loyalist n separatists in thailand 1977

5/21/2018 Loyalist n Separatists in Thailand 1977

1/15

Loyalists and Separatists: The Muslims in Southern ThailandAuthor(s): Astri SuhrkeSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Mar., 1977), pp. 237-250Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643498

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2/15

LOYALISTS

AND

SEPARATISTS:

THE

MUSLIMS

IN

SOUTHERN

THAILAND

Astri uhrke

THE

CONTROVERSY

OVER

the

Thai-Malaysian

border

agreement

n

1976

reflected,

mong

other

things,

a

recognition

n

Bangkok

that

the

Thai

government

as

unable

to

govern

he

southern

border

provinces

ffectively.

his

paper

addresses

tself

o this

problem

from he

point

of

view

of the

Muslims

n

southern

Thailand.

What

are

the

main

dimensions

of the

problem,

and

how

are these

regarded

by

the local Muslims?1

The

Muslim

population

in

the

South

is

concentrated

n

the

four

provinces

f

Pattani,

Yala,

Narathiwas

and

Satul.

The

southern

Mus-

limsrepresent

bout

3%

of

the

population

of Thailand,

or

700,000

people

according

to

the

1960

census.

In

the

four

provinces,

however,

they

onstitute

0-80%

of

the

local

population

and are clearly

demar-

cated

as a

distinct

roup.

They

speak

a local

dialect

of Malay

and

only

a small

proportion

20-30%)

also

speak

Thai except

n

Satul,

where

a

substantial

proportion

of

the

Muslim population

speaks

Thai.

They

are Malay Muslims,maintain theirtraditionalMalay dress and cus-

toms,

nd

rarely

marry

hai

Buddhists.

The presence

f

this territorially

oncentrated

roup

of Malays

in

a region

bordering

on

Malaysia,

where

the Malays

have

a

dominant

political

role,

has

meantpersistent

ifficulties

orboth

the

Thai

gov-

ernment

nd

the

minority roup.

Everyone

oncerned

recognizes

hat

the problem

is

an

old one,

going

back

to the

13th

century

when

the

Sukothai

kings

claimed the

southern

Muslim

sultanates

s vassals.

This

relationshipwas decisively ransformed

y

the administrative

eorgani-

1

This is

an

abridged

version

of

a

paper

presented

at the

Association

for

Asian

Studies

meeting,

Toronto,

1976.

It is primarily

based

on information

ollected dur-

ing

fieldwork

n Thailand

in 1970,

1971,

and 1976.

would

like to

note the

assistance

of

Charoenchit

Na Songkhla,

former

director

of the

Co-ordination

Center

in

Yala;

the late

Senator

Leck V.

Angkul,

Dato

Sin

Daraman

in Narathiwas,

Professor

Pattaya

Saihoo

at

Chulalongkorn

University,

and representatives

of the

United

Patani Freedom

Movement.

Connor

Bailey

of

Cornell

University

made

useful

com-

ments on the paper.

237


3/15

238

ASTRI SUHRKE

zation of

Thailand

starting t the end of

the

19th

century,

t which

time the

presentmanifestations

f the problem

first

egan to emerge.

These can

be divided into three

main areas,

relating

to educational,

administrative,nd economicmatters, ach of which will be briefly

discussed

here.

Education:

The

Thai governmenthas

continuously

emphasized

that the Muslims

must learn

the Thai language and

receive secular

education. Indeed,

there s a

tendency n Bangkok

and among

local

government

fficials

o

regard

ducation as

a panacea forpeaceful

nte-

gration f the Muslims.

But the

response

f the Muslim community

o

secular

education has been mixed.

In lower

primary chool (P.S.

1-4)

student nrollment orrespondso the ethnicproportions f the popu-

lation n

the border

provinces:Muslims clearly

predominatewhile the

Buddhists

re a small

minority. owever, he

Muslim

studentbody

de-

clines

drastically romower primary

o

upper primary chool (P.S.

5-

7), and

this trendcontinues

n high school

(M.S. 1-3,

4-5). The over-

whelmingmajority

of

the student

population

at

these levels is

Bud-

dhist,while the Muslims

constitute

small minority.

This anomaly

s

partly

xplained by

the

attitudes owards

ecular

education mongthe Muslims.Someoppose it out of deference o tra-

ditionalvalues,which

hold

thatreligious ducation

s

more

important

than secular education.

Another

factor s the conviction

mong

some

that the

Thai government

s using

seculareducation

to assimilate

the

Muslims,

o

make

them

eventually

eny

their

religion,

historical

herit-

age, race

and customs-in

short heirreligious

and ethnic

dentity.As

the separatist

nited

Patani Freedom Movement

UPFM)

has claimed:

The

Thai

government

s

trying

o teach

the

younger

generation

he

Thai

language

and make them

ove the

Thai

government

nd

respect

the king o that n the future heywill forget he Malay race and com-

pletely

ccept

Thai

nationality. 2

Militant

Muslimshave attacked

gov-

ernment chools and teachers,

eading

to the establishment

f teacher

vigilantegroups

and a

temporary

eacher boycott

n Narathiwas in

October 1975. These

views,

n

turn,

are

strongly

riticized

by

other

Muslims

who

maintain

that

secular Thai education

is desirable

by

enabling

the Muslims

better

o

protect

heir ights gainst

ocal officials

and

eventually ermitting

pward

socioeconomic

mobility.

