) violence.17

Madaaris  and  violent  sectarianism    Another form of militancy in Pakistan is known as sectarian violence. Research finds a close link between religious seminaries and sectarian violence. As mentioned above, madaaris are divided on sectarian bases, thus the divisions show that every sect is preserving and propagat-ing their respective interpretation of the correct form of Islam, referred to as its maslak or Islamic creed.

Besides the apparent divisions between Sunni and Shia madaris, there are a number of varia-tions among madaaris of Sunni sub-sects as well. It is difficult to comprehend Sunni madras-sas without segregating them by affiliations due to sub sects, due to their fundamental differ-ences. Since differences of madaaris on the basis of sects have become solidly entrenched, it is difficult to establish a universal model of the madaris in Pakistan. Madrassas not only spread a certain brand of sectarian identity among its students but also spread it in society, to the families and extended families of these students. This division of sect binds society and students to follow their ideology, and do not allow pupils and society to look at alternative perspectives within the religious discourse. Some madrassas that label themselves as universi-ties may discuss the teachings and jurisprudence of all sects. However, this is not done to promote religious pluralism, but to reject the teachings of other sects and show that their own school of Islamic thought is better. Sectarian divisions among Muslims in the subcontinent are part and parcel of these divisions, and also to be blamed for the unprecedented increase in sectarian violence recently in Pakistan. Militancy in sectarian conflicts cannot be attributed solely to the teachings in the madrassas, though, of course, the propagation of divergent be-liefs does create the potential for negative bias against people of other beliefs. Establishment of sectarian outfits within sects is a major driver for propagation of sectarian hatred. Though madrassas disassociate themselves from sectarian or militant outfits, Deobandi madrassas continue to have well-established links with groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, whereas Shia madrassas have affiliations with violent sectarian organization like Sipah-e-Muhammad and Tehreek-e-Jaffria.

Sectarian violence is also alarming for madrassa authorities as it damages their cause and sys-tem of education. The principal of Jamia Khair ul-Madaaris Multan, Qari Hanif says, “It is my utmost desire that the system of madaaris should not be based on sects, but it is (a) reality

15    

that sects have a long history and their elimination is not possible. Differences of opinion will open new avenue of thinking. However, we should avoid dissemination of hatred among sects by following the adage of ‘do not leave your sect, do not disturb others.’ We are trying to bring all sects under the umbrella of Ittehad Tanzeemat Madaris in order to promote com-monalities, create consensus in the curriculum and system. Although it is beyond our limits to eliminate sectarian outfits, elders of each sect should talk with the leaders of the organization to put down the militancy.” Principal Jamia Salafia Faisalabad, Qari Yasin Zafar says, “[The] point of view of all sects is being taught in our madrassas whereas rests of [the] sects do not follow this precedent. On the basis of sect, establishment of militant organizations is not a right step.” An overwhelming majority of madaaris are against sectarian violence, and seem willing to overcome this menace. However, they are also not amenable to stop propagating their sect, even at the risk of exclusivity from religious harmony amongst sects in Pakistani society. Thus, the potential for polarized worldviews promulgated by these institutions sprout-ing seeds of sectarian violence is quite real.

Radicalization  in  madrassas    Perceptions prevail that madaaris are promoting extremism and radical views among their students and the people, but madaaris deem themselves custodians of Islam, and claim that they provide education that is based purely on Islamic injunctions. The process of radicaliza-tion, anyhow, can be seen in madaaris as well as in religious circles, espoused by international and domestic political actors who want to use religion to mobilize human resources of these madrassas for their own political objectives. In a historical perspective, during the Zia regime, the U.S. and its allies used the madaaris for recruitment of manpower to wage their proxy war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. By the time the Soviets pulled out from Afghanistan in 1989, many madrassas had matured in their militant worldview, and had gained promi-nence within Pakistani politics. These changes propelled madrassas from their historic role as centers of education to indoctrination centers of Islamic extremism.

There are various factors which can create extremist and radical tendencies among madrassa students. Existing biased political views, inclination and sense of superiority of specific sects, and intellectual curiosity towards jihad as a means to dominate the world are major factors that propagate extremist ideas among students. Even though the madaaris ostensibly claim to not be directly involved in radicalizing students, during education, madrassas create a mindset to make seminary students vulnerable to adopt footsteps of militants to join ‘the holy war’. Madaaris affiliated with jihadi outfits invite jihadi commanders to visit and approach students for recruitment by glorifying their experiences and cause. Moreover, leaders of sectarian out-fits motivate students against other sects through speeches and distribution of literature which leads to sectarian violence. Similarly, the anti-western political views can also instigate stu-dents to join global jihadi organizations or start agitation against their own government. Thus,

16    

even though madaris deny any direct involvement in the radicalization of Pakistani society by claiming that they are just imparting Islamic education, the particular brands of teaching are inextricable from the preconditions for radicalization.

Madaaris  and  politics  The role of madaaris in politics has been important ever since the inception of religious politi-cal parties in Pakistan. Religio-political parties have been present in Pakistan since pre-partition days of the sub-continent. There were a number of religious groups and smaller par-ties that supported the cause of Pakistan. Islamic scholar Ab’ul ala Mawdudi laid the founda-tion of Jama’at-i-Islami in 1941, as the Muslim political party focused on creating an Islamic government. After partition, Deobandis in Pakistan formed the Jami’at Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) whereas the Barelvi school of thought followed a similar line by establishing its political par-ty, Jami’at Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP). The Ahl-e-Hadith sect and the Shia also developed reli-gious political parties in the same manner. All the religious political parties have extended their network in madrassas of their respective sect.

