liberia gender case study

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LESSONS, CHALLENGES

AND OPPORTUNITIES

LIBERIA’S SPECIALIZED

SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:

A Case Study



LESSONS, CHALLENGES

AND OPPORTUNITIES

LIBERIA’S SPECIALIZED

SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:

A Case Study



II I

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................IV

Introduction .......................................................................................................................1

I. SGBV and Access to Justice in the Liberian Context ...........................................2A. BACKGROUND .............. .............. .............. ............. .............. .............. ............. .............. .............. ............. .............. . 2

B. ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN LIBERIA .............. ............. .............. .............. ............. .............. .............. ............. .............. . 3

II. Criminal Court E and the Legal Response to SGBV in Liberia ..............................7

A. THE GENERAL RESPONSE TO SGBV ............ .............. .............. ............. .............. .............. ............. .............. .......... 7

B. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ............. .............. .............. ............. .............. .............. .............. ............. .............. ............ 7

C. THE IMPETUS FOR SPECIALIZED STRUCTURES ................................................ ....................................................... 8

D. FEATURES OF CRIMINAL COURT E ............ .............. .............. ............. .............. .............. .............. ............. ............ 9

III. Successes and Challenges .................................................................................12

A. VICTIM-CENTERED PROCESS .............. .............. ............. .............. .............. .............. ............. .............. .............. ... 13B. EFFICIENCY ............. .............. .............. .............. ............. .............. .............. ............. .............. .............. ............. ...... 16

C. SUSTAINABILITY AND LEGITIMACY ............. .............. .............. ............. .............. .............. .............. ............. ........ 20

D. VISIBILITY................................................................................................................................................................ 22

IV. Lessons and Recommendations .........................................................................23

A. LESSONS FROM THE LIBERIAN EXPERIENCE .............. .............. .............. ............. .............. .............. ............. ...... 23

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CRIMINAL COURT E AND THE WIDER JUSTICE SYSTEM ..........................................25

Reference List .................................................................................................................27



IV LIBERIA’S SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:

This report was prepared under the World Bank Institute (WBI) project entitled “Lessons on Gender Inclusion inFragile and Conflict Affected States – Women’s Access to Rights, Resources and Voice.” It is part of a library ofcase studies that aim to document key issues relating to women’s access to rights, resources, and voice in fragileand conflict-affected states. This paper focuses on rights, targeting the ambitious project designed to improvethe legal response to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in Liberia: the establishment of a specializedsexual offenses court known as Criminal Court E. It describes and explains the experience with this court anddraws lessons from the Liberian context that may be instructive for other fragile and conflict-affected situations.

The report was prepared by Finlay Young (Consultant) under the supervision of A. Waafas Ofosu-Amaah (TaskTeam Leader). The task team consisted of Rea Abada Chiongson, Camilla Gandini, Lwanzo Amani, and Sanam

Naraghi Anderlini (Consultants).

The team expresses its thanks to the representatives of the government, civil society, and nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs), as well as the international development partners and individuals in Liberia who providedvaluable information for this case study: Ministry of Gender and Development (Deddeh Kwekwe, GBV UnitCoordinator); Specialized Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit (Cllr. Felicia Coleman, Lead Prosecutor); the judiciary

(Judge Evelina QuaQua, former judge, Criminal Court E; Judge Eva Mappy Morgan, judge, CommercialCourt; and John Sackor, Financial Comptroller); National Council of Chiefs and Elders (Ma Musu E. Coleman,

Vice Chair of Internal Affairs, Peace and Reconciliation); African Network for the Prevention and Protection

against Child Abuse and Neglect - Liberia (ANPPCAN) (Alvin Winford, Program Manager); Servants of AllPrayers Assembly (SOAP) (Rev. Stephen D. Tour); UN Government SGBV Joint Program (Madhumita Sarkar,Program Advisor); U.S. Department of State Justice Sector Support Program (Damare Theriot, SGBV Advisor);United Nations Mission in Liberia

(Catherine Barley, Senior Policy Advisor to the D/SRSG Rule of Law; SophieFrediani, Human Rights Advisor); UN Women (Martine Villeneuve, Program Officer); Carter Center (AmandaRawls, Program Advisor; Timothy Meyer, Legal Associate; and Alfred Hill, Monitoring and Reporting Officer);the Liberian Government SGBV Taskforce membership (for permitting the author’s participation and assis-ting with contacts and information), and members of Monrovia’s Jallah Town Community (various individualswho together served as an informal focus group).

The team also acknowledges the following World Bank Group colleagues for their technical guidance andcollaboration: Bernard Harborne, Lead Social Development Specialist; Jared Matthew Schott, Justice andConflict Advisor; Jeni Klugman, Director, Gender and Development; Heike Gramckow, Lead Counsel; and Louis-Alexandre Berg, Justice and Conflict Advisor. Peter Forster Chapman, Program Officer for Legal Empowerment(Open Society Justice Initiative), also provided valuable insights. Finally, the team is very appreciative of theinputs, critiques, and suggestions from the members of the Gender Issues in Fragile Situations Community

of Practice (GFCoP) (https://collaboration.worldbank.org/groups/gender-issues-in-fragile-situations). Specialthanks go to GFCoP members, Crystal Corman, Peace Medie, Wren Chadwick, Lillian Dang, and Janine Moussa.

The report was made possible by the generous support of the Government of the Netherlands, under the WorldBank-Netherlands Partnerships Program (BNPP) Trust Fund.

Acknowledgments



1LESSONS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

Among the many complex development challenges presented by the country of Liberia, perhaps none is asemotive as its enduring problem of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Following the cessation of abrutal and prolonged civil conflict infamous for its disproportionate victimization of women, the election of EllenJohnson-Sirleaf as President in 2005 presented new and exciting opportunities for gender-sensitive reform.With strong support from international donors, the new administration made addressing the problem of SGBVa key priority.

As eight years have passed since the commencement of these reform efforts, Liberia’s experience representsa potentially valuable case study on the effectiveness of interventions aimed at addressing the issue of SGBVin fragile and conflict situations (FCS). The high prevalence of SGBV and the general impunity enjoyed by

the perpetrators remain significant issues in many such contexts, and while the implementation of effectiveresponses is well established globally as a priority area of concern, information about the effectiveness of justicesystem interventions designed to strengthen the legal response in FCS remains limited. This case study situatesitself within this developing global discourse.

The study focuses on perhaps the most ambitious project designed to improve the legal response to SGBV inLiberia: the opening of specialized sexual offenses court known as Criminal Court E. It is necessarily limited inscope, intended as a concise and accessible stand-alone case study to inform and stimulate discussion amongdevelopment practitioners and policy makers interested in examining, analyzing, and identifying possiblesolutions to the problem of SGBV in the context of fragility. It also seeks to outline the experience, provide anumber of recommendations for reform, and derive lessons from the Liberian context that may be instructivefor other FCS.

The case study is based on a review of the relevant literature and data, as well as interviews with key government,civil society, nongovernmental organization (NGO), and United Nations (UN) actors conducted by the author inLiberia between October 2012 and March 2013. Due to the sensitive nature of some interviewee observations,their specific identities have been withheld where requested.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author.

Introduction



2 LIBERIA’S SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:

I. SGBV and Access to Justice

in the Liberian Context

A. BACKGROUND

Efforts to rationalize the extent and severity ofLiberia’s current SGBV issue have frequently focused

on the impact of the devastating civil conflictthe country suffered between 1989 and 2003. Inthis period, all armed parties perpetrated acts ofgender-based violence with impunity, using it as amethod of instilling fear and exerting control overcivilian populations (TRC 2009, 4). A 2003 study ofLiberian refugees in Sierra Leone camps found that74 percent of women surveyed had been sexuallyabused before displacement (Liberia and UN JointProgramme 2011, 31), while other assessmentsput this figure even higher.1 Yet, bald figures suchas these fail to show the exceptionally traumaticmodalities of the crimes committed.2

Although the horrors of the Liberian war can tellus much of the horrific potential of institutionalizedviolence against women in the country, they explainlittle of the origins of this violence and its enduringmanifestation in peacetime Liberia. As one scholarwriting on SGBV in Liberia put it: “The prevalence ofgender based violence is almost always reflective ofgender inequalities and power imbalances that havebeen in existence before the conflict” (UNMIL 2008,17). Most observers agree that the Liberian conflictserved only to exacerbate latent social divisionsand patriarchal structural inequalities, including

ingrained patterns of violence against women

existent long prior to the war. These norms endure,with the disempowerment of women “…embeddedin socio-cultural institutions, value systems, normsand practices” (Liberia and UN Joint Programme

2011, 8).

Over a decade has passed since the cessation ofconflict, but the specter of SGBV has not receded.Numerous studies have consistently revealed apeacetime reality of extremely high prevalenceof SGBV.3 According to Liberia’s Ministry ofGender and Development statistics, 6,277 caseswere reported from 2010 to 2012 (see figure 1).4

In 2012, rape accounted for 55 percent of cases, with68 percent involving victims between the ages of 3months to 14 years. As was stated in Liberia’s Poverty

Reduction Strategy, “…young female citizens sufferthe brunt of Liberia’s epidemic of gender basedviolence” (Liberia 2008, 90). Further, perpetrators aregenerally known to the victims, with statistics from2011 showing that 76 percent of perpetrators wererelatives, friends, neighbors, or intimate partners ofthe survivors (Liberia 2011).

Reported cases represent only the tip of the iceberg,however. It is estimated that over two-thirds of SGBVcases never enter the justice system at all, let alonegain access to legal aid or the courts (Dziewanski2011, 19). To fully understand this reality, an analysis

of Liberia’s access to justice context is required.

