litigation updates glen stankee september, 2015. akerman | 2 seminole tribe of florida v. florida,...

Litigation Updates

Glen StankeeSeptember, 2015

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Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Case No. 14-14524 (11th Cir., August 26, 2015), aff’g in part, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1095 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

The State of Florida attempted to impose tax on rentals that a non-Indian lessee paid for space in the Tribe's on-reservation casino. The Tribe sued for declaratory and injunctive relief.

If the legal incidence of the Rental Tax rested with the Indian landlord, it would be categorically barred under McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995). However, the legal incidence of the Rental Tax rests with the non-Indian lessee.

The federal district court determined that the Rental Tax, as applied to leases of Indian land, is prohibited under 25 U.S.C. §465 and is preempted by federal law, including the surface leasing regulations, under White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980). The Eleventh Circuit agreed.

Rental Tax

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Rental Tax (Cont’d)Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Case No. 14-14524 (11th Cir., August 26, 2015), aff’g in part, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1095 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

25 U.S.C. §465 expressly prohibits state taxation of Indian land and certain interests in Indian Land. In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), the Court said that §465 prohibits state taxation of the "use" of Indian land, but not income derived from activities conducted on Indian land.

The district court held that a state tax on rentals is a tax on the "use" of Indian land, rather than a tax on income from activities conducted on Indian land. The Eleventh Circuit agreed, holding that the right to lease land is a fundamental privilege of ownership.

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Rental Tax (Cont’d)Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Case No. 14-14524 (11th Cir., August 26, 2015), aff’g in part, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1095 (S.D. Fla. 2014).• The Eleventh Circuit distinguished the Rental Tax from a tax

on activities conducted on the land and from a tax on tangible personal property, such as oil and gas, removed from the land.

• The state contended that, under Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. Thurston Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 724 F. 3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2013) and Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. Riverside County, 442 F. 2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), §465 does not apply to leasehold interests in Indian land.

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In Agua Caliente, §465 was not mentioned. The state construed the court’s silence as a holding that §465 does not apply to leasehold interests?

The Eleventh Circuit said Agua Caliente is not good law after Mescalero. Also, it is based on the presumption that every state tax on a non-Indian lessee is permissible in the absence of "legislation dealing with Indians and Indian lands [that] demonstrates a congressional purpose to forbid the imposition of it." 442 F. 2d at 1186. That has not been the law since 1980 when Bracker was decided.

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A new challenge to the California Possessory Interest Tax as applied to leasehold interests in Indian land has been launched. See, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Riverside County, California, Case No. ED CV 14-00007 JGB (C.D. Cal. 2014).

It is not clear whether §465 applies only to Indian tribes, or whether it attaches to, and "runs with", the Indian land so that non-Indians to whom the Tribe transfers interests can rely on it. In Chehalis, the Ninth Circuit held that §465 prohibited state taxation of a non-Indian lessee’s leasehold improvements on Indian land.


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Rental Tax (Cont’d) Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Case No. 14-14524 (11th Cir., August 26, 2015), aff’g in part, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1095 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

Federal Surface Leasing Regulations – Preemption

The holding that §465 prohibits the Rental Tax was dispositive of its validity. However, both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit went on to say that, even in §465 did not apply, the Rental Tax is preempted.

§162.017(c) expressly prohibits state taxation of leasehold or possessory interests in Indian land. The state claimed that the Secretary did not have the authority to issue regulations that preempt state law because Congress had not expressly granted that authority to him.

The general rule - that Congress must expressly grant the authority to preempt state law - has no application to on-reservation activities.

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The authority to issue regulations that preempt state law is implied whenever the federal regulation of the activity is pervasive and exclusive.

The issue is whether Congress intended to permit or prohibit state taxation in the particular circumstances. If that intent cannot be determined from the federal statutory scheme, it is determined under Bracker.

The surface leasing regulations were promulgated pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. Neither the district court nor the Eleventh Circuit appeared to believe that this affected the validity of the exemption.


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The district court relied on the Secretary’s declaration that federal law preempts state taxation of Indian leasing.

The Eleventh Circuit said that it was error for the district court to defer to the Secretary's determination that federal law preempted state tax. It said that the district court was required to independently conduct its own Bracker balancing test. The Eleventh Circuit then conducted its own Bracker balancing test and determined that state taxation of Indian leasing was preempted because the significant federal and tribal interests in Indian leasing outweigh the state's generalized interest in collecting tax revenues.

The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the federal regulation of Indian leasing is so pervasive and exclusive as to preclude any state tax burdens.