According to a survey,18 a majority of madaaris have political affiliations. According to that survey, about 172 (62%) of the 251 madrassas had political linkages – 59 per cent were affili-ated with religio-political parties, 3 per cent with other mainstream parties, and 18 per cent with sectarian or jihadi outfits. About 18 per cent did not express any kind of association. The majority of madaaris connected with political parties are eager to play prominent roles in poli-tics. The administrations of about 60 per cent of the madrassas surveyed believed that playing a role in politics is a religious obligation. About nine per cent preferred to be affiliated with a political party to protect their interests. Most of these interests revolve around administrative issues concerning government departments. 21 per cent cited their aspiration to remain part of the community with the association of a political party. The survey showed that Deobandi and JI madrassas are more inclined towards politics, as 82 per cent of Deobandi and 100 per cent of JI madrassas have political affiliations. It is easy to understand the reason in case of JI madrassas – they are under the patronage of a political party – but for the Deobandi madrassas it can be a matter of their tradition, as political struggle was the main objective behind the formation of Dar ul-Uloom Deoband, whose founders had taken part in the freedom move-ment of 1857. The Jami’at Ulama-e-Islam, whose leadership mainly consists of madrassa teachers, is the continuity of the same legacy.19

The majority of wafaqs or madrassa boards dislike associations of madaaris with any political parties, however Rabita ul-Madaris fully support its political party; Jamaat-e-Islami. Never-theless, there is consensus that students can take part in politics after completion of their edu-cation. On a query about the role of madaaris in politics Qari Hanif Jallandhary said, “Politics on the basis of religion is the need of the hour in the country. But I think that the madaaris

17    

should pay attention on education and avoid practical politics. Students should not take part in any kind of political activities besides education. However, after attainment of degree, they are free to do whatever they want to do.” Dr. Raghib Naeemi said that madaaris should not be used as a base camp for politics.

It is observed that involvement of the madaaris in politics detracts students from education, and creates a rigid mindset amongst them which leads towards extremism. During affiliation with a single political party, students confine themselves to its manifesto and political views. In such circumstances, politically affiliated seminary students lack ability to tolerate other views. This polarized thinking also compels them to join sectarian and violent organizations to fulfill their agenda as part of a political agenda.

Reforming  madrassas:  success  and  failure  Reforms in madrassa education has been underway for some time, but post-9/11, the United States and western countries forced the Pakistani government to take immediate measures in this regard. Since then, irrespective of being elected or non-elected, the government has been trying to introduce some reforms in the madaaris, but these have failed to materialize in any substantive efforts due to differences between the government and the madrassas. Many as-pects of the madaaris reforms pertains to registration of madaaris, curriculum reforms, inclu-sion of modern subjects and the presence of foreign students; all of these are being discussed in a way to bring madaaris education at par with mainstream education systems. As far as the madaaris are concerned, the administrations of madaaris perceive such efforts with suspicion.

In the backdrop of reforms, the government initially drafted the “Model Deeni (religious) Madaaris and Madrassa Board Ordinance 2001”, and the federal cabinet passed it on June 21, 2002. According to the Ordinance, the government shall issue the gazette notification for the establishment of Pakistan Madaaris Education Board which will modernize the education system and organize the madaaris. The Education Board will set up model religious schools and approve their affiliations on the recommendation of Council of Islamic Ideology. The board shall be authorized to set curriculum and examination systems, and to hold teacher training programs. At the madaaris set up by the board, Islamic education shall be given prior-ity, while other subjects shall also be included. As far as implementation of this new law is concerned, only 449 madaaris were registered out of the almost 25,000 madaaris, while only three model madaaris could be established throughout Pakistan. This ordinance could not prove its effectiveness.

In June 2002, the government drafted “Voluntarily Registration of Regulations Ordinance 2002” and it was passed by the federal cabinet, but it could not be promulgated as President Pervez Musharraf could not sign this decree due to strong resistance from the madaaris. Un-

18    

der this ordinance, the madaaris were to be asked to get registered voluntarily, while foreign financial assistance was banned for the madaaris. In October 2004, as a next step, the gov-ernment introduced the “Government Madrassa Reforms Program 2004”. According to this, besides religious subjects, English, Mathematics, Social Studies and General Science will also be included from primary to the secondary level while English, Computer Sciences, Econom-ics and Pakistan Studies will be taught to the higher level. This program remained partly suc-cessful, and it is still in progress.

Registered  and  ghost  madaaris  The issue of madrassa registration is a very important one in the current debate. Historically, madaaris registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860 as charity organizations, but requirements for registration were removed in 1990. The issue of registration once again sur-faced during Musharraf’s time in office.

After a long discussion amongst stakeholders, the government promulgated the Societies Reg-istration (Amendment) Ordinance 2005 for the registration of madaaris. This ordinance was the amended form of the ‘Societies Registration Act 1860.’ This act stipulated that every madrassa will give an annual report of its activities to the registrar. The madaaris will also present a report of the annual budget as well as receipts of their revenue and expenditure. No madrassa will teach or publish any literature or material that promotes terrorism, sectarianism or religious hatred. All the madaaris will be registered, and no madrassa can be established and run without registration. However, the Ordinance did not work out in its intended spirit, and the madaaris rejected survey forms from the office of the Interior Ministry on ground of non-fulfillment of agreed conditions. The Ittehad Tanzeemat Madaaris Pakistan (ITMP) claimed that the government was seeking credentials from madaaris, violating the agreement that any information about any seminary would be sought through the wafaq instead of the government. They said any interference in the working of madrassas would not be tolerated. “If the government desires to obtain any information about madrassas, it should take the ITMP representatives into confidence,” said Abdul Qadoos, spokesperson Wafaq-ul-Madaaris Al-Arabia, while denouncing the survey forms being distributed by the ministry as ‘unac-ceptable.’20 However, the process of normal registration (which a madrassa has to fulfill when applying to be built) is going on, but is many times not followed by the madaaris.

The ITMP agrees on registration of madaaris, but they are against intervention of the govern-ment in their matters. Qari Hanif Jallandhary, Secretary General ITMP, on issue of registra-tion says, “The issue of registration has been created by the government, madaaris have not refused to register them. During the Benazir Bhutto era, the government had banned registra-tion of madaaris because the government wanted to change the system but it could not do so.

