liberal citizenship and civic frienship

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Liberal Citizenship and Civic FriendshipAuthor(s): Jason A. ScorzaReviewed work(s):Source: Political Theory, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Feb., 2004), pp. 85-108Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4148170 .

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86 POLITICAL THEORY February 2004

usual instrumental purposes of liberal citizenship, which include the com-mon defense of personal freedom, the establishment of basic conditions of

social justice, and the maintenance of civil peace.It is not surprising, herefore, hat iberal ndividualists end to relegate he

practice of friendship and ts norms) to the private sphere, where citizens asprivate persons are free to establish amicable relations with whomever theychoose (regardless of whether heir riends are fellow citizens).2 They do not,as a rule, propose that friendship serve as a normative model for the practiceof citizenship, as Aristotle and some of his contemporary dmirers do and asEmerson appears o do in this passage. But Emerson s not an ordinary ndi-

vidualist, and certainly not an ordinary iberal. Significantly, his conceptionsof friendship and citizenship are both informed by a commitment o "demo-cratic connectedness," noninstrumental alue enjoyed through responsive-ness or receptivity o others, and expressed hrough membership n a commu-nity of equals based on openness and empathy, rather than merely oncontractual obligations. As such, Emerson's conceptions of friendship andcitizenship are sympathetic o, and may very well enrich, rights-based or lib-eral) conceptions of citizenship, but should not be mistaken for them.

The term "democratic onnectedness" was first used by George Kateb,who illuminates and refines Emerson's original idea.3 According to Kateb,Emerson does not embrace an extreme or unmodified ndividualism. Rather,he attempts o reconcile a strong commitment o individualism with a strongcommitment o a distinctively democratic orm of association. Self-reliance,defined by Kateb as thinking one's own thoughts and thinking hem through,is the central practice of Emersonian ndividualism, while democratic con-nectedness is the central practice of the democratic-rather than religious,

racial, tribal, or national-form of association theorized by Emerson.Self-reliance and democratic connectedness do not themselves constitute

a positive vision of a good life. Rather, they are practices that, in theory,enable individuals o choose for themselves a good way of life from myriadpossible ways of life, or to engage in a succession of experiments n living.The practice of democratic connectedness ntroduces ndividuals o the vari-ousness and possibility of human ife through mmediate relations with otherpersons, while the practice of self-reliance enables individuals to navigatedeliberately through the gardens-and minefields-of human variousnessand possibility. Here we begin to see the intrinsic value of the practice of civicfriendship, which contributes both to the development of the individual andto the shared democratic culture.

Although democratic connectedness can mitigate some of the worst ego-istic, selfish, competitive, and acquisitive endencies of unmodified ndividu-alism, this is not the main reason why we should value it. Almost any form of


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Scorza / LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIC FRIENDSHIP 87

connectedness-including many orms of religious, racial, ribal, and national

unity-can tame individualism as well or better han democratic connected-ness. However, these other types of connectedness end also to foster chau-vinism and ntolerance, ather han promoting ivic friendship within a heter-ogeneous community. They appeal more to the authoritarian ersonality hatseeks to evade fears of freedom and responsibility by submitting he con-science to some external authority. ndeed, these other types of connected-ness often work o stigmatize nd suppress-rather han enrich-individualism.As such, religious, racial, tribal, and even most kinds of national unity playno part n Emerson's conception of civic friendship, which stands as much nopposition to these forms of unity as it does to merely contractual orms.

By theorizing about citizenship n terms of friendship, Emerson contrib-utes to an understanding f civic life that s thicker han conventional iberalconceptions, but more individualistic than typical communitarian views.However, Emerson does not aim at a middle position between iberal ndivid-ualism and more collectivist visions of citizenship, such as those articulatedrecently by the so-called civic liberals.4 Rather, Emerson calls us to a radicaldemocratic vision in which the nation-state ades into the background, andprimary relationships between citizens as such emerge as the focus of civicidentity and activity, and of personal striving and transcendence.

The significance of Emerson's vision should be obvious. Politics in liberaldemocracies has gradually degenerated nto the worst conceivable version ofMadisonian pluralism, with citizens divided and conquered by special inter-ests, and public opinion manufactured y powerful media forces. Ties unit-ing citizens as such are practically nonexistent, except at the concrete evel ofthe state, where individuals enjoy the status of taxpayers and clients, and at

the abstract evel of the nation, where citizens often love their country but nottheir countrymen. And so Emerson wonders, "Could not a nation of friendseven devise better ways?"

In this essay, I explore Emerson's conception of friendship and considerhow its two crucial communicative norms (which he calls "truth" nd "ten-derness") could help to enrich he contemporary ractice of citizenship.6 Thenorm of truth, briefly, is a posture of candor and directness in politicalspeech, and a willingness to listen to such speech from others, while the norm

of tenderness s an attitude of gentle respect toward others and a responsive-ness or openness to others (particularly, hose who are different from one-

self). Constrained by the norm of tenderness, relations of friendship are pro-vided with an element of civility (a quality that is no less important or

citizenship han t is for friendship). Constrained y the norm of truth, riend-ship is provided with a crucial element of incivility.7 Working n tandem,these two norms can help to promote he limited nstrumental urposes of lib-


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eral citizenship, while simultaneously ranscending his instrumentalism yelevating he practice of citizenship o an encounter with the radical possibili-ties of democratic connectedness.

In addition o providing a conception of friendship hat s compelling n itsown right, Emerson makes at least three distinctive and worthwhile contribu-tions to our understanding f the relationship between the practice of citizen-ship and the norms of friendship. First, unlike most contemporary heorists ofcivic friendship, he emphasizes communicative norms, rather than more

demanding civic obligations such as the communal ethic of care endorsed bySibyl A. Schwarzenbach, he general responsibility or the welfare of compa-triots proposed by Andrew Mason, or the obligation o fellow citizens to par-ticipate fully in public life supported by numerous communitarian nd civicrepublican heorists.8 Contrasted with these theories, Emerson's more mod-est communicative norms can enrich the practice of liberal citizenship with-out attempting o erase, replace, or transform t into a watered-down versionof republican, communitarian, r Aristotelian citizenship.

