MACQUARRIE ON "GOD EXISTS"

Many philosophers today make a distinction between believing-in and believing-that, and theologians have made a similar distinction between faith and belief? I may believe in my friend in the sense that I am committed to him or trust him. I may also believe in my dog, my country or in a classical education. And in spite of efforts on the part of some to divorce belief-in from belief-that, it is generally accepted that they are closely related. When I believe in someone, for example, I also believe that such and such is the case about him. One might argue with regard to religious belief that it is the belief-in, the trust and commitment, that is central. Yet it is unreasonable to divorce this from certain beliefs about God, and it seems that at a minimum one who believes in God would also believe that God exists, even if one admitted that the belief that God exists is more dubious than the belief that one's friend exists. And traditionally, of course, the debate between theists and atheists has centered around the .question, does God exist?

This is so much a part of our traditional way of talking about God that it seems odd, if not absurd, for a religious believer to claim that one should say neither th, at God exists nor that God does not exist. Yet a brief survey of the literature indicates that the use of the word 'exists' with reference to God has been held by many thinkers to be problematic. For example, Radhakrishnan argued that God is a universal reality who is beyond existence and non-existence, and Paul Tillich argued that since God is Being-Itself and since existence can be predicated only of beings, one cannot speak of the existence of God without contradiction. Wittgenstein pointed to a peculiarity in the use of 'exists' with reference to God when he wrote: "If the question arises as to the existence of a god or God, it plays an entirely different role to that of the existence of any person or object I ever heard of. One said, had to say, that one believed in the existence, and if one

1 H.H. Price, Belief, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), pp. 426-54.

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did not believe, this was regarded as something bad. Normally, if I did not believe in the existence of something no one would think there was anything wrong in this." ~ Some followers of Wittgenstein have argued that the question of the existence of God is part of the uni- verse of religious discourse and as such cannot be answered by philo- sophers.

John Macquarrie is another contemporary thinker who seems reluctant to speak about the existence of God although he would agree that believing-in involves believing-that. Macquarrie has not written a systematic treatise on the subject and some of his remarks have, I believe, led to confusions regarding the position that he main- tains. He seems at many points to fo110w an essentially Tillichian argument, but he is more reluctant than Tillich to avoid all together the use of the word 'exists' with reference to God. His position is also complicated by his claim that what separates theists and atheists in the contemporary debate is not so much the question of the existence of God as it is the question of the character of Being or Reality. Macquarrie's position, I believe, should be understood from within the context of his rejection of the traditional theistic way of talking about God and his talk about God as Being itself. In this essay I provide an analysis of Macquarrie's talk about the existence of God and an interpretation which is intended to preserve the fundamental points that he wishes to make while clearing up some ambiguities and responding to some of his critics.

The word 'exists' is an exceedingly complex one and we use it in a variety of contexts. We may talk, for example, of the existence of mathematical ideas, tables, electrons and persons. The general use of the word in this sense I will call 'exists1'. Perhaps one might refer to it as an ontic sense of exists. What we mean in this context may be most clearly expressed in sentences of the kind "There exists an instance of X." The intent in such sentences is not to give a descrip- tion of the entity referred to but to indicate that it is. 'Exists' in this sense does not appear to have one determinate sense. Rather it is de- pendent on the context in which the word is used, and the conditions under which we are prepared to say that ideas, tables, electrons, and persons exist will vary. Nevertheless, those things which are said to exist may be said to make up the totality of what exists.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religions Belie[, (Oxford. Basil BlackweU, 1967), p. 59.

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There is a second general use of the word 'exists' and I will call this 'exists~'. Existentialists, for example, have used this word in a restricted sense to apply exclusively to that kind of being which belongs to man. Existence in this case indicates something about the character or nature of man. When Heidegger says that "the essence of Dasein lies in its existence," he means that Dasein is constituted by its pos- sible ways of being. Milton Munitz speaks, I believe, in a related way when he talks of the existence of the world. He is not of course defining 'exists' in the way that the existentialist does. Nor is he denying the legitimacy of using 'exists' in sentences of the kind "There exists an instance of so and so." He is, however, pointing to that fact that the word 'exists' is a verb in developing a descriptive use of it with reference to the world. 'Exists' in this sense has referen- ce to some form of activity and in reference to the world is said to designate "what the world does." 3

Although I believe that Macquarrie occasionally blurs the distinction between what I have called exists1 and existse, it is clear that he is aware of a variety of ways in which the word 'exists' is used as well as the general distinction that I have drawn. In Principles of Christian Theology he cites the existentialist and what he calls the traditional uses of the word 'exist' and indicates a reluctance to use either with reference to God.' Speaking of the existentialist use of 'exists', he writes, "If we use the word in this specialized sense, then we cannot say that God exists, just as we cannot say that a river exists, or a horse, or an angel. But this has nothing to do with the question of the 'reality' of any of them" (p. 118). This point seems to me to be non- controversial.

