World Politicshttp://journals.cambridge.org/WPOAdditional services for World Politics:Email alerts: Click hereSubscriptions: Click hereCommercial reprints: Click hereTerms of use : Click hereThe Contribution of Nicholas John Spykman tothe Study of International PoliticsEdgar S. FurnissWorld Politics / Volume 4 / Issue 03 / April 1952, pp 382 - 401DOI: 10.2307/2009129, Published online: 18 July 2011Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0043887100013472How to cite this article:Edgar S. Furniss (1952). The Contribution of Nicholas John Spykman to the Studyof International Politics. World Politics, 4, pp 382-401 doi:10.2307/2009129Request Permissions : Click hereDownloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/WPO, IP address: 85.75.62.19 on 21 Jul 2015THECONTRIBUTIONOFNICHOLASJOHNSPYKMANTOTHESTUDYOFINTERNATIONALPOLITICSBy EDGAR S. FURNISS, Jr.TENyearsagoHarcourt,BraceandCompanypublishedAmerica'sStrategyinWorldPolitics.ItwaswrittenbyNicholasJohnSpykman,ProfessorofInternationalRelationsatYaleUniversityfrom1928untilhisdeathin1943, andfirstdi-rectoroftheInstituteofInternationalStudiesatYale.Criticsrecognizedthatthebookwasimportant,butagreedonlittleelse.Onereviewerhaileditas"brilliant,incisive,provocative,well-reasoned, well-written, and altogetheradmirable as an analy-sis ofAmericanforeignpolicyfroma pointofviewalltoolongneglectedintheUnitedStates." Ontheotherhand,a secondre-viewerbitterlyasked,"WhatwerethoseeminentscholarsatYalethinkingaboutwhentheyletsuchanidealoose[thattheUnitedStatesmightneedGermanandJapanesepowerafterthewar]?.. . Suchguessingandsurmisingisnotobjectivepoliticalscience,itis notanythingbuttheexpressionofmentaldiscom-fortthatthelearnedgentlemanfeelsina worldthat,despitehisowncold-bloodedcultofpoliticalrealism,doesnotappeartobemovinginthedirectionsuggestedbyhisownwishfulthink-ing." Andthere was more, much more, bothpro and con. Despitealaudatory,front-pagereview,completewithpicture,intheNewYorkTimesBookReview,ProfessorSpykmanprobably,ifthe score weretotaled, didno betterthanbreakeven.WhatwasallthefiringaboutoveronebookbyanauthorwhoseonlypreviouslypublishedvolumehadappearedeighteenyearsearlieradoctoraldissertationonTheSocialTheoryofGeorgSimmel?Andwhyre-examinetherecordtenyearsaftertheevent?Thetwofoldanswerliesintherapiddevelopmentofthestudyofinternationalpoliticssince1942andthecontribu-tionwhichProfessorSpykmanmadetothemethodologyofthefield.CriticsofAmerica'sStrategyshouldnotbejudgedtooNICHOLASJOHNSPYKMAN383harshlyforverdictswhich,adecadelater,borderontheridic-ulousandthenaive. Whenthebookandthereviewswerewrit-ten, therewas very littleinthewayof formbywhichtomeasurescholarly publicationsininternationalpolitics. Furthermore,thethemechosenbyProfessorSpykmanprobablymademoredif-ficultthetaskofgraspingthemethodofanalysiswhichhewasusing.(Asnotafewcriticspointedout,theorientationofthebookwastowardtheisolation-interventiondebateandwasselectedbeforetheJapaneseactionatPearlHarborforciblyendedthe controversy.)However,a carefulre-readingofAmeri-ca's Strategy,togetherwithallofProfessorSpykman'sarticlesandTheGeographyofthePeace, whichwaspublishedafterhisdeathin1944,*plusaknowledgeofhisundergraduateandgraduate courses at Yale, makeplainthe structureofthefieldofinternationalpoliticsasSpykmanenvisagedit.Thatstructureunderliesthe one whichmany leading scholars nowfollow.IBasictoSpykman'sviewofinternationalaffairswashisoft-reiteratedbeliefthat relationsbetweenstates are powerrelations.".. . Individualstatesmustmakethepreservationandimprove-ment oftheir power positiona primaryobjectiveoftheirforeignpolicy,"hestatedintheintroductiontoAmerica'sStrategy."Forceismanifestlyanindispensableinstrumentbothforna-tionalsurvivalandforthecreationofabetterworld,"readsasentence inTheGeographyof the Peace. Such statements didnotvery well fit thetemperoftheirtimes. FromthedreamworldofabdicationofresponsibilityAmericanswereslowtoawake,evenaftertheoutbreakofWorldWarII.Theprecipitationofthe* AchronologicalbibliographyofSpykman'spublishedworkincludes:TheSocialTheoryofGeorgSimmel,Chicago,UniversityofChicagoPress,1925;"TheSocialBackgroundofAsiaticNationalism,"AmericanJournalofSociology,xxxn,No.3(November1926),396-412;"States'RightsandtheLeague,"YaleReview,xxiv,No.2(December1934),274-93;"GeographyandForeignPolicy,"AmericanPolitical ScienceReview,xxxn,No.1(February1938),28-51,andNo.2(April1938),213-37;withAbbieA.Rollins,"GeographicObjectivesinForeignPolicy,"AmericanPoliticalScience Review,xxxm,No.3(June1939),391-412,andNo.4(August1939), 591-615;America'sStrategyinWorldPolitics,NewYork,Harcourt,BraceandCo.,1942;"Frontiers, Security, andInternationalOrganization,"Geographical Review,xxxn,No. 3(July1942),436-38;lettertoLifeMagazine,January11,1943,p.2;TheGeographyofthePeace,ed. byHelenR.Nicholl,NewYork,Harcourt,BraceandCo.,1944.384WORLDPOLITICSUnitedStatesintotheconflictappearedtomanyasauniqueeventunrelatedtothepast,withoutlessonsforthefuture.Tosuggest,asSpykmandidinAmerica'sStrategy,that"asoundforeignpolicyfortheUnitedStates mustacceptthis basicrealityof international society[the needforpower] anddevelop a grandstrategyforbothwarandpeacebasedontheimplicationsofitsgeographicpositionintheworld"appeared,eventoscholarlycritics, as "obsessed with Realpolitik"(Machtpolitikf),or at leastas "anexcess of cynicism."Ofthe unpopularitywhichanempha-sis onpowerwouldentailSpykmanwaswellaware."