These communicative norms are also more relevant han many other con-ceptions of civic obligation to some of our most urgent contemporary oliti-cal problems. The resurgence of chauvinistic nationalism around he world,the dumbing down of democratic discourse, and the political infantilizationof the democratic citizen all seem to demand communicative norms capableof defusing tensions and fostering appreciative onnections between groups,elevating political conversation, and activating he deliberative capabilitiesof citizens, who must earn o give fellow citizens (and expect to receive fromthem) reasonable accounts of their political preferences. The Emersoniannorms of truth and tenderness would be transferable o any of the deliberative

settings that Amy Gutmann nd Dennis Thompson call "middle democracy,"including governmental nstitutions, such as legislative sessions, court pro-ceedings, and administrative earings, as well as nongovernmental ssocia-tions, such as grassroots groups, labor unions, citizens committees, profes-sional organizations, and, of course, schools and universities.9 t is here, inmiddle democracy, hat citizens can get a feel for one another, as actual-notabstract-persons, and where communicative norms derived rom a conceptof friendship might be practiced, nitially, for purely instrumental easons

but, ultimately, perhaps, or normative ones.It should also be noted that Emerson's communicative norms rely far less

on formal civic education or indoctrination han do other theories of civicfriendship, ncluding hose of both civic liberals and the critics of liberalism.Whereas citizens could not reasonably be expected to engage in communalcare, general responsibility for the welfare of compatriots, or fully activepolitical participation without first being taught the intrinsic value of these


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practices, they could begin to practice the communicative norms ntegral oEmerson's conception of friendship n public ife for purely nstrumental ea-sons (i.e., because they help address he aforementioned political problemsand because they promote he basic purposes of liberal citizenship). Citizensmight then discover the intrinsic value of citizenship-namely, the value ofdemocratic connectedness-by actually practicing these norms. Bonds ofcivic friendship would emerge as individuals began to feel valued andrespected by their compatriots, by virtue of how they are spoken and istenedto in the public sphere, not merely because they are urged by teachers, ead-ers, or implored by political theorists o treat heir ellow citizens like friends.

THE POLITICAL ELEVANCE OF FRIENDSHIP

Systematic attempts o establish the political relevance of friendship canbe traced back to Aristotle, who identifies three different ypes of friendship,based, respectively, on utility, pleasure, and virtue. As he argues amously nThe Nicomachean Ethics, friendship based on virtue s the most perfect type,insofar as it aims at the pursuit of goodness or moral excellence for its ownsake rather han merely the interests or pleasures of individuals.1o However,each kind of friendship s, in a sense, altruistic, ince we are concerned withthe welfare of our friends or their sake, not merely for our own.'1 The generalbonds of civic friendship politike philia), which are almost certainly a vari-ety of utility friendship rather han of virtue friendship,12 help maintain us-tice and law in the state, thus preserving space for the cultivation of personalfriendships based on virtue. Meanwhile, he proliferation f personal riend-

ships based on virtue serves as an independent check on the possible civiccorruption of the state as a whole.'3 Citizens who view one another as civicfriends would come together n a broad consensus on matters of public pol-icy, a consensus made easier in Aristotle's scheme by the exclusion from the

political community of many marginalized roups with potentially differinginterests, such as women, slaves, and persons of foreign descent.14

There have been numerous attempts n recent years to restore he Aristote-lian conception of friendship o preeminent tatus.'" These efforts, however,

have consistently generated ar too demanding a notion of civic friendship.'6Nevertheless, t may not be necessary to abandon riendship as a normativemodel for citizenship ust because Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian oncep-tions are unsuited o modem liberal societies. Likewise, it may not be neces-

sary to condemn liberalism or the instrumental oals of liberal citizenship)simply because they are incompatible with civic friendship, as it was con-ceived by Aristotle. There are, n particular, wo striking but often overlooked


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structural imilarities between friendship and citizenship that ustify furtherinquiry nto the usefulness of the norms of the former or improving he prac-tice of the latter.

First, relationships between citizens as such, like relationships betweenfriends, may-but, obviously, do not necessarily--evolve and develop hroughthe investment of time and effort. Like friendships, elationships between cit-izens seldom begin at the highest level of intimacy, mutuality, and trust.Hence, just as one may chafe when a new acquaintance presumes a level ofintimacy that has not been earned, claims made upon us by fellow citizenswho are practically or completely strangers o us can feel excessive. How-

ever, when people invest n their acquaintanceships, hey do sometimes blos-som into deeper, more trusting, and more mutually satisfying relationships.Likewise, if people invest in the practice of citizenship, it could graduallydevelop beyond its original, modest instrumental purposes, into a practicethat is, potentially, both noble and ennobling.

Secondly, members of modem liberal societies often disagree and fightwith each other, much as friends do. An important ifference, however, s thatfriends try to govern their disagreements n such a way as to preserve and

develop, rather han terminate, he bond between them. They do not exces-sively stifle or suppress disagreements, creating deadly silences that couldcause the bonds of friendship o gradually rode. Nor do they engage in unre-strained ree-for-alls, risking the eruption of violence that could cause thebonds of friendship o suddenly snap. Instead, hey employ relatively simple(but subtle) communicative norms to achieve a balance, somewhere inbetween. One might say that friends try to disagree today in a manner hatwill allow them to disagree again tomorrow. Liberal citizens could, perhaps,also learn to govern their disagreements n much the same manner and forsome of the same reasons.

On the other hand, Christopher Heath Wellman argues that relationshipsamong fellow citizens are disanalogous to those among friends, for at leastthree cogent reasons. First, friendships are based to some degree on consent,whereas consent is missing from citizenship. Second, the strong emotionalbonds found in genuine friendship are absent from relationships between cit-izens as such (especially in large communities or states). And, third, whereas

friendship s commonly udged to be intrinsically, ather han instrumentally,valuable, the same cannot be said for citizenship.'7

These objections would appear o damn the ethics of friendship o irrele-vance where the practice of citizenship is concerned. None of us, initially,consents to membership n our state or nation, although t is possible for us-with considerable difficulty-to withdraw rom such memberships when wefind them unpalatable. Wellman's point, though, s that we incur special obli-


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gations to friends precisely because these relationships are consensual. In theabsence of consent, there can be no such special obligations to fellow citi-zens. While I am inclined to agree with this analysis, I would note one caveat.Although he relationship f citizenship may or may not entail special obliga-tions, such as giving preference o the welfare of fellow citizens over "simi-larly situated foreigners,"'" t does convey a duty to be mindful of how onespeaks to fellow citizens and how one listens to them. Our fellow citizens areour civic equals, as well as free and autonomous persons. As such, we maynot converse with them as if they are children, subjects, or slaves. As long asour account of obligations to fellow citizens does not extend prima faciebeyond certain obligations on democratic discourse, but are discoveredinstead through democratic discourse, Wellman's first objection againstmodeling citizenship on friendship can be refuted.

