liu xiaobo, charter 08, and the contested rhetorics of democracy and human rights in china

TO DANCE WITH LOST SOULS: LIU XIAOBO,CHARTER 08, AND THE CONTESTED RHETORICS OFDEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA

STEPHEN JOHN HARTNETT

This essay addresses Chinas Nobel Peace Prize-winning and now imprisoneddissident, Liu Xiaobo, and his movement-launching manifesto, Charter 08,as test cases of the fate of democracy in China. By examining how the ChineseCommunist Party attacked Liu and how international nongovernmentalorganizations and political allies rallied to his cause, the essay probes thelimits of human rights discourse in an age of globalization, wherein transna-tional ideals of justice crash into nation states committed to local rather thanglobal forms of governance. Such rhetorical concerns are tempered by Chinasincreasing dominance of global markets, meaning this essay also studies thecomplicated relationships among local activists, international justice move-ments, and neoliberal capitalism. The essay therefore maps how China mar-shals the rhetoric of globalization to enter new markets even as it deploys therhetoric of nationalism to block foreign influence. Nonetheless, Charter 08sprophetic rhetoric and Lius heroic charisma have struck a chord internation-ally, thus opening a new chapter in the movement to call upon globalizinghuman rights in the name of building democracy in China.

STEPHEN JOHN HARTNETT is Professor and Chair of the Department of Communication at TheUniversity of Colorado, Denver. For their intellectual support, thanks to my colleagues in theFront Range Rhetoric Group, including Drs. John Ackerman, Hamilton Bean, Greg Dickinson,Sonja Foss, LisaKernen, andBrianOtt. For their camaraderiewhile traveling inChina, thanksto Drs. Patrick Dodge, Donovan Conley, Sonja Foss, Lisa Kernen, BarbaraWalkosz, and SteveThomas. Special thanks to Marty Medhurst and the journals reviewers for their exceptionallyhelpful commentary.

2013Michigan State University Board of Trustees. All rights reserved. Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 16, No. 2, 2013, pp. 223274. ISSN 1094-8392.

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Liu Xiaobo, the former professor, prolifc author, and prominentactivist, was arrested in Beijing on December 8, 2008, whenGiant Pandasa term used by dissidents to belittle the securitypolicecarried him away to an undisclosed location and undeclaredfate.1 Lius disappearance was a preemptive strike against Charter 08, theblockbuster call for human rights and democracy in China, which Liuand his allies were set to release to the Chinese public on December 10,2008. Liu was held in secret detention until June 2009, when the ChineseCommunist Party (hereafter CCP, or Party) announced that he wasbeing charged with subverting the state. Liu was tried on December 23,2009, in a closed court session that lasted less than three hours; he wasfound guilty and sentenced, on Christmas Day, to 11 years in prison.2

Lius case was then complicated even further, and the importance ofCharter 08 heightened, when, on October 8, 2010, Liu was named thatyears winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. While supporters of Liu andCharter 08 celebrated the news as confrmation of the globalizing marchof a universalist version of human rights and expanding democracy, theCCP responded to the award as if it was a declaration of war againstChinese sovereignty, calling Lius triumph an obscenity.3 Hence, bythe autumn of 2010, Liu Xiaobo, Charter 08, and the Nobel Peace Prizewere rolled into a hotly contested international controversy regardingsome of the key questions of the early twenty-frst century, including,will the CCP support democracy in China? Are human rights universalnorms or nation-specifc political practices? And what exactly did LiuXiaobo and Charter 08 say that so enraged the CCP, even while winningthe hearts of activists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), anddemocracy supporters worldwide? By addressing these questions, thisessay contributes to a recent surge of articles in Rhetoric & Public Affairsabout China and opens up fruitful dialogue about the dynamic characterof United States-China communication patterns, thereby offering anoccasion for pondering the shared political fates of the worlds twosuper-powers.4

While this essay engages these sweeping questions about competingversions of democracy and human rights in an age of globalization, itscore concerns are rhetorical: why did Charter 08 outrage the CCP, andwhy did it speak so clearly and persuasively to international audiences?What do the rhetorical characteristics of this text tell us about the

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strategies available to activists who seek to change the policies of theCCP? As the most celebrated and controversial document to emergefrom China in the past decade, Charter 08 offers unique opportunitiesfor probing these questions. Liu and Charter 08 make for confusingreading, however, for while Charter 08 explicitly appropriates the formand content of the U.S. Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Consti-tution, and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, Liu is alsoa fre-breathing poet and provocateur whose rhetoric stands at thecrossroads of prophesy and diatribe. This essay argues that these com-bined, confusing, and sometimes contradictory rhetorical strategies arethe consequence of the Partys outlawing even the slightest politicalcriticism. Indeed, the CCPs repression drives anyone who is curiousabout democracy underground, turning patriots into traitors and re-formers into rebels: by closing all avenues of measured political debate,the CCP forces advocates into diatribes and prophesies that furtherpolarize an already fractured nation. In this sense, Lius rhetoricalpatterns may be understood as the consequence of living in a state thatoutlaws political debaterepression from above creates rhetorical esca-lation from below. This rhetorical quandary perhaps explains why,following the CCPs repression of Charter 08 and its arrest of Liu, hemoved from practicing rhetorical means of persuasion to a positionrooted in the political theater of sacrifcial martyrdom.

Although Charter 08 failed at domestic persuasion in China, thisessay chronicles how it was a stunning, perhaps game-changing, successas an act of international persuasion. Recognizing the different re-sponses of Lius domestic and international constituencies means thataddressing Charter 08 offers insights into one of the core dilemmas ofglobalization: the tension between border-hopping transnational ideasand entrenched national spaces, powers, and customs. As tienne Bali-bar observes, even while globalization tends to knock down frontierswith respect to goods and capital, nation states tend to respond byerecting a whole system of barriers against foreign labor, capital, andideas.5 This case study of the jockeying between Chinese dissidents,global NGOs, U.S. politicians, and CCP offcials illustrates this tensionin action, as democracy activists and NGOs invoked globalizing normsimported from abroad to support Liu, while the Party defended itspositions in the name of protecting national honor and cultural auton-

TO DANCE WITH LOST SOULS 225

omy against imported dangers, what the criminal verdict against Liucalled despicable influence[s].6 This essay therefore extends the com-plexity of D. Robert DeChaines characterization of globalization as athreat and a promise by mapping how threats and promises dependon the audience in question.7 In this case, Charter 08 was received as adire threat by the CCP but as a glowing promise by Chinese dissidents,international NGOs, and some progressive forces in the U.S. govern-ment. Charter 08 therefore offers a compelling case study for watchinghow globalization ensures that any text engaging in persuasion on agrand scale, even if productive for one or multiple audiences, is bound tooffend other audiences, for while globalization means that everythingcirculates, it does not mean that readers or listeners share a set of normsand expectations for interpreting global texts. In short, studying LiuXiaobos case illustrates how globalization accelerates circulation butshort-circuits understanding.8

To pursue these arguments, the essay unfolds in three sections. First, toput the human rights questions asked here in theoretical context, the essayopens by addressing the debate between those who support a universalistversion of rights and those who support a particularist version of rights. Aswe shall see, this debate carries deep political conflicts tinged in large part bythe history of colonialism. Second, to examine how Charter 08 enacts oneside of this human rights debate, and to demonstrate the rhetorical dilem-mas of persuasion in an age of globalized texts, the essay examines Charter08s confusing oscillation from offering prudent means of accommodationto leveling diatribe-laced threats to unleashing prophetic visions. Third, towatch how these human rights and rhetorical questions played out on theinternational stage, the essay chronicles the eruption of debate followingLius receiving the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize. The CCPs responses to Liu,Charter 08, its supporters, and international rights advocates are inter-spersed throughout the three sections. Taken as awhole, the essay illustrateshow the rhetorical habits of democracy work well for persuading interna-tional actors already committed to supporting a universalist version ofhuman rights, but not for persuading the CCP to change its ways. LiuXiaobos Charter 08 therefore stands as both a stunning rhetorical triumph(in international venues) and a dismal rhetorical failure (in China), andhence as a provocative occasion for thinking about the complexity ofpersuasion in an age of globalization.


CONTESTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

While the bulk of this essay engages in detailed rhetorical criticism ofCharter 08 and Liu Xiaobos other major documents, it is important frst tooutline the two major strands of human rights thinking that have guidedU.S. and Chinese responses to this international affair. On the one hand,when the U.S. government and international NGOs ratcheted up the pres-sure on the Party, they did so in the name of a universalist version of humanrights that supposedly transcends national boundaries and local customs.For example, the U.S. Congress, acting as if it could dictate policy to China,and assuming to speak for norms that are self-evident and apolitical, pro-duced a resolution demanding that China immediately release Liu Xiaoboand begin making strides toward true representative democracy.9 On theother hand, when the CCP responded, it relied upon claims of nationalsovereignty and cultural autonomy, charging that anyone calling forWestern-style human rights and democracy in China acted as a shock troopfor imperialism. For example, Chinas Foreign Ministry spokeswoman,Jiang Yu, claimed that any attempt to influence Chinas handling of Liu andother democracy advocates amounted to gross interference with Chinassovereignty.10 In assuming that it can tell the CCP what to do, the U.S.Congress reprised a long-standing pattern of arrogance, enabling the CCPto invoke the ghosts of colonialism and to worry about Chinas allegedlythreatened national sovereignty. The Partys response was no more sophis-ticated, as it demonstrated a typical intransigence whereby it claims anextreme version of exceptionalism that places China outside evolving inter-national rights norms. This deadlock illustrates how the United States andChina are stuck in a dangerous rhetorical pattern wherein the UnitedStatesclaiming to speak for a universalist version of human rightsandChinainvoking a particularist and Communist version of rightsdo notseek common ground, instead provoking each other to alarming levels ofnationalist chest-thumping.11 This case study therefore provides interna-tional evidence confrming Leonard Hawess claim that instead of resolv-ing disputes . . . rights-based arguments more often than not escalateantagonisms.12

The question of how the United States and China marshal antagonisticversions of human rights is intriguing, for while Chinas actions regardingLiu and Charter 08 provoked the ire of many observers, it should be noted


that Michael Ignatieff, the director of Harvards Carr Center for HumanRights Policy, recently observed that human rights have become unthink-ingly imperialist.13 In fact, Samuel Moyn has demonstrated that Western-style human rights have long been criticized by Third World constituentswho have been less interested in implementing U.S.-style norms of freespeech and human rights than in establishing anti-colonialand oftenCommunistversions of national sovereignty.14As Party functionaryQianSi intoned in 1960 in high-Maoist style, human rights are nothing morethan the right of the bourgeoisie to enslave and oppress the laboringpeople.15 Updating this thinking in 2010, the CCPsChinaDaily argued, inresponse to Lius Nobel Peace Prize, that countries have no right to evalu-ate the human rights situations in other countries, for sovereignty isalways the prerequisite.16 While someWestern readers may be inclined toread such responses as propaganda, it is important to note that the CCP hasin fact developed its own consistent position in these matters. Part of thattradition is based on flagging the hypocrisy of Western cultures, where, asargued byXiaoWeiyun, LuoHaocai, andWuXieyung, everywhere there iswidespread unemployment, inflation, serious crime, racial discrimination,oppression of women, drug addiction and traffcking, etc. Where is thehuman dignity? From this position, dominant Western notions of humanrights, which care so little about economic equality, are nothing but afraud.17 For the CCP, a better version of human rights supports the rightsto subsistence and development, which can best be pursued when no oneplaces his own rights and interests above those of the state and society.18

In sum, for the past 50 years the Party has argued that its local confgura-tions of national sovereignty and Communist versions of economic devel-opment trump universal versions of human rights, which are seen asnothing less than excuses for political colonialism and economic exploita-tion. Moreover, given the revelations about U.S.-sponsored atrocities inAbu Ghraib, Guantanmo Bay, and elsewhere, Wang Jisi reports that cyn-icism among Chinas leaders is so widespread regarding the UnitedStatess human rights practices that no one would openly affrm that theAmericans truly believe inwhat they say about human rights concerns.19 Ifwe hope to understand the complexity of LiuXiaobos case, the furor causedby Charter 08, and the fate of human rights and democracy in China, thenwe will need to take this alternative perspective seriously.


On the other hand, there are good reasons to fear the mercenary relativ-ism called for by the CCP, for as Ignatieff has noted, it is the invariable alibiof tyranny.20 Gerard Hauser has likewise cautioned against giving up thesearch for principled common ground in international human rights dis-course, as his research on political prisoners has found that dictators like touse cultural discourseas opposed to universalist discourseas a coverfor brutality.21 By examining Liu Xiaobos case, this essay demonstrateshow the prevailing norms of human rights discourse in an age of globaliza-tion remain stuck in provincial patterns, for whether the United Statespushes its allegedly universal version or the CCP pushes its avowedlyanti-colonial version, both nations appear to use human rights talk as arhetorical battering ram for pursuing national interests.22

To help work through this apparent impasse, Ignatieff argues that advo-cates who frame human rights as universal and non-negotiable moraltrump cards risk turning historically specifc laws into a species of idola-try: humanismworshipping itself. In contrast to such paradoxically secularidolatry, Ignatieff proposes that we approach human rights in a minimalistfashion, seeing them not as transcendent laws thundering across bordersbut as limited injunctions against barbarism. Such thin rights do not goon to defne what their freedom to should consist in, for all they proclaimis certain specifc freedoms from clearly defned forms of cruel andunusual punishment.23 Diane Orentlicher praises this position as enactingprudential humanism, yet as David Hollinger notes, the rulers of author-itarian regimes would be foolish not to recognize that prowling within theminimalist bag of such prudential humanism is an ambitious liberalreforming cat.24 For example, whenArchbishopDesmondTutu celebratesthe Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a subversive instrumentavailable to overturn injusticethis is precisely the activist, revolutionaryversion of rights that the Party fears.25 The controversy regarding LiuXiaobo, Charter 08, and the Nobel Prize hinges on this distinction betweentwo interpretations of human rights: do calls for such rights point to thereformist and civic-minded task of charting a roadmap for prudentialhumanism, or are theyTrojan horses housing ambitious liberal reformingcats intent on overturn[ing] injustice and, as the CCP fears, subvertingexisting states?

Answering these questions within the specifc United States-China con-text addressed here requires familiarity with Liu Xiaobos record of activ-


ism, which, as interpreted by the Party, points not toward prudentialhumanism but toward revolution. Liu had been on the radar of the CCPsince the Tiananmen SquareMassacre of June 4, 1989. Earlier that summer,he left a post as a visiting scholar at Columbia University, in NewYork City,to return to Beijing, where he played a prominent role in organizing theprotests that prompted the Partys crackdown. Liu was subsequently sen-tenced to 21 months in prison. He was again targeted by the CCP in 1996,whenhe received three years in one ofChinas feared re-education throughlabor (RTL) camps as punishment for his pro-democracy writings. Uponhis release from the RTL, Liu renewed his calls for China to move towarddemocracy while escalating his diatribes against the Party. For example, in a1999 poem he tarred the Partys offcials as trained/to uphold a hideouslie; he called the CCPs tenure in power the lie of a century; referring toMay Day celebrations in Tiananmen, he lamented how amid gloriouspomp/murder weapons will roll once again across this square.26 Becausesuch diatribes appealed to international NGOs intent on toppling commu-nism, Liu was awarded the Reporters without Borders Press Freedom Prizein 2004, elevating him into the pantheon of global celebrity activists.27 Bythis time, he was serving as president of the Independent China PENCenter, the Beijing-based and globally linked chapter of theworldwide PENCenter coalition that represents authors and free speech advocates.28 Fol-lowing his disappearance in 2008, Liu received awards from the PENAmerican Center (in 2009) and Human Rights Watch (in 2010). Thus,when Liuwon theNobel Peace Prize inOctober 2010, it waswidely hailed asa rebuke to the Party and as confrmation of Lius long-time bravery,eloquence, and persistence.29 And so, by 2010, Liu had become a synecdo-che for the global human rights debates outlined herein, in which interna-tional human rights advocates and local dissidents marshal one rhetoricalstrategywherein human rights are celebrated as a universal birthright and anineluctable component of globalizationwhile the CCP marshals anotherwherein the needs of state sovereignty require defensive action againstcolonialists.

It is important to note that the Partys concerns were based on hardhistorical lessons. While Western intellectuals hail PEN, Human RightsWatch, and the Nobel prizes as markers of enlightened cosmopolitanism,the CCP sees some of these groups as fronts for U.S.-driven meddling. Thisposition is not without cause. In fact, the PEN chapter Liu led in China is


funded in part by theNational Endowment forDemocracy (NED), which inturn derives its funds from the Unites States Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID).30 Because of these ties to Cold War cultural orga-nizations, the CCP has long been wary of PEN; as Frances Stonor Saundersargues, starting in the early 1960s the CIA made every effort to turn PENinto a vehicle for American government interests by attempting to linkPENs activities and personnel to the CIA-run Congress for Cultural Free-dom. Saunders argues that the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and othersuch CIA-backed cultural organizations, amounted to hidden weapon[s]in Americas Cold War struggle against communism.31 Thus, in 1983,when President Ronald Reagan launched the National Endowment forDemocracy (it was the new incarnation of the disbanded Congress forCultural Freedom), William Blum reports that its raison dtre is to dosomewhat overtly what the CIA had been doing covertly for decadesmanipulate the political process in a target county. The NEDs anti-Communist activism was so well-known that Blum calls it Washingtonsspecially created stand-in for the CIA.32 Knowing these facts should helpWestern readers to understand why the CCP responded to Liu Xiaobo andCharter 08with such fury: the Party placed this fgure and this text within aCold War narrative, wherein the NED and Chinas branch of PEN havemurky funding streams and missions tainted by their association with theCIA. To watch howCharter 08 streamed into the heart of this debate, I turnnow to a detailed rhetorical analysis of the text that landedLiuXiaobo in jail.

CHARTER 08'S APPROPRIATION OF DEMOCRACY AND THE DILEMMASOF PERSUADING A DICTATORSHIP

While the Partys response to Liu Xiaobo and Charter 08 outraged globalrights advocates, analysis of his rhetoric indicates that his patterns of asso-ciation (his referencing of fgures, texts, andnorms foreign toConfucianismand hostile to communism), his use of prophetic language, and his habit ofsliding from reasoned argument toward heated diatribes clearly signaledwhat the Party took to be hostile intentions. If calling upon the rhetoricalroots of democracy enabledCharter 08 to strikemany international readersas a rousing tribute to the core principles of enlightenment and modernity,then those same tropes struck the CCP as little more than euphemisms forU.S.-led aggression. Moreover, because Charter 08 so clearly bases its form,


key terms, and guiding ideals on foundational Western political declara-tions, the text can feel both confused and confusing, as if it is more inter-ested in persuading Western than Chinese readers.