1 This refers to a 2004 World Health Organization study, cited in Liberia and UN Joint Programme (2011, 31).2 Liberian women reported being raped with objects including bananas, pieces of wood, metal, guns, hot water, mud, dried batteries, and

hot peppers. See Omanyondo (2005, 26).3 These studies include those from the NGOs Human Rights Watch in 2011 and Save the Children in 2009. See also Liberia and UN Joint

Programme (2011).4 For these and similar gures, see the Annual Reports of Liberia’s Ministry of Gender and Development for 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012,

which are available at http://mogd.gov.lr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=67&Itemid=125.

“Before the war we had the issue, but it wasnot known to us as gender-based violence. Itwas just the way of life.”

—GBV Coordinator, Ministry of Gender andDevelopment




5 Detailed gures can be found in two document produced by UNMIL’s Legal and Judicial Systems Support Division. See UNMIL(2010 and 2011).

“Olivia’s perpetrator was never caught,because her perpetrator was her uncle.This is the difculty. We relocated Olivia’smother because everyone in the village wentagainst her. She had ‘shamed’ the uncle. Shewasn’t meant to say those things. In theircommunity, the best person to side withwas the perpetrator, the one who raped herso badly. He was arrested and taken to themagisterial court, but somehow he has neverbeen put in prison. When Olivia died (of herinjuries) nobody from the village came toattend the funeral.”

—SGBV Coordinator, Ministry of Gender andDevelopment

FIGURE 1. SGBV CASES REPORTED TO THE MINISTRY OF GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT

B. ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN LIBERIA

The case above attracted international opprobrium

in 2012 after the tragic death of Olivia, a young rapevictim. The circumstances of Olivia’s case serve tohighlight many of the cultural and contextual factorsthat militate against access to justice for SGBVsurvivors.

i) The weakness of the formal justice system

Perhaps the most important consideration is that inLiberia overall, the formal justice system of police,prosecution, and courts, a common law systemdrawn largely from a U.S. template, is chronicallyweak. Even if a case is taken to the police, “Arrest…is no guarantee that cases will be forwarded through

the criminal justice system, creating a situation wherea survivor may have identified a perpetrator—whomay be known to the survivor—without the policehaving the means to investigate the crime or providesecurity for the survivor” (Nagelhus Schia and deCarvalho 2009, 3).

Should the case enter the court system, magistrateand circuit courts are highly inefficient, with too fewlawyers to serve the needs of the population. A 2011UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report foundthat there were only 250 lawyers in Liberia, serving apopulation of 4 million people (UNODC 2011, 12).

Further, despite the appearance of improvementthrough the renovation of courts and the provision ofhardware and vehicles, the enhancements made havenot generally translated into better service deliveryat the court level. Dockets in the most utilized urbancourts have generally grown more crowded eachyear,5 while citizens in rural areas operate largely

Source: Ministry of Gender and Development Annual Reports, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

2009 2010 2011 20120

Number of SGBV Cases Reported

to MoGD by year




absent formal justice options and prefer alternativemeans of resolving disputes.6 Moreover, allegationsof corruption are rife at all levels,7 and there is ageneral lack of affordable legal aid.

Further, the system has very limited effective reachbeyond urbanized areas, and the Liberian citizenrygenerally and historically does not trust it. Publicperceptions of a system few understand remainoverwhelmingly negative.8 In common with allgovernment entities in Liberia, the justice systemhas traditionally served elite interests, largely as aconduit for extraction. As one commentator hasnoted, throughout much of Liberia’s history, theformal justice system has been subject to executiveintervention and is deeply corrupt. Prior to the war,the formal judicial services did not reach many of thecounties and where available, were ineffective” (Ebo

2005, 22).

As such, impunity for SGBV must be consideredagainst a general backdrop, historical and current, ofimpunity for crimes in general. For victims of SGBV,the repercussions of this pervasive impunity are thatthey must carry the physical and emotional traumaof their injuries indefinitely, frequently within viewof the perpetrators, with little prospect that formalstructures will provide protection from or recoursefor their suffering.

ii) The reality of legal pluralism in Liberia

As a consequence, the formal justice system isnot generally the structure chosen to resolve mostdisputes in Liberia. Instead, processes broadlytagged “informal” or “traditional” processes,normally emanating from existing hierarchies atthe community level but also including formallysanctioned tribal governor courts, are preferred.

According to an extensive study undertaken in 2009by the Centre for African Economies at OxfordUniversity, only 3 percent of civil cases in Liberia

went to court during that year, and only 2 percent ofcriminal cases. For criminal matters, this compares to45 percent of cases that went to an informal forum,and 53 percent to no forum at all (Isser, Lubkemann,and N’Tow 2009, 4).

Of particular import here is the fact that the formal andinformal processes, although both “justice systems”in the widest sense, are actually qualitatively at odds.The formal justice system of courts emphasizesidentifying a victim and perpetrator(s), determiningwrongdoing, and meting out retribution. It is notfocused on reconciliation, and hence not onlyfrequently fails to resolve underlying tensions, butcan serve to exacerbate adversarial relations (Isser,Lubkemann, and N’Tow 2009, 4). This stands instark contrast to informal processes in Liberia, whichemphasize the wider goals of social harmony and

reconciliation. In many instances, the process ofreconciliation will involve wider family members,and entail an admission of wrongdoing, a publicapology, and in many instances, the imposition of afine. This form of process, most frequently utilizedby Liberians, produces outcomes that are generallyaccepted by citizens but are often inimical to theconcept of justice as defined by the courts.

iii) Rape and Liberia’s informal justice processes

The general norms and usage of the Liberian justice

landscape seem to apply equally to rape cases. AsIsser, Lubkemann, and N’Tow write:

[I]n the resolution of most types of rape mostrural Liberians continue to emphasize restorativeand socially reconciliatory objectives as moreimportant than punitive ones. The objective ofreconciliation remains particularly important ina context in which the kinship relations that areso vital to all aspects of subsistence and socialorder itself are likely to socially link perpetratorsand victims and their families. (Isser, Lubkemann,and N’Tow 2009)

6 For the most complete analysis of access to justice in rural areas, see Isser, Lubkemann, and N’Tow (2009).7 According to the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report, “Judges were susceptible to bribes for awarding damages in civil cases.

Judges sometimes requested bribes to try cases, release detainees from prison, or nd defendants not guilty in criminal cases.” See U.S.Department of State (2011, 12).

8 The most recent detailed analysis was conducted in June 2011 by the Human Rights Center of the University of California, Berkeley. In par-ticular, it noted that “Most agreed with the claim that ‘going to court is too expensive’ (75 %), and just a minority agreed that ‘ judgmentsare the same for everyone’ (23%), or that ‘judges treat everyone equally’ (28%). The results suggest an overall lack of trust in judges, andmore broadly in the justice system.” See Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer (2011).




These social or “kinship” links are often decisive inwhether a victim will enter the formal justice system.As a female member of the National TraditionalCouncil, the body representing “traditional people”(the collective term generally used to describe those

living under traditional authority structures) of Liberia,explained: “Most of the time, even here in Monrovia,everlasting enemy-ship is created between familiesin a community if you put the boy (accused rapist) inprison—this makes most people believe it’s better tohandle it a different way.”

This “different way” is what Liberians will refer toas “compromising” a rape case, often using chiefs,elders, or tribal governors. When a complaint isbrought to the chief, he will often deal with the casediscreetly so as not to shame the parties involved or

their families. Frequently, if the perpetrator is young,the chief will instead deal with the parents as thoseresponsible for the perpetrator.

TABLE 1. INFORMAL VS INFORMAL JUSTICE FROM VICTIM PERSPECTIVE

FACTOR INFORMAL FORMAL

Guiding Logic Reconciliatory PunitiveAccessibility of Remedy High Low

Social Stigma Lower High

Likelihood of Remedy Higher Low

Financial Cost Low Higher

Time Cost Low High

Source: Author’s summary.

While there is an increasing awareness among tra-ditional leaders that the government wants rapecases to go through the formal system, there is a cor-responding dissatisfaction with how the courts dealwith these cases. This is likely linked to a large extentwith the overall ineffectiveness of courts, which leadsto impunity and disharmony at the community level.However, importantly, there is also a widespreadfeeling that the formal adjudication of rape fails toreflect Liberia’s social and cultural values. In essence,the informal processes are viewed as acting in har-mony with prevailing social norms, whereas formalprocesses and courts are viewed as acting contrary

to them.

iv) The “costs” of formal justice for rape victims

From a survivor’s perspective, accessing the formalsystem in response to SGBV is a “high cost” en-deavor in three main respects. First, financially , theprocess of going to court is, relative to the wealth ofmost Liberian citizens, hugely expensive. In the firstinstance, it will often involve paying for the police

to come and investigate, particularly if the personsinvolved are situated outside the capital Monrovia(Nagelhus Schia and de Carvalho 2009, 3). Shouldthe case proceed to court, this will often necessitatethat the survivor (frequently also a guardian, con-sidering the high percentage of cases that involvechildren) leave behind family responsibilities andwage earning activities to travel to Monrovia or theregional capital where circuit courts are situated.The unpredictability and delays of court proceduresexacerbate the loss of earnings and costs incurred.

Second, socially , there remains a powerful and

pervasive cultural stigma surrounding rape and thereporting of sexual offenses in Liberia. It is generallyconsidered a family or community matter, andnot a matter suitable for the courts. In particular,the Ministry of Gender’s statistics show that adultwomen victims very rarely report cases of rape, a factgenerally attributed to perceived shame or othersocial factors. This reality is intertwined with the factthat in most cases, the perpetrator is known to thevictim—he is from the same community or is even




a family member. As it was for Olivia, by enteringthe criminal justice system, the victim risks beingostracized by the community or even her family.