Wellman's assertion that the emotional ties between fellow citizens arenothing like those between friends, although unsubstantiated mpirically,rings true enough to be taken seriously. As he explains,

Not only does the enormous size and bureaucratic ature of contemporary tates entail

that citizens will never meet (let alone become intimately attached o) more than a tinyfraction of their compatriots, he multiculturalism f most states often results n xenopho-bic citizens' harboring antipathy ather han sympathy oward each other.19

This seems somewhat muddled, however. As we will see, the practice of

friendship s dynamic. Individuals do not as a general rule begin their rela-

tionship at the most intense level of mutual regard. nstead, riendships growand evolve over time, propelled by an inner momentum of which we are not

always fully aware. Friendships have a way of sneaking up on us. ConsiderThomas Jefferson and John Adams who-once bitter political enemies-became friends in the end.20

Wellman also argues hat he relationship f friendship has intrinsic value,and is properly valued for its own sake, whereas citizenship can only everhave instrumental alue.21 Wellman's position s usefully contrasted with thatof Mason who argues that special obligations o fellow citizens emerge fromthe intrinsic moral value of the relationship of citizenship. This, he suggests,

is based on being "a member of a collective bodyin which

they enjoy equalstatus with its other members and are thereby provided with recognition."22Although I am inclined to agree with Mason that free and equal democratic

citizenship has an intrinsic moral value, vested in the treatment f each mem-ber as worthy of equal recognition and respect, I am less confident that onecan, or should, attempt o derive more than a very limited set of obligationsfrom this premise. Such obligations, t seems to me, do not include a duty of


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political participation r giving preference o the welfare of fellow citizens,as Mason argues, but, rather, nly a duty to speak and isten to fellow citizens

with respect and regard or their equality.23 hat s, these duties pertain onlyto the enactment or realization of the intrinsic value of citizenship, namely,the feeling of mutual respect, recognition, and responsiveness hat followingKateb) I have been calling democratic connectedness. I would add that thedynamic character f friendship, which Wellman neglects in his analysis butwhich Emerson emphasizes, again makes friendship an excellent analogy forthe relationship of citizenship, which may begin primarily as an instrumentalarrangement ut, with time and practice, may evolve into something more

meaningful.Turning from the theoretical to the practical, there are some important

ways in which the dynamics of actual political life in the late twentieth andearly twenty-first enturies defy any attempt o establish norms of friendshipas norms of citizenship. In particular, nequalities of power; hierarchies ofclass, race, and gender; and the relative powerlessness of ordinary people inmany contemporary ocieties seem to make the idea of genuine friendshipbetween all citizens laughable. Additionally, Wellman s right to point out

that using friendship as a model or analogy for citizenship s potentially mis-guided because it "lends credence to the dangerous idea that others havestanding only if they stand n some relation o us."24 his idea, he thinks, sus-tains (or at least fails to deter) ethnic conflict, violation of human rights, and(presumably) ndifference o such violations.

However, it is not my contention, nor was it ever Emerson's, that truefriendship epresents, n general, a good basis for politics. Rather, my point sthat certain communicative norms based on the norms of friendship may also

serve, effectively, as constraints n disagreements between members of mod-ern societies who often have different values, competing interests, and con-flicting understandings f the good. At the very least, they may provide a crit-ical vantage point with broad cultural and intercultural) ppeal from whichto assail manipulative and/or coercive communicative strategies, a benefitnot to be taken lightly.

In some respects, the premise I am presenting follows the aims of dis-course ethics. The communicative onstraints ypically set by discourse eth-

ics, including mutual recognition of the equality of all participants and anumber of constraints f rationality e.g., absence of force or structural res-sure, the admissibility only of rational arguments, he privileging of no un-shared assumptions, etc.), work to promote ustice by constraining dialogueand provide critical leverage against manipulative and coercive discourse.Unfortunately, hese ideal conditions arrive rom nowhere, relate to no com-mon practice, and are connected to no cultural (much less transcultural)


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norms. Moreover, hey take no account of religious, cultural, racial, territo-rial, and socioeconomic divides among participants.

The norms of friendship, on the other hand, derive from an almost univer-sal practice that cuts across religious, cultural, racial, territorial, nd socio-economic divides.25 We have all experienced riendship and know its normsintimately, ven if we practice hem imperfectly. Although much more mod-est, perhaps, than the ideal conditions of full-blown discourse ethics, thenorms of friendship are at least available and familiar o anyone who has, orhas been, a friend. This is not to say that beyond some basic norms there arenot also significant differences between the attitudes oward riendship n dif-ferent traditions.26 owever, n spite of these differences, there are enoughunderlying similarities between conceptions of friendship o provide a basisfor intercultural discussion and cross-cultural understanding. Many tradi-tions, for instance, suggest that riendship must nvolve a significant measureof frankness or truth-telling, n addition o the expected kindness or gentle-ness.27 f common norms, such as these, can be transferred o the practice ofliberal citizenship, then its practice may be enhanced, without resorting toconceptions of citizenship nconsistent with the contractual iberal approach.

EMERSON AND THE NORMS OFDEMOCRATIC RIENDSHIP

Like most important oncepts in Emerson's unsystematic heoretical ys-tem, friendship, o him, is closely related o the concept of self-reliance. Per-sons practicing elf-reliance heed their own moral udgment as much as pos-sible, and depend as little as possible on the opinions of others, or on societalconventions. However, the relationship between self-reliance-the core ofEmerson's ndividualistic reed-and the practice of friendship s a paradox-ical one, for friendship s a relationship hat promotes self-reliance by threat-ening always to undermine and destroy it. It is, for Emerson, a cruciblethrough which self-reliance must pass in order to realize itself fully.

Ideally, riendship erves as an aid to self-reliance. Through acquaintancewith friends, one's acquaintance with oneself can be renewed. So Emerson

writes, in his poem "Astraea,"" 'What am I? companion, say.'/And he friendnot hesitates/To assign just place and mates;/Answers not in word or letter;/Yet is understood he better;/Each o each a looking-glass,/Reflects his figurethat doth pass."28 merson means that only another elf, to whom one is openand responsive, can reveal one to oneself.29 n a gesture, pause, word, orglance, individuals can, in a flash, see themselves through the eyes of afriend. Friends can also renew one another's acquaintance with the world in


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which they live. For instance, a friend can introduce us to new perspectivesand viewpoints, share with us a new experience or way of life, or evenincrease our awareness of the variousness and possibility of human lifeitself by shaking us from our doldrums, depressions, and dogmas. And itis through this process of developing or awakening friendship that thevalue of democratic connectedness-understood as receptivity or respon-siveness to others-is realized.

In spite of these apparent enefits, however, Emerson realizes that friend-ship also can undermine elf-reliance because one's integrity s almost con-stantly under siege by the influence of one's friends. While we might deliber-

ately, or playfully, choose to try out a way of life that our friend has alreadyexplored or embraced, we also may sometimes feel compelled to accept afriend's way of life as our own, either for fear of losing that friend or due toself-doubt. As Emerson explains in his essay "Friendship" 1841), the idealfriend is "a sort of beautiful enemy, untamable, devoutly revered."30 To con-ceive of a friend as an enemy, even as a beautiful one, is shocking. And,clearly, Emerson wants to shock, as does Nietzsche when he transforms heAristotelian epitaph "friends, here are no friends" o "enemies, there is noenemy!"3' It is his way of disrupting onceptions of friendship hat picture tas a perfect harmony or unity, or which reduce it to casual companionship(e.g., friends as golf partners r drinking buddies). Of course, Emerson doesnot mean that riends are enemies in the conventional ense. They do not, nor-mally, try to kill or ruin us, although hey may, periodically, misunderstand,mislead, or disappoint us. Rather, by appealing magnetically o our sensibili-ties, by being attractive o us, friends tempt us to become more like them andless like our own ideas of ourselves.

