lynch bolivar and the caudillos (hahr 1983)

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Bolivar and the CaudillosAuthor(s): John LynchSource: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Feb., 1983), pp. 3-35Published by: Duke University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2515357

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Hispanic AmnericanHistorical Review63(1), 1983, 3-35Copyright ?) 1983 by Duke University Press

Bolivar and the Caudillos

JOHN LYNCH*

1

I NDEPENDENCE imposed many roles upon SimonBolivar.He was a military planner and a field commander, a po-

litical philosopher and a maker of constitutions, a liberator

of peoples and a founder of republics. He had to deal not only with

royalist enemies but with foreign friends and anarchic followers. He also

had to control the caudillos, to tame the guerrillas and their leaders

within the revolutionary ranks. The wars of independence in northern

South America incorporated two processes, the constitutionalism of Bo-

livar and the caudillism of the regions, and they were fought with twoarms, regular forces and local guerrillas. These movements were part

allies, part rivals. To compete and rule in such circumstances a soldier

had to be a politician. Bolivar sought power as well as freedom; he wanted

to rule as well as to liberate.' But power did not come easily to him.

He began with obvious assets. His family, education, and status madehim a natural leader in the society of the time. He was one of the richest

men in Venezuela, the owner of four haciendas, two houses in Caracas,

another in La Guaira, and the master of numerous slaves. His private

property gave him a firm power base, until, of course, it was confiscated.

His losses early in the revolution amounted to 80,000 pesos, the largest

single confiscation made by the royalists. Bolivar's total wealth probably

amounted to at least 200,000 pesos, though at the end of his life he had

little more than the unrealized assets of the Aroa copper mines.2

In the primitive warfare of the llanos and among the mass of the

* The author is Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies and Professor of

Latin American History in the University of London.

1. Gerhard Masur, Simon Bolivar (Albuquerque, 1948), p. 184.2. Vicente Lecuna, Catdlogo de errores y caluinnias en la historia de Bolivar, 3 vols.

(New York, 1956-58), I, 157-159; Stephen K. Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, 1815-1820 (Columbus, 1974), p. 163; Paul Verna, Las minas del Libertador (Caracas, 1977), pp.179-181.



4 HAHR I FEBRUARY I JOHN LYNCH

insurgents, these advantagescounted for little. Bolivar belonged to anotherworld, another culture. The incongruity of his position is illustrated in a

story told by the English observer Richard Vowell. In 1817, after the loss

of Calabozo, the patriot officer Manuel Cedefio reached San Fernandoin disgrace, to be met by mutinous llaneros. Jose Antonio P'aez,caudillo

of the western llanos, "who knew how to make himself feared and re-

spected by the soldiers," ended the tumult with a few words and per-

sonally rescued Cedenio. To show who was in command, he had theringleaders arrested, though they included officers from his personal fol-

lowing. Thus the movement was stifled owing to the "irresistible ascend-

ancy" of P'aezover the llaneros. Bolivar meanwhile had shut himself in

his house with his aides and secretaries, and when night fell, he em-barked discreetly on a boat for Angostura, conscious perhaps that withouthis own troops he was powerless among the llaneros, who only obeyed

their personal chief.3

One of Bolivar's greatest achievements was to overcome his innate

disadvantages, to improve his qualifications for leadership, and to gain

for himself the power necessary to fulfill his task. To do this, he had todominate a series of lesser rivals for leadership. He was not an absolute

enemy of the caudillos; in a sense he took them for granted as inevitable

and even useful. Individually a regional caudillo was probably no morethan a minor irritant. Collectively they were a majorhazard to the cause

and the career of the Liberator.

2

The caudillo was a regional chieftain, deriving his power from control

of local resources, especially of haciendas, which gave him access to men

and supplies. Classical caudillism took the form of armed patron-client

bands, held together by personal ties of dominance and submission andby a common desire to obtain wealth by force of arms. The caudillo'sdomain might grow from local to national dimensions. Here, too, su-

preme power was personal, not institutional; competition for;offices andresources was violent and the achievements were rarely permanent. The

caudillo is recognized in profile by historiansand social scientists, thoughsome of his features remain obscure.4 The structural interpretation is

useful but static and lacks the realism of chronology and prosopography;

nor does it allow sufficiently for distinct stages of development, when

3. Richard Vowell, Cainpaias y cruceros (Caracas, 1973), pp. 65-66.4. Eric R. Wolf and Edward C. Hansen, "Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis,"

ComlparativeStudcliesn Society and History, 9 (1966-67), 168-179.



BOLIVAR AND THE CAUDILLOS 5

caudillism existed in embryo, then in incipient or partial form, before

culminating in the major figures of caudillo history.

The colony was not propitious for caudillism. The Spanish empire wasgoverned by an anonymous bureaucracy, and while personalism may

have been important in patronage, it had little place in government or

policy-making, both of which were highly institutionalized. On the mar-

gin of colonial society, however, caudillo prototypes made their appear-

ance. In Venezuela land concentration in the llanos resulted in the for-

mation of vast hatos ("ranches")owned by powerful proprietors who came

to assert private property rights. The hunting activity of the llaneros,

hitherto regarded as common usage, was now defined as rustling and

condemned as delinquency. In self-defense many llaneros grouped them-selves into bands under chieftains, to live by violence and plunder; the

frontiers of rural life came under the control of bandits, and some areas

were in a permanent state of rebellion. While they were an affront to

colonial law and order, however, bandit leaders did not operate beyond

their locality, nor did they pose a political threat.

The caudillo was essentially a product of the wars of independence,

when the colonial state was disrupted, institutions were destroyed, and

social groups competed to fill the vacuum.5 There was now a progression

from llanero, to vagrant, to bandit, to guerrilla fighter, as local proprietorsor new leaders sought to recruit followers. While such bands might enlist

under one political cause or another, the underlying factors were still

rural conditions and personal leadership. The countryside was soon im-

poverished by destruction, and people were ruined by war taxes and

plunder. As the economy reached breaking point, so men were forced

into bands for subsistence under a chieftain who could lead them to

booty. Thus, banditry was a product of rural distress and a cause of it,

and, in the early years of the war, delinquency was stronger than ide-

ology.

It is not uncommon to observe in these vast territories groups ofbandits who, without any political motivation and with desire ofpillage their only incentive, come together and follow the firstcaudillo who offers them booty taken from anyone with property.This is how Boves and other bandits of the same kind have beenable to recruit hordes of these people, who live by vagrancy, rob-bery, and assassination.

5. Robert L. Gilmore, Cauclillisrnand Militarism in Venezuela, 1810-1910 (Athens,Ohio, 1964), pp. 47, 69-70, 107.

6. "Reflexiones sobre el estado actual de los Ilanos," Dec. 6, 1813, cited in GermanCarrera Dainas, Boves, aspectos socio-econ6micos de su accion historica (Caracas, 1968),

p. 158.




Pillage was characteristic of the caudillo system, a method of waging

war used by both sides in default of regular revenue. There were varia-

tions of looting-confiscation of enemy property, taking of provisions,

forced loans, donations, and fines.7 The small bands of guerrillas who

harassed the royalist lines of communications lived by looting. The sei-

zure of booty was also authorized or tolerated by the major chieftains,

and by Bolivar himself. At the first battle of Carabobo (1814), it was

reported, "the booty was immense," and soldiers held triumphantly in

their hands not only articles of war, but money, equipment, and personal

property of royalist officers.8 Looting, therefore, while practiced in a

crude form by caudillos, was not exclusive to them. In a disguised, in-

direct, or even direct form, it was the only way of paying an army or ofacquiring resources for the war effort. In the Guayanacampaign of 1817,

the patriot army simply looted the Caroni Missions and traded the pro-

ceeds in the West Indies for war supplies. In justification Bolivar invoked

the imperatives of war, which forced him to take terrible but vital mea-

sures. In effect, a revolutionary state without revenue had to impose an

informal tax system. This was done in other campaigns, too, when ex-

actions, forced loans, and fines were levied with an arbitrarinesshardly

different from that of the caudillos. And some of Bolivar'sown caudillos

used methods just as cruel as those of any royalist. Juan Bautista Aris-mendi offered JuanAndres Marrerothe chance to buy the lives of himself

and his six sons; after taking the ransom, Arismendi had them all killed.9

Plunder and resources were not the only objectives of the guerrillas.

Bolivar was intensely aware of the deep racialdivisions in Venezuela and

of the reckless exploitation of race prejudice by both sides in the conflict.

Jose Francisco Heredia, creole regent of the Audiencia of Caracas, spoke

of the "mortal hatred" between whites and pardos in Valencia during the

First Republic, and commented: "The guerrilla band that later joined

the king's side encouraged this rivalry, and it was commonly said by theEuropean extremists that the pardos were loyalists and the white creoles

were revolutionaries whom it was necessary to destroy." This was the

policy, he added, of Jose Tom'asBoves and other bandit chiefs, nominally

royalists but in fact "insurgents of another kind," who waged war on all

white creoles: "and so he became the idol of the pardos, who followed

him in the hope of seeing the dominant caste destroyed. "'10When Boves

7. Carrera Damas, Boves, pp. 56, 73.

8. Gazeta de Caracas, No. 73, June 6, 1814.9. JtuanVicente Gonzalez, La doctrina conservadora, Juan Vicente Gonzalez, El pen-

sartnientopolitico venezolano del siglo xix, 2 vols. (Caracas, 1961), I, 179.10. Jose Francisco Heredia, Mernorias del Regente Hereclia (Madrid, n.d.), pp. 41-

51, 239.




occupied and plundered Valencia in June 1814, the Spanish authorities

looked on helplessly; when he took Caracas, he refused to recognize the

captain general or to have his lianero forces incorporated into the royalarmy." His was a personal authority, expressing violence rather thanlegitimacy, and loyal to only a very distant king. Bolivar was acutely

conscious of these developments. He noticed that royalist caudillos in-

cited slaves and pardos to plunder in order to increase their commitment,morale, and group cohesion. 12

But race consciousness also existed among the insurgents. In the

struggle for Maturin in May 1815, the royalist commander Domingo

Monteverde was defeated and his life was saved only by the cover given

him by his zambo servant, "for the insurgents would not fire on thehoinbres de color." 13 The insurgent chieftain in this action was the pardo

Manuel Piar, and Bolivar was to suffer from Piar an insubordination not

dissimilar to that which the royalists experienced from Boves.