There

are some

institutional

ehicles

for

combining

secular

and

religious

education.The Islamic College in Bangkoktakessome stu-

dents

from

the border

provinces,

nd

it

is

interesting

o

note that

among

these

almost

all

cite

the

prospect

for

upward

mobility

s

the

main

reason for seeking higher

education.3

For

the

majority

of

the

southern

Muslims

religious

education s

providedby

the

local

Islamic

2

United

Patani Freedom

Movement,

Declaration

of

Warning,

August

1, 1971.

(Original

in Jawi

and Malay).

3

Author's survey

of student

attitudes

(1971).


4/15

MUSLIMS IN

THAILAND 239

schools (Pondok),

which

until recently

aughtno

standard

Thai cur-

riculum.

n the

traditionalPondok

the

students nteredat

age 8 and

lived with the

teacheron

the

premisesfor several

years

often 7-9),

hence the Pondok constituted n effectiveompetitor o the govern-

ment

schools. The

government

esponded

n the late 1960s

by using

monetary

ncentivesto

gradually

convertthe

Pondoks into

private

schools that would

also

teach Thai

language and

some standard cur-

riculum.

A

majority f the Pondok

headmasters

to-kru

in

Thai) reg-

istered heir

chools n this

program,which

may, f

successful,mediate

the

conflict etween

eligious nd

seculareducation.

Much will

depend

upon

the

manner

of

implementation s

the

Pondok is a

powerful

symbol f

religious

nd ethnic

dentity o

southernMuslims

of all per-

suasions. Separatist pokesmen redictably enounced the program s

an

attempt o

undermine

hePondok

schools, nd

even thoseMuslims

who

favored ecular

ducationcautioned that

the

governmentmustnot

close

down Pondok schools

thatdo

not convert, r

convert

oo slowly.

Administration:here

are no

statistics

vailable on the

number of

Muslims

n thelocal

administration,

ut it

is widely assumed

that

the

Muslims

are in a distinct

minority,

nd a Muslim

District

Officer r

DeputyDistrictOfficers a rarity.This is primarily ue to the low

level of

education among

the

Muslims, although one

frequently

n-

counters

he

suspicion hat ven f a

Muslim would

qualify,

he

govern-

ment

would

post him

anywhere ut the border

provinces

or

fear that

he

may

not be

reliable.

Moreover,

ne

segment

f the

Muslim

com-

munity,

he

separatists, enounces all

forms

f

cooperation

with

the

Thai

government

nd

calls on the

people not

to seek administrative

positions.

The

predominance f

Thai

Buddhist

government

fficialsn

the

South,mostofwhomdo notspeakMalay, s a crucialfactor n creating

an

adversary

elationship

etweenthe ocal

people

and

the administra-

tion.This

ranges

from

omplaints y

the Muslims

of

petty

harrassment

and

corruption

o more

serious accusations of

persecution

and im-

prisonment f

Muslims

based

on tenuous

allegations

of

banditry

or

subversion.

Muslim

leaders have drawn differentonclusions

from his situa-

tion.

Some,

such as the famous

Haji

Sulong,

who was

killed in

1954

(evidently

y

Thai

police),

argue

that

a

majority

of

the

government

officialsn the Muslimprovincesmustbe Muslim,

although

there s

disagreement n

whether his should be

a

gradual

process

correspond-

ing

to

the

growth

f

higher

ducation

among

the

Muslims,

or be im-

plementedregardlessof

existing

educational

requirements

under a

general

autonomy

cheme.4Othersmaintain that the Muslims

should

4

Information ited in Stuara

iswa (Kuala Lumpur), December 1970, claims that

Haji Sulong was killed by

Thai

police agents.

This was confirmed y a less partisan

source,

British former fficer f the Malay police, in an interviewwith this author.


5/15

240 ASTRI

SUHRKE

rather

rely

upon

present

opportunities

o act

as a

cushion

between

the administration

nd

the people

in the capacity

fvillage

and

hamlet

headmen

kamnan

and

puyaiban),

nd

as electedrepresentatives

o

the

townshipstambon)and in theNational Assemblywhenfunctioning).

This

strategy

as

at

least

two

limitations,

owever.

One

is that

Thai-

land

remains

what

is

aptly

called

a

bureaucratic

polity where

effec-

tive

political

power-to

protect

nd promote

ndividual

or group

in-

terests-resides

n

the

centralized

dministration,

eaving ittle

cope

of

activity

for the

elected

representatives

r local

leaders.