Although drawn by thoughts of ideal friendships, Emerson also fre-quently emphasizes their frustrating eality. Among his chief concerns s thevulnerability of friendship to degeneration and disintegration. Emersonexplains, "Our riendships hurry o short and poor conclusions, because wehave made them a texture of wine and dreams, nstead of the tough fibre of thehuman heart."32 y his own analysis, friendship cannot begin in the clouds.He writes, "I wish that friendship should have feet, as well as eyes and elo-quence. It must plant tself on the ground, before it vaults over the moon."33

Consequently, much of Emerson's heorizing bout riendship s concerned-quite properly-with the norms by which its bonds may, slowly and overtime, be developed. In contrast, while Aristotle also discusses the frustrationsof "inferior" ypes of friendship i.e., those based on utility or pleasure), heoffers little insight into how these could develop into higher sorts of friend-ship. This represents a significant difference between his conception of


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friendship and Emerson's, especially if the practice of friendship s to be seri-ously considered as a normative model for liberal citizenship.

Importantly, or Emerson, riendship does not entail a perfect harmony orunanimity between persons. Rather, he views friendship as a turbulent nion,characterized lmost as much by incivility as by civility, and almost as muchby separateness as by unity or harmony. Once again, therefore, his concep-tion of friendship s uniquely suited as a model for the practice of citizenshipin modem liberal societies, since they are often characterized y deep asym-metries of power and resources, by enduring ethnic, racial, and religiousantagonisms, and, most importantly, by moral and cultural pluralism. As amodel for liberal citizenship, Emerson's conception of friendship distin-guishes itself from Aristotle's, which presupposes a broad moral consensusas well as virtual unanimity concerning questions of public importance.34

Truth

Foremost among the norms of friendship dentified by Emerson are twocommunicative constraints, which he calls truth and tenderness.35 ruth, nthe context of friendship, s a practice of frankness conjoined with opennessto the frank speech of one's friends. The development of the bonds of friend-ship requires a kind of mutual understanding, r at least a willingness to worktoward mutual understanding, oth by speaking frankly and by listening tofrank speech. As Emerson writes in "Behavior" 1860), there "is a Frenchdefinition of friendship, rien que s'entendre, good understanding. The high-est compact we can make with our fellow, is,-'Let there be truth between ustwo forevermore.' 36Therefore, among friends, here should be no predeter-mined limits to what may be said and heard. So Emerson writes in "Friend-ship," "A friend is a person with whom I may be sincere. Before him I maythink aloud.""37

According to Emerson, the bonds of friendship, ike the muscles of thehuman body, must be exercised regularly f they are to grow stronger, overtime, rather than degenerate. Truth-saying and truth-hearing re practicesthat test and develop the muscularity of a friendship. Of course, speakingfrankly is difficult. One may, reasonably, worry that one will be misunder-stood, or even scorned. Openness o frank alk is also problematic, or in dis-putes and disagreements with friends the desire to win can be extremelystrong, and winning can require omission, as well as deception. However, asEmerson explains,


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The great gain is, not to shine, not to conquer your companion,-then you learn nothingbut conceit,-but to find a companion who knows what you do not; to tilt with him and be

overthrown,horse and

foot,with utter destruction

of all your logic and learning.38

Applied to politics, the norm of truth cannot nvolve the telling of the lit-eral truth n all instances because the practicalities of politics would neverpermit such a thing. Deception, misinformation, and misdirection are, forbetter or worse, part of the everyday arsenal of the politician, and always willbe.39 The norm of truth, n the context of politics, is much more concernedwith the frank representation f perspectives, purposes, and values, and with

the ability of citizens to listen seriously to such representations, ven if theyappear o be threats o their own way of life. Through he practice of truth, oconceived, members of modern liberal societies may come to know andbetter understand one another, although not necessarily agree with oneanother, or even like one another, as personal friends hopefully would.

Examples of how disarming rank alk can be are easily observed. I expe-rienced his while sitting n an interfaith athering of some sixty students andcolleagues, in the aftermath f the September 11, 2001 terrorist ttacks. Sev-

eral Muslims n the group were at great pains to express sympathy, anger, andregret regarding the tragedy, overtures and acknowledgements that wereheartfelt and, obviously, welcomed by non-Muslim members of the group.But they seemed to follow a formula, saying things that needed to be said andthat everyone expected to hear. Similarly, a number of non-Muslim membersof the group acknowledged hat American foreign policy was not, perhaps,always beneficial o the world and that many Muslims n the Middle East mayhave legitimate grievances with the U.S. This, too, needed to be said, andthere was a

certain expectation hat it would be.Nonetheless, a great divide of understanding emained and the groupseemed haunted by things unsaid. Apparently, here were non-Muslim mem-bers in the group (including myself) who expected a lesson on the nature ofIslam. It was not until a number of Muslims candidly explained hat they hadno intention of explaining or apologizing for Islam, and that they were notinclined to justify their religion to anyone, that the air began to clear, even asthe tension momentarily heightened. And it was not until the non-Muslims

beganto

grasp why the Muslims were so unwilling-they felt they werebeing asked to explain why they weren't terrorists, oo-that the group beganto pull together across the divide. The ritual ormulas of rapprochement is-solved and what ensued was a real discussion of what could be done together,as a group, n response to the tragedy.

To say that political conversation s constrained by truth s sometimes ustanother way of saying that t is unconstrained y silence. A model of "uncon-


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strained" public discourse, which requires members of a society to articulatetheir true commitments, desires, needs, projects, and so on, would, in theory,promote a community n which the genuine needs and purposes of individu-als are taken into account.40 Although a mutual understanding f commit-ments, desires, needs, and so forth alone cannot settle controversial politicalissues such as abortion, school prayer, affirmative action, or capital punish-ment, when citizens find themselves in conflict with one another over suchissues, they are well-served by an understanding f the values and commit-ments of their fellows. There is no guarantee hat any particular view orvision of social justice would emerge from a condition of improved mutualunderstanding etween citizens. However, one would expect rival views orvisions of justice to receive proper hearings. And, any consensus concerningprinciples of justice that emerged from such hearings would be the result ofthe process and practice of politics, rather han the result of a prepoliticalattempt o squelch or silence genuine disagreements within a community.

