Realising a post-campaign approach

Lieutenant General Sir Nicholas Carter KCB CBE DSO

Strengths Resilient, combat hardened, and self confident Comfortable with mission command and

decentralization Accomplished COIN tactics / equipment Air / Land integration CIED skills Dismounted close combat and targeting

operations Influence operations Tactical bases and infrastructure Materiel and personnel exploitation Combat medicine

Weaknesses Combined Arms manoeuvre and mobile

operations Unfamiliar with general phases of war (e.g.

defence, offense, transitional phases), air defence, suppression and CBRN

Unaccustomed to having to take unlimited risk in order to win – the ruthless streak?

FOB bound and averse to austerity Unrealistic expectation of resources Ability to train one’s own organization

Opportunities Time to do things properly, to be educated, to

rebuild core skills and invest in people Freedom to train more broadly Challenge of innovation and imagination Public support Forward engagement – soft use of hard power

Threats Economic pressure Post COIN political and public appetite for

‘entanglements’ and interventions Legal challenge Ever rising equipment and personnel costs

The British Army post-Afghanistan

A new post-campaign approach

• A continuum of persistent engagement in which the soft end of hard power is used to achieve effect, to establish insight and understanding, and to allow one to act with precision and agility

A new post-campaign approach

• A continuum of persistent engagement in which the soft end of hard power is used to achieve effect, to establish insight and understanding, and to allow one to act with precision and agility

• A ‘people-centric’ approach that recognizes a changed character of conflict

A new post-campaign approach

• A continuum of persistent engagement in which the soft end of hard power is used to achieve effect, to establish insight and understanding, and to allow one to act with precision and agility

• A ‘people-centric’ approach that recognizes a changed character of conflict

• A redefined divisional level of command that is scalable, integrated and which underwrites the soft use of hard power

The continuum of persistent engagement

Enduring Stabilisation

(Phase 4)

Intervention (Phase 2 & 3)

ForwardEngagement (Phase Zero)

Deterrence (Phase 1)

Post-Conflict Capacity Building

(Phase 5)

Insight and understanding

‘Every age has its follies, but the folly of our age has been an irresistible desire to change the world without first studying and understanding it.’

Antonio Giustozzi

“France has developed a deep understanding of Mali and the region through historical ties, mature OGD representation, and regionally based military forces; this allowed them to intervene without detailed plans but with a feel for what was possible.”

UK MOD Assessment

Generating precision and agility

A new post-campaign approach

• A continuum of persistent engagement in which the soft end of hard power is used to achieve effect, to establish insight and understanding, and to allow one to act with precision and agility

• A ‘people-centric’ approach that recognizes a changed character of conflict

• A redefined divisional level of command that is scalable, integrated and which underwrites the soft use of hard power

Manoeuvre is now multi-dimensional …

“The defeat of the insurgents in the military sense may assist in, but does not translate into victory for the coalition, because the interpretation of the conflict in military metrics may well be a frame of reference to which most audiences do not subscribe.”

Emile Simpson

... and perception is now the key

“The political fragmentation that characterises the Afghan conflict is likely to point to the future of contemporary conflict rather than prove an anomaly … there are endless ‘actors’ and ‘audiences’, which often overlap ... the conflict is far more of a game of musical chairs than a two-way fight.”

Emile Simpson

... involving multiple audiences

A ‘people-centric’ approach

Objective

A ‘people-centric’ approach

WarlordClan / TribeInstitutionOpponentAlly

Audience

Objective

A ‘people-centric’ approach

WarlordClan / TribeInstitutionOpponentAlly

Audience

DestroyMarginalizeReconcileProtect

Effect

Objective

A ‘people-centric’ approach

KineticsCyber / EWDynamic narrativeConversationDeceptionCoercionCash

WarlordClan / TribeInstitutionOpponentAlly

Audience

Method

DestroyMarginalizeReconcileProtect

Effect

Objective

Less about kinetics – more about soft power

Responding to the information environment

“Contemporary warfare is a form of theatre, played out by a small, separate group, orchestrated by a team of unseen directors, stage managers and lighting engineers, but watched by many more.”

Rupert Smith 2005

A form of theatre

A ‘people-centric’ approach

KineticsCyber / EWDynamic narrativeConversationDeceptionCoercionCash

RedWhiteGreenBlack

Information

WarlordClan / TribeInstitutionOpponentAlly

Audience

Method

DestroyMarginalizeReconcileProtect

Effect

Objective

A new post-campaign approach

• A continuum of persistent engagement in which the soft end of hard power is used to achieve effect, to establish insight and understanding, and to allow one to act with precision and agility

• A ‘people-centric’ approach that recognizes a changed character of conflict

• A redefined divisional level of command that is scalable, integrated and which underwrites the soft use of hard power

A redefined divisional level of command

• It will continue to be the lowest level where:– Operational art is practised– We plan and execute simultaneous tactical engagements in a

conceptual framework of deep, close and rear– We would be prepared to war fight

An illustrative division

A redefined divisional level of command

• It will continue to be the lowest level where:– Operational art is practised– We plan and execute simultaneous tactical engagements in a

conceptual framework of deep, close and rear– We would be prepared to war fight

• Increasingly we should think about it being scalable and integrated so that it can execute operations using the full range of Joint, inter-agency and wider non kinetic effects

A new post-campaign approach

• A continuum of persistent engagement in which the soft end of hard power is used to achieve effect, to establish insight and understanding, and to allow one to act with precision and agility

• A ‘people-centric’ approach that recognizes a changed character of conflict

• A redefined divisional level of command that is scalable, integrated and which underwrites the soft use of hard power