Consider the fact that Charter 08 was named to echo Charter 77, theCzechoslovakian document that helped spawn the Velvet Revolutionitthus flew into Chinese political life proudly bearing the imprint of VclavHavels thinking in particular and the hopes of anti-Communist Westernintellectuals more broadly.33 To cement that leaning toward the West,Charter 08 was released to the Chinese public on December 10, 2008, the60th anniversary of the United Nations celebrated and contested UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights (hereafterUDHR).34Charter 08 opens with aforeword offering a ten-paragraph-long history of China, including theseframing devices:

A hundred years have passed since the writing of Chinas frst Constitution.2008 alsomarks the sixtieth anniversary of the promulgation of theUniversalDeclaration of Human Rights, the thirtieth anniversary of the appearance ofthe Democracy Wall in Beijing, and the tenth of Chinas signing of theInternational Covenant onCivil and Political Rights.We are approaching thetwentieth anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre of pro-democracystudent protesters.35

Beginning with the Republics frst (and comparatively liberal) constitutionin 1908, moving to the U.N.s seminal 1948UDHR (which the Communistsinitially supported but then denounced), to the key pro-democracy eventsof 1978/1979 (which Deng Xiaoping crushed), to one of Chinas few (andlargely forgotten) nods to international norms of human rights, and fnallyto the tabooed atrocities of 1989all of which the Party has tried to erasefrom popular memoryCharter 08 opens with a rousing dose of anti-Communist history.36 In fact, in contrast to the uncountable struggles, thelong trail of human rights disasters, and the abyss of totalitarianismfoisted upon the Chinese frst by Maoism and more recently by the Partysmodernizing autocrats, the authors ofCharter 08 claim that they have cometo believe that freedom, equality, and human rights are universal values.They ask the question that confronts China and the world: Where is Chinaheaded in the twenty-frst century? Will it continue with modernization


under authoritarian rule, or will it embrace universal human values, join themainstream of civilized nations, and build a democratic system?37

To begin answering that question, the authors invoke the U.S. Declara-tion of Independence to celebrate the rights of citizens to freedom, toproperty, and to the pursuit of happiness. The call for such rights comeswrapped within a threat, as the authors of Charter 08 close their forewordwith the claim, the decline of the current system has reached the pointwhere change is no longer optional.38 The implication is clear: theCCP canreform itself by embracing American-style rights, or it will face a possiblerevolution led by the authors of Charter 08. Considering how the U.S.Declaration of Independence led to the downfall of the British Empire in theNewWorld, how the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizenhelped to topple the monarchy, how Charter 77 hastened the collapse ofthe Soviet Unions hold on satellite states in Eastern Europe, and how theUDHR was turned into a mobile weapon against communism during theColdWar, observers cannot blame the CCP for taking that threat seriously.

While Ignatieff, Hawes, and others have tried to argue for human rightsin aminimalist fashion intended not to threaten national sovereignty, LynnHunt observes how the demands elucidated in the documents noted have atendency to cascade, often achieving what she calls the bulldozer force ofthe revolutionary logic of rights.39 As students of this bulldozer force,and as the leaders presiding over what Perry Link has called Chinas newnationalmood of insecurity, there can be little surprise that theCCP readCharter 08 as a dire threat.40 This was no misreading, for as I demonstrate,the document offers a stunning rebuke to the Partys current leadership, tothe past 50 years of Communist rule, and to a nation that has lost its way, allwhile invoking canonicalWestern texts and ideas.Charter 08 thus stands asthe culmination of a generation of Chinese New Enlightenment thinking,whichWangHui characterizes as driven by an oppositional, antiorthodox,and antiestablishment pro-Western tendency.41

For example, following the foreword, the next section of Charter 08 istitled Our Fundamental Principles; it includes six italicized terms accom-panied by a defnition, with each principle based on a foundational text ofWestern democracy. The frst principle isFreedom, which bears eight rights;of these, the frst fourfreedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedomof assembly, [and] freedom of associationare direct appropriations ofthe U.S. Constitutions First Amendment, hence saddling the CCP with the


uncomfortable task of pursuing reformby adopting the foundational text ofChinas chief rival for twenty-frst century global leadership.42 The secondkey term is Human Rights, which are described as the inherent rights todignity and freedom with which every person is born.43 This secondclaim echoes the preamble to and Article 1 of the UDHR. These frst twofundamental principles argue, in short, that Chinas future can in no waybe Communist, as the change called for would mean adopting the U.S.Constitution and the U.N.sUDHR as models.Whether these moves wouldsave the nation or not, it would be diffcult for the CCP to accept suchproposals, foras is consistentwith prophetic rhetoricthey offer no routetoward change that does not mean humiliation for the Partys leaders andthe likely destruction of the Party. As James Darsey has observed, suchprophetic rhetoric violates one of the traditional functions of rhetoric byemphasizing separation over identifcation.44 Thinking historically, Ste-phen Lucas has shown how theWesternworlds great political declarations,which tend to share similar rhetorical protocols, have all been issued amida breakdown in the standard operations of government.45 Perhaps be-cause of this breakdown, the contents of such declarationsbold, daring,uncompromising, accusatory, self-righteousoften appear to preclude thepossibility of prudence and negotiation. Following in this tradition,Charter08 produces separation at home, yet its appropriation of long-standingand cherished rhetorical norms enablesWestern readers steeped in Enlight-enment principles to feel an intense sense of identifcation with Liu andhis fellow Chinese dissidents. In an age of globalization, identifcation andseparation transcend local politics while speaking to multiple internationalaudiences.

The third key term ofCharter 08 indicates how some Chinese believe thePartys embrace of free markets has created a nightmarish version of com-munism that produces wealth gaps reminiscent of the Gilded Age in theUnited States.46 Moreover, as China has pushed relentlessly into new landsalong its contested southern/Buddhist and western/Muslim borders, soethnic and religious tensions have flared, particularly in Tibet and Xinji-ang.47 Responding to this rising economic, ethnic, and religious tension, thethird key term of Charter 08 is Equality, which the authors argue shouldapply regardless of social station, occupation, sex, economic condition,ethnicity, skin color, religion, or political belief.48 In asking for Freedom,Human Rights, and Equality, the authors of Charter 08 offer a stunning


rebuke to the Chinese Communist Party; by doing so in language thatechoes theU.S. Declaration of Independence, theU.S. Constitution, and theUDHR, they situate themselves as champions of the sameWestern, Liberal,and Enlightenment traditions that the CCP has long seen as cover forcolonialism. This may not have been the best persuasive strategy, for SusanShirk, the long-time China observer and former Deputy Assistant Secretaryof State for United States/China relations, has cautioned that such shamingrhetoric is doomed to failure. Our [American] hopes for political reform inChina, she argues, will never be realized through outside pressure.49 Andso, while human rights advocates railed against the Party, andwhileCharter08 invoked the foundational texts of Western democracy, the criminalverdict against Liu convicted him for the grave act of inciting subversion ofstate power.50

The question, then, is whether asking for Freedom, Human Rights, andEquality was an attempt to subvert the CCP or a last-ditch effort to helpsave the Party from its own worst habits? Would pursuing such goalsdestroy national unity and peace, as the Party claims, or would it help areformed Party achieve political legitimacy, spawn a new wave of intellec-tual and economic creativity, and enable China to assume the mantle ofenlightened global leadership, as the authors of Charter 08 hope? The nextthree key terms from the documents Fundamental Principles help toanswer that question, for the authors ofCharter 08 call here for Republican-ism, meaning a U.S.-style separation of powers balanced among differentbranches of government.51 The next term, Democracy, argues that thelegitimacy of the state should flow up from the people, who get to choosetheir leaders in periodic competitive elections. In short, democracy is amodernmeans for achieving government truly of the people, by the people,and for the people.52 Echoing President Abraham Lincolns monumentalline from his 1863 Gettysburg Address makes obvious rhetorical sense, butnot necessarily political sense, for while the passage provides stirring ora-tory, it is hard to imagine the CCP engaging in political reform by adoptingthe prophetic language of a president who fought a CivilWar in the name ofhigher valuesprecisely the thing the Party fears most.53 Put differently,whereas Western readers have come to understand the historically pro-phetic language of democracy as a beloved but compromised cultural in-heritance that, when put into practice, leads toward moderation, prudence,


and sometimes stalemate, the CCP heard such language in a literal sense,and understood Charter 08 as a call to incite a revolution.

