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43-109.4. Grandparental visitation rights.

A. 1. Pursuant to the provisions of this section, any

grandparent of an unmarried minor child may seek and be granted

reasonable visitation rights to the child which visitation

rights may be independent of either parent of the child if:

a. the district court deems it to be in the best

interest of the child pursuant to subsection E of

this section, and

b. there is a showing of parental unfitness, or the

grandparent has rebutted, by clear and convincing

evidence, the presumption that the fit parent is

acting in the best interests of the child by

showing that the child would suffer harm or

potential harm without the granting of visitation

rights to the grandparent of the child, and

c. the intact nuclear family has been disrupted in

that one or more of the following conditions has

occurred:

(1) an action for divorce, separate maintenance

or annulment involving the grandchild's

parents is pending before the court, and the

grandparent had a preexisting relationship

with the child that predates the filing of

the action for divorce, separate maintenance

or annulment,

(2) the grandchild's parents are divorced,

separated under a judgment of separate

maintenance, or have had their marriage

annulled,(3) the grandchild's parent who is a child of the

grandparent is deceased, and the grandparent

had a preexisting relationship with the child

that predates the death of the deceased

parent unless the death of the mother was due

to complications related to the birth of the

child,

(4) except as otherwise provided in subsection C

or D of this section, legal custody of the

grandchild has been given to a person other

than the grandchild's parent, or thegrandchild does not reside in the home of a

parent of the child,

(5) one of the grandchilds parents has had a

felony conviction and been incarcerated in

the Department of Corrections and the

grandparent had a preexisting relationship


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with the child that predates the

incarceration,

(6) grandparent had custody of the grandchild

pursuant to Section 21.3 of this title,

whether or not the grandparent had custody

under a court order, and there exists a

strong, continuous grandparental relationship

between the grandparent and the child,

(7) the grandchild's parent has deserted the

other parent for more than one (1) year and

there exists a strong, continuous

grandparental relationship between the

grandparent and the child,

(8) except as otherwise provided in subsection D

of this section, the grandchild's parents

have never been married, are not residing in

the same household and there exists a strong,

continuous grandparental relationship between

the grandparent and the child, or

(9) except as otherwise provided by subsection D

of this section, the parental rights of one

or both parents of the child have been

terminated, and the court determines that

there is a strong, continuous relationship

between the child and the parent of the

person whose parental rights have been

terminated.

2. The right of visitation to any grandparent of an

unmarried minor child shall be granted only so far as that rightis authorized and provided by order of the district court.

B. Under no circumstances shall any judge grant the right

of visitation to any grandparent if the child is a member of an

intact nuclear family and both parents of the child object to

the granting of visitation.

C. If one natural parent is deceased and the surviving

natural parent remarries, any subsequent adoption proceedings

shall not terminate any preexisting court-granted grandparental

rights belonging to the parents of the deceased natural parent

unless the termination of visitation rights is ordered by the

court having jurisdiction over the adoption after opportunity tobe heard, and the court determines it to be in the best interest

of the child.

D. 1. If the child has been born out of wedlock and the

parental rights of the father of the child have been terminated,

the parents of the father of the child shall not have a right of

visitation authorized by this section to the child unless:


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a. the father of the child has been judicially

determined to be the father of the child, and

b. the court determines that a previous grandparental

relationship existed between the grandparent and

the child.

2. If the child is born out of wedlock and the parental

rights of the mother of the child have been terminated, the

parents of the mother of the child shall not have a right of

visitation authorized by this section to the child unless the

court determines that a previous grandparental relationship

existed between the grandparent and the child.

3. Except as otherwise provided by this section, the

district court shall not grant to any grandparent of an

unmarried minor child, visitation rights to that child:

a. subsequent to the final order of adoption of the

child; provided however, any subsequent adoption

proceedings shall not terminate any prior court-

granted grandparental visitation rights unless the

termination of visitation rights is ordered by the

court after opportunity to be heard and the

district court determines it to be in the best

interest of the child, or

b. if the child had been placed for adoption prior to

attaining six (6) months of age.

