\lP

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~ attitude ot tho ~ ~ffiiiil' - - '

- 27il

tOv/Ql"4a

Tho Soviet polioy With rosur4 to tho Polilh ttat10nal a!Dor1-

t1tl la entirely 1noona1aten~.

Aa a reeult at tho Poltah-so~1ot ~o«mont ot 30th JUly, the

euth01"1t1te ot the u.s.s . .:r. p;rooe ede' t.o releeat e l -l t be Polish

ottlze.aa roc;ardl.eaa ot t.bet.r nattonaltty. Bee14eo the Poleo.

thorotore , almOst all t be Jet~ , a conat~erablo n~ber at Otralntans

aod all or t be ~tt·Rutbeniaa. were aet tree.

All the promiuont pol1t1o1ans, &r~onG whot13 t h& Jtwa : SOamer ­

otein, Rtool , Loser, an4 the Ukrc1n1ons: Ctla~o~, Luokt on4

X:ufZ'C;;;ioz, wert retained either to l)rtsotl or ooooentration ompa.

At the ~~• tim.o , no objeoti!'n.a •....ere t•atae\1. with r~bftl'd to

Polish c1t1zen.e ot toretan desoo:tt earollta.:: 1:»: the Polbb ..un;y .

The rtrat zewa Who were released wore evan sent 41r eotl y to t bo

Polieh milit ary Qampa . OwiQA to 1nsurt1o1ent selsotlon there ~•

aeon.. thr.J a oocs14erable oucber ot unrel1aUle 1od1v1dualo, such

ae aguggltre, apeoulator o etc.

The al~uation or the Jer.s to the F~ltah Arr~ duri~ tbe tlrat

,erl~ "'•• the objeot or 1,ecial inl..~u.·eat to torel~ Jevt1ol1 corres­

pondents and v1iS1lanoo on the pbrt ot the n .r. . ,;. c . I t aa also

circulated the.t, on1~ to tho .. onti-lewiab teello.,;s ot tha Poloa",

the ze;;a \till not enoount1r a rovourable t~.t.mos,here in the renke

ot' tbll Poli ch ;_.nll' -.~ .. .-111, the~"'torc, b• une:Olt! t.o ['3rtot"to th.e!r

se.M'1oa . ..\t. t~e 3t.:r.t ti:.e, t.he :J. i . •••• o. were ,,raadittu t ho O!)inlon

the.t the J'eHs e.ro th~t wora~t el«o\ent in the .~~~ , tb.3\. they u.re

al\IO.ifB d1tu;.at.1•t1?\o. end t.~t.:. t., therefore, it. woul.S be ...;.c.:;t 4eo1ra'bl e

tor the Polee to u~t riU ot tho • Un4er thuso uirouuotsn~ua the

e nde<J.VOUl'S

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f:Htdesvoure ot tho i:on-Z1od1at Or~nlzat lon to tor111. eepo..re.t.., Ul\1l-a

ot t he l ollo with the View or aendint tb.u 1n t he tutu.re to Pa.leatioe,

w.ro DOt without o18n1t1oanoo.

lfo't'lrtbolooo, tbo oon41t1ono ot tbo J'owo 1n J'DUsb Wl1to "ro

~on4ablo and t bo1r oon4uot oo t ho wbolo woo loyal and 41so1pl1oo4.

T!lt very bi!;ll proportion or Jews 1n the P\)lish Al"t.'l)' t.t tho out. net,

subaeq~ontlJ d1wi l1ubed 0\Jia ~ to tho e~ec,t10l or c oer~ai n n~~b•r

o.a t J1a ,;1'0\UG.a ot ~lh.:;stoal u!1t1:n.eae . .:..t ~tfoent t be n\U..Iber ot Je~ota

in tho Sth Oiv1s1oo in 'l'a.t i e htoh;:. v 1u rstl t.l oo:~.sl,lot·=.ble .J!ld i n s one

units c.tt.1.1.i!\$ ~O".J. l}aner::l Soz:ut..l, th~ 'l .o.o. 5~!1 Diviai oA, rataea

no obJoot1o4a u.,::ai NJt t hou . I n :~e StL. U1v1a1o.'l uoat of the Je\'<IS

WOl' U dotooheU tlnd, in e,ooor:\e.i\00 ·:lit\J the t'I<;,UG:Jt Of t ho .:e\1-

~io~iats, they torcoG a eeparate bfttallto~. Tbe Op)Ooenta ot

~bot)'nO~t1 Ull Ut ,rt;~nft~\t ,:'lrOtO&tin ,.. llC&i!\St 1.:110 tiOOitJiOil. Their

