Gonzales v. Office of the President 2012/2014

Petitioners: Emilio A. Gonzales III / Wendell Barreras-Sulit

Respondents: Office of the President

(SUBJECT/TOPIC COVERED OR ARTICLE/PROVISION APPLIED)

SUMMARY: 2 consolidated petitions questioning the President’s exercise of the power to remove petitioners from the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman

FACTS:

Both petitioners seeks to declare sec 8(2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) which gives president the power to dismiss a deputy ombudsman of the office of the ombudsman

o Gonzales case: assails jurisdictional grounds on the Office of the President

decision that dismissed him as deputy ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices upon a finding of guilt on administrative charges of gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct constituting a betrayal of public trust.

o Barreras-Sulit: seeks to reverse order requiring petitioner to submit a written

explanation with respect to acts constituting serious offenses in relation to the plea bargaining agreement entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia issued by Office of the President

2008: Formal charge for grave misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion, and physical injuries) was filed before the PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and 4 others docketed/

o Christian M. Kalaw, private complainant, filed a similar charge before the Office

of the City Prosecutor of Manila docketed as I.S. No. 08E-09512 July 24, 2008: During the pendency of the cases, Office of the Regional Director of the

National Police Commission turned over, upon request of Gonzales, all relevant documents and evidence of said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for administrative adjudication

o Case No. OMB-P-A-08-0670-H for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S

Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers Aug 26, 2008: I.S. No. 08E-09512 was dismissed

o October 17, 2008: Internal affairs of PNP recommended dismissal without

prejudice of the administrative case against same police officers Feb 16, 2009 Emilio Gonzales III recommended dismissal of Rolando Mendoza and

others guilty of Grave Misconduct in case OMB-P-A-08-0670-Ho May 6, 2010: Gonzales endorsed Order for final approval of Ombudsman

Meceditas Gutierrez August 23, 2010: Rolando Mendoza hijacked Chinese tourist bus to have himself

reinstated o 8 HK nationals died, 7 injured, and Mendoza died

Incident Investigation and Review Committee was created to determine accountability for the incident

o Petitioner and ombudsman refused to appear on the assertion that the Office of

the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional bodyo IIRC found that petitioner is among those whom culpability must lie for

letting Mendoza’s MoR lie more than 9 months without justification violating Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve MoRs within 5 days

o If they had acted on the MoR, the hostage taking would have been avoided as

Mendoza expressed willingness to take full responsibility of the incident if his demand for the release of the final decision or reinstatement was met

o Office of the President instituted a formal charge against Gonzales and

dismissed him Barreras-Sulit Case: Petitioner sought Sandiganbayan’s approval of a Plea Bargaining

Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into with General Carlos F. Garcia and family who are charged with Plunder and Money Laundering

o HoR Committee on Justice: recommended dismissal of Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit

for allowing Garcia to get off the hook despite strong evidence for serious public offenses because of the PLEBARA

ISSUE/S:

WoN OotP has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman - NO

o The ombudsman’s administrative disciplinary power over a deputy ombudsman

and special prosecutor is not exclusiveo Sec 21 of RA 6770: Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The

Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary

o Sec 8(2) of RA 6770: (2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed

from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process

o Petitioners contend that they cannot be removed by the president because under

RA 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over themo Statcon: in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be

given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions.

harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had

intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively

Congressional deliberations show that the Chair expressed apprehension that the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman may try to protect one another. Senator Angara: outside official should be vested with authority to discipline Ombudsman to effect a check and balance

The Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service, but the President has concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions.

o By granting express authority power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman

and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the lawo Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the

power to appoint the Ombudsman and his Deputieso While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in

the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter.

o By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law

without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.

o Power of the president to remove a deputy ombudsman and a special prosecutor is

implied from his power to appointo Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to

remove.o As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also

removable by him.o The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the

power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power

Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission Section 1(2), Article IX(B), the Commission on Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the Commission on Audit Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the President,

but they may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).

o Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not

diminish independence of the office of the ombudsman What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is,

essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."

Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from political influences and the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the President's exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process.

o Gonzales may not be removed from office where questioned acts do not

constitute betrayal of public trust The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against

petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of removal from office was based on the finding of gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct in office amounting to a betrayal of public trust, which is a constitutional ground for the removal by impeachment of the Ombudsman (Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution), and a statutory ground for the President to remove from office a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act.

The OP held that petitioner's want of care and wrongful conduct consisted of his unexplained action in directing the PNP-NCR to elevate P/S Insp. Mendoza's case records to his office; his failure to verify the basis for requesting the Ombudsman to take over the case; his pronouncement of administrative liability and imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal on P/S Insp. Mendoza based upon an unverified complaint-affidavit; his inordinate haste in implementing P/S Insp. Mendoza's dismissal notwithstanding the latter's non-receipt of his copy of the Decision and the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration; and his apparent unconcern that the pendency of the motion for reconsideration for more than five months had deprived P/S Insp. Mendoza of available remedies against the immediate implementation of the Decision dismissing him from the service.

Thus, taking into consideration the factual determinations of the IIRC, the allegations and evidence of petitioner in his Answer as well as other documentary evidence, the OP concluded that: (1) petitioner failed to

supervise his subordinates to act with dispatch on the draft resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration and thereby caused undue prejudice to P/S Insp. Mendoza by effectively depriving the latter of the right to challenge the dismissal before the courts and prevent its immediate execution, and (2) petitioner showed undue interest by having P/S Insp. Mendoza's case endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and resolving the same against P/S Insp. Mendoza on the basis of the unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim Christian Kalaw.

Would every negligent act or misconduct in the performance of a Deputy Ombudsman's duties constitute betrayal of public trust warranting immediate removal from office? The question calls for a deeper, circumspective look at the nature of the grounds for the removal of a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor vis-a-vis common administrative offenses.

Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.

o Barrera-Sulit petition: Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have

sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused of the crime charged. However, if the basis for the allowance of a plea bargain in this case is the evidence on record, then it is significant to state that in its earlier Resolution promulgated on January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan had evaluated the testimonies of twenty (20) prosecution witnesses and declared that "the conglomeration of evidence presented by the prosecution is viewed by the Court to be of strong character that militates against the grant of bail."

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. InG.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Dissent Brion, J:

I disagree with the conclusion that Section 8(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 (which empowers the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman or a Special Prosecutor) is constitutionally valid. It is my considered view that the power to discipline or remove an official of the Office of the Ombudsman should be lodged only with the Ombudsman and not with the Office of the President, in light of the independence the Constitution guarantees the Office of the Ombudsman.

In more concrete terms, subjecting the officials of the Office of the Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Ombudsman and her officials, and must consequently run counter to the independence that the Constitution guarantees the Office of the Ombudsman. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies but for other lesser officials of that Office who act as delegates and agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of her duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 67706(providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) clearly runs against the constitutional intent and should, thus, be declared void.

January 28, 2014 petition (wrote by Brion LOL): court reverses ruling on the previous case and holds presidential power over ombudsman as unconstitutional because the ombudsman was made to be independent from politics because it derives its authority from the constitution.

o On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales’

petition and to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman.

o The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be

inferior – but is similar in degree and kind – to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning

o Sec 8(2) of RA 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy

Ombudsman violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional

o In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and

removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.

o The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate

officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major

problem for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.

o Mutual protection argument: this concern stands on shaky grounds since it ignores the

existing checks and balances already in place. On the one hand, the Ombudsman’s Deputies cannot protect the Ombudsman because she is subject to the impeachment power of Congress. On the other hand, the Ombudsman’s attempt to cover up the misdeeds of her Deputies can be questioned before the Court on appeal or certiorari. The same attempt can likewise subject her to impeachment.

o Congress’ power determines the manner and causes for the removal of non-impeachable

officers is not a carte blanch authorityo In short, the authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide for the

manner and cause of removal of all other public officers and employees does not mean that Congress can ignore the basic principles and precepts established by the Constitution.

NOTES:

Guys sorry I copy pasted most of this because of consti midterms pls forgive me huhu at least u get somewhat a whole picture of the cases HUHUHU.