3

After the collapse of the First Republic in July 1812, Venezuela under-

went a royalist reaction. This was challenged in the course of 1813 by

two movements, an invasion under Bolivar from the west and the onsetof guerrilla operations in the east. Who were the guerrillas?

The first guerrilla thrust had a social and regional base but also a clear

political objective: to resist the oppressive regime of Monteverde and

fight for a free Venezuela. When, on January 11, 1813, Santiago Mariiio

headed a small expedition, the famous "forty-five" rom Trinidadto Gui-

ria, he led forth his band from his hacienda like a true caudillo, to operate

in territory where he had property, relations, and dependents. Mariiio

was no social bandit. Like Bolivar he came from the colonial elite and he

sought to mobilize social forces, not to change them. 14 At first he was alocal rather than a regional caudillo, but he quickly increased his stature

through military success and reputation. Yet he never acquired the na-

tional, much less the American, vision of Bolivar. He argued that it was

necessary to conquer and hold the east as a precondition of liberating the

11. Jose de Austria, Bosquejo de la historia inilitar de Ventezuela, 2 vols. (Madrid,1960), II, 256.

12. Bolivar to Gaceta Real dejamnaica,Sept. 1815, in Sim6n Bolivar, Obras completas,ed. by Vicente Lecuna an-dEsther Barret de Nazaris, 2d ed., 3 vols. (Havana, 1950), I,

180.13. Heredia, Memnorias, . 172.14. CaIacciolo Parra-P6rez,Marinioy la independencia de Veniezuela,5 vols. (Madrid,

1954-57), I, 134-138. The same is true of many other caudillos, such as Monagas, Valdes,Rojas, and Zaraza.




west. P'aez, on the other hand, maintained that the western front was

the crucial battlefield; victory there would have enabled the royal army

to defeat the eastern caudillos one by one, and thus "the fate of therepublic was at stake in the llanos of Apure."15 The strength of the cau-

dillos lay in their tactical rather than strategic sense. Without Bolivar,

the various regional fronts could not have joined into a national or con-

tinental liberation movement.

Moreover, this particular asset of the caudillos, a regional base for

raising troops, was also a limitation. These troops, as Bolivar complained,

were reluctant to leave their own province, and the caudillos were un-

willing or unable to compel them. At the beginning of 1818, troops of

Francisco Bermuidezrefused to proceed to Guayana. In December 1818even Mariiio was powerless to persuade his men to follow him out of the

province, and he arrived at Pao not at the head of a division as Bolivar

was expecting, but with an escort of thirty men. 16 Insubordination was a

further constraint. In 1819 Mariiio was styled General-in-Chief of the

Army of the East, and "responsible to the Government for the conser-

vation of all that part of the Republic," but in fact he exercised no com-

mand at all over Bermuidez or other minor caudillos. Insubordination

began directly below Bolivar. In 1820 Marifio refused to obey Bolivar's

summons to headquartersand retired in disgust to his hacienda in Giiiria,where he had resources, security, and a guardof loyal retainers: formerly

his troops, now his peons. 17

Yet the guerrillas kept the cause of independence alive during the

long years of counterrevolution. In the course of 1814-16, a number of

bands emerged under leaders who were to become indispensable to Bo-

livar:Pedro Zaraza n the upper llanos, Jose Antonio P'aez n the western

llanos, Manuel Cedenioin Caicara, Jose Tadeo Monagasin Cuman'a,Jesus

Berreto and Andres Rojas in Maturin. These groups rose from the ruins

of the Second Republic. The surviving patriots fled to the plains, jungles,and forests of the east to escape royalistretribution. They then regroupedunder a leader of their choice, partly for self-preservation, partly for the

revolutionary cause. 18 For a guerrilla to surrender or to be captured was

to walk into execution. In this sense emancipation was the only option

left to them. Groups converged and coalesced, until they found a super-

caudillo. Armed with ptias ("lances"),and taking their horses and cattle

15. Jose Antonio Paez, Autobiografla del General Jose Antonio Paez, 2 vols. (Caracas,

1973), I, 109.16. Parra-Perez, Marinio, III, 40.

17. Ibid., III, 242.18. Daniel Florencio O'Leary, Metnorias del General Daniel Floi-encio O'Leary. Na-

rraci6n, 3 vols. (Caracas, 1952), I, 350.




from the Ilanos of Barcelona and Cumana, the guerrillas fought success-

fully against regular forces, attacking communications, ambushing de-

tachments, harassing towns, and then disappearing. They pinned downroyalist forces in a number of different places and forced the Spaniards

to maintain immobile garrisons.The guerrillas not only fought the royalists but also competed with

each other. Leader rivalry sometimes obstructed the war effort, as cau-

dillos struggled with each other for that supremacy which only military

success and the attraction of recruits could bring. No caudillo wanted to

submit to another; each fought to remain independent, in a state of nature

without a common power. Out of this internal war emerged the most

powerful leaders: Monagas, Zaraza, Cedenio, Piar. This was in the east.Leadership in the western llanos demanded supreme physical talents,

and it was this challenge which brought P'aezto the fore:

To command these men and dominate the situation was neededa particular superiority and talent in using the lance with bothhands, to fight on wild horses and to break them in during actualbattle, to swim and to fight while swimming in swollen rivers, tolasso and kill wild beasts simply to get food, in short, to have theability to dominate and overcome a thousand and more dangers

which threaten in these conditions.20

Bolivar, too, possessed extraordinary natural talents and learned to

compete with the caudillos on their own terms. He, who decreed war to

the death against Spaniards, was no less ruthless than the caudillos. His

record of active service was in no way inferior to theirs. His aide, General

Daniel Florencio O'Leary, was struck by the contrast between his slight

physique and his powers of endurance: "After a day's march, enough to

exhaust the most robust man, I have seen him work five or six hours, or

dance as long."2'

Bolivar, however, was distinguished above all by themagic of his leadership. He conquered nature as well as men, overcoming

the immense distances of America in marches which were as memorable

as the battles. He conquered, too, his own origins, widening the social

base of the revolution to appeal to slaves and gente de color.

Yet Bolivar was never a caudillo.22 He always sought to institutionalize

the revolution and to lead it to a political conclusion. The solution that

19. Fernando Rivas Vicufia, Las guterrasde Bolivar, 7 vols. (Bogota, 1934-38; Santia-go, 1940), II, 85-95.

20. Austria, Historia tinilitarde Venezuela, II, 454-456.21. O'Leary, Narraci6n, I, 492.22. For other interpretations, see Masur, Simrzon olivar, p. 253, and Jorge I. Do-

minguez, Inisurrection or Loyalty: The Breakdown of the Spanish AmiiericanEmlpire(Cam-bridge, Mass., 1980), pp. 197-198, 226-227.




he favored was a large nation-state with a strong central government,

totally dissimilar to the federal form of government and the decentrali-

zation of power preferred by the caudillos. Bolivarnever possessed a trueregional power base. The east had its own oligarchy, its own caudillos,

who regarded themselves as allies rather than subordinates. The Apure

was dominated by a number of great proprietors and then by Paez. Bo-

livar felt most at home in Caracas and the center-north. There he had

friends, followers and officers who had fought under him in New Gra-

nada, in the camnpaiaadmnirable,nd in other actions in central Vene-

zuela. Bolivar could give orders to Urdaneta, Ribas, and Caiipo as to

trusted officers, assign them to one division or another, to one front or

another. But from 1814 central Venezuela was occupied by the royalarmy, and Bolivar had to assemble his power by a mixture of military

and political success. As he himself said, he was forced to be a soldier

and a statesman, "simultaneously on the battlefield and at the head of

government . . . both a chief of state and a general of the army."23

Bolivar was a dictator when he wrote these words. Bolivarian dicta-

torship, however, was not caudillism. It was less personal and more in-

stitutional; it dealt in policies as well as patronage. After the campaign

of 1813, Bolivar entered Caracasin triumph on August 6 and established

his first dictatorship, served by known supporters and backed by thearmy. His intention was to concentrate authority in order to defend and

extend the revolution. There was some resentment, however, and he

convoked an assembly on January 2, 1814, to which he explained his

dictatorship: "My desire to save you from anarchy and to destroy the

enemies who were endeavoring to sustain the oppressors forced me to

accept and retain the sovereign power . . . . I have come to bring you

the rule of law. Military despotism cannot ensure the happiness of a

people. A victorious soldier acquires no right to rule his country."24Sub-

sequent Bolivariandictatorships, in Peru and in Colombia, embodied thesame principles; they were a response to emergency, they represented

policies not interests, and they restored law as well as order. Meanwhile,

in 1813, Bolivar was dictator of only half of Venezuela, the west. The

east was won by Marinio,who also saw himself as a liberator, though he

was not preoccupied with definitions of power.25

Bolivar was not alone in his dedication to constitutionalism. General

Rafael Urdaneta, a Zulian, was a man of order and authority, but he

23. Bolivar to RichardWellesley, Jan. 14, 1814, Sim6n Bolivar, Escritos del Libertador

(Caracas, 1964- ), VI, 63.24. Speech to the Caracasassemrbly,Jan. 2, 1814, Escritos, VI, 8-9.25. Parra-Perez, Mariio, I, 325-326.




never became a caudillo, never acquired partidarios or made compro-

inisos binding him to a certain band. He was the complete professional

soldier, later an official, executing always the orders of the central gov-ernment.26 But the supreme example of the noncaudillo was Antonio Jose

de Sucre. As a young man, Sucre in 1813 accompanied the expedition of

Marifioand fought in a number of important actions; but unlike his col-

leagues Manuel Piar, Jose Francisco Bermudez, and Manuel Valdes, he

did not aspire to be an independent chieftain. He came from a wealthy

Cumanafamily and had received an education in Caracas. He was inter-

ested in the technology of warfare and became an expert in military

engineering. "He reduced everything to a method . .. he was the scourge

of disorder," as Bolivar later wrote of him.27 He served as an officer inthe Army of the East for four years, and came under the influence of

Bolivar in 1817, accepting appointment to the Liberator's staff in pref-

erence to the factions of the east.