vrotost Y11ll bo oonaiderolol i n th" noc~~wat tut.u..·e . It i a evident ,

!lo·.:over, t!ult tb.~ eot1c1pc.t1on or the ~viets \tlt.h l.' e.;M"d t"o in·

t errw.l 41s c01'd i n t-he POl'lsb Foruoa toet. Hlt h complete d1aappo1nt­

r.:ent . Thul.r speculation conoerni.ay a.nt1-Jeuiah teollnJl al30n_ the

POles ?rove~ ~tori&l.

1~o dumber or Ukra1n~ane in tho Fellah Army WhO cona iderably

reduced , o-.rtng to t he taot t hat they ware sprea<Uoo oaz:t propece.nda •

.;.s t itth·oolumnista t hey ott!!Mpt ad to d6J•.oral1~e the troops, conti­

nually rotain:.. oonpla1nto, 1n 11 canner coa.tra.ry to d1sc1!)11ne ~

age.tn.st Tarioua <iotloionctes Wb1Cb ti..o }JOles endar"d and continue

to ~coept with oonplacenoy .

The lltt1tude or the~ .fhito-::\Uthenie.na , on tLa otl:.er h.u...oQ, is

beyon4 r•proaob . They ooit no occasion to dta,l ey their loyalty

to Pol awJ. . 4\ooordinc:: to t.he op1a1on of Oooel~ul J..:ldtl·s , e~reeaed

durinv the oonterenoo or ~neral jtkcrski ~lth Stalirt at the

I I

J _L

• ll •

~omlln on tho 4th Doo0l1lber, tbe ;II!I'to·:!uthenlan eoldlera are

tnt1rtl7 4evottd to the Pol1ah ~tat•.

Duritl.;) liovm'ber arul Deoettbt r 19·~1, the nationalis t p1•oOltm

entero4 u9on a totally !lltflol:runt phaat . ow-t oe t o the •nl1otgent 1a

tbe SOviet ;.r.xy ot aevercl J'ewa \i'b.o \fOre Pol1ah oit1zel10 1.n A.l..Jna J.tc,

the Pol1ab .:t:mbaaey proteate4 in " noto dat ed November lOtb . Oo tbe

l ot Dooombor tho :~~0Din41ol replied by r otuaal atatin~ ~08

other 5:

• In oonaeotion With tto Ukaee ot tbt Supreme COUD011

•ot tho U.s .S.R. doted NoT~bor 2Qth, l V39, all oi ti~ons

not WOGtet n lJkra1n1ClQ and ~lh1te-tnlthen1a.n territoriOI Of

•tha u.s .s.:t. who on t he let o.nd tho 2nd november , U39,

~were t 1ft414b tber~elYeo 1a the above ~ed areas have

"aoquiroa o1Uzensh1p or t ho u.s .s .a. on the ;;rou11da or

"tbo deoree ot August 19th , 1939 , "oonoorninw o1t1zt~nah1p

"Of tho Union or SoYlot S001t.liat .1epu.bl1os" .

" 1"ho ro.odlneaa ot t he Soviet 1oYe.rm:.ent t o rec.ocntze

•a a f0l1eh c1 tizen$ thoae !)eraon.o or Polish natioiutl ity 11\ftlO nero 1nbabit1n~ the above mont1oood territor y on tho

" lat ac4 2nd ~.ZOVe::.ti)Or , 19JO , ,;ivea proof ot i,;O~clwill and

"oo~plaoency on behalr ot tbe Soviet Govora=ent . UDder

"no cond ition whatever can the o.bovo provtoe ;rounda tor

"the s imilar r ooocni tion aa Pol iah citizens or persons ot

"Other n&t1Cn&lity and partiCularly U~rainiana, .. ~ite

·r:-tutheniono and Jew:a, owir~ to the oiroUT.18te.noe t hat tbe

nq,ueation ot bound.e.riee between the u.s .s .rt. ana Poland

"hoe not been aettlod An' will bo •ubjeot t o exaginGtion

•in t!le futuro .