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Resultantly, registration remained closed for many years, and the government propagated that madaaris were not willing to register themselves. During the Musharraf era, negotiations started with the madaaris in the ambit of Societies Registration Act 1860, under which madaaris were registered since 1950; this was amended with addition of section 91. Now the issue of registration has been solved. However, bureaucracy creates hurdles due to which too much time has been consumed.”21

On a question about the process of affiliation to wafaq, Qari Hanif says, “Any madrassa where student are taught can be registered with any board or wafaq. There is no condition about the number of students and teachers. If the government wants to bring all Madaaris un-der an organized system, the independent or non-registered madaaris should not be allowed to work. All the religious seminaries should register with Wafaq ul Madaaris so all these institu-tions and the students studying there would be registered.”22

The total number of madaaris affiliated with the wafaqs is approximately 28,000; besides them a large number of unregistered madaaris are also working. Scores of unregistered madrassas escape scrutiny of the government, since those are usually built as an ‘additional’ room of a mosque where students get Nazira Quran and Hifz lessons. The mushrooming of unregistered madrassas is a severe problem for the government. Most of the unregistered madaaris are located in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or other remote are-as of the country. Tremendous growth of madaaris has been witnessed in the last 25 years – especially in the era of Zia-ul-Haq, when his Islamization policies resulted in expansion of the madaaris to support the Afghan Jihad against Soviet Union. There is no credible information for the number of unregistered madrassas, particularly, since these are generally located in remote areas. Thus, many such ghost madrassas escape detection.

Madrassa  reforms  and  the  state    The   government   started   madrassa   reforms   in   the   backdrop   of   9/11,   commonly   per-­‐ceived  as  being  under  pressure  of  western  powers.  Thus,  any  efforts  in  this  regard  are  perceived   as   part   of   a   ‘foreign   agenda’.  Not   enough   research  was   done   to   understand  these   Islamic   systems  of   education,   and   the   term   ‘reform’  was  used     even  when   there  was  no  consolidated  pool  of  knowledge  about  the  madaaris  education  system.  This  lack  of  vision  and  strategy  created  differences  between  the  stakeholders.  Irrespective  of  con-­‐cerned  ministries  and  departments,  the  debate  about  these  systems  gained  an  emotive  element  as  well.  This  mitigated   the   impacts  of  any  proposed  reforms,   since   it  was  un-­‐clear  what  was  needed   to  be  done   to  control   the  madaris   to  curb   terrorism,  and  what  substantive  reforms  were  needed  to  upgrade  this  education  system.    

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Initially, wafaqs or boards held negotiations with the government individually. Later on, they developed an umbrella organization consisting of five wafaqs or boards known as the earlier mentioned IMTP. The IMTP termed the reforms program as a conspiracy of the West. They said that the government, to implement US and Western agendas, was alleging that madaaris produce terrorists, and are hideouts of extremists. They maintain that this is completely mis-guiding and incorrect. They argue that the condition of the public sector educational institu-tions concerning radicalization is also very bad, but question why the government is concen-trating on madaaris instead of improving the mainstream educational system in public sector. The IMTP are of the view that the government has consistently failed to take any concrete decision regarding madrassa reforms, since it does not appear to be serious in this regard. As the main government arm spearheading these reforms, IMTP hold the bureaucracy responsi-ble for lack of progress.

With regard to curriculum reforms, the government tried to introduce modern subjects in the curriculum of madrassas. In the beginning some religious clerics declared the teaching of Computer and English in the madaaris as un-Islamic and forbidden in Islam. However, com-puter and English language are gradually making their inroads to the madaaris. The ITMP, after negotiations with the government, agreed to introduce compulsory contemporary sub-jects at tenth class (Matric) and 12th class (Intermediate) levels.

The madaaris administrations are not against reforms per se. For instance, Maulana Yasin Zafar stated in an interview that there is space of improvement in everything created by hu-man beings. However, if madaaris were under supervision and patronage of the government, reforms would have been rational. Nevertheless, the madaaris are in the realm of the private sector, where reform is neither possible according to the government aspirations, nor can the government effectively control them.23 Maulana Raghib Naeemi is of the view that the gov-ernment was planning to control madaaris, but ITMP ‘bravely’ fought against Musharraf’s government and did not compromise on their independence. Maulana Abdul Malik said, “What were the requirements of the government in the name of reforms? Actually, the madaaris reform was negotiated under agenda of the U.S.” Dr Syed Muhammad Najfi said, “There is space for improvement especially in specialization. We do not need funds of the government, but (prefer to) remain independent.” Qari Hanif Jallandhary remarked about the reforms, “It was (the) demand of the government that modern education should be part of the wafaq’s curriculum. The government asked for the introduction of Mathematics, Geography, English, Pak-Study and Science, and we included these subjects as it is the need of the hour. In fact, the government is trying to control madaaris through reforms, but we cannot com-promise on our independence. There is no personal interest in this regard but we feel that our performance is up-to the mark without government assistance. We can see that institutions controlled by the government are on the verge of collapse. The government is privatizing its

21    

various institutions, but it is surprising that it is trying to control religious seminaries.”24 He further explained, “Only the wafaq can bring changes in madaaris as it can order all madaaris affiliated to include all modern subjects in their madaaris. We agreed with the government that the wafaq will adopt the curriculum of the government text board, but the problem is that we hold examinations according to the lunar calendar and at that time there are no examina-tions of the government boards.” He claimed, “The government wants to control madaris ad-ministratively and educationally. Educationally, it wants to implement its own curriculum.”25

The following demands of the madaaris came into view during the study:

• The wafaq degrees of Metric (Sanwiya Khasa) and FA (Sanwiya Aama) are not approved yet, whereas its higher degree, Shahadat ul-Aalmia is recognized as equal to MA Islamic Studies and Arabic. The government should accept these lower level degrees as equal to the formal educational system.