Macquarrie then reports that the word 'exists' has been used traditionally in a much wider sense (I want to say a different sense) "to mean anything that has being," and in this sense he says one has traditionally argued for or against the existence of God. But again Macquarrie is reluctant to say "God exists." He writes, "strictly speaking, however, one cannot say that God exists in this way either, for if God is being and not a being, then one can say no more that

3 Milton K. Munitz, The Mystery o/ Existence, (New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts, 1965), pp. 72-99. 4 John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, Second Edition, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), p. 1.18. See also Macquarrie, Existen- tialism, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 61ft.

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God is than that being is. God (or being) is not, but rather lets be" (p. 118).

Thus far Macquarrie's position seems to be fairly straightforward. One cannot apply the term 'exists' to God in the existentialist sense on the grounds that it is defined in a restrictive way to refer to human existence only. And one cannot apply 'exists' in the traditiona! sense to God on the grounds that existence can be predicated only of beings, and God in Macquarrie's thought is not a being but Being. On this point Macquarrie is similar to Tillich who wrote "However it is defined the 'existence of God' contradicts the idea of a creative ground of essence and existence. The ground of being cannot be found within the totality of beings, nor can the ground of essence and existence participate in the tensions and disruptions characteristic of the transition from essence to existence." 5

But now Macquarrie begins to qualify what he has said. He writes, "But to let be is more primordial than to be, so that, as has already been said, being 'is' more 'beingful' than any possible being which it lets be; and this justifies us using such expressions as 'being is', provided we remain aware of their logically 'stretched' character .... So it can be asserted that, while to say 'God exists' is strictly inac- curate and may be misleading if it makes us think of him as some being or other, yet it is more appropriate to say 'God exists' than 'God does not exist', since God's letting-be is prior to and the condition of the existence of any particular being" (p. 118). In the second edition of Principles Macquarrie has added a paragraph which is intended to elaborate these qualifications and respond to his critics. Here he says that the words 'being', 'is', and 'exists' can be used analogically with reference to God and to illustrate this he gives an example of what I have called exists~. "If I say that man 'exists' in the sense that Sartre and others say this, the word has a very active sense and indicates man separating himself from nature and choosing his own essence. But if I say God 'exists', then the dynamic, active sense of existing is raised to a new unimaginable level and the limitations of human existence are discarded. Provided that one is clear that the word 'exists' (or 'is') has an entire range of meanings, then it is appropriate to say 'God exists' " (p. 119).

Paul TiUich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 204-205.

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There are some problems created, I believe, by a tendency to blur the distinction between what I have called exists1 and exists2. But in general it might be said that while Macquarrie is sympathetic with Tillich's argument, he has moved to a position closer to that of H. I. Paton who in his Gifford lectures said that he saw no need to be dogmatic on this issue, that if the word 'exists' is understood to apply only to finite things in time and space then it is inappropriate to say "God exists" but that one may say "God exists" provided that he make it clear that he uses the word 'exists' in some analogical sense ?

However, a further complication is introduced when Macquarrie, after a diversion, returns in Principles to his main theme and writes "The assertion 'God exists' is not to be taken as meaning that there is to be found a being possessing such and such characteristics. 'God exists' is a way of asserting what would perhaps be more exactly expressed as the holiness of being. But it is precisely the assertion of the holiness of being which is denied by atheism so that our manner of interpreting the expression 'God exists' in terms of God as being, makes not the slightest concession to atheism. It does, however, rule out obsolete and untenable mythological and metaphysical ways of thinking of God" (p. 120). The real issue between atheists and theists, Macquarrie says elsewhere, is not that of the existence or non-existence of God but of the experience of Being understood as gracious or alien. 7

Macquarrie then is suggesting that the debate between theists and atheists should no longer center about the question "Does God exist?" but about the question 'Is Being gracious?" This is an important and fundamental shift in the way of looking at the question of God and is basic to Macquarrie's version of what is sometimes called panen- theism. Yet I believe that this shift and the reasons for it are obscured by his talk of using 'exists' as an analogy to refer to God. To say that "God exists" means "Being is Holy" is to do more than stretch the meaning of 'exists'. It is to judge inappropriate a particular way of thinking and speaking of God and this needs to be kept clearly in mind. Because of this I want to propose a scheme which will, I

6 H.I. Paton, The Modern Predicament, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955), pp. 182-84. 7 lohn Macquarrie, Thinking About God, (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp. 90-95.

