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LUND UNIVERSITY
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Local Government in Uzbekistan
Urinboyev, Rustam
Published in:Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance
DOI:10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3665-1
2018
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Citation for published version (APA):Urinboyev, R. (2018). Local Government in Uzbekistan. In A. Farazmand (Ed.), Global Encyclopedia of PublicAdministration, Public Policy, and Governance Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3665-1
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Chapter Title Local Government in Uzbekistan
Copyright Year 2018
Copyright Holder Springer Nature Switzerland AG
Corresponding Author Family Name Urinboyev
Particle
Given Name Rustamjon
Suffix
Organization/University University of Helsinki, AleksanteriInstitute
City Helsinki
Country Finland
Division/Department Department of Sociology of Law,Faculty of Social Sciences
Organization/University Lund University
City Lund
Country Sweden AU1
Email [email protected]
1 L
2 Local Government in3 Uzbekistan
4 Rustamjon Urinboyev5 University of Helsinki,6 Aleksanteri Institute, Helsinki, Finland7 Department of Sociology of Law,8 Faculty of Social Sciences,9 Lund University, Lund, SwedenAU1
10 Synonyms
11 Decentralization in Uzbekistan; Local12 government in Central Asia; Public administra-13 tion in Uzbekistan; Subnational government in14 Uzbekistan
15 Introduction
16 Uzbekistan became an independent state in 199117 following the demise of the Soviet Union.18 Coming on the heels of a global discourse on19 good governance and decentralization, Uzbeki-20 stan embarked on the highly complex task of21 reforming its public administration system. The22 implementation of these reforms, however, pro-23 ved to be a daunting task, since the country had to24 deal with its Soviet legacy and its internal power25 structures and contradictions: weak state institu-26 tions, poorly developed national identities, and
27entrenched subnational political networks (cf.,28Ilkhamov 2004; Markowitz 2008; Melvin 2004).29Local government is one of the most problem-30atic areas in Uzbekistan where the failure of the31reform initiatives is quite evident. This chapter32delineates the processes involved and explores33the context, problems, quality, and trajectories of34local governance in Uzbekistan. More specifi-35cally, it addresses the following two questions:36(a) What are the responsibilities of local govern-37ments and do they carry them out in an adequate38and efficient manner? (b) How do local govern-39ments involve communities and their organiza-40tions in the governing process in terms of the41principles of good governance, such as transpar-42ency, accountability, rule of law, voice, democ-43racy, and accountability? In doing so, the paper44examines four conditions: contextual, structural,45institutional, and human resource. These condi-46tions are considered to be factors that can account47for the capacity of local governments in48Uzbekistan.49The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: the50next section describes the internal structure of51local governments, which will be instructive in52understanding the conditions under which they53function in Uzbekistan. This is followed by the54presentation of a brief overview of the tasks55and service delivery responsibilities of local gov-56ernments. The financial conditions and actual ser-57vice delivery capacity of local governments are58then discussed. The section after that examines59the relations between the central and local
# Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018A. Farazmand (ed.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3665-1
60 government, followed by concluding remarks on61 the main trends and challenges local governments62 face. Suggestions on areas for governance reform63 are also provided.