Even so, some theorists do not believe that members of modem liberalsocieties should be expected to expose to one another their most intimatebeliefs, desires, fears, and commitments. According to J. Donald Moon, forinstance, there s a coercive aspect to this expectation, violating the value ofprivacy or individuals and groups. Moreover, Moon argues, his expectationruns afoul of normal psychological defenses against vulnerability.41 This is aserious objection to unconstrained iscourse, or truth, conceived of as a con-straint on public discourse. Certainly, Moon's assessment of the psychologi-cal barriers o such a practice s painfully accurate. If one's principles andcommitments are based on deeply personal religious beliefs, as was the casefor Muslim participants n the campus teach-in, t could be agonizing to talk

to nonbelievers about them. Nonetheless, when fellow citizens seek to bindone another by law-as, for example, prolife and prochoice advocates do-we can reasonably xpect them to present he true reasons why they are doingso. It may be intrusive, but it is not unreasonable, o ask one's fellow citizensto explain why they are attempting o use the coercive power of the state tothwart one another's goals, hinder he satisfaction of one another's needs, orblock the enjoyment of one another's conception of the good life. However,the requirement of truth would pertain only to political disagreements n

which citizens intend to subject one another o a common law or policy. Noone should expect fellow citizens to bare their souls or expose their mostcherished beliefs to public scrutiny under any other circumstances.

Another objection to the idea of truth as a constraint on public discourseconcerns the potential mpact of truth-telling n mutual respect. John Rawls,for one, urges citizens to invoke only public reasons derived rom an overlap-ping consensus concerning constitutional essentials. Nonpublic reasons,


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derived from the many comprehensive moral, philosophical, and religiousdoctrines that constitute the background culture of a society, are to be

excluded from public discourse and debate.42 According to Rawls, one doesnot demonstrate espect or one's fellow citizens by offering reasons hat heycannot reasonably be expected to comprehend or recognize as legitimate.Therefore, citizens have a duty of civility

to explain to one another on those fundamental uestions how the principles and policiesthey advocate and vote for can be supported y the political values of public reason. This

duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness n deciding whenaccommodations o their views should

reasonablybe made.43

This argument s quite compelling. It is, certainly, reasonable o expectfellow citizens to speak the same political language, in the name of mutualrespect, whenever hey try to bind one another by law. It is also reasonable oask citizens to listen to one another, and try to make compromises betweenstrongly held opinions. However, we do not demonstrate mutual respect forour fellow citizens by depriving hem of the right to express their deepest andmost

passionatecommitments in the

political sphere. Indeed,this denial

makes a mockery of our duty to listen to them. The norms of citizenshipshould aim at broadening, ather han restricting, dialogue between citizenswith different trongly held values and beliefs. Hence, while a requirement ooffer mutually coherent reasons n public disagreements s sound, a prohibi-tion on nonpublic reasons is not.

Tenderness

The basic meaning of tenderness s something like "kindness" r "affec-tion." However, a richer meaning s intended by Emerson. n his discussion ofthe norms of friendship, he understands enderness o be both a posture ofgiving and a posture of receiving, one of speaking and listening. In "Man-ners," Emerson describes a debate between Burke and Fox in the English Par-liament, during which Fox "urged on his old friend the claims of old friend-ship with such tenderness, that the house was moved to tears.""44 n this

instance, Emerson seems to mean by tenderness something that is given orproffered. t is a gentle but respectful manner of handling others who are, pre-sumably, one's equals and deserve to be treated as such. However, n "Friend-ship," Emerson confesses to "an extreme enderness of nature" pon meetinga new person who may be a potential riend. In this instance, Emerson seemsto mean by tenderness a kind of permeability or responsiveness. Throughresponsiveness, we adopt a posture of openness to our interlocutor, xposing


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ourselves to his or her words and thoughts, while through gentle respectful-ness, we try to be sensitive to that person's potential permeability or respon-siveness to our words and thoughts. Therefore, no unfair advantage s taken.Instead, we attempt o care for our nterlocutor hrough our words (even if wefeel no genuine affection for that person).

Tenderness, when properly understood s a manner of speaking, demandsrecognition and respect for the dignity and autonomy of others. Yet, tender-ness also connotes something of firmness. Neither riends nor citizens shoulddeal with one another as if they were made of glass or with gratuitous ough-ness or cruelty. Similarly, one may care for others without treating hem as ifthey are incapable of making choices for themselves. Hence, one sense oftenderness s "to tender." This is not a term of love or affection, but one thatdescribes a relationship nvolving something of closeness and something ofdistance. Importantly, enderness, n this first sense, means respecting the

potential of other individuals for self-reliance. Throughout his essays andlectures, Emerson argues hat every human ife is properly viewed as an ave-nue through which great thoughts and great actions not only may flow butalso deserve to flow. He insists, therefore, hat every person has a right (and,perhaps, even a duty) to think and act self-reliantly, depending as much aspossible on one's own thoughts and sense of justice for guidance, and livingas much as possible as one likes (provided hat one's way of life and experi-ments in living do not transgress upon the dignity or rights of others). Emer-son writes, "For nonconformity he world whips you with its displeasure."45Tenderness, n this first sense, means never holding the whip, if one can pos-sibly avoid it.

On the other hand, tenderness understood as a manner of listening con-

notes a permeability or responsiveness o impressions received from othersand about others. This responsiveness can enrich our lives by introducing usto different ways of life, as well as the variousness of human life itself.

Describing this responsiveness, Emerson writes, "High thanks I owe you,excellent lovers, who carry out the world for me to new and noble depths, and

enlarge he meaning of all my thoughts. .. I confess to an extreme endernessof nature on this point."46

Emerson himself is understandably autious about the possibilities for

tenderness as a constraint on personal friendship. Certainly, he is more cau-tious, say, than Walt Whitman, who pictures human ife as ajourney down an

open road, a quest for individuality undertaken, perhaps paradoxically,through something ike responsiveness o others, and manifested, variously,as camaraderie, riendship, erotic love, and democratic citizenship.47 How-ever, like Whitman, Emerson believes that the practice of tenderness helps


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introduce ndividuals o the variousness of human ife and helps them achievea distinctly democratic connectedness with others. Emerson writes,

Analogous to the laws of society are those of conversation, which is the first office offriendship. In able conversation we have glimpses of the universe, perceptions ofimmense power native o the soul, fardarting ights and shadows of a mountain andscape,such as we cannot at all attain unto in our solitary studies.48

Of course, this responsiveness would have to be strictly balanced by the prac-tice of self-reliance, which enables individuals to navigate intelligently

throughhe

depths-andshoals-of human variousness and

possibility.Transferred nto the political realm, the norm of tenderness s not withoutcertain limitations and liabilities. For instance, one might complain thateffective political talk could never be characterized by tenderness (in thesense of gentle respectfulness) but must be characterized by eloquence.Indeed, most effective political speakers attempt o become masters of words,while taking care themselves to avoid being victims of words; to remain un-moved, while moving others. However, practicing enderness-understoodas

gentle respectfulness-doesnot necessitate unilateral disarmament n the

political arena. Treating one's fellow citizens with gentle respect can be assound, strategically, s attempting o trick them. This is especially true n themany smaller settings of middle democracy, where citizens encounter oneanother face to face, and where participants n a discussion can responddirectly to attacks. If we take the possibility of social justice seriously, wemust acknowledge the importance of tenderness. Otherwise, unconstrainedby tenderness, or some comparable norm, political conversation s likely tobe just another mode of domination or

cynical manipulation,deaf to the

claims of justice.Another possible objection to tenderness as a communicative norm for

democratic deliberation s that it goes far beyond the practice of tolerationnormally required by liberalism. While toleration merely requires citi-zens to put up with difference, tenderness in the sense of responsiveness)attempts o entertain he possibilities that difference suggests. This is one ofthe more inviting noninstrumental ossibilities of citizenship understood nconjunction with the communicative norms of

friendship.However, tender-

ness may be, in other respects, a more modest, and ess taxing, constraint hantoleration. Whereas toleration appears to require citizens to exercise self-censorship when they encounter ways of life inconsistent with their valuesand principles, thereby projecting the appearance of at least tacit approval,the norm of tenderness equires only that citizens have a go at trying o under-stand one another.