The Poliuh Al!1baaaador rea.oted agu.1nat. eu.oh a we.y ot pu.ttin(5

the problen by a very f irm note 1n Wblob he stated thot Polish legis­

lation does not. diatingu1ah citizens aooord1~ t.o raciel or national

identity, that the ~\lest 1on or Polish o1ttzeMh1P ou oal..y be 4 eo1de4

by Pol iah l aw and, t herefore , a decree concern14S the citizenship

or tb~ U.s .s .R. cannot be ~pplled to Pollsb o1t1zona . It would be

contrary to t ho stipulations or tba IV liasue Convention ot 190? .

The s oviet attit ude expraaaod in tho noto ot the lat December,

1941, vm.s 1a.G1oated. ap t n on t.ha oc.,asion or 1ss-.a1na peaaj)Or'ta to

9er3ona or Jow1sh doacent . ?erc1ss1on tor exit to Pulestine waa

retuaed to e well ~no .... n ;N"&]er r.ercha..,t tro::t Craoow A.loic.aondrowioz

and

I

..-... --... -·-----. -

~1G t~llt , oc tho ;rounds that t hey -.ro SOY1et o1~1~eu.. !he

Polleh pea eporta ot •· Sttrn, the author, and hie \dte were 41a­

r eaardod un4er th~ pretext that: -They h&d eooeptod soviet o1t1~eo­

eh1p i n oonneoti oA wit~ the deo:oo ot t he Pree141uu ot the ~preme

oouno11 or the u.s .s. a . datt4 :bvo~bor 29th. 1939 . and therefore

beln.: per aons ot noa-Poliah nat ionality they ret e.i a.ed their oitizec ...

shi p ••• • " It i a nsooeao.ry to !)Oint out that the St ern t ar.a1ly toot~

a Soviet. paesport ln LWO'I': ln tbo ee.ce •Y a s a coo.a14erable p•.rt ot

t he Poliah population wes obllled to do , ln order to retuln the

poee1bU.1ty ot et.:ployment . On t ho other hand, the .O.eksandrowicz

t acily did oot aooept SoViet paeaports, never oe~aed to ~pbaalze

the ir. Polloh nat1oaal1ty and r4tuae' to bo entor~d ee Jowa .

J'r'.Oo oonYerea'tioce held With or·rtolals, it tallows t hat at the

p.reaent DOtnont tho s oviet nutboritiuu. dooline to lltJue to 8..1\Y ;ro~l

a via• or exit on a Polish peGsport . U~er those olroUQatancea,

eadea•oura or theil" to.m1111a to :!O to Palc&ti ne 01• elalHihll'e would

be obeoleta.

In tb1a matt er ot oar4inal 1cportance the Poliah autboritles

find 1t impossible to agree to any helt· coeeures . oapeclelly aa it

is looko4 upon by tbe o:ber ~ty as c precedent tor t bo detorci­

.a.atlon ot the tut.ure bouudar1oa. 'rho Polish it,ubaaaa6.or woe very

tirm on this subjeot duri~ ~io coaver sotion with Cocmisaar

~tYszy.o.aki, 1Vbo abowed uuct1 eul.ba_.rraasuent. . The le.ttor reoo$Jlizell

that it woul4 create nu:oeroua eooplloat1oos and alao aokn01Jle-tA&od

that tho Sovie~ pleblaoites o~ Pollah territory could not furG1ab

any crounda for tho solution or t~e proble~ .

Tbe Britieb ~~IIY in Auiblab•• lnterpreta the soviet point

ot view to the tfteot that l,uasla 11!1 already dee1Cie4 t o e.eaure tor

heroelt the settleoent or boun~arl•• · Slnco the setLle~nt or the

Pol1ab-

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Pollah·Ruealcn tronti ere enta1la tho neoeaalty to oo~t to terms

witb the Pollah Government, the Soviett deatre, u~til that t~e,

~ treat the Polish eeatern torr1tor1ea Wbioh thOJ he4 oooupled in

1939 aa neutral and ;>reveot thr.l tree bel ao ooM14e.rod •• c.rdto.a t o

whioh kuaal a 04a lsy no olatm. They are endeovourint to ensure thia

11l1autrality" b)• r e cot;n1t.1n: the Pol1oh o1t1zen.sb1p ot tho Polloh

popul 4t1o, a nd t ho aon-Pollob pO)~let lon ae Soviet oitl~onG.