...Powerhasabadname,andtheuseofpowerisoftencondemned,"hesaid in America'sStrategy.And,inGeographyofthePeace,that"thereis atendency,especiallyamong certainliberalsandmanywho call themselvesidealists, to believethatthesubjectofpowerintheinternationalworldshouldnotbespokenofexceptintermsofmoraldisapproval."Yet,hewarnedinthelatterthat"politicalideals and visions unsupportedby forceappearto havelittle survivalvalue."(Itisquitepossiblethatadecadelaterthependulumhasswungtoofartheotherway,thatsomewritersintheforefrontofinternationalpoliticsplacetoo greatemphasisonsheerpowerinbeing,onmobilizedmilitarymightas aninstrumentofstage-craft.WouldSpykmanbeinthatnumber?Itisdoubtful.Theauthoris fullyawareofthefactthatmenare motivatedbyotherdesires thanthe urge forpowerandthatpoweris notthe only aspect ofinternationalrelations.[Critics seem to have skippedthis sentencefromAmerica'sStrategy.]Internationalaswellasnationalaffairsarein-fluenced by love, hate, andcharity,by moralindignationandthehopeofmaterialgain,bythemoodsandpsychologicalabnormalitiesofrulers,andbytheemotionalafflictionsofpeoples.It would seem to the writerthatSpykmanwouldnow bewarningthe"power-is-all"writersnottooverstatetheircase.Butthisisconjecture.)Spykman,then,was sayingthata state'ssecuritydepended,inthelastanalysis,onitsabilitytousetheinstrumentsofnationalpowerto maintainitselfvis-a-visotherstatesinaninternationalenvironmentinwhichtherewasnocentrallycontrolledmo-nopolyoftheuse offorce.WhatwerethefactorswhichwenttoNICHOLASJOHNSPYKMAN385makeupthenationalpowerofaparticularstate?Spykmanwasaccusedofneglectingmostoftheminfavorof"geopolitical"analysis.TheaccusationarisesinpartfromhastyreadingofAmerica'sStrategy,inpartfromtheforminwhichhechosetoexpresshisideas.Ittakescarefulexamination,plusknowledgeoftheframeworkofhisteaching,todispeltheillusion.WhenSpykmandealtwiththe"geopolitical"aspectsofna-tionalpower,hedidsoinfullandexplicitrecognitionofthenon-geographicfactorswhichwereinvolved.Inthefirstoftwoarticleson"GeographyandForeignPolicy,"writtenin1938forthe AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,hestated:Unfortunatelyforthepoliticalscientistwithafondnessforsimplifica-tion,butfortunatelyforthestatesmanstrivingtoovercomethegeo-graphic handicapsofhis country,neitherdoesthe entireforeignpolicyofacountrylieingeography,nordoesanypartofthatpolicylieingeography.Thefactorsthatcondition[notdetermine]thepolicyofstatesaremany;theyarepermanentandtemporary,obviousandhid-den;theyinclude,apartfromthegeographicfactor,populationden-sity,theeconomicstructureofthecountry,theethniccompositionofthepeople,theformofgovernment,andthecomplexesandpetprejudicesofforeignministers;anditis theirsimultaneousactionandinteractionthatcreatethecomplexphenomenaknownas"foreignpolicy."America'sStrategy,widelycriticizedforneglectingallfactorsotherthanthegeographic,containsthissentence,whosemean-ingseemscleartoallwhotroubletoreadit:"Buttherelativepowerof states dependsnotonlyonmilitaryforcesbutonmanyother factorssizeofterritory,natureof frontiers,size ofpopula-tion,absenceorpresenceofrawmaterials,economicandtech-nologicaldevelopment,financialstrength,ethnichomogeneity,effectivesocialintegration,politicalstability,andnationalspir-it."Iftheforegoingsentenceweremissed,thereaderwouldbeconfrontedwithalengthyanalysisinPartTwoofAmerica'sStrategyofthepossibilitiesofhemisphericintegration,whichdiscusses, inadditionto geographicdata,socialorganization,po-liticalinstitutions,ideasandideology,naturalresources,tech-nological development,andfinancialstrength.Inthe undergraduatecourse whichProfessorSpykmantaughtat Yale University,thefactorsconditioningnationalpowerwere386WORLDPOLITICSschematicallypresentedas follows:geographic,demographic,ra-cial, ethnic, economic, social, political,ideological,andpersonal.Within the time limits of the course, the implications of each factorwereexploredandtheirinterrelationshipdeveloped.Thisthecritics of America'sStrategy could not be expectedto know, forinthat workProfessorSpykmanchose to use the word"geopolitics"todescribehismethodofapproach."Geopolitics"hadunfortu-nate connotations in the United States, where Americans were justlearningaboutamancalledHaushoferwhowassomehowin-volvedinthemegalomaniaofAdolfHitlerandinGermany'splansforworldconquest."Geopolitics"hadaworsecolorthan"power politics"; it was stranger;it was foreign;it was Germanic.Thedecadesince1942hasenabledthestudyofinternationalpoliticstodevelopothertermstodescribeframeworksofanaly-sis.FewofthemwereavailablewhenAmerica'sStrategyap-peared.ProfessorSpykmanthuswas