Decisions of this kind were a question of mentality and values. Sucre

had a soldier's respect for obedience to authority. In placing his interests

and career in Bolivar's hands, he added, "I am resolved to obey you

blindly and with pleasure."28 Sucre did not love fighting for fighting's

sake, as did so many caudillos. He preferred people to join the patriot

cause out of conviction, and by October 1820 he was satisfied that westernVenezuela was convinced: "This triumph of opinion is more brilliant than

that of force."29 Sucre was aware of the alternatives: caudillism or profes-

sionalism. In 1817, when acting for Bolivar to "bring in" Marinio,he

reported: "I have no doubt that General Marifio will come to heel, as he

has no alternative, except to be a guerrilla in the mountains of Gijiria."30

His obedience to Bolivar never faltered. When Francisco Antonio Zea,

vice-president of Venezuela, promoted him to the rank of brigadier gen-

eral, without Bolivar's cognizance, Sucre explained later "that he had

never intended to accept the promotion without General Bolivar's ap-proval. 31 In Peru he was "the right arm of the Liberatorand the mainstay

of the army. 32 Sucre and Urdaneta were the leading lights of the Boli-

varians, an elite of professional officers devoted to the Liberator in war

and to his government in peace.

26. See Rafael Urdaneta, Metmoriasdel General Rafael Urdaneta (Madrid, n.d.).27. "Resumnenucinto de la vida del General Sucre," 1825, Archivo de Sucre (Caracas,

1973- ), I, xli.

28. Sucre to Bolivar, Oct. 17, 1817, ibid., I, 12.29. Sucre to Santander, Oct. 30, 1820, ibid., I, 186.30. Sucre to Bolivar, Oct. 17, 1817, ibid., I, 12.31. O'Leary, Narraci6n, II, 68.32. Ibid., II, 252.




4

The years 1813-17 were perhaps the most challenging of Bolivar's

career. While he fought the enemy without, he also had to resist thecaudillos within, yet he lacked the resources which these enjoyed. The

caudillos conformed to prevailing conditions more closely than he did.

In the absence of a national army, personal leadership was bound to be

decisive, and without a national objective, the structure of insurgency

was inevitably informal.

Marinio was the first caudillo to confront Bolivar. In early 1813 he had

under him Bermuidez, Piar, Valdes, and other minor chiefs who had

recruited troops after landing at Giuiria, forming a force of more than

1,500. After the occupation of Giuiria, he captured Maturin and, later inthe year, Cumana and Barcelona. So Marifio grew into a super-caudillo

through his style, his victories, and his violence. He repaid cruelty with

cruelty. In Cumana he had forty-seven Spaniards and creoles shot in

reprisal; in Barcelona he executed sixty-nine conspirators, because "the

life of such men was incompatible with the existence of the State."33

Naming himself "chief of the independent army," he established not only

an autonomous military command in the east but a political entity sep-

arate from Caracas and from the dictatorship of Bolivar. The Liberator,

on the other hand, insisted on establishing a central authority for allVenezuela. While it made sense to have two military departments, it was

essential to have one central government uniting east and west, Vene-

zuela and New Granada:

If we establish two independent authorities, one in the east and

the other in the west, we will create two different nations which,

because of their inability to maintain themselves as such, or even

more to take their place among other nations, will look ridiculous.

Only a Venezuela united with New Granada could form a nation

that would inspire in others the proper consideration due to her.

How can we think of dividing her into two?34

Thus, Bolivar's first projection of a greater Colombia, united for national

strength and economic viability, was presented as an alternative to the

anarchy of local caudillo rule.

Bolivar's position, weakened by a rival dictatorship in the east, was

destroyed by the intervention of the royalist caudillo Boves and the

triumph of the counterrevolution. Marifio eventually brought his forces

33. Parra-Perez, Marinio, I, 245.34. Bolivar to Marifio, Dec. 16, 1813, Sim6n Bolivar, Cartas del Libertador, ed. by

Vicente Lecuna, 12 vols. (Caracas, 1929-59), I, 88.




to join those of Bolivar and fought alongside him in February and March

1814. The joint army regrouped at Valencia and Bolivar yielded the com-

mand to Marifio, "as a sure sign of his high opinion of his person andservices, and also in this way to ensure the adhesion of the eastern officers

to the common cause of Venezuela."35 Neither the eastern caudillos nor

their forces distinguished themselves in these engagements. Bolivar and

Marinio had to retreat from central Venezuela to the east, not to a safe

base but to caudillo-inspired anarchy. There, in the port of Caruipano,

they were repudiated and arrested by their own "officers," Ribas, Piar,

and Bermudez, and escaped only with difficulty.36

Anarchic and divisive though they were, the caudillos kept the rev-

olution alive during Bolivar's absence. As Jose de Austria observed: "Whilethey did not advance, neither could they be totally destroyed."37 Guer-

rilla warfare was the appropriate method, given the resources available,

the nature of the war, and the strength of the enemy. After the disasters

of 1814 and the victory for royalism even in eastern Venezuela, the cau-

dillos slipped away to recover and to fight another day, sure of finding

followers, as Marinio did in 1816 from "the slaves and bandits in the

mountains of Giiiria."38 It was the counterinsurgency mounted by Gen-

eral Pablo Morillo that brought the caudillos out of their lairs, for it

directly attacked the lives, property, and vital interests of themselves and

other Venezuelan leaders, and made war the only hope of security, "caught

as they were in the desperate alternative of dying or fighting. "39And so

the rural guerrillas were mobilized again, not as a social or political force,

but as military units under strong leaders who offered them booty.

Meanwhile in Haiti, where he was planning a new invasion of Ven-

ezuela, Bolivar had to resolve the question of leadership. A group of

major caudillos was persuaded to recognize his authority for the expe-

dition and until a congress could be held. The vote of the assembly was

reinforced in the initial phase of the expedition at Margarita, whose cau-

dillo, Arismendi, was a supporter of Bolivar's national authority. In a

second assembly, held in the presence of Marinio, Piar, and other cau-

dillos, the leadership of Bolivar was confirmed, and a unanimous vote

was given against the division of Venezuela into east and west: "that the

Republic of Venezuela shall be one and indivisible, that His Excellency,

President and Captain General Simon Bolivar is elected and recognized

as its Supreme Head, and His Excellency General Santiago Marinio as

35. Austria, Historia militar de Ventezuela, II, 222, 226.

36. Parra-Perez, Mariiio, II, 16.37. Austria, Historia inilitar de Venezuela, II, 388.

38. Mox6 to Morillo, Aug. 10, 1816, Parra-Perez, Marinio, II, 70.39. Austria, Historia miilitar de Venezutela, II, 385.




his second-in-command."`0At the same time, Bolivar agreed to legitimize

the guerrilla chiefs by giving them rank and status in his army;the senior

caudillos were made generals and colonels, and the others were given

appropriate rank.

These rituals had only a limited significance. One of the reasons why

Bolivar did not dominate the caudillos was that he did not dominate the

battlefield. After the collapse of the first expedition from Haiti and the

catastropheof Ocumare, he was-actually weaker than the caudillos, some

of whom had at least secured a foothold in the east. Marinio nd Bermuidez

were now determined to deal with Bolivar, whom they called a deserter

and traitor and regarded as inexpert in the art of war. A proclamation

was published in Giliria (August 23, 1816) deposing Bolivar and appoint-ing Marinioas supreme chief, with Bermuidezsecond-in-command. The

army split, and civil war threatened the ranks of insurgency. The caudillos

wanted to take Bolivar into custody, and he barely escaped with his life

from Guiria to Haiti. The humiliationhe suffered in 1816 owed something

to his strategic errors. At this point in the revolution it was impossible

to win on the northern coast of Venezuela, as it was too well defended.

But he had still not learned this lesson or accepted the need for devel-

oping another front.

In the second invasion from Haiti, Bolivar landed at Barcelona, andhis initial plan was to assemble an army to attack, not Guayana, but the

royalist forces blocking the way to Caracas.He thus made himself utterly

dependent upon the caudillos, who were already operating separately in

various parts of the east. He wrote to one caudillo after another, calling

on them to assemble around him in a great proyecto de reunion. He

wrote to Piar, who had already marched on Guayana, instructing him to

bring in his forces: "Small divisions cannot achieve great objectives. The

dispersion of our army, far from helping us, can destroy the Republic."4'

He wrote to Marinio,Zaraza, Cedenio, and Monagas, ordering, request-ing, appealing for unity and obedience. But the caudillos did not sud-

denly change their ways; they stayed out, pursuing their separate objec-

tives. The great army was an illusion, and Bolivar abandoned his hope

of occupying Caracas;he could not even hold Barcelona. He had to make

his way to Guayana, still without an army of his own, still without a

caudillo power base, the victim not only of inexperience but of guerrilla

anarchy.

Bolivar now faced a rebellion of the caudillos. First Bermu'dezand

40. "Acta de Reconocimiento de Bolivar comno efe Supremo," May 6, 1816, Escritos,IX, 123-126.