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of what Macquarrie wants to say with regard to the existence of God. First, I suggest that one can within the context in which Macquarrie

the question of God while retaining what seems to me to be the heart believe, make clear this fundamental shift in the way of looking at is thinking, continue to speak of the existence (exists~) of God on the grounds that while God is not a being, God is that which enables beings to be and is manifest in them. In this case, however, we must keep clearly in mind that 'exists' is being used in a descriptive and analogical sense and further that in order to be informative it should be replaced by terms which indicate the specific ways in which God functions or behaves. One may, for example, speak of God by analogy to human existence in speaking of God's love, historicity and so forth. Second, I suggest that one give up talk about the existence of God in the sense of exists1. Granted that exists1 is used in a variety of contexts (e.g., with reference to tables, electrons, ideas and per- sons) and that the criteria for accepting something as existing will differ, sentences of the kind "There exists an instance of X" always seem to refer to some kind of entity and I cannot conceive of sentences using exists~ in which this can be avoided. Yet Being or God is said not to be an entity and thus not a part of the totality of that which exists (exists0.

I want now to elaborate on what I have said with regard to exists1 and show how this fits with Macquarrie's way of talking about God. The suggestion that we cease using exists1 with reference to Being or God fits, I believe, with Macquarrie's claim that we have passed beyond the mythological stage in which God was conceived anthropo- morphically as a being much like ourselves who dwelt in a particular place. If God is understood in the mythological sense, it may be appropriate to ask "Does God exist?" and to this question most contemporary theologians would respond "God does not exist." Mac- quarrie, however, argues that we have also passed beyond the stage of traditional theism to the extent that it conceived God as a person but as an odd metaphysical kind of person who dwelt metaphorically beyond the world intervening as necessary. 8 In this case the use of the word 'exists' with reference to God becomes more complex. God is spoken of as a being but the difference between God and other entities is stressed and frequently reference is made to God's

a lbid, pp. 99ff.

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necessary existence suggesting that the term is being qualified in reference to God. Talk of God's existing or not is made more am- biguous, the more it is stressed that God is immeasurably the greatest being and different from all particular beings.

Macquarrie is arguing that we have passed beyond the stage of traditional theism. He admits that he stands near to the tradition of the Greek Fathers, Augustine, and St. Thomas in associating the idea of God with the idea of Being, but he argues that we must now assert unambiguously that God is not a being, not even immeasurably the greatest being but Being itself. I am arguing that if Macquarrie wishes to assert unambiguously that God is not a being then he should also assert unambiguously that one should not use the word 'exists' (exists0 in reference to God on the grounds that such usage blurs the very distinction which he wishes to maintain. Presumably every thing which exists exists as something but God understood as Being cannot be said to exist as something.

In denying the appropriateness of talk of the existence of God where God is understood as Being, I am not arguing as D. Z. Phillips seems to argue that the question of God's existence is merely a matter of faith, that it is not a theoretical question, and that if the question whether God exists "is to mean anything at all, it is to wonder about praising and praying; it is to wonder whether there is anything in all that." 9 Although I would agree that the question of the existence of God is not merely a theoretical question, I would argue that it should not be treated as a question merely within religious discourse, that belief-in brings belief-that and that argument about these beliefs should pass beyond the limits of religious discourse.

If one does reject as inappropriate talk about the existence (exists0 of God in conjunction with the claim that God is not a being and that we have passed beyond traditional theism, it is easier to under- stand Macquarrie's claim that the real issue between theists and atheists is not one of the existence or non-existence of God but of the character of Being or Reality. In saying this, Macquarrie does not intend to rule out questions of truth or falsity with reference to reli- gious claims. While he places primary emphasis on describing the

9 D.Z. Phillips, Religion Without Explanation, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976), p. 181. See also W.D. Hudson, A Philosophical Approach to Religion, (Lon- don: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 89ff. and Hudson, Wittgenstein and Religious Belief, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1975), pp. 175ff.

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experience of Being on the grounds that religion is primarily a matter of faith and that arguments do not make one religious, he also argues that a theistic theory derived from an understanding of the various dimensions of experience gives a better account of the data of ex- perience than do atheistic theories. 1~ This is not to suggest that anyone who believes Being or Reality to be other than alien or absurd is a theist. It is to suggest that the line between theists and atheists cannot be drawn as sharply as it can if the question is one merely of whether or not one believes in some divine entity in addition to the other entities which make up what we call world.

