low cost carriers within an evolving industry - growth and challenge with special thanks to: raymond...
TRANSCRIPT
Low Cost Carriers
within an
Evolving Industry -
Growth and Challenge
With special thanks to:
Raymond James and Associates, Inc. (RJ&A) and
GCW Consulting
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U.S. Airline Industry Earnings History and Projections
Source: RJ&A, SEC Filings, Forms 41, Carrier Reports
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YearEnd 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005E 2006E
LEGACY CARRIERSAMR Corporation* DEC 4.71$ 5.32$ 6.30$ 3.45$ 4.65$ (9.13)$ (12.97)$ (9.68)$ (5.57)$ (4.05)$ (0.43)$
47% 13% 18% -45% 35% NM NM NM NM NM NMContinental Airlines, Inc.* DEC 5.04$ 5.03$ 6.03$ 4.61$ 5.45$ (4.79)$ (4.52)$ (3.21)$ (3.87)$ (2.97)$ 0.97$
85% 0% 20% -24% 18% NM NM NM NM NM NMDelta Air Lines, Inc.* DEC 4.83$ 6.22$ 6.87$ 6.79$ 6.81$ (8.46)$ (7.89)$ (8.58)$ (16.28)$ (8.14)$ (1.89)$
45% 29% 10% -1% 0% NM NM NM NM NM NMNorthwest Airlines * DEC 5.71$ 5.29$ (1.81)$ 2.89$ 3.21$ (6.32)$ (5.71)$ (6.57)$ (8.25)$ (6.45)$ (0.84)$
10% -7% NM NM 11% NM NM NM NM NM NMUAL Corporation* DEC 7.68$ 9.97$ 10.50$ 10.06$ 2.38$ (33.23)$ (34.56)$ (17.64)$ (10.16)$ (6.62)$ (2.15)$
50% 30% 5% -4% -76% NM NM NM NM NM NMUS Airways Group, Inc.* DEC 2.33$ 6.18$ 5.60$ 0.50$ (2.33)$ (17.35)$ (15.56)$ (12.61)$ (10.87)$ (6.25)$ (3.00)$
324% 165% -9% -91% NM NM NM NM NM NM NM
LOW COST CARRIERSAirTran Holdings, Inc. DEC (0.76)$ (1.37)$ (0.13)$ ** 0.28$ ** 0.43$ ** 0.18$ ** 0.08$ ** 0.46$ ** 0.11$ 0.11$ 0.41$
NM NM NM NM 54% -58% -56% 475% -76% 0% 273%Frontier Airlines, Inc. MAR (0.82)$ (1.00)$ (1.30)$ 1.09$ 0.94$ 1.90$ 0.39$ (0.78)$ 0.45$ (0.75)$ 0.02$
NM NM NM NM -14% 102% -79% NM NM NM NMJetBlue Airways Corporation DEC NA NA NA NA (0.25)$ 0.16$ ** 0.56$ 0.86$ 0.43$ 0.18$ 0.30$
NM NM NM NM NM NM 250% 54% -50% -58% 67%Southwest Airlines Co. DEC 0.27$ 0.41$ 0.55$ 0.59$ 0.78$ 0.51$ 0.25$ 0.36$ 0.40$ 0.54$ 0.60$
13% 52% 34% 7% 32% -35% -51% 44% 11% 35% 11%
EVOLVING LOW COST CARRIERSFLYi, Inc.^ DEC 0.53$ 0.40$ 0.75$ 0.68$ 0.72$ 0.93$ 1.18$ 1.29$ (3.01)$ (3.81)$ UR
89% -25% 88% -9% 6% 29% 27% 9% NM UR URMidwest Air Group, Inc. DEC 1.51$ 1.74$ 2.51$ 2.71$ 0.23$ (1.42)$ (1.08)$ (0.88)$ (2.43)$ (1.41)$ UR
23% 15% 44% 8% -92% NM NM NM NM NM NM
* First Call Consensus Estimates^ Effective as of August 4, 2004, Atlantic Coast Airlines Holdings, Inc. announced that its name would be changed to FLYi, Inc.** EPS is on a proforma fully taxed basis.