41. Bolivar to Piar, Jan. 10, 1817, ibid., X, 46.




Valdes revolted against Mariflo, then Marinioagainst Bolivar, and Piar

against all authority. Marifio convoked a minicongress at Cariaco to es-

tablish a provisional government and make himself legitimate. On May9, 1817, he issued a proclamation to the peoples of Venezuela, a sign of

his desire to be a national leader, not simply a regional caudillo. But a

caudillo could not suddenly become a constitutionalist. This was where

Mariflo lost his credibility. Bermuidez and Valdes had already left him

for Bolivar. Now General Urdaneta, Colonel Sucre, and many other of-

ficers who had previously obeyed Mariniowent to Guayanato place them-

selves under Bolivar's orders. The tide began to turn. Military successin Guayana and his own political sense enabled Bolivar to improve his

prospects against the caudillos. It was at this point, when Bolivar wasgathering support, that Piar chose to rebel.

Piar was not a typical caudillo, for he did not possess an independent

power base, regional or economic. He had to rely on his militaryabilities

alone, rising-"by my sword and good luck"-to the rank of general in

the forces of Marifio, a title he conferred upon himself.42He was a pardo

from Curaiao and he made the pardos his constituency. 'Bolivar, too,wanted to recruit coloreds, to free the slaves and incorporate the pardos,

in order to tilt the balance of military forces toward the republic, but he

did not propose to mobilize them politically. Bolivar suffered much elsefromPiar, from his arrogance, ambition, and insubordination,yet he tried

to repay insults with reason: "If we destroy ourselves through conflicts

and anarchy, we will clear the republican ranks and they will rightly call

us vagrants."44But Piar was uncontrollable. He claimied the Orinoco

campaign as his own theater of war, Guayana and the Missions as his

private domain. A contest for supremacy turned into outright rebellion.

He appeared not to realize that the balance of power was turning againstthe caudillos, or perhaps this was what drove him. The victory over the

royalists at Angosturaconfirmed Bolivar's power and placed the initiativewith him. He decided the moment had come to challenge factionalism

and dissidence in the east, and in this mood he ordered Piar and his

Cumana band to be hunted down.45Piar was captured, tried, and sen-

tenced to death as a deserter, a rebel, and a traitor. Bolivar confirmed

the sentence and had him publicly executed, "forproclaiming the odious

principles of race war . . . for inciting civil war, and for encouraging

42. Parra-Perez, Marino, II, 368.43. Jose Domingo Diaz, Recuerdos sobre la rebeli6n de Caracas (Madrid, 1961), p.

336.44. Bolivar to Piar, June 19, 1817, Escritos, X, 264.45. Bolivar to Cedello, Sept. 24, 1817, ibid., XI, 91.




anarchy."46Piar represented regionalism, personalism, and Black revo-

lution. Bolivar stood for centralism, constitutionalism, and race harmony.

He later commented:The death of General Piar was a political necessity which savedthe country, for otherwise he would have started a war of pardosagainst whites, leading to the extermination of the latter and thetriumph of the Spaniards. General Marinioalso deserved to diebecause of his dissidence, but he was not so dangerous and there-fore policy could yield to humanity and even to an old friendship. ...never was there a death more useful, more politic, and atthe same time more deserved.47

The claim had a certain justification. Bolivar simultaneously warned andreassured the creole caudillos.

5

Bolivar now took his campaign for supremacy a stage further. With

the authority and resources won from the victory in Guayana, he began

to impose a unified army structure on the caudillos, to institutionalize

the army, and to establish a clear chain of command. The decree of

September 24, 1817, marked the beginning of his campaign against per-

sonalism and for professionalism. This created the General Staff"for the

organization and direction of the armies," a Staff for the whole army, and

one for each division. The Staff was part of a career structure open to

talent; it was also the source of command, instructions, and orders down-

ward to commanders, officers, and troops.48

The caudillos became generals and regional commanders; their hordes

became soldiers and subject to military discipline defined at the center.

Reform extended to recruitment. Commanders were given quotas and

encouraged to seek troops beyond their original constituencies. Bolivar

fought against regionalism and immobility, and projected a Venezuelan

army with a national identity:

The frequent desertion of soldiers from one division to another onthe pretext of being natives of the province where their chosendivision is operating, is a cause of disorder and insubordination inthe army and encourages a spirit of regionalism which we havetried so hard to destroy. All Venezuelans ought to have the same

46. Bolivar, Manifesto to the peoples of Venezuela, Aug. 5, 1817, ibid., X, 337.47. L. Peru de Lacroix, Diario de Bucuramanga, ed. by N. E. Navarro (Caracas, 1949),

p. 108.48. Decree, Sept. 24, 1817, Escritos, XI, 94-95.




interest in defending the territory of the Republic where they havebeen born as their brothers, for Venezuela is no more than one

single family composedof

manyindividuals bound

together byindissoluble ties and by identical interests. 4

He urged the caudillos to help each other, ordering them to transfermen

and supplies wherever necessary, "accordingto the development of the

war." He did not succeed in integrating Venezuelan insurgency into a

single army, and it remained a collection of local forces. But unity was

his ideal. His object was to end dissidence, to harness regional resources,

and to inspire a national effort. In the course of 1817-19, he organized

three military groups, the Army of the East, the Army of the West, and

the Army of the Center, under himself. Finally, he created a council ofstate as an interim measure until a constitution could be established after

liberation. This consisted of the chief military and civil officers, and ex-

isted to deal with matters of state, defense, and justice. It was advisory

only, and depended on the supreme chief for its meeting. 50

Caudillos who collaborated were employed in specific assignments.

After the execution of Piar, Marifio was isolated and his government

collapsed. Bolivar could afford to awaithis voluntary submission. He sent

Colonel Sucre on a mission of pacificationto persuade Marifio'sallies and

subordinates to acknowledge the authority of the supreme chief. Hischarges against Marifiowere expressed in precise terms: while Piar was

a "rebel," Marifiowas a "dissident," a threat to authority and unity, and

Bolivar made clear his determination "to break up the faction of which

you are caudillo."51 Bermuidezwas appointed governor and militarycom-

mandant of Cuman'a, a province so impoverished by war that it was

incapable of sustaining independent caudillism and had to be supplied

from outside.52 Bolivar now approved of Bermrndez: "He has a great

reputation in his country, is well liked, obedient, and a keen defender

of the government."53 Not everyone agreed.

Coercion of the caudillos was not complete. Bolivar's policy of using

caudillos to control caudillos had only limited success. While he regarded

Bermuidezas an agent of unification, others knew him as a savage and

vindictive rival, a medium of discord, not peace, the archcaudillo, who

happened now to be on Bolivar's side. Marifio rejected the mission of

Bermuidezand swore that "no power on earth would remove him from

49. Bolivar to Bermuidez, Nov. 7, 1817, Daniel Florencio O'Leary, Memorias, 33 vols.(Caracas, 1879-87), XV, 449-450; Rivas Vicunfa,Las guerras de Bolivar, III, 63-64.

50. Decree, Oct. 30, 1817, Escritos, XI, 318-320.51. Bolivar to Marin-o,Sept. 17, 1817, ibid., XI, 27.52. Bolivar to Zaraza, Oct. 3, 1817, ibid., XI, 157-158.53. Bolivar to Monagas, Oct. 30, 1817, ibid., XI, 160.




his province."54 Conflict between the two caudillos simply held up the

military effort in 1818 and enabled the royalists to dominate Cumana. It

was some time before Bolivar could pacify Marinioand persuade him tocollaborate in an attackon the enemy; and late in 1818 he appointed him

general-in-chief of the Army of the East, with jurisdiction in the llanos

of Barcelona, while other eastern districts were assigned to Bermuidez

and Cedefio. But the struggle with caudillism was not over. Having rec-

onciled the easterners, Bolivar had still to win over the strongman of the

west, Jose Antonio Paez.

P'aezwas the perfect caudillo, the model against which all others were

measured. He was of, yet above, the llaneros; in, yet outside, the lianos.

However modest his origins, he did not come from the marginof society.He was a blanco, his father was a petty official, and he had fled into the

llanos from Barinas, becoming a cavalry captain in the army of the First

Republic. He underwent recognizable preparationsfor leadership, learn-

ing llanero life the hard way on a cattle estate, and he became more

successful than others in plundering, fighting, and killing. His qualities

of leadership attracted his first followers, and plunder retained them.

Like most caudillos he specialized in guerrillafighting rather than regular

warfare, knowing the plains and rivers of the southwest and the tactics

suitable for that region. He was the prototype of the man on horseback,lance at the ready, leading his bands in cattle raiding, in fighting rivals,

in defeating Spaniards. The ideological commitment of his followers was

slight, and booty was a greater interest. His troops, or some of them,

had previously fought for the enemy, "composed in large part of those

ferocious and valiant zambos, mulattos, and Blacks who had formed the

army of Boves."55But P'aezhad his own methods with the llaneros. Many

of the Venezuelan officershe regarded as barbariansand assassins. Unlike

them, he did not kill prisoners. Royalist llaneros received fair treatment.

Those who were interested were welcomed into the patriot forces; therest were sent home to spread his reputation for tolerance and gain more

adherents. This was the force which he fashioned into an armyof cavalry.

This was the force which Bolivar wanted for the army of independence.

P'aezhad already won a leadership struggle in 1816 before he faced

Bolivar. Most Venezuelans regarded the phantom government of Dr.

Fernando Serrano at Trinidad de Arichuna as irrelevant, and they had

little confidence in Colonel Francisco de Paula Santander, the New Gra-

nadan officer whom Serrano had appointed commander-in-chief of the

Army of the West. This was a case, as Jose de Austriapointed out, where

54. Parra-Perez, Marino, II, 497-498.55. Diaz, Recuerdos, p. 324.




a formal "constitutional" structure, isolated and powerless, had to yield

to a more realistic authority, the caudillo; for the local military "did not

recognize any superior authority other than that gained by the valor anddaring with which they fought . What the llanero soldiers wanted

and the situation demanded was "an absolute militarychief" in command

of operations, recruits, and resources. The so-called military revolt of

Arichuna, therefore, was not a caudillo coup but a spontaneous move-

ment among officers, llaneros, and priests to produce a leader who could

deliver them from the enemy. "The instinct of self-preservation was the

principal incentive. Colonel Santanderwas not the leader needed for that

war:in other campaigns, in other military and civil duties, his knowledge

and intelligence could be useful; but for the difficulties then prevailinghe lacked the essential qualities."56According to P'aez,he was "elected"

to replace Santander, for the troops wanted "a supreme chief."57There

was a certain truth in the claim: this was how a caudillo was made, and

these were his qualities, voted upon by a junta of senior military com-

mandersin the Apure. It was a different route from that taken by Bolivar.