Second,

the

more

successful

his

strategy

s, the

more

it tends

to

polarize

attitudes

within

the

Muslim

community

ince

the

militants

ee it

as

traitorous

cooptation

by

local

leaders.

The

UPFM,

for

nstance,

has accused

the

kamnanand puyaibanof being intelligence fficers or the govern-

ment

and

warned

that

these

are

very

dangerous

people.5

One

may

expect

a similar

reaction

from

militant

Muslims

if the present

Thai

government

roceeds

to

implement

the

Bill

on Local

Government

passed

by

the

National

Assembly

n

November

1975,

designed

to

strengthen

he

power

of

township

ouncils

by

direct

allocation

of

re-

sources

o theseunits

500,000

baht

per

tambon).

Maintenance

of a

modicum

of law

and

order

has

become one

of

themostpressing roblems n theborderprovinces,whichhave been

under

martial

aw since

the

Sarit

Administration.

he government

ev-

eral

times

has

moved

n troops

o

quell

disturbances -whether

aused

by

communists,

andits,

separatists,

r combinations

thereof.

nvari-

ably,

the

presence

f

regular

rmed

forces

eads

to

an escalation

of

vio-

lence and

embitters

xisting

divisions

between

the Buddhists

and

the

Muslims,

s

well

as among

the Muslims.

The

so-called

Pattani

massacre

in December

1975

seems

to

be

a typical

example.

Five Muslim

youths

were allegedly

murdered y

Thai

soldiers, eading

to

large

demonstra-

tions by Muslimswheremorepeople werekilled. But therewas also

evidence

of

disagreement

mong

the

Muslimson

the

propriety

f

the

demandspresented

o

the

government

n that occasion (that

the gov-

ernment

mmediately

withdraw

roops,

pay

compensation

o the

vic-

tims'

families,

nd send

Prime Minister

Kukrit

to the South

for

wide-

ranging

iscussions

with

Muslim

leaders).

Some felt

the

demands

went

too

far,

thers

hat

they

did

not

go

far

enough.

The

government's

e-

sponse

also

received

mixed

reaction,

specially

he decision

to appoint

a Muslimfrom atul, TermsakdiSamantarath, o replace the

incum-

bent

Thai

Buddhist

Governor

f

Pattani.6

To

the militants

t

was

an-

5

United

Patani

Freedom

Movement,

Declaration

of

Warning.

6

Governor

Termsakdi

comes

from

a

distinguished

family

of

public

servants

n

Satul

and

served

previously

n

Narathiwas

and

Satul.

1-is

views

on

conditions

in

the

border

provinces

re

presented

at

length

in

a

thesis

he

wrote

for

the

National

Defense

College,

Kawbanyasarob

satangan

si

changwad

paahtai

(An

Account

of

Conditions

in

the

Four

Southern

Provinces)

(mimeographed),

Bangkok,

1970.


6/15

MUSLIMS

IN THAILAND

241

other cooptation

move;

to others t

demonstrated

overnment

fforts

to meet local

demands

and promised

betterunderstanding nd

com-

munication

betweenthe

local

population

and the

Governor's

ffice.

Economic spects:

Buddhists and

Muslims

agree

thatdisturbances

in

the Muslim

provinces

re

closelyrelated

to economic

problemsthat

have

some

unique, local

dimensions.

The

economic

structure

s domi-

nated by

Thai Buddhist

government

fficialsnd

Thai

Chinesecapital-

ists

(merchants

nd rubber

plantation

owners).

Although

it can

be

demonstrated

haton

a nationwide

cale there

re

Thai Buddhists

who

are

as poor

as the southern

Muslims,the

focus

of the latter

s more

narrow,

usuallyconfined

o the

borderprovinces.

n this universe,

he

Muslim s generally rubbertapper heavilydependenton fluctuating

world

market

rices

fornatural

rubber),

fisherman,r

a vendor,

while

the Thai Chinese

and

the

Thai Buddhists

occupy

the higher

socio-

economic

strata.

Moreover,

the relatively

ow educational

attainment

of

the southern

Muslims

makes

economic

advancement

correspond-

inglydifficult.

thnic divisions

thus

tend to coincide

with economic

cleavages.

Some Muslim

leaders conclude

that

autonomy

or secession s

nec-

essary orthe Muslimsto obtain a just shareofthe incomegenerated

in the area. This claim

is based

on

the

assumption

hat

thefour

border

provinces

re rich

n

rubberand tin

but

this

wealth

s

siphoned

off

by

Thai Buddhists

and

Thai

Chinese.

Others,

however, oint

to the fact

that the

budgets

f the four

provinces

re heavily

ubsidized

by

the

cen-

tral

government,

nd argue

that

pressure

must

be exerted within ex-

isting nstitutions

o increase this share.7

imultaneously,

hey ay,

the

Muslims

themselves

must take

a more

positive

attitudetowards

du-

cation

as

a

means

of

economicadvancement.