64 The Internal Structure of Local65 Governments
66 In Uzbekistan, the local government consists of67 a local state administration (administrative body)68 and an elected local council (legislative body) at69 the regional (oblast) and district (raion) levels.70 Representatives are appointed/elected for a period71 of 5 years. The local administration represents72 the executive and regulatory bodies of the state73 at the regional, district, or city/town levels and74 implements the policies of the president and cen-75 tral government in the provinces. All the heads of76 the local state administrations are appointed by77 the central government, subject to [symbolical]78 approval by the corresponding local councils79 (Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001). The president80 appoints regional (oblast level) governors, who in81 turn appoint district and city/town governors that82 come under regional subordination. Thus, the dis-83 trict and city governors are accountable to the84 regional governor, who in turn is accountable to85 the president. This means that local governors86 often experience double or even triple subordina-87 tion, being accountable to the regional governor,88 the central government, and the president.89 The local councils, running alongside the local90 state administrations, are the primary local legis-91 lative bodies. The council representatives are92 elected by the residents of the respective93 administrative-territorial units through general94 and direct vote (Bektemirov and Rahimov95 2001). As elected bodies, the local councils are96 expected to express and realize the will of the97 citizens in their respective administrative-98 territorial units. At least in theory, local councils99 can exert some influence over their administrative100 bodies. However, this is not the case in practice101 as the heads of the local state administrations102 enjoy absolute power in the management of local103 affairs (e.g., Popa and Munteanu 2001). Since all104 the governors are appointed, the local councils
105cannot exert significant influence on them. Even106though governors periodically report to their107local councils on the current situation of the terri-108tory, this process is mainly symbolic in nature109(Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001). This is because110the governors of the regional, city, or district state111administrations simultaneously exercise execu-112tive authority and serve as local council chairmen.113This means it is very difficult to distinguish114between the functions of the local state adminis-115tration and the local self-government bodies, since116the same individual (i.e., the governor) heads both117branches of power.118In addition to the regional and district119state administrations, there are sub-district level120governance institutions –mahalla committees – in121towns and rural areas. Mahalla committees122were part of the state farms, collective farms,123and enterprises during the Soviet era, but124shortly after independence, Uzbek authorities125revamped these institutions, assigning them126new legal status as “local self-government127bodies of citizens” (Giffen et al. 2005). Mahalla128committees assist district/town administrations129in implementing local development projects,130collecting taxes, administering social welfare pro-131grams, maintaining and repairing roads, disposing132of waste, ensuring security and order, removing133garbage, maintaining playgrounds and sports134fields, and many other tasks that are of local135importance (Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001;136Urinboyev 2011). Regarding the financing and137autonomy of these sub-district self-government138institutions vis-a-vis the higher-level local state139administrations, they are fully dependent on140budget allocations from the latter and regularly141report to the head of the district or city/town142administrations. The chairmen and secretaries143of the mahalla committees are salaried state offi-144cials. This means that mahalla committees do not145have any real capacity to act as sites of local146democracy and participation but merely serve147as sub-district extensions of the local state148administrations.149However, it should be noted that some form150of informal autonomy can be observed at the151level of the informal/social mahalla. Hence,152there is a need to distinguish between the mahalla
2 Local Government in Uzbekistan
153 committees (administrative mahalla) and the154 informal mahallas (social mahalla). The Uzbek155 people usually refer to the chairmen of the156 mahalla committees as the “eyes and ears of the157 local government” (“quloq” in the Uzbek lan-158 guage), given the fact that they serve the interests159 of the local government. The leaders of the social160 mahallas, on the other hand, are elected by161 mahalla residents during informal gatherings in162 mosques or teahouses (guzar). They work pro163 bono for the community and represent the inter-164 ests of the mahalla people. The social mahallas165 function informally and autonomously and can166 thus be regarded as a genuine citizen self-167 government institution (Urinboyev 2014, 2018).168 They offer a community-based alternative dispute169 resolution mechanism and provide a space for170 informal governance of everyday life and social171 relations. The analysis of scholarly literature172 shows that for many Uzbeks, social mahallas are173 more legitimate and easily accessible than the174 formal state institutions (Aminova and Jegers175 2011; Masaru 2006; Sievers 2002; Urinboyev176 2011, 2013a, b).
177 Tasks and Service Delivery178 Responsibilities of Local Governments
179 The tasks decentralized to local governments180 in Uzbekistan include environmental protection,181 prevention of natural and technological accidents,182 fire protection, public sanitation, public order and183 security, local economic and social development,184 culture, tourism, sports, maintenance of leisure185 facilities, communal services (e.g., water, gas,186 electricity, heat, waste management, sewage,187 engineering infrastructures), construction, main-188 tenance and local road repair, public transport,189 employment and job creation support, and the190 development of small and medium enterprises.191 Almost all healthcare services are provided192 by the public authorities. The central government193 manages healthcare services through the regional,194 district, and city/town level healthcare offices195 of the Ministry of Health. Healthcare services196 are primarily financed by the central budget197 and administered by territorial structures of the
198respective ministry. The local government is199only responsible for the maintenance and renova-200tion of healthcare institutions (Bektemirov and201Rahimov 2001). Schooling is the joint responsi-202bility of the central and local government in the203sense that the local offices of the Ministry of204Education pay teachers’ wages and oversee205administrative control; other expenditures such206as school maintenance are included in the local207government budget (Bektemirov and Rahimov2082001).209Unlike Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and210Tajikistan where local governments are responsi-211ble mainly for providing social assistance to212needy families, the mahalla committees213(administrative mahalla) in Uzbekistan are214responsible for the administration and targeting215of state social welfare benefits, such as child216and maternity benefits, and social assistance to217low-income families, families with children218under 16, and single mothers with children under2192 (Coudouel and Marnie 1999; Micklewright and220Marnie 2005). Funding for these programs is221established centrally as part of the consolidated222budget expenditures, which in turn are transferred223to the mahalla committees. The remaining social224protection programs (e.g., pensions, veterans of225the war benefits) are the responsibility of the dis-226trict/city level units of the Ministry of Labor and227Social Protection (Bektemirov and Rahimov2282001).