Still, given more than a decade of double-digit economic growth, thepresence of strong nationalism, the continued power of the relatively ho-mogenousHanmajority, and the ever-present fear of political turbulence, itis possible that even while the authors of Charter 08 invoke Western idealsand rhetoric, an open election at the national level could return the CCP topower. Amore confdent Party therefore might have readCharter 08 not somuch as a prophetic attempt to destroy it as a moderate means of workingtoward even greater political legitimacy. Writing from prison to DengXiaoping in November 1983, Democracy Wall hero Wei Jingsheng ob-served how the Partys habitual suspicion craze led it to react in an overlysensitive fashion to political critiques; because of the CCPs perpetualinsecurity, it reacted as if anyone with opinions different from their ownwere an enemy force planning to usurp their power.54 Much as thishabitual insecurity led the Party to imprisonWei in 1979, and to respond tothe Tiananmen protesters in 1989 with unnecessary severity, so it led theParty to perceive Charter 08s call for Freedom, Human Rights, Equality,Republicanism, and Democracy as the rallying cries of an enemy force.Fei-Ling Wang thus observed in 2011 that the Party is stuck in panicmode.55

Consider the sixth key Fundamental Principal, the call for Constitu-tional Rule, which, for the authors of Charter 08, means that the legalsystem and legal regulations should not be devised by fat but by the peoplein elected assembly.56 This may sound like a radical threat to the Party, butin fact China has a Constitution and various bodies charged with amendingitthe Party even passed a National Human Rights Action Plan in 2009meaning amore supple and confdent Partymight have sought not somuchto destroy Charter 08 as to implement it in a limited way, to explore itsprovisions via qualifed steps that could have meshed with existing docu-ments and practices, thus enhancing the legitimacy of a reconstituted gov-ernment.57 By refusing to pursue this possibility and instead charging Liuwith treason, the Party made a dramatic interpretive move: it escalated hisrhetoric from a loving critique of a nation that needs change into a hatefulattack on a government that needs to be overthrown.

Indeed,Charter 08s demandswere perceived by theParty not somuch asloving nudges toward prudential humanism as revolutionary calls for


trouble. By mid-December 2008, just two weeks after its release online,Charter 08 had accrued over 10,000 signatures, signaling to the Party thatthe document was gaining steam as a revolutionary rallying cry.58 In retro-spect, 10,000 supporters is a drop in the bucket of a nation with almost 1.5billion inhabitants.Moreover, in the CCPs verdict against Liu, it noted thatthe articles (alongsideCharter 08) that landed him in court had accrued hitson the web ranging from as low as 57 for one essay to as high as 749 foranotherthese are hardly numbers that indicate a swelling movement.59

But the Party was in no mood for experimentation, as indicated in thecomments of Party offcial Jia Qinglin, who argued that China must builda defensive line against interference by incorrect Western thinking.60 Intaking this hard-line stance, the Party confrmed what Western critics andthe authors of Charter 08 feared: that the Party was committed not topursuing political reform but to maintaining what Sophie Richardson,Human Rights Watchs Asia Advocacy Director, called naked politicalrepression.61 Thinking historically, these events ft into anunbroken chain:from the persecution of intellectuals under Mao in the 1950s and 1960s toDengs attacks on Democracy Wall activists in 1979 to the massacre atTiananmen Square in 1989 to Wei Jingshengs disappearance in 1994 toLius imprisonment today, the Party has shown scant interest in exploringdemocratization and a stern commitment to practicing whatWei describesas the despicable old habits of brutal repression.62 While the Partysrepression escalated Lius charges from critique to incitement, and turnedhis local irrelevance into international stardom, it also shifted his tone fromsounding hyperbolic, or prophetic, or provocative, to hard-edged truth-telling, for the Partys responses confrmed Lius worst allegations.

Charter 08 switches gears in the What We Advocate section, as itmoves from invoking canonical Western ideals to offering a hard look atwhat a reconfgured China might look like. This section of the documentincludes two arguments that, if enacted, would blow the lid off existingpolitical arrangements, hence raising serious questions about Lius politicaljudgment. Buried within another long list of demands, in a paragraphcalling for a decentralized and Federated Republic (demand 18), theauthors ofCharter 08 propose ways for China to act as a responsible majorpower. They argue that the freedoms that already exist in Hong Kongand Macao should be supported and that Taiwan should be approachedwith the goal of negotiating as equals . . . [who are] ready to compromise.


Regarding the national-minority areas of China, they call for seekingways to fnd a workable framework within which all ethnic and religiousgroups can flourish. We should aim ultimately, they claim, at a federa-tion of democratic communities in China.63 They are talking about dis-mantling the empire. The problem is that Taiwan is not seen by the Party asan equal so much as a break-away state to be recaptured.64 Depending onhow you delineate the ancient lands of Tibetnot the shrunken adminis-trative apparatus now called the Tibet Autonomous Region but the muchlarger zones where Tibetans have lived for centuriesthat ethnic/politicalarea amounts to anywhere between 20 and 30 percent of Chinas currentlandmass, holds the future of regional water supplies, and serves as one ofthe keys to Chinas southward-looking military plans.65 Hong Kong is oneof the great economic engines of global capitalism, and Macao is a thrivingmetropolitan zone of international investment.66 The sprawling MuslimUyghur lands encompass the western rim of China and hold incalculablemineral reserves, to say nothing of serving as a buffer between China andRussia.67 To pursue Charter 08s proposed federation of democratic com-munities, its imagined peeling away of these valued holdings in the nameoflocal governance and cultural autonomy, therefore would amount to theend of Great China ambitions. It takes little imagination to fgure that noChinese political offcial would willingly preside overnor would mostChinese citizens supportthe dissolution of the nations current holdings.The Peoples Daily thus lambasted Liu as a traitor, noting that chief amonghis crimes was his hope to separate China into distinct regions.68 AnotherParty outlet noted that if Lius argument was taken seriously, then thewhole country would fall apart.69 Yet another source warned that ifChinese people do act according to his [Lius] desire, the country will surelysuffer from wars and conflicts.70

Charter 08s 18th demand is therefore rhetorically inept: it asks toomuch, it cannot help but fail while demonstrating that its authors have littleinterest in the governing dilemmas of realpolitik or the national ambitionsof their Chinese neighbors. As Theodore Windt observed of the diatribe asa genre, its major weakness is not nihilism but romanticism.71 In thissense, Charter 08s 18th charge fails not because of its boldness but becauseit reveals its authors naivety, their romantic hope that Western-style no-tions of democracy and cultural autonomy could be marshaled againstAsias most powerful empire and a population immersed in what Liu once


called bellicose patriotism.72While the CCP charged treason, it is impor-tant to note that this call for loosening the bonds of control over Chinasfringe regions echoes the positions of expatriate activists working on behalfof Tibet and Xinjiang.73 In an age of globalization, Charter 08s romanticappeals resound in the salons of cosmopolitan internationalists and thefar-flung Chinese diaspora even while falling upon deaf ears at home.

The charge of naivety is particularly relevant regarding the documents19th claim, the What We Advocate section, wherein the authors proposeTruth in Reconciliation (TRC). Following an international wave of TRCwork, Liu and his coauthors call for reparations to all those who sufferedpolitical stigma during the long nightmare of Maos rule.74 While thissounds like a noble idea, to undertake such a venturewould touch hundredsof millions of lives, affecting almost every family in China. In The Vagrants,her chilling depiction of betrayal and brutality during the Democracy Wallcrackdown of 1979, the expatriate Chinese novelist Yiyun Li chronicles howevents in 1979 were colored by wounds inflicted during the Cultural Revo-lution. Speaking in an allegorical tone, wherein the Cultural Revolution andDemocracy Wall crackdown seem to melt into one ongoing tragedy, Lirecalls that in those dark days it seemed that being human was suffcientreason for humiliation. Everyone was implicated in some way, either asvictim, perpetrator, snitch, or witness; as one of Lis characters warns, youcould be the butcher one day, but the next day you will be the meat on thecutting board.75 Asking for reparations for Mao-era atrocities thereforewould be destabilizing, for pursuing reparations claimswould openwoundstoo deep, family histories too tangled, and a Pandoras box of ethical andeconomic dilemmas.

The authors of Charter 08 hope to avoid this danger by implementing aTruth Investigation Commission empowered to study past injusticesand atrocities, yet it is worth asking if the horrors of Maos wave-upon-wave of mass killings and mass imprisonments are too vast to unearth andtoo damaging to integrate into a post-Communist government.76 As EvanOsnos notes, speaking of those Chinese who dare contemplate the damageofMaos reign, thememory of their societys dark potential still throbs likea phantom limb.77 The causes of that throbbing are slowly being addressedby a new generation of critics, and a savvier government would carefullysupport such memory work, yet it is clear that such investigative bodiesmust be handled delicately and require an immense amount of trust in the


judiciary, which presently does not exist in China.78 Moreover, as PriscillaHayner notes in Unspeakable Truths, her history of 21 TRCs, while mostinternational observers support such projects in the name of creating abetter future by excavating truths about horrible pasts, there are certainsituationsshe cites postwar Mozambique and Cambodiawhere the linebetween perpetrators and victims is so blurred, the shades of guilt so fuzzy,that digging into the details of past conflicts can be dangerous and desta-bilizing.79What if China is such a place? AsMichael Dutton, Hsiu-ju StacyLo, and Dong Dong Wu have noted, contemporary China seems obsessedwith a history of humiliation and weakness. It takes a remarkable leap offaith to imagine how unearthing the macabre details of what they call thegreat politically unspeakable moment will help a new generation of Chi-nese citizens towork past their humiliation to construct a newnation.80 Insum, for the authors of Charter 08 to assert such reconciliation demandsto a recalcitrant Party and a complacent citizenry indicates a strong sense ofhubris: the authors appear less interested in working toward what is politi-cally possible than in unleashing prophetic visions. Thinking rhetorically,the 18th and 19th claims are counterproductive for a domestic audience,albeit falling squarely within international trends.