One especially ensitive oint is the government's olicyof estab-

lishing

and settlements

nikom

sang

kong eng)

whereby

and is

allo-

cated

to Buddhists

rom ther

provinces.

here

is no evidence hat

such

settlements

re

concentrated

n

the Muslim

provinces

s

compared

to

otherprovinces

n the

country,

ut

this

s a moot

point

to those Mus-

lims

who

fear

that

eventually

he

program

may

seriously

ffect

heir

own

land tenure.8

eparatist

pokesmen

aturally mphasize

the

nikom

program

n theiranti-government

ropaganda.

7

Narathiwas

province,

which

is not

atypical,

collected

local

revenues

totalling

25

million

baht

in

1970,

while

budget expenditures

were slightly over

117

million

baht.

This does

not

include capital

investment

ffected

irectly

under

central

ad-

ministration

offices.

Changwat

Narathiwas,

Hua kawbanyasarob

kong

changwat

narathiwas,

2513.

(Narathiwas

Provincial

Yearbook,

1970).

8

According

to

the

Ministry

f the

Interior,

Self-help

Land

Settlement

n

Thai-

land

(Bangkok,

1971),

therewere

49

nikom

in the

country,

f which

six were in

the

Muslim

provinces.


7/15

242 ASTRI SUHRKE

Loyalists nd Separatists

Within the

southernMuslim community, hen, ne can distinguish

two schools of thoughtwith respectto the nature of the problem

and

the means of solving t. One view, which may be labelled loyalist,

holds that the Muslims must accept Thai rule as legitimate, nd that

theymust work with Thai officials o solve problemsof economic de-

velopment, ducation and administrationn the South. Autonomy

or

separatism re seen as impossible nd for that reason undesirable.The

loyalists rgue that the Thai government ermits great deal of toler-

ance in religiousand educational affairs. n some respects heyblame

the governmentmore for ins of omissionthan commission e.g., failing

to provide adequate social and economic nfrastructure),lthough they

also fear

governmentmisuse of power against

the

Muslims as

indi-

viduals

or

as a

group.

A

completely ontrary iew- the separatist -maintains that the

Muslims will never be able to protect nd maintain themselves

s

a

distinctcommunity nder Thai rule, and that opportunities

or eco-

nomic self-advancementre stifled. hose who are concerned

with the

latter

and not all Muslim leaders are), also argue

that the debate be-

tween orthodox and modern Muslims in the South is perverted

by the presenceof a Thai administration ince to become modern

means

to

become Thai.

Only by obtainingautonomy

or

independence

can those

Muslims

who

wish

to become modern do so while

still re-

maining

a

Malay

Muslim.

Similarly,

hose

whose

primary

oncern s

to

protect eligious nd communalvalues can only do so under

conditions

of

self-rule. his view has in the past been held by advocates

of both

autonomy and secession. However,

the

attractiveness

f

autonomy

as

an

alternative as

declined as

the

Thai

government roved equally op-

posed to this as to separatism. ts leading advocates n the past were

either

killed

(Haji Sulong)

or

went into exile

(Abdul Na

Saiburi and

Tengku

Abdul

Yala).9 Although autonomymay appear

as a

possible

compromise

n the

future f the

situation n

the South

markedly

de-

teriorates,

t

is not likely to findmany supporters t the presenttime.

Moreover,

t

should be

recalled

that the central

government

as tra-

ditionallyresponded

to

challenges o its authority y trying

o

tighten

centralcontrol

rather

han to

decentralize.

While the movements

avoring utonomy ppear

to have declined

9

Some autonomy may be

openly

advocated by

Thai

Buddhists,

however. In

January

1976, for instance, two smaller

opposition parties

in the

National

Assem-

bly, the New

Force

(Palang Mai) and

the

Socialist

Party

of

Thailand, formed

a

united

front

and included

an

item

in

their

program

that

read:

Equal

rights and

some

autonomy

must be

provided

to

minoritygroups. Bangkok Post,

January 6,

1976. Some

Muslims

in

the

Bangkok

area

(who are not

Malay)

have

tried

to

mediate

between the government nd

southern

Muslims who advocate

autonomy, arguing

that the latter

is not

treason. See statement by The

Siam Muslim

Group in

Bangkok

Post, June 27,

1974.


8/15

MUSL[MSX IN THAILAND 243

in recent years, the separatists remain. Their strength nd

constituency,

however, are

extremely hard to assess. They do not seem to draw sup-

port from any one educational or occupational stratum within the

community. So far they have not demonstrated any ability to mobilize

popular support

on a sustained and massive basis. Violent conflict in-

volving separatists

has been limited in scope and distinguished by its

festering nature.

The separatists are divided among themselves, al-

though it is difficult

or outsiders to determine if the various organiza-

tions

are

competing, overlapping, or duplicating entities.'0 None of

them claims to

receive significant xternal support. Still, the separatists

maintain that theirstrength ies with the people, and that the strug-

gle will and must

continue regardless of the poor prospects for success

in the near future.

A closer view of the attitudes and characteristics of

the separatists

can be attained

from the interviews below. They are contrasted with

similar interviews and

descriptions of representatives of loyalist

Muslims.