• The madrassa boards should be given the status of an independent examination board to each wafaq.

• The wafaq should be affiliated with the Federal Ministry of Education or Federal Ministry of Religious Affairs. Despite passing of the 18th amendment, the madaaris prefer to re-main part of the federal government. Madaris should also link with the Higher Education Commission (a Government higher studies oversight body) and all education grants should be distributed among madaris through it.

• Madrassas should be exempted for all utility bills, and this will be the best way of cooper-ation from government side.

• Obstacles of bureaucracy for registration of madaaris should be removed in the registra-tion process.

• Opportunities should be provided for madaaris students for easy admission in universities and participation in competitive exams.

• The government should provide opportunities of job to wafaq students in all its depart-ments.

Foreign  students  at  the  madaaris  Foreign students have been studying religious education subjects in Pakistan for a long time. After 9/11, the issue of foreign students came into the limelight. Under pressure of their re-spective governments, the government of Pakistan started an operation to send them back. According to a report of July 19, 2006, the daily Ummat says, “The federal government in-formed the National Security Council (NSC) that about 447 foreign students have been repat-riated to their countries because of having incomplete documents, however, returning of 784 students to their countries is in the process. Students of more than 64 countries including the US, UK, Africa, India, China, and Russia are getting education from the Pakistani seminaries.

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Earlier, obtaining No Objection Certificates (NOCs) from the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan was necessary, but now the government has made another obligation for foreign students to attain NOCs from their respective countries.”

With strict enforcement, numbers of international students are nominal at the moment, and no fresh students are allowed to study in madrassas. Only those students in Pakistan with their studies in the pipeline are allowed to complete their education. The government has put for-ward two pre-conditions for remaining students to continue their education. Firstly, extension of NOC from Interior Ministry is imperative, and secondly, that the embassy of their country permits them the continuance of their education. This is to be substantiated on issuance of a letter by a wafaq or board, in which the particular foreign student's remaining study schedule is laid out in detail.

On a more grass roots level however, the government has still not formulated any policy or mechanism regulating admissions of foreign students in religious seminaries. In this perspec-tive Qari Hanif says, “It is (an) honor for Pakistan that foreign students get education from Pakistan and serve in their countries as an honorary ambassador of Pakistan. The issue of new students is still pending and it can be resolved with imposition of certain terms and condi-tions. If foreign countries are not willing to send their students in Pakistan, it is the responsi-bility of the government to convince them on diplomatic fronts. The wafaq is ready to address the reservations of foreign countries in this regard. It is partial policy of the government to allow foreign students for modern education in universities, but their admission in religious education is not allowed. Facilities should be provided for provision of visa to foreign stu-dents on an urgent basis”. He recommended that reservations with regard to admission of for-eign students should be addressed jointly, and there should be one window operation at the Interior Ministry in regards to this.

On the issue of foreign students, Dr. Raghib Naeemi says, “studying of foreign students (as a) trend is now towards India instead of Pakistan. On completion of their education, foreign stu-dents are honorary envoys of Pakistan in their countries, but now their loyalties are with In-dia”. The other boards and wafaqs also seem to support the abovementioned arguments, and insist on setting up a desk to maintain contact between the government and the madaaris.

Foreign  funding      The madaaris want to remain independent in term of their financial matters. They do not al-low state intervention regarding their sources of funding. According to the ‘Societies Regis-tration Act’, any religious school or charity which is set up under the above-said act is bound to submit an audit report from an independent charted accountant. The ITMP follows this condition effectively and the heads of madaaris are accountable to their governing bodies or

23    

the boards of trustees. Some madaaris even maintain their budget through audits, and present it before the students and the administration of the madaaris. Nonetheless, the issue of fund-ing from foreign countries is heavily debated. It is perceived that foreign funds are used to promote political agendas of foreign countries, in particular that of Iran and Saudi Arabia. There is no evidence regarding financial assistance from abroad, Maulana Yasin Zafar26 says. He further adds, “Foreign countries may provide facilities pertaining to health and food. They are funding through proper channels instead of open hand (his language) and banks can pro-vide information in this regard. Foreign NGOs and institutions donate towards education and health sectors; why can’t they be allowed to support madaaris on ground of Islamic brother-hood. (To ensure transparency) madaaris should attain funds, if foreign countries send it through their embassies, the same procedure that the Saudi government follows with permis-sion of the government.”27

An official of Wafaq ul-madaaris Shia, Dr Syed Muhammad Najfi denies receiving any kind of foreign assistance, and explained that if madaaris do so, law enforcement agencies are aware of it. According to Shia Fiqh, khums, 20 per cent on one’s entire wealth has to be sub-mitted to the mujtahid. A mujtahid is a religious scholar who reaches the status after years of rigorous study and examinations, and can thus be considered to have credible religious line-age. The mujtahid can be based anywhere, and people send their khums to him and later on it will be distributed among madaaris and needy people.

Dr Raghib Naeemi says that the government is well aware of donations that are coming from foreign countries. “It is (a) reality that Salafia and Al-Shiite madaaris receive funds from for-eign countries to promote their agenda. However, foreign donations should come through the government’s channel(s) and should be distributed amongst all madaaris.” Maulana Abdul Malik says Iran and Saudi Arabia are sending funds on religious basis. Qari Hanif Jallandhary expresses his ignorance about financial assistance of foreign countries to the madaaris. “Philanthropists of Pakistan are the major sources of income. However, if overseas Pakistanis donate to the madrassas, they have their right to do that. If the government wants to keep a check on the madaaris’ funds, it should have treated NGOs in a similar way.”