':bo Polleb e t t1tule Hlt.h r ef.)lr4 to thoae quest i on.a t a knarm to

tho aupro ... o 3ov1et e.uth~r1t1os . i>ur l a,.. h i e etu.y in ;tuee l a , Gene r c.l

S1kor:.Y.1 or.t,he.aiz-od u.or e t ho.n onoo i n thu pr oseaoe ot :tye~yna1..1 and

ot he r SOvl "'t repros~ntativoa t he GJ,'oat 1upo1·ta noo to t l\o Polich

St::t a or t!:e eo.oter !l t el":"ltorlo:; a.aa. t.ht po!)Ulct1.on 1!\h.::.l>itill.u

th.m. I n o91tc of :e•orftl c.ttr..o.pt..s 1.t t!' is tt:--!otio:l o, the part

or S to.ll!'t , loner D.l s u~or:s :1 r~tr~1ted t ro-...: ... .lll~ C.1ac:&.Ss1oJ. couceriUn...

the Po t 1ah-n-u~ts 1fl.n t 1•ortt ieru .

~• sov!.ot :,:>oin;, or view is al so ftpp.i.U~oo~ 1.1 t.he inatructi oo or

the soviet. St~tr 1,:aued to the liai c:oo ot!'1cert Ltt.e.o:t•4 t.o tt:.e

Pol ish P'Oroea , i a connection \\1.tb tL..: rtcruit:..c lt to tbo ne-. 4.1vt­

o1on.e. . It \l:ts unotr1c14:ll :· oo...,!....•J..:rlo~to4 to tho Pol ish !U:._Jl C'JI'Z".&:.nd.

A:,.on.) ot!:.or3 tho& i u:Jtruotton s t !ltes the.t "it i s ~n .. 1ttud to r e cr uit

?oleD fO"" tl.o ne-:·: ct1v1siou tro~ ~ll .~:-ta ot Polan! 1noluG.1 .1.;

r.estcr~ t~-ln~ att~ ~etern ·4htte ~tbtnla ; other nat1oaal1t1es

are not t o be tnDbraoe4 'or the r eoru1 tunt".

Tbe newe of the r eoogn1t1on by the 3ov1et author 1t 1oe or all

the Jews wbo 1nhdb1t~d tor~ito~ics ooou,io~ by ~uaaiuna ~a c1ti~Od9

:.:a..· letr."otsio•l. Unt.~n.1 ... llli a~ ... 1- :.: t~.r. :. ':. tp:_~ u:- ..., lu:>s~Ue

o.t titu( tr t":: ,\!.r4!e t~r. Pol~n •lu!"i.l.._ tl~·~ .t\Jctc1~.;.~1 ocon.,>e.t..i.).l ~.r.nd tt.!...l1-

t~3te thl)lr colle1lot·ut1.on \'lith t :tn soviet. uutr.oJ·1ti •Jtt rl.'OJl tbo

_o;.an< r1.o• t~'' .'>o . .r-...ioa oi>t•r•' u;><>• P<>Uo:. to,.1tory . :Jut

. '

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t h<:' 3C~t:'IC. or 11lju~t1co t.ttd. Utt_;l• .... t!!tlO,\ V~1Ch tile~· :.r:.v ; !:Lloe

autter~ll ie t.t ~r'CtDOflt eo .Lnt.biiS"' t.u on,_ tho :ot;t; thAt it he.e pro­

!.u.l .. u:. G1:fl1:.~ , cont~.-'t .... nt c v&n :.utreJ. of nu~eia. . Tlloil• nttitude

to;~e.rds t:to v.s .s .::t . is toc!ey even t.ore s t:vero an4 stubborn tlu;: • .st

t he.t ot the Foles or :'011si1 orl ..).Jl uilo , 1/h&r. t~uy tou:td tt.e.~e lves

under 3.Jv1&t ooou.p::.tion , h;:.d n~ illusions wi th t•o :;o.rd t:. t.!ta hostile

ettit ud" o£ tho i:lvaUttl.'!) . 't'ac Po11st.-:;ov1et ~~eer_ont c.nd t :te r v ..

co~.:U.tion or t h6 Polish 3to.te ~t·ot&u.:t;td mor1~ tllc J'orl8 t:te loua.e~t

t:-c. -w,orts of sat1st!-.Ct1on o::t.~ e-nthus1:tsr:.. Thlly !u.,vc boon expr e!ls-

1:::.,.: end. continuo to Uet:onot re.t o t.hair ott~cb!.,.ent to f'ole.~ &:ul the

o=.r nesi; ~tu,li.•e ot retUl'nin~ a~ all costs to t.ilci.t• t.),Ass in tho

casto):n ~rovinoes bolonz1~ t.o tho Polin.i~ ~tat~ .