U.S. Airline Industry Earnings History and Projections
LEGACY CARRIERS Year End 1996 2000 2002 2004 2005E 2006E
AMR Corporation DEC 4.71$ 4.65$ (12.97)$ (5.57)$ (4.05)$ (0.43)$ 47% 35% NM NM NM NM
Continental Airlines, Inc.* DEC 5.04$ 5.45$ (4.52)$ (3.87)$ (2.97)$ 0.97$ 85% 18% NM NM NM NM
Delta Airlines, Inc.* DEC 4.83$ 6.81$ (7.89)$ (16.28)$ (8.14)$ (1.89)$ 45% 0% NM NM NM NM
Northwest Airlines* DEC 5.71$ 3.21$ (5.71)$ (8.25)$ (6.45)$ (0.84)$ 10% 11% NM NM NM NM
UAL Corporation* DEC 7,368.00$ 2.38$ (34.56)$ (10.16)$ (6.62)$ (2.15)$ 50% -76% NM NM NM NM
US Airways Group, Inc.* DEC 2.33$ (2.33)$ (15.56)$ (10.87)$ (6.25)$ (3.00)$ 324% NM NM NM NM NM
LOW COST CARRIERS
AirTran Holdings, Inc. DEC (0.76)$ $ 0.43 ** $ 0.08 ** 0.11$ 0.11$ 0.41$ NM 54% -56% -76% 0% 273%
Frontier Airlines, Inc. MAR (0.82)$ 0.94 0.39 0.45 -0.75 0.02NM -14% -79% NM NM NM
JetBlue Airways Corporation DEC NA (0.25)$ 0.56$ 0.43$ 0.18$ 0.30$ NM NM 250% -50% -58% 67%
Southwest Airlines Co. DEC 0.27$ 0.78$ 0.25$ 0.40$ 0.54$ 0.60$ 13% 32% -51% 11% 35% 11%
EVOLVING LOW COST CARRIERS
FLYi, Inc. ^ DEC 0.53$ 0.72$ 1.18$ (3.01)$ (3.81)$ UR89% 6% 27% NM UR UR
Midwest Air Group, Inc. DEC 1.51$ 0.23$ (1.08)$ (2.43)$ (1.41)$ UR23% -92% NM NM NM NM
* First Call Consensus Estimates
^ Effective as of August 4, 2004, Atlantic Cost Airlines Holdings, inc. announced that its name would be changed to FLYi, Inc.
** EPS is on a proforma fully taxed basis.
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Source: RJ&A, SEC Filings, Forms 41, Carrier Reports
-12.00%
-6.00%
0.00%
6.00%
12.00%
18.00%
OP
Ma
rgin
AA CO DL NW UA US Total
International Operations Remain Robust
SysIntlDom
Forms 41, Reported Profit and LossYear Ending 2004 3Q
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1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3L C C s 1 6 . 8 % 1 7 . 6 % 1 8 . 5 % 2 0 . 3 % 2 1 . 2 % 2 3 . 6 %R e g i o n a l s 1 1 . 9 % 1 2 . 5 % 1 3 . 0 % 1 3 . 7 % 1 6 . 6 % 1 8 . 8 %L e g a c y 6 6 . 7 % 6 5 . 2 % 6 3 . 8 % 6 1 . 4 % 5 7 . 9 % 5 3 . 3 %O t h e r * 4 . 6 % 4 . 7 % 4 . 7 % 4 . 7 % 4 . 3 % 4 . 4 %
T o t a l D o m e s t i c P a x ( M M ) 5 9 8 . 8 6 2 4 . 6 6 4 9 . 3 6 0 6 . 1 5 9 4 . 3 6 0 2 . 5
* A i r l i n e s t h a t a r e n o t d i s t i n c t l y l e g a c y c a r r i e r s , r e g io n a ls a i r l i n e s , o r L C C s i n c l u d eA la s k a , M id w a y , M id w e s t , A l o h a , H a w a i i a n , a n d o t h e r s
U . S . L C C s C a p t u r e D o m e s t i c P a s s e n g e r S h a r e
S o u r c e s : D O T F o r m 4 1 D a t a , E c l a t C o n s u l t i n g , A v S t a t A s s o c i a t e s , a n d R J & A E s t i m a t e s
6
U.S. Dom estic Airline Industry – 2003 ($$)By M arket Segm ent
Dom estic Industry=$71.7 B illion
64.5%Legacy Carriers
$46.3 billion
17.0%
Low Cost
Carriers
$12.2 billion
17.1%
Regional