Current  debate  on  madaaris  reforms        As a result of talks between the government and Ittehad ul-Tanzeemat-e-Madaaris Pakistan, it was recently proposed that a madaaris education commission would be set up on the style of Higher Education Commission (HEC) to monitor the curriculum and education in madaaris. The proposed commission is meant for better working relationships between the government and the madaaris. The government proposed a new education policy in September 2009, and a decision has been made to establish a Madrassa Regulatory Authority under the Interior Min-

24    

istry to control the madaaris. However, the ITMP has rejected the proposal to work under the Interior Ministry, and has suggested setting up the authority under Ministry of Religious Af-fairs or Education instead.

In October 2010, the government succeeded inking an agreement with Ittehad Tanzeemat-e-Madaaris Pakistan for the introduction of contemporary subjects in seminaries in their metric and intermediate courses. However, the issue of madrassa reforms has become more complex after the promulgation of 18th Amendment, under which the subject of Islamic education has been transferred to the provinces. Provincial governments are currently clueless as to how to regulate the madaaris under the 18th amendment. Besides the issue of registration, there is no headway on account of madrassa reforms, since clear mechanisms have yet to be identified. The state and the madrassa boards remain at the usual cross roads; the madaaris stick to their stance on acceptance of their degrees and boards by the state, while the state insists on greater controls over curriculum, funding, and counter terrorism aspects of madrassa education.

Potential  to  adapt  to  the  modern  world  Madaaris and their students are said to be hostile to the modern concept of globalization as they don’t adhere to the principles of modern statehood like democracy etc. Some of them do not even accept secular law, the writ of the state, pluralism, gender equality and the separation of public and private spheres in individual life. When the madrassa system is discussed, two pertinent questions about its functioning and utility are commonly raised. Are the madaaris adopting new concepts of the modern world? Do they even have the capacity to ‘fit in’ with the modern world? Contrary to this, madaaris believe that the syllabus of the religious schools is compatible with present-day demands, and impart quality education. They deem that the madaaris are centers of specialization in religious education, which they consider up-to the mark and modernist in their own context.

Irrespective of various point of views, it is a need of the hour to produce Islamic scholars who are able to understand modern-day complexities, and be community leaders, academics and professionals in both religious and secular environments in order to further the cause of a plu-ralist Islamic society. Malaysian and other experiments have shown that since the desire for religious education just cannot be ‘wished away’; there is need for madaaris where essential aspects of religion are taught in a manner to produce students able to compete with the gradu-ates of the secular institutions. Such religious students also need to be tutored in a manner in which they emerge as functional members of a pluralist society. This study found that the madaaris are not totally incognizant of modern changes in the society, and they want to in-clude new subjects in their curricula according to their needs. Maulana Yasin Zafar points out that the ulama should have knowledge about the modern Islamic world and modern subjects,

25    

especially current affairs and latest banking systems, particularly Sharia complaint ones. He mentions that if modern subjects cannot be included in the curriculum, there have to be sup-plementary lectures to cover a number of issues.

Dr Raghib Naeemi recommends that subjects like modern economic system, political ideolo-gies and modern philosophy in light of the Quran and Sunnah can be taught in the madaaris. Qari Hanif Jallandhary suggests that besides modern Philosophy and Logic, History, Comput-er Science, Mathematics and Geography should also be part of the curriculum. He further suggests, “As far as languages are concerned, English and Arabic should be focused upon in order to expand contacts with the Muslim world and Europe. Comparative study of religions should also be focused and commonalities should be found out.” Thus, the madaaris may be teaching antiquated subjects, but they still have the potential to cope with more modern stud-ies with the proviso that these should somehow complement the curricula of religious studies being taught in the madaris.

A  deeper  look  at  the  madrassa  system    The importance of the madrassas in Pakistan cannot be ruled out. They are centres of educa-tion for many people who cannot afford any other alternative, producing a cadre of imams or clergy, at the same time leaving a conservative impact upon the society. It is necessary to un-derstand the nuances of the issues of the madaaris for bringing them into the mainstream edu-cational setup in the country, thereby also countering radicalization. To examine madrassa education with reference to the importance of Islam in Pakistani society, it is vital for policy makers to comprehend that Islamic education is important for many Pakistanis. Madrassas will continue to fill that niche, and thus reforms have to be aimed at integration into the main-stream, rather than stringent punitive controls only, which will further alienate the huge num-bers of people studying in such institutions.

Relationship  between  the  madrassa  and  society    The institution of the madrassa has always been connected to another institution of Islam, the mosque, since long. Besides being a place of worship, the mosque is considered a social and community center in Islamic societies, whereas the madaaris are educational centers and pro-vide Imams for mosques. Madaaris offer a more organized institutional structure than the lo-cal mosque Hifz school, and different academic levels of religious studies. The mosque-madrassa relationship exists in the public domain in the highest orders of society. Historically, mosque and madrassas were the focus of the rulers and the ruling elites for religious reasons as well as for strengthening their power; their importance is still valid in the existing era as these institutions are used for similar purposes. The Friday sermon is an important event in the life of the Muslim community. The prayer leaders are largely independent in Friday ser-mons, and play significant roles in formulation of public opinion in the society. The prayer

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leader or Imam participates in social activities related to birth, marriage and death. His daily interaction with the people is on regular basis in the mosque during prayer times. The social role of the clergy is significant; in addition to preserving traditions, they play prominent roles in legal decisions, rituals, weddings, funerals and become a requirement for societies. Essen-tially then, madaaris and mosques lose their credibility when they are used for political pur-poses.