E. 1. In determining the best interest of the minor child,

the court shall consider and, if requested, shall make specific

findings of fact related to the following factors:

a. the needs of and importance to the child for a

continuing preexisting relationship with thegrandparent and the age and reasonable preference

of the child pursuant to Section 113 of Title 43

of the Oklahoma Statutes,

b. the willingness of the grandparent or grandparents

to encourage a close relationship between the

child and the parent or parents,

c. the length, quality and intimacy of the

preexisting relationship between the child and the

grandparent,

d. the love, affection and emotional ties existing

between the parent and child,e. the motivation and efforts of the grandparent to

continue the preexisting relationship with the

grandchild,

f. the motivation of parent or parents denying

visitation,

g. the mental and physical health of the grandparent

or grandparents,


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h. the mental and physical health of the child,

i. the mental and physical health of the parent or

parents,

j. whether the child is in a permanent, stable,

satisfactory family unit and environment,

k. the moral fitness of the parties,

l. the character and behavior of any other person who

resides in or frequents the homes of the parties

and such persons interactions with the child,

m. the quantity of visitation time requested and the

potential adverse impact the visitation will have

on the customary activities of the child, and

n. if both parents are dead, the benefit in

maintaining the preexisting relationship.

2. For purposes of this subsection:

a. harm or potential harm means a showing that

without court-ordered visitation by the

grandparent, the childs emotional, mental or

physical well-being could reasonably or would be

jeopardized,

b. intact nuclear family means a family consisting

of the married father and mother of the child,

c. parental unfitness includes, but is not limited

to, a showing that a parent of the child or a

person residing with the parent:

(1) has a chemical or alcohol dependency, for

which treatment has not been sought or for

which treatment has been unsuccessful,

(2) has a history of violent behavior or domesticabuse,

(3) has an emotional or mental illness that

demonstrably impairs judgment or capacity to

recognize reality or to control behavior,

(4) has been shown to have failed to provide the

child with proper care, guidance and support

to the actual detriment of the child. The

provisions of this division include, but are

not limited to, parental indifference and

parental influence on his or her child or

lack thereof that exposes such child tounreasonable risk, or

(5) demonstrates conduct or condition which

renders him or her unable or unwilling to

give a child reasonable parental care.

Reasonable parental care requires, at a

minimum, that the parent provides nurturing


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and protection adequate to meet the childs

physical, emotional and mental health.

The determination of parental unfitness pursuant

to this subparagraph shall not be that which is

equivalent for the termination of parental rights,

and

d. preexisting relationship means occurring or

existing prior to the filing of the petition for

grandparental visitation.

F. 1. The district courts are vested with jurisdiction to

issue orders granting grandparental visitation rights and to

enforce visitation rights, upon the filing of a verified

petition for visitation rights or enforcement thereof. Notice

as ordered by the court shall be given to the person or parent

having custody of the child. The venue of such action shall be

in the court where there is an ongoing proceeding that involves

the child, or if there is no ongoing proceeding, in the county

of the residence of the child or parent.

2. When a grandparent of a child has been granted

visitation rights pursuant to this section and those rights are

unreasonably denied or otherwise unreasonably interfered with by

any parent of the child, the grandparent may file with the court

a motion for enforcement of visitation rights. Upon filing of

the motion, the court shall set an initial hearing on the

motion. At the initial hearing, the court shall direct

mediation and set a hearing on the merits of the motion.

3. After completion of any mediation pursuant to paragraph

2 of this subsection, the mediator shall submit the record of

mediation termination and a summary of the parties' agreement,if any, to the court. Upon receipt of the record of mediation

termination, the court shall enter an order in accordance with

the parties' agreement, if any.

4. Notice of a hearing pursuant to paragraph 2 or 3 of this

subsection shall be given to the parties at their last-known

address or as otherwise ordered by the court, at least ten (10)

days prior to the date set by the court for hearing on the

motion. Provided, the court may direct a shorter notice period

if the court deems such shorter notice period to be appropriate

under the circumstances.

5. Appearance at any court hearing pursuant to thissubsection shall be a waiver of the notice requirements prior to

such hearing.