Mr.

X

is

a young

Muslim born

in

one of the four southern border

provinces.12 He speaks Thai, English, and Arabic, in addition to his

native Malay. He has

a university degree from abroad,

has close con-

tactswith radical student groups in Malaysia, is on intimate termswith

leaders

of the

clandestine

separatist movement,

the United

Patani

Free-

dom Movement,

and earns

his

living by working

for the

Thai govern-

ment in

a professional

capacity.

His

views

on the

separatist

movement,

its

chances

of

success, and

of

the alternative of accepting the

Thai

gov-

ernment's integrationist

policies are ambivalent. He is hedging his

bets

and

keeps

his

options

and contacts

open

to

both

sides.

He

summarizes

his attitude as follows:

I am a Malay Muslim. I must stay with my people. The Thai govern-

ment does not

respect

us. The

villagers

re

treated

with

contempt

nd

the educated

Muslims are

regarded

with

suspicion.

We

have

a

right

to

self-determination,

o

remain Malay

Muslim.

On the

other

hand,

it

is

a

long

and difficult

truggle.Maybe

it is

better to

stay

with Thailand

and take as

much

advantage

of

the educational

and

economic

oppor-

tunities

s

we

can-at

least

until the

Movement

becomes

stronger.

The

United atani Freedom

Movement:13

he meetingwith a represen-

10

Various names

have

appeared

in recent

years, ncluding

The

Patani

Islamic

Revolution,

The

National

Revolutionary

Front,

The

National

Liberation

Front

of

Patani,

and The United

Patani Freedom Movement.

liThe

interviews

ook

place

in

1971.

They were conducted

in Thai

and

Eng-

lish and with

the assistance of

a

Malay interpreter.

12

Further

details have been

omitted

to

prevent dentification

f the informant.

13

For

a

more recent

nterviewwith separatistspokesmen,

ee Norman Peagan,

Boiling Point

in the

Troubled

South,

Far

Eastern Economnic

eview, May

1976,

pp. 10-11.

Mr.

Peagan

does not

identify

which organization these

separatists repre-

sented.


9/15

244

ASTRI

SUHRKE

tative of

the UPFM military section took place in Pattani

under con-

ditions of considerable preoccupation with security and cautionary

measures by the intermediaries who arranged the meeting.

The military man is quite young. He speaks some Thai, but much

prefershis native Malay. He obtained his military training by staying

with the

Thai Army for two years, and says that some of his

fellow

guerrillas also have been in the Thai Army or police forces

previously.

I

have been in the jungle for eight years now. My whole

family

joined

the

Movement, partly because we were afraid of the

police,

partlybecause we want to help. When we joined, the

Movement

was

a

pretty mall group around Poh Yeh. Now there are about 1,000 of

us, although it is difficult o give exact figures. ome are not quite

loyal,

but are

merelybandits who have escaped the Thai police. They

are not true to the Movement at heart, and we give them

the bad

weapons. We now have one top-secret ermanent amp in the

jungle,

the rest of

us move around. We do not

want

to keep

too

many

men

in

the jungle but, rather, end in people to contact the

villagers

to

educate

them

about the Movement

and

to teach them how

to handle

weapons.

This

way

we

have

an

infrastructure hich

we can call

upon

when

the day comes. Now

we are

building up our strength

nd we

only

attack to get food and

weapons,

and

also to show

the

people

our

strength. ometimes t is necessary o kidnap or kill Muslimsin order

to show the people that they must work with

us.

The poor

people

give

us their

manpower,

but

the

rich

are

less willing to give.

Do we

get

more

support

from

the

uneducated than the educated Muslims?

n

one

sense,

education

helps

us

because

it

is

easier to teach the educated

Muslims

about

our

cause.

They

understand the

principles.

On the

other

hand,

the educated Muslims

are

sometimes

fraid to

cooperate

because they

fear the Thai

government.

The Movement, he says, draws on a variety of sources in its edu-

cational

program.

There are

political

teachers at

the

camp

who discuss

guerrilla

tactics

developed

in

the

Vietnam and

Algerian wars;

there

are seminars

on Castro

and

Che

Guevara.

Educational

material reaches

the Movement in

various

ways.

One

English-language

book

about

Che

Guevara,

for

instance,

was translated

into

Malay by

a

Malaysian

who

had studied

at

Oxford

and

supported

the

Movement because his

grand-

father had

originally escaped

from

Thailand.

Chinese sources

are

translated into

Malay by Malaysian

Chinese

(for appropriate

remuner-

ation), and Vietnamese sources are sometimes translated into Thai by

persons

who have lived

in

the

Eastern

border

regions

where there are

sizable

Vietnamese communities.

As

for

any

further

cooperation

between the

Movement

and other

groups,

he comments:

The

communists

Thai

communists

n

the

mid-South, he Malay-

sian, mainly

Chinese

communistswho

use the

border

provinces

as

a


10/15

MUSLIMS

IN THAILAND 245

sanctuary]use the same tactics as us, but our

aims

are different.