Taken out of context this shift from talk about the existence of God to talk about the nature of Being appears a bit devious. How- ever, it is my contention that this shift follows naturally from and corresponds to the shift from talk about God as a transcendent entity to talk of God as Being. This is suggested in Macquarrie's discussion of Wisdom's parable concerning the garden and the gardener. Wisdom's parable begins, says Macquarrie, as a useful illustration of the traditional way of discussing whether or not God exists, the traditional discussion between theists and atheists. But, says Macquar- rie, a shift takes place in the parable which has not been readily noted, and this shift parallels that which takes place when one shifts from the classical type of theism to one which takes more seriously the immanence of God to the world and his relation to it.

They begin by returning to their neglected garden, and the question at issue is whether a gardener comes to tend it. This seems to represent the dispute between classical theism and the corresponding atheism. But not much further on, the grounds of the dispute have shifted and the argument takes a different form. Now one man says to the other, "You still think the world's a garden and not a wilderness." Here the argument is no longer about the question of the gardener who may or may not come to tend the plot. It has become an argument about the character of the plot of ground itself whether or not it is a garden. As the argument proceeds, it seems to assume increasingly the second form. It becomes less and less an argument as to whether there is a gardener, separate from the garden and coming and

lo See my " lohn Macquarrie on Language, Being and God," The Review o~ Metaphysics, Vol. XXX, No. 2, December 1976.

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going at will, and it becomes more and a question as to whether the plot displays such a character as would constitute it a garden, or whether it must be reckoned a wilderness. The checking pro- cedures differ also. For there is less and less talk about the pos- sibility of hearing, seeing or otherwise detecting a gardener at work, and more and more talk about the immanent characteristics of the plot of ground, and especially whether one can trace in it what might be called the pattern of gardenhood, u

Macquarrie's primary purpose in this passage is to illustrate the difference between the classical or monarchial type of theism in which God's transcendence over and priority to the world have been central and an organic view of God in which the relation between God and world is understood to be much more intimate. Macquarrie adopts what he calls an organic model for God as a corrective to the monar- chial model and while his view differs from persons influenced by Alexander, Whitehead and Hartshorne, he makes it clear that he shares much in common with them. But this passage also suggests that when we explore the question of the existence of God within the context of Macquarrie's version of theism we discover that talk of the existence of God comes to be replaced by talk of the character of Being. Perhaps one might say that in exploring the question of the existence of God within this context one becomes aware of the limits of the question and of the need to confront the issue of the reality or unreality of God in another way. The question now has to do with the most appropriate way of describing our experience of Reality. It is not that the theist sees something that the atheist does not. It is rather that they pattern their experiences in different ways and they argue over whether talk of God or the holiness of Being can be justified in the effort to organize experience.

Perhaps it should be expected that one might at this point argue that the debate between theists and atheists has been narrowed to the point where one is talking only of a debate between the followers of Jaspers and Heidegger on the one hand and the followers of Sartre and Camus on the other hand. The majority of atheists, one might argue, are not ones who argue that Being is threatening or absurd. Rather most atheists are prepared to say simply that things are and

~1 Macquarrie, Thinking About God, pp. 115.

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that there is no justification for disputing over the character of Being. 1~ The point is, of course, well taken. This is what has sometimes been called an empirical age by which is meant in part that it is an age characterized by the absence of interest in metaphysical questions. And if one maintains this position consistently there is probably little room for serious dialogue between theists and atheists.

However neither Macquarrie nor Heidegger, to whom Macquarrie appeals, is unaware of this. Indeed, it is the intent of Macquarrie's natural theology that one begin at this point in an effort to show the significance and importance of the question of Being. The question of Being, as Macquarrie understands it, is not so much concerned with giving a rationalistic account of Being as it is with asking about the meaning of Being for human existence. Macquarrie argues, for example, that in reflecting on the nature of human existence, on how we understand ourselves, we may come ultimately to ask the question of the whence of human existence and the nature of Reality which accounts for the fact that we are and how we are. Within the realm of moral experience we may be led to ask concerning the source of the meaning of moral experience or moral obligation. Questions con- cerning the meaning of human existence may lead to questions con- cerning whether or not there is some ultimate context of meaning and so on. There is, of course, no necessity that such questions be asked and if asked no necessity that they lead to the question of God, and certainly no necessity that the asking of such questions result in religious faith. But it is in this context that the question of God as the question of the character of Being can be said to be relevant.

Eugene Thomas LONe University of South Carolina

1~ Alister Kee, The Way o/ Transcendence, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1971, 45ff.