Similarly, madrassas have deep links with society as they have their own board of trustees or executive committees, which consist of local business elites and society members. Such rela-tionships create strong social relationships that are perceived as beneficial for economic and religious reasons. Charity and education are considered acts of worship in Islam. In the madaaris charity plays an important role, which enables them to operate autonomously with their own curriculum and become philanthropic bodies that provide free education, boarding and food for students. Despite these characteristics, madaaris and mosques are facing a lot of criticism in the ongoing debate about their role in promoting militancy in the country. The madrassa establishment believes that they remain close relations with society. People come to madaaris to donate funds and to get legal verdicts (fatwas) on different issues. However, what needs to be understood is that even though the image of Islam and the madaaris has generally received a negative reception within the international community, the number of madaaris and trends of religious education has actually increased significantly in the Pakistani society, with continued community engagement and support to local madaaris still a norm in many sections of the Pakistani society.28

When suggestions for more harmonious peaceful co-existence of the madaris with local popu-lace were elicited, religious scholars and ulama suggested that madaaris and mosques needed to extend their contacts into society beyond the regular namazis (prayer performers) to the common people. They should also participate in various ceremonies and welfare activities. The community leaders and ulama should jointly work for the betterment of society and co-operate with each other to resolve the issues. Media can play an important role in this regard. Media should highlight the importance of religious education and ulama, and they should avoid creating differences and discriminations in the society.29 However, this opinion does not sit-in well with the deep religio-sectarian differences within the madaris as elucidated above, and the author of this report fails to comprehend how the mere outreach of madaris can promote harmony in society whilst such divides continue to exist and be propagated.

Madrassa  curriculum:  a  case  of  misinterpretation?      Amidst the debate on militancy and madaaris, madrassa curriculum has also been the subject of immense scrutiny as it is blamed for inclusion of hostile materials in subjects taught in ma-

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daris, which creates trends of extremism amongst students. Research reveals that curriculum of madaris is antiquated and has not undergone major changes for many years. Ulama of madaaris are in favour of ‘injecting’ advanced subjects in order to be compatible with the modern world. Madaaris are of the view that the pre-9/11 curriculum is still being taught in these institutions, but nobody raised any objections to this before the attacks on the twin tow-ers in United States. According to the interviews with organizers of the major wafaqs, this is a blame game being propagated on political grounds which has no connection with reality. Os-tensibly, the curriculum is based on the Quran and Sunnah which conveys messages of peace and tolerance.30

The madrassa curriculum is called “Dars-e-Nizami”, which has a rich history and is shared by most madrassas in the country. Mullah Nizamuddin Sihalvi (d. 1747), who was a scholar of repute in Islamic jurisprudence and philosophy in Lukhnow in pre-partition India, introduced this curriculum in the madaaris. This curriculum is not the same as that associated with the name of Mullah Nasiruddin Tusi (d. 1064) and the Madrassa Nizamia, which he established in eleventh-century in Baghdad. Almost all Sunni madrassas, irrespective of Deobandi, Barelvi, or Ahl-e-Hadith inclination, follow the same standard Dars-e-Nizami adopted by the Deoband seminary in 1867. Academically vast and structurally organized, it has eight to 10 years programs divided into six levels, each being ostensibly equivalent to corresponding lev-els in mainstream education. The curriculum (Dars-e-Nizami) includes the subjects of Quran, Hadith, Tafseer, Fiqh, Arabic and Persian literature. Quran and Sunnah are the basic source of this religious education. The differences lie at levels of interpretation and explanation accord-ing to various schools of thought. There are two major concerns regarding madrassa curricu-lum; confining students rigidly to their own interpretation of school of thought, and declaring others as unauthentic, thereby promoting sectarianism directly or indirectly within the society. Secondly, misinterpretation of jihadi verses for political purpose within the curriculum may cause students of madaris to gravitate towards militancy.

Another new trend change has been observed in the madrassa education, in which a new breed of madrassas is emerging in urban areas that combines formal school/college education with religious education. The students go for formal state-managed examinations for regular degrees but get additional Islamic education, which is taken care of by the institution itself. Many students attended government schools before joining madrassas; they attribute this to poor quality of education and parents ‘religious inclinations’; presumably this hybrid madras-sa education is more rewarding both academically and spiritually.

With regards to curriculum reforms, the ITMP explained that every board or wafaq has their own independent committees responsible for looking into the matter of change in syllabus according to the prevailing requirements. The committees recommend suggestions to their

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wafaqs. ITMP are of the opinion that a madrassa is an institution of special education similar to engineering colleges or medical colleges. After metric or FA, students are allowed to join a medical or engineering college, or join madaaris for specialization in Islamic education. It is an era of specialization and there are plenty of subjects for specialization in one department.31 However, what was not clearly obvious to the author of this report was that even though cur-ricula committees recommend reforms to wafaqs, at what level they would interact with the government to recommend deletion of parts of curricula not promoting harmony in the socie-ty. As elaborated earlier in the report, wafaqs are deeply distrustful of the government to what they term as efforts to ‘manipulate’ madaris. Clearly, this is very much a contentious issue still.

The  madrassa  myth  There are two renowned myths about madaris; students of madrassas belong to poor, under-privileged families unable to afford formal education, and secondly madaaris are run on mere alms. There is no doubt that the parents who are unable to afford formal education for their children send them to madrassas which provide food, shelter and education.

It is however observed that many students of madrassa belong to the middle class; they are sharp and intelligent, and can compete even with ‘secular’ students in board examinations of formal education. Free education is also attractive in madaris, but it is not the most important factor for enrolment. Abdul Qudoos, madrassa spokesperson in an interview said, “Less than five per cent of students enroll because of economic reasons. The rest are here because they want a religious education, and the enrollment of students from well-to-do backgrounds has been steadily increasing.”32 Another attraction for student of middle class families is that modern sciences and computer education have broadened the scope for madrassas. Similarly madaaris are beneficial for lower class families’ students, and many have benefited from technical education in a variety of ways creating opportunities to practice another trade for economic self-sufficiency, while continuing education based on religion.