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Again, the gap in intercultural understanding evealed by the Septem-ber 11 terrorist ttacks on the United States can illustrate his problem. Somehave argued hat attempts o understand he motivations of terrorists, r theiradmirers, s somehow equivalent o justifying their actions, or that attempt-ing to imagine how an American Muslim feels in the aftermath f the attackssomehow diminishes the memory of those who perished. However, assum-ing a posture of responsiveness oward one's fellow citizens (or toward citi-zens of other nations) does not necessarily involve abandoning one's ownvalues and principles, or giving up the fight (if one happens o be in one). It isnot moral bankruptcy r political treason. nstead, t is an attempt at empathicidentification with others. If genuine sympathy or affection does not emergefrom this practice, so be it. If members of modem liberal societies must haveenemies, they can, at the very least, take the time to get to know these enemiesbetter. This practice s exemplified by the United Nations, where ambassa-dors and staffers of rival nations maintain cordial relations n spite of theirdifferences, and where representatives f former enemies (and potential ene-mies) may be observed chatting affably in the corridors and dining rooms.The UN may be an unexpected place to discover the practice of Emersonian

civic friendship. However, f it can be practiced here t can, perhaps, be prac-ticed elsewhere.

CONCLUSION

The use of Emerson's conception of friendship as a model for liberal citi-

zenship is neither obvious nor unproblematic. ndeed, some scholars, like

Wilson Carey McWilliams, have found this conception unsatisfying andemotionally cold. Indeed, McWilliams observes hat Emerson distrusted per-sonal friendships because they are "based on qualities of personality which]hamper men in their efforts to 'merge' with the all."49 n other words, Emer-son is too willing to sacrifice riends or the sake of an idealized transcenden-tal connectedness. McWilliams also notes that Emerson's conception of

friendship s premised upon a radical ndividualism hat, in spite of Emer-son's own intentions, could serve to "moralize disloyalty and self-seeking."50Rejecting Emerson, McWilliams writes approvingly of ancient Greek con-ceptions that view fraternity s a need established by the nature of man, with-out which society would be sick, alienated, ndividualistic, and without anytraction on the truly human excellences that urn mere ife into the good life.

Nonetheless, Emerson's conception of friendship, with its twin practicesof truth and tenderness, represents a compelling challenge to the traditionalAristotelian view that tends to dominate discussions of friendship and citi-


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zenship. One major advantage of Emerson's conception over Aristotle's isthat the former accepts as given the moral and cultural pluralism of mostmodem societies, and does not insist that a strong or comprehensive moralconsensus exist between citizens prior to politics.51 Unlike Aristotle, Emer-son had the opportunity o immerse himself in Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu,Confucian, and other non-Western writings, and can acknowledge signifi-cant intellectual debts outside of the Western radition.52 or instance, n hisessay "Persian Poetry," Emerson asserts that certain Eastern poets, amongthem Ibn Jemin, Hafiz, and Jami, make contributions o the philosophy offriendship equal to that of Montaigne. He admiringly quotes Jami, who (likeEmerson himself) portrays riendship as growing stronger hrough constanttesting, writing, "A friend is he, who, hunted as a foe,/So much the kindliershows him than before;/Throw stones at him, or ruder avelins throw,/Hebuilds with stone and steel a firmer loor."53 Similarly, one of Emerson's morefamous observations oncerning riendship, "He will have learned he lessonof life who is skilful in the ethics of friendship," s based on a quotation romHafiz, "Thou earnest no secret until thou knowest friendship, since to theunsound no heavenly knowledge enters."54

The main strength of Emerson's conception of friendship as a model forliberal citizenship, when compared with Aristotle's, is a dynamic elementthat could give both defenders and critics of liberalism reason to believe thatthe practice of citizenship n liberal societies can evolve in noninstrumentaldirections without jeopardizing iberal citizenship's usual instrumental ur-poses. Friendships do not spring forth, fully grown, like Athena from thehead of Zeus. Rather, f friendships are to grow and flourish, they requireinvestment and gradual development. "Let us buy our entrance o this guild,"Emerson advises, "by a long probation."55 he norms of friendship dentifiedby Emerson work to promote relationships hat grow, and grow more solid,over time, rather han weakening and dying by degrees. By practicing ruthand tenderness, he two crucial norms of friendship, elations between fellowcitizens also can slowly develop, and can gradually come to be characterizedby a more open form of deliberation, more stable form of disagreement, nda more truly democratic connectedness.

The communicative norms of friendship heorized by Emerson promotesolid relationships where disagreements are possible but not explosive.Friends, after all, disagree all the time but make reserving and strengtheningthe bonds of friendship a priority and winning a particular rgument a sec-ondary consideration. Strategies such as pulling one's punches or leavingthings unsaid may be employed to maintain friendships, but such strategiescould also indirectly serve to weaken he bonds of friendship n the long run.


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Friends who cannot be frank with one another, or are afraid that franknesswill jeopardize their relationship, cannot be friends in the richest possiblesense. They may be close acquaintances nd know one another very well, orthink they do. But such relationships are fragile and unsure. To endure, a

friendship must develop, and to develop a friendship occasionally must betested by an element of incivility. Therefore, Emerson writes, "I do not wishto treat friendship daintily, but with roughest courage. When they are real,they are not glass threads or frost work, but the solidest thing we know.""56

Truth and tenderness could, conceivably, be viewed as competing or con-tradictory norms, since the former is primarily concerned with testing thebonds of friendship, while the latter s primarily concerned with preservingthem. Although Emerson does not say so explicitly, it seems to me that thenorms of truth and tenderness are not necessarily opposed to one another at-egorically, where the practices of friendship and citizenship are concerned,but, instead, may be dialectically opposed. That is to say, the norms of truthand tenderness may turn out to be dialectical correlates in a process of per-sonal and social development hat operates, at least in part, hrough he mech-anism of disagreement and deliberation.

Working together through the norms of friendship, truth and tender-ness, as theorized by Emerson, can help produce a social union that ischaracterized not by fear or decorum, which may leave too much unsaid,or by street fighting, which leaves too much unheard. Instead, t would becharacterized by a synthesis that Bernard Crick once called "a rough civil-ity."57 he element of incivility-namely, truth-pushes a society to recog-nize the divisions and tensions within it, while the element of civility-namely, tenderness-helps that society reach an endless series of delibera-

tive compromises. Working together against silence and violence, bothnorms promote a more durable social union and, ultimately, a greater andmore meaningful harmony.