askinghisreaderstoacceptterminologyasheusedit,nottoreadmysticalmeanderingsofHaushoferiandialectic(derivedandrefinedfromFriedrichRatzel,RudolphKjellen,HalfordMackinder,etah)."Astheword[Geopolitik]indicates,theadherentsarenotonlyengagedina study of the geographic conditioning of politicalphenomena;theyarealsoengagedinadvocatingpolicy,whichishardlyascientificendeavor,"ProfessorSpykmanstated.Toofewcaredto makethedistinction.Hischoiceoftheword"geopolitics"wasclearindicationthatSpykmanregardedgeographyasthemostbasicfactorcondition-ing a state's foreignpolicy. Hewrotein"GeographyandForeignPolicy":Warwas aninstrumentofnationalpolicyinhis[Napoleon's]timeandstillis today, andina world wheregroups struggleforpowerby meansofwar, policy becomesa highstrategy.Insucha world,thegeographicareaofthestateistheterritorialbasefromwhichitoperatesintimeofwarandthestrategicpositionwhichitoccupiesduringthetempo-raryarmisticecalledpeace.[Thisrepeatedinsistencethatitwascon-flict whichwas normal, peace whichwas abnormal,horrifiedAmericancritics.]Itisthemostfundamentallyconditioningfactorinthefor-mulationofnationalpolicy, becauseitis the mostpermanent.Becausethegeographiccharacteristicsofstatesarerelativelyunchangingandunchangeable,thegeographicdemandsofthosestateswillremaintheNICHOLASJOHNSPYKMAN387sameforcenturiesandbecausetheworldhasnotyetreachedthathappystate wherethe wantsofnomanconflictwiththoseofanother,thosedemandswillcausefriction.Thusatthedoorofgeographymaybelaidtheblameformanyoftheage-longstruggleswhichrunper-sistentlythroughhistorywhilegovernmentsanddynastiesriseandfall.Inmoresuccinctform,thesamethoughtisfoundinAmerica'sStrategy:A sound foreignpolicy must notonly be gearedto the realities ofpowerpolitics,itmustalsobeadjustedtothespecificpositionwhichastateoccupiesintheworld.Itisthegeographiclocationofacountryanditsrelationtocentersofmilitarypowerthatdefineitsproblemofsecurity.Theheavyemphasisongeographywasaccompaniedbyawarn-ing:Itshouldbeemphasized,however,thatgeographyhasbeendescribedasaconditioningfactor,ratherthanasadeterminingfactor.Theword was chosenadvisedly. Itwas notmeanttoimplythatgeographiccharacteristicsplayadeterministic,causalroleinforeignpolicy.Thegeographicaldeterminismwhichexplainsby geographyallthingsfromthefourthsymphonytothefourthdimensionpaintsasdistortedapictureasdoesanexplanationofpolicywithnoreferencetogeog-raphy.Spykman,itnowbecomesclear,hadselectedtheterm"geo-politics"toindicatethecloserelationshipbetweenthegeo-graphic, economic, andpolitical factorsas conditioningelementsofstatebehaviorintheinternationalenvironment.Beforeproceedingtoexaminesomeoftheideasandproposi-tionsto whichSpykman'sframeworkledhim,however,itwouldbe wellto completeanexpositionofhisconceptofthestudyofinternationalpolitics.Inadditiontofactorsconditioningna-tional power, Spykmanaddedthe objectiveswhich statespursue,andthetools andtechniquesofstatecraft.Theobjectives,hebe-lieved,couldbeschematicallydividedintocategoriesparallel-ingtheconditioningfactors:geographic,racial,ethnic,eco-nomic,social,political,andideological.Thetoolsandtech-niques,themethods,ofstatecraftfollowed"thethreebasicprocessesofcooperation,accommodation,andopposition"andincludedpersuasion,barter,coercion, andsubversion.388WORLDPOLITICSIn parts of the study dealing with factors other than those con-ditioningnationalpower,Spykman'schoiceofconcentrationwas again geographic. Withhis researchassistant Abbie A. Rol-lins,hewrotetwoarticlesfortheAmericanPoliticalScienceReviewin1939entitled"GeographicObjectivesinForeignPolicy." Thereinthe authors discussed the importance of varioustypes of frontiers,rangingfromthe mountainareato thebufferstate,thevarioustypesofgeographicexpansionisminwhichnational states had historically indulgedtoward a river or ocean,up and down stream, circumferential,and so forthand,finally,theresultantconflictpatternsbetweenstateswhichemergedfromtheiroppositionon the geographiclevel. Theauthors con-cluded:Historytestifiestotheconstantreappearanceoftheseexpansionformsandtheever-recurringconflictpatternsthatresult,andthereseemstobe noreasontoassumeorexpectthatthesebehaviorpatternsofstateswill suddenlychangeordisappearinthenearfuture.Anawareness oftheiruniversalityandinevitabilityshouldthereforeprovideausefuland valid basis foranalysis ofany andallconflictsituations,actualandpotential,wherestatesfaceeachotheracrossriversandseas.Countlessotherfactorswillcomplicateandvaryeachspecificcase, butthebasicpatternagainstwhichthesefactorsmustbeviewedgivespromiseofremainingconstant.It would appearthatthe concentrationon geographicobjectivesof states was more closely relatedto the field of militarystrategythan to an understanding of general conflictsin the internationalfield. However,as willbepointedoutlater,conclusionscouldbedrawnfromsuchasystemofanalysiswhichareapplicabletothebipolarconflictwhichProfessorSpykmandidnotlivetosee.IISpykman'ssystemofanalysisledhimtothreebroad,relatedconclusions. Theywere:thatAmericanisolationwas