Charter 08 concludes with two rousing paragraphs wherein the authorsrepeat the claim that the democratization of Chinese politics can be put offno longer before noting that we stand today as the only country among themajor nations that remains mired in authoritarian politics. And so, tobegin the process of correcting this great wrong, we dare to put civic spiritinto practice by announcing Charter 08, which, if followed, could helpbring a brilliant new chapter to Chinese civilization.81 What the Partyfears, and what the authors of Charter 08 apparently do not see as worri-some, is the threat that such sweeping political changes could leadasvirtually every political transformation in China in the past 2,000 yearshasto the abyss of chaos. In January 2009, when Charter 08 was stillcirculating on the web in China (it was shortly thereafter banned), TangXiaozhao, a woman from Shanghai, was quoted as saying that although sheknew signing the document could lead to repercussions, she did so anyway,for I am not afraid anymore.82 Yet the Party appears afraid, very afraid. Infact, the CCP is so committed to preventing the democracy-causing-chaosscenario that it nowdoles out 514 billion renminbi (RMB) per year (roughly$80.3 billion) on stability maintenance, the internal policingmechanisms


that enforce the Partys dictatorship. Perry Link reports that this allocationfor domestic surveillance and repression is more than the governmentspends on health, education, or social welfare, and is second only . . . tothe military.83 The secret police are so well-funded and so omnipresentthat the exiled authors of Nine Commentaries on the Communist Partyassert that everyone lives in the shadow of terror and chokes upon theblack cloud of oppression.84While that claimmay be overblown, AnChennotes that the slogan social stability is above all reflects a ubiquitous anddeeply held belief; as we will see in the conclusion, harmony is a dominanttrope in China.85 Tang Xiaozhao may claim that she is not afraid any-more, but the CCP and most Chinese citizens clearly arewhich puts theburden on the authors of Charter 08 to seek a rhetorical strategy that coulddiminish rather than escalate anxiety. This they did not do.

While itmay be edifying to invoke canonicalWestern declarations aboutuniversal human rights and democracy in the face of theCCPs tyranny, thisanalysis demonstrates that shaming the Party, calling for dismantling theEmpire, and trying to pry open old wounds better left alonecalled for viadiatribes and prophetic rhetoric, and issued froman organizationwithColdWar tiesare not likely to persuade either Party offcials or quiescentneighbors to take the activists proposals seriously. As Andrew Kirkpatricksuggests, these rhetorical strategies are guaranteed to enrage Chinese lead-ership, for, as one of his Chinese colleagues commented to him, theyconvey the impression of being full of the scent of gunpowder.86 Still,while Charter 08 failed to change the thinking of a nation predisposed toprivilege stability and harmony above all else, the document was highlysuccessful in motivating global audiences who already believed that thePartys lock on power must end.

LIU'S NOBEL PRIZE, DISSIDENT SUPPORT, AND THE PROBLEM OFREPRESENTATIVITY

While Liu was imprisoned in China, while Charter 08 was erased from allChinese websites, and while both Liu and Charter 08 remained largelyunknown inmainlandChina, the international community respondedwithan outpouring of adoration, capped by the October 2010 announcementthat Liu hadwon theNobel Peace Prize. Londons Financial Times capturedthe tenor of themomentwhen it hailed the award as a ftting career capstone


for this martyr for democracy.87 The CCP respondedwith controlled furyand, in a futile attempt to quash interest in theNobel, denied Liu the right totravel to Oslo to receive his award. To put this gesture in perspective,consider that when the Soviet Unions Andrei Sakharov won the prize in1975, his wife accepted the award for the imprisoned activist. This sameprocedure was used in 1983, when Polands Lech Walesa was preventedfrom attending the ceremony, and in 1991, when the son of Burmas DawAung San Suu Kyi accepted her award while she was imprisoned by themilitary junta. In refusing to allow the imprisoned Liu Xiaobo, or his wife,Liu Xiawho was then under house arrest in Beijingto accept the awardinOslo, the CCP replicated an empty chair embarrassment not seen since1936, when the German peace advocate, Carl von Ossietzky, was locked upin a Nazi prison and no one accepted his prize, which was placed in anempty chair.88 As the New York Times editorialized, making such a com-parison between Nazi Germany and contemporary China is chillingandshould shame Beijing.89 Still, while the moment became an internationalblack-eye for the CCP, no one could blame them for remembering thatSakharovs and Walesas awards were precursors to the dissolution ofembattled Communist regimes.

And so, with Sakharov and Walesa as their worst-case scenarios, andwith the Nobel serving as a synecdoche for the universalistand allegedlycolonialistversion of human rights, the CCP launched an extraordinaryand unprecedented campaign against the Nobel Peace Prize, both attack-ing its legitimacy and pressuring other nations to boycott the award cere-mony.90 That strategy succeeded in lining up eighteen states: Pakistan, Iran,Sudan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Colombia, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Iraq,Vietnam, Afghanistan, Venezuela, the Philippines, Egypt, Ukraine, Cuba,and Morocco, amounting to a roll-call of the worlds least democratic andmost troubled regimes and the Philippines, a young democracy with inti-mate trade relations with China.91 It is hard to imagine how assembling thisalliance of oppressive regimes, narco- and oil-fefdoms, failing states, anddependent market partners could alter the CCPs international reputationas a human rights violator. In fact, the German newspaperWelt am Sonntagargued that by assembling such an illustrious club of dictators and auto-crats, China had become the center of a worldwide, anti-democraticalliance.92 For thosewho think in terms of globalization, the signifcance ofthe moment was clear: whereas discussions tend to focus on the West/


center attempting to force neoliberal capitalism and weak versions ofdemocracy onto developing/peripheral states, herewasChina building analternative form of globalization by supporting state-controlled marketsand one-party rule in what Stefan Halper calls the most brutal and back-ward regimes in the world.93 As the South China Morning Post (publishedin Hong Kong) warned, such CCP-style globalization amounts to an at-tempt to muzzle the whole world.94

Hoping to counter such claims, the CCP devised its own award, theConfucius Peace Prize, which was given to Lien Chan, the former vicepresident of Taiwan and once a strong voice for the reunifcation of TaiwanwithChina. TheTaiwanesewinner, described by theNewZealandHerald asa Beijing stooge, announced, however, that he had never heard of theprize, did not showup for the award ceremony inBeijing, andhence helpedto turn the frst Confucius Peace Prize ceremony into what Londons DailyTelegraph described as a near farce.95 Not since the Tiananmen incidentof 1989 had the CCPs international reputation sunk so low. Precisely as LiuXiaobo had planned, his writings and actions, coupled with the Partyscrackdown, had captured a sympathetic global audience and were puttingthe regime and its courts on the moral defensive.96

Internally, however, the CCP blocked such unflattering internationalnews and initiated a blistering campaign against Liu Xiaobo and hissupporters. For example, the ultra-nationalist China Tibet Online siteargued that the Nobel Committees decision was unthinkable andridiculous, and called the 1989 winner, the Dalai Lama, a Tibetan slavemaster involved in armed rebellion. By celebrating insurgent fguressuch as Liu and the Dalai Lama, this site argued, the Nobel Peace Prizeillustrates the scheme of western powers to trigger unrest and chaosin China.97 The Peoples Daily echoed these themes, dubbing Liu acriminal convicted of agitation aimed at subverting Chinas govern-ment; this same source alleged that the Nobel Committees decisionwas aimed at humiliating China.98 The Party also used the occasion torewrite history, arguing in China Tibet Online that Liu stands in a longline of dupes, including those hooligans who were supported bysome western forces to trigger the turbulence that befell Beijing in1989.99 Thus playing upon the long-standing tropes of humiliation-at-the-hands-of-meddling-Westerners, democratic-advocacy-equals-rebellion, andTibet-must-be-saved-from-itself-by-China, these party-controlled media


outlets countered the discourse of globalizing human rights and advanc-ing democracy by marshaling fears about Chinas allegedly threatenednational honor.100 The CCP was so worried that democracy-supportingChinese would celebrate Lius award, the London Guardian reported,that in the days surrounding the Nobel award ceremony, the policeordered bars, restaurants, and cafes in Beijing to turn down reserva-tions from parties of more than six people.101 The Partys alternativeglobalization alliance and aggressive media strategy were thus coupledwith enhanced local repression.

