MARK JOSEPH T. DELIMABachelor of Laws II

Land Titles and Deeds

June 26, 2015MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS COURT OF APPEALSFACTS:

The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy International Airport located at Paranaque City. The Officers of Paranaque City sent notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency. MIAA then settled some of the amount. When MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, the officers of Paranaque city threatened to levy and subject to auction the land and buildings of MIAA, which they did. MIAA sought for a Temporary Restraining Order from the CA but failed to do so within the 60 days reglementary period, so the petition was dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with the Supreme Court a day before the public auction, MIAA was granted with the TRO but unfortunately the TRO was received by the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the public auction. MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of the land and building are with MIAA still the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also contends that it is an instrumentality of the government and as such exempted from real estate tax. That the land and buildings of MIAA are of public dominion therefore cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale. On the other hand, the officers of Paranaque City claim that MIAA is a government owned and controlled corporation therefore not exempted to real estate tax.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a government owned and controlled corporation and as such exempted from tax?2. Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale?RULING:

Under the Local government code, government owned and controlled corporations are not exempted from real estate tax. MIAA is not a government owned and controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA should either be a stock or non stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation for its capital is not divided into shares. It is not a non stock corporation since it has no members. MIAA is an instrumentality of the government vested with corporate powers and government functions.Under the civil code, property may either be under public dominion or private ownership. Those under public dominion are owned by the State and are utilized for public use, public service and for the development of national wealth. The ports included in the public dominion pertain either to seaports or airports. When properties under public dominion cease to be for public use and service, they form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

The court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion. Since the airport is devoted for public use, for the domestic and international travel and transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for support of its operation and for regulation and does not change the character of the land and buildings of MIAA as part of the public dominion. As part of the public dominion the land and buildings of MIAA are outside the commerce of man. To subject them to levy and public auction is contrary to public policy. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport land and buildings from public use, these properties remain to be of public dominion and are inalienable. As long as the land and buildings are for public use the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS REPUBLIC

FACTS:

OCT No. P-2823 was issued on September 26, 1969 in favor of one Angelito C. Bugayong. Said mother title emanated from Sales Patent No. 4576 issued in Bugayongs name on September 22, 1969. It covered a parcel of land located in Bocana, Kabacan, Davao City, with an area of 41,276 square meters.

The land was initially subdivided into four lots. Bugayong sold all of the four lots to different persons. Lot No. 4159-A, which was then under TCT No. T-32769, was sold to spouses Lourdes and Candido Du .Accordingly, said TCT was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-42166 in the name of spouses Du. Afterwards, the spouses Du further caused the subdivision of the land covered by their TCT No. T-42166 into two (2) lots. They sold one of said lots to spouses Felix and Guadalupe Dayola, who were issued TCT No. T-45586. The other remaining lot, registered under TCT No. T-45587, was retained by and registered in the names of spouses Du. Subsequently, Du spouses TCT No. T-45587 was cancelled and was replaced by TCT No. T-57348 registered in the name of Lourdes Farms, Inc. subject of this case. Lourdes Farms, Inc. mortgaged this property to petitioner LBP on April 14, 1980. The validity of OCT No. P-2823, as well as its derivative TCTs, remained undisturbed until some residents of the land it covered, particularly those along Bolton Diversion Road, filed a formal petition before the Bureau of Lands on July 15, 1981.

The Bureau of Lands said that the sales patent in favor of Bugayong was improperly and illegally issued and that the Director of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of the subject land. RTC and CA ruled in favor of republic hence this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Land Bank of the Philippines has a valid claim over the land?

RULING:

No, the Land Bank of the Philippines has no valid claim over the land.

In the case at bar, the LBP has no valid and subsisting claim over the land. Titles issued to private parties by the Bureau of Lands are void ab initio if the land covered by it is a forest land. It went further by stating that if the mother title is void, all titles arising from the mother title are also void.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS IAC

FACTS:

This case is in connection with Araneta vs Director of Lands case which trial court rendered decision in favor of Araneta.

The land involved is an island known as Tambac Island in Lingayen Gulf, situated in the Municipality of Bani, Pangasinan. The initial application for registration was filed for Pacific Farms, Inc. under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, Act No. 496. Later on, The Pacific Farms filed a manifestation motion to change the applicant to J. Antonio Araneta. Antonio Araneta presented evidences which were documents of sale, tax declarations and receipts, and survey of property. Applicant, however, failed to present the tracing cloth plan and instead submitted to the court certified copies thereof.