The guerrilla war which Paez then waged was a personal triumph; in

the lands of the AraucaRiver and the plains of the Apure he was supreme.

But his force was not effectively linked to the independence movement,

and while the Spaniardswere harassed, they were not destroyed. Bolivarknew that he needed PTaez nd his army for the revolution. The two

leaders came to terms.

P'aezclaimed that he commanded in the Apure "with absolute inde-

pendence and answerable to no human power." Yet when Bolivar sent

two officers from Guayana to ask that P'aezrecognize him as "supreme

head of the republic," the caudillo did not hesitate; he agreed without

even consulting the officers who had elected him, and insisted to his

reluctant troops that they do the same. So Paez submitted his authority

to that of the Liberator, "taking into account the military talents of Bo-livar, the prestige of his name and his reputation abroad, and realizing

above all the advantage to be derived from a supreme and central au-

thority which would direct the different caudillos operating in various

parts . . 58 When Paez first met Bolivar in the llanos at San Juan de

Payara, he was struck by the contrast between his civilized manner and

the wild surroundings,between his refined appearanceand the barbarism

of the llaneros: "There could be seen in one place the two indispensable

elements to make war: the intellectual force which plans and organizes,

56. Austria, Historia inilitar de Venezuela, II, 454-455.57. Paez, Autobiografla, I, 83.58. Ibid., I, 124.




and the material which brings them to effect, qualities which assist each

other and which are ineffective without the other."59 Paez was charac-

teristically wrong in assuming that Bolivar was an intellectual only. More-

over, he still played with the idea of an independent authority, and when

a group of officers and lianeros at San Fernando de Apure attempted to

install him as general-in-chief, he accepted, and it needed firm action by

Bolivar to nip this movement in the bud. In his autobiography, Paez told

the story as an innocent.bystander, but this was not the impression of

O'Leary.60

This and other incidents did not go unnoticed at the time. The cau-

dillos were not helpless creatures of events; political and military options

were open to them. This was why contemporary historians tended tocriticize them for insubordination. Paez rejected the criticism:

Sr. Restrepo, speaking of the guerrilla chiefs who operated in

various parts of Venezuela, says that they behaved like great lords

of feudal times, with absolute independence, and that only slowly

and reluctantly, especially the present writer, did they submit to

the authority of the supreme chief. This historian forgets that at

the time to which he refers there was no central government, and

force of circumstances obliged the military chieftains to exercise

an independent authority, as they did until Bolivar returned fromabroad and requested us to recognize his authority as supreme

chief. 61

P'aez omits to say that there were still many examples of insubordi-

nation. In February 1818, he refused to follow Bolivar's lead and take

the offensive to the enemy, and instead continued to press the siege of

San Fernando. There were good military reasons for his decision. San

Fernando was important in itself and for an opening to New Granada,

while to pursue Morillo northward into the mountains was to take the

patriot cavalry into territory where the Spanish infantry was superior.The subsequent campaign was not to Bolivar's advantage. But there were

also political elements in the caudillo's action, as O'Leary points out:

In this, too, Bolivar had to acquiesce, because the troops of the

Apure were more like the contingent of a confederate state than

a division of his army. They wanted to return to their homes . . .

P'aez, accustomed to exercise a despotic will and the enemy of all

subordination, could not reconcile himself to an authority which

59. Ibid., I, 128.60. Ibid., I, 153-154; O'Leary, Narraci6n, I, 489-491; R. A. Humphreys, ed., The

"Detached Recollections" of General D. F. O'Leary (London, 1969), pp. 19-20.61. Paez, Atntobiografia, I, 155.




he had so recently recognized. And Bolivar, for his part, was too

shrewd and tactful to exasperate the violent and impetuous Paez.62

Bolivar still understood the limits of his authority and his dependence

on the resources of individual chieftains in his army. O'Leary compared

it to the relation between monarchs and powerful feudal barons in me-

dieval Europe. In preparing to invade New Granada, Bolivar was careful

to avoid trouble from the caudillos, aware of the danger behind him as

well as of the enemy ahead.

Bolivar led a trained army into New Granada, and the victory of

Boyac'a in August 1819 set the seal of success on his authority and his

strategy. Meanwhile, in Venezuela, the caudillos were engaged in smaller

operations, not always successfully and rarely in agreement among them-

selves. P'aez ignored specific instructions from Bolivar to move toward

Cuicuta and cut the enemy communications with Venezuela.63 Marifio

failed to link up with Bermuidez. Urdaneta was obliged to take Arismendi

prisoner for insubordination. And the caudillos now vented their hostility

not directly on Bolivar but on the government in Angostura, especially

the vice-president, Francisco Antonio Zea, who was a civilian, a Grana-

dine, and a political weakling, qualities held in little respect by Vene-

zuelan caudillos.64 They forced Zea to resign, Congress elected Arismendi

in his place, and he in turn appointed Mariiio general-in-chief, based at

Maturin. Thus in the course of September 1819 the caudillos staged a

comeback, expressing and exploiting Venezuelan nationalism in a way

which was a warning for the future. But this victory was only temporary,

for the news of Boyac'a was already undermining the rebellion; Bolivar

was now powerful enough to overlook it and to post Arismendi and Ber-

murdez to military commands in the east. 65 His next task was to end the

war in Venezuela and prepare for a postwar settlement.

6

The Carabobo campaign was important not only for the defeat of the

Spaniards but also for the further integration of the caudillos into a na-

tional army. As divisional commanders, they led their troops out of their

homelands to serve under a commander-in-chief whom they had so often

repudiated in the past. To bring the republican army to its most effective

position at the right time in the course of June 1821-this marked true

62. O'Leary, Narraci6n, I, 461.63. Ibid., I, 552-555.64. Bolivar to Santander, July 22, 1820, Obras comipletas, I, 479.65. Rivas Vicufia, Las guerras de Bolivar, IV, 152-155.




progress in organization and discipline, the direct result of the military

reforms of Bolivar. As the army advanced in search of its adversary, it

consisted of three divisions: the first commanded by General P'aez, thesecond under General Cedefio, and the third in reserve commanded by

Colonel Plaza; General Mariiio served on the General Staff of the Lib-

erator himself. Bolivar described this army as "the greatest and finest

ever to bear arms in Colombia on any battlefield."66The victory of June

24 crowned these great troop movements. Cedeiio and Plaza fell in battle.

P'aezwas promoted to general-in-chief on the field. And Mariniowas left

as commander-in-chief of the army, while Bolivar and Paez went on to

enter Caracas. Carabobo, however, did not signify the death of the cau-

dillos. While these warriorscould be organizedfor war and marched intobattle, peace would let them loose again.

In the aftermathof Carabobo, Bolivar's satisfaction was tempered by

his awareness of postwar political problems. He despaired of Venezuela:

"This is chaos; it is impossible to do anything good here, because the

good men have disappeared and the bad have multiplied."67 If Venezuelawere to organize itself peacefully, it was essential to satisfy and to coopt

the caudillos. This he did in two ways: by giving them regional appoint-

ments and by granting them land.

On July 16, 1821, Bolivar issued a decree which in effect institution-alized caudillism. In the west he established two politico-military regions,

one for Paez, the other for Marinio.The eastern provinces he assigned

to Bermuidez. Overtly all three were equal, and the country so divided

into departments entered into the republic of Colombia on the same

footing as other provinces. But from the start, the government of Paez

enjoyed hegemony, and from a regional caudillo Paez became a national

hero, indisputable military and political leader of Venezuela. Established

in the country's socioeconomic center around Caracas, commander of

what remained of a disciplined army, the soldiers of the llanos of Apure,P'aez was well placed to impose his authority over the other military

caudillos, attentive to the oligarchywho surrounded him and the masses

who idolized him. Marinio,rooted out from his homeland in the east and

deserted by his own caudillos-Bermuidez, Monagas, Valdes-had lost

his base, his clients, his patronage. General Paez was thus promoted to

a position from which in one form or another he was to dominate Ven-

ezuela for the next twenty-five years.

But had Bolivar any alternative? While he was away in Colombia and

Peru, he had to leave Paez in charge and the caudillos in their homelands,

66. O'Leary, Narraci6n, II, 90.67. Bolivar to Santander, July 10, 1821, Obras comipletas, I, 572.




as this seemed the only realistic way to govern Venezuela, by a systemof power applied from strong personal domains. The professional mllilitary

he kept with him for his campaigns outside Venezuela, for they weremore mobile than the caudillos, more useful as officers, and less moti-

vated by political ambitions. But after the war, their only base was the

professional army, their career was the revolution, while the caudillo had

come to represent basic economic and political interests that were vir-

tually unchallengeable by the Bolivarians. Meanwhile, the civilian leg-islatorshad begun to resent the military, both caudillos and professionals,

and to attacktheir claims upon resources. The House of Representatives

in Bogota sought to remove the military fuero and abolish the right of

soldiers to vote in 1825. O'Leary thought they were going too far andtoo fast, for the soldiers had won the war and the republic still needed

them. In Colombia, he argued, men were everything, institutions noth-

ing:

The government was still sustained through the influence andpower of the caudillos who had made independence: institutionsby themselves had no force at all; the people were a machinewhich had ceased to function, being too ignorant to take action;what is known as public spirit did not exist. It was not politic,

therefore, to provoke so powerful a class [the caudillos] in soci-ety.68

If the war of independence was a struggle for power, it was also a

dispute over resources, and the caudillos fought for land as well as for

liberty. Bolivar was the first to acknowledge this and to provide economic

incentive as well as political access. His decree of September 3, 1817,ordered the confiscation by the state of all property and land of the

enemy, Americans as well as Spaniards, to be sold in public auction to

the highest bidder, or, failing that, to be rented out on behalf of thenational treasury.69The property was used not only as an immediate

income for the patriot government, but also as a source of land grants to

officers and soldiers of the republic according to their rank, promotion

being regarded as a gauge of service. The decree of October 10, 1817,ordered grants ranging from 25,000 pesos for a general-in-chief to 500

for an ordinary soldier.70 The scheme was confined to those who had

68. O'Leary, Narraci6n, II, 557.69. Decree, Sept. 3, 1817, Escritos, XI, 75-77; Universidad Central de Venezuela,

Materiales para el estudio de la cuesti6n agraria en Venezuela. Vol. 1. 1800-1830 (Caracas,1964), pp. 201-202.