If the norms cultivated within friendships are transferable o politicalcommunities, hen people who understand what it means to be a good friendalso will know something, although not everything, about what t means to bea good citizen. People will not necessarily practice good citizenship because

they actually are united with their fellow citizens by reciprocal goodwill, as

Aristotle had hoped. Friendship will not become the concrete basis for thestate. Rather, people will practice good citizenship, at least initially, because

they recognize that he same norms that work for friendship also will work to

preserve and strengthen modern iberal societies, even in the face of inevita-ble disagreement between members with different values and interests. The

practice of citizenship hat emerges will resemble contractual iberal citizen-


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ship in many respects, particularly n its affirmation f expansive ndividual

rights. But it also will be enriched by a democratic onnectedness hat s bothradical n character and, it must be said, indefinite in its possibilities.

NOTES

1. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Politics," Emerson: Essays and Lectures, ed. Joel Porte (NewYork: Library of America, 1983), 570-71.

2. Christopher Heath Wellman is typical of this view. See Christopher Heath Wellman,

"Friends, Compatriots,and

SpecialPolitical

Obligations,"Political

Theory29

(April 2001):217-36.3. Kateb explores the idea of democratic onnectedness with reference o Walt Whitman n

"Walt Whitman and he Culture of Democracy," n The Inner Ocean (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-

sity Press, 1992), 240-66. He investigates his conception further with reference o Emerson nEmerson and Self-Reliance Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), esp. chap. 4.

4. Articulations of civic liberalism include William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods,Virtues, nd Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991);Stephen Macedo, Democracy and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizen-

ship, Virtue, nd Community n Liberal Constitutionalism New York: Oxford University Press,1990); Peter Berkowitz, Virtue nd the Making ofModern Liberalism Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1999); Thomas Spragens Jr., Civic Liberalism: Reflections on Our DemocraticIdeals (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999); Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens: PoliticalEducation and Liberal Democracy (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1997).

5. Emerson, "Politics," 70.6. James R. Martel also identifies these two central features of Emerson's conception of

friendship, but defines them rather lumsily as "repulsion and attraction." ee James R. Martel,Love Is a Sweet Chain: Desire, Autonomy nd Friendship n Liberal Political Theory New York:

Routledge, 2001), 127.7. The word "incivility" has come to enjoy an almost purely negative connotation due, in

part, to the efforts of critics like Stephen L. Carter. See Stephen L. Carter, Civility: Manners,Morals, and he Etiquette ofDemocracy New York: Basic Books, 1998), 134. Compare his withMark Kingwell who, in an excellent study of the practice of civility, acknowledges hat civilitymay not be sufficient. Conceding hat civility could "be a means of oppression or an expression of

power, not a restrained and open orientation o understanding," ingwell argues that we mustrebuke one another, rankly, when we suspect that "civility hides an instrumental nd" other han

maintaining ivil peace and social order. See Mark Kingwell, A Civil Tongue: ustice, Dialogue,and the Politics of Pluralism (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 238-39.

8. See Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, On Civic Friendship," thics 107 (October 1996): 97-128;Andrew Mason, "Special Obligations o Compatriots," thics 107 (April 1997): 427-47; DavidSelbourne, The Principle of Duty (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994), 156, 230-31.

9. Amy Gutmann nd Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1996), 12.

10. For discussion, see Paul Schollmeier, Other Selves: Aristotle on Personal and PoliticalFriendship Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).


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Scorza LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIC FRIENDSHIP 105

11. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1155al-1158a36.12. John M. Cooper argues hat Aristotle's conception of civic friendship s properly under-

stood to be a variety of utility friendship, and that utility friendship, ike true riendship, nvolvesmutual and disinterested well-wishing. See John M. Cooper, "Aristotle n Friendship," n Essayson Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press,1980); and John M. Cooper, "Political Animals and Civic Friendship," nAristotle's Politik: Pro-

ceedings of the XIth Symposium Aristotelium, ed. Gunther Patzig (Friedrichshafen:Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990), 220-41. In contrast, Alasdair MacIntyre views Aristoteliancivic friendship as a kind of virtue riendship. See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, ded. (NotreDame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), 156.

13. See Paul J. Waddell, Friendship nd the Moral Life (Notre Dame, IN: University of NotreDame Press, 1989), 49, 61-68.

14. For discussion, see Suzanne Stern-Gillet, Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship Albany:State University of New York Press, 1995).

15. For instance, Schwarzenbach ttempts o shed the Aristotelian onception of some of itsinfamous masculinist, elitist, and xenophobic connotations, arguing hat citizens of modern oci-eties can maintain a close approximation f Aristotelian civic friendship based on a relativelythin consensus regarding oleration, mutual recognition of rights, and a universal value of care.See Schwarzenbach, "On Civic Friendship," 05-14.

16. Indeed, according o MacIntyre, members of modern iberal societies are unable o prac-tice civic friendship as Aristotle understood t. For iberal ndividualists, MacIntyre xplains, "a

communitys

simplyan arena n which ndividuals ach pursue heir own self-chosen conception

of the good life, and political institutions xist to provide hat degree of order which makes suchself-determined activity possible." See Maclntyre, After Virtue, 195.

17. Wellman, "Friends," 21-23.18. Ibid., 220.19. Ibid., 222.20. See Merrill D. Peterson, Adams and Jefferson: A Revolutionary Dialogue (Oxford, UK:

Oxford University Press, 1995); Jean M. Yarbrough, Politics and Friendship n the Adams-Jef-ferson Correspondence," n Friends and Citizens: Essays in Honor of Wilson Carey McWilliams,ed. Peter Dennis Bathory and Nancy L. Schwartz Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000);

Jean M. Yarbrough, The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence betweenThomas Jefferson andAbigail and John Adams, ed. Lester J. Cappon Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1988).

21. While friendship s "a constituent of well-being," he powers and rights of citizenship areno more than a means to well-being. See Wellman, "Friends," 23.

22. See Mason, "Special Obligations," 42. Mason builds upon the work of Joseph Raz, whohas argued hat the obligations of friendship are constitutive of the intrinsic good of friendship,rather han merely being burdens hat benefit others. See Raz, "Liberating Duties," Law and Phi-

losophy 8 (1989): 3-21. For refinements of Raz's basic argument, ee Samuel Scheffler, "Rela-

tionships and Responsibilities," Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (summer 1997): 189-209;

Michael O. Hardimon, "Role Obligations," Journal of Philosophy 91 (July 1994): 333-63.Scheffler argues hat special obligations adhere o relationships hat one happens o value, whileHardimon suggests that role identification provides the moral reasons to assume specialobligations.