Third, psychologically , the process of a victim of rape

pursuing access to justice through formal channelsin any national context is fraught with high risk of“secondary trauma.” This is particularly so in Libe-ria, where “man-woman business” remains a largelytaboo issue in public, and where the professionalismand capacity of practitioners in the justice system isoften suspect. A situation in which a survivor mustgo through invasive medical inspections and recounther ordeal on numerous occasions to different, unfa-miliar actors in positions of authority, and where con-fidentiality is not ensured, is highly intimidating. Thisis especially pronounced for the many victims whoare still children.

Fashioning an effective legal response to the pro-blem of SGBV against this complex socio-legaland cultural landscape, in a context still in disarrayfrom recent war, was the stark challenge facing thegovernment, UN, and NGO policy makers. To be

successful, their response had to address these highcosts associated with access to justice for women,creating a process that was victim friendly and moreefficient and that would combat the prevalent cultureof impunity for crimes of SGBV.




II. Criminal Court E and the Legal Response

to SGBV in Liberia

A. THE GENERAL RESPONSE TO SGBV

Few countries have taken as many steps, or as manyvisible steps, to combat the issue of SGBV as hasLiberia in the years since the war. Indeed, a plethoraof progressive gender-focused policy initiatives havebeen implemented. Notably, Liberia became oneof only six African countries to develop a nationalaction plan for the implementation of UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 1325.9 The country’s develop-mental roadmap, the 2008–2011 Poverty Reduction

Strategy, prioritized the issue of women’s rights andSGBV in particular, and a National Plan of Actionfor SGBV was drafted and approved. In addition tothese policy initiatives, permanent new institutionswere formed; most notably, a Ministry of Gender andDevelopment was instituted, complete with a GBVUnit mandated to coordinate activities and developSGBV responsive policies.

Within this broad-based policy framework, formula-ting an effective legal response was a key compo-nent. To combat impunity for acts of SGBV, a Women

and Children Protection Service (WACPS) within theLiberia National Police was formed, along with anSGBV Crimes Prosecution Unit within the Ministry of

Justice. In addition, a new specialized sexual offensescourt, Criminal Court E, was established. The inter-national donor community provided strong fundingand technical support to all of these initiatives, andthe UN agencies also implemented a correspond-ing UN Joint Programme to Prevent and Respondto Sexual and Gender Based Violence, which wassigned in June 2008. This series of legal responseswas a central tenet of all the efforts made to combatSGBV in Liberia.

B. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

At that time, however, the legal remedies to SGBVlacked a solid underpinning in law, as Liberia’s legalframework around SGBV was archaic. Advocacyefforts by women’s rights groups sought improvementthrough several legal and judicial reform proposals.Their first success was reform of the legal frameworkon rape, substantially amending chapter 14 ofthe Penal Code. The new law came into effect onJanuary 17, 2006. Among other reforms (see table2), the new law included harsher penalties for the

crime of rape, made rape a non-bailable offense, andstipulated that specified sexual violence cases mustbe held “in camera” (or in private).

9 UN Security Council Resolution 1325 represented the rst time the Security Council addressed the impact of armed conict on womenand girls and the importance of women’s participation at all decision-making levels in conict prevention, conict resolution, and peaceprocesses. It was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on October 31, 2000.

TABLE 2. FEATURES OF THE NEW LEGALFRAMEWORKON RAPE

SIX KEY FEATURES OF AMENDMENT OF CHAPTER 14 OF THE PENAL CODE

1. The legal age of consent is raised to 18 years old.

2. The crime of gang rape is established as a rst-degree felony.

3. First-degree rape will be a capital offense attracting up to life imprisonment.

4. First-degree felony where victim is younger than 18 years old (and perpetrator is older than 18).

5. Other rapes are second-degree crimes, with sentences of up to 10 years.

6. All cases of sexual violence to be held “in camera.”

Source: Chapter 14, Liberian Penal Code.




The effect of the legislation alone seems to havebeen limited. As a United Nations Mission in Liberia(UNMIL) report for May–July 2008 stated “Despitewidespread publicity surrounding the legislation’scontents and the personal commitment of the

president to tackling this issue, the response of lawenforcement and judicial authorities has been disap-pointing” (UNMIL 2008). While there is no compre-hensive data, and not enough time had passed toproperly gauge performance improvements, anec-dotal evidence from those working in Liberia at thetime suggests that there was no discernible improve-ment in the reporting and progression of SGBV casesthrough the justice system following the passing ofthe new law.

C. THE IMPETUS FOR SPECIALIZED STRUCTURES

“We sat with too many cases, and partnerswere coming and complaining that rapecases were not heard because all cases weretogether. Judges had conservative attitudesand didn’t want to hear about rape. Theyput cases at the back of the queue. Whencases were heard, the process was terriblefor survivors.”

—Liberian women’s rights activist

As the above quote from a long-time women’s rights

advocate in Liberia highlights, the apparent limitedeffects of law reform seemed to implicate either theinability or the conscious reluctance of the judiciary toaddress rape cases through normal court processes.Even with a newly protective legal framework, theinstitutional capacity or inclination was not sufficientto secure access to justice for most survivors.

With increasing focus on SGBV from internationaldonors and the Liberian government, and with thetrue extent of the issue ever more visible to healthcare providers and law enforcement personnel, thedemand for improved judicial remedies had a clear

basis. The justice system, however, dysfunctionaleven before the war and decimated after, was not

equipped or coordinated to respond to the complexchallenge. Cognizant of these unfavorable institu-tional factors, local and international organizationsadvocated for a specialized prosecution unit andsexual offenses court.10

These groups encountered strong resistance fromsome sectors of the legal community. For example,against substantial available evidence, former ChiefJustice Johnnie N. Lewis stated in October 2006that: “There is no need for such a court right now asour court systems can handle those cases.”11 Manylawyers were also not supportive of the idea of a spe-cialized prosecution unit or court, or even the newlaw. Indeed, various members of the legal commu-nity advocated for its overturn, claiming it was unfairto and “wicked against defendants.”12 Nonetheless,a trio of interlinked and mutually reinforcing special-

ized structures was instituted, encompassing thepolice, prosecution, and courts.

Criminal Court E was eventually established by anamendment of the Judiciary Law of 1972, Chapter25, which was published in handbill on September23, 2008. The court opened in December 2008,with the Danish government (through the Peace-Building Fund and managed by the United NationsPopulation Fund [UNFPA]) providing substantialfinancial support. Over US$200,000 went towardrefurbishment of the court itself, including television

sets for in-camera proceedings, as specified in theamendment to chapter 14 of the Penal Code.13 Other elements of support to the court includedspecialized training and study abroad programs.

Following this development, an SGBV Crimes Pros-ecution Unit, under the Ministry of Justice, was for-mally opened in February 2009. Its intention was to“…enhance prosecution services for these crimes,providing a concentrated prosecution unit, spe-cially trained in the prosecution of these crimes, andin providing support for victims” (Liberia 2009, 7).As noted above, the WACPS special investigative

unit was also formed at this time within the LiberiaNational Police, designed to deal with SGBV cases

10 Liberia has a number of long-established specialized courts. The Judiciary Law of 1972 species the existence of labour, debt, monthlyand probate, juvenile, tax, trafc, and civil courts. Subsequent to the opening of Criminal Court E, in September 2008, the country’s rstcommercial court was opened, on which three judges handle the backlog of cases on nancial and commercial disputes.

11 See “Liberia: Rapists go Free,” IRIN, October 19, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/61369/LIBERIA-Rapists-go-free.

12 Peter N. Toby, “Liberia: Lawyers Denounce Rape Laws As Unjust,” AllAfrica, August 31, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201008310721.html.

13 “Liberian Leader Dedicates Criminal Court ‘E,’” Press release (Monrovia: Executive Mansion, December 3, 2008), http://www.emansion.gov.lr/2press.php?news_id=972&related=7&pg=sp.




14 United Nations, “Gender Based Violence Unit of the Ministry of Gender and Development, Liberia (2008),” UN Secretary-General’s Databaseon Violence against Women,http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/searchDetail.action?measureId=33910&baseHREF=country&baseHREFId=766.

at the police level in tandem with the SGBV Crimes

Unit. Since its inception, approximately 245 inves-tigators have been trained. Referrals to these insti-tutions come from a variety of service providers,notably the Ministry of Gender GBV unit, which wasstarted up to provide counseling and legal and refer-ral services to survivors, as well as to monitor data,raise awareness, and provide education.14

D. FEATURES OF CRIMINAL COURT E

Criminal Court E was designed to deal exclusivelywith sexual offenses. To that end, it has original

exclusive jurisdiction over cases of rape, sodomy,corruption of minors, sexual abuse, and sexual assaultthat take place in Montserrado County, where thecapital Monrovia is located. This precludes any othercourt in Montserrado County, whether magistrate orcircuit court, from hearing any sexual offense cases.If a sexual offense is reported to a magistrate court inMontserrado County, that court has no jurisdiction,cannot issue a writ, or determine probable cause,and must instead pass it on to Criminal Court E.While the law envisages divisions of Criminal CourtE in other counties, the Monrovia court remains theonly specialized sexual offenses court established

thus far in Liberia. It is important to note the limitedgeographical scope of Criminal Court E, althoughapproximately one-third of Liberia’s citizens livein Montserrado County, the most urbanized ofLiberia’s counties. Sexual offenses reported in the 14

STAGE 1:LNP Womenand Children

Protection Services

STAGE 2:Specialized

SGBV CrimesProsecution Unit

STAGE 3:Specialized SexualOffenses Criminal

Court E

FIGURE 2. CRIMINAL COURT E IN CONTEXT OF OTHER SGBV REFORMS

FIGURE 3. POLITICAL MAP OF LIBERIA


Source: Open source map.

other counties are dealt with by conventional, non-

specialized circuit courts, and are not prioritized overother forms of cases. One circuit court exists in eachof these other 14 counties.