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Bracker

The purpose of the Bracker balancing test is to determine whether Congress intended to permit or prohibit state taxation in the particular circumstances when that intent cannot be inferred from the federal statutory scheme. Bracker requires a particularized analysis of the competing federal, state and tribal interests.

Where the state tax burdens an activity that is pervasively and exclusively regulated by federal law (i.e., "where the state has had nothing to do with the on-reservation activity, save tax it." Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186), Bracker holds that the state cannot justify the tax based on its generalized interest in collecting tax revenues. The tax must be “narrowly tailored” to compensate the state for services it provides in connection with the taxed activity to the persons that pay the tax.

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State taxes of general application that fund off-reservation services for state residents in general can never satisfy the “narrowly tailored” test.

State taxes subject to the “narrowly tailored” standard are rarely valid.

If the state tax burdens an activity, the federal regulation of which is not pervasive and exclusive (e.g. where it is shared with the state), it can be justified under a much more lenient standard. In those circumstances, the tax can be justified by the state's generalized interest in collecting tax revenues. The availability of off-reservation services that are available to tribal members and the negligible economic impact of the tax on the Tribe are all relevant factors.

State taxes not subject to the “narrowly tailored” standard are rarely invalid.


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The issue in this case is whether federal law prohibits the application of the California Possessory Interest Tax (“CPIT”) to lessees' possessory interests in Indian land.

This was the subject of Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. Riverside County, 442 F. 2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), and Fort Mojave Tribe v. San Bernandino County, 543 F. 2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976) where the CPIT was upheld.

The result might be different this time.

Possessory Interest TaxAgua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Riverside County, California, Case No. ED CV 14-00007 JGB (C.D. Cal. 2014).

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The Eleventh Circuit said that Agua Caliente and Fort Mojave are no longer good law.

They relied on U.S. v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958) which was decided at a time when the Supreme Court viewed a tax on the use of property as distinct from a tax on the property itself. That distinction was obliterated in Mescalero. The CPIT os probably barred by §465.

Agua Caliente and Fort Mojave rely on the proposition that a state tax is permissible in the absence of "legislation dealing with Indians and Indian lands [that] demonstrates a congressional purpose to forbid the imposition of it." 442 F. 2d at 1186. That congressional purpose has now been demonstrated in the surface leasing regulations. In any event, presumptions in favor of the validity of a state tax were eliminated in Bracker.

Possessory Interest Tax Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians sued Riverside County, California, Case No. ED CV 14-00007 JGB (C.D. Cal. 2014).

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Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Case No. 14-14524 (11th Cir., August 26, 2015), rev’g in part, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1095 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

The Utilities Tax is a tax on the utility services, including electricity. The state imposed the Utilities Tax on electricity delivered to the Tribe on the reservation.

The tax must be remitted to the state by the service provider for the privilege of engaging in the utility service business in the state. The service provider's obligation is limited to remitting the tax he has collected from the consumer.

The Florida statute permits the service provider to pass-through the Utilities Tax to the consumer by simply adding the tax to the bill. The statute does not require the service provider to add the tax to the bill, but no utility service provider has ever elected not to.

Utilities Tax

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A state tax on an on-reservation activity or transaction is categorically barred if the legal incidence of the tax rests with the Indian tribe. See, e.g., McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1973), and Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995).

The critical issue is whether the legal incidence of the Utilities Tax rests with the Tribe as the consumer or the service provider.

Florida law does not designate which party bears the legal incidence of the Utilities Tax.

Utilities Tax (Cont’d)

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Where the pass through of the tax to the consumer is mandatory, the legal incidence of the tax is shifted to the consumer as a matter of law. See, U.S. v. State Tax Comm'n of Miss., 421 U.S. 599, 607 (1975).

The district court held that the pass-through of the Utilities Tax as applied is mandatory because every payment that the service provider receives from a customer is deemed to include a proportionate share of the tax, regardless of whether the tax was included in the bill. The customer can not avoid paying the tax.


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The Supreme Court has held that the absence of mandatory pass through language does not mean that the legal incidence rests with the service provider. See, California Board of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 474 U.S. 9 (1985).

The correct inquiry is whether the state legislature intended that the tax be passed through to, and collected from, the consumer. That is clearly the case of the Utilities Tax.