nolongerapracticalmeansofattainingsecurity;thatcontinuedpo-liticalparticipationinworldaffairsacrosstheAtlanticandthePacificOceansshouldhaveasitsprimaryobjectivethecre-ationandmaintenanceofa balanceofpower;andthatinterna-tionalgovernmentcouldbenoacceptablesubstituteforsuch aNICHOLASJOHNSPYKMAN389balanceindeed,thatanyenduringsystemofinternationalor-ganizationcouldonlygrowoutofadelicate,dynamicbalancebetweennation-states.Eachoftheseconclusionswascompletewithdetailedprognosticationsandpredictions,manyofwhichwillbementionedinthecourseofdiscussingthethreeinter-relatedideas.AllthreegeneralconclusionswereembodiedinAmerica'sStrategyinWorldPolitics.Ofthethree,contemporarycriticswere forthe most partpreparedto accept onlythefirst,althoughnotitsconsequencesorthereasoningthatledSpykmantoit.Thesecondandthirdconclusionsappearedtomanyoutlandish,mistaken,cynical,and/orsinfulnotnecessarilyinthatorder.Thesystemofnationalstateinteraction,saidSpykman,hadceasedinthetwentiethcenturytobeaEuropeanphenomenon.Alltheworldwas involvedinthepercussionsandrepercussionsattendantuponstate behaviorintheinternationalenvironment.Onlystatesmenwhocandotheirpoliticalandstrategicthinkingintermsofa roundearthandathree-dimensionalwarfarecansavetheircountriesfrombeing outmaneuveredondistant flanks. Withairpowersupplementing sea power andmobilityagainthe essence ofwarfare,noregionoftheglobeistoodistanttobewithoutstrategicsignificance,too remoteto beneglectedinthecalculationsofpowerpolitics.It followedthat, whethertheUnitedStates realizeditor not,thiscountrywasinvolvedinworldaffairstakingplacethousandsofmilesfromitsownshores.Aconditionofpotentialdouble-en-circlementhadbeencreated,SpykmanwroteinA merica'sStrat-egyencirclementoftheOldWorldbytheNeworoftheNewbytheOld.IftheNewWorldcanbeunitedororganizedinsuchamannerthatlargemassesofunbalancedforceareavailableforactionacrosstheocean, itcaninfluencethepoliticsofEuropeandAsia. AndiftheOldWorldremainsdividedandbalanced,thatexternalforcecanplayadeterminingroleinitspoliticallife.If,ontheotherhand,theOldWorld can be unitedandorganized in sucha mannerthatlarge massesofunbalancedpowerbecomeavailableforactionacrosstheoceans,theNewWorldwillbeencircledand,dependingonitspowersofre-sistance, may havetosubmittothe dictatesoftheOld.Itwastothisproposition,andhowbesttopresentitfromacartographicpointofview,thatTheGeographyofthePeace390WORLDPOLITICSwas dedicatedalarge, slim bookwithmanymapsanddiagrams,publishedin1944 underthe editorship of HelenR. Nicholl,afterProfessorSpykman'suntimelydeath.EncirclementcouldnotbeavoidedbyapolicyofisolationwithintheWesternHemisphere.InAmerica'sStrategySpyk-manconsideredatlengththeresourcesatthedisposaloftheUnitedStateswithinthehemisphereandthedegreeofunityattainedforthepurposeofmakingthema monopolyunderthedirectionof this country's foreignpolicy. His conclusion,reachedbeforetheattackonPearlHarbor,wasthatAmericanisolation-istscouldoffernoacceptablealternativetoparticipationinextra-hemisphericaffairs.Naturally,allreviewersofthebookwereinagreementonthispoint.TheUnitedStateswas,afterall,atwar;isolationwasatanend.Why,therefore,seektode-stroyanargumentthatworldeventshadalreadydemolished?Theauthor'sresponsetothisanticipatedcriticism,asseenintheadditionsmadehereandtherethroughoutthebookafterthemanuscripthadbeenconcludedandbeforetheworkap-pearedinprint,wasthattheisolationistargumentwasonewhichwouldrecuraftertheendofthewar,ifhehadreadAmericanhistory aright,andthatthe corollaryto thedestructionoftheisolationistthesiswasthecontinuedinvolvementoftheUnitedStatesinEuropeanandAsiaticaffairsforthepurpose ofmaintaining a balance of poweronthese two continents.Readersofthedailypress,listenerstothespeechesofformerPresidentsandwould-bePresidentsmustbeinclinedtofeelthatSpykmanhadreadAmericanhistorycorrectly,thattheideaofAmericanIisolationismis frequentlydiscredited but never utterly destroyed.JWhataboutthecorollarythatfewcriticswerewillingtojaccept:thatthepurposeofAmericanparticipationinEuropeanand Asiatic affairsmustbethe establishmentandmaintenance of ja balanceof power?Inwritingofthe"GeographicObjectivesin IForeignPolicy," Spykman hadwarned:Whenever...pressuresbecomeunequal,boundarieswillmove.Theproblemofcollectivesecurityistheproblemofequalizingthese pressures;andas longas thatproblemremainsunsolved,thephenomenonofexpansionas suchwillcontinuetoappear.NICHOLASJOHNSPYKMAN391Hewenton,inAmerica'sStrategy,tostatethatpost-WorldWar II would findthe world in much the same conditionas hadexisted in the interwar period.Basically,the new orderwillnotdifferfromtheold,andinternationalsociety will continueto operatewiththesamefundamentalpowerpat-terns.Itwillbea worldofpowerpoliticsinwhichtheinterestsoftheUnitedStateswillcontinuetodemandthepreservationofabalanceofpowerinEuropeandAsia.Theconcluding paragraphofTheGeographyof the Peacecar-riesthesametheme.Onesentencereads,"Balancedpoweronthe Eurasian Continent is one of the objectivesfor which we arefighting andtheestablishmentofsuchanequilibriumanditspreservationwill be ourobjectivewhenthe fight is won."One of the reasons for the