We

can work togetherfor tactical and diplomatic purposes,

but

not

be-

yond that.

We do want international ecognition,

o that

when we are

ready,we will have foreign upport. For instance, we have discussed if we

should kidnap

British

or Americans who come to the South so that

we can

get internationalpublicity.

With

respect to the currentmilitary ituation (1971) and

the

joint

Thai-Malaysian borderpatrols,he says:

Sometimeswe have

a

mock fightwith

the Thai Border

Patrol

Police,

and the

police

units

surrender heir weapons.

Now

things

are

a bit difficult ecause the Thai Army s brought n, and we are also

worried that the Malaysian security forces

will

go

after

us more

heavily

n

the future.We have told the Malaysian forces

not to

attack

their

Muslim

brothers nd said that we, in return,

will

not attack oint

patrols. f we attack,more Malaysian forcesmay come in.

In the ong run, you can interpret ur tactic s

a

means to weaken

the Thai

economyby making the government pend

more on the

mili-

tary.When the soldierscome down here we withdraw r hide, or only

surfaceto

ambush them. t is

then

difficult or the

government

o

de-

fendtheir expenditures o the National Assembly.Also, if the govern-

ment

has to

spend

more

money on

the

military

here

will be less

to

spend on economic development, nd this will

turn

the people against

the government.

The meetingwithrepresentatives

f

thepolitical

arm

of the

Move-

ment took

place

in a

village

n a

quite

different

tmosphere.

Here we

were clearly

on home

ground. Except

for

the fact

that

the

meeting

took place at night, herewere no security recautions r nervousness.

One oftherepresentativesas a

to-kru,

he otherwas an

imam

leader

of

prayers).

The imam was

an

old

man,

the

to-kru

ather

younger.

None of

them

poke

Thai.

The

aim

of our

organization s

full

independence-not autonomy

or federation

with

Thailand. Neither do

we

want

to be

part

of

Malay-

sia-even

if that were

possible. Only independence

will

serve our

people.

In

order

to obtain

this,

the most

important hing

is

to work

with the

people

and to teach them.

They

must be

taught

slam

first,

and when they re strong n Islam we teach the history f our region

and

the needs for

the

future.

Our

struggle

s

an

old one. In

recent

times,

the

most

promising

periods

for our movement

were

probably during

the war

[World War

II],

and

after

the

war when

Hadji Sulong

was

the

leader.

But

then

came

difficult

ears,

and

things

are also

difficult

ow-partly

because

there

are

parliamentarians.

The

parliamentarians from

the

South]

are not doing

the

right hing.

Their

way

of

doing things

will

not help

our

people,

but

some

people might

still listen

to

them

and

follow


11/15

246

ASTRI SUHRKE

them.We

are

also in a difficulteriod

now because

the governments

trying o change

the Pondok

schools.

This we

must prevent. f neces-

sary,

we will

stop all the

schools n the

villages

because no teacherswill

dare to come

here and

teach. The people here

are not interested

n

learningThai. But the governments trying o lure thepeople over to

their

side through ducation. Some

to-kru

have

followed

the govern-

ment policy

because they

are afraid,but we can

always win

back the

to-kru.

The policy

of the Thai government

o

appoint some

Muslims

from he region

to administrative

ositions s a

bad policy.

These Mus-

lims cannotreallyhelp their

people

because in

theirhearttheybecome

like the government.

On the question of outside aid, the religious leaders were skeptical

about

the

merits

of establishing a working

relationship

with

Thai and

Chinese communists

in

the area.

It was noted that

they were

not

Mtalay

Muslims; they were

outsiders. Ideological differences

were

also men-

tioned. They were

only slightly

more

optimistic about the

possibility

for

assistance from Muslim

countries

and groups, although

this was

clearly a

more desirable option.

We

hope

for

help

from

other

Muslim

countries,

but

this is

dif-

ficult.We cannot acceptmuch help fromMalaysia either.We appre-

ciate

demonstrations

n

Malaysia

on

behalf of the

rights

of Muslims

in

Thailand,

this

gives

our people

moral support,

but

we

cannot

rely

on getting

muchmore assistance.When

the

day of uprisingcomes,

we

will have

diplomatic

and

international

onnections,

ut first

we must

work with

the

people

and

strengthen

urselves.

The people

are with

us,

and our organization,

which has

existed for

20 years,

s

now

much

better organized

than

before.

We

have

a

centralized

tructurewith

a

small

committee

f

leaders on

the

top,

the

lower

levels do

not know

the personshigher up, and so on. This makes us much more effective

in the

struggle.

It has

been

a

long

struggle.

f we

do

not succeed

in

our

lifetime,

the

next

generation

will

carry

n to

victory.

Abdul Bhuminarong,

at

40

years

old,

has twice

been elected to the

National

Assembly

as

representative

from

Yala.