Director of Lands and Director of Forest development both averred that said land is an unclassified public land, hence inalienable.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the presentation of the tracing cloth plan is necessary.

2. Whether or not the land known as "Tambac Island" can be subject to registration.

HELD:

The submission of the tracing cloth plan is a mandatory requirement for registration. The failure to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is fatal it being a statutory requirement of mandatory character. It is of no import that petitioner failed to object to the presentation of the certified copy of the said plan. What is required is the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for and objection to such requirement cannot be waived either expressly or impliedly.

As to the second issue, lands of the public domain are classified under three main categories, namely: Mineral, Forest and Disposable or Alienable Lands. Under the Commonwealth Constitution, only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated and only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. Mineral and Timber or forest lands are not subject to private ownership unless they are first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.

This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.

COLLADO VS CAFACTS:Petitioner Edna Collado applied for registration of a parcel of land (120 hectares in Antipolo, Rizal) with the land registration court. She attached a technical description of the Lot, signed by Robert Pangyarihan, stating this survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed. About a year later, Collado amended the application to include additional co-applicants and more applicants joined (petitioners).

The Republic through the SG, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through the Municipal Attorney and Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners application.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not the petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.

HELD:Petitioners have no registrable title over the lot.

In the case at bar, petitioners failed to complete the require period of possession under CA 141 (Public Land Act) or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073 (the law prevailing at the time the petitioners applied for registration. When EO 33 was issued (1904), Leyva had been in possession of the Lot for only 2 years. Thus, there is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33, the petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed, acquisitive prescription, or any other mode of acquisition from the State.

LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC. VS VICTOR O. RAMOSFACTS:On March 3, 1995, President Ramos signed into law R.A. No. 7942. Section 15 thereof declares that the Act shall govern the exploration, development, utilization, and processing of all mineral resources. Such declaration notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7942 does not actually cover all the modes through which the State may undertake the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources.

The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded the primary power and responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization thereof. As such, it may undertake these activities through four modes: The State may directly undertake such activities.

The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations.

Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens.

For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Republic Act No. 7942 known as Philippine Mining Act 1995 is constitutional.

HELD:The court granted the petition, and that R.A. No. 7942 is unconstitutional in violation to section 2, Article Xll of the Constitution (National Economy and Patrimony), wherein said provision states that all other natural resources shall not be alienated, it is preserved for the Filipino people.BAGUNU V. AGGABAOFACTS:The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to Felicisimo Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag. On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free patent over the subject land with the Bureau of Lands. On November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third sale) to the petitioner, who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant. On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the petitioners free patent application. The respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated June 23, 1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista. The DENR Regional Office found out that the petitioner actually occupies and cultivates the area in dispute including the area purchased by the respondents. On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in his free patent application since this lot belongs to the respondents. The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional Office denied the motion. On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed the ruling of the DENR Regional Office. According to petitioner, DENR has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Actions involving ownership of real property fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not the DENR has jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:Yes, the DENR has jurisdiction over the case.The determination of the identity of a public land is within the DENRs exclusive jurisdiction to manage and dispose of lands of the public domain. Under Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192, the Director of the Lands Management Bureau has the duty, among others, to assist the DENR Secretary in carrying out the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141) by having direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other forms of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain.

Furthermore, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

REPUBLIC VS LAOFACTS:Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application forregistrationof a parcel of land. She allegedly acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma.VictoriaValenzuela whoinheritedit from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn,inheritedthe land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from EdilbertoPeridoby transfer.She prayed that the land be registered in her name underCommonwealthAct 141 (Public Land Act) based on her and her predecessor-in-interestsopen, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. She presented witnesses and evidence constituting of deed of sale, survey plan, the technical description of property and tax declarations in her and her predecessors names. The court approved the application. The petitioner represented by the Solicitor General appealed the decision before the CA which re-affirmed the lower court decision, hence this petition for review before the SC. The petitioner contends that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant the issuance of the title to the respondent as she fails to comply with the required periods and acts of possession mandated by law and her failure to prove that the land is alienable and disposable land of thepublic domain.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not the respondent sufficiently provided evidence that she meets the qualifications required by law on the manner of possession (continuous, adverse, notorious, etc..) and the period of time (30 years) necessary to have a bonafide claim of ownership under C.A. 141?

