london interna tional model united nations 2018

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LONDON INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2018

Table of Content

African Union London International Model United Nations 19th Session | 2018

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Table of Contents

Introduction Letters ………………………………………………………… 3

Introduction to the Committee ...….………………………………………... 5

Topic A: Developing a Long-Term Security Strategy in East Africa ……. 6

Introduction ……………………………………………………………. 6

History of the Problem ………………………………………………… 7

Statement of the Problem ……………………………………………… 9

Current Situation ……………………………………………………... 11

Bloc Positions ………………………………………………………... 13

Questions the Resolution Should Answer ……………………………. 14

Topic B: The Future of the Continental Free Trade Area ……………… 17

Introduction …………………………………………………………... 17

History of the Problem ……………………………………………….. 19

Statement of the Problem …………………………………………….. 21

Current Situation ……………………………………………………... 23

Bloc Positions ………………………………………………………... 24

Questions the Resolution Should Answer ……………………………. 26

Conference Information ………………………………………………..…. 28

Agenda & Rules of Procedure …………………………………………….. 28

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Introduction Letters

Amit Arkhipov-Goyal

I'm a Russian/Indian economics student at Erasmus University Rotterdam,

currently doing a minor in international relations at Leiden University in The

Hague. I have been involved in Model UN since 2013 and have participated as

a delegate and a chair at conferences in

Qatar, the UK, the Netherlands and the US.

This will be my second time at LIMUN,

and I'm looking forward to us all making it

a great one! My personal interests lie at the

intersection of economic development and

international security. Aside from that, I'm

into exploring new places and embracing

the cliché Dutch stereotype - cycling.

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Jan-Paul Sandmann

I am a second-year Undergraduate reading BSc Government and Economics at

the London School of Economics (LSE). I only started MUN last year, and

being pushed to go to a conference in Ireland, I was finally convinced that

MUN is what I love doing. Last year, I was able to go to LIMUN, WorldMUN,

as well as OxIMUN and have truly fallen in

love with the art of diplomacy. This year, I am

serving as LSE’s MUN Director; beyond all the

administrative tasks involved in the job, I

thoroughly enjoy preparing our delegates for

conferences in the UK and abroad. Beyond

MUN, I have formally been a parliamentary

intern to the German Minister for Economic

Affairs and Energy. I am an enthusiastic jazz

musician and love to play in various bands here

in London or my home town Dortmund.

Should you have any questions or concerns about your preparation or the

committee proceedings, don’t hesitate to contact us at [email protected].

mailto:[email protected]

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Introduction to the Committee

The African Union is a Pan-African organisation consisting of 55 member states. The

AU is the successor of the Organisation of African Unity and was officially

established in 2002. The institution is focused on ridding the continent of its colonial

remnants, promoting unity amongst member states, coordinating development

cooperation, safeguarding the sovereignty of member states and promoting

international cooperation. This is achieved through addressing social, economic,

political and security challenges facing the continent.

The organisation is comprised of several bodies, often similar to those of the

European Union and the UN. Notable committees are the Assembly, the Peace and

Security Council and the Pan-African Parliament. The Assembly is the supreme

organ of the AU, comprised of the heads of state and government of the member

states. The Peace and Security Council is tasked with addressing a common defense

policy along with the authorisation of peace-making decisions such as peacekeeping

missions, sanctions and coordination of counter terrorism missions. The Pan-African

Parliament aims to improve the participation of the African people in governance,

development and economic affairs, however the protocol relating to its functions and

powers is still in the process of being administered. The Union works closely with a

number of countries and regional organisations such as the EU, China, India, Korea

and the US via official partnerships.

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Topic A: Developing a Long Term

Security Strategy in East Africa

Introduction

The East African region continues to remain highly volatile, with ongoing conflicts in

South Sudan, Somalia and others on its peripheries, such as in the Democratic

Republic of Congo (DRC) and Yemen, exacerbating the challenges that the region

faces itself. More stable countries like Kenya and Burundi still endure political

struggles that have often turned violent in recent years. Countries in the region are

confronted with challenges including political crises, socio-economic weakness,

armed conflict and terrorism - all requiring urgent action.