In Montserrado, due to the large number of SGBVcases, Criminal Court E is placed in a unique posi-tion in Liberia in terms of the load it must bear. Thisis because for other types of cases, magistrates mayundertake a preliminary examination to determine

probable cause even where they do not have juris-diction to hear the case at the subordinate level. Thisprocess of preliminary examination is able, in theory,to serve as a filter, eliminating cases where there isno probable cause for the state to prosecute beforethey are transferred to the circuit court. There is nosuch filter for Criminal Court E, however, and withoutthis preliminary step, it is not until the grand jury hasbeen arraigned for the case that a determination ofwhether the state has sufficient cause to proceed totrial is made. In the eventual trial, a 15-person jurywill sit, unless this right is waived by the accused.

The law establishing Criminal Court E also providesfor two judges to be assigned to share the caseload.This distinguishes the court from conventional cir-cuit courts, which only have one assigned judge.15 However, despite this provision, Criminal Court E has

only ever operated with a single judge, for reasonsthat are not clear. The first judge assigned, a femaleformer Deputy Minister of Justice and Law Profes-sor who was instrumental in supporting the court’sformation while operating in the Executive Branch,moved to the United States to undertake graduatestudy not long after her appointment. In the interimperiod, the court was presided over by anotherfemale judge. In early 2013, the initially appointed

judge finally took up her position on the court, withthe second judge returning to normal circuit courtduty rather than continuing at Criminal Court E.

TABLE 3. THE MODEL – SOUTH AFRICA’S SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURTS

THE MODEL – SOUTH AFRICA’S SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURTS

Background • South Africa’s rst specialized sexual offenses court was established in March 1993 atthe Wynberg Magistrate’s Court.

• By the end of 2005, 74 specialized courts had been established nationwide.• The courts were intended to address very high rape gures, and in particular, mitigate

the problem of secondary victimization.

Key Aspects

of the Process

• Unlike in Criminal Court E, the Wynberg Court had in-camera rooms where children

could give evidence with a social worker acting as intermediary. This option had to berequested and justied by the prosecutor.

Successes • Conviction rates were generally higher than in non-specialized courts, and there was adecrease in case timelines from report to nalization.

Challenges • Courts were underfunded, carried high caseloads, and suffered from high staff turnover,particularly for prosecutors.

• Secondary victimization remained an issue due to the adversarial nature of trial,particularly in cross examination.

• Courts did not have a specic establishing framework, and had poor visibility in remoteareas and a lack of well-trained, experienced court personnel.

• There was no monitoring and evaluation mechanism developed to continually assess the

courts.• The program was subsequently discontinued, and there are now only nine sexualoffenses courts remaining South Africa.

The Future • In 2013, with sexual violence a continuing issue, the South African governmentannounced that it would be reintroducing the sexual offenses courts; 22 will be in use bythe end of 2013–14.

Source: Cossins (2009); Altbeker (2003).

15 By contrast, the specialized commercial court, which opened in 2011, has three judges assigned to it.




Criminal Court E, located in the judiciary headquar-ters (the Temple of Justice) in Monrovia, was basedlargely on the template of South Africa’s specializedsexual offenses courts. Along with its original andexclusive jurisdiction, it is distinguished from other

courts through its emphasis on victim-friendly pro-cesses. In particular, as noted above, witness tes-timony is given in camera, which means the victimgives evidence into a microphone from within awitness room closed to observers, with televisionscreens in court showing only the back of the victim’shead. This feature is designed to make court a lessharrowing experience for the survivor, as she neednot confront the accused face to face in the court,nor face an intimidating gallery of onlookers whilerecounting events and delivering testimony. Thisaspect is compulsory; the law does not allow for awaiver of the in-camera element by the survivor, nor

at the judge’s discretion. Further, only the lawyersand a limited number of family members generallywitness proceedings in Criminal Court E.

Except for these features, Criminal Court E remainsa conventional adversarial common law style courtin designand layout. Since 2010–11, it has benefitedfrom the piloting of a new court reporter program, inwhich a limited number of practitioners are trained to

use advanced recording and voice recognition soft-ware. When the equipment is operational, this allowsfor far more efficient and accurate court reportingthan is the norm in Liberia, where the task is gener-ally undertaken on a typewriter, and also limits thefrequent need for lawyers and witnesses to repeatstatements for the benefit of the typist. However, incommon with the wider Temple of Justice building,Criminal Court E is hampered by intermittent elec-tricity outages. In terms of operational budget, thecourt’s costs are incorporated fully into the judiciary’sbudget. According to the financial comptroller, itsrunning costs are the same as for other non-special-

ized courts, and it has the same working set-up ofclerks, marshals, and so on, who are conventional

judiciary employees.

Report toand

Investigationby WACPS

Via LiberiaNationalPolice

Via Medical

ServiceProvider

Via MoGDGBV unit

Via NGO orINGO

Via SGBVCrimesProsecution

Unit

FIGURE 4. JUSTICE SYSTEM ENTRY POINTS

16 “INGO” refers to “international nongovernmental organization.”

Source: Author’s summary.16




III. Successes and Challenges

There were three main interrelated motivating fac-tors that drove the institution of Criminal Court E andthe other specialized SGBV-focused justice sectorstructures, the WACPS and SGBV Crimes Unit. Thesemotivations emanated primarily from a clear under-standing of prevailing deficiencies in the wider con-ventional justice system. First and foremost, the cre-ation of the new court and special investigative unitswas intended to make the process more victim cen-tered , assuaging as much as possible the differentcosts—financial, social, and psychological—which

frequently dissuaded the victim from pursuing thecase through the formal justice system. Second, itwas intended to be a more efficient process, eliminat-ing the delays pervasive in the conventional courts sothat a larger number of survivors would have timelyaccess to justice, with a corresponding dent in theprevailing culture of impunity. Third, it was hopedthat the court would increase the visibility of theissue, and serve as a deterrent to potential offenders.In addition to consideration of the court’s success inpursuit of these goals, this section will also considertwo other wider factors: the sustainability of Criminal

Court E in the long run, and its continued legitimacy .

These five key concepts (victim centeredness, effi-ciency, visibility, sustainability, and legitimacy) pro-vide a viable, logical structure in which to assess thesuccesses and challenges of Criminal Court E. Thespecial requirement for a particularly victim-centeredapproach for sexual offenses is coupled with the fun-damental rule of law principles of a timely trial (effi-ciency), where justice is seen to be done (visibility),by a court whose authority is clear and respected(legitimacy). However, it should be noted that theseelements are, in reality, largely intertwined and mutu-

ally reinforcing. For instance, from a victim’s perspec-tive, if the process is not efficient , it cannot be trulyvictim centered , as these delays will result in accruedcosts—financial, social, or psychological. Similarly,a process that is not visible and efficient will notbe viewed as legitimate from a wider societal per-spective. As such, quantitative questions (does thecourt hear enough cases?) and qualitative indicators(how victim friendly are the court’s procedures andoutcomes?) cannot be considered divorced fromeach other.

FIGURE 5. ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL SPECIALIZED COURT IN FCS

Visible

Efcient Legitimate

Victim-Centeredprocess

Sustainable

SuccessfulSpecialized

Sexual OffensesCourt





“The lawyer is looking down at her. Thelittle girl says nothing. It was in open court,

it was embarrassing, the child couldn’t talk.Everyone was there sitting looking at her.The man who raped her too.”

—Women’s Rights NGO Program Ofcer

A. VICTIM-CENTERED PROCESS

i) Court procedures

The above memory of observing a rape trial involvinga minor in open court prior to the opening of CriminalCourt E, recounted by a member of a women’srights NGO, shows why many felt the existing

judicial process was not considerate to the needs

of the victim. Criminal Court E was an opportunityto address this within the context of the court itself.Ensuring court procedures are victim centered is ofparticular importance, as a court appearance canrepresent perhaps the most visible and exposingaspect of the process for a victim. It is here that thesocial and psychological costs highlighted earlier canbe especially pronounced.

The law addressed this concern through its require-ment that the trials be held in camera. As describedabove, this means that the victim gives testimony

from a closed witness booth in sight only of the judge, and testimony is broadcast via microphoneand video screen, with a video camera relaying toa screen only the back of the victim’s head. The aimwas to reduce the secondary trauma for the survivor,shielding her from having to confront the perpetra-tor face to face, and also to protect the identity ofthe victim from observers and the press (who are notpermitted in court without special dispensation).

This aspect of Criminal Court E proceedings has beenexceedingly controversial. Generally, the administra-tion of justice must be public, with members of the

public and the media having the right to attend allcourt hearings and report fully on trials. This “open

justice principle” is central to the rule of law, provi-ding scrutiny of the trial process. Also critical to therule of law is the constitutional right of the accusedto confront his or her accuser.

The in-camera element of Criminal Court E trialsseems to run counter to these general principles,and as such, has been subject to much criticismwithin Liberia. A UNFPA report on the SGBV CrimesUnit referred to the resentment of the Liberian legal

community: “This procedural by-pass has attractedferocious criticism from practicing defense lawyers, aswell as other legal luminaries. Some of the criticismsare genuine and includes denying defendant thefundamental due process of the law, firstly. It violatesconstitutional requirement where the adversarialsystem is practice of how a trial should be run in theRepublic of Liberia, secondly” (Saffa Abdulai 2010,20). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Liberiain 2012 ruled that the in-camera element did notviolate the Liberian Constitution.17 This decision,while binding, remains highly controversial.