70. Decree, Oct. 10, 1817, Escritos, XI, 219-221; La cuesti6n agraria en Venezuela,pp. 204-205.




fought in the campaigns of 1816-19, and the intention, as Bolivar put it,

was "to make of each soldier a property-owning citizen."7t It was also

necessary to find a substitute for a salary.The caudillos were the first to benefit. One of the earliest grants, by

special request of Bolivar to the National Land Commission, was that to

General Cedeiio, to enable him to establish a hacienda in the sabanas of

Palmar.72 Even those out of favor were among the first recipients. The

Congress of Angostura in December 1819 confirmed the award of cacao

haciendas in Guiria and Yaguarapo to Mariiio and Arismendi.73 These

were properties confiscated from Spaniards. The government also grant-

ed certain old properties belonging to Spaniards to Urdaneta, Bermudez,

and Soublette, most of whom had entered the war of independence with-out any kind of property. From 1821, the caudillos were pressing their

claims for specific haciendas and lands directly on the executive, who

usually preferred to pass the requests to the land tribunals. The most

desirable properties were the commercial plantations in the north, many

of whose owners had, if only nominally, supported the cause of indepen-

dence and now fiercely resisted any attack on their property, even by

the caudillos.

P'aez was the most successful of all the caudillos. Yet P'aez had used

land as a medium of mobilization very early in his campaign.

When General P'aez occupied Apure in 1816 he found himself

alone in enemy territory . . . he was therefore forced to offer his

troops a free share in the properties belonging to the government

of Apure. This was one of the most effective ways of retaining the

support of the troops and attracting new recruits, as they all stood

the same chance of gaining.74

This policy did not materialize, for P'aez proved to be more interested in

his own acquisitions than in those of his men.Even before the end of the war in Venezuela, P'aez was granted "by

the General Congress the right to redistribute national properties as

President of the Republic," though it was confined to the army of Apure

and the territory under his jurisdiction. These special prerogatives were

delegated by Bolivar out of frustration over the failure of previous at-

tempts to redistribute land among the military.75 Before distribution,

71. Bolivar to Zaraza, Oct. 11, 1817, Escritos, XI, 227.

72. Bolivar to Land Commission, Dec. 3, 1817, La cuesti6n agraria en Venezuela, p.211.

73. Parra-Perez, Marinio, III, 225.74. Bricenio Mendez to Gual, July 20, 1821, O'Leary, Meinorias, XVIII, 399-400.75. Decree, Jan. 18, 1821, La cuesti6n agraria en Venezuela, pp. 282-283.




however, P'aez acquired the best properties for himself. His holdings

were not restricted to the llanos, but extended into the center-north, the

homeland of the traditional oligarchy. He began to appropriate land ona large scale in the valleys of Aragua in October 1821, when he appliedfor ownership of the Hacienda de la Trinidad, one of the largest in the

area and previously the property of an einigrado, Antonio Fern'andezde

Leon, whose family had founded the estate in the eighteenth century.

He was awarded the property in November in exchange for the payment

of wages in arrears. He also succeeded in his bid for the Yagua ranch.76

A few years later, in 1825, he made an overtly generous offer to the vice-

president of Colombia to donate his land to the nation so that the troops

could be granted the land they had been promised in lieu of wages. Butthis gesture was purely demagogic: it enabled him to act as a patron and

retain the loyalty of the troops, while reserving the right to buy back the

debt vouchers, which were the first-and often the only-stage of a land

grant.7 These were the tactics of many caudillos, who offered the troops

sums of money (sometimes 50 or 60 pesos for vouchers worth 1,000) in

exchange for these land certificates, a notorious abuse which extended

throughout Venezuela and New Granada.

Acquisition of land and the formation of estates helped to keep the

caudillos in a state of contentment in the years immediately after inde-pendence and prevented them from turning their menacing gaze upon

the central oligarchy. A new elite of landowners, rewarded from seques-

tered property or from public land, joined the colonial proprietors andin some cases replaced them. According to Santander, under the law of

July 25, 1823, some 4,800,000 acres had been distributed or offered to

claimants in settlement of military pay, and more land was being sought

by Congress for such purposes from the national total of some 640,000,000

acres.78Meanwhile, the military, who had not received their due, com-

plained bitterly over the operations of the land commissions. From eastto west there were accusations of favoritism, inertia, and inefficiency. A

76. Soublette to Minister of Finance, Oct. 5, 1821, La cuesti6n agraria en Venezuela,pp. 311-312, 316-317; Manuel Perez Vila, "El gobierno deliberativo. Hacendados, comer-ciantes y artesanos frente a la crisis 1830-1848" in Fundaci6n John Boulton, Politica yeconoinia en Venezuela 1810-1976 (Caracas, 1976), pp. 44-45.

77. Paez to Santander, Feb.-Mar. 1825, La cuesti6n agraria en Venezuela, pp. 421-

422.78. Santander to Pedro Bricefio Mendez, Jan. 6, 1826, Santander to Montilla, Jan. 7,

1826, in Roberto Cortazar, ed., Cartas y nensajes del General Francisco de Paula Santan-

der, 1812-1840, 10 vols. (Bogota, 1953-56), VI, 40-44; Paez, Autobiografia, II, 297; Lau-reano Vallenilla Lanz, CesarismXo emocrdtico (Caracas,1952), pp. 106-107; Federico Brito

Figueroa, Historia econo6micay social de Venezuela, 2 vols. (Caracas, 1966), I, 207-220;

Miguel Izard, El niedo a la revolucio'n.La lucha por la libertad en Venezuela (1777-1830)

(Madrid, 1979), pp. 158-163.



26 HAHR I FEBRUARY ! JOHN LYNCH

complainant in Cumana drew attention not only to family influence but

also to "deference to class," in favor of the few against the many.79

First among the few was Paez. He was shrewd enough to realize thatcontrol of local resources, indispensable for a local caudillo, was insuffi-

cient for access to national power. The cattle ranches of the llanos and

the sugar estates of Cuman'a could give leaders like P'aez and Mariiio

bases for regional action, but in the ultimate analysis these economies

were dependent upon Caracas and subordinate to its interests. This was

the reason why Paez and other political pretenders sought land in the

center-north and an alliance with the established elite of that region.

Paez was successful in acquiring a new power base and in reassuring the

landowners, merchants, and officeholders of Caracas that he stood fororder and stability; they in turn tamed their chosen caudillo, dissuaded

him from pursuing abolition of slavery, and converted him to new eco-

nomic priorities. Thus, he came to identify with the agricultural and

commercial interests of Caracas; he turned his back on the llanos and the

other regional economies, and accepted the hegemony of the northern

hacendados and the exporting sector.

This was in the future. Meanwhile, in the mid-1820s, Paez led the

Venezuelan oligarchy in a separatist movement which would place their

country under the control of the national elite, ruled from Caracas andnot from Bogota, and monopolizing its own resources. This was an alli-

ance of landowners and military caudillos on behalf of a conservative and

independent Venezuela. But a movement against Colombia was a move-

ment against Bolivar and led to a new stage of caudillo history.

7

Bolivar was not preoccupied by caudillos; he saw them as an inevitable

part of the postrevolutionary settlement, as they hadbeen

anessential

feature of the war.

I believe that Venezuela could very well be governed by P'aez,

with a good secretary and a good adviser like General Bricenjo

Mendez, and with the help of 4,000 men of the army which went

to Peru . . . . I want Bricenio Mendez to go to Caracas to marry

my niece and become adviser to Paez . . . General Marinio would

not do as intendant, but he can serve well as commanding general,

though General Clemente could do better. General Paez, together

with Bricenio Mendez, will rule the region to perfection, as Paezis feared by all the factious elements and the others are second-

ary.80

79. Ale-ta (Cumana), Feb. 10, 1826, La cuesti6n agr-ariaen Venezuela, p. 476.

80. Bolivar to Santander, Oct. 13, 1825, Obras coinpletas, II, 234.




Dissident caudillos he distrusted, and for this reason he did not like

the idea of Mariiio returning to political activity, least of all in the east;

but where a caudillo was amenable, he regarded him as an asset for a

country like Venezuela. Yet the problem was more complex. P'aez as a

medium of authority was useful; Paez as a national leader was dangerous.