Alongside visible security threats, countries in the East African region and the rest of

the continent are experiencing food security issues, mass migration and high youth

unemployment. Considering issues that may undermine the social construct of the

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countries is crucial in understanding what threats a long term security strategy

will need to address. On a cross-country level, taking into account the impact of

climate change and natural resource extraction, as well as external influence such as

foreign arms supplies is important in recognising the instability in parts of the region.

The rest of the topic section explores the historical contexts of the regional problems,

followed by current problems and the respective responses by member states and

regional organisations. The Guide is concluded with an outline of block positions and

a number of questions that the committee resolution should aim to answer.

History of the Problem

The historical background of the region is undoubtedly crucial in understanding the

current issues it faces. The influences often lie far back in history, including the

damaging colonial periods and the consequent attempts to achieve postcolonial state

sovereignty. However, a number of underlying causes can be observed in more recent

history, with the last two decades witnessing a major shift to regionalism across

various parts of the world. In Africa, this has since lead to the development of

multiple regional free trade agreements and several regional security and

development organisations discussed later.

For decades, Eastern Africa has experienced a number of conflict complexes, having

major regional implications. These include non-state conflicts, intrastate, interstate

and one-sided violence against local civilian populations (FOI, 2016). The mass

atrocities of the 1990’s in Rwanda and Darfur, along with the unsuccessful

involvements of the US and the UN in Somalia demonstrated the need for an

increased capacity to respond to such crises.

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The foreign intervention in Libya under UNSCR 1973 in 2011 was regarded

by a number of African states as an attempt at regime change. While on the Security

Council rotation, the South African president proclaimed the need of “African

solutions to African problems” and extended his support for the African Union

(Patrick, 2012). It is therefore worth considering what other driving forces exist

behind such sentiment and what would be necessary to achieve independence in this

respect.

A 2013 annual report on African development by UNCTAD highlighted the

importance of intra-Africa trade development. Although addressed at the economic

aspect, the report highlights the necessity for cooperation amongst African states on

features central to their sustainable development (UNCTAD, 2013). Interdependence

is not necessarily a guarantee of security, but delegates may consider the historical

implications of the stances of their respective countries on domestic and regional

security matters.

Role of the African Union

The UN Security Council Resolution 1809 passed in 2008 highlighted UN’s

appreciation of African Union’s active efforts in conflict mitigation and its

development of peace initiatives across the continent (UNSCR, 1809). Along with the

restructuring of the African Union in 2002 from the Organisation of African Union

and its subsequent increased engagement in peacekeeping operations, the AU has a

wider acting capacity in the field of security and peace enforcement (African Union,

2000). However, the AU is a relatively young organisation, so it is worth considering

the limitations of its acting capacity and potential ways of addressing them within the

framework of regional security.

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Statement of the Problem

The African Union has the right of intervention in a member state to stop genocide,

war crimes and crimes against humanity under Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act,

meaning the AU has active capacity to act should it be deemed necessary (African

Union, 2000). However, negotiating the balance between the responsibility of

individual states and the African community in case of conflict is key, particularly

considering the resource constraints faced by the organisation and due to the conflicts

already raging across the continent. Although the international community can not

stand by such violence as has often occurred in the 1990’s, the joint UN-AU mission

in Darfur has demonstrated the difficulty of transforming desires into action, meaning

set objectives should also be realistic and achievable (International Peace Institute,

2008).

Radical Islamist Terrorism

The Al-Shabab terrorist group remains one of the key threats to regional stability. The

group’s continuous attempts to destabilise Somalia were recently highlighted by one

of the most lethal terrorist attacks against the country’s civilians, claiming more than

350 lives in a truck bombing in Mogadishu (The Guardian, 2017). The group has

perpetrated attacks beyond Somalia, carrying out a suicide bombing in Kampala in

2010 and an attack on a Nairobi mall in 2013, demonstrating its wider regional reach

(Council on Foreign Relations, 2015).