It remains extremely difficult to properly assess thevictim’s role and experience without reference touser/perception surveys or other qualitative data.However, the in-camera element was generallyviewed as positive by interviewees engaged with theprocess from a victim’s perspective, who perceivedthat it made the court itself a less harrowingexperience for victims, particularly with regard tothe recounting of traumatic testimony. However,from the perspective of a prosecutor charged withsecuring a guilty verdict from the jury, the impactof the in-camera element is less clear-cut. While in

theory it should enable the victim to feel more secureand comfortable and therefore assist in the elicitingof effective testimony, one U.S.-trained former sexcrimes prosecutor noted one disadvantage. As sheput it: “Bad as it sounds, when you are trying to geta conviction in front of a jury, that moment wherethe witness points out the perpetrator in court, thatis golden. You need a victim to look at her accuserand cry.”

It may well be that the utility of the in-camera trialsdepends on the particular case and the situationof the victim. Under the current law, however, the

procedure is compulsory. This may make sense in thecontext of Criminal Court E, where the vast majorityof cases have concerned the rape of children. In theAugust 2012 term of the court, 20 out of 23 cases onthe docket were statutory rape cases, which place

17 Case of Musa Soloman Fallah v. Republic of Liberia, July 2011, available on www.liberlii.org.




the need for a secure, non-intimidating processin particularly stark relief. However, the apparentprioritization of child cases by the prosecution, whileunderstandable, has perhaps not helped in securingconvictions. Cases involving children are notoriously

hard to prosecute in any country. In Liberia, whereculturally young children (particularly girls) are notgenerally used to communicating vocally to adults(especially those outside the family), eliciting thenecessary descriptive detail is very challenging.Further, along with making it more difficult to secureconvictions, there is a danger that in prioritizingcases involving child victims (which are more widelyaccepted as criminal acts suitable for the court), thecourt could serve to legitimate the ingrained culturalperception that rape of adult women is less serious,and therefore not a matter for the courts.

Along with the in-camera element, intervieweesalso highlighted the leadership of a female judge asimportant in ensuring a victim-centered court pro-cess, pointing to the reality that the vast majority ofcases concern female victims. As mentioned earlier,since the court’s inception, two female judges haveserved. The previous judge selected was not, how-ever, able to address important issues affecting thefunctioning of the court, such as deficient court man-agement, the maintenance of discipline in the court-room, and the need for the consistent, predictablesentencing of offenders. It was suggested by a pro-

minent Liberian lawyer that the nomination of amale judge to Criminal Court E at some future pointwould help to address the perception among manymen, even in the legal community, that the court is asort of special interest “women’s court.”18

ii) Wider considerations for a victim-centered pro-cess

Regardless of their impact, it is important to set theefforts within Criminal Court E in perspective againstthe wider process of accessing justice. A few pointsare especially important. First, to minimize social

and psychological costs, confidentiality and discre-tion must be maintained for the victim at all stagesof the process, as the victim interacts with medical,

law enforcement, and prosecution personnel. A vic-tim’s safety and security must also be ensured. Fewof those interviewed were confident that this wasthe case, however, due to disparities in capacity andapproach, the lack of effective coordination, and the

non-uniform—and frequently ad hoc —referral path-ways. Second, financial cost is a key factor in whethermany Liberians can pursue justice, including in casesof SGBV. Currently, as for other court cases, bringinga case to Criminal Court E remains an expensive pro-cess, due to factors such as work time lost and eventravel costs to attend court. The formal justice systeminstitutions have tried to address this financial realityby means of two separate endowment funds, oneoperated by the Ministry of Gender and the otherassociated with the SGBV Crimes Unit. However, aswas highlighted at an SGBV taskforce meeting, theseresources are generally acknowledged as insufficient

and inconsistently administered.19

iii) Utilizing informal processes

There is a deeper, difficult question that must beasked about the requirements of a victim-centeredprocess as it intersects with the best interests ofthe victim and the concept of victim autonomy. Asalluded to above, the formal system’s focus on com-bating impunity is oftentimes at odds with the goalof reconciliation that underpins indigenous Liberiandispute-resolution processes. This seems to create a

tension between the goal of creating a victim-cen-tered process and the fact that this process withinthe formal system is not one that most victims arefamiliar with or would ordinarily choose to enter.As one UN representative put it: “The Ministry ofGender and those who support them are obsessedwith fighting impunity, which leads to a focus on theflawed formal judicial process which often doesn’trespect the true will or best interests of the victim.”

The idea that entering the formal justice process topursue justice could be against the best interestsof the victim seems counterintuitive and contra-

dicts the conventional wisdom that dominates theSGBV discourse in Liberia. Yet, as it has been noted,from a victim’s perspective, the financial, social, and

18 It is important to note that even by Liberia’s low standards, representation of women in the judiciary remains chronically low at 8 percent,according to the Ministry of Gender.

19 This was the consensus view of members when the issue was raised at a meeting of the Government’s SGBV taskforce.




20 See, among others, Isser, Lubkemann, and N’Tow (2009).

psychological costs necessarily involved in goingthrough the formal process (even where victim-sen-sitive steps like in-camera proceedings exist) meansthat this is often the case. A truly victim-centeredapproach therefore also requires an understanding

and acceptance of why a victim, making a rationalchoice based on financial and cultural costs, maynot want to pursue his/her case in the formal justicesystem at all. Further, without extremely effectivemechanisms to assuage these costs as much as pos-sible, there is still less incentive for someone to enterthe system, given the fact that even a determinationof guilt gives no tangible recompense to the victim.What is more, in a situation where the perpetrator isknown to the victim, the victim will likely suffer socialsanction. Dealing with the case outside of the formalsystem is thus more likely to produce a favorable out-come, where financial recompense is paid. There is

simply no corporeal payback for the investment oftaking a case through the extremely lengthy formalcriminal justice process.

This state of affairs raises an important questionabout the singular focus of support upon a formal

justice mechanism like Criminal Court E for victims ofSGBV. Bearing in mind its much higher case volumesand higher trust and acceptance among citizens, isthere a potential role for informal justice mechanismsin combating SGBV? One recent study addressedthis notion:

The customary justice mechanisms continue tobe useful in Liberia for a number of reasons.They are quick, accessible, cost-effective, andremain socially and culturally relevant in the livesof most communities in Liberia. However, their‘jurisdiction’ over sexual and gender based vio-lence cases cannot be understood in isolationfrom the traditional beliefs, values, and prac-tices that legitimise and, therefore, perpetuateviolence against women. (Liberia and UN JointProgramme 2011, 51)

The latter reality has led to the current situationin which traditional processes play no formal rolein combating SGBV. As a representative of theNational Council of Chiefs and Elders, Ma Musu E.Coleman, describes the situation, “Police and Courts

tell chiefs and tribal governors when they come tothe system that they shouldn’t have looked into itthat it wasn’t their business.”

For most international donors and other supporters,too, there is a strong aversion to the participation oftraditional leaders. As a senior advisor to the Liberiangovernment on SGBV stated, “There should be nosexual offenses dealt with by traditional leaders. Thesystem is too patriarchal. We must instead focuson making the formal system more accessible.”The perceived barriers to informal processes dealingwith SGBV cases have resulted in the current unique

emphasis on the Liberian formal criminal justicesystem overall, and as such, puts a spotlight on itsshortcomings.

The main issues with this perspective are twofold.First, it can be argued that these formal justiceapproaches do not seem to have yielded significantgains for women in Liberia thus far. Second, thereis little evidence that traditional leaders do not takewomen into account. Studies show few complaintsagainst traditional processes, while formal courtcriticisms are rife.20 However, as there has been no

specific research work done on this issue relating toSGBV, it is not possible to draw definitive conclusionson victim preferences. Regardless, there is a dangerthat a singular focus on Criminal Court E and otherformal system processes to address SGBV is an in-adequate solution to the magnitude of the problem.




The above quote, reported in a local newspaper asCriminal Court E was launched in 2008, reveals a cen-tral hope associated with the court. It should addressthe delay in hearing SGBV cases, thereby increasingaccess to justice for survivors, improving the victim-friendliness of the process through decreasing time-frames, and countering the prevailing impunity formost perpetrators. It is for perceived failings in theserespects that Criminal Court E has been called mostoften into question.

i) Numbers

Criminal Court E completed just 18 trials in the fouryears from 2009 to 2012. Detailed analysis undertakenby UNMIL in 2011 shows that Criminal Court E hasnot heard significantly more sexual offense cases

than other non-specialized circuit courts. UNMILstatistics from the most recent completed court year,2012, are highly instructive,21 showing that only fivetrials were completed in that year. The vast majorityof cases the court considered, rather than brought

to trial, were dropped or dismissed under section18 of the Criminal Procedure Law. This provisionof the law is designed to protect the constitutionalrights of pretrial detainees to a speedy trial and thepresumption of innocence, and to not be deprived ofliberty except in accordance with due process of law.This, in essence, means that the system’s inefficiencyin bringing cases through to trial results in many ofthose accused of rape going free (in accordance withthe law). Indeed, fully 93 percent of cases disposedof by Criminal Court E in 2012 ended in this way. Inthis situation, the ends of justice are not served forthe victims, or for those accused, who spend long

periods in pretrial detention.

The key question is: why has Criminal Court E beenunable to complete more trials? In order to answerthis, we must first consider briefly the requirementsfor the effective disposition of a case by this court.

FIGURE 6. NUMBER OF TRIALS COMPLETED BY CRIMINAL COURT E

Source: UNMIL Legal and Judicial Support Services.

6

5

4

3

2

1

2009 2010 2011 20120

Number of Trials Completed by

Criminal Court E (per year)

“The undue delay in prosecuting such caseswill now be a thing of the past.”

—UNMIL Independent Human Rights Expert, 2008

B. EFFICIENCY

21 The author is grateful to UNMIL for releasing to him a summary document “2012 Criminal Court E Data” in advance of the formal publishingof this data.