coldness of critics toward the balanceofpowerasanobjectiveofAmericanstatecraftwasthatitofferednoeasy surceasefromforeign-policywoes. HerewasnoUtopia, no brave new world, no era of enduring peace. Here wasmoreofthesamemixtureasbefore,amixturewhichhadnotpreserved peace in the past and showed little likelihoodof beingable to do so inthe future.As Spykmanhimselfrecognized,thebasic elementinthebalanceofpower was instability.Thebal-ance always tended to deviate fromequilibrium because the com-ponents of the balance, the states themselves, did notknow withanydegreeofcertaintyjusthowmuchpowerwasintheotherscale and therefore desired, not a balance, but a surplus of power.Uncertainty,lackofyardsticksformeasurement,strivingsforincreases in relative power, all jarred the scales. The balance wasupset;warwastheconsequence.ThebestthatProfessorSpyk-mancouldsayfortheobjectivewhichhewishedhiscountryto pursue was containedinthree sentencesattheendof Ameri-ca'sStrategy:Anequilibriumofforcesinherentlyunstable,alwaysshifting,alwayschanging,is certainlynotanidealpowerpatternforaninternationalsociety.Butwhilewe candeploreits shortcomings,we shalldo welltorememberthatit is an indispensableelementforaninternationalorderbasedonindependentstates.Itencouragescooperation,conciliation,andthe growth of law andis more likely to preserve peace andmaintainjusticethanany othertypeofpowerdistribution.392WORLDPOLITICSThis best was farfromsatisfactoryto most critics. TheyopenedfireonSpykmanwithallavailablepensflying.OntwocountsSpykmanwas attacked.First,thebalanceofpowerwasobsolete.Second,Americandemocraticgovernmentdidnotknowandshould notattemptto learn how to operatesucha system.(Spyk-manwasinagreementwiththefirstpartofthesecondin-dictment,butarguedthatignorancewasdangerousandaprel-udetodefeat.)"Spykman'srealismistherealismofpastcenturies,"saidonereviewer.Otherswerelessrestrained."...The'balance'policy cannotrecommenditselftotheintelligenceorto the conscienceofanAmericawhichis determinedthatthewarcyclemustbebroken.Theutter,fatalbankruptcyofsuchapolicyis convincinglydemonstrated,albeitwithoutdesign,bytheauthor.""Thebalanceofpowermaywelllandusallinacrematory."NotonlywasthesystemproposedbySpykmanbad,butitcouldnotbefollowedbya democracy." . . .Democraticgovern-mentisnotadaptedtopursuingaforeignpolicyofbalancingpowers.""...Oneshouldconsiderwhetheranydemocracysoresponsiveinitssentiments,anycountryso muchaffectedbyitsracial and sectionalpoliticsas theUnitedStatescouldeffectivelyfollowthrougha policyrequiringtheruthlessandprecisecalcu-lationsofthe balanceofpower."Anotherreviewerwas pronetoblameGermanicinfluencesforSpykman'stheory:"Acceptingas hedoesapowerpoliticsthatoriginatedinthephilosophyofPrussian militarism,it not surprising too thatProfessorSpykmanfails to examinethetheory in relationto democraticgovernment.Muchofthetalkaboutdemocracydoubtlesswearieshimasvague,platitudinous,andsentimental."Andsoondownthelistofmost reviewersof America'sStrategy.IrritationatSpykman'sprescriptionforpostwarAmericanforeignpolicyevenleda fewcriticsto labelita prescriptionforaggressiveimperialism.TheyweretherebyacceptingthethesisthattheUnitedStates couldnotignore whatwas going onintherestoftheworld,butaddingquicklythatthiscountryshouldnotparticipatetoomuchinEuropeanorAsiaticaffairs.Theirattitude approachedambivalence. "Spykman's argumentspresageNICHOLASJOHNSPYKMAN393anunblushingUnitedStatesImperialism,"wroteone."...Ifthisbrandofgeopolitical'realism'wins,theUnitedStatesisinforamilitaristicfutureunderwhichdemocracywillbecomeindistinguishableincontentfromthepoliticalsystemsofthetotalitarianpowers,"predictedasecond."Thus,whatProfessorSpykman'sdescriptionforAmericaamountstoispermanentwar," complaineda third, somewhatawkwardly.Didthecriticshavesomethingbettertoofferthananadmit-tedlydangerous,oneroussearchforabalanceofpower?ManythoughttheyhadinasystemrejectedbySpykmaninterna-tionalgovernment."Attheendofthewartheonlychoicewemay faceis thatbetweena morestableorganizationandtheendofallorganization,betweensomesortoforderandcompleteanarchy.""IfAmericaninterestsincludedemocracy,politicalstability,andwelfareeconomics,thenourwiseststrategyinworldpoliticsistopromote,preferablybyconsent[otherwisebyforce?],theage-oldprocessofpoliticalintegration,thistimeon a world scale." "Thewhole logic of ProfessorSpykman'sbookleadstointernationalgovernment;butheendswithanon-sequitur.Sofarashisconclusionsgo,thereisnotrealism,butonlydefeatism."Theattitudeofthese"learnedgentlemen,"toborrow a phrase fromone ofthem, was a previewofthatadoptedbyworldgovernmententhusiastsimmediatelyaftertheendofthe war. World governmentsimply hadto come aboutinahurrybecausetheworldwasrapidlygoingtohellinabasket.Fromcontemplatingthehorriblealternative,theywerereachingasurprisingconclusionforscholarlyauthoritiesinthefieldofin-ternationalpolitics."Wishingwillmakeitso,"theyweresayingineffect.Spykmanemphaticallydidnotbelievethatwishingwouldmake it so. Thisdidnotmeanhe was