During

the

1957

elec-

tion,

he

ran on a Saha

Phoumi

ticket;

in the 1969 elections he ran

as

an

independent

but

joined

the

government party

(Saha

Pracha

Thai)

shortly fterbeing elected. He comes from an old and respected Muslim

family;

his

father,

in

particular,

was well

known

in the area. Mr.

Bhuminarong

studied

in

Kelantan-although

he

has no close

family

there

he

says

it was

quite

usual

to

study

in Kelantan at that

time.

Later he

spent

14

years

in

Bangkok,

working

for a

Japanese

firm

and

serving

as

a

parliamentarian

after the

1957

(December)

elections.

He

returned

to

Yala

to

campaign

in the 1969

elections,

and won a

small

margin (37 votes)

over

his two

opponents (a

Thai-Chinese

municipal


12/15

MUSLIMS

IN THAILAND 247

councillor nd a Thai Buddhistrubberplantationowner). He explains

the slendermarginby referringo his long absence from he province,

and

the factthathe won at all he attributes o his family's restige nd

standing n the area. He lives in a Thai-stylehouse in the provincial

capital,owns a small business, nd is married o a Thai-Chinesewoman

fromYala. His wife was previously radio announcer nd now teaches

high school. She helped her husband in the election campaign (1969)

and

says

that

the villagers id not reactnegatively o the quite unusual

fact

of a Thai-Chinese being marriedto a Muslim, although she took

care torespect he customs f the villagers o as to avoid givingoffense.

Bhuminarongcommented n what he saw as marked changes n

government olicy towardsthe Muslims n the last decade.

He

is par-

ticularly ppreciative f the educational policy.

Primary ducationmustbe expandedon a broad basis so that

the

Muslims

earn to

speak Thai.

If

theyonly complete he

lower

primarychool evelthey oon forget hai. But f they omplete igher

primarychool

s

well they o not forget hai. Now,the

Thai

govern-

mentofficialshink hat the Muslims re stupid. f the Muslims an

speak

Thai

they an protect

heir

ights.

He notesthat ducationdoesprovidethe Muslimwithan increased

range of professional nd economicoptions, nd stresses he encourage-

mentgivenby the government

n

providinghigh school

and

university

education

for

Thai-Muslims.

Several Muslims who

manage

to

go

this

far do not want to return

to

the

South, however,

but

it

is important

that

they

do returnand

set an example

to

others

n

demonstrating

what benefits ducation can

bring,he says.Moreover, f

these educated

Muslims become

government

fficials

hey

will be

able

to

help

their

people because theyknow the local customs nd the language.

On the

other hand, it would not be good if Muslims aspired to high govern-

ment

positions

n

the

South

because the

governmentmight

then

be

afraid of

separatism.

We

have to

find balance.

t is better o have educated

hais as

government

fficialshan

to have uneducatedMuslims

s

officials,

nd

stillbetter o haveboth

Thais

and Muslims

working

n

theadministra-

tion so that

he

government

ould not

worry

bout

separatism.

The

separatist

ovement

s

an

old

story.

t

is

a

hopeless

ause.The

separatistso notknowhow toorganizendfight,nd theyoungMus-

lims are not interested

n the

movement.

he

younger eneration

s

interested

n

getting

n

education

nd

moving

n-within he

Thai

nation.

He

does not see

any incompatibility

etween

being

a

good

Mus-

lim, on

the one

hand,

and

having

a secular education

and

speaking

Thai,

on the other.

Only

the

older

generation

eels

this,

the

conserva-


13/15

248

ASTRI UHRKE

tive nd stubborn ld people. In

thisconnection,

e recommends

hat

the to-kru

e

presentedwith

progressive

iews

more forcefully

han

is

the

case at present.

The to-kru

onstitute

highly

respected

and

ex-

tremelymportant eadershipsegment n the community nd they

should be educated

n disciplines

ther

han religion

o

that they

ould

teach

n

these areas

as well.

At present,

he government

nly brings

groups

f

to-kru o

Bangkok

for ight-seeing.

here

should

be a much

more comprehensive

rogram.

Even

though

he emphasized

the need

for

secular education,

he

warned

against

the professed

overnment

olicy

of closing

down

all

Pondok

schools

by

the end of

1971

unless they

start

converting

o

private

chools nd

introduce

Thai language

and secular

topics

n the

curriculum. he conversionprocess s difficultnd mustbe gradual.

Religious

education s

better

han

no education

whichmay be

the

al-

ternative

n some

areas

f the Pondok

are closed.

Most

importantly,

he

Pondok

have symbolic

mportance

o

the

Muslims

and there

will

cer-

tainly

be troubles

f

they re closed,

he warns.

Khun Pisan

is a young

Muslim

living

in

Yala where

he

teaches

school.

He

will

shortly e

promoted

o local

school

inspector.

He sug-

gests hathe maynotbe representativefmanyMuslims ince he

is

too

Thai in many respects-including

his practice

of speaking

Thai

at

home

with

his

wife and

children

although

ie

speaks

Malay

with

his

parents)

nd havinga

Thai name.