FIGURE 7. CRIMINAL COURT E: HOW CASES WERE DISPOSED OF IN 2012

Source: UNMIL, “2012 Criminal Court E Data” (forthcoming).

ii) Prerequisites

It is important to consider that the court does notoperate in a vacuum. No one element of the justicesystem can be considered in isolation from the other

interdependent links in the chain. Criminal Court Erelies heavily upon the quality and efficiency of theSGBV Crimes Unit in effectively bringing, preparing,and presenting viable cases in a timely manner. Thevictim and the accused, as well as their witnesses,must be prepared and present when required. Theprosecution in turn depends upon the effectiveinvestigative work of the police, frequently theWACPS, in the first instance. When this is deficient,the rest of the process is compromised. In Liberia,cases within the jurisdiction of the circuit courtmust go through the grand jury process, wherebyit is determined the state has sufficient cause to

proceed. For the trial itself, a jury must be selectedand present for the trial.

The court, for its part, has to manage these differentconstituent parts of the process effectively. Thisplaces a heavy emphasis on basic administration andcourt management. Judges must also move casesforward expeditiously, not allowing parties to delaythe process interminably.

iii) Issues involving the police and prosecutor’s office

From interviews conducted by the author, it isclear that Criminal Court E suffers not only from its

own deficiencies, but also from those of the otherinstitutions involved. Indeed, the inefficiency of theSGBV Crimes Unit was a major reason cited for thelow number of cases disposed of. As one formerinternational advisor put it: “The SGBV CrimesUnit is just incredibly disorganized. There is a lackof coordination and appreciation of who exactlyshould do what. There is really low capacity beyondthe two lead prosecutors, and with workshops andtravel, even they don’t spend the necessary time.”The prosecution of rape, like other offenses, is notsystematized and does not follow bureaucraticprocedures. The prosecutors in turn cite the

ineffective investigation by police as obstructingtheir work.

The police, of course, generally function as initialgatekeepers to the whole justice system. Petty cor-ruption at a low level is rife. The demand for paymentto facilitate investigation/arrest is frequently cited asan issue, particularly in rural areas where police trans-portation is especially difficult. Even more impor-tantly, interviews indicated a perception among the

Completed Trial - 5 cases

Guilty Plea - 2 cases

Plea Bargain - 1 case

Dropped/Dismissed under s18

(docketed) - 6 cases

Dropped/Dismissed under s18

(non-docketed) - 99 cases

4%

88%

2%

1%5%




police that their role is to arrest the accused ratherthan to investigate the crime. This fits with the pre-vailing norm whereby establishing actual proof ofguilt is seldom the central element of the process.Specifically to SGBV, the lack of forensic capability is

a constant refrain from Liberian justice practitionerswhen asked why prosecutions are so hard to secure.There is currently a donor-supported pilot programof swabs testing, and while swabs cannot identify a

specific perpetrator, they can, if used properly, showdefinitively that, in rape cases, for example, inter-course took place. The Swedish government is alsofunding the development of a mobile forensics lab.These efforts may yield improvements, but there is

currently an inadequate foundation from the policethrough to the prosecution, which greatly hindersthe ability of Criminal Court E to dispose of caseseffectively.

22 By way of example, in its August 2010 end-of-term analysis report on the circuit courts, LJSSD noted that seven trials were conducted byCriminal Court “A” during the August term alone, six of which were non-jury trials in which defendants had waived the right to a jury trial. Bycontrast, in the February and May 2010 terms, in which jury trial was not waived in any case, only one case was tried at Criminal Court “A”during the respective terms.

iv) Issues involving the grand jury and jury systems

Within the court’s control, the grand jury and jury sys-tems are a major factor in the slow progression of

cases (Gongloe 2010). The chief prosecutor of theSGBV Crimes Unit highlighted that there is insuffi-cient grand jury in Montserrado County to indict all

the cases that come to the grand jury during the 42days it sits during a term of court. As for the juryitself, the process is disorganized and subject toabuse. Evidence collected by UNMIL Legal and Judi-

cial Support Services suggests that the Liberian jurysystem substantially reduces the numbers of casesthat can be tried during any one circuit court term.22

FIGURE 8. PROGRESSION OF SGBV CASE THROUGH CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS


1Crime

Reported PRISONCRIMINALACTIVITY

2Investigation

3Arrest

4GrandJury

5Trial

NotGuilty

NoCause

NoArrest

ExitCriminalJusticeProcess

Stage inCriminalJusticeProcess

KEY




23 This gure includes cases carried over from previous court terms.

24 Trials completed include all those ending in conviction, acquittal, or hung jury. Cases otherwise disposed of include guilty pleas and pleaagreements; nolle prosequoi pursuant to Section 18.1 Criminal Procedure Law (CPL); and failure to proceed pursuant to Section 18.2 CPL,Motion for Judgment of Acquittal S.20.10 CPL.

25 Figures taken from UNMIL (2011).

FIGURE 9. INTER-LINKED NATURE OF THE JUSTICE PROCESS


INVESTIGATION

Liberia National Police

GRAND JURY, toADJUDICATION

Criminal Court E

PROSECUTIONSGBV

Crimes Unit

general malaise of the Liberian justice system as awhole. Liberia’s courts generally dispose of few casesand complete very few trials. According to UNMIL’scourt statistics, in 2011, there were 2,118 cases onthe 12 circuit court dockets for which records were

available.23 Only 44 trials were completed in thatperiod,24 meaning that on average, a circuit courtcompleted just four trials in the legal year.25 Thisis strikingly similar to the trial completion figuresfrom Criminal Court E, and is despite judiciary-wideefficiency-focused initiatives such as the implemen-tation of a new recordkeeping system in 2010 –11.The court and SGBV Crimes Unit were, in essence,an attempt to circumvent the chronic deficienciesof Liberia’s anemic criminal justice system, insula-ting SGBV cases from its problems. They have clearlyfailed to do so, since in addition to having to dealwith the inherently greater complexities of SGBV

cases, Criminal Court E also demonstrates all of the judiciary’s wider institutional weaknesses.

v) General inefficiency

Finally, Criminal Court E is dogged by various con-tinuing issues such as poor court administration,logistical problems, personnel tardiness and non-

appearance, poor preparation by lawyers, unneces-sary adjournments, and delaying tactics by defenselawyers who know that the longer the case runs, thesmaller the chance that a conviction can be secured.An UNMIL observer noted that lawyers will frequentlyask for time to read the transcripts before they crossexamine. As one civil society actor said: “By the timecase gets to court it is losing weight all the time. Theslow pace of justice is the main issue.” For victims ofSGBV, the slower the pace, the smaller the chance ofthe perpetrator being convicted and the more costlythe process financially, psychologically, and socially(as outlined above).

It is important to note that these issues are notspecific to Criminal Court E, but rather reflect the




C. SUSTAINABILITY AND LEGITIMACY

“It [Criminal Court E] is something of a whiteelephant introduced by the internationalcommunity, and the government needs toproperly embrace it.”

—Senior UN Advisor on SGBV

Sustainability and legitimacy are interlinked con-cepts. Many of the factors that contribute to sustain-ability are also prerequisites to legitimacy. Theseconcepts can be considered from the point of view ofthree different Liberian constituencies with a stake inthe SGBV court: the Liberian government, the Libe-rian legal community, and the general population.

i) Buy-in of the Liberian government

It is generally acknowledged that the internationalcommunity played a driving role in pushing for andsupporting action on SGBV, including the launch ofCriminal Court E. Some who were involved in theformation of the court went so far as to label it a“demand” of the international community. This, initself, is not necessarily a negative phenomenon;indeed, the same could be said for many develop-ment-focused initiatives in Liberia. However, in thelong run, for an initiative to be successful, a transitionmust take place from this internationally supported

founding to the meaningful local ownership that isa prerequisite to the sustainability and legitimacyof any development initiative. Ownership demandsthat responsibility is taken for an initiative’s continu-ing success, for financial investment in the project,and for a commitment to its long-term goals. In thecase of Criminal Court E, the challenge is complex;the court must seek to avoid the problems of thesystem, yet for sustainability and legitimacy, it mustbe considered as part of the system.

Respondents in this study all had keen awareness ofSGBV as a magnet for donor funds. As one represen-

tative of the UN correctly stated, “Rape is a politi-cal tool par excellence for money and internationalrecognition.” As a result, some expressed concernabout the role of the Liberian government in CriminalCourt E and other SGBV initiatives, and whether thiswas more indicative of government acquiescence inpursuit of donor funds than meaningful participa-

tion based on true commitment to the issue. Thisis a significant concern in a country such as Liberia,where donor funds represent such a high proportionof available financial resources amid general scarcity.

In terms of Criminal Court E, while actors complainedof underfunding, the court is fully incorporated intothe financial budget of the judiciary and treated “thesame as any other of our courts,” according to the judi-ciary’s financial controller. This is a very positive sign.However, financial support does not necessarily meanstrong institutional support. Generally, intervieweesseemed to feel there was “surface level appearanceand limited genuine investment.”26 A representativeof the UN said: “Criminal Court E is still viewed as aproject, not a component of the Liberian system.”One donor report from 2010 stated that: “Within theMOJ [Ministry of Justice] itself, and the entirety of

the judiciary, there is a lack of willingness and ownership of the new dynamics that unfolded with the cre-ation of Criminal Court ‘E’ and the establishment ofthe (SGBV) Crimes Unit” (Saffa Abdulai 2010, 14).One prominent adjudicator felt that the appointmentof less experienced judges to sit on Criminal CourtE has made it difficult for the court, and reflected a

judiciary that is placating donors and key voices inthe Executive without demonstrating real buy-in.

ii) The support of the Liberian legal community

Another important sphere of ownership is theLiberian legal community. Poor understanding ofcontext and cultural norms can yield unintended andhighly counterproductive consequences. The court,and SGBV initiatives in general, initially attractedsome resentment, for a number of reasons. First, thelegal community remains dominated by men, manyof whom, in common with prevailing social norms,did not consider rape a matter for the court. As onemagistrate noted, “That’s family business in Liberia,not court business.” Others resented the focus offinances and interest on what was viewed as a bou-tique “women’s” program. One lawyer commented

on the fact that the SGBV Crimes Chief Prosecutor,part of the Ministry of Justice, was getting paid morethan the Solicitor-General, the Chief Prosecutor inLiberia. Such attitudes made the embedding pro-cess for the court more difficult, though they seemto have subsided somewhat as the initiatives havebecome established.