6. If the court finds that visitation rights of the

grandparent have been unreasonably denied or otherwise

unreasonably interfered with by the parent, the court shall

enter an order providing for one or more of the following:

a. a specific visitation schedule,


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b. compensating visitation time for the visitation

denied or otherwise interfered with, which time

may be of the same type as the visitation denied

or otherwise interfered with, including but not

limited to holiday, weekday, weekend, summer, and

may be at the convenience of the grandparent,

c. posting of a bond, either cash or with sufficient

sureties, conditioned upon compliance with the

order granting visitation rights, or

d. assessment of reasonable attorney fees, mediation

costs, and court costs to enforce visitation

rights against the parent.

7. If the court finds that the motion for enforcement of

visitation rights has been unreasonably filed or pursued by the

grandparent, the court may assess reasonable attorney fees,

mediation costs, and court costs against the grandparent.


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TROXEL et vir. v. GRANVILLE

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

No. 99138. Argued January 12, 2000Decided June 5, 2000

Washington Rev. Code 26.10.160(3) permits [a]ny person to petition for visitation rights at

any time and authorizes state superior courts to grant such rights whenever visitation may serve

a childs best interest. Petitioners Troxel petitioned for the right to visit their deceased sonsdaughters. Respondent Granville, the girls mother, did not oppose all visitation, but objected to

the amount sought by the Troxels. The Superior Court ordered more visitation than Granville

desired, and she appealed. The State Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the Troxels

petition. In affirming, the State Supreme Court held, inter alia, that 26.10.160(3)unconstitutionally infringes on parents fundamental right to rear their children. Reasoning that

the Federal Constitution permits a State to interfere with this right only to prevent harm orpotential harm to the child, it found that 26.10.160(3) does not require a threshold showing of

harm and sweeps too broadly by permitting any person to petition at any time with the only

requirement being that the visitation serve the best interest of the child.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, affirmed.

Justice OConnor, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer,

concluded that 26.10.160(3), as applied to Granville and her family, violates her due process

right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her daughters. Pp. 517.

(a) The Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause has a substantive component thatprovides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights

and liberty interests, Washington v. Glucksberg,521 U.S. 702, 720, including parents

fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children,

see, e.g., Stanley v.Illinois,405 U.S. 645, 651. Pp. 58.

(b) Washingtons breathtakingly broad statute effectively permits a court to disregard and

overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation whenever a third party

affected by the decision files a visitation petition, based solely on the judges determination of

the childs best interest. A parents estimation of the childs best interest is accorded nodeference. The State Supreme Court had the opportunity, but declined, to give 26.10.160(3) a

narrower reading. A combination of several factors compels the conclusion that 26.10.160(3),as applied here, exceeded the bounds of the Due Process Clause. First, the Troxels did not allege,

and no court has found, that Granville was an unfit parent. There is a presumption that fit parents

act in their childrens best interests, Parham v.J. R.,442 U.S. 584, 602; there is normally no

reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question fitparents ability to make the best decisions regarding their children, see, e.g.,Reno v. Flores,507


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U.S. 292, 304. The problem here is not that the Superior Court intervened, but that when it didso, it gave no special weight to Granvilles determination of her daughters best interests. More

importantly, that court appears to have applied the opposite presumption, favoring grandparent

visitation. In effect, it placed on Granville the burden ofdisproving that visitation would be inher daughters best interest and thus failed to provide any protection for her fundamental right.

The court also gave no weight to Granvilles having assented to visitation even before the filingof the petition or subsequent court intervention. These factors, when considered with theSuperior Courts slender findings, show that this case involves nothing more than a simple

disagreement between the court and Granville concerning her childrens best interests, and that

the visitation order was an unconstitutional infringement on Granvilles right to make decisions

regarding the rearing of her children. Pp. 814.

(c) Because the instant decision rests on 26.10.160(3)s sweeping breadth and its application

here, there is no need to consider the question whether the Due Process Clause requires all

nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as acondition precedent to granting visitation or to decide the precise scope of the parental due

process right in the visitation context. There is also no reason to remand this case for furtherproceedings. The visitation order clearly violated the Constitution, and the parties should not be

forced into additional litigation that would further burden Granvilles parental right. Pp. 1417.