Similarly, the myth related to funds of madaaris as being based on merely charity is some-times misperceived. The madaaris see themselves as NGOs, doing their very best to provide education, helping the poor and eradicating poverty. In fact, it is sometimes highlighted that religious leaders and groups are more reliable in providing social services than corrupt State functionaries. Philanthropists consider madaaris as deserving institutions for effective use of their donations. Apart from public donations, madaaris are now concentrating on self-dependence, and during last few years a new trend has been observed that big madaaris are investing in real estate business, education and other profitable commercial ventures.

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Privately financed and independently run institutions are the major trademarks of autonomous Pakistani madaaris. Therefore, they refuse governmental assistance on political reasons. It is not inaccurate in any regard that local people support madaaris through trusts, endowments, charities and zakaat contributions. In turn, the madrassa pays for the teachers’ salaries, board and food for teachers and students, books, and some even offer stipends to poor students. Madaaris are increasingly maintaining income and expenditures like other institutions.

Conclusions    Although madaaris are facing many challenges and a number of controversies, their role can-not be reduced or just ‘wished away’ due to their importance in the Pakistani society. In other words, the importance of the madrassa as a social institution cannot be subverted or mini-mized by branding it as a political entity. Complicated issues of madaaris have further exac-erbated the problems due to conflicts among stakeholders. A large number of madaaris are not involved in acts of militancy or terrorism; however, such actions on part of a nominal number cannot be refuted. One of the core issues is the fierce sense of independence that the wafaqs inculcate; this presents a problem as well as an opportunity, inasmuch that they would want to maintain that freedom, as well as resisting efforts to curbing those freedoms. Madaris are in-creasingly realizing that they will continue to be branded as terrorist breeding places, unless they agree to cooperate with the state regarding presence of nefarious elements. If they were to continue to hesitate in such cooperation, their freedoms would face increasingly stringent curbs by the state. Thus, the role of madaris as a haven for terrorists may increasingly de-crease in significance, except for some in tribal and remote areas in Pakistan; ghost madaris may also be a problem in this regards.

Madrassa affiliation with jihad and politics, to some extent, remains intact; that cannot be addressed without solid steps of the government. Sectarian linkages of madrassas are also deep rooted because of division among seminaries on the basis of sects. Besides the presence of sectarian outfits in Pakistan, lack of interaction among students and teachers among differ-ent sects is also a reason of sectarian violence. The interference of international and domestic non-state actors plays a major role in the radicalization of madaaris in order to achieve politi-cal objectives. Existing biased political views, inclinations and sense of superiority of specific sects, and curiosity towards jihad as a tool to dominate the world are major factors that can be used to indoctrinate extremist ideals among students.

Madrassa administrations show unanimity of views in the need for educational reforms in curriculum; as a first step they agree that registration of every seminary of any school of thought with government departments is necessary. Taking the ulama into confidence and addressing their concerns are necessary to achieve the desired results in further madrassa re-

30    

forms, which will have to be implemented to bring these institutions into the mainstream. Im-position of generalizations and half thought out ideas on madaaris has damaged the process of negotiations between government and madrassa authorities, and needs to now become more nuanced. The ‘secularization’ of madaaris is a goal which is currently very far away from reality, and any halfhearted, ill thought out attempts will lead to further confrontation in so-ciety. The first step would be to recognize that these institutions are here to stay, and a gradu-al inclusion of these into the societal mainstream would have to be the precondition to all such efforts.

Policy  recommendations    

For  the  Government  of  Pakistan:  

Regarding  madrassa  reforms      • Madrassa boards must be taken into confidence before any step of reform, rather than

general bureaucrats; the reform committee should include senior ulama amongst its mem-bers, obstacles of bureaucracy for registration of madaaris should be removed in registra-tion process.

• The wafaqs’ degrees of Metric (Sanwiya Khasa) and FA (Sanwiya Aama) are not ap-proved yet, whereas its higher degree, Shahadat ul-Aalmia is recognized as equal to MA Islamic Studies and Arabic. The government should accept these lower level degrees as equal to the formal educational system.

• The government should take measures to enhance/rationalize the economic bene-fits/avenues available to the people of madrassas and religious scholars. The government should take measures to provide comparable economic benefits to madrassa graduates and religious scholars, and provide opportunities of job to them in all its departments.

• Wafaqs should be affiliated with the Federal Ministry of Education or Federal Ministry of Religious Affairs. Despite the passage of 18th amendment, the madaaris prefer to remain part of the federal government. Madaaris should also link with HEC and all education grants should be distributed among madaaris through it.

• In order to nurture the intellectual discourse among religious scholars, measures should be taken to keep them updated and aware of current affairs. The madrassa teachers and staff should be provided advanced training, and steps should be taken to enhance their capacity.

• The madrassa boards should be given the status of an independent examination board to each wafaq. By endorsing educational certificates of madrassas as equal to other educa-tional certificates, discrimination should be eliminated so that madrassa graduates could serve in government and private organizations.

• To improve working of the ‘tangible’ and moderate madaaris, government should close illegal and ghost madaaris. To dilute international pressure and accusations on the

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madaaris, the government will have to take firm steps to overcome the menace of ghost madaaris.

• There should be ban on the formation of new madaaris without government permissions. The government should advise district administrations to check seminaries annually. There must be comprehensive mechanisms to check the illegal formation of madaaris.

• There should be a clear option for students to undertake studies that can grant them ad-mission and placement in higher education institutions or vocational training programs. Opportunities should be provided for madrassa students for easy admission in universities and participation in competitive exams.

• There is need to restore contacts between government officials and madrassa administra-tions.

• Madaaris may be considered for exemption of utility bills as a confidence building meas-ure between them and the government.

To  overcome  the  menace  of  terrorism  and  sectarian  violence    • There is ambiguity about various questions at the academic, intellectual and jurispruden-

tial levels, and due to this ambiguity, intolerant behaviors find a space to thrive. For in-stance, what are the principles and regulations and conditions for apostasy? What are the limits, manner and scope of discouraging bad deeds (Nahi Anal Munkar) in society? Who has the right and authority for jihad? What is the status of suicide attacks in Islam? Ambi-guity on these issues cannot be redressed without making them a focus of serious academ-ic debates and discussions. Government should form a higher level board of ulama, repre-senting all schools of thoughts, to address these questions.