26 Quote from a former international adviser to the SGBV Crimes Unit.




iii) The general population: prison conditions andpretrial detention

In general in Liberia, the perceived legitimacy of theformal justice system, to the extent it exists, stems

not from its playing an effective, respected role inthe life of citizens, but rather from the state’s abilityto deprive liberty. At the same time, excessivearbitrary detention, like corruption, can also have adeleterious impact on the state’s legitimacy in theeyes of the citizens. To be seen as fully legitimate,courts such as Criminal Court E must be viewed asfair and just, and the justice meted out must apply toboth the victim and the accused.

Those accused of crimes in Liberia, particularly if poorand unrepresented, frequently face long periods ofpretrial detention in overcrowded prisons. As many

as 79 percent of those currently detained nationwidehave not been brought to trial.27 The average lengthof pretrial detention is 169 days.28 This problem,which involves those accused awaiting trial in prisonconditions that have been described as “appalling,”29 is the result of pervasive and broad underlyingsystemic weaknesses. The largest prison, MonroviaCentral Prison, continues to operate at betweentwo and three times over its intended capacity30 andunder extremely poor conditions.31 As of September2012, there were 1,782 people in prison nationwide.Of those, 1,411 were pretrial detainees (the figure of

79 percent mentioned above). In Monrovia CentralPrison, the pretrial detainee rate as of September2012 was 87 percent.32 Overall, strong efforts toaddress the issue over the past three years have notyet resulted in a significant improvement in Liberia’spretrial detainee statistics. Moreover, despite thisprison overcrowding and high rate of detention,victims rarely see convictions.33

Criminal Court E mirrors the poor state of the wider justice system in terms of the minimal number of trialsit manages to complete (see section III B above).However, the relevant legal framework exacerbatesthis for cases of rape, due to two main factors. First,

as first-degree rape is a non-bailable offense, thosewho are arrested must wait in detention for trial.Second, as a magistrate court may not hold a prelimi-nary examination, there is no assessment of whetherthe state has cause to proceed until a grand jury can bearraigned, a process that can take an extremely longtime. As such, on the strength of an accusation andsubsequent arrest, an accused individual will oftenspend punitive periods in pretrial detention beforethere is an opportunity for the grand jury to make adetermination of whether there is cause to proceedat all. While the reasons for the non-bailable provi-sion are clear in safeguarding the rights of the victim,

there is an argument to be made that this affects thelegitimacy of the court by serving to engender sym-pathy for those accused of this crime, and by encou-raging spurious accusations, and that this also runscounter to the fundamental principle of innocenceuntil proven guilty.

This issue is linked to the fact that in Liberia percep-tions as to the criminal nature and seriousness of rapevary greatly, particularly in cases where the victim hasreached sexual maturity (regardless of age). Therealso seem to be few social sanctions for perpetrators

of rape and sexual violence. As elsewhere, wherelaws seek to sanction in excess of society’s normsand expectations, judges and other justice sectoractors will often struggle to implement them effec-tively, and the system’s legitimacy in the eyes of thepopulation will be affected.

27 Information derived from UNMIL Correction Advisory Unit’s (CAU) nationwide prison records for September 2012.

28 As of September 2012, according to an analysis of the UNMIL CAU’s prison records.

29 Amnesty International, “Appalling Prison Conditions in Liberia Must Be Improved,” (London, Amnesty International, September 21, 2011),http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/appalling-prison-conditions-liberia-must-be-improved-2011-09-21.

30 Monrovia Central Prison is designed to hold a maximum of 374 detainees. In September 2012, records showed it contained 947 detainees.

31 According to the U.S. State Department’s report: “Inadequate provisions for food, sanitation, ventilation, temperature, lighting, basic andemergency medical care, and potable water contributed to harsh and life-threatening conditions in the country’s 15 prisons and detentioncenters.” See U.S. Department of State (2011, 3). See also Amnesty International (2011).

32 In September 2012, of 947 detainees, only 121 were sentenced.

33 UNMIL LJSSD found that only 44 trials were completed in 2011 in the 12 circuit courts surveyed. Trials completed account for around halfof all cases disposed of at the circuit court level. See UNMIL (2011).




D. VISIBILITY

High profile initiatives such as Criminal Court E, whichseek to address an issue that finds its roots, to a largeextent, in a lack of awareness and troublesome cul-

tural norms, have a potentially valuable role to playin raising the visibility of the issue among the generalpopulation. Further, where impunity has been pre-valent, could the visibility of the court provide adeterrent effect in relation to potential perpetrators?

i) Increased awareness

Among interviewees, most cited “visibility for theissue” and “increased awareness” as the one clearsuccess of Criminal Court E. The court, in commonwith other specialist “gender” projects such as theMinistry of Gender, the SGBV Crimes Unit, and the

WACPS, coupled with the issue’s inclusion in govern-ment rhetoric, has served to raise awareness of theissue of SGBV and the rights of women generally.Community-level interviews in Monrovia showed ageneral understanding of the fact that there was a“woman’s court” at the Temple of Justice. Many per-ceived it as linked with the Ministry of Gender andDevelopment. Younger respondents seemed betterinformed, though male interviewees frequentlyexpressed negative emotions about initiatives per-ceived as specifically for women. From the admit-tedly small sample group, it seems that young urban

males perceive many reforms, particularly thoseseen as stemming from the Ministry of Gender andDevelopment, as excluding them. It is likely this levelof negative awareness about the court is limited toMonrovia and parts of Montserrado, since the reachof the Criminal Court E and other gender initiativesis geographically limited.

ii) Deterrence

Perspectives from government, international, andcivil society organization (CSO) stakeholders on the

importance of increased visibility normally imbue thecourt with a power of deterrence in relation to poten-tial perpetrators. This perception—that the exis-tence of sanctions such as judicial mechanisms andstringent sentencing serve as a deterrent to criminalbehavior—is a very conventional view worldwide. Inrelation to SGBV in Liberia, one report even went sofar as to proclaim that, on the reason for the highprevalence of SGBV: “It is therefore safe to conclude,inter alia, that the lack of strong law and state me-chanism to deter people from practicing SGBV is thecause” (Saffa Abdulai 2010, 5).

Certainly, severe penalties for SGBV are providedunder the new rape legal framework, with theassumption that the more severe the penalties, thegreater the deterrent effect. However, this view, whileintuitive, seems largely unsupported by research. Ingeneral, most agree that: “Punishment certainty is farmore consistently found to deter crime than punish-ment severity, and the extra-legal consequences ofcrime seem at least as great a deterrent as the legalconsequences” (Wright 2010, 5).

Applied to Criminal Court E, there is an almost ne-

gligible chance that a case, even if brought to thesystem, will result in a conviction. If there is a deter-rent effect, it exists in the long periods of pretrialdetention that those accused of SGBV face due toovercrowded dockets. While this effect would bewelcome, it is not without cost for fundamental ruleof law principles.




IV. Lessons and Recommendations

A. LESSONS FROM THE LIBERIAN EXPERIENCE

i) On specialized structures generally

First and perhaps most obviously, the experience ofCriminal Court E shows that the existence of a spe-cialized institution does not necessarily, in and ofitself, result in immediate tangible gains for thoseseeking to expand access to justice for victims ofSGBV. Similarly, the existence of a detailed and pro-gressive policy framework is only an expression ofintent, which must then be implemented effectively.Second, where concrete improvements are hard to

identify, there is a tendency to have recourse to themore abstract importance of “symbolic messages”sent by initiatives like Criminal Court E. It is crucialto recognize that while the initial message sent cancertainly be potent, this will erode if service deliveryis not improved as a result. The “message” cannotalone justify the medium. In Liberia, the appearanceof surface-level progress and a focus on symbolicimportance have probably obscured to a certainextent a lack of significant improvement in servicedelivery for SGBV survivors.

“The international response to the situationof women in Liberia – although toutedas one of the great success stories inimplementing the United Nations SecurityCouncil (UNSC) resolution 1325 by theUnited Nations (UN) and the Liberiangovernment – has not achieved what it setout to do.”