P'aez had few political ideas of his own and was prone to take advice;

not, however, from Pedro Briceiio Mendez or other Bolivarians, but from

a faction in Caracas which Bolivar called "the demagogues." These en-

couraged him to believe that he had not received the power and recog-

nition he deserved. His exasperation with legislators and politicians fo-

cused especially on those in Bogot'a, civilians whom he regarded as

oppressors of the "poor military." In 1825 he urged Bolivar to take great-er, even monarchical, powers and to make himself a Napoleon of South

America. Bolivar rejected the idea, pointing out that Colombia was not

France and he was not Napoleon. 81

In April 1826, P'aez was relieved of his command and summoned to

Bogot'a for impeachment by Congress on charges of illegal and arbitrary

conduct in recruiting civilians for the militia in Caracas. The object, as

Santander explained, was "to make the first chiefs of the republic un-

derstand that their services and heroism are not a license to abuse the

citizens."82 But P'aez resisted. Backed by the llaneros, and promptedperhaps by the Venezuelan military and the federalists around him, he

raised the banner of revolt on April 30, first in Valencia, then in the

Department of Venezuela. There was much support for him, though not

universal support, for a sense of national identity was not sufficiently

developed to appeal to everyone. His action was divisive. The other

caudillos reacted variously. Marinio aligned himself with P'aez; Bermurdez

rejected him.

In Zulia, meanwhile, General Urdaneta awaited orders from Bogot'a

and remained a loyal Bolivarian. Like many of the military, however, hederived satisfaction from P'aez's opposition to Congress, as it reinforced

their pressure on Bolivar to establish a stronger government. Bolivar was

now the focus of the personalism that he so abhorred. The British consul

in Maracaibo reported, after an interview with Urdaneta, that the military

"remain constant in their attachment and obedience to their Chiefs, rath-

er than to the Constitution and to Congress, and hope much from the

return of the President . . . . the civil power and republican principles

have been making too rapid, or rather too rash, strides to destroy the

military aristocracy . . . . According to the same source, the militarywere disillusioned with a government "monopolized by General Santan-

81. Bolivar to Paez, Mar. 6, 1826, Cartas, V, 240.82. Santander to Bolivar, May 6, 1826, Cartas y mzensajes,VI, 316.




der and by a faction of shopkeepers at Bogota . . . . My impression is

that there are very few military men in the country that would not cheer-

fully cry out tomorrow, Long live King Bolivar .. 83 Whatever theaccuracy of this impression, it confirmed other indications that military

opinion placed all its hopes in Bolivar.

Bolivar's reaction to the rebellion of Paez was ambivalent. He did not

approve of military rebellion against civil power. Yet in this particular

case he had more sympathy with Paez than with Santander and the leg-

islators, whom he saw as destroying their liberators and causing resent-

ment among the military. He also knew that they were being unrealistic

in trying to deprive a caudillo of his military command. He did not wish

to become personally involved, for, if he failed, he risked his own au-thority. It was in this mood that he wrote his dramatic analysis of the

racial origins and the moral history of Americans and expressed his pref-

erence for an "able despotism." Given the socioracial formation of Amer-

ica, he asked, "Can we place laws above heroes and principles above

men?"84 Bolivar here recognized the force of personalism and the power

of the strongman, and gave it a structural explanation. It was in this

context, too, that he wrote to P'aez, admitting the danger of demoralizing

the army and provoking provinces into taking power unto themselves.

He denounced democrats and fanatics and asked, "Who shall restrain theoppressed classes? Slavery will break its yoke, each shade of complexion

will seek mastery."85 And the answer? In due course, it was his Bolivian

constitution with a life-term president empowered to appoint his succes-

sor. Meanwhile, the government had to maintain law and order "by

means of the press, the pulpit, and the bayonet."86 So Bolivar stood for

the continuation of Colombia under his dictatorship, exercised through

extraordinary powers which the constitution allowed him, and the rec-

onciliation of Venezuela through necessary reforms.

The conflict between centralism and federalism, therefore, containeda racial problem, or so Bolivar believed. He was aware that there were

strong objections to the choice of Bogota as capital, not least the fact of

its remoteness. But he argued that there was no alternative, "for though

Caracas appeared to be the more natural spot, from being more populous

and influential, yet the province was chiefly composed of people of color

who were jealous of and opposed to the white inhabitants, and it was

83. Sutherland to Canning, Maracaibo, Sept. 1, 1826, Sutherland to H. M. Charg6

d'affaires,Oct. 2, 1826, Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office (hereinafter cited asPRO, FO) 18/33.

84. Bolivar to Santander, July 8, 1826, Cartas, VI, 10-12.85. Bolivar to Paez, Aug. 4, 1826, ibid., VI, 32.86. Bolivar to Paez, Aug. 8, 1826, ibid., VI, 49-52.




desirable consequently for the general tranquility to diminish rather than

augment the influence of Caracas."87 From the same facts the Venezuelan

ruling class drew precisely the opposite conclusion. They wanted proxi-mate power, even home rule, for Venezuela, "a very energetic and con-

centrated system in consequence of its containing a great diversity ofcolor."88Racial tension and pardo ambition required close supervision

and control, and the elite could not but support P'aez,because, like Juan

Manuel de Rosas in Buenos Aires, he was virtually the only leader whocould control the popular classes.

Bolivar moved into Venezuela in late 1826 to confront the rebellion

of P'aez.He warned the caudillo of his previous encounters with person-

alism.

General Castillo opposed me and lost; General Piar opposed meand lost; General Mariiio opposed me and lost; General Riva-Agiiero opposed me and lost; and General Torre Tagle opposedme and lost. It would seem that Providence condemns my per-sonal enemies, whether American or Spanish, to perdition. Butsee how far Generals Sucre, Santander, and Santa Cruz havegone. 89

He also made it clear that he went as president and not in a personal

capacity, pointing out that his was the only legitimate sovereignty in

Venezuela, whereas P'aez's command came from the municipalities and

was born in violence. Although he mobilized his forces, he did not want

further violence. He had come to save P'aez "from the crime of civil

war."90Conciliation was also favored by the majority opinion in both

countries. There was little alternative. Bolivar was aware of the dangerof trying to use force against P'aez,"since almost all the principal military

commands throughout Colombia are filled by natives of Caracas."9tSohe compromised. On January 1, 1827, he received P'aez's submission,

but at a price, namely, total amnesty for all the rebels, guarantees of

security in their offices and property, and promises of constitutional re-

form.

Bolivar governed Venezuela in person from Januaryto June 1827. He

incurred the most scathing criticism of Santander and his supporters for

leniency toward Paez and for unconstitutional tendencies. He confirmed

87. Ricketts to Canning, Lima, Feb. 18, 1826, C. K. Webster, ed., Britain aned heIndependence of Latin Amzerica, 1812-1830. Select Documnents rom the Foreign Office

Archives, 2 vols. (London, 1938), I, 530.88. Ker Porter to Canning, Apr. 9, 1827, PRO, FO 18/47.89. Bolivar to Paez, Dec. 11, 1826, Cartas, VI, 119-120.90. Bolivar to Paez, Dec. 23, 1826, ibid., VI, 133-134.91. Watts to Bidwell, Aug. 5, 1826, PRO, FO 18/31.




P'aez in his command with the title Superior Chief of Venezuela, a title

which did not exist in the constitution and which Bolivar produced to

recognize the facts of the case and legitimize a caudillo. P'aezwould never

obey Bogot'a, but he might obey Bolivar. Yet Paez's political role was

determined not only by Bolivar. He was recognized as a valuable leader

by the Caracas landowners, merchants, and others of the coalition that

he kept together on a platformof peace and security and on the awareness

of a mutual need.

8

Bolivar left Venezuela to the rule of Paez and returned to Bogota in

September to assume command of the administration. Amidst the grow-ing anarchy of 1828, when the independence of the great magnates and

the restlessness of the masses threatened to destroy the young republic,

he spoke compulsively of the need for "strong government. "I foresee

the certain destruction of Colombia unless the government is given an

enormous power, capable of stifling the anarchy which will raise a thou-

sand seditious heads."92He believed that the constitution did not con-

form to the social structure: "We have made the executive subordinate

to the legislative, which has been given a far greater share in adminis-

tration than the nation's true interests require."93He also believed thatthe legislative had excessive power over the military; it had given the

civil courts absolute control in military cases, thus destroying discipline

and undermining the confidence of the army. But he had little hope in

the Congress of Ocaiia and was strongly critical of its factionalism and

hostility to Bolivarianpolicies. He was also outragedwhen the convention

endorsed the rebellion of the pardo General Jose Padilla, who sought to

rally Cartagena against Bolivar in favorof Santanderand the Constitution

of Cuicuta, a rebellion based on the pardo population of the coast. His

own view was that Padilla should be tried according to the law as an

example to others, and in due course he was.94

The rebellion of Padilla had the "effect of rallying all the people of

property and influence round the person of General Bolivar, as the only

one capable of now restoring tranquility in Colombia. 95 As the Conven-

tion of Ocaniabroke up in deadlock, Bolivar took the next logical step:

he assumed dictatorship in June 1828, with apparently wide support; for

92. Bolivar to Paez, Jan. 29, 1828, Cartas, VII, 138.93. Bolivar, message to Congress of Ocafia, Feb. 29, 1828, Obras cornpletas, III, 789-

796.94. Bolivar to Paez, Apr. 12, 1828, Cartas, VII, 215-217.95. Campbell to Dudley, Apr. 13, 1828, PRO, FO 18/53.




he alone commanded respect, and Colombia needed what O'Learycalled

"the magic of his prestige" to restore government and stability.96Yet

even when he exercised absolute power in 1828-30, Bolivar did not rulelike a caudillo or a despot; his dictatorship responded to no particular

social or regional interest, and his respect for the rule of law did not

desert him. In 1829 he rejected a project to establish a monarchy in

Colombia, presented to him without previous consultation.97He did not

substantially extend his extraordinary powers. There was a decree on

conspiracy(February 20, 1828) already in existence, but it was not effec-

tively applied, and he himself was the victim of an assassinationattempt

on September 25, 1828. This was not a caudillo-type conspiracy, much

less a mass revolt, but an attempted coup designed to overthrow Bolivar.The moving spirit behind it was Santander, and the agents were Grana-

dine army officers. Condemned to death by military tribunal, Santander

was pardoned by Bolivar on the advice of his ministers, advice he bitterly

resented. Piar, Padilla, and others had died for the crime of rebellion,

so why should Santander escape? Bolivar dreaded above all the resent-

ment of the pardos. "Those of the same class as Piar and Padillawill say,

and justifiably, that I have shown weakness only in favorof this infamous

white, whose services do not compare with those of these famous pa-

triots."98

The dictatorship of Bolivar had support from the Bolivariansand the

caudillos alike. In 1828 Sucre advised him that the people were disillu-

sioned with written guarantees and theoretical liberty, and only wanted

security of their persons and property, protected by a strong government.