It r~· Ue c.o&St}l'toG. thut if !)l'OV1ou~l~· t.he.ro \re!'e 1ndiv1duuls

ru.:.ontst t ho Polb:h Je\!& \:ho e.1deavow·ec1 to oouviacc , ?arttcularly

~nclo-Scxon O.tJ1n.1on. th.ut l>lle eestorn provincoo should not 'b3lO!lE

to ?ola.n.d but to =:uscb, a.t !Jr<:sent there h !10 doubt ttJat even

amon_; th6 .rew1s11 OOi.;~mun1sts there ttoulc.. be ila:"4l y o.nyona \\ho \'!oul d

Qofend tho olui:.la or :ttm&it:. t.o those to:rz-itor i es . On t to oontrbl'Y ,

the Pol!oh J owa 111 tho u .s . 3 . :t . o.rc &t: prvsent t be t.:.oat art.lant

advooetee of t~e oe.atern '9I'Ovinc8n ot t he Polish co:w.omtoalth .

The sovlot e.utilori t.iee lu: .. ve tully realised tb.i::s manifestly

u::rt'riendly atl'!oo phere \'/h1ot ... in t he r.w:tia r eason f'or · t hair u.nw1111n2:­

ness to pe rmit the Jews to z.o abr.oad or to l.'eOO!'!JliSe them e.s F011sh

oiti~enG . This ctro~tanoe , rovokes still ~eater indiGnation

monG.St the J'ews, co.osi.iet'1!\J that in 19Jti the se.ce sovic.lt. e.uthot•i ..

ties prevent ed the itlho.bit;ents ot the occupied tel:'r !tory trom

establ ishin:; their Polish o1t.izen.sh1p t1.nd oblisad the:... by threata ,

o.nd when nocosao.ry even by to r oe, to assert their .rev/1sb nat1ono.l1ty •

This 1!let hod was tu.lopted i n s,pite of tho t'aot that in the u . s . s . R.

t he

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t ho Jowa &l<Dst without oxooption oaaort their Ruaaion nat1onalit7

An4 tho SOviet rosulotiona Otr iotly to,.bi4 tho a4>;-• :on or lllltiona­

llty on a~ other i!l'OWI4o than t ho print• aoaao or notionality or

tho 1n4iv14unl.

AI resarda tho Ukra1niea., it follows trom t be utee~ancea ot

the Sov1at ot t1oi41 o1rclea tbot j~uoe 1G 4es1-rea to asamblc within

hor limi te tho wt1ole ot tho Ukrainian ele:r.ent and do C\,...)" with t~e

JF..cr:sta.ien "Pic~)()oe'· in Poland . The 3ov1et e \fOuld like to exter­

min~te tho Ukra1n1~ns end i n the tuturt ~et r14 or n factor Which

ln t~toir Oi)iaion is their only G.ana~r ot internal 41a1nte.;re.t!on .

Du.r11.t hia oonveruation '\lith G-anero.l Sikorsl,l, Stalin expressed

thio vi~tYI when ha t~ :=oopoeed. to etve his a.eei,etanoe to Poland toward.&

"crua.hin,s" the Ukr.:tinisns once end tor oll, prov1dt4 undtratandlng

we.a r"a.ehed v1ith rogard to the frontiers . He offered to transfer

2 - 3 a.llltoa Ukrainiena to :tuasto. Oone.ral S1korak1, however,

avol,ed convereat1on oo the subJect .

The Lithuanian proble~ ta verr Citterent. rtu•ste boasts that

she has obta1nad the oo~aent ot Great Brit41n tor the incorporation

or Lithuania together With Latvia nn4 ~atonia in tho u .s.s.?.. Tbis

would doprl•e tho Lithuaniane of all hope ot re~inin& their 1n­

depon4onoe . FUrtherttOre, it ia r.\oet likely that it Russia i s

viotortous ahe will en4eavour to t ore a barrier ot purelY Russian

elsrnent on the territories or t boao states . This would bo equ1Talent

to the evnouetion of millions of tho inhabitants of the border lando

to tho doptha of the (I,S ,S.a . '!'hle trail has nlrea4y bOOQ 1ndi·

ce.te4 by tho wholesele transports ot Ulcra!ni-aos an.4 Gercaoe to

~1d4lo end NOrthern Siberia.