The continuous political turmoil in Somalia since the 1960’s has witnessed the

presence of radical Islamist groups, highlighting the importance of focusing on good

governance measures within the security strategy. Somalia is one of a number of

countries combatting Islamist groups across the continent, meaning countries outside

the region, particularly those in the Sahel, have a wealth of experience to contribute

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to the topic. In a report to the Security Council, a group of experts noted that

the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continues to make progress, but

the qualitative evolution of Al-Shabab’s methodology continues to make it one of the

main threats in the region (UNSC, 2014).

Internal Conflict

The presence of the active armed conflict in South Sudan continues to impact the

region. With the conflict subsiding since its peak in 2014, the UN declaration of

famine in parts of the region in 2017 highlights its continuing destructive impact

(Crisis Group, 2017). Combined with the instability in neighbouring countries such as

Chad, the DRC and the Central African Republic, there appears a need of a wider

African engagement on conflict mediation and peacebuilding measures.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), one of the regional

organisations, actively partakes in conflict resolution, as was the case with Sudan,

where IGAD’s involvement included its leading role in drafting the Sudan peace

agreements in 2005 (FOI, 2016). The involvement of regional organisations in

conflict resolution demonstrates the potential impact of internal conflicts on the wider

region, suggesting it is worth considering the effect on the neighbouring countries,

should the conflict spill over national borders.

Political Turmoil

Political upheavals are not necessarily signs of human security threats, but promotion

of good governance policies can prevent the escalation of political issues into armed

engagements. Kenya and Burundi have both witnessed violent clashes in recent years

prior to and during election periods. Burundi has undergone an attempted coup in

2015, crackdowns against journalists and politicians and mass migration to the

neighbouting Tanzania due to a cholera outbreak, highlighting the cross-border

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impact of domestic political problems (Crisis Group, 2015). Therefore,

addressing stability during critical junctures like national elections may prove

favourable.

Current Situation

International organisations such as the UN and the AU actively participate in

peacekeeping missions within the region and the rest of the continent. 5 UN missions

are in Central Africa, 3 of them being on the periphery of the East African region

(UNDPKO, 2017). Combined with several AU interventions and external support for

security and development objectives, the vast number of actors involved in the

security dilemmas is evident.

Countries from outside the region actively contribute their troops to missions taking

place in East Africa, especially Egypt, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso and Ghana

among others (UNAMID & UNMISS, 2017). However, the peacekeeping operations

are often overstretched as troop contributing countries (TCCs) often do not deploy the

committed amount or end up withdrawing their troops due to more pressing domestic

issues (FES, 2007). Country representatives should therefore assess the extent to

which their operational capacity matches their interests and objectives in the East

African region. Moreover, deployment structures vary per mission, complicating the

experience gained from previous missions. Recent examples have been sequential

deployment (Burundi), fully integrated missions (Darfur) and parallel deployment

(CAR and Chad). Cooperative structures are often context dependent and reliant on

the interaction of the international organisations involved (Brosig, 2010). The

delegates may therefore consider reviewing the deployment characteristics of

missions in East Africa and considering whether the structures are effective in the

context of the given conflict.

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Particular missions to consider in the regional context are UNAMID (Darfur),

UNMISS (South Sudan), UNISFA (Sudan-South Sudan) and AMISOM (Somalia). In

recent decades peacekeeping operations have evolved considerably, with missions

often deployed to areas where peace has not yet been established. In Somalia, the

stabilization mission has lower chances of succeeding, since the conflict is at a

different stage of continue violence, meaning reviewing the approach to the conflict

is necessary (Brosig & Sempijja, 2017). Moreover, studies have demonstrated

positive association between peacekeeper safety and upholding of the mission

objectives, implying that resolution methods are to be considered before

peacekeeping forces can be applied effectively.

Evidence has further demonstrated that the impact of the AU mission in Somalia has

had a near-zero impact on the upholding of rule of law and accountability as well as

national security in the country (Brosig & Sempijja, 2017). Given the shortcomings

of the current force, delegates may consider previous examples of successful

interventions to identify the problems of the current mission in Somalia. One such

case has been the UN mission in Liberia. A potential reason is the ratio of

peacekeepers per population, with 1:278 in Liberia as opposed to 1:488 in Somalia

(Brosig & Sempijja, 2017). Identifying and analyzing such problems is critical to

developing an actionable resolution on the issues.