againstworldgovernment,internationalorganization,orcooperationbetweenstates.Inanarticlewrittenin1934fortheYaleReview,entitled"States'RightsandtheLeague,"hewashopefulforthefutureofthatorganizationbecausestatesmenwerefinallyrecognizingitsim-portanceasaninstrumentofnationalpowerandtherebyweretransferringtheLeaguefromtherealmofmake-believeintothe394WORLDPOLITICSrealmofrealityininternationalpolitics.Spykmanwasquicktowarn,as hedidinlaterwritings,thataninternationalorganiza-tion was not a substituteforpower politics, butratheradifferentandmoredesirableformthereof."Thecreationofinternationalorderis notamatteroftheabolitionofforce,"hewroteintheYaleReview,"butachangefromtheuseofforceasaninstru-mentofnationalpolicytotheorganizationoftheuseofforceby thecommunity."Unfortunately,theLeaguehadbeenunabletoeffectthistransferenceofforce,andhadultimatelygonedownbeforena-tionallyemployedmilitarypowerininternationalaggression.Therewas noreasontobeoptimisticthatanypostwarorganiza-tioncouldsuddenlysucceedwheretheLeaguehadfailed.Dreamersofaneworderspringingsuddenly,full-blown,fromthewreckageofwarwerepreciselythatdreamers."Plansforfar-reachingchangesinthecharacterofinternationalsocietyareanintellectualby-productofallgreatwars,but,whenfight-ing ceases, theactualpeacestructureusuallyrepresentsareturntobalancedpower,"SpykmanassertedinAmerica'sStrategy.Moreover,thedreamersmightnotwelcomehavingtheirvisionsprecipitouslytransformedintoreality.Worldfederationis stillfaroff.Thisis perhaps justas well becausetheworld-statewouldprobablybeagreatdisappointmenttoitsadvocatesandverydifferentfromwhattheyhadanticipated.Brotherlylovewouldnotautomaticallyreplaceconflict,andthestruggleforpowerwouldcontinue.Diplomacywouldbecomelobbyingandlog-rolling,andinternationalwars wouldbecomecivilwarsandinsurrections,butmanwouldcontinuetofightforwhathethoughtworthwhile,andviolencewouldnotdisappearfromtheearth.Spykmanfeltthatthebestassuranceofbothinternationalor-ganizationandthe developmentofa worldcommunitywastheirfoundationona EuropeanandAsiaticbalanceofpower,whichcouldonlybeestablishedbyAmericanparticipation.InalettertoLifeonJanuary11,1943,Spykmanmildlyobjectedtothatmagazine'sdescriptionof himselfas an exponent of"cold-bloodedpowerpolitics."Myinterestinabalanceofpower[Spykmanwrote]isnotmerelyin-spiredbyaconcernforourpowerposition,butalsobymyconvictionthatonlyinasystemofapproximatelybalancedpoweriscollectiveNICHOLASJOHNSPYKMAN395securityworkable.Onlyundersuchconditionscancommonactioncreateoverwhelmingpoweronbehalfoftheinternationalcommunity.Ifthereis nopossibilityofbalancingpower,thereis nopossibilityofrestraint,andthelesspowerrequiredtocheckmateaggression,themore likelyarestatestomake goodontheirguarantees.IaminfavorofabalanceofpowerinEuropeandAsiabecauseonlyundersuchcircumstancescantheUnitedStates,whichis faraway,participateef-fectivelyinthe preservationofinternationalorderandundertakeposi-tivecommitmentstopreservetheterritorialintegrityofsmallstatesacrosstheoceans. Justiceis mostlikelytoprevailamongstatesofap-proximatelyequalstrength,anddemocracycanbesafeonlyinaworldin whichthe growthofunbalancedpowercanbeeffectivelyprevented.OnereviewerofAmerica'sStrategy,writinga yearaftertheap-pearanceofthebook,foundtheforegoingstatementatvariancewiththeideaspresentedinthevolumeitself.TothepresentwriteritappearsasanelaborationofbasicconceptsdevelopedinAmerica'sStrategy,anelaborationwhichSpykman,perhapsunfortunately,didnotfeelcalledupontomakeearlier.Proba-bly he considered it unnecessary explicitly to classifyhimselfwiththe angelsandagainstsin. Probablyhehopedhisreaderswouldcredithimwithmoralprinciplesinanyevent.Suchahope,ifentertained,provedtobeexaggerated.Tobe successful,a collectivesecuritysystemshould,Spykmanbelieved, beorganizedona soundregionalbase.InitsfailuretofollowthisprinciplelayoneofthedifficultiesoftheLeagueofNations, because,Spykmanwrotein1934, onlywithinalimitedsecurityareawerestateswillingtogiveadvanceguaranteestoone anotherthat wouldbe honoredwhena test came. Fouryearslater,in"GeographyandForeignPolicy,"Spykmanreturnedtothe same point.Thereshouldbeinanyregionalsystematleastthreelargepowersofapproximatelyequalstrengthandanum-berofsmallerstatesinwhosepreservationatleasttwoofthelargepowerswereinterested.Herewasclearexpositionofamultiple-balancesystem,andSpykmanwasstillfollowingitin1942.Heenvisagedatleastthreeregionalorganizationsemerg-ing afterWorldWarIIin Europe, Asia, andthe WesternHem-isphere.Foreachareatheconstructionofthetypeofbalancef whichwouldenableevenlimitedcollectivesecuritytooperate'wouldbeextremelydifficult.396WORLDPOLITICSTheidealofunitsofapproximateequalityinmilitarystrengthandpowerpotentialis,however,notlikelytobefullyrealized[SpykmanwroteconcerningEurope].Butevenifitwere,itwouldnotpermittheUnitedStatestowithdrawfromEurope.Thirdpartystrengthwillcontinue to be needed to neutralize differentials,and a balance of poweris essentiallyan unstableequilibriumthatneeds constantattentionandadjustment.Was theUnitedStates, then,to supersedeBritainas