Justice Souter concluded that the Washington Supreme Courts second reason for invalidating

its own state statutethat it sweeps too broadly in authorizing any person at any time to request

(and a judge to award) visitation rights, subject only to the States particular best-interestsstandardis consistent with this Courts prior cases. This ends the case, and there is no need to

decide whether harm is required or to consider the precise scope of a parents right or its

necessary protections. Pp. 15.

Justice Thomas agreed that this Courts recognition of a fundamental right of parents to directtheir childrens upbringing resolves this case, but concluded that strict scrutiny is the appropriate

standard of review to apply to infringements of fundamental rights. Here, the State lacks acompelling interest in second-guessing a fit parents decision regarding visitation with third

parties. Pp. 12.

OConnor, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which

Rehnquist, C. J., and Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., and Thomas, J., filed opinions

concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., Scalia, J., and Kennedy, J., filed dissenting opinions.


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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR BRYAN COUNTYSTATE OF OKLAHOMA

IN RE THE GUARDIANSHIP OF:

#Sierra Sloan , age 12, dob 1/4/2000Hunter Sloan, age 9, dob 11/8/2002Harley Sloan, age 9, dob 11/8/2002Minors

Case no.#Judge

Admissions Statement

Comes now, Linda Grider to Admit onto Evidence as per Oklahoma Rules of Evidence, aSummary byDr. Edward S. Stern entitled The Medea Complex: the Mother's Homicidal Wishes to herChild, as read at the Child Psychiatry Section at the Annual Meeting of the RoyalMedico-psychological Association at Eastbourne.

Part I.Original Articles

The Medea Complex: the Mother'sHomicidal Wishes to her Child*

Edward S. Stern, M.A., M.D., M.R.C.P., D.P.M., Medical Superintendent

+ Author Affiliations

The Central Hospital, Hatton, near Warwick

Summary

The situation in which the mother harbours death wishes to her offspring, usuallyas a revenge against the father, is described and named the Medea complex.

It is shown that there is considerable resistance against admitting these thoughtsto the consciousness of the mother or any other person, but that they are of

general occurrence.

The Medea complex causes many marital difficulties, e.g., dyspareunia,prevention and interruption of pregnancy, failure of breast feeding, and otherdisordered domestic relations.

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It explains such matters as baby farming, disposal to others, and neglect ofchildren, unjust accusations of cruelty to children such as blood libels, and acts ofcovert and overt cruelty to them.

Footnotes

* A Paper read at the Child Psychiatry Section at the Annual Meeting of theRoyal Medico-Psychological Association at Eastbourne

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Comes now, Anne House to Admit onto Evidence, as per Texas Rules of Evidence oneemail from Merry Sloan September 11, 2006, whereby it is in evidence that Merry Sloan1. Did not have care and custody of Hunter or Harley Sloan 2. that on this date MerrySloan makes threats Constituting Criminal Coercion, re: a Doctor adopting Hunter andHarley. 4. Merry Sloan admits that when she went to Chris and Anne's house, it was

never not clean. 5. Merry Sloan admits in this email that her intent is to have jointcustody of the children, although at this time, she had not seen the children for nearly twoyears, of her own volition.

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----- Forwarded Message ----From: Ron Sloan To: [email protected]: Mon, May 2, 2011 10:19:48 AMSubject:

Mr. BakerI was letting you know that I have released Morrison attorney law office on the intervene of Linda Grider. I do not wish to go against her for Grandparent custody rightsI am waving my parental and guardianship rights from Sierra JoAnn Sloan, Harley Rachelle Sloan, andHunter Lee SloanIn wishing that the courts will give Linda Grider full custody of the three kids. Ron SloanSales RepresentativeAllied Stone, Inc.Office: (580) 931-3388Cell: (580) 920-3792Fax: (580) 931-39982201 W. ArkansasDurant, Ok 74701


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