Still, the CanadianGlobe andMail reported that the CCPs informationembargo hadnt been completely successful, as web-savvy netizens foundways to learn of and speak about Liu Xiaobos award. Students at ZhongnanUniversity, in Hunan province, even displayed a banner on their campuscelebrating the event.102 The students and web-surfers were not alone, astheHongKong-based ChinaMedia Project released a translation of a letter,dated October 11, 2010, wherein 23 CCP reformers petitioned the StandingCommittee of the National Peoples Congress for free speech. Written by acommittee led by Maos former secretary, Li Rui, and the former editor ofthe Peoples Daily, Hu Jiwei, the letter calls the CCPs political repression ascandalous mark. The letter writers base their arguments on Article 35 ofChinas Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of speech, press, andassembly. Li and Hu charged the CCPs censors with violating the Consti-tution and functioning as invisible black hands who censor not onlyactivists but PremierWen Jiabao, whose recent speeches supporting reformhave been blacked-out inChina.103 This letter demonstrates that Liu andhisallies enjoyed some internal support: even some of the Partys elite fguresbacked themove towardmore free speech and enhanced political freedoms.Nonetheless, the BBC reported that as soon as October 13, 2010, two daysafter its release, the Partys censors had already deleted the letter fromChinese websitesthe Party reformers call for an end to censorship wasbeing censored.104

And so, while the world watched in fascination as the CCP blunderedinto what Canadas National Post called a horrible embarrassment, theNobel award ceremony was galvanizing theWest, as the AustralianDailyTelegraph argued.105 More importantly, the ceremony became a rallyingoccasion for what the South China Morning Post called an unprecedentedreunion of overseas Chinese dissidents, as more than forty exiled activists


came together in Oslo, amounting to the largest gathering of such fguressince the Tiananmen protests.106 Back in China, with Liu imprisoned andthe Party reformers censored, the Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, often calledGrandpa Wen because of his gentle demeanor, took the unprecedentedstep of appearing at the National Petition Bureaua contested space thatleads as often to arrest as to the government hearing a citizens petitiontoannounce that the CCP should serve the interest of the people.107 ForChinese dissidents and international supporters of Liu and Charter 08, itwas hard not to see Wens act as a rebuke to Party hardliners and as tacitacknowledgment that the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize was not in error. Indeed,for optimists, it appeared that democracy was bubbling up, history was onthe march, change was in the air: led by Lius bravery and the Partysham-handed responses, the dream of globalization as an unstoppable waveof universal human rights and democratic governance was being fulflled.

In fact, following Lius initial conviction in 2009, and then again follow-ing his receiving the Nobel in 2010, Chinas dissidents rallied to the cause,launching a series of statements, interviews, andat least in the Westrallies on his behalf. These actions were marked, however, by the sameconfusing rhetorical dynamics outlined above, wherein Chinese dissidentsinvokeWestern texts, fgures, and traditions in an effort to shame the Party.For an example of this strategy, consider the opening of the One WorldHuman Rights Film Festival, held in Prague, Czech Republic, onMarch 11,2009. The prestigious Homo Homini Award was being given that night byVclav Havel to the then-disappeared Liu Xiaobo, with the award beingaccepted in Lius absence by his fellow Charter 08 signer (and perhapscoauthor) Professor Xu Youyu, the noted philosopher, witness to the mas-sacre at Tiananmen, and long-time advocate for reform. In his speech thatnight, Xu argued that Charter 08 is not a subversive manifesto. What wecall for and what we demand, Xu said, is nothing but compliance with theexisting obligations. No call for revolution and chaos,Charter 08 is insteadintended to achieve reconciliation and consensus.108 This nod to existingobligations indicates that the supporters of Charter 08 seek not to topplethe state but to help it honor its own foundational texts, which promise toprotect free speech and other modes of engaged citizenship. Speaking laterthat summer, Xu said that he and his allies were calling for peacefulevolution, not radical revolution.109 Hoping to speed that peaceful processof evolution, Xu said in Prague that Charter 08 strives to instill an active


civic perspective, [an] ethos of citizenship, and joint civic responsibility forpublic affairs. Perhaps recognizing that the greatest impediment to democ-racy is the Partys habitual insecurity and its production of a cowed andcompliant citizenry, Xu begged his listeners to realize that we must notbecome resigned to living in fear and indifference.110 At this point in Xustalk, it appeared that he was framing Charter 08 as a peaceful call forprudential humanism, creating a space where the Partymight consider itsauthors suggestions, for the speechwas bathed in a tone of hope, possibility,and reconciliation. This is the frm-but-moderate (as compared to revolu-tionary or prophetic) position favored by many cosmopolitan intellectuals,as indicated in one London Financial Times editorial, where Englandscaptains of industry note that Liu and Xu and others have not sought toinstigate subversion but to encourage China to serve its people by grant-ing the rights . . . Chinas own constitution formally guarantees.111

Talk of moderation is often complicated, however, by the hard rhetoricof Chinas dissidents. For example, toward the close of Xus speech inPrague, after establishing a tone of reconciliation and gradualism, heswitched gears and, almost by habit, as if he could not help himself, un-corked this diatribe: Stalinism has not yet died of decrepitude, and tries toprolong its lifewith the help of [the]market economy, receiving infusions offresh blood capital from the whole world. In the new combination ofcircumstances they have given birth to a monster.112 Xus speech thusveered from prudently supporting Charter 08s hopeful intentions into aname-calling tirade complete with references to blood capital and mon-sters. And so the Partys institutionalized tyranny crashed into the dissi-dents long-simmering hatred, leaving both sides trapped in a rhetoricalimpasse. The result, as everyone knows, would be more arrests.

In fact, in December 2009, a group of 164 Charter 08 signers issued apress release challenging the Party to arrest them. Their statement begins byechoing the threat that lurks within Charter 08: serious injustice will bringabout social conflicts. Still, while threatening rebellion, the authors asserttheir loyalty to the state by claiming that in signing Charter 08 they did nomore than perform our civic responsibility in accordance with the rightsaffrmed by the Constitution. Moreover, like Xu, they argue that Charter08s demands have never been considered to be contrary to any of theexisting laws and regulations. Such prudence is soon overwhelmed by asense of antagonism, however, as the authors assert that the indictment of


Mr. Liu Xiaobo puts each of us on trial; if Mr. Liu Xiaobo is convicted, it isequivalent to condemn[ing] every one of us as being guilty. We have nochoice but to bear punishment with Liu Xiaobo.113 These 164 signers ofCharter 08 invite the CCP to arrest them as well. It is hard to read the letterwithout marveling at its authors courage, yet also diffcult not to questiontheir misplaced heroism. Under Maos leadership, the Party presided overthe death of asmany as 70million Chinese; in 1989, DengXiaoping orderedthe PLA to slaughter unarmed civiliansdoes anyone think the Party willhesitate to add another 164 victims to that roll call of shame? And doesanyone believe that the majority of Chinas citizens, who are poor andruraland who will never read this letter, do not have access to Charter 08,and know little if anything of these debateswill mourn the arrest of theseurban and wired advocates? Just in the past few years, the Party has lockedaway such noted activists as Huang Qi, Tan Zuoren, Xue Feng, Xu Zerong,Jin Haike, Xu Wei, and Zheng Yichun, to say nothing of Liu Xiaobo andcountless othersvery fewChinese will blink (or even know) if another 164Charter 08 signers are added to that list.114

This brings us to the heart of thematter: Chinas pro-democracy activistshave more traction in the West than in their homeland. Following LiuXiaobos disappearance, but before his trial and conviction were an-nounced, Human Rights in China published an interview with ProfessorDing Zilin. One of Chinas leading voices for openness and a signatory toCharter 08, Ding is one of the founders of the Tiananmen Mothers group,which is dedicated to uncovering the truth about the 1989 massacre, inwhichDings son, Jiang Jielian, wasmurdered. Because of her bravery, Dinghas suffered 20 years of repression and was nominated for the Nobel PeacePrize in 2003. Asked about her activism, Ding said we want them [theParty] to reckon with the will of the people, to know that the will of thepeople cannot be cowed.115With the ban on all forms of civic engagement,however, and in the face of the repression of anything that even smells likedissent, it is almost impossible to know thewill of the people. For example,Dings interviewers, representing the group Human Rights in China, arebased in Hong Kong and New York City, but are banned in mainlandChina; wired cosmopolitans who live in democracies can check those web-sites daily, but Dings neighbors in Beijing cannot. When Ding claims thatthe signers of Charter 08 stand as Chinas conscience, supporters of auniversalist version of human rights want to believe her, yet we must


remember that most Chinese citizens have never heard of Charter 08 orHumanRights inChina. Indeed, by creating a culture devoid of any politicaldebate, neither the Partys nor its opponents claims to speak for the peoplecan gain any traction; this is what Marina Svensson calls Chinas problemof representativity, for who knows where the masses allegiances lie?116 AsChinese media historian Zhao Yan has observed, once Mao seized power,the news media nationwide degenerated into a lie-manufacturing ma-chine.117 There can therefore be no public opinion in China, just thePartys unilateral messaging and its citizens hushed musings.

The exiled authors of Nine Commentaries go so far as to claim thatbecause ofMaos reign of terror, producing lies, tolerating lies, and relyingon lies became Chinese peoples lifestyle.118 Working within this vacuumof informed discourse, where democracy is criminalized and the Partyslies blanket the land, activists like Liu, Xu, and Ding may be the heroicconscience of their neighbors or they may be deluded foolsin theabsence of any public deliberation, it is impossible to know. In Atop aVolcano, a 2005 article attacking the Partys rule, Liu Xiaobo depicts Chinaas a nation about to burst at the seams, with protests of various size andferocity occurring at a rate of approximately 160 disturbances per day.119

Still, it is hard to know if these local events have any national pull, any largerpolitical agenda, for Liu, Xu, Ding, and the dissidents noted here act in avoid created by the Partys repression, where roiling markets have createdmuch public space but no public. Rather, as we shall see in the conclusion,the Party has partnered with the interests of global capital to create a worldwhere agency is expressed as compliant consumerism, not as engagedcitizenship.