theholderofaEuropeanmultiplebalanceofpower?ItwouldseemthatSpykman'sideastendedinthatdirection."ItistobehopedthatthisEuropeanpowerzone canbe organizedintheform ofa regional League of Nations with the UnitedStates as an extra-regional member." Similar multipowersystems of regional secu-rity were to be the objectiveof Americanpolicyin Asia andtheWesternHemisphere,althoughinbothareastheirattainmentwould be even more difficultthan in Europe.ThedifferencesbetweenSpykman'sconceptionin1942ofwhatthepostwarworldwouldlooklikeandwhattheworld of1952hasfinallycomearoundtoaremoreapparentthanreal.Theregionalapproachtointernationalorganizationhadim-portantadvocatesintheUnitedStatesduringthewar.ItlaybehindtheoriginalstudiesmadebytheDepartmentofStateunderSumnerWelles.AsdescribedinSherwood'sRooseveltand Hopkins,the proposals which President Roosevelt presentedat Teheranto Churchill and Stalin strikingly parallelSpykman'sideas. Nowhere in America's Strategydoes Spykman spell outinany detailthetype ofall-inclusiveorganizationhehadinmindto link and transcend the regional groupings. He does state, how-ever,thatsuchanorganizationwoulddependforitssuccesson cooperation among the great nations and on the establishmentofabalanceofpower.Since1947,whenitbecameapparentthat there could be no cooperation with the Soviet Unionexcepton its own terms, whenit became equally clear thatthe balanceof power was dangerously in favor of the aggressive forces of Com-munism,theUnitedStateshasbeenhardatworkbuildingregional security systems which can enlarge the area and increasethedepthofcooperationamongtheirindividualmembersandatthe same timehelpto restorethetypeofequilibriumwhichNICHOLASJOHNSPYKMAN397willdetertheSovietUnionfromfurtherexternaleffortsatter-ritorialaggrandizement.I l lIfthecriticsin1942wereforthemostpartunwillingtoac-ceptthepremisethateffectiveprotectionofAmericaninterestsdemandedaEuropeanandAsiaticbalanceofpower,theywereeven more hostile to certainof Spykman's corollariesdrawnfromthatpremise.TherewaslittledispositiontoquarrelwiththestatementinTheGeographyofthePeacethat...theclosestcooperationbetweenBritainandtheUnitedStatesisabsolutelynecessary. TheeffectivenessoftheBritishIslesasabaseforactionagainstthecontinentorincooperationwithithasbeenamplyproved by history, and they are an indispensable adjunctto anyattemptbythiscountrytotakepartintheestablishmentofsecurityintheworld.Itwouldbequiteawhileafter1945,however,beforeAnglo-Americancooperationreachedthe pointadvocatedbySpykman.Onthe otherhand,Spykman'sstatementsofwhat,beyondco-operationwithGreatBritain,wasinvolvedinaEuropeanandAsiaticbalanceofpowerarousedmuchshockandanger."ARussianstatefromtheUralstotheNorthSea,"hewroteinAmerica'sStrategy,"canbenogreatimprovementoveraGer-manstatefromtheNorthSeatotheUrals."Thiswasbadbe-cause it seemedto impugnthepurityofthemotivesofourgreatSovietally.Butworsewasyettocome:"Thepresentwareffort;is undoubtedlydirectedagainstthe destructionofHitlerandthe:NationalSocialistParty,butthisdoesnotnecessarilyimplythatit is directedat the destructionofGermany as a militarypower."One criticlabeledthis"oneofthemostastonishingconclusionsI thatcouldwellbeimagined."[AsfortheFarEast,therealsoProfessorSpykmanhadsome hereticalideas, whichappearinanentirelydifferentlightadec-ladelater.InthisareaSpykmanfoundthecontemporarydan-I ger, Japan,andthecontemporaryally,China,capableofquicktreversalafterthewar.A modern,vitalized,andmilitarizedChinaof450millionpeopleisgoing to be a threat, not only to Japan,butalso to the positionof the398WORLDPOLITICSWesternPowersintheAsiaticMediterranean.Chinawillbeacon-tinentalpowerofhugedimensionsincontrolofalargesectionofthelittoralofthatmiddlesea.HergeographicpositionwillbesimilartothatoftheUnitedStatesinregardtotheAmericanMediterranean.WhenChinabecomes strong, herpresenteconomicpenetrationinthatregionwill undoubtedlytakeonpoliticalovertones.Topreservethe balanceof powerinAsia,Spykmansuggested,the UnitedStates mightfinditselfforcedto shiftits supportfromex-allyto ex-enemy.("Oneofthecharmsofpowerpolitics,"hewrylyremarkedearlierinthesamebook,"isthatitoffersnoopportunitytogrowwearyofone'sfriends."Thiswasjustthetype of aside that arousedthe critics to cry "cynic,""cold-bloodedrealist,"andthelike.)Withregardto Japan,Spykmanwrote:TwiceinonegenerationwehavecometotheaidofGreatBritaininorderthatthesmalloff-shoreislandmightnothavetofaceasinglegigantic militarystate incontroloftheoppositecoastofthemainland.Ifthe balanceof power intheFarEastis to bepreservedinthefutureas well as inthe present,theUnitedStates willhavetoadoptasimilarprotectivepolicytowardJapan.AsfortheentirebalanceofpowerinAsia,Americansmustrecognize,saidSpykman,thatpossibilitiesfordirectWesterninfluencewereconstantlydiminishing.Thiswas a themehehaddevelopedas earlyas1926 in discussing"TheSocialBackgroundofAsiaticNationalism."Westernimperialismcarriedwithittheseedsofitsowndestruction.SixteenyearslatertheprocessofWesternexclusionwasstillcontinuingandwouldcontinueafterthedefeatof