Utilities Tax (Cont’d)Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Case No. 14-14524 (11th Cir., August 26, 2015), rev’g in part, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1095 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

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The Eleventh Circuit reversed after interpreting Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995), as holding that the legal incidence of the tax is shifted to the consumer only if the service provider is required to collect the tax from the consumer. Since the statute does not require the service provider to add the tax to the bill, it concluded that the legal incidence rested with the service provider.

Chickasaw Nation held that the state fuel tax was shifted from the fuel distributor to the retailer who purchased the fuel from the distributor even though the statute did not require that the distributor collect the tax from the retailer.

The Tribe has asked the court to reconsider its holding on that limited issue.

Utilities Tax (Cont’d)Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Case No. 14-14524 (11th Cir., August 26, 2015), rev’g in part, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1095 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

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Even if the legal incidence of the Utilities Tax were held to rest with the service provider, it would be preempted under Bracker to the extent that the electricity were used in an on-reservation activity that is pervasively and exclusively regulated by federal law.

The Tribe engages in many activities that are pervasively and exclusively regulated by federal law, including leasing of Indian land, providing essential governmental services and Indian gaming.


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The district court had dismissed the Tribe’s complaint for a declaration that state taxation of fuel used by the Tribe in the performance of on-reservation governmental services is constitutionally prohibited and for an injunction prohibiting the collection of that tax, on the grounds that it was barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the Tax Injunction Act.

The Eleventh Circuit agreed that district court did not have jurisdiction in an action seeking a declaration that the state fuel tax did not apply to fuel that the Tribe purchased off-reservation but used on reservation, but not because of Rooker-Feldman or the Tax Injunction Act. It determined the action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment (which the district court did not consider).

Fuel TaxSeminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, 750 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, U.S.S.C. No. 14-351 (2015).

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Under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Eleventh Amendment does not bar an action for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief. It bars only suits for retrospective damages.

Because Florida pre-collects the fuel tax, relief from the invalid tax is best achieved through the repayment of pre-collected taxes. The state already has a system in place for exactly that purpose.

In a split panel decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that an injunction would be tantamount to ordering the state to pay refunds in the future which it said would constitute retrospective payments of money damages.

Fuel Tax (Cont’d)Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, 750 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, U.S.S.C. No. 14-351 (2015).

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Under this holding a state can avoid suits challenging the constitutionality of its tax scheme by simply pre-collecting the tax.

The United States Supreme Court denied cert. on January 12, 2015.

The Seminole Tribe has now brought a new suit for refund of taxes on fuel used to perform on reservation governmental services in state court in a different district.

Fuel Tax (Cont’d)Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, 750 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, U.S.S.C. No. 14-351 (2015).

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The state court determined that the Yakima Tribe's treaty, which granted the Tribe the "right to transport goods to market without restriction", barred Washington from taxing fuel that a tribal fuel distributor imported from Oregon for sale to on-reservation businesses.

Fuel Tax (Cont’d)Cougar Den Inc. v. Department of Licensing of Yakima County, Case No. 14-2-03851-7, Washington Superior Court for Yakima County.

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The state supreme court rejected an industry group's challenge to the validity of various fuel tax agreements between the state and various Indian tribes under which the state agreed to refund a portion of the fuel taxes on fuel purchased by the Tribes.

Fuel Tax (Cont’d)Automotive United Traders Organization v. Washington, Case No. 89734-4 (Wash. August 27, 2015

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Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Hildreth, Case # 1:15-cv-00277 (S.D. Ala.).

A County tax assessor in Alabama imposed property tax on property held in trust for the Tribe, contending that the Secretary had no right to accept the property into trust under Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009), because the Tribe was not under federal authority in 1934 when the Indian Reorganization Act was enacted. He argued that property improperly accepted into trust is not exempt.

Carcieri involved a timely filed petition by the state under the APA challenging the Secretary's decision to accept the property into trust. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary had no authority to accept property into trust for a Tribe that was not federally recognized in 1934. The property in Carcieri remained subject to local regulations.

Property Tax

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The Tribe argued that, under Carcieri, challenges to the Secretary's entrustment decisions must be made in a petition filed under the APA within the 6 year statute of limitations.

This was the holding in an earlier Alabama district court when it ruled that the state could not halt gaming on the Tribe's land.

Property Tax (Cont’d)

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In Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, Nos. 10-17808 and 10-17878, en banc (9th Cir., June 4, 2015), the Ninth Circuit held that challenges to the Secretary's entrustment decision must be made by filing petition for review under the APA within the statute of limitations.

The district court agreed with the Tribe and, on July 27, 2015, issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the assessor from levying the tax. The assessor has taken an interlocutory appeal of that preliminary injunction.