A year later Sucre added:

I will always be sorry that in order to obtain this internal peaceand stability you have not made use of your dictatorial power to

give Colombia aconstitution, which would have been sustained

by the army, the cause of so many revolts against the laws. Whatthe people want is peace and guarantees; as for the rest, I do notbelieve that they dispute for principles or political theories, whichhave caused so much damage to their right of property and se-curity.99

P'aez recognized the dictatorship promptly and considered it the best

solution against the factionalism of the military and the mischief of the

96. O'Leary, Narraci6n, II, 601.97. Joaquin Posada Gutierrez, Memorias hist6rico-politicas, 4 vols. (Bogota, 1929), I,

283-284, 310-325.98. Bolivar to Bricefio M6ndez, Nov. 16, 1828, Cartas, VIII, 117-118.99. Sucre to Bolivar, Oct. 7, 1829, O'Leary, Mernorias, I, 557.




liberals. Dictator and caudillo both wanted the same thing, strong gov-

ernment and stability. Paez, it is true, also wanted the independence of

Venezuela, but peacefully and without another revolution, because, asSoublette reported, "he does not have the will to start another revolution,

nor does he dare to break his often-repeated oaths of allegiance to you. "'00

Bolivar seemed to accept that Venezuela, with its military fiefdoms so

unlike the rest of Colombia, might have to go its own way. He recognized

that the center was too remote from the outlying districts, and govern-

ment authority was dissipated by distance. "There is no prefect, no gov-

ernor, who does not invest himself with supreme authority, principally

as a matter of absolute necessity. It might be said that each department

is a government distinct from the national, modified by local conditionsor circumstances peculiar to the area, or even personal in nature."10'

These were the conditions which bred caudillos. But what was their

legitimacy?

Are the military always to rule Swdo1-(:ll hland? Will not the civilian

population complain of the despotLism-of the army? I admit that

the existing Republics cannot be governed except by the sword,

and yet at the same time I cannot concede that the military spirit

is incompatible with civilian rule. 102

Bolivar had now reached the peak of personal power. In spite of his

preference for a political over a military solution, in spite of his long

search for constitutional forms, he fell back in the end on personal au-

thority, ruling through a dictatorship and coopting the caudillos into a

system which appealed to their own instincts on government. His dilem-

ma remained unresolved. Every political measure, the Bolivian consti-

tution, the life-term presidency, the liberal regime in Colombia, received

only partial or temporary support, and that because of the prestige of the

Liberator. Nothing else endured. Such social mobilization as had takenplace during the war was now ended. Even political participation by the

creole elite was limited, except insofar as regional caudillos ruled in col-

laboration with local interests. The irreducible fact remained, that the

source of the dictator's legitimacy was his own personal qualities. Bolivar

ruled alone, the only stable thing in a world in turmoil.

At this moment, his judgment impaired perhaps by his very isolation,

he presented the caudillos with a needless advantage. Unreconciled to a

purely personalist solution, he decided to consult the people. On October

100. Soublette to Bolivar, Aug. 28, 1828, Jani.12, 1829, Jan. 21, 1829, Parra-Perez,Mariuio,IV, 474-475.

101. Bolivar to O'Leary, Sept. 13, 1829, Cartas, IX, 125.102. Ibid.




16, 1829, the Ministry of the Interior issued Bolivar's celebrated circular

letter (August 31, 1829) authorizing, indeed ordering, that public meet-

ings be held where the citizens could give their opinion on a new formof government and the future organization of Colombia. 103 This was for

Congress to determnine, but the elected deputies were to attend Congress

not as free agents but as delegates mandated by written instructions. So

Bolivar sought the will of the people and undertook to be bound by it,

for good or for ill. 104 But were the people free to express their will? Would

not the caudillos control or intimidate the assemblies? Bolivar's closest

friends and advisers had grave reservations about this procedure. Sucre

advised him to reduce it to the simple right of petition; otherwise, the

right to give binding instructions "will revive local pretensions." 105Indeed, the separatists immediately exploited these meetings to se-

cure the opinions they wanted. Representation could not in itself frustrate

caudillism. In Caracas the meeting of the people on November 25, 1829,

was preceded on the night before by a meeting of 400 leading citizens

in the house of the caudillo Arismendi, and with other generals present,

who pronounced for the independence of Venezuela and against Bolivar.

Another example of pressure was given in a complaint from the town of

Escuque to General Paez against the procedures adopted by the military

commander of the district of Trujillo, Colonel Cegarra.

Even the popular assemblies have been the occasion of his inso-

lence, since he has insisted that the citizens sign not what has

been said and agreed in their meetings, but various papers which

he himself has written in his own home, threatening with violence

those who refused to obey. Is this freedom, Sir? Can a people

speak freely when at the very time of their assembly they see a

squadron of cavalry and a company of fusiliers forming up in the

main square? If the papers which Sr. Cegarra wanted us to sign

had contained fair and reasoned complaints, then our approvalmight have been sought at an opportune moment. But to require

us to subscribe to a lot of insults, abuse, and insolence against

General Bolivar does not seem proper, for we have always be-

lieved that we could reject his authority yet treat him with re-

spect. 106

Most of the towns and districts of Venezuela pronounced for indepen-

103. Jose Gil Fortoul, Historia constitucional de Venezuela, 2d ed., 3 vols. (Caracas,1930), I, 650-663.

104. Bolivar to Paez, Mar. 25, 1829, Obras cotinpletas,III, 157-158.105. Sucre to Bolivar, Sept. 17, 1829, O'Leary, Meinorias, I, 552.106. Francisco A. Labastidato Paez, Feb. 23, 1830, Secretaria del Interioi y Justicia,

TomnoV, Boletini del Archivo Nacional (Caracas),10, 37 (1929), 49-50.




dence from Colombia, and in favor of Paez against Bolivar, whom they

called a tyrant and worse. The majority of the caudillos wanted indepen-

dence. "The untrammeled expression of popular desires" so ardently

sought by Bolivar turned into a torrent of abuse and negation, and the

Constitutional Congress of Colombia solved nothing.

In March 1830 Bolivar formally resigned his military and political

offices, knowing that Venezuela and the caudillos had repudiated him.

Bermundez issued a strident proclamation calling Venezuela to arms against

the "despot," the promoter of monarchy, the enemy of the republic. 107

Mariiio, who claimed to know "the virtues, the views, the particular

interests of every inhabitant of Cumana," was outraged when Bolivar

refused to employ him in the east. 108 Paez wanted an independent Ven-

ezuela, and independence meant opposing Bolivar. Caudillism now ad-

vanced because it coincided with Venezuelan nationalism, and this was

an expression of interests as well as of identity. The caudillos had begun

as local leaders with access to limited resources. War gave them the

opportunity to improve their personal fortunes and expand their bases of

power. Peace brought them even greater rewards, and these they were

determined to keep. The caudillos abandoned Colombia because they

were Venezuelans and because they were resolved to retain Venezuelan

resources for themselves and their clients. Caudillism and nationalismreinforced each other.

The Constituent Congress of Venezuela assembled in Valencia on

May 6, 1830. From his headquarters at San Carlos, Paez sent a message:

"My sword, my lance and all my military triumphs are subject to the

decisions of the law, in respect and obedience. "'109 t was a double-edged

remark, reminding the legislators that, with his llaneros behind him and

the oligarchy of wealth and office at his side, he was the supreme power

in the land. This Congress founded the sovereign and independent re-

public of Venezuela, in which P'aez retained the dual authority of presi-dent and army commander. As for Bolivar, he was deeply disillusioned:

"The tyrants of my country have taken it from me and I am banished;

now I have no homeland for which to sacrifice myself. ""'i

Caudillism was not a preoccupation of Bolivar's political thought. The

failure of the First Republic he attributed to federalism and weak gov-

ernment. The collapse of the Second Republic he blamed on disunity

and inexperience. He then had to work with the caudillos to revive the

107. Bermudez, Proclamation, Cumana, Jan. 16, 1830, Parra-Perez, Marinio, V, 46.108. Maril7o o Quintero, Sept. 2, 1829, Parra-Perez, Marinio, IV, 478.109. Ibid., V, 180.110. Bolivar to Vergara, Sept. 25, 1830, Obras cotinpletas, III, 465.




revolution. After 1819 he denounced lawyers, legislators, and liberals.

In 1826 he identified "two monstrous enemies" in the speech presenting

his draft constitution to the Bolivian Congress. "Tyranny and anarchyconstitute an immense sea of oppression encircling a tiny island of free-

dom.""' Colombians, he lamented, were "seduced by freedom," each

person wanting absolute power for himself and refusing any subordina-

tion. This led to civilian factions, military risings, and provincial rebel-

lions. To counter anarchy he advocated a strong executive power and a

life-term president. Caudillos were good or bad according to whether

they were instruments of government or anarchy. In describing the po-

litical world around him, Bolivar did not isolate caudillism as a particular

phenomenon. This was left to subsequent historians.Bolivar neither promoted caudillism nor prevented it. While he

abhorred personalism and was sorely tried by "the old caudillos," as he

called the eastern chieftains, he seems to have accepted their existence

as a fact of life and sought to institutionalize their system, first within the

army of liberation, then in the political settlement which followed. In

the end, he failed to coopt the caudillos into a Colombian constitution,

and their rule outlasted his own.

111. Bolivar, Message to the Congress of Bolivia, May 25, 1826, ibid., III, 763.

lynch bolivar and the caudillos (hahr 1983)

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