The EU, China and the US, among others, have consistently provided support for

security enforcement across the African continent. Although some organisations

focus on financing of defense capacity building, others have provided supplies and

even combat support, as has been the case with the US in Somalia. The EU has taken

a niche approach and provides targeted mission support to avoid overlapping efforts

with actors involved (Brosig, 2014). Resource capacity is central to a long-term

security strategy, suggesting it is worth considering the sustainability of foreign

financing and its political implications.

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Bloc Positions

Nation states of the region are all members of the African Union, along with two

major regional economic communities (REC’s). The first is the aforementioned

IGAD, established in 1996 and comprising of Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan,

South Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia and Uganda. IGAD focuses on conflict prevention,

management and resolution, and political and humanitarian affairs (IGAD, 2016).

Taking into account IGAD’s involvement in the Sudan crisis, delegates may consider

the effectiveness of multiple organisations operating in the same domain in the region

and the challenges this may present.

The second major REC is the East African Community (EAC), comprising of

Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The organisation was reactivated in

1999 with a focus on regional economic affairs, but has introduced a “Regional

strategy for Peace and Security” in 2006 (EAC, 2016). This highlights the crucial link

between economic and security affairs, reiterating the point on assessing the financial

capacity of a regional security strategy.

The relationship between regional member states and outside nations can demonstrate

the stance of many countries on particular issues. The differences can be considered

along social constructs, for example, a number of African countries belonging to the

Organisation of Islamic Cooperation or the Arab League (OIC, 2017). Another aspect

is economic ties, such as trade, financial support or the hosting of large minority

populations from neighbouring countries, which results in remittance flows to the

home country. The former is particularly important for major trading hubs such as

Botswana, Nigeria, Namibia and South Africa (Africa Studies Centre Leiden, 2017).

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On national levels, major continental economies maintain an active presence in the

East African region. Nigeria, for example, continues to cooperate closely with the

region and has pledged $2 million for the victims of famine, while Nigeria’s

president has visited Ethiopia and Rwanda in his current term (Nigerian MFA, 2017).

Ethiopia has actively participated in regional peacekeeping missions and has been a

close US ally in combatting terrorism. Given its central position in the ‘regional

conflict complex’, Ethiopia has widely contributed to the political resolutions to the

instability in Sudan and South Sudan (Clingendael, 2016). Kenya also bears a

sizeable part of the regional security budget, in part due to its military involvement in

Somalia and commitment to eliminate Al-Shabaab. Kenya’s efforts have been

strongly supported by the EU and the US, with each providing more than $300

million since 2007 (Anderson & McKnight, 2014). Both Kenya and Ethiopia

continue to face tense relations with the Muslim minority populations in the two

countries, exacerbated by the aforementioned conflict.

Another question to consider is the perspective of member states on legal proceedings

against groups operating across borders and the role of criminal justice in the region.

Numerous African states have had issues with the International Criminal Court

(ICC), with Burundi recently withdrawing from the court, Uganda refusing to

cooperate, and while South Africa and Gambia have notified the UN on the intention

to withdraw (The Guardian, 2008). Given the demonstrated positions, identifying

legal accountability measures is relevant for a long-term security strategy.

Questions the Resolution Should Answer

Addressing ‘hard’ security measures with actions such as counter-terrorism and

armed engagement as standalone measures is unlikely to prove successful. ‘Soft’

security challenges such as social injustice, extreme poverty and discrimination are

all drivers of further instability, meaning considering them within the scope of a

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security strategy is valuable. Moreover, time lags for particular issues may

vary, with food insecurity having immediate impacts while social divides may take a

while to have an effect, suggesting that the relevant adopted recommendations must

address these variations. Some questions the resolution must address:

• What is the role of other international and regional organisations such as the

UN and IGAD in addressing the security challenges of East Africa?