In his counterclaim, the tax assessor added the Department of Interior as a party. Initially, the court rejected his attempt to add it as a party, but reversed the decision on August 20th.


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Even if the Secretary was not legally permitted to accept the Tribe's property into trust pursuant to §465, it would not necessarily mean that the state could tax it.

Unless the transfer from the Tribe to the United States were considered null and void, the property would still be titled in the name of the United States. States may not tax property owned by the United States. See, Ala. Code 40-9-1(1).


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§465 is not the only source of exemption. Any property in "Indian Country", as defined in 18 U.S.C. §1151, is exempt under McClanahan principles. See, Oklahoma v. Sac and Fox, 508 U.S. 114 (1993) and Oklahoma v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi, Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991). The definition of Indian Country is arguably broader than the definition of "Indian land" for purposes of §465. The property involved on Poarch might satisfy the definition of "Indian Country" regardless of whether the Secretary was authorized to accept it into trust.

Property Tax (Cont’d)Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Hildreth, Case # 1:15-cv-00277 (S.D. Ala.)

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The Tribe sued the state when it refused to reissue its liquor license for failure to pay sales tax on liquor sales at its casino.

The issue in this case is whether IGRA preempts state tax on non-gaming goods and services, including fuel, food and beverages, that were sold to non-Indians at its on-reservation entertainment facilities which include a casino.

The argument that IGRA generally preempts all state taxation at Indian casinos was rejected by the Second Circuit in Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F. 3d 457 (2013), where it upheld tangible personal property tax on slot machines that were leased by non-Indians to the Tribe for use in Indian gaming.

This issue is similar to the issue in the Tulalip case, discussed next.

Sales/Use TaxFlandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach, Case No. 4:14-cv-04171-LLP (D.C. S.D., filed 11/18/14).

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Tulalip Tribes, et al v. Smith et al, Case No. 2:15-cv-00940 (W.D. Wash., June 12, 2015).

The Tribes sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that the state is constitutionally prohibited from taxing any property, transactions or activities of non-Indian lessees that take place in a tribally chartered municipality located on the reservation, including sales of non-Indian goods to non-Indian customers for use or consumption off-reservation, on the grounds that the state provides no on-reservation services and the state tax makes it impossible for the Tribes to impose their own taxes that are needed to support the infrastructure and provide the governmental services.

Sales/Use Tax

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The Ninth Circuit rejected similar arguments in Gila River Indian Community v. Waddell (“Waddell I"), 967 F. 2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1992); Gila River Indian Community v. Waddell (“Waddell II"), 91 F. 3d 1232 (9th Cir. 1996); Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. State of Arizona, 50 F. 3d 734 (9th Cir. 1995); and Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Scott, 117 F. 3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1997).

In the Waddell cases, the issue was whether the state could tax tickets to on-reservation entertainment events conducted by a non-Indian lessee. The Ninth Circuit said that the tax would be preempted under Bracker only if the tax burdened an activity in which the Tribe had a substantial interest. It said the Tribe had a substantial interest only in those activities in which it materially participated. Accordingly, a tax on entertainment activities would be preempted only if the Tribe materially participated in those activities.

Sales/Use Tax (Cont’d)

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The issue in Salt River was whether the state could tax sales of non-Indian goods by non-Indian businesses to non-Indian customers at an on-reservation shopping mall that was operated by a non-Indian lessee. The court held that the sales tax was not preempted because the Tribe added no value to the goods sold. The goods were simply imported onto the reservation and re-sold to non-Indians for use or consumption off-reservation. The Ninth Circuit applied the same analysis to these goods as the Supreme Court applied to cigarettes in Wash. v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), and Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). The court noted that the businesses that sold the goods were all managed and owned by non-Indians and the Tribe did not participate in any of their business decisions or share in any of their profits.


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In Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Scott, 117 F. 3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1997), the state was allowed to tax rentals of rooms at an on-reservation hotel operated by a non-Indian lessee because the Tribe did not participate the hotel business.

In California v. Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), the state was held to have no right to regulate on-reservation gaming activities after the Court distinguished Colville on the grounds that "the Tribes are not merely importing a product onto the reservations for immediate resale to non-Indians. They have built modern facilities which provide recreational opportunities and ancillary services to their patrons, who do not simply drive onto the reservations, make purchases and depart, but spend extended periods of time there enjoying the services the Tribes provide. . . [T]he Cabazon . . . Bands are generating value on the reservations through activities in which they have a substantial interest."