2. Whether or notrespondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was disposable and alienable land of thepublic domain?

HELD:In the case at bar, the court held thatCommonwealthAct 141 requires thatbefore one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been inopen, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; in adverse possession over the land for at least 30 years and the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of thepublic domain. Petitioner was right to contend that the respondent did not prove by incontrovertible evidence that she possessed the property in the manner and time required by law. She did not provide the exact period when her predecessors-in-interest started occupying the property. No extrajudicial settlement of the property from its previous owners was shown and she did not show any relationship between the parties where she obtained her deed of sale. She further did not present any certification from appropriate government agency to show that the property is re-classified as disposable and alienable land of thepublic domain. It is incumbent for an applicant of a landregistrationto provide these incontrovertible evidences to support her claim for her application. In the absence of these evidences, her application shall fail. Hence the petition was granted and her application was denied.

REPUBLIC VS HEIRS OF FABIOFACTS:On 21 November 1996, respondents, who are the heirs of Juan Fabio, represented by Angelita F. Esteibar (Esteibar) as their Attorney-in-Fact, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, an application for registration of title to the Lot with an approximate area of 1,096,866 square meters or 109.6 hectares. The Lot is situated in Barangay Sapang, Ternate, Cavite. The respondents sought the registration of title under the provisions of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529).

In the application, respondents alleged that they are the owners of the Lot, including all the improvements, having acquired the same through a bona fide claim of ownership. They declared that they and their predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the Lot in the concept of an owner for more than 100 years. Their claim was supported by various documents

ISSUE:1. Whether or not the respondents have acquired a right over the lot.HELD:In the case at bar, as enshrined in Section 14(1) of PD 1529 states that there are three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title: (1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Well-entrenched is the rule that unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation in the concept of an owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Consequently, respondents could not have occupied the Lot in the concept of an owner in 1947 and subsequent years when respondents declared the Lot for taxation purposes, or even earlier when respondents predecessors-in-interest possessed the Lot, because the Lot was considered inalienable from the time of its declaration as a military reservation in 1904. Therefore, respondents failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Lot is alienable and disposable. Public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable land remain part of the inalienable public domain. In view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that the Lot was already classified as alienable and disposable, the Lot applied for by respondents is inalienable land of the public domain, not subject to registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 and Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by PD 1073. Hence, there is no need to discuss the other requisites dealing with respondents occupation and possession of the Lot in the concept of an owner.

While it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and in line with the ideal of social justice, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national patrimony. We must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards relative to the registration of imperfect titles.

REPUBLIC VS VEGAFACTS:Respondents Vega sought to register a parcel of land, claiming that they inherited the same from their deceased mother. Respondent-intervenors Buhay claimed a portion of the lot in question which was opposed by the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General. The Republic maintains that the parcel of land is public domain, and that respondents failed to substantiate that such was alienable. Respondents presented as witness an officer from CENRO who testified that the land in question is indeed alienable.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the parcel of land in dispute is part of public domain.

HELD: In the case at bar, to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable public land, the general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.

As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion and based solely on the evidence presented on record - may approve the application on the ground of substantial compliance showing that there has been a positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of effective opposition from the government. Since respondents sought CENRO certification, they are in good faith in claiming the land which is considered as competent and sufficient proof. This ruling applies pro hac vice.

JOCSON VS SORIANOFACTS: Silvestre Estacion purchased from the Government, lots. He continued to make payments under his contract, until death. After his death, Valentina Jocson, the surviving widow, taking advantage of the provisions of section 16 of Act No. 1120, had said lots transferred to her.Notwithstanding this, the administrator of the estate of Silvestre took possession of the same, included them in the inventory of the estate and continued to administer the same as a part of the estate of the deceased.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Valentina has the right to the title of the subject lands.

HELD: Yes, Act 1120 provides that the titles remain with the government until full payment of the purchase price. Section 16 provides that in case of death of purchaser, prior to completion, his widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land stated in the certificate upon showing that she has complied with the requirements of law for the purchase of the same. . . ."The character of the right of Silvestre was analogous to a homesteader. Act No. 926, provides for homesteads. Section 3 provides that "in the event of the death of an applicant for a homestead prior to the issuance of a patent (title), his widow shall be entitled to have a patent for the land applied for issue to her" upon a proper showing, and until a final title or patent is issued for the land to the applicant the Government remains the owner.