• A national-level forum should be formed which should comprise prominent religious scholars and muftis (expounders and interpreters of Islamic law). Only this forum should have authority to issue a fatwa.

• No jihadi organization, irrespective of their cause, should be allowed to operate in the country.

• For promotion of religious tolerance and dialogue on inter-sectarian harmony, activities should be initiated at the level of madrassa students, such as inviting position-holder stu-dents of different madrassa boards in prize distribution ceremonies, and organizing train-ing sessions for them etc.

• The government should arrange joint congregations of different sects on various special religious days at madrassas and mosques. Commonalities among different religious sects should be promoted through discussions on the media, including TV and radio.

• Sectarian organizations should not be allowed to establish a madrassa to oppose rival sects in the area.

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• To eliminate intolerance and extremism, the causes (political, social and economic imbal-ances, oppression and injustice, undue and aggressive religious behaviors) should also be addressed.

For  the  madrassa  administrations    

Regarding  madrassa  reforms  • Religious clerics and madrassa authorities should be sensitized to follow positive, mod-

ernizing reforms from the government side. • The madrassa curriculum needs to be reformed to highlight pluralistic traditions in Islam,

particularly in dealing with differences of opinion between faith and traditions. • Basic introduction and awareness about modern knowledge and disciplines should be im-

parted to madrassa students. • The administration of madaaris should exert utmost care about fund collecting; they must

focus on the Pakistani community and should not look towards foreign secret funding.

To  create  sectarian  harmony  and  tolerance    • The commonalities between various sects should be highlighted and sectarian differences

limited to only academic discourse. Moreover, they should be expressed in such a manner that controversies should not spread further.

• Madaaris should concentrate on religious education; they should not allow jihadi com-manders and politicians to interfere with their policies.

• The policy of not criticizing others’ sect and not leaving one’s own should be promoted. • Instead of focusing on points of sectarian differences, religious scholars should highlight

and propagate those areas of jurisprudence and respective interpretations of the Quran and Sunnah on which all religious sects are in agreement.

• It is imperative to listen to the others’ point of view respectfully. There should be a plat-form of religious scholars of different sects in order to reduce confrontation among sects.

• There should be contacts among sects, and writing competitions and tournaments should be held to inculcate a sense of sportsmanship.

• Principals of madaaris should control any measure that causes hatred among sects. • Mosques’ platform should be used by religious scholars for positive things and discourses

only.

For  civil  society  • Every segment of society should express its disassociation with mischievous elements

among them who try to create differences. All the pillars of the civil society including madaaris should establish relations with each other, and work together to promote peace and harmony in the society.

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• Improved monitoring mechanisms for madrassas through effective public-private partner-ships should be evolved to ensure credibility of madaaris.

• Dialogue between diverse segments of society (Muslims, non-Muslims, liberal and con-servative, non-religious, etc.) should be a constant practice. Efforts should be made to in-vite and engage elements that display extremist tendencies rather than just ignoring them.

• Civil society and academic institutions should act as a bridge between various segments by promoting dialogue between them, and should provide analytical and informative ma-terial regarding social issues, making them accessible to the trendsetters among all seg-ments of society.

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Notes  and  references                                                                                                                  1 “Madaaris” or “madrassas” are used as plural of “madrassa” and means a religious seminary where the Islamic 2 Rahman, Tariq. “Madrassas: The Potential for Violence in Pakistan?” February 2004.  3 Memorising of the Quran.  4 Reading the Quran in Arabic pronunciation.  5 A course designed for the madrassa students to become a religious scholar.  6 A religious-cum-charity organization based in Pakistan which have their own educational system.  7 Qari Hanif Jallandhary, Nazim-e-Aala (Secretary General) Wafaqul Madaaris Al-Arabia (Deobandi) and Prin-cipal Jamia Khairul Madaaris Multan, interviewed on June 24, 2012.  8 Dr. Raghib Naeemi, Principal Jamia Naeemia Lahore, vice president Tanzeemul Madaaris, interviewed on June 13, 2012.  9 Interview of Qari Hanif Jallandhary.  10 Interview of Syed Habib-ul-Haq, Vice principal Jamia Rizvia Zial Uloom, Rawalpindi on June 17, 2012.  11Rana, Amir “Gateway to Terrorism”,New Millennium, London, 2003.  12 Muhammad Amir Rana, “Mapping the Madrassa Mindset: Political Attitudes of Pakistani madaaris,” Conflict and Peace Studies, Volume 2, Number 1, Jan-Mar 2009.  13 Report by Rebecca Winthrop, a Brookings fellow.  14 Qari Yasin Zafar, Nazim-e-Aala (Secretary General) Wafaqul Madaaris al-Salafia interviewed on July 04, 2012.  15 Interview of Maulana Abdul Malik, President Rabit-ul-Madaaris, interviewed on July 02, 2012.  16 Ibid .  17 Dr. Syed Muhammad Najfi, Principal Jamia Madina tul Elm, Islamabad, interviewed on June 28, 2012.  18 A survey conducted by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) in 2008 available at www.san-pips.com.  19 Muhammad Amir Rana, “Mapping the Madrassa Mindset: Political Attitudes of Pakistani Madaaris”.  20 Interview published in Daily Jang, April 13, 2009.  21 Interview with Qari Hanif Jallandhary.  22 Ibid.  23 Ibid  24 Ibid  25 Ibid  26 Secretary General Wafaqul Madaaris al-Salafia.  27 Ibid.  28 Interviews with administration of different Madaaris.  29 Ibid.  30 Ibid.  31 Interview of Qari Hanif Jallandhary.  32 Daily Jang, Interview published in April 13, 2009.