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The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an otherwise valid state tax is not rendered invalid simply because it makes it more difficult for the Tribe to impose its own taxes. See, Colville (where the Tribe's taxes did not deprive the state of the right to impose its cigarette taxes on on-reservation sales to non-Indians), and Cotton Petroleum. It has also held the there need not be any relationship between the state tax imposed and the value of the state services provided.

On August 4, 2015, the United States moved to intervene in the case. That motion was granted on September 1, 2015.

Sales/Use Tax (Cont’d)Tulalip Tribes, et al v. Smith et al, Case No. 2:15-cv-00940 (W.D. Wash., June 12, 2015).

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The United States contends that state taxation of on-reservation sales of non-Indian goods by non-Indian lessees to non-Indian customers for use or consumption off-reservation is prohibited where the state provides few if any services in respect to the on-reservation activities and it inhibits the Tribe’s ability to impose its own taxes. It contended that the state tax is preempted by federal law, violates the Tribe’s sovereign rights to self-government and violates the Indian Commerce Clause.

The United States has not alleged that the state tax burdens an activity that is pervasively and exclusively regulated by federal law. Consequently, the “narrowly tailored” standard does not apply. Instead, it has engaged in balancing the strengths of the federal and tribal interests against those of the state.


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Historically, this has been a very low threshold that the state must satisfy. See, Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F. 3d 457 (2013) (where the state’s interest in applying its tax uniformly across the state was held to be an important interest). The United States contends that the Tribes have a strong interest in the sale of non-Indian goods by non-Indians to non-Indians for use or consumption off-reservation because of its investment in the facilities in which the sales take place and the governmental services it provides to lessees and their customers.

On August 17th, the Washington Department of Revenue filed a brief in opposition to the United States’ motion to intervene and the United States responded on August 21st.


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Sales/Use Tax (Cont’d) Tulalip Tribes, et al v. Smith et al, Case No. 2:15-cv-00940 (W.D. Wash., June 12, 2015).

Under Waddell, Salt River, Yavapai-Prescott, goods to which the Tribe added value (e.g., meals or mixed drinks) would arguably be exempt from state tax.

Under Cabazon, goods to which the Tribe does not add value, but which are consumed on the reservation in connection with the entertainment activities that the Tribe provides or in which it participates (e.g., sodas, beer and wine) would arguably be exempt from state tax.

On-reservation services the Tribe provides or in which it participates (e.g., hotel rooms) would arguably be exempt from state tax.

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However, the state would arguably have the right to tax any goods that are simply imported onto the reservation and sold to non-Indians for use or consumption off-reservation.


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U.S. v. Billie, Case # 14-13843, (11th Cir. June 1, 2015).

The issue in this case was whether tribal sovereign immunity precludes enforcement of an administrative summons that is issued by the IRS for records of the Tribe. The court held that it does not because the United States is a superior sovereign.

Summons Enforcement

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Smith v. Parker, Case 996 F. Supp. 2d 815 (D. Neb. 2014).

The Omaha Tribe asserted authority to tax liquor sales on reservation land that it sold to non-members with the consent of Congress. The issue was whether that land was still considered part of the reservation and therefore under the Tribe's taxing jurisdiction. The district court held that, under Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 584 (1977), once land has been designated reservation land, it remains reservation land until Congress has clearly indicated otherwise.

The Eight Circuit affirmed, Case # 14-1642, on December 19, 2014.

On June 5, 2015, Nebraska filed a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.

On August 21st, the United States urged the Court to reject the petition.

Tribal Liquor Tax

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Westmoreland Resources, Inc. v. Montana, Case # DA 13-0547 (Montana, August 5, 2014).

In computing the Resource Indemnity Trust and Ground Water Assessment Tax owed by a non-Indian company for coal mined on Indian land, the issue was whether Montana law, which allows a deduction for any taxes paid to the federal, state or local government, permits a deduction for the severance and gross proceeds taxes that are paid to the Tribe. The Montana Supreme Court held that it does not.

.

Resource Indemnity Trust and Ground Water Assessment Tax

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Anadarko Petroleum Corporation and Kerr MeGee Oil & Gas Onshore, L.P. v. Utah, Case No. 20130192, Sup. Ct. of Utah, January 30, 2015.

In computing the value of its oil and gas interests for state severance tax purposes, the issue was whether royalties paid to the Indian tribe are deductible. The Utah Supreme Court held that they are.

Severance Tax

litigation updates glen stankee september, 2015. akerman | 2 seminole tribe of florida v. florida,...

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