J

!.:a.roh :50, l {;~2

L'\1. ~~r . r.thorton:

·•hen our now cwbassador 1a

r eady t o leave to r Wo<:rlu , pl ou o

be k ind en ouch to be auro ct.a t

thls Quoa t l on contulnod i n tho

memor a ndum l oft wi t 'l me by (}en.-

oral :>ikor:s <l t !ll a llOrn1 1\:i 1a

placed b efore h illl wi t h 1m trv.c­

t1ollll t o ~o w:JA t he can upon h is

arrival i n ~adr1d t o ~ersuode the

Spanish authori t i es t o let thoae

people out . I am eatlefiod thut

thes e oft l oerG wil l be or r eal value

t o the ,-ol1ah f o1•oes 1n tho near

futur e i t t h e7 could be r oleaaed

rrom Spain .

U:SW tD!JK

.... 0 1-g

13 >-j 0 -

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.. MZliORA.t-rpyy

on the neoeeaity ot 1~e4iate eotton ~o atop O.rman ou~ras•• In Polaad.

I - ""'" Polish Goverm.n~ baa boon uoeivlna latel y

nuruerou.e tru.at't/Ort h.y r~ports rroa Polan4 r e latir\.1;;

to • r~crudoooonoe and 1nton$1t1oat1on or the

number ot t erroris t cot s and or1.'l'l3 co::-.lttaG.

DI!OIIltlt t he Polioh on<l Jewish popul •t lon by t he

Geroe.n cuthor1t1es or oo:Juputlon . ThiOI QOt 8

a.rs ot e na turo unprooodeato-4 a.a re(iarcl::J orw:l tr

And bee"tiallty . The ropo~to doscr1bo uots or

taOs exacutioac oarriyC out otter 1ntl1ot1on ot

1ndeocr1bc:blo r.ut!lu.tion: an4 torture ·titL c.

rotiJ\IJl_ent ot luutul 1ty o.nd oudisu Hh1oh oa.'1 only

bo quc.lltl"'d fUl in.~u:~n in tho tulle!:t ncn:Jo ot

thQ uord .

halt , beon aurre·rtn... tro:: ever 1noreaa1oo ruthless

treatment at the hands of ita oppressors , calla

upon ita Go•ertcl8nt to appoal to the United No.t1or.e

tor t.mucdiato action 1n viev.t or etop,itt~ this

1nh\L"tla1l c:r.torrti llatiou or tho Polish ~o!)le .

III - ~~ Poli~h JOO~lo ox,r&ss t~ ~o~1ct1on t~~ th1o

could be t:>rou,)lt ubout onl y by 1u~ed1a.tc t1Gu::~ureo

ot

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ot rat~liatio~ applied to Oorcan na~ioanll Wherever

thio i a pooaiblt en<! their publication 1n u tillY

•1111oll Will bri~ it to the !:J>OWl o4e;o ot t ho O<>r=n

nation.

IV .. Ott Janucry t:th , 194!: , on I nt.·er-All1e4 D'.Jolo.rutton

r olc.ti.a.... to retribution to!" \IU or1r~ea waa o1~o4

in LOrtdon by t l1t nepruoentat1vea ot oou.ntriea

oooupied by Gel~ny . Thie oolemn AOt took plece

unuor tho Chllirzansbip or ao~ornl Sikoroki, PriDe

t:inister or Poland , in tbe pl'U onoe ot tho

Repreoeotativee ot t ho u. s. A•• GroMt Br1tcin ac4

tho Brit1ah Dominio:>o, Soviet n\Uiaio Olld Ohln&.

II¥ this Deolarl!.tioo the oi.;Mtor1eo Tlisllo4: (1)

to mako oort~in ( acoordia~ to the Dooleration m4do

on sept~ber ~ . li4l, by Proa1d4nt Roosevelt and

Price ~1Diotor Oburohill) th•t tho roopona1b1litioa

ot tho in<linduol war criminals <10\11<1 not bo evaded

in the future, ( 2) to eatabliah as t't'om now a

record ot the vartoua ocses, and publtcl7 to

denou.ooo the crimes, which had oome to their

knowledge , thu• endea•or1n~ to pro4uoo a pre•entive

ottect on the morale ot tho oooupants .

v - notwithe tan-ditl.G thi.a Declc.ration, GeZ'IIen outrage• 1n

Poland are on the inorc.aae and call ror enercet1o

and imMediate aotion .