23.According o Mason, this obligation cannot be derived rom national dentity but, rather,

only from civic identity, although he reasons for this are not entirely clear. See Mason, "SpecialObligations," 442. Wellman argues that no such distinction can be made between civic and


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national dentity, since both provide mainly instrumental oods that promote well-being. SeeWellman, "Friends," 23.

24.Wellman, "Friends,"

30.25. Some cultures caution against cross-cultural riendships. See for instance Qu'ran, 3:26,

3:116, 4:137, and 5:51. However, reating others according o some of the norms of friendship orinstrumental easons is not the same as forming genuine friendships with them.

26. For an account of the historical development of the concept of friendship n Islamicthought, see Lenn E. Goodman, "Friendship n Aristotle, Miskawayh, and al-Ghazali," nFriendship East and West: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Oliver Leaman (Richmond, UK:Curzon, 1996), 164-91; for discussion of Confucian hinking on friendship, ee David L. Halland Roger T. Ames, "Confucian Friendship: The Road to Religiousness," n The Changing Faceof Friendship, ed. Leroy S. Rouner Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1994), 77-

94; for discussion of traditional ndian views of friendship, ee Bhikhu Parekh, "An ndian Viewof Friendship," n The Changing Face of Friendship, ed. Leroy S. Rouner (Notre Dame, IN:Notre Dame University Press, 1994), 95-113.

27. We read in al-Ghazali, or instance, that friendship "entails ove as well as candor andonly benevolence can guide the choice between speaking out and keeping silent." See Goodman,"Friendship n Aristotle," 184. Similarly, t was recognized n the Indian epics that riendship "isone of the few relationships n which honest and fearless criticism s both permitted nd required.Friends must 'speak ruth' satyam vada) o each other; otherwise heir riendship ests on untruthand is 'false.' " See Parekh, "An Indian View," 102.

28. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Astrea," n The Complete Works fRalph Waldo Emerson, cen-tenary ed., ed. Edward W. Emerson, 12 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1903-04), vol. 9, 80.

29. In an early lecture, "Society," Emerson writes of friendship, "This is another self. Heoccupies another point of view, and sees the same object on another ide. His confirmation f ourreport ejoices, his contradiction makes us pause." Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Society," The EarlyLectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 3 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972),vol. 2, 102. This notion of a friend as "another elf' recalls Aristotle's understanding f a truefriend as a "second self." See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1166a30-35. However, Emersondoes not mean, as Aristotle does, that my friend s another me, possessing the same moral per-spective and concern or virtue, so that self-love embraces both persons equally. There s a crucial

separatenessinvolved in Emersonian

riendship,which does not

appearo exist in

Aristotle'sconception of virtue friendship. For discussion, see Stern-Gillet, Aristotle's Philosophy, 37-40.Also see Kateb, Emerson and Self-Reliance, 106-7.

30. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Friendship," n Emerson: Essays and Lectures, ed. Joel Porte(New York: Library of America, 1983), 351.

31. See Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, ed. Marion Faber Lincoln: Universityof Nebraska Press, 1984), section 376. For discussion, see Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friend-ship (London: Verso, 1997), throughout.

32. Emerson, "Friendship," 45.33. Ibid., 348.

34. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1167a22-1167b15.35. Kateb dentifies and elaborates hese two aspects of Emerson's conception of friendship.

Although Emerson laims, initially, o give these aspects equal weight in constituting riendship,Kateb s probably orrect n his view that truth eceives a larger place in Emerson's system, per-haps due its more intimate connection to self-reliance, which is the central concept of this sys-tem. See Kateb, Emerson and Self-Reliance, esp. 102-9.

36. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Behavior," n Emerson: Essays and Lectures, ed. Joel Porte(New York: Library of America, 1983), 1049.


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Scorza LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIC FRIENDSHIP 107

37. Emerson, "Friendship," 47.38. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Social Aims," Complete Works f Ralph Waldo Emerson, cente-

nary ed., ed. Edward W. Emerson, 12 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1903-04), vol. 8, 95-96.39. For discussion, see Sissela Bok, Lying (New York: Vintage, 1989), esp. 90-106. Also seeGutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, esp. chap. 3.

40. For discussion, see Seyla Benhabib, "Liberal Dialogue versus a Critical Theory of Dis-cursive Legitimation," n Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), esp. 146-54. Compare with Bruce Ackerman's defense ofconversational estraint n "Why Dialogue?" Journal of Philosophy 86 (January 1989): 5-22.

41. See J. Donald Moon, Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 92. For a contrasting view, see StephenHolmes, "Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission," n Constitutionalism nd Democracy, ed. Jon

Elster and Rune Slagstad (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988).42. John Rawls, Political Liberalism New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), fn. 220.43. Ibid., 217.44. Ralph Waldo Emerson, in "Manners," Emerson: Essays and Lectures, ed. Joel Porte

(New York: Library of America, 1983), 525.45. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Self-Reliance," n Emerson: Essays and Lectures, ed. Joel Porte

(New York: Library of America, 1983), 264.46. Emerson, "Friendship," 43.47. Whitman's "Song of the Open Road" concludes with, "Camerado, give you my hand!/I

give you my love more precious han money,/I give you myself before preaching r law;/Will yougive me yourself? Will you come travel with me?/Shall we stick by each other as long as welive?" See Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass (New York: New American Library, 1980), 144.Derrida appears o echo this sentiment n Politics ofFriendship, where he writes, "When will webe ready for an experience of freedom and equality that s capable of respectfully experiencingthat friendship, which would at last be just, just beyond the law, and measured up against itsmeasurelessness? O my democratic riends" p. 306).

48. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The Heart," n Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 3 vols.

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), vol. 2, 292.49. Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity n America (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1973), 285.50. Ibid., 285.51. Bernard Crick argues against he need for such a consensus, writing, "The moral consen-

sus of a free state is not something mysteriously prior o or above politics: it is the activity (thecivilizing activity) of politics itself." See Bernard Crick, In Defense of Politics, rev. ed. (Balti-more: Penguin, 1964), 24.

52. Among Emerson's sources were the Bhagavad Gita, the Hindu Vishnu Sarma, the fourclassic books of Confucianism namely, he Analects, the Book of Mencius, the Chung Yung, ndthe Ta Heo), various collections of sayings of Buddha, several volumes of Persian and Arabic

poetry including Firdusi's epic Shah Nameh), and several volumes of Islamic history and philos-ophy (including the Akhlak-I-Jalaly, which introduced Emerson to Sufism). For discussion ofEmerson's exposure to non-Western hilosophies, see Robert D. Richardson Jr., Emerson: TheMind on Fire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 218-23,376-80, 391-94,404-9.

53. Ralph Waldo Emerson, n "Persian Poetry," Complete Works f Ralph Waldo Emerson,centenary d., ed. Edward W. Emerson, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1903-04), vol. 8,259.

54. Compare Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Domestic Life," n Complete Works f Ralph WaldoEmerson, centenary d., ed. Edward W. Emerson, 12 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1903-04),vol. 7, 129, with Emerson, "Persian Poetry," 58.


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