229Financial Conditions and Actual Service230Delivery Capacity of Local Governments
231One of the most important criteria used by the232citizens to assess the performance of local233governments is the quality and accessibility of234local public services (Popa and Munteanu 2001).235However, there are only a few studies with data on236citizens’ satisfaction with local government237performance in Uzbekistan. This is because238Uzbekistan has long been a heavily authoritarian239and closed country, making it difficult for local240and foreign organizations and researchers to eval-241uate the performance and effectiveness of the242local government in the country. Neema Noori’s
Local Government in Uzbekistan 3
243 (2006) study of decentralization processes in244 Uzbekistan is one of the few in this respect.245 As Noori argues, decentralization has had a246 negative impact on public service delivery in247 Uzbekistan because it was not accompanied by248 the corresponding resources and consequently249 worsened the quality and accessibility of public250 services. Hence, the central government has dele-251 gated numerous tasks and service delivery respon-252 sibilities to the local governments without253 providing adequate funding (Kandiyoti 2007;254 Noori 2006). One of the key challenges to255 improve the performance of local governments256 in Uzbekistan is to bridge the gap between257 their economic and social functions and the258 meagre financial means available for their259 implementation.260 The healthcare provision situation is also261 problematic. In Uzbekistan, the healthcare system262 is financed by the state, which means medical263 services should be free of charge. However,264 the healthcare system is de facto private and265 highly reliant on informal forms of financing.266 Most patients have to make informal payments267 to medical professionals in order to receive proper268 medical treatment, even though the public author-269 ities claim that citizens are entitled to free medical270 care. Local governments do not have sufficient271 resources to maintain adequately the healthcare272 infrastructures, the majority of which were built273 during the Soviet period.274 A similar situation can also be observed in the275 field of education. Due to their vulnerable finan-276 cial situation, local governments do not have suf-277 ficient resources to maintain local schools and278 provide an adequate number of books or to build279 modern sports facilities. The parents usually cover280 these expenditures.281 These problems can be largely explained by282 the fact that the local governments in Uzbekistan283 have limited financial autonomy and are strongly284 dependent on the central government (Ergashev285 et al. 2006; Sievers 2002; Urinboyev 2015). Local286 budgets mainly consist of transfers from the cen-287 tral government and local tax revenues. Local288 budget planning is centralized and closely tied to289 the national budget. This implies that central gov-290 ernment bodies determined the revenue bases of
291the local budgets. The local governments cannot292independently establish tax rates or collect their293own revenues through local taxes, with the excep-294tion of some insignificant local fees, taxes, and295duties, such as a land tax. National budget funds296are redistributed among different regions by297deducting budget surpluses from the regions that298perform well and making allocations in the form299of subventions, subsidies, or equalization trans-300fers to vulnerable regions that cannot cover their301needs. The revenues collected from local taxes302constitute a small portion of the local govern-303ments’ revenues and are insufficient for covering304even the basic expenses. Hence, the ability of305local governments to raise their own revenues is306considerably limited, and they remain dependent307on transfers from the central government to fulfill308their service delivery functions. Consequently,309they neither enjoy fiscal autonomy nor do they310receive transfers from the central government that311are sufficient to meet their service delivery needs312(Leschenko and Troschke 2006).313Due to the incapacity of the local government314to address adequately the local needs, social315mahallas have evolved to respond to the declining316state capacity in the post-Soviet era, acting as a317pseudo-local government entity. This means that318people living in the same neighborhood (mahalla)319pool their efforts and engage in mutual aid prac-320tices by exchanging labor, money, material goods,321and services. Typical mutual aid practices include322the community financing of constructing irriga-323tion facilities, cleaning streets, asphalting roads,324building houses or mosques, organizing wed-325dings, funerals and circumcision feasts, and326many other services not provided by the local327government.