Waahiaaton , l!.t.roh 24th, 104 2 .

..

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' '

eESR!f

SUBJECT: Germany

\ DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memoronclum ol Conversation

DATE: December 4, 1942

PARTICIPANTS: Prime !Uni s ter of Pola nd, General Sikor ski ; Ambassador of Poland, l~r . J an Ciechano11ski ;

Under Secretary, t-!r . ~lelles

COPIES TO: S onl y

The Prime l>!inister of Poland , a ccompanied by the Polish Ambassador , called to see me this after noon.

Genera l Sikorski handed me a document, a t tached herewith, containing t he views of t he Pol ish Government , and the Prime 141nister specifically emphasized that this document l i kewi se had received the formal approval of all of the other Governments in exile in London , with regard to steps Hhich shoul d be t aken by the victorious United Nat ions in and concerning Germany.

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It is essential unconditionally to constrain Germany to

accept the following most important demands and resolutions

ot the Allies. These demands concern:

a) the immediate reparation of all territories occupied by Gel'JD8ll1 and the disarmament of the German military potential (disarmament ot armies and of war industries) ;

b ) the reparation or all prisoners of war held in Germany as well as of all civilian population deported to Germany;

c ) the occupation of Germany and movements ot populations;

d ) punishment tor war crimes;

e ) reparation and compensation of losses sustained by the Allies and in the first instance by the Continental EU»opsan States aonquered and occupied by the Germans .

!· Demilitarization ~ Security,

1l The disarmament should apply to the total German armed f orces, police force and all existing para­military bodies. The members of front forces should be treated, atter their complete disarma­ment, as prisoners of war, applying to them the same methods as applied by Germany to our prisoners ot war; the rest (the rear forces) might be demo­bilized by the Allied military authorities as soon as it will appear possible without prejudice to the interest of general security. The members of the National Socialist Party should in every case be detained and isolated. The German armed forces, including police force and all existing para­military orgaoizations in the occupied territories should be treated as tront forces.

2)

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2) Tbe ~ied prisoners or war, workers, ciVil internees etc. to be set tree immediately.

3) War ~terials in the largest sense should be banded over to the Alliee without any exception, their production immediately etopped, the relevant work­shops removed or destroyed. The transition to a strictly peaceful production should be admitted under Allied supenision only; the production or machines and chemical articles should be allowed only as tar as will be established beforehand by the Allied Authorities. The metallurgical produc­tion and the output ot electric power should be similarly reduced.

4) All kinds or maps, plans, documents and archives ot importance tor warfare or military production should be banded over to the Allies.

5) Warships and merchant vessels should be banded over to the Allies tor immediate distribution between their respective navies.

6) All existing military and paramilitary organizations, societies, associations etc. as well as the National­Socialist Par ty and its organizations should be immediately dissolved and a resumption ot their actiVities strictly forbidden.

7) The execution ot the above regulations should be entorced by enacting, independently or a general responsibility, ot individual responsibility to the Allied Authorities ot all persons concerned.

8) All members or the German administration in the largest sense (including e . g. the so-called •trustees" - "Treub!nder" - tor industrial and other economic ente.rprises/ should be put under the obligation or rendering account or their actiVities to the local authorities ot the Allied States concerned, and ot transferring in pertect order to the same authorities, on demand, ot all administered real and personal property, documents etc.

II. Occupation.

9) The occupation or the pre~unicb territory ot the German State should be organized under two ditterent systems, called here bristly: "the general occu­pation" viz. "the strict occupation".

10)

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10) General occupation in Germany proper which will be carried out in principle by British and U. s . Forces should include all centers or strategic and political. importa.nce. The aim or this occupation is the supervision or general politi­cal developments in Germany in accordance with principles or democracy as well as the super­Tision ot the execution by Germany or all conditions applied to Germany as a consequence ot the cessation ot hostilities. The internal situation in Germany at the end ot the war may necessitate the taking over ot the entire administration or the country by the Allies tor a certain period of time.

Apart tromthe above mentioned general occupation "strict occupation" is foreseen tor territories ot Germany in her frontier zones. This term is used to detine territories the incorporation ot which into other States is foreseen, or such the occupation or which is indispensable trom the military v iewpoint to exact by force the strict execution ot imposed conditions.