Japan'seffortsatdominationofanEastAsianCo-ProsperitySphere.ThepowerbalanceintheOrientrests,inthefirstplace,ontherela-tive strengthofthestates withintheareaand,inthesecondplace,onthepressureswhichtheWesternStatescanmakeeffectiveinthere-gion[saidSpykmaninAmerica'sStrategy].Sincetheturnofthecentury,thesignificanceofthesetwosetsoffactorshasshiftedmoreandmoreinfavorofthelocalforces.ItthereforebehoovedtheUnitedStates, as a powerfarremovedfromAsia,tomakeuseofthoseforcesexistingintheareaitselfwhichcouldestablishandpreserveabalanceofpower.AmongsuchforceswasJapan.Aword,finally,needstobesaidaboutProfessorSpykman'sNICHOLASJOHNSPYKMAN399conclusions regarding United States relations within the Western-Hemisphere, a subjectto whicha largepartof America'sStrat-egy was devoted. Spykmanwas generallyandspecificallyscepti-calconcerningNorthAmerican-LatinAmericancooperation,friendship,and understanding. ".. . Thefactremains, that, not-withstanding the constant reiteration of unity and solidarity, theNewWorldhaspreservedasmuchinternationalanarchyandachievednomorepoliticalintegrationthandespisedEurope,"he wrote. And, also,throughtheUnionofAmericanRepublics,theNewWorldhasmadesomehaltingstepstowardpoliticalintegration,butithasnotmovedmuchbeyondplatonicresolutionsonthebeautyofsolidarity.Ithasalsofailedtocreatethepoliticalframeworkforasystemofcommondefenseagainstthreatsfromacrosstheocean.AtleastonecritictookSpykmantotaskforunderestimatingthedegreeofpracticalcooperationwhichhadbeenachieved.Andrightlyso. OneofthedifficultiesappearstobethatSpyk-man nowhere made clear whether his criterion was the degree ofunitynecessaryforthesurvivalofaWesternHemisphereen-circled by a united Europe and Asia hostile to the United States,orthedegreeofcooperationnecessarytoenabletheUnitedStates to mount a successful effortto defeat German and JapaneseattemptsatforcibleunityofEuropeandAsia.(Itshouldberemembered that the manuscript was written beforethe entranceoftheUnitedStatesintoWorldWarII,butappearedashortwhile afterPearlHarbor with only a few amendmentsand addi-tions.)Overlypessimisticashewas,however,ProfessorSpykmancame up with at least three concrete conclusions which a decadelatershouldstillbeborneinmind,notwithstandingthere-markablegrowthoftheinter-Americansystemsince1945. Oneconcerned the weakness of conference resolutions and the dangerofconfusingthemwithactualpolicies.Resolutions, particularlyPan Americanresolutions, areusually melodi-ousintoneandindicativeofafineappreciationofliterarystyle. Col-lectedtogether,theymakeacharmingexhibitandshowwhatartisticresultscan flow fromcooperationbetweenlegalandpoeticminds.400WORLDPOLITICSThesecondhadtodowithUnitedStates-Argentinerelations,withregardtowhichSpykmanwarnedthatsocial,economic,andpoliticalforcescombinedwithgeographicremotenesstomake Argentinaa naturalopponentoftheUnitedStatesandadeterminedresistanttoUnitedStates-sponsoredeffortsatinter-Americancooperation,whateverthesurfaceappearanceofhar-monymightbeatanygivenmoment.Histhirdandmostim-portant conclusion reflectedon the truenature ofUnited States-LatinAmericanrelations.TheWesternHemispherecontains one greatstate surroundedby weakcountriescompletelyunabletodefendthemselves,letaloneothers.Thepossibilityoftruereciprocityis,therefore,excluded,andanymultilateraltreatycontainingreciprocalguaranteeswouldbeincon-flictwiththepowerrealities.TheAmericasmust,therefore,neces-sarilyoperateonthebasisofbilateralagreementsbetweentheUnitedStatesandherneighborsand,becauseoftheenormousdiscrepancyinpowerbetweenthepartiesinsuchagreements,theymustinevitablyremainone-sidedandassumemorethecharacterofprovisionsforthedefenseofprotectoratesandbufferzonesthanofalliancesbetweenequals.And a statement to be memorized by all scholars who have talkedgliblyabout"multilateralizing"theMonroeDoctrine:"Hemi-spheredefensewillcontinuetorest,as inthepast,notontheunited effortsof the American republics, but on the armedforcesoftheUnitedStates."In1952,asin1942,thereexistsintheinter-Americansystem the same nexusof multilateral,bilateral,andunilateralarrangements,withthemoregeneraldependingfortheir success ultimatelyonthemostspecific.Thestudyofinternationalpoliticsina systematicfashionisrelatively new in the United States. Not until the middlethirtieswere serious effortsdevoted to the formulationof a methodologywhich would enable scholars to analyze phenomena, classifydata,andpredicttheprobableresultsofalternatecoursesofpolicy.TothisworkProfessorSpykmandevotedthetragicallyshortperiodgrantedtohim.Thepresentwriterdoesnotbelieveitanexaggerationtostatethattheframeworkforthestudyofinternational politics at which he arrivedplaced him inthe veryforefrontofthe field andledhimtoconclusionswhichareforNICHOLASJOHNSPYKMAN401themostpartas validtodayastheywereadecadeago.PerhapsthetruerecognitionoftheimportanceofSpykman'sworkliesinthe factthatithas servedas thefoundationformorecompre-hensivetheoreticalframeworks,whichcontainmanyelabora-tions andmodificationssuchas hehimselfwouldhave madehadhe livedto continuehis studies.