(Nagelhus Schia and de Carvalho 2009, 38)

As shown in the foregoing analysis, Criminal Court Ehas struggled to meet expectations initially placedupon it. The purpose of this closing section is to firstidentify basic general lessons learned from the Cri-minal Court E experience, which may prove instruc-tive in other contexts considering initiatives toimprove legal responses to the issue of SGBV. Fol-lowing these lessons, a number of specific construc-tive recommendations for Liberia are made, drawnfrom Criminal Court E’s successes and challenges.

ii) On the need for effective initial research onbest practices, pre-project piloting, and ongoingmonitoring and evaluation mechanisms

It is not clear that the lessons of the South Africanexperience, the model upon which Criminal CourtE was based, were considered by those setting upCriminal Court E. As part of gauging improvementsin service delivery, the vital processes of pilotingand then rigorous evaluation have not been consis-

tently prioritized by those implementing and fun-ding Liberia’s SGBV programs. A cost-benefit analy-sis may be useful at this point in time, as it couldprovide insights into sustainability, particularly onhow to use resources more effectively. For ambi-tious projects such as Criminal Court E, especiallyin challenging contexts like Liberia where there islittle semblance of a knowledge discourse to drawon, the need for continuing analysis of the quality ofservice delivery takes on even greater importance inorder that approaches may be reoriented in light oflessons learned. The gathering of reliable informa-

tion on both quantitative and qualitative indicatorsis vital to this endeavor. In Liberia, the specializedinstitutions to combat SGBV seem to have operatedfree of effective monitoring and agreed benchmarks,despite the substantial amount of funds invested intheir success. Many of those working alongside thecourt have been baffled at the persistently low expec-tations of donors in terms of the performance of thecourt, particularly in view of the high hopes that ini-tially accompanied the project. As one internationaladvisor described it: “There’s no clear output. Whydon’t people care? Look at the numbers. The inter-national community is too busy patting itself on the

back for doing something.”

iii) On the impact of wider institutional norms

Expectations of specialized structures such as Crimi-nal Court E should be tempered according to wider,existent justice sector ills. If the experience of Crimi-nal Court E shows anything with absolute certainty, itis the impossibility of insulating a specialized struc-




ture from the deficiencies of the wider institutionalbackdrop within which it must function, particularlywhile seeking to secure the seemingly opposinggoal of institutional ownership and sustainability. Assuch, Criminal Court E has come to mirror exactly the

capacity, administration, and accountability deficitsof the wider Liberian judiciary, while also coping withthe increased complexity of new victim-centeredprocesses and SGBV cases in general. Addressingthis situation requires corresponding work on coreinstitutional capacity as well as measures aimed atimproved accountability.

iv) On the capacity-building/accountabilitydichotomy

As the main deficits of Criminal Court E reflectthe institutional deficiencies of the judiciary, so

too have the suggested remedies mirrored thoseposited at the wider justice sector level. Donorshave focused on the need for capacity buildingto improve justice sector performance, seeminglydiagnosing the sector’s poor functioning as an issueof lack of understanding of law or processes. Thisapproach leads to the funding of workshops andtrainings, where large numbers of justice sectoractors are brought together for one–three days toreceive instruction. This has been particularly so foractors concerned with SGBV, such as magistrates,the staff of Criminal Court E, and the SGBV Crimes

Unit. While there is definitely a need for targetedtraining, there is little evidence that this approachis the key element in stimulating improved justicesector performance. Rather, consistent mentoringand support is needed, with corresponding externalstructures for encouraging accountability for poorperformance. CSO funding efforts must thereforeavoid creating situations where the CSOs arecoerced into “cozy” relationships with governmentinstitutions because the government is the conduitfor their funding. Such a structure, prevalent inLiberia, is not conducive to enabling these groupsto hold the government institutions accountable for

their performance.

v) On the need for pragmatic approaches

The issue of SGBV is uniquely emotive, which, in theend, helps attract much-needed funding to SGBVinitiatives. Yet the need to “do something now” tohelp survivors must not negate the need, on the partof both donors and government, for pragmatismin devising approaches, a pragmatism that should

involve the contemplation of less than perfect,though improved, scenarios. It should also envisagelong-term approaches, rather than immediate fixes.In Liberia, the international community has proposedand supported an unrealistic framework of nor-

mative expectations in relation to addressing SGBV.Resources have been channeled into projects, likeCriminal Court E, that perhaps reflect more donorand elite Liberian perspectives on immediate needsand aspirations than a pragmatic understandingof the requirements of the context. Fragmentingthe issue of legal responses to SGBV, treating it asa distinct “boutique” issue rather than an overallissue of justice sector weakness, has led to theprioritization of initiatives like Criminal Court E at theexpense of strengthening the needs of rule of lawinstitutions overall. Moreover, the process has ruledout the contemplation of a place for informal actors,

who play a far more significant role in the lives ofmost Liberian citizens.

vi) On the determinative role of prevailing culturalnorms

Pragmatic approaches also must understand pre-vailing cultural and social norms, and appreciatetheir determinative role and influence. It is fair to saythat Criminal Court E, and wider SGBV initiatives,have been based on a western, retributive image of

justice, which often runs at odds with prevailing Libe-

rian cultural norms and practices when it comes tothe resolution of disputes and social problems suchas SGBV. “Justice” is viewed as an end in itself, a uni-versal and necessary good for the victim and widercommunity. Perpetrators must be apprehended. Vic-tims require that justice be done. This perspectivecan negate much of the cultural, social, and financialreality for victims, who are generally extremely poor.This must be understood if a truly victim-centeredapproach is to be developed.




B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CRIMINAL

COURT E AND THE WIDER JUSTICE SYSTEM

i) A victim-centered process

Increase and systematize financial support forvictims who are taking cases to court. The financialelement is, according to most analyses, the keydeterminant affecting access to justice through theformal justice system, and is especially so for CriminalCourt E. There must be an increase in the financialsupport for victims that considers the full financialburden of taking a case forward. Correspondingly,the SGBV Crimes Unit, in collaboration with theMinistry of Gender and Development, must focusthis support on instances where there is sufficientevidence for a strong case to be built.

Implement accountability and knowledge-gather-ing mechanisms. In order to better understand theimpact or otherwise of the court in improving victimexperiences, court user scorecards or post-processinterviews should be systematically implemented.The data collected will be invaluable to any effortsto refine the approaches of the court to ensure maxi-mum gains to victims.

Consider modifying the in-camera element andincreasing the role of social workers. The SouthAfrican approach of having the option (on request

and with justification) of giving evidence in a sepa-rate room with the help of an intermediary socialworker seems to be a less rigid approach, and onethat can still be conducive to reducing secondarytrauma for the victim.

Open “one-stop” facilities for victims. The currentinitiative of the UN Joint Programme on Sexual andGender Based Violence to open centers for victimswhere medical, psychosocial, legal, and safe housefacilities are provided should be encouraged andsupported. The process of entering the criminal

justice system must be made as simple, safe, and

trauma-free as possible. The decision to proceedmust be the victim’s, made in full cognizance of theprocess involved.

Consider a potential role for traditional leaders. While there are clear concerns about the role of tra-ditional leaders in dealing with cases of SGBV, thefact remains that informal actors constitute the domi-nant power and dispute-resolution structures in mostof the country. Representatives of the National Tra-ditional Council were adamant that a chief must be

utilized: “Instead of saying it should not be handled,we should say that both will work together. That waywe can work with the chief to let him know that toconceal the case is not good.” Traditional leaders, ifadequately informed, could play a vital role, perhaps

via paralegals, in referring serious cases to the formalsystem, including Criminal Court E.

Offer paralegal services for SGBV cases. Paralegalscould play an extremely important role in informingvictims of their options. In Monrovia, the SGBVCrimes Unit case liaison officer plays a paralegal-type role already, assisting with witness identificationand preparation, following up, researching, andcoordinating with victims and witnesses. Paralegalsfunded through civil society groups (such as thecurrent Catholic Justice and Peace Commissionprogram in Liberia) could, particularly in rural areas,

act as intermediaries between communities, chiefs,and the formal system. These paralegals, with basictraining in the legal and psycho-social elements,could support and inform victims as they decideon whether to pursue their case through the formalsystem.

Ensure integration of gender-sensitive approaches

into all justice actor curricula. It is important thatgender-sensitive approaches become a normwithin the justice sector, not just a special interestapproach for addressing SGBV cases. This requires

the mainstreaming and integration of pragmaticgender-sensitive approaches in all core justicesector curricula, not as a stand-alone topic, but as afoundational element informing all processes.

ii) Efficiency

Consider a change to the grand jury and jury sys-

tems. There are ongoing discussions in Liberia aboutmodifying the jury and grand jury systems. Thisreport advocates for an exploration of the potentialfor and ramifications of modifying or even abolishingthe grand jury system for the indictment of sexual

offenses. In its place, a simple preliminary examina-tion of probable cause could be undertaken by thecourt.

Increase the number of sitting judges to two, as

specified in the statute. One simple step to aidCriminal Court E’s disposition of cases would beincreasing the number of sitting judges from oneto two. This could increase the amount of time thecourt spends in session.




Increase the duration of court sessions. Terms

of court are extremely short in Liberia. Currently,Criminal Court E is in session fewer than half thedays in the year, which is simply not enough time toaddress the backlog of cases.

Focus training on basic court administration andmanagement. Criminal Court E suffers from the samebasic administrative and management deficienciesas other courts in Liberia. While the “specializedelements” of the process are important, also vitalis focusing on basic courtroom management,discipline, and court reporting.

iii) Sustainability/legitimacy

Strengthen the legal involvement in support struc-tures such as the SGBV taskforce. The judiciary in

particular must participate more fully in SGBV coor-dination processes such as the SGBV taskforce. Thelegal pillar in general, which is part of the SGBV task-force, has not been an active participant (accordingto other participants). In particular, the judiciary ge-nerally never participated in the process as the courtwas being instituted. This absence has continued tothe present.

Encourage the setting of benchmark case time-lines and effective monitoring of the court in

adhering to a statutory time period for cases. Where there is insufficient evidence to proceed, suchcases must be dropped. Where the accused has been

detained longer than the statutorily allowed period,he or she should be released. Prosecutors must knowthey have limited time to bring people to trial, andCriminal Court E should play a more effective role inmonitoring this. If a case is not ready, it should bedropped. While these are bitter pills to swallow, it isonly through adherence to the law that the account-ability needed for improved performance can beencouraged, from the police through the prosecu-tion to within the court. Initiatives to monitor SGBVprojects through the UN Joint Programme are wel-come. Further, the taskforce on SGBV is a valuablebody for the coordination of initiatives. However, the

weakness of civil society in these processes remainshugely problematic. The justice system generallyneeds to be held accountable by civil society for itspoor performance sectorwide, including CriminalCourt E. Currently there is very little incentive to dis-pose of cases quickly, and very few, if any, sanctionswhere poor performance causes the delays. Account-ability needs to involve the setting of benchmarks forprosecution and the courts.




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