8/16/2019 Locke Personal Identity Summary

1/2

John Locke personal identity summary:

8. Man is the animal (organized body of life over time) of a particular form, Homo Sapien.

Even a Homo Sapien of limited reason and intelligence is still a man!

". # person is defined as a thin$ing intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and

can consider itself as itself, the same thin$ing thing, in different times and places!consciousness is inseparable from thin$ing. Have a real time understanding and

comprehension of our senses. %istinguishes the self from all other selves

&'.he continuity of consciousness and hence personal identity is defined by memory.

here are brea$s in consciousness, not all memories are accessible at all times.

Substance as it changes does not define identity

&&.#n eample is given as to ho* *e already identify *ith our consciousness+ if our arm is

chopped off (a part of our substance) *e no longer identify *ith the piece of meat *e

called our arm, *e identify *ith the remaining body as it caries *ith it our

consciousnesses

&.dont fully understand&-.hat lin$s consciousness through variations in substance is memory

/f the same consciousness can be transferred from one thin$ing substance to another, it

*ill be possible that t*o thin$ing substances may ma$e but one person. 0or the same

consciousness being preserved, *hether in the same or different substances, the personal

identity is preserved!

&1.2oc$e criticizes the neo3platonists *ho argue for a re3incarnation of an immaterial

substance that retains memory. He argues that not retaining any conscious eperience of

those they profess to have the same soul *ould not, even if true, *ould not ma$e them

the same person, this difference 2oc$e4s stresses is his main criticism of those *ho thin$ that substance defines identity. He then gives a scenario in *here some of the particles

(substance) are retained in t*o different animals and says that this is absurd that this

ma$es them the same person.

&5.6ur idea of man is both made up of body and soul!, if the consciousness *hich loc$e

identifies *ith soul is transferred, *hich he gives and eample bet*een a prince and a

cobbler, *e *ould, as -rd persons, identify them *ith their bodies, although the thethoughts of the prince *ill be in the body of the cobbler. 2oc$e labels them as being the

same man, as identifiable by their bodies, but the person is different

&7.%espite our changing substance *e are still responsible for our actions, even if / share

no material or immaterial substance in common *hen / performed the action. his is

true because / share the same consciousness *ith myself over those periods of time.

&. /f the consciousness of the body *as located in a specific part (little finger) and that partremoved, *e *ould identify that person *ith the little finger

&8. /n the course of 9ustice *e punish the conscious person. :ot the substance of the person.

/f a man lost an arm in the procedure of a court case *e *ouldn4t loc$ the man up *ith

his arm

&".;rea$s in consciousness are also brea$s in the self. #nd it *ould be incorrect to punish

someone for *hat they did in this brea$ of consciousness or visa versa'. in a body in *hich there is a brea$ in consciousness and hence memory it can be said

8/16/2019 Locke Personal Identity Summary

2/2

that there are t*o people *ithin the same man&.don4t fully understand

. it is unli$ely that