A irlines
$12.3 billion
1.4%
Charter A irlines$1.0 billion
Sources: SEC Filings, U.S. Department of Transportation, Companies,and RJ&A Estimates
PAX MARKET SHARE CAN OVERSTATE LCC PENETRATION
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LCC Growth did not happen entirely by Accident
The American Express AirfareIndex
$0
$100
$200
$300
$400
$500
$600
$700
Jan-96
May-96
Sep-96
Jan-97
May-97
Sep-97
Jan-98
May-98
Sep-98
Jan-99
May-99
Sep-99
Jan-00
May-00
Sep-00
Jan-01
May-01
Sep-01
Jan-02
May-02
Sep-02
Jan-03
May-03
Sep-03
Jan-04
May-04
Sep-04
Lowest Discount Fare
- 27% from YTD October 1996 to YTDOctober 2004
- 4% from YTD October 2003 to YTDOctober 2004
$129 YTD October 1996
$324 in 1Q96
$509 in 1Q04
$579 in 1Q01
$94 YTD DEC 2004
Sources: American Express Business Travel Monitor and Harrell & Associates.
Non-Fuel Costs Have Stayed More Stable Than You Think
Total Operating Cost less Fuel Per ASM Domestic
0.00000
0.02000
0.04000
0.06000
0.08000
0.10000
0.12000
0.14000
0.16000
0.18000
0.20000
2001 1 2001 2 2001 3 2001 4 2002 1 2002 2 2002 3 2002 4 2003 1 2003 2 2003 3 2003 4 2004 1 2004 2 2004 3
Ce
nts
Pe
r A
SM
AAD
B6D
COD
DLD
F9D
FLD
HPD
NKD
NWD
TZD
UAD
USD
WND
9
Source: Forms 41, GCW Consulting
Highest Cost Carrier Twice as Expensive as Best LCC in Adjusted Stage Length Analysis
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2Q04 CASM at 1000 mile Stage Length
6.2 6.8 7.48.1 8.2 8.8 9.1
10.3 10.9 11.0 11.612.2 12.6 13.3
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
Co
st p
er A
SM
(ce
nts
)
Source: Unisys’ R2A Cost Calculator.
S ta g e L e n g th A d ju s te d U n it C o s t G a p E v e n L a rg e r F o r L C C s(C o m p a ra b le N a rro w b o d y A irc ra ft a t 1 0 0 0 -m ile S ta g e L e n g th )
1 1 .5 1 1 .8
6 .76 .1
0 .0
2 .0
4 .0
6 .0
8 .0
1 0 .0
1 2 .0
1 4 .0
2 Q 0 3 2 Q 0 4
Co
st
pe
r A
SM
(c
en
ts)
*C o s t p e r A S M is a w e ig h te d a ve ra g e b a s e d o n c a p a c ity
L e g a c y
C a rrie rs
L e g a c y
C a rrie rs L C C sL C C s
+ 7 5 %+ 8 8 %
S o u rc e s : U n is ys ’ R 2 A C o s t C a lc u la to r a n d F o rm 4 1 D a ta , R J & A
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The GAP is closing very slowly.
PILOT AND OTHER LABOR COSTS AREIMPORTANT BUT NO PANACEA
YE 2Q 2004 LABOURCASM
INDEX-HP TOTALCASM
INDEX-HP
Legacy actual avg. 3.99 165 11.10 135Legacy with cuts 3.29 126 10.41 127WN 3.32 137 8.5 103LCC (avg.) 3.01 124 8.58 104FL 2.44 101 9.03 109HP 2.44 100 8.22 100B6 2.04 84 7.01 85
Source: GCW analysis based on DOT Form 41 data (year ending June 2004), Bankruptcycourt documents describing proposed US Airways and United labor costs proposals andpress releases describing the cost cutting program’s of other Legacy carriers.
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Recently Legacy Carriers have tried to keep up with LCC capacity.