• Which conflict prevention measures are most appropriate for the East African

region?

• What are the most appropriate means of financing a regional security strategy?

• How to ensure that African Union Peacekeeping Missions have adequate

resources to carry out their objectives?

• How to improve the effectiveness of ongoing peacekeeping missions?

• What potential impacts of exogenous factors such as climate change and

increased interest of major international powers such as China and the US need

to be considered within the security framework of the region?

Sources

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Eastern Africa. African Affairs, 114(454), 1-27.

Brosig, M. (2010). The Multi-Actor Game of Peacekeeping in Africa. International

Peacekeeping, 17(3), 327-342.

Brosig, M. (2014). EU Peacekeeping in Africa: From Functional Niches to Interlocking

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Brosig, M., & Sempijja, N. (2017). What peacekeeping leaves behind: evaluating the effects

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https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/burundi-peace-sacrificed

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EAC. (2017). East African Community. [online] Available at: https://www.eac.int/

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and EASF. Studies in African Security. [online] Stockholm: FOI. Available at:

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FES (2007). Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (1): Hybrid Missions. Dialogue on

Globalization. [online] New York: FES.

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region-report-2016.pdf.

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Full_Report.pdf.

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Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab.

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Patrick, S. (2012). The UN Versus Regional Organizations: Who Keeps the Peace?. [Blog]

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the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)

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Veen, E. V. (2016). Perpetuating power, Ethiopia’s political settlement and the

organization of security (Conflict Research Unit Report, Rep.). The Hague: Clingendael.

https://www.eac.int/

https://www.foi.se/download/18.2bc30cfb157f5e989c31188/1477416021009/FOI+Memo+5634.pdf

https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/11527/igad-state-of-the-region-report-2016.pdf

https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/11527/igad-state-of-the-region-report-2016.pdf

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/8A90EB1768ABA91EC12574F3004BF217-Full_Report.pdf

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/8A90EB1768ABA91EC12574F3004BF217-Full_Report.pdf

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/12/uganda.warcrimes

https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en

https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en

https://www.cfr.org/blog/un-versus-regional-organizations-who-keeps-peace

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http://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unamid

http://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate

http://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmiss

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Topic B: The Future of the Continental

Free Trade Area (CFTA)

Introduction

Today, intra-African trade stands at a mere 15% of the continent’s GDP, while

trading among member countries of the European Union accounts for 60% and for

53% of GDP of the East Asia region, respectively (ISS, 2017). Simultaneously, many

of the continent’s countries depend on imports from abroad. In particular, food

imports from developed countries have increased extensively since 2001 (ASC

Leiden, 2017). In 2012, the African Union (AU) formally agreed upon the

establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) leading to a free customs

area, and potentially a monetary union in the long-run (AU, 2012). Such a free trade

zone would for the first time in the continent’s history bring together all 54 member

states with a combined GDP of more than US$3,4 trillion (UNCTAD, 2015).

According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the CFTA has

the potential to boost intra-African by 52% between 2010 and 2022. By seeking to


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increase productivity levels in the agricultural as well as industrial sector,

CFTA is a substantial strategic agreement that is supposed to boost intra-African

trade and thereby strengthen the continent’s economic status leading to a diminished

degree of dependence on external trade.

The establishment of a continent wide trade zone is highly ambitious, and while

many African states have formally accepted the establishment of such, the concrete

implementation and the long-term strategy for trade within the continent may be a

particularly contentious issue among member states of the African Union. Due to

political and ethnic turmoil in many regions, a vast number of African states still

impose wide-ranging tariffs on the imports of certain goods. Agreeing to reduce the

tariffs in the eyes of many states means walking on thin ice while finding the right

balance between sovereignty and economic integration. The plan to establish a

continent-wide customs union would have to stipulate thoughts on how to ensure that

labour laws and the protection of migrant labourers, in particular in light of regional

and global anti-migration-sentiments, can be ensured. Moreover, while some regions

already incorporate well-established trade zones, and have been given superior status

in the negotiation process, they need to find a way to align their economic interests

with states of strikingly lower development levels.