This alliance between global capital and local dictators has long been oneof Lius chief concerns. In fact, before publishingCharter 08, Liuwas knownin China as one of the leading critics of Chinas manic swerve from com-munism to capitalism; he was no fan of the former, but he feared how thelatter offered his neighbors the Faustian bargain of giving up their hopes fordemocracy in return for access to a newworld of cheap baubles and alluringtrinkets. In 2006, Liu pointed to the doomsday picture of dictatorialpolitics, framing his critique in apocalyptic terms. The Party, Liu trumpets,has sought to buy off the people with the promise of a comfortable life,producing a nation whose soul is rotten to the core. Here is the titanicsmirk of the diatribe mixed with the prophets habit of foretelling a coming


catastropheit makes for blistering rhetoric. Writing in a full lather, Liuthunders that in contemporary China not a single penny is clean, not asingle word is honest.120 The charge surely appeals to those already con-vinced of the Partys faultsit feels good to be so indignantyet it is hard toimagine fruitful dialogue following such totalizing assertions.121

Indeed, a prudent critic could counter that Lius accusations go too far,are too sweeping, and are unfair to the hundreds ofmillions of Chinese whowork hard, love their country, and seek nothing more than the rest of us: toraise our families, work with dignity, and live in peace. Because Lius proseis so sharp and biting, he eschews this simple fact, letting his anger lead tosentences that are neither considered nor careful. Xing Lu, a Chinese-American scholar who experienced the terror of the Cultural Revolution asa child, warns that such blistering language tends to reproduce violence. Sheworries that as the children ofMao learned from him to speak in dogmaticand radical tones, so Lius generation of activists have inherited this sametendency of talking hard, thus creating a vicious cycle of escalating rhetor-ical aggression and violence.122 For further evidence of how Liu falls intothis trap, consider one of his 2007 essays, in which he spewed denunciationsagainst a Party that is not only incompetent but hopelessly inept.Because theCCP is, as Xunoted,monstrous, and as Liu argues, both corruptand inept, then it makes sense to allege that the authoritarian system willnever learn to respect life and protect human rights.123 If this is so, if theParty is irredeemable, then the only answer is revolution.

This dangerous conclusion conflicts with the tenor of one of Lius mostimportant works, his 1994 essay, That Holy Word, Revolution, whereinhe argues against perpetuating the heroic mythology and righteous indig-nation that drive calls for violent uprisings. Liu writes here in a commem-orative and introspective mode, for he is looking back upon the events inTiananmen Square, about which he carries a heavy load of doubt regardingthe actions of both the government and the protesters. Much like themurderous Red Guard before them, Liu observes that the students whooccupied Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989 had been driven madby revolution, that foundational trope ofMaoism that taught generationsof Chinese to carry an exaggerated righteousness into their politicaldealings. As Liu describes them, even those students hoping to endMaoismand turn toward democracy actedwith the fury andobsessional drive taughtto them by Maothey were anti-Maoists acting in the worst tradition of


Maoism. Looking back upon that fateful summer, Liu warns that if there isto be revolution, theremust be hatred, and where there is hatred, one fndsa radical justice that shows no forgiveness. This is the path of war, ofbloodshed, of Cultural Revolutions. Instead, Liu steps back from the brinkto call for patience: bringing democracy to China must be gradual, peace-ful, and long term, he counsels, andwill depend on both the goodwill of thepeople and the self-reform of the Communist Party. In fact, Liu realizesthat in todays China, the least costly way to democratization andmodern-ization is self-reform of the Communist Party. And so Liu offers thefollowing goals:

All that needs to be done is to privately compensate the kin of June Fourthvictims; release all June Fourth political prisoners; restore to their formerpositions those who, because of June Fourth, were unfairly treated; graduallyremove anddemote thosewho rose to power on the bloodof June Fourth; andallow those who fled overseas because of June Fourth to safely return.124

This is a remarkable passage, for while these calls to action parallel thecontent of Charter 08, they are framed in an entirely different tone, ashappening privately and gradually, as part of a slow transitional processmeant to democratize without chaos, and hence to sustain Chinas rise togreatness while win[ning] the hearts of the people.125 Eschewing pro-phetic righteousness and angry diatribes, Liu offers the CCP a face-savingroute toward democracy. As Lius predecessor Wei Jingsheng argued in a1991 letter to Jiang Zemin, reform seems more desirable because it is lessdestructive than the violent revolution that frst Wei and now Liu imply islikely to engulf China if it does not democratize.126 What makes Lius essayso powerful is that its familiar threat is couched not in anger but in wisdom:change will come to China, Liu argues, but only a fool would hope it comesin the form of a bloodbath.

Lius major rhetorical artifacts therefore present us with three distinctand contradictorymodels. Option one, as outlined in the prophetic tones ofCharter 08, is to pursue democratic change in China by absorbing thelessons of Western-style and especially U.S.-style democracy and a univer-salist version of human rights. This is not happening. Option two, asoutlined in Lius earlier diatribes, is to overthrow an irredeemably corruptParty via revolution. This is not happening.Option three, as hinted at above,


is to go slow, to open up Chinese society from within, with the Partycontrolling the pace of transformation. The key question is whether this ishappening, as the Party claims, or whether it is not happening, as dissidentsclaim. For democracy supporters both in China and exiled abroad, any talk ofParty-led gradualism is a charade. In fact, the enraged authors of Nine Com-mentaries go so far as to claim that because of 60 years of Communist rule anda generation of frenzied wealth creation, the Chinese people have lost theirhumanity.127 If this is so, if the Party is unmovable and the nation has lost itshumanity, then domestic persuasion and Party-led reform are impossible.

Approaching this bleak conclusion may explain why Liu has courteddanger so relentlessly: he sees no alternative. As he wrote from Beijing onDecember 29, 2009, while languishing in a prison cell, I have long beenaware that when an independent intellectual stands up to an autocraticstate, step one toward freedom is often a step into prison. Now I am takingthat step; and true freedom is that much nearer.128 In short, pursuinginternational stardom via imprisonment is the course of last resort. If wordscannot do their job in the face of the Partys dictatorship and his neighborswell-learned complicity, then Lius only choice (so he seems to believe) is toput his body on the line, to draw global attention to the plight of Chinesedissidents by willing himself into martyrdom. Liu has thus moved from therealmof rhetorical persuasion to the symbolic theater of sacrifce. Seen fromthis perspective, Lius strategy amounts to an attempt to perform his will-ingnesslike Martin Luther King Jr. and the Dalai Lama before himtospeak hard even if death will surely follow. As Darsey reminds us, martyr-dom is a perfectly reasonable presentation of the claims of sacred commis-sion.129 Given the apparent lack of any mass public support for thedissidents, martyrdom might also, in Lius case, amount to a reasonablepolitical calculation: better to die as an imprisoned prophet than to live as afree coward. It is a desperate bargain, for as Liu noted in a 2000 letter,pursuing this version of heroism means foregoing the simple pleasures ofdaily life to dance with lost souls.130

Such heroic actions take one perilously close to a self-aggrandizinggrandeur that violates the ritual propriety undergirding Confucianism,wherein, as George Q. Xu argues, loyalty to the nation is the foundationof all values.131 In this sense, Lius embodiment of cherished Westernvalues about heroism and innovation may be seen as a liability, for suchbehaviorthe hallmark of Chinese New Enlightenment thinkingtreads


hard on the expectation of compliance to authority, which Ling Chenclaims is the foundation of moral conduct in the traditional thinking ofChinas Confucian culture.132 Randy Kluver reminds us that piety, loyalty,and submission to authorities stand among the key traits of Confucianism,meaning that Lius brash appeals to globalizing human rights can feel tosome traditionalists like a form of cultural heresy.133 At the least, LiuXiaobos relentless presence on international websites raises the question ofwhat Richard B. Gregg famously called the ego function of protest move-ments.134 In fact, Liu argued in an editorial in the London Times that theinternet has the extraordinary ability to create stars and truth-speakingheroes.135 Whether driven by ego or a selfless commitment to Chinasbettermentor bothLiu has certainly sought to become a star by ful-flling the prophetic narrative conventions established by King, Gandhi, theDalai Lama, Havel, and other truth-speaking heroes. As Rya Butterfeldhas shown, the CCP has long-tried to produce Model Worker heroes,compliant proletarian icons meant to exemplify the spirit of the party.136

Lius strategy turns that cultural model on its head, replacing manual laborwith intellectual labor, Party-fawning nationalism with Party-bashing in-ternationalism, and life-affrming good cheer with self-sacrifcing martyr-dom.The irony of the situation is that Lius construction of this anti-ModelWorker persona was only possible with the Partys ham-handed support,for the character Liu sought to buildtheWestern-style critic, imprisonedprophet,NewEnlightenment spokesman, and anti-Confucian truth-speakingheroneeded to be imprisoned.

CONCLUSION: ON HARMONY, BEING HARMONIZED, AND ARTFULDISSENT

While Liu fulflled this heroic narrative, the globalmarket collapsed, leavingthe reeling United States to turn to China, for the frst time, as a supplicantin need of loans, investments, and retail opportunities. Thus, despite all thebluster of the debates of 2010, by the time Chinas President Hu JintaovisitedWashington, D.C. in January 2011, the New York Times announcedthat U.S. Shifts Focus to Press Chinese to OpenMarkets.137 Sure enough,by the end of PresidentHus visit, U.S. PresidentObamawas celebrating the$45 billion-worth of trade agreements signed during theirmeetings, includ-ing deals that amount to bonanzas for Boeing, General Electric, Cummins


Engine, and Honeywell.138 Chinas Peoples Daily, which had spent theprevious year fulminating aboutWestern Imperialism, U.S. arrogance, andthe absurdity of human rights, suddenly found a happier tone, announcinga new chapter of cooperation based upon mutual respect. The only hintat the controversies addressed in this essay in the Chinese media was whenthe Peoples Daily cautioned that Beijing and Washington should hold ontight to their new consensus by protect[ing] their relationship fromnegative influence by accidental and sporadic events.139 Some Americanjournalists did their best to prevent the White House press conference ofJanuary 19, 2011 from descending into banal platitudes, but their questionsabout contested human rights were met with boilerplate answers from the2009Nobel Peace Prizewinnerwho,when pressed about the fate of the 2010winner, said China has a different political system than we do. . . . Wecome from very different cultures. . . . We can engage and discuss theseissues.140 The message was clear: containing North Korea, handling Iran,monitoring Sudan, andmaking proftswould take the lead,while expandinghuman rights and democratic reforms would have to wait.