328The Relations Between the Central and329Local Government
330The local government in Uzbekistan functions in a331rather complex environment characterized by an332authoritarian political culture, limited financial333autonomy, and weak local legislative bodies.334The power and functions between the central335state agencies and local governments are
4 Local Government in Uzbekistan
336 ambiguously distributed, which largely derives337 from the deficiencies in national laws that do338 not clearly specify the functions and powers339 across various tiers of the government. The central340 government bodies make most of the administra-341 tive decisions concerning district and regional342 public service delivery issues. In these bodies, a343 hierarchy of power starts at the ministry, followed344 by the ministry’s main regional departments, and345 followed by the district or city units. Ministries346 control the daily activities of their territorial347 agencies and directly appoint their heads, in348 coordination with the governor, which implies349 that the territorial units of the ministries are350 accountable to their central bodies and thereby351 rarely coordinate with local governments.352 Local councils, despite having official status353 as local legislative bodies, are in practice subordi-354 nated to the local state administrations. Hence,355 institutions of self-governance fulfill completely356 different functions and aims than the officially357 declared ones. This means that there is very358 little or no understanding of the true essence359 of local government reform in the country. As360 Abdukhalilov (2007) notes, in Uzbekistan,361 administrative reforms are often understood as a362 cutback in staff or an attempt to save money.More363 importantly, administrative reforms do not con-364 tain a single paragraph about the necessity to365 change the hierarchical norms and mentality of366 the managers.367 Accordingly, Uzbekistan’s public administra-368 tion system can hardly be regarded as369 “decentralized” given that local governments are370 highly dependent on the central government at371 all levels – administratively, financially, and polit-372 ically. Overdependence on the central government373 limits the ability of local governments to support374 local development. The malfunctioning local375 governments are mainly the outcome of a central-376 ized government that does not delegate any real377 autonomy to local administrations (Bektemirov378 and Rahimov 2001). Under these circumstances379 political and civil servants at all levels do not feel380 any accountability to the citizens; rather, they try381 to meet the expectations of those who have the382 power and authority to hire them. Public partici-383 pation in local politics is almost nonexistent, and
384local elections are merely used to assert and legit-385imize the central government’s influence in the386periphery. Openness and transparency are not387viewed as a norm in the day-to-day operations of388the local administrations. Local government offi-389cials care less about informing people about their390work or listening to their opinions on the level and391quality of public services. They are chiefly392concerned with fulfilling the orders and expecta-393tions of the central government.
394Concluding Remarks
395As shown in the previous sections, the relation-396ship between the local state administrations and397the central government is often based on subordi-398nate relations rather than on mutual cooperation.399Local government reform is interpreted merely400in terms of citizens’ active participation in local401government, but other key conditions for local402self-government (i.e., autonomy of local self-403government structures from the state) are largely404neglected (Ilkhamov 2004; Urinboyev 2015). As405the results demonstrate, the core challenge hinder-406ing local government reform in Uzbekistan comes407from the persistence of authoritarian style admin-408istrative practices. Although there have been some409local government reform initiatives in the country,410they remain “on paper” and have little or no effect411on the governance processes. In practice, the local412governments continue to be subordinated to the413central government in all public policy issues, be414it education, taxation, health care, welfare, or415agriculture. As a result, the local governments do416not have any real capacity to adequately address417the needs and concerns of citizens, as they are418merely concerned with implementing centrally419designed policies.420Another area of concern is financial autonomy.421Since the local governments do not have a solid422financial base and the important public policy423decisions are made at the central government424level, there is little or no possibility at the local425level for citizens to voice their concerns about426public goods and services. One visible conse-427quence is the emergence of citizens’ alternatives:428informal coping strategies that are based on
Local Government in Uzbekistan 5
429 mutual aid practices. These alternative strategies430 are short-term solutions that have little to do with431 local development issues and negatively influence432 the image and legitimacy of the central govern-433 ment. It is thus suggested that local government434 reform should go beyond official proclamations435 and rhetoric and grant more political and financial436 autonomy in practice.
437 Cross-References
438 ▶Civil Service Development in Kazakhstan439 ▶Governance in Tajikistan440 ▶Local Government in Kazakhstan441 ▶Local Government in Uzbekistan442 ▶ Public Administration in Kyrgyzstan443 ▶ Public Sector Reforms in Central Asia
444 References
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