In the long-run, the establishment of the CFTA shall only be the first major step in

furthering economic integration among African states. Where shall this pathway

lead? Is a closely integrated trade and eventually monetary zone based on the

principles of the European Union attainable for the African Union? Shall the

economic integration process rather follow the model of ASEAN or is an entirely

new concept needed for the AU?

The focus of this topic will be on the negotiation process and concentrate on how the

CFTA agreement shall be implemented. Yet, the particular policies derived from the

negotiation process will unavoidably have decisive implications for the long-term

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development of intra-African trade. The following sections investigate the

historical roots of the issue, the contentious issues at hand, bloc positions and critical

questions a resolution must answer.

History of the Problem

From Cape to Cairo

Historically, the discussion of ideas, visions, and sometimes merely dreams of

strengthened trade relations between African states has been critical, and often highly

contentious to the development of the whole continent. In the 1890s, British

Imperialists and most prominently Cecil Rhodes, envisaged a trade zone that would

reach from Cape Town all the way up north to Cairo. Rhodes and others’ vision

focused primarily on the establishment of transport networks (such as the Pan-

African Highway or the Cape to Cairo Railway). Their development goals were

deeply founded on economically exploitative intentions complementary to the

extractive institutions brought by the imperial powers (Lois, 1937; Merrington,

2001). While the dream of an integrated trade zone from “Cape to Cairo” has existed

for more than a hundred years, today’s visions and aims to establish such differ

critically from those of Rhodes and other imperial officials. Today, AU member

states seek mutual benefit and further development for all countries. However, when

discussing the CFTA and contemporary trade in Africa, it shall be of importance to

keep the foundational historical circumstances in mind, and delegates shall be aware

of the historical roots.

Previous Agreements and Treaties

In order to understand the development of the current plan for a Continental

Free Trade Agreement, we must first shed light on the complex history and structure

of agreements and treaties of the African Union concerning trade and development.

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The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa

championed by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) first laid out a long-term

agenda for Africa-wide development. The Lagos Plan was further developed by the

Abuja Treaty, which was signed in 1991 and entered into force by 1994 (ICTSD,

2014). The treaty emphasised the need for regional integration of African economies

which in the long-run shall lead to the establishment of the African Economic

Community (AEC), and laid out six stages (to be completed by):

• 1999: Creation of regional blocs in regions where such do not yet exist

• 2007: Strengthening of intra-Regional Economic Community (REC)

integration and inter-REC harmonization

• 2017: Establishing of a free trade area and customs union in each regional bloc

• 2019: Establishing of a continent-wide customs union (and thus also a free

2023: Establishing of a continent-wide African Common Market (ACM)

• 2028: Establishing of a continent-wide economic and monetary union (and thus

also a currency union) and Parliament

• 2033: End of all transition periods. (ICTSD, 2014)

Importantly, prior to the Abuja Treaty, some regional economic communities (RECs)

had already formed, and several new ones were to be added by 1999 so that all

African countries could be part of one of the existing or newly formed RECs. These

regional communities are considered as the building blocks of the AEC and have

been regarded as instrumental to the structural process of future trade negotiations

(UNCTAD, 2016,).

Among the the pre-existent trade blocs and contemporarily manifested communities

are the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and

Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Southern African Development Community

(SADC). Other RECs, such as the Community of Sahel-Saharan States or the Arab

Maghreb Union, were only formed several years later and remain less robust than the

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older communities (African Union, 2016). In 2008, the heads of the EAC,

COMESA, and SADC announced a shared free trade zone spanning across their

countries in Southern and East Africa. The so-called African Free Trade Zone

(AFTZ) was extended to also include three smaller communities (ECOWAS,

ECCAS, and AMU), and currently includes 26 member states.

At its 18th Ordinary Session in 2012 in Addis Ababa, on the theme “Boosting Intra-

African Trade”, the member states of the African Union agreed upon implementing

the Abuja Treaty, and thereby extending the size of the African Trade Zone to all 54

African countries. Therefore, the Heads of State and Government agreed on a

roadmap for establishing a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by the indicative

date of 2017. The negotiation process consists of three major parties. First, the

Tripartie of the existing large trade zone consisting of EAC, COMESA, and SADC.