ASM Domestic Capacity Big 6 and 7 Low Cost Carriers
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
2001 1 2001 2 2001 3 2001 4 2002 1 2002 2 2002 3 2002 4 2003 1 2003 2 2003 3 2003 4 2004 1 2004 2 2004 3
Millio
ns o
f A
SM
s
BIG 6 7 LCCs
13
Source: Form 41s, GCW Consulting
Thesis: They Have Not Done it in a Cost Minimizing WayLegacy Carrier Airplane Size Chart
Average Seats in U.S. Domestic Service The Big Six and Their Feeders
3rd Quarter 1995 to 2004
115
120
125
130
135
140
145
150
1995 3 1996 3 1997 3 1998 3 1999 3 2000 3 2001 3 2002 3 2003 3 2004 3
Source: Form 41s; GCW Consulting
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Breathtaking Negative Impact on Infrastructure Financing from Reduced Aircraft Size
• Government Failure: Executive, Legislative, and Judicial.
• Market Failure: Fighting the Last War.
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A typical Regional Jet imposes the same infrastructure costs but contributes $60 per passenger less than a typical mainline narrow-body.
XX RJ (LGA) vs. Spirit MD-80
Landing Fees 42,549 X $6.45 = $277.44 130,000 X $6.45 = $838.50
Excise Tax (7.5%) 4,411* X .075 = 330.85 11,800**X .075 = 885.00
PFC/Segment/($6.10) 27.4 X $6.10 = 167.14 118 X $6.10 = 719.80
$775.43 $2,443.30
RJ ShortFall = 1,667.87
Per RJ Pax = 60.87
*27.4 avg. onboard pax X 2003 avg. fare. Overstates contribution to the extent lower yielding connectionsare carried.
** Assumes 118 pax @ 100 per pax.
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2 0 0 4 A 2 0 0 7 E * % C h a n g e
A i r T r a n 8 7 1 4 4 6 6 %F r o n t i e r 4 7 6 2 3 2 %J e t B l u e 6 9 1 6 1 1 3 3 %S o u t h w e s t 4 1 7 5 3 4 2 8 %T o t a l 6 2 0 9 0 1 4 5 %
* I n c lu d e s t h e e x e r c is e o f o p t io n s f o r a l l b u t F r o n t ie r
S o u r c e s : S E C F i l i n g s a n d C o m p a n y P r e s s R e l e a s e s ;
R J & A .
LCCs - Sharp Growth In Aircraft
17
123135 139
4
923
73
87
106
0102030405060708090
100110120130140150160170
2003 2004 2005E 2006E 2007E 2008ENu
mb
er
of
Air
cra
ft (
inc
lud
ing
op
tio
ns
)
Options
Firm
ASM Growth y/y: 22% 20% 28% 20%-30% 15%-25% 10%-25%
162
144
127
Source: Company presentation and RJ&A Forecast.
AirTran’s Fleet To Almost Double Over Next Four Years(Includes the exercise of options)
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61 5
3 5
7
2 5
4 3
6 1
7 9
9 7
1 0 0
1 0 0
3 3
1 8 31 8 31 7 1
5 33 7
2 1
6 9 1 1 81 3 5
1 5 3
1 0 18 4
42
0
1 5
03 06 09 0
1 2 01 5 01 8 02 1 02 4 02 7 03 0 03 3 03 6 0
2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 E 2 0 0 6 E 2 0 0 7 E 2 0 0 8 E 2 0 0 9 E 2 0 1 0 E 2 0 1 1 E 2 0 1 2 E
E M B -1 9 0 O p tio n s
E M B -1 9 0
A 3 2 0 O p tio n s
A 3 2 0 F ir m O rd e r s
1 2 6
2 3 6
1 9 8
1 6 1
3 1 3
2 7 4
3 5 1
9 1
A S M G r o w th : 9 6 % 6 6 % 3 9 % 2 6 % 2 9 % 2 7 % 2 2 % 1 9 % 1 6 % 1 4 % 1 2 %
S o u r c e s : J e tB lu e A irw a y s C o rp o ra t io n v ia R J & A
JetBlue - Strong Growth in Aircraft to Drive Strong Capacity GrowthEnd of Year Cumulative Total Fleet
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Southwest's Planned Fleet Growth
(Including Options)
435 457 482 488
1123
5297
417387375
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2002A 2003A 2004A 2005E 2006E 2007E 2008E
# o
f A
ircr
aft
Options
Firm
446480
534
585
% Change: 3% 8% 7% 8% 11% 10%
Source: Company Press Release via RJ&A
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Southwest Growth Moderate in Relative Terms
Southwest- Lowest CASM on a Stage Length Adjusted Basis(Ba sded on 2Q04 CASM Adjuste d for a 500-mile Stage Length )
7.69.1
10.2 10.311.4 11.7 11.8
14.2 14.8 14.9 15.1 15.3 15.316.3
0.0
2.0
4.06.0
8.0
10.0
12.014.0
16.0
18.0
Co
st p
er
AS
M (c
ents
)
Source: Unisys’ R2A Cost Calculator.