My father,

who is

a merchant,

was

very

strictwith our

religious

upbringing

when we

were small,

but he

encouraged

me

to

go

to

school.

I

went

first

o

a

Pondok school

in

Pattani,

then to

a

govern-

ment

school,

followed

by pre-university

tudies

at

an

American-sup-

ported

Christian

school in

Bangkok.

Many

of

the

Muslims

who,

like

me, go to Bangkok,do not want to returnto the South because they

feel that

people

here

are

too

orthodox

and

concerned

with

religion

alone.

But things

are

changing

here.

It

is

only

the

old

people

who

are

mainly concerned

about

religion

and the

after-life;

he

young

people

are interested

n

education

and material

welfare,

n

social and

economic

mobility.

hey

are

reversing

he

priorities

f theold

genera-

tion.

The villagers

re

changing. hey

come

into the town

to

sell

their

rubber

and

go

to

the

stores;

they

change

into

town-style

lothes

when

they

are here and change

back

to

traditional

dresswhen they

return to

the

villages.

When

they

are in town

they

even

go

to

the

movie-which s not quite as sinful as it used to be. Some to-kru re

also changing.

The

to-kru

ometimes

ay

that

it is

good

to teach

the

Thai

language

because then the

people

can talk

to the

government

officials

nd

protect

their

rights,

nd,

secondly,

have

a better

material

life.

n

10-20

years

think the Pondok

schools

will

change

to

become

full

private

schools

that teach

only

a few hours of

Islam.


14/15

MUSLIMS N THAILAND 249

The old people are rightwhen hey ay t is impossibleo be

both

a traditionalistn religious uestions nd a modernman. When you

go

to the

city

nd

you get

an

education ou cannot

be so traditional

and strict n manyways.But you can still combine he essenceof

Islam withmodem ife.

Concerning he studentdemonstrationsn Malaysia

in

June 1971

protestingThai government olicy in the Muslim provinces,Khun

Pisan feels that the news did not have much impact on the local

people: they only want to be left n peace, theydon't want trouble.

Perhaps

some

bandits in the jungle are interested

n

the news.

He

also

thinks hat the old, traditionalMuslims n the area look askance

at the Muslims in Malaysia for being too modern - there are no

Pondok in Malaysia and the Muslims there ven drinkbeer.

In

discussing the parliamentarians elected from the Muslim

provinces uringthe 1969 elections,Khun Pisan emphasizes hat:

whenpeople elect their epresentatives,hey irstook at his religion,

but secondlyhey ee what ort f manhe is. Rememberhat woBud-

dhist

andidates rom

ala

got manyvotes.But

a

Muslim andidate-

ifhe is a goodman-may ave more fan impact ince hegovernment

will know hathe speaksfor he people.The reason hatmanymem-bersof parliament rom he Southhave been rather uiet n the past

is not that hey re afraid f speaking p or afraid hat hegovernment

will distrust hem

of being separatists,

ut

just

that

they

are bad

M.P.'s. Still, hegovernmentends o misunderstandhesituation ere

by suspecting hat many Muslims re politically ad. In fact,the

separatistsrobably

make

up a very

mall

group.

The

government

lso

misunderstandshe peoplehereby believinghat

ll

Muslims re reli-

gious traditionalists.

n

fact, s

I

have said, things

re

changing.

The Muslimsin southernThailand presenta classic case of the

dilemmas

of a small

minority roup

faced

with

a

majority-directed

integration olicy. The leadership

of

the minority s split between

the

loyalists

who

accept

the

legitimacy

of

majority

rule

and

hope

for

gradual changes

within the

existing ystem, nd,

on the other

hand,

the

separatists

who

proclaim

the

necessity

f

self-rule.

ach

group

at-

tempts

to

mobilize

popular support,

but neither has

been

markedly

successful o date.

One of the most

significant

actors

etermining

he

outcome of

this

competition

n the

future

may

well

be

the

govern-

ment's

education

policy

and the extent o which t succeeds n mediat-

ing

the

conflict

between

traditional and modern

values. If this

dichotomy

s cast in a

communal-religious

old

whereby

moderniza-

tion

is seen

as

equivalent

to

Thai-ification,

he

loyalists and

the

government)

will

undoubtedly

meet considerable ocal

resistance.For

the

separatists

he

question is, rather,

o

what extent the

movement(s)


15/15

250 ASTRI SUHRKE

can

expand by denying eculareducation and thus alienatingyounger

Muslimswho

receive

such education. Another question

relates to the

role of youngMuslims who have studied abroad in Muslim

countries.

Very ittle s known about thisgroup,even its size, yetit mightcon-

ceivably merge

o

compete

with

ocal

religious

eaders who have

been

instrumentaln shaping eparatistmovement(s)

n the

past.

ASTRI

SUI-IRKE is

an

Assistant Professor n

the

School

of

International

Service,

AmericanUniversity,Washington,D.C.

loyalist n separatists in thailand 1977

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