What the CCP hailed as President Hus message of harmony wastherefore based upon an agreed silence: the United States could enjoyimproved trade and military relations with China only by remainingmum on human rights issues.141 This conditional version of interna-tional harmony echoes an ironic version of that term used by Chinasdemocracy activists, who joke about being harmonized, meaning dis-appeared, arrested, or otherwise coerced into compliance with theCCP.142 And so, like Chinas dissidentswhose hard work was dis-missed in the Peoples Daily as accidental and sporadic eventsPresident Obama has now been harmonized in the name of bringing jobsto American voters and profts to American boardrooms. While extrem-ists on both sides of the U.S. political spectrum hailed this news asevidence of the presidents weakness (for the Right, he caved to Com-munists; for the Left, he caved to neoliberal capitalism), realists couldnot blame President Obama for trying to make the best of a bad hand.143

For as I have shown here, the tensions between U.S.-style neoliberalismand CCP-style totalitarian capitalism, and between those who supportuniversalist or particularist versions of human rights, have led to, andwill continue to produce, some awkward but necessary compromises.


By way of conclusion, I will review the lessons learned from this casestudy, which may provide useful suggestions for working through thetensions and compromises noted above. To do so, I return frst to thequestion of human rights in an age of globalization, where it appears thatboth the universalist and particularist camps are worthy but flawed startingpoints. We have seen how the CCP bashes human rights as little more thancover forWestern imperialism, but it should be noted that the Partys fear ofthe UDHR is based in part on a misunderstanding of its genesis, which infact included signifcant input from numerous developing nations. As Su-sanWaltz has shown, the document is not Western but global.144 In fact,scholars have studied the debates leading to the formation of theUDHR andconcluded that Chinas representative at the founding meetings played acrucial role in ensuring that the Confucian tradition was inscribed in theopening article of the UDHR.145 Moreover, Tu Weiming reminds us thatthe round of meetings leading up to the World Conference on HumanRights, a June 1993 gathering meant to breathe new life into the UDHR,included gatherings in Tunis, San Jos, and Bangkok, thus enabling theparticipation of developing nations representing a wide range of religious,ethnic, and cultural heritages.146 In sum, and precisely as Liu and his alliesargue, the charge that human rights are a form of Western culturalimperialism falls apart under historical scrutiny.

At the same time, we also have seen that the CCP and its allies are notwrong when they assert that the universalists in general and advocates ofChinese New Enlightenment thinking in particular bear a crippling blindspot regarding the shortcomings of contemporary human rights. Because oftheir focus on securing legal individual rights, Henry Rosemont Jr. asserts,such norms have served to obscure the wrongness of the radical mal-distribution of the worlds wealth, leading to a Hobbesian world marked,so Tu Weiming argues, by run-away acquisitive individualism, viciouscompetitiveness, pernicious relativism, and excessive litigiousness.147 Asthe CCP charges, and as the situation in many developing nations proves,more rights does not necessarily mean more justice.

Rather than wielding antagonistic generalizations about universalist andparticularist versions of human rights, and allegedly Western versusautonomous notions of cultural norms,my rhetorical analysis ofCharter 08suggests one possible route for constructing more fruitful dialogue: toforego totalizing arguments about the foundational groundings and legal


claims of human rights to instead discuss the specifc thin rights that theUnited States and China can agree upon. This would mean shifting theargument from philosophical and legal grounds to rhetorical and politicalgrounds, to ask what is possible in China today? For Liu and his support-ers, this shift in strategy wouldmean foregoing both prophetic rhetoric andblistering diatribes to instead think more seriously about the means ofdomestic rather than international persuasion, for no movement in Chinacan succeed without grassroots support. To be successful, this new rhetor-ical strategy would need to include at least these three components. First,explaining to Chinas population how Confucian values, contrary to recentParty efforts to turn Confucius into the philosopher of obedience, arelargely coterminous with theUDHR and other international documents.148

Second, rather than stoking fears of the turbulence many Chinese assumewill follow any rapid political transformation, the dissidents need to do abetter job of illustrating how their vision can unfold gradually and peace-fully. Third, the dissidents would be wise to consider their position vis-a`-visChinese nationalism, for no one is going to follow reformers whose vision iswidely seen as jeopardizing national unity and sovereignty, terms MartinJacques has called sacrosanct.149

For the Party and its supporters, the prudent rhetorical strategy sug-gested here would mean understanding that our age of globalization pre-cludes the kinds of national exceptionalism China likes to claim as itsdefense, for our networked interconnectivitymeans the Party can no longerrepress its citizens at home while trying to pursue a superpower positionabroad. As Rosemary Foot has argued, for China to make the transitionfrom its developing-country identity to its new great-power status, itwill need to start acting less like a fearful former colony and more like aproud force of progress.150 In short, the global outpouring of anger follow-ing the Partys imprisonment of Liu demonstrates that China is not likely toascend to it desired role of global leadership without wielding amore subtleversion of what Joseph Nye calls soft power.151 While the Party appearswilling to spend billions of dollars on spectacles like the Beijing Olympicsand the ShanghaiWorld Expo, my analysis of Charter 08 illustrates that theworlds NGOs, liberal governments, and democracy activists believe thatsuch soft power will only blossom once free speech and human rights areprotected and valued in China. As a frst step toward achieving these goals,


the CCP could make no more powerful a statement than releasing LiuXiaobo from prison.

While this frst set of lessons follows from my analysis of humanrights discourse in an age of globalization, the second goal of this essaywas to examine the possible modes of artful dissent within China. Thus,thinking rhetorically, I asked: if the CCP makes democracy a crime andcontrols the public sphere so completely that no critics are allowed to beheardthus creating the problem of representativitythen should weappraise the arguments of Liu Xiaobo and his Charter 08 colleagues asnoble gestures likely to bring about political change or suicidal invita-tions to further repression? Can prophecies and diatribes work in theChinese context? My rhetorical analysis of Charter 08 suggests that theparadoxical answer to this question is No for now but maybe Yes later.This ambiguous answer follows because we have little hard evidence forknowing when a state is about to undergo what Bruce Gilley calls ademocratic breakthrough, that moment when the old regime begins tocrumble and tabooed ideas suddenly look like answers. As the ArabSpring illustrates so powerfully, the democratic breakthrough has nofrm timeline. Still, Gilley is hopeful that such a moment is fast ap-proaching for China. When it arrives, he expects to see a moment ofbackward legality, forward legitimacy, whereby the new leaders lookbackward in history to draw upon the old states governing mechanismseven as they look forward in history to create a new regime based onmore democratic principles. Specifcally not revolutionary in the senseof hoping to avoid a blood bath, such a transitional interim regimemight be able to govern while also transforming society.152 If and whensuch a moment comes, Liu Xiaobos decades-long record of principledopposition and the courage of his Charter 08 coauthors will stand asstrong evidence that they should be among the central players. Somecritics of this notion will charge that it is utopian at best, or dangerous atworst, yet as we have seen in South Africa with Nelson Mandela, inPoland with Lech Walesa, in Czechoslovakia (and then the Czech Re-public) with Vclav Havel, in Myanmar with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,and with a number of leaders across the Arab Spring landscape, yester-days political prisoners and exiles may well become tomorrows leaders.Prophetic rhetoric that once felt too grand, and diatribes that once felttoo acerbic, may suddenly seem commonsensical.


While the frst set of suggestions points to modifed human rights dis-course in an age of globalization, and the second set speaks to the range ofoptions for producingmore artful arguments for democracy in China, I willclose this essay by reviewing the lessons learned in the third and, I believe,most important part of the essay. For in addressing the global outpouring ofsupport for Liu Xiaobo and Charter 08 alongside the Partys response, wesaw that arguments about human rights and democracy in an age of global-ization hinge in large part on questions of national narrativeswho speaksfor the heart and soul of the nation? Whose claims resonate not only asreasonable but as offering a sense of dignity and nobility? At the most basiclevel, this question may be broken down into two parallel sub-questions.First, is the Partys fear of democratization a prudent response to a fragilenation wracked for centuries by internal turmoil and foreignmeddling, or acynical excuse to linger in power? Second, do those advocates who demandimmediate reform based onWestern principles underestimate the possiblecomplexities of a transition toward democracy, or do they have their fngeron the subterranean pulse of Chinas vast democracy-hungry population?In sum, and thinking in terms of a national narrativea grand arc ofexplanation and justifcationthe third part of the essaywonderedwhetherChina should err on the side of preserving existing national arrangements inthe name of harmony and stability, or on the side of opening up toglobal pressure formore human rights and enhanced democratic practices?

The preliminary

liu xiaobo, charter 08, and the contested rhetorics of democracy and human rights in china

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