Cost advantage particularly compelling for Southwest.
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Profile of Fuel Hedges Pro Forma Comparison Ex-Fuel Hedges Southwest utilizes financial derivative
instruments for both short-term and long-term time frames when it appears the Company can take advantage of market conditions
LUV’s average fuel price during 2004 was $26.00/ barrel while market average was $ 41.51 / barrel
Has a mixture of purchased call options, collar structures, and fixed price swap agreements in place to hedge against rising fuel prices
25%30%45%
65%
85%80%83%
60%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Southwest’s Average % Fuel Hedged
2004 PF 2004
Revenues $6,530 $6,530.0
Operating Expenses:
Aircraft Fuel $1,000 $1,597
Non-Fuel Operating Expenses 4,976 4,976
Total Operating Expenses $5,976 $6,572.5
Operating Income $554 ($42.5)
% Margin 8.5% (0.7%)
Net Income $313 ($107.5)
% Margin 4.8% (1.6%)
EBITDAR $1,164 $567.5
% Margin 17.8% 8.7%
Southwest’s ambitious fuel hedging program has enabled them to remain profitable while while holding fares to historically low levels.
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American 72.0%Continental 86.6%Delta 81.0%Northwest 87.8%United* 95.9%US Airways* 98.7%AVERAGE 87.0%
Southwest 32.6%
*Includes liabilities subject to compromise
Long-Term DebtPlus Off-Balance Sheet Operating LeasesAs A Percentage Of Total Capitalization
(As of September 30, 2004)
Sources: SEC Filings and RJ&A Forecast.
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Surviving Hubs PossibleSurvivors
Very Marginal Closed
DL ATL CVG, JFK*, SLC DFW, MCOAA ORD, DFW, MIA*UA ORD SFO*, IAD, LAXNW MEMCO CLEUS PHL, CLT PIT
Note: * = only viable as international gateway - not competitive as a domestic hub.
Source: Horan, GCW Consulting
THE FATE OF THE HUBS - One Man’s Opinion
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Concentration at National Level Not DangerousNational Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH1) Index Since Deregulation
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Paxhhi
Miles HHI
Source: US DOT OD1A DatabaseNotes: Domestic O&D Passengers
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The Seven Phases of Airline Deregulation - Thus Far
Phase 1 (1978 - 1980) INITIAL SHOCK
• Entry of former charter carriers; UA goes Point-to-Point; Two Tier Pricing Approved.
Phase 2 (1980 - 1984) BIG ADJUSTMENTS
• Frequent flyer programs; information technology and yield management; Hubs develop including international; new entrants fail (all but one).
Phase 3 (1984 - 1988) MERGER MANIA
• An historic shift in competition policy. WN moves onto the radar screen.
Phase 4 (1989 - 1993) RETRENCHMENT AND HUB DOMINANCE
• Recession, war, oil prices, too much for the unprotected middle tier except for one.
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The Seven Phases of Airline Deregulation (continued)
Phase 5 (1994 - 2000) RECOVERY, BOOM, AND DOMINANCE
• Demand soars; price discrimination accelerates; new entrants fair poorly; profits approach records but labor costs keep pace.
Phase 6 (2000 - Present) TRAGEDY AND RESTRUCTURING
• LLCs emerge; Swissair and United in the Tank; Do you believe in the “great (wo)man” theory or in the market?
Phase 7 - BE OPTIMISTIC
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