Second, all other RECs, and third, all further AU member states outside the pre-

existing regional free trade zones. In order to establish the continent-wide free trade

zone, these three blogs must consolidate their regional free trade process into the

CFTA, supposedly by 2015-2016. Parts of this have been achieved. However, in

many areas, the regional communities have not been able to publicly agree on shared

regulation and harmonization so that the indicative date of October 2017 could not be

reached (Vickers, 2017). The following section investigates the key issues at hand,

and offers insights into the central, unresolved issues of the negotiation processes.

Statement of the Problem

Structural and Political Complexities of Regional Trade Blocs

As outlined in the previous chapter, a central problem lies in the complexity of

existing structures and resulting differences in the integration of different states in the

negotiation process. Currently, the African Free Trade Zone (AFTZ) includes 26 out

of 54 African Union member states. Moreover, membership is based along

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geographical lines. As the AFTZ has been established by the Southern and

East African Tripartie of EAC-SADC-COMESA, it does not include states in

Western and North-Western Africa. Further, the Tripartie blocs are particularly well-

established and have been given outstanding status in the negotiation process. The

largest economy in Africa by GDP, Nigeria, is not part of this group (World Bank,

2016). Yet, Nigeria and other western African states have established extensive trade-

relationships with member countries of the EAC (e.g. the bilateral trade pacts

between Nigeria and Kenya signed in 2014). The CFTA could form a meaningful

step in overcoming these geographical inequalities and extending primarily bilateral

agreements into multi-regional ones. Simultaneously, Eastern and Western African

states remain competitors, and the fact that the biggest African economy has a less

strongly manifested stance in the negotiations could lead to a more difficult

institutional process.

The existence and institutional reliance on the RECs is further complicated by some

countries’ overlap in membership. For example, Kenya alone is member of four blocs

(CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, and IGAD). In many cases, the overlap of membership

creates duplication of tasks and responsibilities resulting in sometimes competing

activities of cooperating states, leading to inefficiencies and a further extension of

already overstretched foreign affairs summits and committees (UNCTAD, 2016). It

is, however, unlikely that this significant issue can be solved during the negotiation

process as the institutional framework is dependent on it and states would be

unwilling to give up leading positions in particular trade communities. One of the

main reasons for the CFTA has been to resolve this issue of overlapping regional

membership. It therefore must be the result, and not part of, the negotiations process.

Augmenting productivity levels

Previously, bi- and multilateral trade initiatives have failed due to flawed regional

cooperation, weak transport links, and political divisions across countries (Hoekman

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et al. 2017). Negotiating parties must seek to find consensus on how to

improve the flow of goods and services, together with improving productivity levels,

and enhancing market access.

Another highly relevant aspect of the negotiations must be concerned with how in

particular the agreement can prepare member states sufficiently for transformative

economic developments. As the African Common Market shall in the long-run be a

competitive player, CFTA negotiations must address the impacts of and a strategy for

the fourth industrial revolution as well as a plan on how to digitalize African

economies and trade (UNCTAD, 2016).

Current Situation

Terms of Trade and Existing Tariffs

The CFTA further needs to take into account the needs of both its smaller member

and its economic powerhouses. Terms of trade and harmonization legislation must be

favorable to and in the interests of both regional economic powerhouses, such as

South Africa, Kenya, or Nigeria, and states that have been affected by slow

development, in many cases due to domestic and international conflict, e.g. in Sierra

Leone, Somalia, or the CAR.

States involved in the negotiating process must also be aware of the predominantly

political causes of high tariffs particularly in Western Africa. In some cases, states

may be unwilling to unconditionally withdraw all tariffs particularly if they are

founded on deep-running differences of political, social, or ethno-religious roots.

Delegates are expected to further research the regional trade relations of their

countries and gain a greater understanding of potential opposition to unconditional

economic liberalization.