11) Such strict occupation includes the following areas:

a) in the East: a line following the left bank ot the river Gerlitzer-Neisse and the lett bank of the 0der, incl uding the necessary bridgeheads; the estuary or the Oder, in­cluding Stettin, the islands or this estuary and the Isle ot Rftgen. The occupying power should be Poland and in the southern area bordering Czedboslovakia - Poland and Czecho­slovakia;

b ) in the South - at least Austria;

c) in the West: the area on the let t bank or the Rhine, including the necessary bridgeheads, and the area on the left bank ot the river Emden;

d) in the North: - at least the German islands on the North and Baltic Seas, as well as the Channel of Kiel and its bordering zones . The occupying powers in the areas or the North Sea and the Channel or Kiel should be Great Britain and America; in the area ot the Baltic islands Great Britain and Poland.

12)

13)

. .

m. !!!:, Crimes.

Germany should be put under obligation to give up (extradite) to the Allies all persons accused of having committed war crimes, upon a simple demand of the competent legal authorities, with­out right to oppose exoeptions of any kind what­soever, and to provide all information, documents eto. which could be useful for the purpose of judicial procesution.

The extratition should apply also to persons who infringe the duties imposed on them according to regulation No . 8 (above).

14) Personal responsibility should be established for all persons hindering the prosecution of war oriminals •

.!!· Movement of Populations .

15) Germany to admit into the area of general occupation:

a) all persons of German extraction, expelled by Allied Authorities;

b) all persons or whatever nationality or ex­traction, expelled because of their collabo­ration during the war with the German autho­rities;

c) all persons of German extraction, who will voluntarily leave the territories under Allied control.

16) Germany must allow free departure from the area of general occupation of all persons, indicated by the Allied Authorities .

y. Reparations.

17) Germany to acoept in a general way a commitment to restore and repair all losses and damages of a material as well as or a moral kind; the deliveries carried out in accordance with the regulat ions established below (Nos. 18-23) should be considered as part payments on accound.

18)

18) Cultural obdeots ot any kind whatsoever, removed or destroyed , should be identified and restored to the authorities or the respective Allied States; in case or loss - these authorities should have the right to take over other goods at their own choice as pledges for fulfilment or the obligation under No. 17 (above).

19) In order to safeguard reparation by Germany of all losses and damages in the field of culture (science, art, education etc . ) the authorities ot the Allied States concerned should take over, as pledges, certain German collections.

20) Germany should deliver all kind of installations, books etc . needed tor the immediate reopening in the occupied countries or high, medium and primary schools; the missing articles should be manu­factured by Germany on the principle of priority and at her own expense.

21) Economic goods of any kind whatsoever removed during the war should be restored; all articles lost or depreciated - replaced by others at the tree choice of authorities of the Allied States concerned.

22) Germany should deliver objects of every kind, in­dispensable tor the purpose of relief in the distressed areas of the Allied States and tor putting immediately in action the economic life in these areas. The missing objects should be manufactured by Germany on t he principle or priority and at her own expense.

Notice: the standard or supply ot Germany during the transition period in articles of consumption, raw materials and ma.nufactured goods should in no case be higher than that· of the countries which were occupied by her during the war.

23) In order to secure the fulfilment of the obligations by Germany under this chapter, the Allies should take over:

a) German property abroad;

b) incomes from customs and other duties, applied to German exports and imports; the Allied Authorities should accordingly exercise a

supervision

v -

supervision of the legislation, concerning these duties , and of their administration;

c) control of the Reichsbank and possibly of the big private banks.

!! . Final Regulations .

23) A Chief Inter allied CoiiJlllission should be organized, which would be exclusively entitled to the:

a) interpretation of the provisions of this settlement;

b) issuance of all executive regulations and orders;

c) exercise of the different activities of supervision and control under this settle­ment .

A German delegation should be attached to the Chief Interallied Commission in order to carry out its instructions and to submit to its decision Germany ' s pleas . The Chief Interallied Commission should be entitled to impose, if necessary, sanctions of a general or local character, according to its decision. ·

24) The Allied Authorities should apply, in the areas of general occupation, to all Germans personally re­sponsible for the execution of all Allied demands arising out of the application of the above stated measures, the provisions of the laws and regulations applied in Germany during this war in respect to the same acts or omissions against the German State, its citizens and public or private property.