look forward reason back

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  • 8/2/2019 Look Forward Reason Back

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    Look Forward, Reason

    Back

    The Cornerstone of Strategic Reasoning

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    Overview

    Advertising and entry

    Retail location strategies

    General Principles

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    Advertising and Entry

    An established retailer is facing possiblecompetition from a rival

    The established retailer can try to stave off

    entry by engaging in a costly advertising andprice cutting campaign

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    Speed and flexibility

    The rival is fast and flexible, so its policy is towait and decide at the last possible instant itsentry choice

    Thus, the rival observes the initiation of thiscampaign before making its entry decision

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    Strategies and Payoffs

    Incumbent: Advertise or not

    Rival: Enter or not

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    Payoffs:

    Incumbent (Best to worst)

    No entry and no ads

    No entry and ads

    Entry and no ads Entry and ads

    Rival

    Entry and no ads

    No entry and ads

    No entry and no ads

    Entry and ads

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    Game Tree

    I

    R

    R

    1,1

    3,3

    2,4

    4,2

    Ads

    No ads

    In

    Out

    In

    Out

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    Backward Induction

    Look to the end of the game tree and pruneback

    Rationality assumption implies that players

    choose the best strategy at each node.

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    Rivals Choice

    I

    R

    R

    1,1

    3,3

    2,4

    4,2

    Ads

    No ads

    In

    Out

    In

    Out

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    Incumbents Choice

    I

    R

    R

    1,1

    3,3

    2,4

    4,2

    Ads

    No ads

    In

    Out

    In

    Out

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    Equilibrium Prediction

    The prediction from this model is that theincumbent will run its ad campaign and thiswill effectively forestall entry

    Notice that even in absence of actual entry,the potentialcompetition from the rival eatsinto the incumbents profits.

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    Is Flexibility an Advantage?

    Suppose that the rival is less flexible in itsmanagement practices.

    It must commit to enter or not beforethe

    advertising decision of the incumbent. How does this affect the outcome of the

    game?

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    Game TreeStodgy Rival

    R

    I

    I

    1,1

    2,4

    3,3

    4,2

    In

    Out

    Ads

    No ads

    Ads

    No ads

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    Backward Induction - Incumbent

    R

    I

    I

    1,1

    2,4

    3,3

    4,2

    In

    Out

    Ads

    No ads

    Ads

    No ads

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    Backward InductionRival

    R

    I

    I

    1,1

    2,4

    3,3

    4,2

    In

    Out

    Ads

    No ads

    Ads

    No ads

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    Equilibrium Prediction

    Notice that now the prediction is that the rivalwill enter and the incumbent will not advertise

    The absence of flexibility on the part of the

    rival improves its outcome relative to the casewhere it retained flexibility.

    This game has a first-mover advantage

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    Do all games exhibit first-mover

    advantage?

    No

    Procurement contracts:

    Two firms are bidding for a procurement

    contract, which will be awarded to the lowbidder.

    There is a cost to preparing a bid

    Firm 1 chooses its bid followed by firm 2.

    Clearly it pays to go second and undercut thebid of the first firm

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    More Players

    Same methods apply to more players

    Only the tree grows more complex

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    Location Decisions

    Three retailers (A, B, and C) are decidingtheir location decisions for an emergingmetropolitan area

    Their decision is whether to locate in anurban mall or a suburban mall

    The urban mall has spots for 2 stores

    The suburban mall has spots for all 3.

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    Motivation

    The urban mall has more traffic than thesuburban mall

    There are synergies in mall location

    The presence of 2 or more large stores drivesdisproportionate traffic to that mall

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    Strategies and Payoffs

    Each retailer chooses where to locate: urbanor suburban

    Payoffs (Best to worst)

    Urban mall with other store Suburban mall with other stores

    Urban mall alone

    Suburban mall alone No mall

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    Mall Allocation

    The malls are not strategic players.

    Urban: B and C have priority over A

    Suburban: Accept anyone

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    Timing

    Firm A is moves first, followed by B and thenC

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    Game Tree

    A

    B

    B

    1,5,5

    C

    C

    C

    C

    5,5,2

    5,2,5

    3,4,4

    2,5,5

    4,3,4

    4,4,3

    4,4,4

    U

    S

    U

    S

    U

    S

    S

    S

    S

    S

    U

    U

    U

    U

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    Backward Induction - C

    A

    B

    B

    1,5,5

    C

    C

    C

    C

    5,5,2

    5,2,5

    3,4,4

    2,5,5

    4,3,4

    4,4,3

    4,4,4

    U

    S

    U

    S

    U

    S

    S

    S

    S

    S

    U

    U

    U

    U

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    Backward Induction - B

    A

    B

    B

    1,5,5

    C

    C

    C

    C

    5,5,2

    5,2,5

    3,4,4

    2,5,5

    4,3,4

    4,4,3

    4,4,4

    U

    S

    U

    S

    U

    S

    S

    S

    S

    S

    U

    U

    U

    U

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    Backward InductionA

    A

    B

    B

    1,5,5

    C

    C

    C

    C

    5,5,2

    5,2,5

    3,4,4

    2,5,5

    4,3,4

    4,4,3

    4,4,4

    U

    S

    U

    S

    U

    S

    S

    S

    S

    S

    U

    U

    U

    U

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    Equilibrium Prediction

    Firm C chooses suburban only if other 2choose S

    Firm B knows that by choosing an urban

    location, C will follow suit, therefore it goesurban

    Firm A knows that B will go urban regardlessand that C will follow Bs lead, therefore if it

    goes urban, it will be shut out

    Therefore A goes suburban and ends up alone

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    General Principles

    Sketch a game tree outlining who moveswhen

    Construct a ranking of outcomes for both you

    and your rivals. Look forward and reason back

    If the outcome is not a desirable one, think

    about how you might change the game

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    Ways to Change the Game

    Contracting: Look ahead in thinking about thestrategic implications of contract terms

    Change the order of moves (i.e. commitment)

    to gain a first-mover advantage.