Acts Nos. 1120 and 926 were patterned after the laws granting homestead rights and special privileges under the laws of US and the various states of the Union. Their object is to provide a home for each citizen of the Government, where his family may shelter and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and to inculcate in individuals those feelings of independence which are essential to the maintenance of three institutions. Furthermore, the state itself is concerned that the citizens shall not be divested of a means of support, and reduced to pauperism.

The doctrine announced with reference to the right of the widow in the homestead upon the death of her husband, does no injustice to the creditors of the deceased, since they have it always in their power to protect themselves either by refusing credit or by demanding such security as will protect them from loss.

REPUBLIC VS LENSICOFACTS:

Spouses Melanio Lensico and Donata Mojica acquired a friar land after occupying it for 34 years. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-78832 was issued in their names. Out of the 16,459m total area of the property, Cavite College occupies a portion of some 11,650. The heirs required Cavite College compensation for occupancy and to either vacate or buy the premises. Their disagreements resulted in the filing of civil cases for recovery of possession of property or payment of price of land by the heirs against said college and annulment of title and reversion of land to the state filed by the Republic against the Lensicos and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite. Cavite college argued that the issuance of title to the registered owners was null and void because the lot is actually a part of the foreshore land which is a public domain.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the respondents predecessor was the lawful owner of the parcel of land occupied by petitioner school.

HELD:

In the case at bar, respondents predecessor was the lawful owner of the subject property. The lower courts properly appreciated the evidence submitted by both parties as regards the nature of the property. These courts have determined that the lot was part of the friar lands that had been titled since 1913; it was not foreshore land. Foreshore land has been defined as that which lies between the high and the low water marks, and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. In other words, it is that strip of land between high and low water, the land left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. In the present case, although corners 3 and 4 of Lot 2833 have been shown to adjoin the sea, they -- let alone the entire Lot 2833 -- have not been proven to be covered by water during high tide. Hence, the property cannot be considered foreshore land.

All told, we find no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings of the two lower courts. Petitioners have failed to prove that, in his application to purchase Lot 2833, Melanio Lensico willfully and knowingly made any false statement that would sufficiently cause the cancellation of the application and the forfeiture (in favor of the government) of all amounts paid on the land. The validity of TCT T-78322, as well as its issuance to respondents predecessor, stands.

ALMAGRO vs. KWAN

FACTS:

This case involves a lot registered in the name of spouses Kwan Chin and Zosima Sarana, who are the parents of respondents, who both died intestate in Dumaguete City. Upon their death, respondents inherited the lot through hereditary succession.

On 18 September 1996, respondents filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) an action for recovery of possession and damages against the people occupying their land.

It was found during verification survey that:

That a big portion of the lot is submerged under the sea and only a small portion remain as dry land.

That some of the defendants have constructed their buildings or houses inside the dry land while others have constructed outside or only a small portion of their buildings or houses are on the said dry land.

The survey showed that the sea had advanced and the waves permanently invaded a big portion of the property making the land part of the shore or the beach. The MTC held that remaining dry land is foreshore and therefore should be returned to the public domain.

Upon appeal, RTC conducted ocular inspections of Lot during low and high tides. All the parties and their lawyers were notified before the two ocular inspections were conducted and observed that the small portion remained dry even during high tide. RTC concluded that the disputed remaining portion of subject Lot was not foreshore land. The appealed judgment was reversed and set aside insofar as it stated that plaintiffs were not entitled to recover possession of the property in question.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which the RTC denied. Petitioners filed separate petitions for review with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is no longer private land but has become foreshore land and is now part of the public domain.

The CA denied the petition, affirmed but modified the RTC judgement and ordered all to vacate except whose buildings or houses are outside the premises.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is still private land or has become foreshore land which forms part of the public domain.

HELD:In the case at bar, it was clearly proven that the disputed land remained dry even during high tide. Indeed, Supreme Court (SC) held all the evidence supports the conclusion that the disputed portion of the Lot "is not foreshore land but remains private land owned by respondents."

Although the MTC concluded that the subject land is foreshore land, we find such conclusion contrary to the evidence on record.

It is undisputed that the subject land is registered in the name of respondents' parents, Kwan Chin and Zosimo Sarana. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals, even the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) declared in May 1996 that Lot No. 6278-M is a private property covered by a Torrens Title and that petitioners should vacate the disputed property or make other arrangements with respondents.