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Transnational labour regulations and human rights

According to the plan indicated in the Abuja Treaty, the free trade area shall

incorporate a harmonized customs union by 2019. In the current negotiations, little

progress has been made on this issue. A customs union would inevitably lead to the

demand of harmonized labour laws. The free movement of labour would imply that

the rights of migrant laborers would reliably have to be ensured. Otherwise, free

movement of people and workers could lead to potentially devastating and

exploitative work conditions. The central issue at hand is whether member states can

find consensus on formulating a continental human-rights based agenda that would

seek to support the rights of workers abroad.

Bloc Positions

This guide has already highlighted the importance of the pre-existing RECs for the

negotiation process multiple times. It will be crucial that delegates research more

closely into the membership of their country of one or several blocs and seek to

understand the role their country plays within their bloc. South Africa, for example,

would be a leading member of the SADC bloc. As trade relations within this bloc

have already advanced to a quite high level (particularly among South Africa,

Namibia, Angola, and Botswana), these countries could give leading examples of

how the liberalization might be executed in countries not as advanced. However, they

may also wish to maintain their comparative advantage, and could critique

liberalization that benefits emerging economies in Western Africa too strongly.

Currently, countries of Southern, Eastern, and North Africa, i.e. of the blogs EAC,

COMESA, and SADC, are currently harmonizing their trade. They have so far not

sought to include countries in West Africa (AB, 2012). The persistent East-West

divide of the African continent could be decisive to bloc positions, and delegates

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should think whether their countries would like to maintain their comparative

advantage within a region or seek to extend such.

The positions of Eastern African countries in the two other tripartite blocs (EAC,

COMESA) are partially similar and include multiple intersections of membership.

However, countries here may either have stronger incentives to trade with Western

Africa, and in some cases, may be more opposed to such. In EAC, Kenya, Uganda,

and Tanzania, will have an important say in the negotiations, and in COMESA the

role of Egypt due to its geographical and political connections to Europe, as well as

Ethiopia and the Sudan can be indicatory. In Western Africa, it would be reasonable

if leading members of ECOWAS cooperate closely. These include Nigeria, Ghana,

and Senegal. Due to religious cleavages and language divides, bloc positions in this

bloc must not be homogeneous.

Even though there seems to be an opportunity for pre-formed blocs, this clearly does

not preclude the possibility of dynamically evolving blocs during the course of

debate. Delegates are encouraged to have a good understanding of their country’s

position but may alter such during the course of debate if a change or transition seems

reasonable regarding the negotiation outcome. An example could be Nigerian-

Kenyan economic relations. While Kenya is one of the most important countries in

the mentioned Tripartie, it seeks to establish closer business ties with Nigeria; and the

willingness to do so has so far been on a mutual basis.

More contentious bloc positions could focus on tariffs and the establishment of a

unified code of labour. For example, Nigeria has a 70% import tax on automotive

parts, while the Southern African Customs Union has increased certain import tariffs

on steel-related products in 2015 (TRALAC, 2015). Countries with a high proportion

of migrant labourers, like South Africa or Kenya, will be particularly critical of a

unified code, while countries of the origin of workers, e.g. Zimbabwe, may on one

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hand push for unified laws but also do not wish to encounter a greater degree

of economic emigration.

Questions The Resolution Should Answer

• To what extent does the liberalization of trade under CFTA span?

• Will agreements among RECs be sufficient to determine the conditions of

harmonization or does the agreement require bilateral sub-agreements on

certain parts?

• How can it be ensured the workers’ rights are protected under the CFTA

agreement?

• Must the CFTA agreement include a unified labour code or even a statement of

a shared human-rights agenda?

• How can the negotiations ensure that small countries gain access to fair terms

of trade?

• Which policies or terms are needed to structure trade liberalization in regards

to the fourth industrial revolution and the exceeding digitalization of the

continental African economy?

• Will the long-term strategy stand as it is?

• Is a monetary union attainable? And if so, can it be viably established by 2028?

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whats-going-on

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http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Protectionism-hurting-trade-within-Africa/2560-3787874-nfh1a1/index.html

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https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/7845-african-economies-unable-to-resist-the-protectionist-impulse.html

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