Furthermore, from the report of the geodetic engineer, it can be clearly gleaned that the contested land is the small portion of dry land. The geodetic was adamant in stating that the remaining portion was not foreshore because "it is already dry land" and is "away from the shoreline." Because of this apparent contradiction between the evidence and the conclusion of the MTC, the RTC conducted ocular inspection twice, during low tide and high tide, and observed that the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M actually remained dry land even during high tide. Thus, the RTC concluded that the said land is not foreshore land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals adopted the findings and conclusion of the RTC that the disputed land is not foreshore land and that it remains as private land owned by respondents.

SC are in accord with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals and the RTC that the disputed land is not foreshore land. To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between the high and low water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. The land's proximity to the waters alone does not automatically make it a foreshore land.

DAVAO STEEL CORPORATION VS CABATUANDOFACTS:

The petitioner, Davao Steel Corporation, is a domestic corporation engaged in the steel and allied metals industry. After scouting around for a factory site, it decided upon an area planted to sugarcane and corn, located at Paknaan or Umapad, Mandawe, Cebu, and belonging to Domingo Mendoza, and, thereafter, sought to acquire it. The corporation negotiated with Mendoza without the latter informing the former that the land was being tilled by a tenant, and, instead, assuring it that there would be no trouble. On 8 May 1961, the corporation bought the land but withheld a part of the purchase price because one Roberta Ouano claimed ownership over a small portion of the land. With the consent of Mendoza, however, the withheld amount was paid to Ouano, thus constituting the corporation as the acknowledged absolute owner.

The respondent, Cornelio Cuyson, had been the long-time tenant of both Domingo Mendoza and Roberta Ouano the land in question and the corporation started constructing their building without the latters consent.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the conversion of the land from agricultural to industrial is valid.

HELD:

In the case at bar, when the petitioner corporation purchased the land, the same was still agricultural; it did not become industrial just because the corporation intended to make it so. The petitioner corporation, by purchase, succeeded into the duties of the former landholder (sec. 9, Tenancy Act), including the obligation respect the tenure of the tenants. The corporation caused the termination of the relationship by devoting the land to industrial purposes without the consent of the tenant or of the Court, and it cannot take cover in the wrongful conversion that it has itself caused. While the decision to convert or not to convert the land from agricultural to industrial resides in the owner-corporation, yet, since the land is tenanted and with growing crops thereon, the owner cannot, unilaterally and without the consent of the tenant, exercise the right of conversion. The requisite consent of the tenant or of the Court is not based upon the premise that the tenant's will not to convert is superior to that of the owner's decision to convert, but that the tenant is entitled to security of tenure, and that the right of possession of the tenant, by express provision of the law, is not extinguished by the sale of the land worked by him (sec. 9, Act 1199).

ARANETA VS DIRECTOR OF LANDSFACTS:The land involved is an island known as Tambac Island in Lingayen Gulf, situated in the Municipality of Bani, Pangasinan. The initial application for registration was filed for Pacific Farms, Inc. under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, Act No. 496. Later on, The Pacific Farms filed a manifestation motion to change the applicant to J. Antonio Araneta.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the land is alienable.

HELD:In the case at bar, the Director of Lands opposed the application alleging that the applicant, Pacific Farms, Inc. does not possess a fee simple title to the land nor did its predecessors possess the land for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of application and that it is a private corporation disqualified under the 1973 Constitution to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The Director of Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging that the land is within the unclassified public land and, hence, inalienable.There were evidences showed by applicant which include a testimony by the fishery guard of Pacific farms that he had been in the island for forty years and that Araneta has been the owner since he bought it from Atty Vicente Castelo. Deposition by oral examination of Araneta was also presented, together with documents of sale, tax declarations and receipts, and survey of property. Applicant, however, failed to present the tracing cloth plan and instead submitted to the court certified copies thereof. Trial court rendered decision in favor of Araneta.

US V. TAN PIACOFACTS:The defendants were charged with a violation of the Public Utility Law (Act No. 2307 as amended by Acts Nos. 2362 and 2694), in that they were operating a public utility without permission from the Public Utility Commissioner. The appellant rented two automobile trucks and was using them upon the highways of the Province of Leyte for the purpose of carrying some passengers and freight; that he cal ried passengers and freight under a special contract in each case; that he had not held himself out to carry all passengers and all freight for all persons who might offer passengers and freight.

The lower court found the defendant Tan Piaco guilty of the crime charged. From that sentence Tan Piaco appealed to this court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the appellant, under the above facts, was a public utility under the foregoing definitions, and was therefore subject jurisdiction of the Public Utility Commission.

HELD:No. In the case at bar, Section 14 of Act No. 2307, as amended by section 9 of Act No. 2694, provides that: "The Public Utility Commission or Commissioners shall have general supervision and regulation of, jurisdiction and control over, all public utilities. Under the provisions of said section, two things are necessary: (a) The individual, copartnership, etc., etc., must be a public utility; and (b) the business in which such individual, copartnership, etc., etc., is engaged must be for public use. "Public use" means the same as "use by the public." The essential feature of the public use is that it is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. It is this indefinite or unrestricted quality that gives it its public character. In determining whether a use is public, we must look not only to the character of the business to be done, but also to the proposed mode of doing it. If the use is merely optional with the owners, or the public benefit is merely incidental, it is not a public use. It must be, in general, a right which the law compels the owner to give to the general public. It is not enough that the general prosperity of the public is promoted.

TAN TOCO VS MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILOFACTS:The Municipality of Iloilo bought from the widow of Tantoco a parcel of land which was used for street purposes. For failure of the municipality to pay the debt, the widow obtained a writ of execution against the municipal properties, and by virtue of such writ was able to obtain the attachment of two auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, two police stations, and two markets, including the lots on which they had been constructed.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not the attachment is valid.

HELD:The attachment is not proper because municipal-owned real and personal properties devoted to public or governmental purposes may not be attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against a municipality. Just as it is essential to exempt certain properties of individuals from execution, so it is also essential and justifiable to exempt property for public use from execution, otherwise governmental service would be jeopardized.

CEBU OXYGEN ACETYLENE VS BERCILLESFACTS:In 1968, a terminal portion of a street in Cebu was excluded in the citys development plan hence the council declared it as abandoned and was subsequently opened for public bidding. Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. was the highest bidder at P10,800.00. Cebu Oxygen applied for the lands registration before CFI Cebu but the provincial fiscal opposed it, so did the court later through Judge Pascual Bercilles, as it was ruled that the road is part of the public domain hence beyond the commerce of man.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Cebu Oxygen can validly own said land.

HELD:

Yes. In the case at bar, under Cebus Charter (RA 3857), the city council may close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed. Since that portion of the city street subject of Cebu Oxygens application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.

Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

HEIRS OF SANTIAGO V. LAZAROFACTS:

On February 28, 1976, the late Felino T. Santiago, a member of the Malacaang Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI), filed an application with the Bureau of Lands for the purchase of a parcel of friar land with an area of 255 square meters particularly described as Lot No. 7, Block 70, Psd-04-000011 of the Tala Friar Lands Estate in Makatipo, Caloocan City. In the Information Sheet he submitted, applicant Santiago stated that he had actually been occupying the land being applied for since February of 1973 and that he had introduced improvements thereon consisting of a small hut, fence, clearings and seasonal crops.

An investigation was conducted by Lands Investigator Buensuceso I. Guido, who, finding the allegations contained in the Information Sheet to be true, recommended that the aforesaid lot be sold at private sale in favor of Felino T. Santiago. Endorsed by the Assistant Director of Lands, said recommendation was approved by the Minister of Natural Resources. Whereupon, Sales Contract No. 77-760 dated March 17, 1977 was entered into by the Director of Lands and Felino Santiago,1 who paid the purchase price in full on the same date as evidenced by O.R. No. 5777291.

However, barely a year from the execution of the Sales Contract, MHAI cancelled Santiagos application over the land in question and allocated the same to private respondent Delia O. Payot. The latters parents then took possession of the land and built a small house thereon without the knowledge and consent of Santiago or any member of his family.

Feeling aggrieved, Santiago inquired from the Office of the Minister of Natural Resources whether his Sales Contract or his application covering the land in dispute had been cancelled. The representative of the Ministry replied in the negative, with the additional explanation that only the Director of Lands has the power to cancel the award.

On April 13, 1981, Deed No. V-15278 was issued by the Director of Lands in favor of Felino T. Santiago2 and on April 22, 1981, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City prepared Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-43080 covering the disputed land in the name of Felino T. Santiago.3

As a result of such issuance, private respondent Delia O. Payot filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands seeking the recall of the award to Santiago, whose application and allocation had allegedly been cancelled by the MHAI and transferred to her, thereby entitling her to the award of the disputed lot.

On January 13, 1983, the Director of Lands rendered a decision finding the protest of private respondent to be without merit. Said protest was disregarded and dismissed, and dropped from the records. Sales Contract No. 77-7604 issued to Feline T. Santiago was declared valid and in full force and effect.

The appeal interposed by private respondent to the Minister of Natural Resources proved unavailing but on further appeal to the Office of the President, private respondent was granted the relief sought. This unexpected turn of events left the heirs of Felino T. Santiago who died during the proceedings below, in a quandary. Ladisla Santiago, his widow, filed thru counsel a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied by the Office of the President. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the cancellation of the award in Santiagos favor is valid.

2. Whether or not there is abandonment on the part of Santiago.RULING:

In the case at bar, for the first issue, the cancellation of the award in Santiagos favor is null and void for lack of authority and competence on the part of the MHAI; Case at bar. Furthermore, it was found by the Director of Lands that the cancellation by MHAI of the award in Santiagos favor was made without earnest efforts to ascertain why the allocatee failed to satisfy the requirements laid down by the Association, despite the proviso voiced out by a Mr. Agbulos, an association officer, during the meeting on April 27, 1975 that the allocatee must first be contacted to find (out) the reason why he has abandoned the lot allocated to him. From these established facts, there can be no doubt that the cancellation of the award in Santiagos favor is null and void, not only for lack of competence and authority on the part of the MHAI, but particularly for being violative of the applicants constitutional right to due process.

For the second issue, the Minister of Natural Resources correctly ruled that there was no abandonment on the part of Santiago; Reasons.Thus, the Minister of Natural Resources correctly ruled that: There was no abandonment on the part of the appellee (Santiago), for abandonment is not considered as such even if possession is intermittent and not continuous, if such is due to circumstances not imputable to the possessor. Mere non-use does not necessarily constitute abandonment. It cannot be inferred from non-use alone. The temporary absence of the appellee from the lot should not be taken against the tenability of his claim because such is mainly attributable to his poverty, aggravated by his recurring illness which later resulted to his death. Even assuming arguendo that private respondent was not aware of the flaws in her title, her possession of the lot, and by proxy, at that, could not rise above the prior possession of Felino T. Santiago, who, during such possession was able to comply with the requirements set by law for the purchase of the lot. Thus, at the time of entry of private respondent into said lot, the sale in favor of Felino T. Santigo had already been consummated thru the execution of the Sales Contract. Only the issuance of the Deed of Conveyance and the Transfer Certificate of Title which had then become ministerial on the part of the Director of Lands, remained to perfect his title thereto.

CHAVEZ VS NHAFACTS:Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by NHA and R-II Builders, Inc. President Cory Aquino issued MO 161 approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state. The SMDRP consists of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite. Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the project. Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.

On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI.ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the RBI may acquire the subject lands.

HELD:Yes. In the case at bar, there must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.

1.) The reclaimed lands across R-10 were classified alienable and disposable lands of public domain of the State. First, there were three presidential proclamations classifying the reclaimed lands across R-10 as alienable or disposable hence open to disposition or concession. These were MO 415 issued by President Aquino, Proclamation No. 39 and Proclamation No. 465 both issued by President Ramos. Secondly, Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 issued by the DENR classified the reclaimed areas as alienable and disposable.

2.) Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are no longer needed for public use or public service, there was however an implicit executive declaration that the reclaimed areas R-10 are not necessary anymore for public use or public service. President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the NHA partly for housing project and related commercial/industrial development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly as enabling component to finance the project. Also, President Ramos, in issuing Proclamation No. 39, declared, though indirectly, that the reclaimed lands of the Smokey Mountain project are no longer required for public use or service. 3. When Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 were issued, inalienable lands covered by said proclamations were converted to alienable and disposable lands of public domain. When the titles to the reclaimed lands were transferred to the NHA, said alienable and disposable lands of public domain were automatically classified as lands of the private domain or patrimonial properties of the State because the NHA is an agency NOT tasked to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of public domain. The only way it can transfer the reclaimed land in conjunction with its projects and to attain its goals is when it is automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State. Being patrimonial or private properties of the State, then it has the power to sell the same to any qualified personunder the Constitution, Filipino citizens as private corporations, 60% of which is owned by Filipino citizens like RBI.

In the case at bar, for short, there were laws granting alienability or disposability of such properties of public dominion.